Content uploaded by Parul Tyagi
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Parul Tyagi on Jul 20, 2022
Content may be subject to copyright.
Investigating the Security Threats in Vehicular ad hoc
Networks (VANETs): Towards Security Engineering
for Safer on-road Transportation
Parul Tyagi
Research Scholar
JECRC University
Jaipur, India
tyagi.parul82@gmail.com
Dr. Deepak Dembla
HoD, Dept. of IT, JECRC University
Jaipur, India
deepak.dembla@jecrcu.edu.in
Abstract— The state-of-the-art improvements in cellular
communication and ubiquitous availability of internet have led to
significant breakthroughs in intelligent transportation systems
where connectivity, autonomous driving and infotainment play a
pivotal role in the enhanced driving experience. The Vehicle ad
hoc Networks (VANET) have emerged as a distinguished branch
of wireless communication pertaining to transportation systems.
VANET is intended to dispense on-road vehicle safety and to
boost the comfort experienced by drivers, passengers and other
commuters. Whereas VANET offers exciting applications and
explores unfamiliar dimensions in transportation, concerns
regarding VANET security also continue to intensify. Security of
vehicular networks, the authenticity and integrity of data
dissemination remains a concern of utmost significance in
VANET deployment. VANET architecture, by virtue of an
abundance of networked vehicles, is susceptible to illegal use,
unauthorized access, protocol tunneling, eavesdropping, and
denial-of-service as the vehicles are unknowingly exposed to
illegitimate information from unidentified adversaries.
This paper investigates the security aspects of VANET and the
attacks and vulnerabilities the VANET architecture is prone to.
The study of security features and flaws is expected to lead to
developed broadcasting and routing services, adding to the
quality-of-service. Due to mobility of vehicles, large scale
networks, rapidly restructuring nodes and frequently changing
topological structure; a fundamental requirement of VANETs is
to ensure safe transmission of the time critical data. The paper
examines various security threats in VANETs, analyses how they
are implemented and their impact on the VANET security
architecture. A few gaps in the VANET security frameworks
have also been highlighted which can be worked upon in the
future.
Keywords: VANET, security, V2V, V2I, attacks,
vulnerabilities, safety.
I. INTRODUCTION
Regardless of a striking operational life of over 40 years,
the existence and applications of internet and cyber-
infrastructure still continue to evolve. More than ever before,
the internet and wireless communication has affected our lives
by opening countless possibilities and opportunities [1]. The
recent trend in interdisciplinary research has been to embed
everyday objects with computers and communication
capabilities [2]. Of late, data transfer and information
processing has emerged as a widespread phenomenon,
permeating almost every type of object. One such category of
communication capable smart devices is intelligent vehicles,
intelligent transportation systems (ITS) and communication
capable roadside infrastructure. These smart vehicles function
based on the principles of Vehicle ad hoc Networks (VANET),
which is essentially a computer-to-computer network where
mobile nodes, i.e. vehicles, behaving as computers, connect
directly to each other, rather than to a server or hub. The
vehicles themselves form a temporary network, and the
participating vehicles also serve as a wireless router, acting
over an approximate range of 100-300 meters of each other. As
the nodes are mobile, they continuously fall out of the signal
range and drop out of a particular network, join in a
neighboring network, connecting vehicles to one another thus
maintaining a mobile internet [3]. The VANET architecture is
also extended to road side infrastructure, known as InfoStations
(IS) and Road Side Units (RSU) as depicted in figure 1. As
vehicles tend to move in an organized fashion, therefore the
interactions with RSU is also characterized fairly accurately.
VANETs have succeeded in addressing a number of today's
traffic challenges and enable drivers to have better awareness
of their driving environment and take timely and evasive
actions in response to abnormal situations. VANETs lend a
valuable contribution to solve many traffic and road-safety
problems and in the recent years, the road transportation
system with the help of VANET is being evolved into a safer
and efficient establishment [4].
The growth of internet and its extension to vehicles has
made our lives convenient, but it has also led to abuse of
technology and misuse through cyber crimes. With
advancements in technology and the advent of VANET, the
prevalence of cybercrimes in the domain has augmented to
include cyber-espionage, eavesdropping, pranksters, and
phishing schemes. With maximum appreciation to the
progressive bias, depth and scope of ceaseless internet utilities
and VANET applications, it is equally necessary to envisage
the security and data confidentiality challenges encountered in
the VANET architecture. Despite the advantages of VANET,
there are many challenges, especially in the aspects of security
2084
978-1-4799-3080-7/14/$31.00 c
2014 IEEE
and privacy. Inter-vehicle communication (IVC) continues to
grow as an indispensable futuristic component, and this paper
investigates a comprehensive overview of the security threats
and vulnerabilities observed in VANET architecture. The focus
here is on the prevalent bottlenecks and security threats
encountered in vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-
infrastructure (V2I) communication. Security requirements and
necessity in VANET architecture and security threats and
attacks in VANET [5] [6] are discussed.
This paper is structured in six sections: section I is the
introduction and the identified sources of attacks. Malicious
exploitation in VANET is presented in section II. Section III
elaborates attacks against routing protocols. Section IV
demonstrates an execution of black hole attack, and outlines a
general methodology adopted by attackers. Conclusions are
given in section VI.
Figure 1. Extensive VANET communication architecture
II. SOURCES OF ATTACKS AND MALICIOUS ACTIVITIES IN
VANET
VANET is prone to several vulnerabilities and attacks.
These vulnerabilities deteriorate the functioning of the
network, stimulate severe problems in the network and pose
potential security threats. The severity of attacks launched by
the attackers can vary based on the motive of the attack and the
potential impact on the victim. The following section gives a
general overview of VANET vulnerabilities.
• Jamming: Interfering transmissions are deliberately
generated by jammer to prevent VANET
communication among vehicles in a given reception
range [7].
• Forgery: Forgery in VANET architecture
compromises the correctness, validity and timely
receipt of transmitted data. The transmission of false
hazard warnings and those being received and acted
upon by all vehicles leads to chaos in the driving zone
and is a major vulnerability [7].
• Impersonation: Any vehicle owner deliberately and
hideously taking on the identity of another vehicle and
attributing it to his own vehicle or vice-versa is known
as impersonation. It also involves fake message
fabrication, message alteration and message replay.
For e.g., an attacker appearing falsely as an
emergency vehicle and misleading other vehicles to
useless or harmful consequences is an impersonation
attack [7].
• Privacy: Privacy is an issue in VANET, as the illegal
monitoring of driver’s personal data could violate
their privacy. Attacks on driver privacy are a severe
vulnerability in VANET due to the periodic and
frequent nature of vehicular traffic. Driver’s personal
data can be retrieved by means of illegal in-transit
traffic tampering of safety and traffic related messages
sent by the driver, management messages, or even
from transaction based communications such as
automated payments [7].
Such frauds and deceptive scams have been on an increase
especially among networked devices as cyber criminals get an
opportunity to send spurious messages to any device on the
network [8]. Whereas VANET was initially intended to
integrate mobile connectivity amongst vehicles to expedite data
transfer while traveling, vehicles in VANET have been victims
to viruses, forged messages, phishing, identity thefts and many
other threats. An issue of paramount concern in vehicular
environment is security, where a wrong message may directly
affect human life, especially in the light of the public
acceptance of the technology [9]. Since the vehicular network
is open and accessible from everywhere in the given DSRC
range, it is expected to be an easy target for malicious users
[10]. Apart from network attacks, disabling or tinkering with
the vehicle on-board units, tampering with the road side
infrastructure, removing, dislocating or destroying them is
another security issue in VANET. OBUs are tampered in a
manner similar to that of modifying an odometer in earlier
vehicles [11]. Use of magnets, electric fields and malicious
software to damage OBUs is a source of concern that needs to
be addressed for safer and secure VANET communication.
Although the OBUs could be subject to periodic examinations
and inspections for any signs of tampering, limitations exist in
relation to the frequency of inspection and the honesty of
technicians performing the inspections. To ensure reliable and
secure V2I communication, it is required that the roadside
equipment is not damaged o purpose.
III. ATTACKS AGAINST ROUTING
VANET is a promising vehicular networking technology which
enhances road safety, traffic management and information
dissemination for drivers and passengers. The success of
VANET relies heavily on efficient dynamic routing protocols
due to the rapidly and constantly changing network topology.
The routing protocol security is important to be considered as
many of the VANET applications are safety-related. Routing is
the backbone of VANET communication and therefore routing
is also the most vulnerable part of VANET, susceptible to
attacks and malicious operations [12]. Malicious nodes in
VANET can exploit the co-operative routing algorithms to
launch routing attacks, similar to BH and rushing attacks.
Attacks against routing in VANET are broadly classified into
two categories: attacks on routing protocols and attacks on
packet delivery.
2014 International Conference on Advances in Computing,Communications and Informatics (ICACCI) 2085
• Impersonating: This attack involves taking on the
credentials of another vehicle to spoof route
messages. It also involves advertising of fake route-
metrics to confuse the topology, forwarding a route
message with false sequence numbers to
suppress/delay other consistent messages. Flooding
the route discover unreasonably with DoS, modifying
a RREQ message to implant false routes, generating
bogus route error messages to disrupt a working route
or suppressing a valid route error to misinform other
vehicles is all further attacks that can be launched by
the impersonator [13].
Application Attack: Safety and comfort related
applications mark potential VANET applications.
Attacker target these application related messages to
exploit these for their own benefits, at the expense of
other users [14]. Attackers tamper with the contents of
the actual messages and forward wrong, modified,
incomplete, forged or fake messages to other vehicles
leading to severe traffic congestions or even
accidents. One of the most common types of
application attacks is the bogus information attack
where an attacker injects bogus information into the
network and these incorrect/fabricated messages
directly affect the behavior of vehicles on the road.
Another disastrous attack in this category is the
modification/alteration of warning messages, which
compromise the degree of truthfulness of a message in
the VANET architecture [15].
The other aspect of VANET applications, i.e. the
comfort applications primarily aims at making driving
a pleasant experience and to improve the traffic
system. Locating a car-parking space is one of the
most common comfort applications where the RSU
communicates the information about parking
availability to a vehicle OBU. In an attack on this
aspect, figure. 2 depicts an authentic vehicle ‘C’
requesting for a parking space at a particular
destination (say, near a shopping mall).
Figure 2. Attack on safety application
The RSU searches for available parking zone and
relays a message ‘parking slot available’ near the
shopping mall. As the vehicle ‘C’ is slightly out of the
radio range of the RSU, the RSU uses vehicles ‘A’
and ‘B’ as routers to send the message to vehicle ‘C’.
The vehicle ‘B’ is actually an attacker who intercepts
reads and alters this message to ‘no empty parking
slot’ and passes this message to vehicle ‘C’, thus
depriving it of available parking resource [16]. Such
attacks can undermine the importance of comfort
applications of VANET such as entertainment,
automatic toll collection, map download, locating
restaurant and gas stations, parking availability etc.
Timing Attack: In this attack, the attacker’s main
objective is to delay an original message by adding an
additional time slot to the original message. The other
contents of a message are not disturbed, but the delay
causes the messages to be received after the requisite
time, thus rendering them useless. VANET safety
applications are time critical applications, and even a
minor delay in message transmission could defeat the
objective of the message. figure. 3 depict a timing
attack scenario where an attacker ‘C’ receives a
warning message ‘Warning! Accident at location Y’
from other vehicle ‘B’. Under normal operating
conditions, this message would have been transmitted
to a nearby vehicle ‘D’ instantly, but the attacker ‘B’
deliberately does so after some time, thus causing ‘D’
not to evade the sight [17].
F
Figure 3. Attack on comfort application
• Social Attack: Social attacks are a class of attack
where the attackers modify/aggravate the behavior of
legitimate vehicles by sending immoral messages to
them. This is a kind of emotional and social attack
that indirectly creates problems in the network by
enticing legitimate users to show angry behavior
when they receive such kind of derogatory messages.
figure. 4 depict this scenario, where an attacker ‘B’
intentionally passes a message ‘You are Idiot’ to a
nearby vehicle ‘C’.
Figure 4. Timing attack in VANET
When ‘C’ receives this message, his driving behavior
is aggravated which results in an increase in the speed
of the vehicle.
The episode culminates in disturbing/distracting the
other users on the network.
2086 2014 International Conference on Advances in Computing,Communications and Informatics (ICACCI)
• Monitoring Attack: Monitoring and tracking of the
vehicles, illegally listening to the communication
between V2V and V2I and misusing any confidential
information is the motive of this attack, figure.5
depicts this scenario.
Figure 5. Depiction of Social Attack
IV. ATTACK-PROCESS MECHANISM AND AN ILLUSTR ATION
OF NETWORK LAYER ATTACK
This section presents a detailed description of the attack
process in VANET. Figure. 6 represent the communication link
between the authentic VANET user, RSU and an attacker. The
steps to launch an attack are described as follows [18]:
• An attacker initially launches an attack on other
vehicles in the network and also on the RSUs, based
on the motive and the extent of damage intended.
• The attacker receives a valid message from another
vehicle/RSU expecting the attacker to forward/re-
route the message.
• The attacker alters/intercepts the contents of the
message and passes this message to other vehicles/
RSU.
• The attacker might also impersonate/masquerade as
another vehicle, launches timing attacks or other types
of attacks on other vehicles.
• Monitors the communication between the vehicles or
infrastructure and achieves his/her benefit
Table I lists different types of security attacks with
attacker types and respective security attributes.
Table 1 Different types of security attacks in VANET with attacker types and respective security attributes .
Name of the Attack Adversary/Attacker type Security attributes and
requirements
Requires
Physical
Access?
Communicatio
n types
Bogus Information Insider Data Integrity/
Authentication
No V2V
Denial of Service
(DoS)
Malicious, active, insider,
network attack
Availability Yes/No V2V/V2I
Masquerading Active, insider Authentication Yes V2V
Black Hole (BH) Passive, outsider Availability Yes V2V
Malware Malicious, insider Availability No V2V/V2I
Spamming Malicious, insider Availability Yes V2V
Timing Attack Malicious, insider Data Integrity No V2V/
V2I
GPS Spoofing Outsider Authentication No V2V
Man-in-the-middle Insider, monitoring attack Data integrity,
confidentiality, privacy
Yes V2V
Sybil Insider, network attack Authentication, privacy Yes V2V
Wormhole/tunneli
ng
Outsider, malicious,
monitoring attack
Authentication,
confidentiality
Yes/No V2V
Illusion attack Insider, Outsider Authenticity, data integrity Yes V2V/V2I
Impersonation
attack
Insider Privacy, confidentiality Yes V2V
Social Attack Insider, e.g. “you are idiot” Data integrity, trust Yes/No V2V
Monitoring attack Monitoring the road activity Privacy, authenticity Yes/No V2V/V2I
2014 International Conference on Advances in Computing,Communications and Informatics (ICACCI) 2087
Figure 6. A simple attack mechanism adopted by attackers in VANET [12]
Black Hole Attack Illustration: Consider the network in figure
7 and illustrate how an intruder can launch a black hole or grey
hole attack. Suppose nodes v9 and v4 each need routes to
nodes v13 and v7 respectively. Therefore, nodes v9 and v4
broadcast RREQs and the initial ow of RREQs is shown in
figure 8. Now assume node v6 is an intruder and wants to
capture the routes in the network to cause either a black or grey
hole attack, by using false RREP packets in the following way
[19]:
The two RREQs from nodes v9 and v4 will be heard by node
v6, which then checks its current destination sequence numbers
for v13 and v7.
• Intruder v6 prepares RREP packets for these RREQs
with destination sequence numbers higher than the
current destination sequence number for nodes v13
and v7.
• V6 sends these false RREPs back to the source nodes
v9and v4 as shown in figure 9.
After receiving the false RREPs, source nodes v9 and v4 will
select the route through v6, since the received RREPs suggest
that v6 has the freshest routes. By repeating this process,
intruder v6 can successfully capture other routes in the network
and force most of the network trafc ow through itself. Now
the intruder v6 is in control of the network data trafc and can
drop data packets to cause either black hole or grey hole
attacks. For instance, source nodes v9 and v4 will send data
packets to their destination node which will reach node v6;
instead of forwarding these data packets, v6 can drop them all,
causing a black hole attack as shown in figure 10.
Figure 7. Network initially without any attack
Figure 8. Network after an intruder generates a malicious RREQ fromV9 &V4
Figure 9. Network without any attack:intruder sending false RREP
to source node V9 & V4
Figure 10. Node v6 drop all data packets to create black hole
V. RESULTS & INVESTIGATIONS
Despite a tremendous potential and application to enhance
road safety and to facilitate traffic management, VANET
suffers from a range of security and privacy issues that have
dramatically restricted their applications as yet. The research
confirms that whereas VANET has emerged as an active area
of research, standardization, and development due to its
tremendous potential to improve vehicle and road safety,
2088 2014 International Conference on Advances in Computing,Communications and Informatics (ICACCI)
improve traffic efficiency and enhance driving comfort, a
strong emphasis needs to be laid on designing novel VANET
architectures and implementations. VANET suffers from
considerable threats to security of the users, and therefore
research needs to be focused on specific areas including
routing, broadcasting, QoS and security. This paper describes
attack process mechanism and illustration of Black hole attack,
which investigate how intruder capture the route and send a
false message to other nodes. It also compares different types
of security attacks in VANET with attacker types and
respective security attributes which shows the effect of
different types of attack in various environments.
VI. IMPACT OF THE ATTACKS ON THE VEHICULAR NETWORK
ARCHITECTURE
As the network evolution is nudging towards a more
wireless future, VANET devices (vehicles and RSUs) are
characterised as resource-constrained devices that need highest
levels of security, connectivity, scalability and efficient data
handling, among other things. As the fundamental element of
VANETs is internet, VANET opens a lot of insecure and
vulnerable end-points. The smart vehicles and internet capable
RSUs generate a huge amount of data originating from
disparate sources. This offers the attackers and hackers with an
opportunity to mine these rich resources and repositories of
data to gain unauthorized insight into confidential data that can
have profound impact on the adoption of VANET technology.
The advanced VANET routing protocols such as context-aware
policy routing not only allow the VANET components
(vehicles and RSUs) to transmit data, but also to share certain
links. As far as the genuine RSU and on-board unit (OBU)
messages are concerned, the VANET appears to be safe, but
sharing of links by malicious attackers is far more dangerous.
Linking and subsequently clicking of these links has changed
the VANET landscape, and malware can be now spread more
effectively using pervasive VANET devices. ‘Masquerading’
and ‘trust’ act as the social bait where a hacker, masquerading
as a known vehicle sends malicious links, trusting the
transmitter makes the victim to click on the posted information
links. The hacker can send links containing messages about
popular topics, intended not for the driver but for other
travellers in the cars, willing to access the infotainment
services. Once the links are activated, they can disrupt the
entire VANET network or disconnect that vehicle from the
network. Some malicious extensions can appear on the
infotainment systems disabling the antivirus/ encryption
systems of the targeted vehicles.
Besides focusing on the network vulnerability protection,
making the VANET networks more resilient to security threats
could prevent a lot of damages to the technology, as follows:
• Theft of data: This consists not only of driver
information or financial data related to parking slot
reservations, but also consists of credit card numbers,
drivers’ sensitive information and in some cases
drivers’ intellectual property or marketing plans. The
attacks have the most profound impact on the
user/driver credentials. Stolen driver credentials
coupled with installation of malware on the target
vehicle can lead to that vehicle being added on a
botnet that caused the attack, causing it to grow even
more powerful. These attacks can deactivate the
encryption settings on the targeted device and also
manipulate sensitive information [20].
• Loss of time: It can usually take a great deal of time to
recover from security attacks in VANET, or even
from the suspicion of an attack. Data might be
needed to be reframed, recovered or extensively
reconstructed.
• Monetary loss: Theft of data is often accompanied by
monetary losses due to maligned intentions of the
hackers and attackers.
• Disabled and crippled services: Protesters and some
governments may encourage discontinued use of the
technology, in case frequent cases of attacks and
information misuse are reported. This is possible
considering the extent of malicious intent of the
hackers.
• Legal exposure: any of the above mentioned cases
might expose an enterprise (such as a taxi firm or a
car rental company) to law suits for loss of data or
money entrusted to them.
The impact of VANET attacks is not restricted to vehicles
and RSUs, but with the advent of smart cities, all the connected
devices that have a VANET device in one of the connected
stages might suffer the consequences of a VANET attack. The
vehicular ad hoc networks can be seen as a crucial component
of the emerging field of Internet of Things (IoT) and the
disastrous impacts of security breach in VANET can adversely
affect the various connected devices. With IoT, more and more
objects ranging from smart homes and smart cities to including
household gadgets, health monitors, palmtops and smart
phones, doors and safety systems etc. have digital
representations that allow them to be accessed and controlled
from anywhere. These devices can be interconnected using the
wireless LAN networks similar to VANET, or might have an
interlinked VANET network. The VANET attacks discussed
above can hamper the operation of the ‘device intelligence
everyday things’ architecture. With widespread ubiquity of
internet, the attackers are also finding innovative ways to break
into the network and harness the resources, and to maliciously
corrupt the data and effective communication between various
elements of the integrated architecture. With increasing number
of vehicles being added to the VANET, it is important to
approach security threats from a more comprehensive point of
view, analysing all the requirements that need to be met for a
secure network [21].
It is understood that attacks and incursions are going to
happen. In the future work, we plan to outline a framework for
network security resiliency, in order to detect, access, predict
and mitigate the damage from VANET attacks as they happen.
The authors propose to gain an expert understanding of how
attacker work, how attackers think, and attacks are launched
and executed and which node in the network is the most
vulnerable. NCTuns simulator will be used to create realistic
2014 International Conference on Advances in Computing,Communications and Informatics (ICACCI) 2089
scenarios that emulate real-world attack traffic. This would
include vulnerability testing, where attacks will be mounted
against the targeted node using databases of known malware,
incursions, intrusions and other attacks.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is concluded that regardless of the encryption and secure
routing protocols, the VANET architecture continues to
remain potentially insecure as the attacker can listen in even
without gaining traceable physical access. The investigation
reveals a few practices and theoretical constructs employed to
mitigate the insecurities in VANET their drawbacks are
highlighted. Major security flaws in VANET and their
adversaries are also presented in the paper. We arrive at a
conclusion that amidst the evolving network environment,
VANET needs to be supported with more secure architecture,
with privacy of the users being acknowledged as the foremost
exponent of VANET requirements. The study of security
features and flaws is expected to lead to developed
broadcasting and routing protocols, adding to the quality-of-
service. Due to mobility of vehicles, large scale networks,
rapidly restructuring nodes and frequently changing
topological structure; a fundamental requirement of VANETs
is to ensure safe transmission of the time critical data. This
paper examines various security threats in VANETs, analyses
how they are implemented and their impact on the VANET
security architecture. It also describe attack process
mechanism , illustration of Black hole attack and compared
different types of security attacks in VANET with attacker
types and respective security attributes. Safer on road
transportation refers to methods and measures for reducing
the risk of a person using the road network being killed or
seriously injured. The highest possible degree of safety shall
be ensured when transporting goods by road. It is of vital
importance to monitor and validate the road transportation
safety, including comprehensive checks on drivers, vehicles
and safety processes.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
We would like to express sincere gratitude to JECRC
University for providing us with a platform to work on this
project. We are thankful to JU for granting us access to
laboratories and library, which has been pivotal in
successfully carrying out this research.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Aijaz, B. Bochow, F. Dotzer, A. Festag, M. Gerlach, R. Kroh
and T. Leinmuller, “Attacks on inter vehicle communication
systems - an analysis”, In 3rd International Workshop on
Intelligent Transportation. WIT, 2006.
[2] A.Weimerskirch et al., “Data security in vehicular
communication networks”, Ch. 9, pp. 309-320.
[3] B. Aslam and D. Turgut, “Defense Against Sybil attack in
vehicular ad hoc networks”, In IEEE Military Communications
Conference, MILCOM, pp. 1-7, 2009.
[4] B. Parno and A. Perrig, “Challenges in Securing Vehicular
Networks,” Proc. Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks
(HotNets-IV), 2005.
[5] C. Laurendeau and M. Barbeau, “Threats to security in
DSRC/WAVE”, In 5th Int. Conf. ADHOC-NOW, Springer
Berlin/Heidelberg, 2006.
[6] C. Marco, “Body, Personal and Local Ad Hoc Wireless
Networks”, in The Handbook of Ad Hoc Wireless Networks,
CRC Press LLC, 2003, Ch. 1.
[7] F. Kargl et al., “Secure vehicular communication systems:
Implementation, performance, and research challenges”, IEEE
Comm. Magazine, vol. 46, no. 11, pp. 110-118, Nov. 2008.
[8] G. Karagiannis et al., “Vehicular Networking: A Survey and
Tutorial on Requirements, Architectures, Challenges, Standards
and Solutions”. In IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials,
pp. 584–616, 2011.
[9] H. Lu, J. Li, and M. Guizani, “A novel ID-based authentication
framework with adaptive privacy preservation for VANET”, In
IEEE Computing, Communications and Applications Conf.
(ComComAp), pp. 345–350, 2012.
[10] I. Aad, J.P. Hubaux and E.W. Knightly, “Impact of Denial of
Service attacks on Ad Hoc Networks”, IEEE/ACM Transactions
on Networking, 2008, pp. 16-24.
[11] J. Cheambe, J. Tchouto and M. Gerlach, “Security in Active
Safety Applications” 2nd International workshop on Intelligent
Transportation (WIT), Germany, 2005.
[12] J. Hubaux, S. Hapkun and J. Luo, “The Security and Privacy of
Smart Vehicles,” Magazine of IEEE Security and Privacy, June
2004.
[13] J. Liu et al., “Privacy-Preserving Quick Authentication in Fast
Roaming Networks,” Proc. 31st IEEE conference on Local
Computer Networks, pp. 975-982, 2006.
[14] J. Sun et al., “An Identity-Based Security System for User
Privacy in VANETs”, IEEE Trans.on Parallel and Distributed
Systems, vol. 21, no. 9, pp. 1227-1239, 2010.
[15] K. Plößl, T. Nowey and C. Mletzko, “Towards a Security
Architecture for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks,” Proc. First Int.
Conf. on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES’06), 2006.
[16] K.C. Lee and M. Gerla, “Survey of Routing Protocols in
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks”, In Car2Car communication
consortium, 2010.
[17] Parul Tyagi and Deepak Dembla., “A Taxonomy of Security
Attacks and Issues in Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs)”,
International Journal of Computer Applications,
vol.91,no.7,pp.22-29, April 2014. Published by Foundation of
Computer Science, New York, USA.
[18] M. Raya and J.P. Hubaux, “The security of VANETs, In
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM International Workshop on
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks, 2005.
[19] M. Raya et al., “On data-centric trust establishment in
ephemeral ad hoc networks”, In IEEE Conf. on Computer
Communications, pp. 1238–1246, 2008.
[20] M. Raya, P. Papadimitratos, and J.P. Hubaux, “Securing
vehicular communications”, IEEE Wireless Communications
Magazine, vol. 13, no. 5, pp.8-15, 2006.
[21] A. Gluhak, S. Krco, M. Nati, D. Pfisterer, N. Mitton, T.
Razafindralambo, A survey on facilities for experimental
Internet of Things research, IEEE Communications Magazine,
vol 49, pp.58–67, 2011.
2090 2014 International Conference on Advances in Computing,Communications and Informatics (ICACCI)
