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Article
Obstacles to innovation in Brazil:
The lack of qualified individuals to
implement innovation and establish
university–firm interactions
Marcia Siqueira Rapini
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Brazil
Tulio Chiarini
Instituto Nacional de Tecnologia, Brazil; Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Italy
Pablo Felipe Bittencourt
Universidade Federal de Santa Catariana, Brazil
Abstract
Through an investigation of data available from the Brazilian Innovation Survey (Pesquisa de Inovac¸a
˜o) of the Brazilian
Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatı
´stica) and from a national survey on
university–firm interactions (the BR Survey), the authors show that Brazilian industrial firms lack qualified individuals
for two key activities: the promotion of innovation and the establishment of a dialogue between universities and firms.
Brazilian firms’ weaknesses and the inadequacy of the workforce supply generate scarce (or inadequate) ‘know-why’.
Furthermore, a restricted perspective in Brazilian universities, focused on creating a more educated society rather than
augmenting the stock of technological knowledge, constrains the generation of ‘know-what’ and ‘know-who’.
Keywords
Brazil, knowledge generation, obstacles to innovation, university–firm interaction, workforce supply
In evolutionary economics, firms are understood to be
agents capable of learning. Learning is essential for firms
to formulate and develop their strategies and trajectories in
their search for the competences required for innovative
processes. A firm can then learn from different internal and
external sources, including customers, suppliers, other
firms in the same industry, universities and research insti-
tutes, and from their own internal activities (Klevorick
et al., 1995). These learning processes yield increases in
the firm’s stock of knowledge (Malerba, 1992) and in its
competences.
Learning is cumulative and allows firms to differentiate
themselves in terms of their own characteristics and per-
formance. These differences are the result of distinct stra-
tegies that provide firms with disparate structures and
capabilities, including those related to research and devel-
opment (R&D) (Nelson, 1991).
The success of a firm depends on its competences to
innovate (Borra´s and Edquist, 2014). Successful innovation
depends on not only the combination of a range of compe-
tences – the set of knowledge, skills and expertise that
individuals and firms have – but also the process by which
competences are created, maintained and developed
(Borra´s and Edquist, 2014). A lack of internal competences
and competence building creates obstacles to the innova-
tion process. Innovative firms are necessarily compelled to
upgrade their competences constantly through continuous
competence building that will keep at the forefront of mar-
ket competition (Borra´s and Edquist, 2014). Firms that are
not able to rebuild their competences will become locked
into established routines and will be less likely to innovate.
Corresponding author:
Marcia Siqueira Rapini, Centro de Desenvolvimento e Planejamento
Regional – Cedeplar, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Avenida
Presidente Anto
ˆnio Carlos 6627, Pampulha 31270-901, Belo Horizonte,
Minas Gerais, Brazil.
Email: msrapini@cedeplar.ufmg.br
Industry and Higher Education
2017, Vol. 31(3) 168–183
ªThe Author(s) 2017
Reprints and permission:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0950422217698524
journals.sagepub.com/home/ihe
This competence building perspective explains a firm’s
competitive performance and is especially relevant for
firms in Industry 4.0 or the 4th Industrial Revolution.
Industry 4.0 requires entirely new competences, even in
jobs less directly affected by technological change (World
Economic Forum, 2016). So, industrial policy should focus
on competence building that is aligned to the actual tech-
nological revolution.
Through an investigation of data available from the Bra-
zilian Innovation Survey (Pesquisa de Inovac¸a
˜o (PINTEC))
of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Insti-
tuto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatı´stica (IBGE)) and from
a national survey on university–firm interactions (the BR
Survey), we acknowledge two important obstacles that Bra-
zilian firms face:
1. a lack of qualified individuals to promote innova-
tion in Brazilian firms and
2. a lack of qualified individuals (in universities/
research institutes and firms) to establish a dialogue
between universities/research institutes and firms.
Departing from the previous findings, we put forward
two propositions. In proposition A, related to the first
obstacle, we argue that the weakness of Brazilian indus-
trial firms and the workforce supply generates scarce
(or inadequate) ‘know-why’. Proposition B, associated
with the second obstacle, is that the historical construc-
tion of a restricted view of Brazilian universities inter-
ested in creating a more enlightened and educated
societyratherthaninaugmentingthestockofscientific
knowledge vis-a`-vis technological development is the
root of the weakness in the generation of ‘know-what’
and ‘know-who’.
Using these propositions for the Brazilian case, we stress
that different types of knowledge are necessary in national
systems of innovation (NSIs): internal knowledge to imple-
ment new processes and/or products and knowledge to
establish relations with other agents.
We divide the remainder of this article into five sections.
In the first section below, we present a review of the liter-
ature on knowledge, learning and innovation. Before pro-
ceeding, we make two important caveats. First, by no
means does this section constitute a comprehensive com-
pendium on the importance of different types of knowledge
for innovation processes. Many studies have been con-
ducted that complement the arguments presented in this
article. Second, an article on such a complex topic must
necessarily be limited in scope. We acknowledge that we
present lessons from the literature – that is, learning is one
important process for innovation and knowledge is a key
resource in this process. If we analytically separate knowl-
edge into different categories (‘know-how’, know-what,
know-who and know-why), we are able to understand that
the lack of qualified personnel (a) for innovative efforts and
(b) for establishing university–firm interactions refers to
the lack of know-why and know-who, respectively.
In the second section, we examine recent Brazilian sci-
ence and technology (S&T) policies focused on public uni-
versity expansion and decentralization and designed to
improve human capital development and so to increase
innovative efforts. We find concrete evidence of a lack of
synchronization between the incentive regimes of S&T
policies which, while defining important areas for playing
technological and economic catch-up, do not have a well-
defined strategy for the allocation of human resources to
those areas. We show that Brazilian universities are
unlikely to produce enough qualified individuals to meet
domestic demand, particularly in the hard sciences. We
also consider the government’s efforts to foster univer-
sity–firm interactions.
In the third section, we explore data extracted from
PINTEC/IBGE on the obstacles to innovation to reinforce
our identification of obstacle (1) above. In this section, we
provide evidence that validates proposition A.
In the fourth section, we present the BR Survey, under-
taken in 2008–2009 with firms, universities and research
institutes located in Brazil. We focus on obstacles to uni-
versity–firm interaction that were noted by the universities,
seek to infer the specificities of the Brazilian case and find
evidence to reinforce our identification of obstacle (2)
above. In this section, we also present evidence to validate
our proposition B.
In the last section, we offer our concluding remarks.
Knowledge, learning, competence building
and innovation
Recent literature on innovation systems provides an impor-
tant framework for understanding both quantitative and
qualitative differences among countries (Edquist and
Hommen, 2011; Freeman, 1995; Lundvall et al., 2009;
Nelson, 1993). Many elements can influence the develop-
ment process in a particular country. Among those ele-
ments, we identify, among others, the productive
structure of specialization, the presence and role of multi-
nationals in R&D activities, the financing structure of inno-
vation, the format and role of the S&T structure, the role of
institutions in imitation and technical development pro-
cesses, industrial and innovation policies and the macroe-
conomic environment. Therefore, an analysis of the
innovation processes in any NIS must be closely related
to historical factors, which are central to an understanding
of the factors that influence the processes of competence
building, learning and innovation.
1
Regarding the role of firms in innovation processes,
evolutionary theory has moved away from the axioms of
traditional microeconomics, particularly since Nelson and
Winter (1982) suggested that the internal processes which
define the particular operations of each firm (i.e. their
Rapini et al. 169
routines) could be understood as functioning like biological
genes. The basic concept behind that analogy is that muta-
tions occur, but many characteristics loaded from yesterday
to today and from today to tomorrow persist. In the devel-
opment process, firms learn and develop their knowledge,
which defines their competences.
The necessary competences – the required set of
knowledge, skills and expertise – (Borra´s and Edquist,
2014) are vital to generate and manage a firm’s techno-
logical changes (Bell and Pavitt, 1993, 1995). These com-
petences are cumulative and are found both in individuals
(in their skills, knowledge and experiences
2
) and in orga-
nizational systems, which are formed and affected by
individuals.
Lall (1992), Bell and Cassiolato (1993) and Bell and
Pavitt (1997) agree that firms located in newly industrializ-
ing nations, such as Brazil, have not developed the tech-
nologies they use: in these nations, most technologies are
imported. The importing of technology is a key element;
however, firms that import technology are not directly
involved in many of the benefits earned by innovators once
the importing firm has become merely a locus for the rea-
lization of an innovation process, whose creation is entirely
exogenous. Therefore, benefits created by the innovation
process, such as new knowledge, are not appropriated by
the importing firm. Importing firms must invest heavily in
developing new competences and upgrading the ones they
already have.
Nevertheless, as highlighted by Nelson (1991), compe-
tence building is not simple. Firms in newly industrialized
nations face at least two significant challenges:
a change in strategy – they must (re)define and ratio-
nalize their goals and how they can pursue them and
a change in structure – they must rethink their orga-
nizational system, and thus how decisions are effec-
tively made.
A change in structure is much more difficult than a
change in strategy because it involves advances in new com-
petences, both individual and organizational (Nelson, 1991).
Competence levels are not the same across all firms
(Lall, 1992, 1994) and range from the most basic to the
most sophisticated (the more sophisticated, the more inten-
sive in R&D). For instance, in the Brazilian industrial struc-
ture, there are rare cases of firms that can advance the
technological frontier.
3
Finding Brazilian firms that
respond rapidly to moves by world leaders is also rare, such
rapid response involving sophisticated competences and
significant R&D investment.
4
A closer look at the Brazilian context reveals a small
proportion of innovative firms and relatively little growth
during 2000–2011 (from 31.5%to 35.5%,asshownin
Table 1).
5
We note that spending on machine and equipment
acquisitions forms an important part of the strategy of Bra-
zilian innovative firms (although this expenditure showed a
relative decrease in the same period); however, these acqui-
sitions are not followed by spending on training, which lim-
its the competence upgrading in firms (declining from 1.9%
to 1.2%in the period). In the same period, internal R&D
efforts increased, the percentage of overall expenditure
almost doubling (16.8%–29.8%–seeTable1).
6
The growth of Brazilian firms’ internal R&D efforts
suggests a change in their behaviour in favour of more
sophisticated and technologically promising strategies.
However, external R&D and external competence acquisi-
tion do not appear to be part of their strategy, as can be seen
from Table 1. Although external R&D acquisition is a less
important strategy for these innovative firms, its use
increased during the period (accounting for 2.8%of spend-
ing on innovative activities in 2000 and 4.4%in 2011).
The literature has paid special attention to R&D activi-
ties since Cohen and Levinthal (1990) highlighted their
dual effect. On the one hand, these activities are associated
with generating knowledge that is directly applicable to
products and processes, such as an increase in competence
stock. On the other hand, knowledge absorption is gener-
ated by potential external technology partners, such as uni-
versities, research institutes, suppliers and customers. In
fact, many recent empirical studies have found a strong
relationship between the use of intra-firm R&D, interac-
tions with advanced sources of S&T and the generation of
Table 1. Innovative efforts by Brazilian firms, 2000–2011.
Variables 2000 2003 2005 2008 2011
Total firms 72,005 84,262 95,301 100,496 116,632
Innovative firms/total firms (%) 31.5 33.3 34.4 38.1 35.5
Expenditure on innovative activities (%)
Machines and equipment 52.2 49.7 48.4 49.2 46.9
Internal R&D 16.8 22.0 20.9 24.5 29.8
External R&D 2.8 2.9 2.8 4.0 4.4
External knowledge acquisition 5.2 3.4 4.7 2.7 2.8
Training 1.9 2.0 1.8 2.1 1.2
Note: R&D: research and development; PINTEC: Pesquisa de Inovac¸a
˜o; IBGE: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics.
Source: Authors. Data sourced from PINTEC/IBGE.
170 Industry and Higher Education 31(3)
high-level innovations. Therefore, R&D is a way to gen-
erate new knowledge and to learn from universities and
research institutes (Caloghirou et al., 2004; To¨dtling
et al., 2009; Vega-Jurado et al., 2008).
External competences can be derived from other firms’
routines, enabling access to external knowledge. Borra´s
and Edquist (2014) stress that firms interact externally with
other firms in many different ways, one of which, for the
purposes of this article, is crucial: the role of university–
firm relations in developing human resources.
Lundvall (2010) argued convincingly about the central
role of learning processes in today’s economy. The litera-
ture suggests a wide range of learning methods (both inter-
nal and external). The following major types of learning
processes listed by Malerba (1992: 848) continue to con-
stitute a useful summary:
1. learning by doing – internal to the firm and related
to production activity;
2. learning by using – internal to the firm and related
to the use of products, machinery and inputs;
3. learning by searching – internal to the firm and
frequently related to formal activities of knowledge
generation, such as R&D;
4. learning by interacting – external to the firm and
related to interactions with customers, suppliers and
competitors;
5. learning from inter-industry spillovers – external to
the firm and related to what competitors and other
firms are doing and
6. learning from advances in S&T – external to the
firm and related to the absorption of new knowledge
in S&T.
In an effort to differentiate relevant forms of learning,
Jensen et al. (2007) subdivided the learning categories with
respect to the ‘degree’ of tacit knowledge involved: the
doing, using and interacting (DUI) mode includes knowl-
edge acquired through learning by DUI, whereas the sci-
ence, technology and innovation (STI) mode emphasizes
explicit and codified knowledge. Using this categorization,
Jensen et al. (2007) found that:
when firms are organized (intentionally or unintention-
ally) in a way that promotes the DUI mode of learning, the
probability of product innovation increases,
firms with strong a science base (STI mode of learn-
ing) are more innovative and
firms’ innovative capacity is significantly increased
when the two modes of learning are combined.
Jensen et al. (2007) identify ‘learning’ as the main process
in today’s economy and the knowledge that emerges from
this process as the key resource. Foray and Lundvall
(1998), Jensen et al. (2007) and Lundvall (2008a, 2008b)
suggest that four different types of knowledge are involved
in both learning and innovation processes:
1. know-what – knowledge about facts (usually called
‘information’),
2. know-why – knowledge about the principles and
laws of nature, highly relevant to innovation devel-
opment in science-based industries,
3. know-how – knowledge rooted in practice (the abil-
ity to do something, thus skills) and
know-who – ‘who knows what’ and ‘who knows how to do
what’; if we accept that the combination of knowledge
becomes increasingly complex as disciplines advance, then
know-who also involves the ‘social ability to co-operate
and communicate with different kinds of peoples and
experts’ (Johnson et al. 2002: 251) both within and, most
importantly, outside the firm.
Each of these knowledge types entails some level of
tacit knowledge. The first two types above are the most
codified, while the last two are the most tacit, and there-
fore the more difficult to transmit or transfer. Importantly,
‘knowledge’ is much more than a synonym of informa-
tion. Information generally covers only two components
of knowledge: know-what and know-why. These two
types come closest to being market commodities. Know-
how and know-who are more difficult to codify and mea-
sure (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment, 1996), given their social embeddedness, and so
they cannot easily be transferred through formal channels
of information.
According to our proposition A, the weakness of Brazi-
lian industrial firms and the workforce supply generate
scarce or inadequate know-why, despite political efforts
to increase the labour supply and upgrade individual com-
petences. Qualified individuals embody specific knowl-
edge and ‘soft skills’
7
that can be used in the production
process and are needed to create new products. As we
discuss later in this article, many Brazilian firms lack
know-why because their structure is weak and they are not
accustomed to dynamic innovative processes. As we also
discuss in the sections that follow, the structure of Brazilian
universities is the root of the weakness of the generation of
know-what and know-who (‘proposition B’).
The above discussion is intended to call attention to the
body of knowledge that may be needed in the processes of
learning and innovation in NSIs. These processes involve a
variety of actors, but the firm is the central player. In the
Brazilian NSI, a major weakness of firms is their low level
of R&D activity. Consequently, efforts have been made to
overcome this deficiency through public policy. In the next
section, we present an examination of recent Brazilian S&T
policies focused on public university expansion and decen-
tralization with a view to human capital development
through competence building.
Rapini et al. 171
Brazilian industrial policies in perspective
The 1990s marked a change in the orientation of Brazilian
economic policy through a long process of deregulation
and economic liberalization. Brazil modified its legal and
institutional apparatus to make it more attractive to for-
eign direct investment, leaving aside a substantial indus-
trial and science, tecnhology and innovation (STI) policy
as a means of fostering endogenous development.
The lack of a genuine industrial policy and a misunder-
standing of the role of public policy, along with the
macroeconomic model deployed (appreciation of the
domestic currency and high interest rates), resulted in an
increase in the country’s external vulnerability and inhib-
ited productive investment and economic growth
(Bielschowsky and Mussi, 2013; Cano and Silva, 2010;
Suzigan and Furtado, 2005).
Regarding innovation policies, actions were sparse in
the 1990s. The exceptions were the establishment of the
‘Sector-Specific Funds Policy’ by the Brazilian Ministry of
Science, Technology and Innovation (Ministe´rio da Cieˆn-
cia, Tecnologia e Inovac¸a
˜o (MCTI)) and the proposal of an
innovation law to provide stimulus to technological inno-
vation by modernizing the regulatory environment, provid-
ing training focused on innovation and viewing the
formulation of an S&T policy as a development strategy.
There were also, in the 1990s, initiatives aimed at pro-
moting university–firm interactions (which can help
explain proposition B). The alpha and omega programmes
of MCTI were designed to support small and medium-sized
enterprises. The Technological Training Support Pro-
gramme (Programa de Apoio a` Capacitac¸a
˜o Tecnolo´ gica),
initiated in 1998, aimed to disseminate and transfer tech-
nology from academia to industry. Additionally, for the
first time, projects to promote cooperation between firms
and universities/research institutes were launched.
The 10,168/2000 Act, which established the ‘pro-
gramme to encourage university–firm interaction to sup-
port innovation’ (Green and Yellow Fund – Fundo Verde
e Amarelo) is worth highlighting. The Sector-Specific
Funds Policy was created primarily to finance activities
related to S&T in various sectors of the national industry
and focused on stimulating the development of scientific
and technological research by the productive sector. In
1997, the first Sector-Specific Fund was created for the oil
and natural gas sector.
Since the 2000s, industrial policies have made a slow
comeback in Latin America, even with their open econo-
mies and orthodox macroeconomic policies (Peres, 2006).
In Brazil, Lula’s administration restored an industrial pol-
icy, marking a break with previous governments through
the formulation of the Industrial, Technological and For-
eign Trade Policy (Polı´tica Industrial, Tecnolo´gicaede
Come´ rcio Exterior (PITCE)). This policy was anchored
in two macro programmes – Strong Industry and Innovate
Brazil – that sought greater involvement in international
trade but still continued the macroeconomic policies of
Cardoso’s administration.
8
The discontinuity presented by the policies adopted by
Lula’s administration is highlighted in the investment
projects carried out with a developmental objective.
These projects involved the political dynamics of the
internal market, thereby supporting the private sector and
investments in infrastructure, social policies and credit
policies. In particular, we note the aforementioned PITCE
in 2004 and:
the Investment Pilot Programme (Programa Piloto
de Investimento), 2005;
the National Sector Fund for Scientific and Techno-
logical Development (Fundo Nacional de Desenvol-
vimento Cientı´fico e Tecnolo´gico), 2007;
the Productive Development Plan (Plano de Desen-
volvimento Produtivo), 2008;
the Growth Acceleration Plan (Plano de Acelerac¸a
˜o
do Crescimento), 2007 and
the Greater Brazil Plan (Plano Brasil Maior), 2011.
However, Cano and Silva (2010) emphasize that, before
the launch of these programmes, some attempts in this
direction were made through the policy documents Road-
map for Development (Roteiro para Agenda de Desenvol-
vimento) and Guidelines for PITCE (Diretrizes de Polı
´
tica
Industrial, Tecnolo
´gica e de Come
´rcio Exterior), both
launched in 2003.
Without a doubt, PITCE led to progress in industrial and
development policy in Brazil. PITCE was reintroduced into
the public policy agenda as an instrument of economic
development (Peres, 2006; Suzigan and Furtado, 2005).
Other subsequent government actions were important in
promoting an innovation policy:
the Innovation Law(Lei da Inovac¸a
˜o),
the Good Law (Lei do Bem),
the Information Technology Law (Lei da Informa´-
tica) and
the Biosafety Law (Lei da Biosseguranc¸a).
The Greater Brazil Plan, launched in 2011 by Rousseff’s
administration, continued the economic planning of Lula’s
administration (PITCE and PDP) to sustain economic
growth in Brazil. According to Almeida (2011), the Plan
demonstrates that the government attributed an important
role to industry in promoting national development. More-
over, its strengths lay in its pioneering of actions such as the
dispensing of investment and exports and the significant
contribution of the Brazilian Innovation Agency (Financia-
dora de Estudo e Projetos) and the Brazilian National
Development Bank (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento
Econoˆ mico e Social) in providing finance for investment
and innovation. However, Almeida (2011) points out that,
172 Industry and Higher Education 31(3)
even with the measures proposed by the Greater Brazil
Plan, Brazil is still far from being a facilitator and promoter
of investment, innovation and exports and remains unlikely
to become more autonomous in terms of technology.
The above summary conveys the impression that many
government incentives to engage in more virtuous innova-
tion processes were adopted, particularly during Lula’s
administrations. However, the Brazilian innovation rate,
9
for example, showed no significant change throughout the
period. That is, despite these recent efforts to leverage
Brazilian firms’ innovation processes, the statistics do not
indicate that a concomitant improvement in innovative
performance accompanied the government’s efforts. From
our perspective, this dichotomy can be understood in light
of the increasing importance of qualified individuals to
innovation processes – perceived only recently by Brazi-
lian firms.
During Cardoso’s administration (1995–2002), the
expansion of access to higher education led to a counter-
democratization effect because it broadened the number of
private higher education institutions and caused a concen-
tration in large urban centres (Pereira and Silva, 2010). In
contrast, Lula’s administration (2003–2010) reasserted the
role of the state as an agent for university expansion in the
country, creating policies such as:
the University for All Programme (Programa Uni-
versidade para Todos),
the Open University of Brazil (Universidade Aberta
do Brasil) and
the Reorganization and Expansion of Federally
Funded Universities Programme (Programa de
Apoio ao Plano de Reestruturac¸a
˜o e Expansa
˜o das
Universidades Federais).
Moreover, during Lula’s administration, educational
loans – the Funds for Financing Higher Education (Fundo
de Financiamento ao Estudante do Ensino Superior) –
increased.
In short, the Brazilian government has made significant
efforts in recent decades to expand access to higher educa-
tion and, consequently, to expand the supply of qualified
individuals. Such efforts would seem valid ways of improv-
ing the training and qualification of individuals and should
enhance the STI capacity of the country if they are appro-
priately integrated into national STI policies. Extending the
stock of human capital with higher education diplomas
does not, however, in itself guarantee the quality of profes-
sionals who enter the labour force and does not ensure that
they are trained in a manner consistent with the strategic
areas identified by government or with firms’ strategies.
Likewise, an increase in graduates does not guarantee the
production of new scientific and technological knowledge
in strategic areas. There is, therefore, a great distinction
between policies to expand the supply of individuals with
tertiary diplomas and those that aim to build and upgrade
individual competences.
Competence building involves ‘the acquisition of infor-
mation, knowledge, understanding and skills by individual
people, through participation in some form of education
and training, whether formal [ ...] or informal [ ...]’ (Bor-
ra´s and Edquist, 2014). In this regard, universities can con-
tribute through the production of formally qualified
individuals and through research that has direct application
to the productive sector, generating competitive returns for
companies that can transform scientific knowledge into
technological innovations. In this context, Chiarini and
Vieira (2011) attempted to relate the strategic areas pro-
posed by PITCE with the areas of knowledge identified by
the Coordination of Improvement of Higher Education Per-
sonnel initiative (Coordenac¸a
˜o de Aperfeic¸oamento de Pes-
soal de Nı´vel Superior (CAPES)), which include exact and
earth sciences, biological sciences, engineering, health
sciences, agricultural sciences, social sciences, humanities,
linguistics, letters and arts and multidisciplinary (Table 2).
In Table 2, we have added an update to the above anal-
ysis by including, in the right-hand column, the structural
areas defined by the Greater Brazil Plan (Plano Brasil
Maior). We opted to relate the areas of knowledge only
to the structuring guidelines regarding the expansion and
creation of new technological capabilities and business
(capital goods, information and communication, chemical
and petrochemical, aviation and space technology, defence
complex and complex industrial health) and the develop-
ment of supply chains in energy (oil and gas, bioethanol,
renewable energy).
The engineering areas – particularly chemical engi-
neering, mechanical engineering, aerospace engineering,
electrical and electronics engineering, biomedical engi-
neering, telecommunications engineering and materials
engineering – essential for the structural areas defined
by the Greater Brazil Plan are emphasized. However,
when analysing the scientific potential in the CAPES
areas of knowledge (exact and earth sciences, engineering
and health) according to the number of researchers and
the research production (articles), we find that 40%of
researchers affiliated with research groups (Directory of
Research Groups (DRGs) of the National Council for
Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq))
belong to these areas, with 10%belonging to exact and
earth sciences, 12%to engineering and 17%to health
sciences (Table 3). In terms of production, these areas
accounted for 13%,9%and 25%, respectively, of articles
published in national and international journals (compris-
ing 47%of the total).
However, an investigation into the area of engineering
indicates that, among 18,579 researchers in 2010, 17.6%
were in the electrical engineering field and 11.4%and
10.4%were in civil engineering and mechanical engineer-
ing, respectively, which are important but traditional areas.
Rapini et al. 173
Only 3%and 1%of researchers were in biomedical engi-
neering and aerospace engineering, respectively (Table 4)
and linked to strategic development sectors.
The data presented in Tables 3 and 4 indicate a mis-
alignment between the areas of research and the training
of researchers and the national strategic development
sectors. The lack of qualified individuals both for the
internal generation of knowledge in companies and to
establish cooperation with other agents of the NIS is an
important structural bottleneck that has been ignored by
S&T policies.
In the following sections, we empirically investigate our
propositions A and B in relation to the scarcity of know-
why, know-who and know-what.
Lack of qualified individuals for innovation
processes
In the above discussion, we indicated that firms’ compe-
tences are cumulative and can be constructed in a manner
that permits changes in their routines to allow them to
innovate. Therefore, we now focus on the propositions pre-
sented in our introduction. We start by exploring the data
on the obstacles to innovation extracted from the Brazilian
Innovation Survey (PINTEC/IBGE) to reinforce the argu-
ment of proposition A, that is, Brazilian industrial firms
lack know-why, which leads to the increasing perception
that Brazilian firms lack qualified individuals who will
promote and implement innovation.
Table 2. Areas of knowledge in CAPES versus PITCE’s strategic areas and Plano Brasil Maior’s structural areas.
Areas of knowledge defined
by CAPES
Strategic areas defined
by PITCE Structural areas defined by Plano Brasil Maior
Exact and earth sciences Software Information technology
Chemistry
Engineering Semiconductors, capital
goods
Spatial and aeronautics, capital goods, communication, energy, health
equipment, petrochemistry
Health sciences Pharmacology Pharmacology
Agrarian sciences Biomass —
Biological sciences — —
Applied social sciences — —
Humanities — —
Linguistics, letters and arts — —
Multidisciplinary Biotechnology,
nanotechnology
—
Note: CAPES: Coordination of Improvement of Higher Education Personnel; PITCE: Industrial, Technological and Foreign Trade Policy. Although there is
direct crossover between areas of knowledge (CAPES) and strategic areas (PITCE), nothing prevents research on particular strategic areas from being
carried out by researchers from other areas of knowledge. For example, although the strategic area ‘software’ is connected with ‘exact and earth
sciences’, research on software is also done in other areas, such as agrarian sciences, engineering, health sciences, social sciences, humanities and even
linguistics, letters and arts.
Source: Based on Chiarini and Vieira (2011: 314).
Table 3. Researchers in Brazil by knowledge area, 2010: Total, PhDs, article publication.
Total
researchers
Percentage of
total (%)
Percentage of researchers with a
PhD (%)
Total
articles
Articles as percentage of
total (%)
Agrarian science 15,269 10 77 113,928 16
Biological science 16,033 11 82 128,045 18
Health science 25,445 17 62 181,003 25
Exact and earth
sciences
14,621 10 81 91,422 13
Humanities 30,378 21 56 74,863 10
Applied social
science
18,579 13 52 49,410 7
Engineering 18,453 12 70 67,837 9
Linguistic, letters
and arts
8860 6 62 19,274 3
Total 147,638 100 66 725,782 100
Note: DRG: Directory of Research Group; CNPq: National Council for Scientific and Technological Development. Values shown refer to the sum of
researchers and articles from all institutions registered in the DRGs. Articles refer to the sum of national and international articles published.
Source: Authors. Data sourced from the DRGS (CNPq).
174 Industry and Higher Education 31(3)
Empirical evidence from PINTEC/IBGE
Data were extracted from PINTEC/IBGE, which has been
published since 2000, to examine obstacles to innovation in
Brazilian firms. PINTEC/IBGE investigates the reasons
given by firms for not implementing innovations. The pri-
mary reason given was market conditions (in the five edi-
tions of the survey), which included deficiencies in the
demand and/or supply structure – this explanation
accounted for 64.27%of the responses in 2011 but peaked
at 69.69%in 2005 (Table 5).
The perception that the disincentive to innovate was
attributable to prior innovations was expressed by
14.91%of all responses in 2011. The last reason, ‘other
factors’, accounted for 20.83%of total responses (in
2011) and ranged from economic factors, firms’ internal
problems (such as technical failures and access to infor-
mation), problems in cooperating with other agents and
regulation. The trends of innovative and non-innovative
firms’ responses to these other factors are shown in Figure 1
(and in Appendix 1).
In Figure 1, the number of innovative and non-
innovative firms that attributed ‘high importance’ to each
factor is recorded. In general, the obstacles linked to the
economic environment were considered important, as
Table 4. Percentage of engineering researchers by field of knowledge, Brazil, 2010.
Electric engineering 17.6% Agricultural engineering 5.0%
Civil engineering 11.4% Fishery engineering 4.6%
Mechanic engineering 10.4% Biomedical engineering 3.0%
Materials and metallurgic engineering 9.9% Nuclear engineering 2.5%
Industrial (production) engineering 9.7% Transportation engineering 1.7%
Chemical engineering 8.2% Mining engineering 1.0%
Sanitary engineering 6.9% Aerospatiale engineering 1.0%
Forestry engineering 6.8% Naval and oceanic engineering 0.3%
Note: DRG: Directory of Research Group; CNPq: National Council for Scientific and Technological Development.
Source: Authors. Data sourced from the DRGs (CNPq).
Table 5. Firms’ reasons for non-innovating, PINTEC, Brazil, 2000–2011.
Reason
2000 2003 2005 2008 2011
Number % Number % Number % Number % Number %
Because of previous innovation 5365 11.62 5984 11.10 6872 11.39 9912 15.57 11,863 14.91
Because of market conditions 25,698 55.65 35,253 65.39 42,030 69.69 35,820 56.26 51,152 64.27
Because of other factors 15,119 32.74 12,674 23.51 11,404 18.91 17,939 28.17 16,576 20.83
Total non-innovative firms 46,182 — 53,911 — 60,305 — 63,671 — 79,591 —
Total firms in the survey 72,005 — 84,262 — 95,301 — 107,605 — 128,699 –
Note: PINTEC: Pesquisa de Inovac¸a
˜o; IBGE: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics.
Source: Authors. Data sourced from PINTEC/IBGE.
Excessive economic risks Higher innovation costs Shortage of appropriate funding source
Organizational rigidities Lack of qualified individuals Lack of information about technology
Lack of information about market Few opportunities to cooperate with other firms/universities Difficulty in adapting to standards, norms and regulations
Weak consumer response to new product Lack of adequate external technical services
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
2000
Innovative firms
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Non-innovative firms
2003 2005 2008 2011 2000 2003 2005 2008 2011
Figure 1. Barriers to innovation: innovative and non-innovative firms, Brazil, 2000–2011.
Source: Authors. Data sourced from PINTEC/IBGE. PINTEC: Pesquisa de Inovac¸a
˜o; IBGE: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics.
Rapini et al. 175
shown by the higher responses to excessive economic risks,
innovation costs and shortages of appropriate sources of
funding. Once the firm has opted for innovation, concerns
related to technical shortcomings (lack of qualified staff
and lack of external technical services), information prob-
lems (lack of access to technology and markets), internal
problems (organizational rigidity) and standards and regu-
lations are more significant. In these cases, the percentage
of innovative firms is generally higher than that of non-
innovative firms for all factors. However, this pattern has
changed significantly: the ‘lack of qualified individuals’,
which was not viewed as an important variable in the first
three editions of PINTEC/IBGE, became one of the most
important variables in the last edition.
There are two possible explanations for this change in
the outcome of PINTEC/IBGE. The first is that universities
and technical institutes are failing to build competences in
students that are concomitant with firms’ requirements,
thus creating a problem for firms that have incorporated
more aggressive innovation strategies – students are leav-
ing universities without proper or insufficient ‘scientific
knowledge of principles and laws of motion in nature, in
the human mind, and in society’ (Foray and Lundvall,
1998: 116) – in other words, know-why. A second explana-
tion could be the internal weaknesses of firms, which may
be related to an inability to reorganize their structures for
more aggressive innovation strategies – for example,
because of difficulties in paying for and/or enhancing exist-
ing professional competences. These difficulties in that
case create an ‘apparent’ lack of qualified individuals
(because firms are not using the available stock of know-
why adequately).
Research by the Institute for Applied Economic
Research (Instituto Nacional de Pesquisa Econoˆ mica Apli-
cada) shows that, in 2009, only 38%of the Brazilian work-
force with a college degree in engineering, construction and
production occupations were employed in the area they had
studied. Most trained engineers have not remained in engi-
neering jobs but have migrated to better paid positions,
such as those in management (Guso and Nascimento,
2011). Furthermore, most researchers in Brazil are still in
academia (67.5%of the total) and not in industrial sectors
(26.2%). This is contrary to the pattern identified in most
technologically advanced countries, where the majority of
researchers are in firms (e.g. 80%in the United States, 75%
in Japan and 58%in Germany).
10
Thus firms in these coun-
tries make considerably more use of the stock of know-why
outside academia.
Among the industrially innovative Brazilian firms,
researchers allocated to R&D with a postgraduate degree
(master’s or PhD) account for only 8.0%of the total per-
sonnel. Researchers with only a bachelor’s degree represent
the majority at 44.9%, and 10.7%are still undergraduate
students. Therefore, 55.6%of R&D researchers have no
postgraduate education (Table 6), which may explain the
obstacles relating to the internal organization of firms, such
as a lack of information about markets and technology and
difficulty in adapting to standards, rules and regulations
(know-why). This factor could also hinder cooperation with
universities and research institutes to the extent that dialo-
gue is not established because of a lack of know-who.
The fact that many engineers are engaged in adminis-
trative and management activities, that many researchers
are engaged in academic science and activities and that the
level of education of researchers in firms’ R&D depart-
ments is low are important elements in understanding the
structural characteristics of the Brazilian NSI. However,
these factors are not exactly new: in the previous section,
we documented the efforts of the Lula administration to
improve the qualifications of the workforce.
From the facts and data presented in this and the previ-
ous section, we believe that the increased perception of
firms that there is a lack of qualified people, despite the
federal government’s introduction of various innovation
policy instruments, may have two causes. First, innovation
policies have altered firms’ perceptions concerning the
advantages of engaging in more consistent innovation stra-
tegies
11
from instruments such as tax credits and funding
incentives. Second, there may be a qualitative mismatch
between the competences required by firms and those
offered by public education and research systems, that is,
the areas of concentration in educational policy do not
necessarily include the competencies demanded by
dynamic innovation processes. If a firm’s strategy shifts
towards greater innovation and is stimulated by new incen-
tives, the lack of availability of appropriately qualified
individuals is an obstacle to effective change in the orga-
nizational structure.
We thus identify a misalignment between the areas of
research and knowledge generation and firms’ strategic
development, with universities not succeeding in provid-
ing appropriate human resources to meet industrial
demands. The difficulty experienced by firms in trans-
forming their structure to enable the initiation of more
Table 6. Personnel occupied in internal R&D in innovative firms,
by formal qualification level, Brazil, 2011.
Qualification Number %
Researchers
Postgraduate degree 5632 8.0
Bachelor’s degree 31,810 44.9
Undergraduate students 7604 10.7
Technologists
Bachelor’s degree 9959 14.0
Undergraduate students 9357 13.2
Others 6439 9.1
Total 70,800 100
Note: R&D: research and development; PINTEC: Pesquisa de Inovac¸a
˜o;
IBGE: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics.
Source: Authors. Data sourced from PINTEC/IBGE.
176 Industry and Higher Education 31(3)
sophisticated innovation processes suggests a lack of
available know-why. This weakness is also related to our
proposition B, since this type of knowledge can form the
basis on which firms access advanced S&T knowledge
(Foray and Lundvall, 1998). We therefore assume that
proposition A is correct.
Lack of qualified individuals in university–
firm interactions
This section was based on the BR Survey carried out with
universities/research institutes and firms in Brazil in 2008–
2009. The BR Survey used information from the DRGs of
the CNPq, which embraces all research groups that interact
with firms and other institutions.
The DRG/CNPq gathers information from various
institutions (federal- and state-funded universities, pri-
vate universities, research institutes, technological public
institutions, public and private R&D laboratories and
non-governmental organizations that are permanently
engaged in scientific and technological research). The
information relates to, among other things, groups,
human resources (researchers, students and technicians),
the research lines developed by these groups, knowledge
areas, sectors of activities involved, scientific and tech-
nological production and the types of relationships with
the productive sector. Adherence to the DRG/CNPq is
voluntary, although researchers are highly encouraged
to participate, primarily to gain access to public funding
and scientific research.
In the Census 2004 of DRG/CNPq, there were 375 uni-
versities and research institutions and 19,470 research
groups in Brazil. In that year, 2151 research groups
reported interactions with 3067 firms and institutions.
These 2151 interactive research groups constitute our uni-
versity database.
The questionnaire was prepared as part of the Roks
Project, which searched for common issues among all
members from Latin America, Asia and Africa and from
surveys of firms. The questionnaires for firms inspired by
the Yale and Carnegie Mellon Surveys (Klevorick et al.,
1995).
For Brazil, a national research network was established
to obtain answers from different Brazilian regions. Ques-
tionnaires were sent to firms and research groups affiliated
with universities and research institutes to ascertain the
characteristics of university–firm interactions in Brazil.
The BR Survey methodology is presented in depth by Fer-
nandes et al. (2010).
The university questionnaires were sent to 2151
research group leaders, and we received responses from
1005 groups (46.7%of the total) covering all 26 Brazilian
states. Most of the completed questionnaires were from
research groups in engineering (32.4%) and agricultural
sciences (19.9%; Table 7), following the Brazilian stan-
dard as evidenced by the DRG/CNPq (Rapini, 2007).
The responding groups were concentrated in the South
and Southeast regions of Brazil.
12
These regions accounted
for 75%of the responses. Moreover, 79%of the research
groups were affiliated with public universities: only 13.7%
were groups from private universities and 6.5%were
affiliated with research institutes. These figures confirm
that public universities in Brazil are the principal locus of
the production of new knowledge.
To verify our proposition B further, we investigate here
the universities’ perspectives and analyse the difficulties
they identify. The difficulties identified by the research
groups with regard to interaction with firms were split into
four categories:
organizational difficulties,
barriers to generating knowledge and personnel
training,
barriers related to cultural differences between aca-
demia and business and
institutional barriers.
Table 8 presents the group leaders’ responses according
to each of these categories and by major knowledge field.
In constructing Table 8, we considered only those obstacles
the researchers thought ‘very important’ or ‘moderately
important’.
The ‘organizational problems’ originate in internal pro-
cesses, whether in firms or in universities. This category
included the difficulties arising from bureaucracy, with
bureaucracy in universities (76.3%) appearing to be more
prevalent. This reinforces the need for initiatives such as
the innovation law and the creation of technological inno-
vation centres (‘bridge institutions’ or intermediaries)
aimed at facilitating the transfer of knowledge and technol-
ogy between universities and firms. In turn, bureaucracy in
firms (45.8%) was also significantly highlighted, indicating
that innovation management processes are needed.
Obstacles related to knowledge generation and person-
nel training are associated with the primary mission of
Table 7. Research groups by knowledge field, BR Survey, 2009.
Knowledge area
Research groups
Number %
Agrarian science 200 19.9
Biological sciences 117 11.6
Health sciences 104 10.3
Exact and earth sciences 158 15.7
Humanities 103 10.2
Engineering 323 32.4
Total 1.005 100
Source: Authors. Data sourced from BR Survey, 2009.
Rapini et al. 177
universities – to form a more educated population and a
more enlightened and culturally elevated society and to
produce scientific knowledge (Nowotny et al., 2001). In
this category, the lack of qualified individuals for establish-
ing a dialogue between the two parties is represented, as is a
lack of knowledge of each other’s needs. These shortcom-
ings may have their origins in obsolete curricula that are
distant from the reality of the productive sector. However,
the obstacles in this category as a whole are relevant but
have been ignored by Brazil’s STI policies, which perceive
knowledge production and personnel training to be suffi-
ciently aligned (Velho, 2007). Thus, the focus of STI pol-
icies has been on the acquisition and generation of
technology, financing, reducing the cost of research and
the issue of intellectual property, as discussed earlier.
Still with regard to the obstacles category concerning
knowledge generation and personnel training, we note that,
in the Brazilian case, universities realize it is difficult to
strengthen university–firm relations because of academic
researchers’ lack of knowledge about entrepreneurial needs
(60.4%) and about the relevance of their own work to firms
(60.4%). Universities also recognize that another reason for
inadequate university–firm interaction is the lack of appro-
priately qualified staff, both in universities and in firms, to
establish a dialogue (52.5 and 48.7%, respectively). The
importance of these aspects was confirmed by Turchi and
Porto (2012) in their analysis of Petrobras’s partnerships
with research groups from CNPq: many engineers recog-
nized the success of the partnerships because the com-
pany’s team and researchers from universities were
communicating in the same language.
Of the four aspects investigated regarding universities’
perceptions of the restrictions on the flow of knowledge
between universities and companies, three – the lack of
qualified individuals to establish a dialogue in universities,
the lack of knowledge of firms’ needs and the lack of
knowledge of activities carried out in universities – derive
from the functional inconsistency of the Brazilian univer-
sity in identifying potential technological demands in the
productive sector and thus to supply solutions for them.
In our view, the root of this weakness is the expectation
that researchers are equipped with the best information to
identify potential demands for their knowledge because
they best understand what they are doing. However, in the
reality of academic life researchers are often uninterested
in anything beyond their academic productivity. This is a
typical case of deficiency in obtaining know-who
(Johnson et al., 2002) – that is, a lack of the social ability
to cooperate and communicate with different types of
people and experts.
The difficulty identified by universities caused by a lack
of qualified individuals to establish dialogue in firms sug-
gests the limited absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal,
1990) of Brazilian firms. This limitation reinforces our
understanding that the lack of more sophisticated knowl-
edge in firms, such as know-why (Foray and Lundvall,
1998), is at the root of the growing perception in firms of
a lack of qualified individuals to establish dialogue with
universities. This weakness may be attributed to the imita-
tive, dependent and opportunistic approaches (Freeman
and Soete, 2008) that have historically defined the strate-
gies of Brazilian firms.
Obstacles relating to the different nature and objectives
of universities and firms (the ‘different cultures’) also
appear to be important. Although both corporate and aca-
demic cultures may be engaged with the creative processes
Table 8. Barriers to interaction with firms by knowledge field (%) from the university perspective, Brazil, 2009.
Type Barrier
Knowledge field
Agrarian
science Engineering
Exact and
earth
sciences
Biological and
health science Humanities Total
Organizational University bureaucracy 72.5 83.6 81.6 70.6 65.0 76.3
Firm bureaucracy 35.5 52.0 47.5 48.0 38.8 45.8
Generation of
knowledge/staff
training
Lack of qualified individuals to
establish dialogue in universities
45.0 50.8 47.5 48.9 50.5 48.7
Lack of knowledge of firms needs 55.0 68.4 59.5 60.2 47.6 60.4
Lack of knowledge of activities
realized in universities
55.0 67.8 55.7 58.8 58.3 60.4
Lack of qualified individuals to
establish dialogue in firms
43.5 61.8 50.0 49.8 53.4 52.5
Different cultures Different research timing 32.0 50.8 31.2 34.8 30.1 38.1
Reliability 28.5 36.5 27.2 25.8 24.3 29.9
Different priorities 54.5 62.5 57.6 55.2 49.5 57.2
Institutional Research costs 67.5 71.8 51.9 63.8 62.1 65.1
Property rights 43.0 41.7 45.6 42.5 20.4 42.3
Geographical distance 38.5 31.3 25.9 2.71 24.3 29.1
Source: Authors. Data sourced from BR Survey, 2009.
178 Industry and Higher Education 31(3)
of generating new knowledge, they remain distinct from
one another, especially with regard to knowledge genera-
tion incentives. Science generated in universities is open
and the results are disseminated through publications. Tech-
nology generated by companies is practical and the results
are judged by its utility (Metcalfe, 2003). These differences
translate into disagreement over the research period and dif-
ferent priorities. Different priorities (57.2%) appear to be the
most significant characteristic of this obstacle as they ham-
per the precise definition of common research objectives and
the meeting of priorities of both sides.
Finally, obstacles arise from the institutional framework
of the NSI that do not originate directly from the activities
of the parties involved. These include the costs of research
(65.1%), property rights (42.3%) and geographical distance
(29.1%). With regard to the last item, previous studies have
shown that, when firms seek scientific excellence in
research groups, geographical distance is not a significant
problem (Righi and Rapini, 2006).
The other two obstacles – research costs and property
rights – are being addressed by STI policies, as discussed
above. Numerous programmes, research grants and fund-
ing lines have been created by federal institutions to
reduce the cost of research and innovation, a significant
obstacle in university–firm interactions. In turn, the issue
of property rights has been addressed through the creation
of intermediate institutions for university–firm coopera-
tion, such as the Centers of Innovation and Technology
Transfer (Nu
´cleo de Inovac¸o
˜es Tecnolo´gicas) in univer-
sities, to promote both the protection of inventions and
their transfer to the productive sector. Regarding the
knowledge field, we observed that groups from huma-
nities generally attributed less importance to barriers to
interaction with firms, which may be the result of the
prevailing modes of interaction – consultancy, courses
and training (Albuquerque et al., 2005).
Obstacles associated with generating knowledge and
training staff are especially important in areas where
research results are closely related to firms’ productive
activities, such as engineering and earth and exact
sciences. These two areas also produced a high percentage
of responses concerning the barriers pertaining to differ-
ent cultures, with significant difficulties identified in rela-
tion to different priorities and disagreements over
research time. This emphasis may be attributable to the
greater distinction in these areas between what is gener-
ated in the university (the prototype) and the application
in the commercial sector.
Among the institutional obstacles, research costs are
especially relevant in engineering, agricultural sciences
and biological and health sciences. The last, which
includes biotechnology, has even been the target of
numerous government programmes (it is considered a
strategic area) to reduce the cost of research (Judice and
Vedovello, 2011).
STI policies in Brazil were designed to overcome obsta-
cles historically present in university–firm interactions.
The innovation policies were implemented in a context of
economic growth with increased employment. Industrial
activities increased significantly, and so consequently did
the demand for qualified workers. In addition, the exchange
rate remained stable and wages increased, putting pressure
on the competitiveness of domestic industry. In this envi-
ronment, firms moved towards innovation strategies,
demanding appropriately qualified workers. The knowl-
edge training gap, however, even if it is addressed by some
of the STI policies, has its roots in structural issues, which
require time and institutional change.
Final considerations
The perception of Brazilian firms that there is a lack of
qualified individuals for the innovation process is a new
element, verified just when the number of innovation pol-
icies in the country had increased substantially, specifically
since Lula’s administration. However, the increase in pol-
icy initiatives was not accompanied by a corresponding
increase in performance, according to indicators such as
the rate of innovation.
This article examined this dichotomy using neo-
Schumpeterian contributions as an analytical framework.
Hence, we assume that firms’ strategies may be changing
with the upsurge of industrial and innovation policies in
Brazil. The increased awareness of a lack of qualified
individuals is a sign that many firms are attempting to
innovate more. However, as pointed out by Nelson
(1991), a change in strategy cannot be successful if the
capabilities needed to effect that change are not available.
In other words, the lack of qualified individuals is limiting
firms’ structural changes. The difficulty experienced by
firms in transforming their structures so that more sophis-
ticated innovative processes can be initiated is attributable
to a lack of know-why, demonstrating that our proposition
Aisvalid.
We have argued that there is a disconnect between the
efforts of educational policy and innovation policy to
expand the supply of human resources focused on techno-
logical development. This disconnect between innovation
and educational policies suggests a ‘learning divide’ (Aro-
cena and Sutz, 2010) that begins in the ‘learning by study-
ing’ phase. Therefore, the integration of these policies is an
urgent priority for the relevant authorities, such as the Min-
istry of Education and Culture (Ministe´ rio da Educac¸a
˜oe
Cultura) and the Ministry of Science, Technology, Innova-
tions and Communications (Ministe´rio da Cieˆncia, Tecno-
logia, Inovac¸o
˜es e Comunicac¸o
˜es). However, we do not
intend to suggest that the government’s role should be lim-
ited to removing barriers to a free market through policies
that force universities to ‘serve’ the market. It must be
remembered that the main role of the university is not that
Rapini et al. 179
of a broker of technology or a commercial competitor
(Bozeman, 2000). The university has two basic functions
to form a more educated, more enlightened and culturally
stronger society, and to produce scientific knowledge
(Nowotny et al., 2001).
The analysis of the data from leaders of research groups
on the obstacles to university–firm interactions in Brazil
(the BR Survey) indicated that the lack of qualified indi-
viduals to establish dialogues between the two parties was a
significant factor. These data indicate the validity of our
proposition B. The lack of knowledge in firms and univer-
sities of one another’s needs may have its origin in outdated
curricula that are distant from the commercial sector’s real-
ity. Another reason could be the lack of the kind of com-
petences displayed by a technology transfer agent, with
experience in building relationships between different con-
stituencies and negotiating complex agreements, and an
ability to understand both universities’ and firms’ particu-
larities (‘soft’ skills).
In addition to this more general analysis, we explored
the issue of workforce quality, examining universities’ per-
ceptions of university–firm interactions. As a result of this
analysis, we conclude that the lack of qualified individuals
may be associated with more than the specific competences
of researchers or, rather, their specific challenges in their
areas of research. The data may point to an inability on the
part of academics to identify potential demand in the com-
mercial sector and the supply solutions required. Of course,
this lack of ability may simply reflect the historical distance
of the parties.
Brazilian innovation policy should focus on building
different internal and external sources of competence.
Vocational training programmes and human capital poli-
cies could be enhanced by better aligning educational pol-
icy with innovation policy, as suggested by Borra´s and
Edquist (2014). In the Brazilian case, the National Pro-
gramme for Access to Technical Education and Employ-
ment (Programa Nacional de Acesso ao Ensino Te´cnico e
Emprego (PRONATEC)), launched in 2011, is an initiative
in this direction. PRONATEC offers vocational training
(up to 6 months) for workers who want to grow and learn
a new profession. University–firm interactions for human
resources development are embraced by the Human
Resources Training Program in Strategic Areas (Programa
de Formac¸a
˜o de Recursos Humanos em A
´reas Estrate´gicas)
coordinated by the CNPq. Although the programme
includes only a small proportion of innovative firms, it
could be integrated with other programmes to contribute
more significantly to bridging the funding and knowledge
gap in such firms.
Authors’ Note
The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors alone.
They do not necessarily reflect the views of, or involve any
responsibility on the part of, the institutions to which the authors
are affiliated. Any errors remain the fault of the authors. An early
version of this article was presented at the 14th Globelics Inter-
national Conference, 12–14 October 2016, Bandung, Indonesia.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with
respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support
for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This
work was supported by Pro´-Reitoria de Pesquisa (PRPQ) from
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (Edital 07/2015 – Pro-
grama Institucional para Melhoria Qualitativa da Produc¸a
˜o Cien-
tı´fica) and by Coordenac¸a
˜o de Aperfeic¸oamento de Pessoal de
Nı´vel Superior (CAPES) from the Brazilian Ministry of Education
(MEC)[BEX 5796/15-6]. ‘BR Survey Project’ was funded by
Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cientifico e Tecnolo-
gico, CNPq from the Brazilian Ministry of Science, Tecnology
and Innovation (MCTI)[Process: 478994/2006-0] and by Interna-
tional Development Research Centre (IDRC), Canada.
Notes
1. More than that, understanding the cumulative characteristics
of firms assists in recognizing that the implementation of
practices observed as virtuous in one country may not neces-
sarily occur in others with different historical trajectories.
2. Individual competence is acquired through formal education
(primary, secondary and tertiary levels) and training at the
workplace (Borra´s and Edquist, 2014).
3. EMBRAER, Petrobra´s and Companhia Vale do Rio Doce are
examples and exceptions.
4. Freeman and Soete (2008) found that the technological stra-
tegies of firms that compete at the technological frontier are
‘offensive’. However, firms may have other less sophisticated
strategies that are ‘imitative’, ‘dependent’, ‘traditional’ and
‘opportunistic’.
5. In comparison, the European Community Survey in 2002–
2010 points to an increase in European firms from 39.5%to
52.9%.
6. In comparison, the reverse is true in some European Union
countries: the highest percentage of spending is on internal
research and development, and the acquisition of machinery
and equipment covers 20–30%of total spending.
7. According to Davies et al. (2011), soft skills are sense-
making in communication, social intelligence, novel and
adaptive thinking, new media literacy, transdisciplinarity,
new design mindsets, cognitive load management and virtual
collaboration.
8. Fernando Henrique Cardoso served for two terms as the Pres-
ident of Brazil from 1995 to 2002. Important features of
Cardoso’s administration were the stabilization of monetary
policies and the deepening of the privatization programme.
Cardoso is identified with neo-liberalism and right-wing pol-
itics. After he had concluded his mandate, Luiz Ina´cio Lula da
180 Industry and Higher Education 31(3)
Silva from the Workers’ Party was elected as the President for
two consecutive terms from 2003 to 2010. Lula is regarded as
one of the most popular politicians in Brazilian history and
his period as the president is characterized especially by its
social programmes. Lula supported Dilma Rousseff’s candi-
dacy: She was inaugurated as the first woman president of
Brazil in 2011 and was re-elected for 2015–18.
9. The innovation rate is the share of innovative companies in
each period. The rate increased from 31.5%in 1998–2000 to
35.5%in 2009–2011; see Table 1.
10. Data sourced from the Brazilian Science, Technology and
Innovation Ministry (Ministe´rio da Cieˆncia, Tecnologia e
Inovac¸a
˜o). Available at: www.mct.gov.br.
11. What derives from the increasing importance of qualified
labour to the innovation processes, perceived only recently
by entrepreneurs.
12. This concentration results from a historical–structural con-
centration of a technical–scientific base in the most dynamic
centres of the country. Schwartzman (1979), Albuquerque
et al. (2002), Motoyama (2004), Diniz and Gonc¸alves
(2005), Suzigan and Albuquerque (2008), Santos and Caliari
(2012) and more recently Chiarini et al. (2013) show the
concentration of the technical and scientific infrastructure
in Brazil.
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Appendix 1
Table 1A. Barriers to innovation: Innovative and non-innovative firms in Brazil, 2000–2011.
2000 2003 2005 2008 2011
Barriers
Innovative firms
Non-innovative
firms Innovative firms
Non-innovative
firms Innovative firms
Non-innovative
firms Innovative firms
Non-innovative
firms Innovative firms
Non-innovative
firms
Number (%) Number (%) Number (%) Number (%) Number (%) Number (%) Number (%) Number (%) Number (%) Number (%)
Excessive economic risks 6069 48.90 7170 47.42 6728 52.84 7400 58.39 5568 48.20 5785 50.73 7184 39.11 8622 48.06 8992 41.41 7082 42.72
Higher innovation costs 7465 60.15 9868 65.27 6990 54.90 9004 71.05 6356 55.02 7500 65.77 8731 47.53 10,298 57.41 11,114 51.18 9314 56.19
Shortage of appropriate funding
sources
5872 47.31 6748 44.63 5855 45.99 5789 45.68 5301 45.89 5739 50.32 6984 38.02 7088 39.51 9269 42.68 6542 39.47
Organizational rigidities 766 6.17 1066 7.05 743 5.84 811 6.40 1143 9.90 707 6.20 2662 14.49 1170 6.52 3500 16.12 2226 13.43
Lack of qualified individuals 2497 20.12 2455 16.24 3,047 23.93 2364 18.66 2658 23.01 1748 15.33 6777 36.89 3571 19.90 10,677 49.17 6458 38.96
Lack of information about
technology
1514 12.20 1673 11.07 1,939 15.23 1122 8.86 1366 11.83 1220 10.70 2431 13.23 1546 8.62 3345 15.40 2057 12.41
Lack of information about market 1179 9.50 1382 9.14 1,612 12.66 1015 8.01 1134 9.82 836 7.33 1753 9.54 1120 6.24 2819 12.98 1624 9.80
Few opportunities to cooperate with
other firms/universities
2007 16.17 1988 13.15 2,109 16.56 1502 11.85 1564 13.54 1594 13.98 2850 15.52 3034 16.91 4479 20.63 1969 11.88
Difficulty in adapting to standards,
norms and regulations
1186 9.56 1705 11.28 2,257 17.73 1971 15.56 2098 18.16 1,757 15.41 2537 13.81 2287 12.75 4241 19.53 2440 14.72
Weak consumer response to new
product
950 7.65 1112 7.35 1,229 9.66 999 7.89 1279 11.08 793 6.96 1821 9.92 1741 9.70 2580 11.88 1723 10.39
Lack of adequate external technical
services
1279 10.31 1753 11.59 1,466 11.52 1025 8.09 1748 15.13 1,392 12.21 2994 16.30 1940 10.82 4914 22.63 2931 17.68
Total firms that responded 12,411 15,119 12,732 12,674 11,551 11,404 18,369 17,939 21,714 16,576
Source: Authors’ own analysis. Data sourced from PINTEC/IBGE.
183
