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European Societies
ISSN: 1461-6696 (Print) 1469-8307 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/reus20
The far right as social movement
Pietro Castelli Gattinara & Andrea L. P. Pirro
To cite this article: Pietro Castelli Gattinara & Andrea L. P. Pirro (2018): The far right as social
movement, European Societies
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2018.1494301
Published online: 17 Jul 2018.
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The far right as social movement
Pietro Castelli Gattinara
a
and Andrea L. P. Pirro
b
a
Centre for Research on Extremism (C-REX), University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway;
b
Department of
Political and Social Sciences, Scuola Normale Superiore, Florence, Italy
ABSTRACT
The literature on the far right is trying to connect with social movement studies.
Scholars from different social scientific backgrounds are increasingly
acknowledging that extra-parliamentary grassroots activism is part of the
alliance and conflict structure of nativist collective actors. The recent rise in
far-right street politics –or, precisely, its re-emergence with seemingly
different clothes –should encourage the study of the inter-relations between
party and non-party collective actors. As a case in point, the far right not only
includes political parties geared towards elections and public office but also
social movements or ‘networks of networks’that aim to mobilise public
support, and a conglomeration of subcultural groups and groupuscules. By
putting forward a three-part metric to analyse mobilisation factors at the
macro, meso, and micro levels, this piece and the Special Issue it introduces
bring the (inter-)relations between far-right parties, movements, and
subcultures frontstage, and elaborate on nativist collective action across
different arenas of contention.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 24 April 2018; Accepted 1 June 2018
KEYWORDS Far right; social movements; political parties; activism; mobilisation
Introduction
The contentious politics of nativism have gained new impetus in recent
years. The demonstrations orchestrated by Patriotische Europäer gegen
die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (PEGIDA), the rise of anti-immigrant
vigilante groups and citizen street patrols (e.g. the Soldiers of Odin),
and the swift spread of the Identitarian movement, demonstrate how
grassroots activism has acquired own standing in contemporary far-
right politics. Nativism, as a radical and exclusionary form of nationalism,
represents the ideological common ground for far-right parties and move-
ments in that it rejects ‘alien’persons and ideas from their conception of
the nation state (Mudde 2007: 19). Confronted with a relevant real-world
© 2018 European Sociological Association
CONTACT Pietro Castelli Gattinara pietroca@uio.no
EUROPEAN SOCIETIES
https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2018.1494301
phenomenon, we seek to elaborate on how the paradigms of social move-
ment studies can help us expand on a predominantly party-centred disci-
pline. Building upon three decades of scholarly research on far-right
politics in Europe, this piece –and the Special Issue it introduces –
brings attention to the non-party sector of the far right (Veugelers and
Menard 2018). In particular, it illustrates the progressive hybridisation
of party and movement practices (Pirro and Castelli Gattinara forthcom-
ing), and it investigates online as well as offline interactions between pol-
itical parties contesting elections and social movements mobilising in the
streets. As we shall discuss, this also implies going beyond an exclusive
focus on either the ‘extreme’or the ‘radical’variant of the contemporary
political right, appraising the composite phenomenon of nativist mobilis-
ation in Europe as ‘far-right’politics.
The consolidation of a new ‘ethnopluralist’paradigm has attracted con-
siderable academic attention. The contemporary far right has progress-
ively turned into a legitimate player by replacing their biological racism
with notions of incompatibility based on cultural difference (Rydgren
2005). According to ethnopluralism, the mixing of different ethnicities
would lead to the cultural extinction of the native group (Minkenberg
1997). Parties subscribing to these tenets have made inroads into Euro-
pean party systems since the 1980s (von Beyme 1988), at times causing
concern among segments of the political establishment, while also
joining or providing support to government coalitions in countries as
different as Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Slovakia, and Switzerland.
1
Pressured by the electoral
gains of the far right, the scholarship has made significant progress in
identifying its ideological makeup, and disentangling demand-side and
supply-side factors underlying its performance at the polls (e.g. Kitschelt
with McGann 1995; Pirro 2014a).
In more recent years, the whole of Europe has seen a resurgence of far-
right street politics, not only by small, and at times violent, extreme-right
organisations but also increasingly so under the initiative of radical-right
grassroots groups engaging in extra-parliamentary politics. While anti-
refugee violence is not new in Europe (Koopmans 1996; Koopmans and
Olzak 2004), the so-called migration crisis triggered a new wave of xeno-
phobic violence and social unrest against refugees (Benček and Strasheim
2016; Castelli Gattinara 2018). In 2016 alone, German authorities reported
1
It is a moot point whether ever-radical parties like Fidesz in Hungary and Law and Justice in Poland are to
be considered themselves nativist actors single-handedly holding power in respective countries (e.g.
Pirro 2016).
2P. CASTELLI GATTINARA AND A. L. P. PIRRO
hundreds of injured asylum seekers in over 3500 attacks perpetrated
against migrants and the places offering them shelter.
2
Similarly, asylum
facilities came under attack 25 times during 2015 in Austria, including
instances of arson and migrants being shot at with air rifles.
3
In February
2018, a 28-year-old far-right activist went on a shooting rampage in
Macerata, a small town in central Italy, wounding five men and one
woman of African origin.
4
At the same time, radical-right non-party
organisations, such as the English Defence League or PEGIDA (e.g.
Busher 2015), have gained media exposure for their engagement in
extra-parliamentary politics and protest, albeit often with limited mobilis-
ation capacity (Mudde 2016b).
5
In this regard, Cas Mudde has lately spoken of a widening chasm
between far-right parties and politics (Mudde 2016a)–and we believe
that the re-emergence of grassroots politics as a relevant space of far-
right contention testifies the value of our effort. Contemporary far-right
politics, in fact, deliver a variegated milieu within which we can dis-
tinguish between political parties geared towards elections and public
office, social movements or ‘networks of networks’that aim to mobilise
public opinion, and a conglomeration of groups within the subcultural
environment (Griffin2003; Minkenberg 2003; Klandermans and Mayer
2005; Caiani et al.2012). In light of the constraints that these collective
actors often experience in the public sphere, it is difficult to neglect the
central role that the worldwide web has come to reach. Indeed, far-right
networks often form and operate online, and the online realm seems to
offer crucial resources to organise, mobilise, and connect with one
another, facilitating the progressive integration of radical parties, extre-
mist movements, and subcultural groups.
Extant research has acknowledged these crucial distinctions, and yet
made very little empirical and theoretical effort for understanding the
non-electoral articulations of far-right politics. Most notably, while recog-
nising the far-right phenomenon as part of a larger mobilisation process,
2
Cullen, S. and Cullinane, S. (2017) ‘Germany: Thousands of migrants targeted in attacks last year’,CNN,
February 27, https://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/27/europe/germany-attacks-on-migrants/index.html
(accessed 27/03/2018).
3
‘25 attacks on refugee facilities last year in Austria’,The Local, March 29, 2016, www.thelocal.at/20160329/
25-attacks-on-refugee-facilities-last-year-in-austria (accessed 27/03/2018).
4
Castelli Gattinara, P. and O’Connor, F. (2018) ‘An Italian neo-fascist shot 6 immigrants. So why won’t Italy’s
political parties condemn xenophobia?’, February 9, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2018/02/09/an-italian-neo-fascist-shot-6-migrants-how-does-this-play-into-the-upcoming-
elections/?utm_term=.6b9df410ce54 (accessed 27/03/2018).
5
Virchow, F. (2017) ‘Pegida: Germany’s anti-Islamic street movement’,Oxford Research Group, January 16,
2017, https://sustainablesecurity.org/2017/01/16/pegida-germanys-anti-islamic-street-movement/
(accessed 20/03/2018).
EUROPEAN SOCIETIES 3
few studies have actually followed suit and approached it within models
transcending institutional politics. Understood in terms of a longer his-
torical cycle, the far right can be indeed appraised as a social movement
constituting a collective challenge ‘by people with common purposes
and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and auth-
orities’(Tarrow 1998: 3). Accordingly, we suggest an approach that
moves beyond the electoral manifestations of far-right politics and con-
ceptualises the interaction of the people with their environment, in
terms of movement organisations and in relation to their wider societal
contexts. Overall, this implies understanding far-right politics in its com-
plexity, recognising the distinctiveness of various forms of political
engagement, and accounting for the interaction –and possible overlap
–between the spheres of action in which nativist collective actors engage.
Heterogeneity in far-right politics
Far-right collective actors are more heterogeneous than usually assumed
and display a considerable degree of diversity despite –or beyond –a com-
parable ideological profile (e.g. Mudde 2000; Pirro 2014b). It is not by
chance that we refer to the ‘far right’as the broader galaxy of nativist
actors including extreme and radical organisations. We thus denote far-
right collective actors as those political parties, social movements, and
groups located on the ‘right’end of the ideological left–right continuum.
While referring to the far right as an umbrella concept including extreme-
right and radical-right variants, we remain aware of standing differences
within this category. Accordingly, we differentiate between explicitly
anti-democratic actors (i.e. the neo-fascist, neo-Nazi, fundamentalist,
and/or supremacist ‘extreme right’) and those who at least comply by
the minimal procedural rules of parliamentary democracy (as with the
majority of ‘radical right’parties represented in parliaments across
Europe). In essence, the extreme right operates in direct opposition to
the democratic constitutional order, whereas the radical right bears
more of a strained relationship with the tenets of liberal democracy,
instead of democracy per se (e.g. Mudde 2007).
We do not aspire to meddle in overly conceptual debates, but would
actually use ascertained differences between (and within) extreme- and
radical-right collective actors to suggest that there is no one-to-one
correspondence between their relationship with democracy and their
organisational/strategic profiles. If the anti-democratic character of
some far-right organisations had been conducive to poor performances
4P. CASTELLI GATTINARA AND A. L. P. PIRRO
at the polls (e.g. Carter 2005), we argue that a social movement profile is
no sole prerogative of extremist and militant actors (cf. Minkenberg 2002;
Mudde 2005). The perception that social movement activity may be a sub-
optimal configuration for those –generally, extremist –parties that failed
to make it into representative institutions is not only part of an electoralist
bias, but also factually inaccurate. Archetypal and successful far-right
parties like the French Front National (National Front, FN) have clear
roots in the movement sector (e.g. Shields 2007). Other collective
actors, like the Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (Movement for a
Better Hungary, Jobbik), bear similar origins and uphold activities in
both the protest and electoral arena to this day (Pirro and Castelli Gatti-
nara forthcoming). Of course, we are not suggesting that far-right parties
necessarily spring from movements; to the contrary. We rather contend
that the activity in multiple arenas of contestation is non-mutually exclu-
sive –and, in all likelihood, the result of contingent and strategic consider-
ations on available opportunities. The social movement perspective we
advocate here is thus a plea for a broader understanding of this phenom-
enon beyond its most visible electoral articulations.
As far as electoral performance is concerned, far-right parties continue
to garner substantial support in local and national elections. This is
confirmed not only in countries with consolidated nativist political pres-
ence and relevance, such as France, Austria, and the Netherlands (Mudde
2016b) but also in those that did not deliver significant far-right forces
until very recently, such as Germany, Greece, and the UK. In post-com-
munist Europe, moreover, the rise and consolidation of the far right has
decidedly contributed to shift the balance of contention towards nativist
territories (Pirro 2015). The radicalisation of discourses and policy-
making –the so-called illiberal turn –of mainstream parties like Fidesz
in Hungary or Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland can be at least interpreted
as an attempt to respond to far-right competitors and woo their voters.
Such developments, although dictated by electoral considerations, hint
at the effects that nativist collective actors can release in the political
process.
At the same time, we note that the protest arena has seen an upsurge in
both extreme- and radical-right mobilisations, especially in response to
the European refugee crisis, which evidences continuities with the realm
of party politics (Mudde 2016a). This particular conjuncture seems to
have sparked more attention to migration, as well as further diversification
among groups and people engaged in the broader far-right network. Con-
temporary anti-refugee mobilisations had taken on a number of forms,
EUROPEAN SOCIETIES 5
ranging from direct confrontational actions challenging the opening of
refugee centres to institutional activities by established political parties,
through grassroots activities aimed at mobilising the citizenry (Castelli
Gattinara 2018). Research on anti-immigrant protest revealed the very
composite nature of PEGIDA’s support base in Germany (Bulli 2017),
and shed light on how far-right activists have used this group’s‘brand’
to mobilise online and at the transnational level (Berntzen and Weiss-
kircher 2016).
Finally, the subcultural environment still represents a relevant space for
the far-right milieu, as exemplified by the myriad of counter-cultural and
anti-systemic groupuscules aimed at overcoming the decadence of liberal
democracy across Europe, as well as embryonic political movements pur-
suing meta-political, ideological, or activist ends (Griffin2003). Although
small groups, political sects, and affiliated organisations have long existed
in the far-right non-party sector (Veugelers and Menard 2018), research is
pointing at new developments in this area. These would include the
‘counter-jihad’movement, configuring the transnational network of Isla-
mophobic individuals and groups that have contributed to bridge main-
stream and radical politics, both online and offline (Mudde 2016b: 612;
Froio forthcoming). New forms of networked identity-based mobilisations
have also emerged with the Soldiers of Odin, a street-patrol collective ori-
ginated in Finland, which rapidly extended to other Scandinavian
countries (and beyond) due to traction garnered on social media
(Bjørgo and Gjelsvik forthcoming). In a similar fashion, the Identitarian
Movement, which emerged from the organisational effort of the French
Generation Identity,helped revive ideologies and strategies à la Nouvelle
Droite (New Right), and a distinctive brand of intellectual and confronta-
tional protest at the transnational level (Virchow 2015; Castelli Gattinara
2018). Identitarians in fact dismiss both revolutionary and parliamentary
tactics to achieve change, and privilege a highly mediatised form of intel-
lectual activism aimed at shaping ideas through media, expressive culture,
and online propaganda (Castelli Gattinara and Froio 2018).
Against a backdrop of organisational heterogeneity, however, connec-
tions within the far-right galaxy are varied. To begin with, political
parties and movements in this area seem to be characterised by a high
level of reciprocal influence, so much so that their anti-elitist and xeno-
phobic agendas, which generally develop independently, ultimately
come to affect one another (Bulli 2017). There are also organisational
overlaps between far-right parties and social movements; if political
parties have for long time sponsored parallel organisations with the goal
6P. CASTELLI GATTINARA AND A. L. P. PIRRO
of disseminating their messages among society (Ignazi 1989; Igounet
2014), grassroots movements similarly organise as networks of cam-
paign-specific and voluntary groups (Albanese et al.2014). Furthermore,
the tenets of the Nouvelle Right are taken up by radical-right parties inter-
ested in combating ethno-religious diversity within the electoral battlefi-
eld, as well as movements and cultural groups engaged in meta-political
projects aimed at subverting left-liberal values and multiculturalism
(Veugelers and Menard 2018).
It should not surprise, then, if the way in which far-right parties
emerge, organise, and mobilise public support has been frequently
likened to that of a social movement (Minkenberg 2003; Kitschelt 2006;
Kriesi et al.2012). Far-right collective actors are part of a large mobilis-
ation process by which they managed to politicise issues previously neg-
lected by mainstream parties (e.g. immigration, minority issues, ‘law
and order’, welfare chauvinism; see Ignazi 1992; Meguid 2005; Pirro
2014b). In this respect, the far right has been read through the lens of
those economic and cultural grievances brought about by the process of
globalisation. This side of the ‘anti-globalisation’story became visible
across different territorial levels and political arenas, and in multiple
mobilisation forms (Kriesi et al. 2008,2012). While the far right’s
ability to attract ‘losers of globalisation’has been called into question
(e.g. Minkenberg 2000; Mudde 2007), their framing of globalisation is cer-
tainly comparable to other social movements (e.g. Zaslove 2008). Indeed,
the far right has been interpreted as an ‘anti-modern’response to the poli-
tics of ‘1968’and, thus, as a nativist and authoritarian ‘counter-revolution’
(Ignazi 1992; Minkenberg 2000). The same ‘counter-revolutionary’
dynamic would hold for post-communist Europe, whereby the far right
is mainly perceived as a phenomenon reacting to the transformations of
‘1989’(Minkenberg 2002; Pirro 2015). As a result, nativist collective
actors are rightfully seen to bridge the conceptual space between move-
ments and parties (Gunther and Diamond 2003: 188). What is more,
they have been often seen to put on ‘movement party’clothes and
resort to contentious as well as conventional politics, engaging both
within and outside the institutional arena (Kitschelt 2006; Pirro and Cas-
telli Gattinara forthcoming).
This notwithstanding, our knowledge of right-wing activism across
different arenas of engagement is limited, to say the least. On the one
hand, the majority of social movement studies is concerned with left-
wing and/or progressive mobilisations, so that a number of concepts
from this scholarship are nearly synonyms of progressive movements
EUROPEAN SOCIETIES 7
(Blee 2007). On the other, social movement dynamics are still largely neg-
lected in research on the far right, to the point that Jens Rydgren has
referred to ‘a rather strict division of labor between scholars studying the
new social movements and scholars studying the new radical right’
(Rydgren 2007: 257). Apart from a few exceptions, the recent rise in far-
right street politics has not been matched by an increase in the scholarly
interest for non-party organisations and grassroots politics (Meadowcroft
and Morrow 2016; Castelli Gattinara and Froio 2018).
Exceptions have been at best circumscribed, though –in our view –
valuable and promising. The same concepts of ‘political opportunity struc-
ture’(e.g. Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 2004) and ‘framing’(e.g. Snow and
Benford 1988), developed within social movement studies, have proven
useful to address fundamental questions underlying far-right emergence
and success (e.g. Rydgren 2005; Arzheimer and Carter 2006). Similarly,
scholars seem to be increasingly interested in disentangling the relation-
ship between electoral and protest arenas, which has strong implications
for the study of far-right party and grassroots politics (Hutter and
Kriesi 2013; Hutter 2014). So far, however, notions pertaining to the
‘hybrid’nature of these actors, their simultaneous participation in the
arenas of electoral and protest politics, and the alliance and conflict struc-
tures in which they are embedded, have been repeated without serious
empirical enquiry. In response to this research gap, we believe that
social movement studies ought to extend the research scope beyond
left-progressive mobilisations, also addressing the movement politics of
right-wing actors. Concomitantly, we contend that the interaction
between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary politics represents an
indispensable way forward for far-right scholarship, not only for pluralist
and interdisciplinary persuasions but also for the empirical analysis of this
phenomenon.
Far-right collective action across multiple levels of analysis
The intersections of social movement dynamics and far-right politics are
complex, and there is a pressing need to offer an innovative and interdis-
ciplinary outlook on their multiple configurations and arenas of mobilis-
ation. The specific modalities of far-right mobilisation across Europe
highlight the value of reducing the admittedly artificial space between
social movement paradigms and models of party competition. Looking
at nativist politics from a social movement vantage point means account-
ing for the purposive, collective, and dynamic factors of participation in
8P. CASTELLI GATTINARA AND A. L. P. PIRRO
collective action. As noted by Klandermans and Mayer (2005: 7), this
would entail looking at members of far-right organisations as ‘movement
activists’, at their structures as ‘movement organisations’, and at contem-
porary far-right politics ‘as a cycle in a longer trajectory’.
We refrain from categorical understandings of far-right collective
action across different arenas. Put differently, collective action in the
protest and/or electoral arena does not represent an inherent trade-off;
it simply responds to different mobilisation purposes and needs. The
action repertoires of archetypal nativist collective actors already show
that privileging party survival over (movement) founding principles is
not a zero-sum game (cf. Panebianco 1988). We, therefore, put forward
a three-part metric according to which it is possible to analyse far-right
political parties, social movements, and subcultural groups –considered
either together or in isolation. Specifically, we suggest to elaborate on
the conceptual, theoretical, and empirical underpinnings of far-right poli-
tics by delving into mobilisation factors at the macro (e.g. the socio-pol-
itical context, political, and discursive opportunities), meso (e.g.
organisational dynamics, choices, and strategies), and micro levels (e.g.
individual motivations, life histories and experiences, and activism).
At the macro level, it is possible to unravel contemporary far-right col-
lective action in the protest and electoral arenas. Proponents of the politi-
cal process approach have rightfully suggested movement activities to be
understood in relation to their broader political context and institutional
setting (see e.g. Kriesi 2004; McAdam and Tarrow 2010). Far-right collec-
tive action is part of its sociocultural and political setting. The analysis of
the contentious politics of nativism must be aware of those contextual
idiosyncrasies upon which the far-right may thrive, and that may be
shaped, in return, by collective action at the party-political, social move-
ment, or subcultural level. One of the fruitful attempts at establishing dia-
logue along similar lines emphasised the importance of spatial as well as
issue competition in favouring the interaction between the electoral and
protest fields (Kriesi et al.2008). While spatial metaphors, models, and
toolkits played an important role in the assessment of far-right impact
and performance (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Carter 2005; Pirro
2015), social movement scholars used these to suggest that mobilisation
in the protest arena might depend upon the political space vacated by
other parties in the system (Giugni et al. 2005; Koopmans et al.2005).
Such a perspective highlights the challenges faced by far-right collective
actors upon entering the political arena, as well as the (external)
EUROPEAN SOCIETIES 9
constraints they are confronted with, when transitioning from grassroots
milieus to the electoral arena.
By looking at the meso level, the focus of attention is on the organis-
ation (i.e. internal structure) and the strategic choices of far-right collec-
tive actors. To date, research on the ‘internal supply side’of the far
right has made only slow progress in tackling organisational aspects,
and specifically elaborate on its internal governance (Heinisch and
Mazzoleni 2016). Other relevant questions have then remained largely
unaddressed, most notably those pertaining movement-like arrangements
outside the institutional arena or levels of intra-party democracy. Evidence
coming from recent comparative work suggests that far-right ‘movement
parties’might subscribe to different decision-making processes, and yet
preserve repertoires of action proper to social movements, notwithstand-
ing their electoral performance and, thus, their levels of institutionalisa-
tion and/or professionalisation (Pirro and Castelli Gattinara
forthcoming). Concentrating on this level of analysis also sheds light on
the identification of allies and opponents of the far right in the electoral
and protest arenas, and among society at large. These aspects account
for the extent to which social movements and political parties can
influence mutual preferences, most notably in terms of alliances, net-
works, and repertoires of discursive and protest action. Hanspeter Kriesi
and colleagues (Kriesi et al.2012; Hutter 2014) suggested that move-
ment-party relations for the political right follow a different logic than
the left, in that the far right alternatively turns to electoral and protest
mobilisations, but generally does not engage in both forms of action at
the same time. Studies on far-right violence have linked it to the electoral
strength of far-right parties, and more specifically to the politicisation of
issues that represent the primary breeding ground for far-right mobilis-
ation outside the institutional arena, most notably immigration (Giugni
et al. 2005). Focusing on meso-level factors helps addressing questions
concerning internal organisation and strategic choice, thus looking at
the ‘production structure’(Rucht 1999) of far-right movements. Notwith-
standing the lower prospects for mobilisation of protest compared to pro-
gressive movements, they might still exert considerable influence on
political parties and public debates (McAdam and Kloos 2014).
Finally, a micro-level approach places the activism and repertoires of
action of individual far-rightists at the core of investigation, for instance,
looking at their motivations in terms of instrumentality, identity, and
ideology (Klandermans and Mayer 2005). This approach acknowledges
that the survival and success of far-right parties does not exclusively
10 P. CASTELLI GATTINARA AND A. L. P. PIRRO
depend on their electoral success and media savviness but also on the par-
ticipation of activists. As there are multiple ways for individuals to partake
in nativist politics, there are also multiple explanations for why parties,
social movements, and subcultural groups opt for specific recruitment
and participation strategies. By venturing down this last route, our
research agenda would concern the meaning of far-right activism across
different contexts; this seems an essential step to address participation
beyond the simple acts of voting or paying membership dues to a political
party. Furthermore, a similar approach would ultimately transcend
macro-societal perspectives, and bring back the focus on individual and
psychological factors in far-right militancy and ideology. On the one
hand, a focus on micro-level factors might shed light on the processes sub-
tending the production of far-right frames, and specifically of different
articulations of nativist narratives (Blee 2002). On the other, the link
between the individual experiences of activists and the institutionalisation
of far-right collective actors represents one of the most intriguing frontiers
of enquiry into individual-agent relationship. We consider these three foci
on macro, meso, and micro levels equally worthwhile and instrumental in
gaining a better grasp of the contentious politics of nativism.
This Special Issue
The contributions included in this Special Issue move the agenda of the
far-right scholarship in new directions. They tackle the discursive, organ-
isational, and strategic complexity of contemporary far-right mobilisation
in ways that have been neglected so far. In particular, they single out col-
lective action logics and dynamics of contention that proved admittedly
hard to address based on approaches exclusively concerned with party-
political and electoral dynamics. Collectively, they corroborate the value
of interdisciplinary persuasions, and make a strong case for greater theor-
etical and methodological pluralism in the social sciences. The combi-
nation of qualitative and quantitative methods, including process
tracing, discourse analysis, interviewing, and content and network analy-
sis, not only allow for a richer outlook on far-right collective action but
also for nuanced insights into its complexity and ramifications. Finally,
most of these studies either directly or indirectly advance prospects for
comparative analysis of far-right politics. Far-right collective actors are
in fact analysed and compared over time and across national contexts,
as well as in terms of why and how they mobilise across different
arenas. The Special Issue delineates multiple pathways through which
EUROPEAN SOCIETIES 11
scholars of the far right can use social movement theory, its methods, and
approaches to study contemporary nativist politics. We are convinced that
the contributions included here offer a novel point of departure for inter-
sectional studies on parties and movements, as well as contentious politics
at large.
The Special Issue examines a broad set of far-right phenomena, ranging
from (populist) radical right actors (also) represented in institutions to
more extremist movements and groups engaged in grassroots politics.
While sharing the ambition of straddling the space between party politics
and grassroots mobilisations, the articles included here present different
approaches to attain this goal. Michael Minkenberg qualifies the interpe-
netration between far-right parties and movements by looking at the con-
tentious politics of nativism in Eastern and Western Europe. Swen Hutter
and Endre Borbáth address the dynamics of contention across the protest-
electoral divide, comparing challengers of the left and right. Caterina Froio
and Barath Ganesh maintain a focus on the online sphere, and study how
social media facilitate the construction of linkages between radical parties,
extremist movements, and subcultural groups on a specific set of conten-
tious issues. Along somewhat similar lines, Ofra Klein and Jasper Muis
engage in a cross-national and within-country analysis of nativist issues,
as articulated across social media by various far-right collective actors.
Sofia Tipaldou and Katrin Uba delve into the Greek and Russian cases,
exploring how specific opportunities affect the different pathways to
mobilisation of far-right collective actors. The article by Gabriella Elgenius
and Jens Rydgren looks at the Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats,
SD) and draws significant continuities between contemporary ethno-
nationalist frames and the historical legacy of reactionary conservatism.
Finally, with their contribution, Andrea Pirro and Dániel Róna present
novel insights into the grassroots politics of the Hungarian Jobbik, with
a particular emphasis on youth participation.
Together, the studies included in this Special Issue push forward the
agenda of far-right research, moving it towards new directions. They
identify continuities and discontinuities in far-right politics across
arenas of engagement; advance comparative knowledge on contemporary
far-right parties, movements, and activists; and show the value of meth-
odological pluralism in the study of nativist and radical politics. In so
doing, they set new standards to analyse mobilisation factors at the
macro, meso, and micro levels, and open up to the complexities of the
far right ‘as social movement’.
12 P. CASTELLI GATTINARA AND A. L. P. PIRRO
Acknowledgements
The ideas behind this Special Issue took shape in our shared office at the Centre on
Social Movement Studies (COSMOS), Scuola Normale Superiore, and were then
taken to the rooms of Charles University in Prague and the University of Milan.
We would like to thank the participants to the panels ‘The Far Right as Social Move-
ment: Theory, Practice, and Empirical Evidence’at the 10th General Conference of
the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) and ‘Movement Parties
and Party Movements: Insights into the European Far Right’at the 30th Meeting
of the Italian Political Science Association (SISP). A special thanks finally goes to
Hanspeter Kriesi for his attentive reading of, and precise comments on, an earlier
draft of this article.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Pietro Castelli Gattinara is Assistant Professor at the Centre for Research on Extre-
mism, University of Oslo. His research focuses on comparative politics, the far right
and migration in Europe. He is currently leading a comparative research project on
far-right collective action during the refugee crisis. He recently published The Politics
of Migration in Italy (Routledge, 2016), and his work appeared on international peer-
reviewed journals including South European Societies and Politics and Comparative
European Politics.
Andrea L. P. Pirro is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Department of Political
and Social Sciences, Scuola Normale Superiore, and research affiliate at the Centre
on Social Movement Studies (COSMOS). He is joint convenor of the European Con-
sortium for Political Research (ECPR) Standing Group on Extremism & Democracy.
His work appeared in different international peer-reviewed journals as well as a
number of edited volumes. He has authored the monograph The Populist Radical
Right in Central and Eastern Europe: Ideology, Impact, and Electoral Performance
(Routledge, 2015) and edited three special issues.
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