Nikolay Korgin

Nikolay Korgin
Institute of Control Sciences | IPU · Laboratory of Active Systems

Dr of Sc

About

72
Publications
28,011
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717
Citations
Introduction
Mechanism Design - theory, laboratory, and field experiments, business games development

Publications

Publications (72)
Conference Paper
Full-text available
The paper explores the complex essence of prototypes in industrial design that allows for engaging and teaming up various stakeholders and product contributors, and for design students to be deliberately exposed to the challenges of real-life projects. It provides a case study of a handcrafted metal framework that prompted a series of collaborative...
Article
Full-text available
The article describes a design and educational experiment that involves cooperation between developers and users of electric transportation for extreme natural and climatic conditions, scientists, students, and teachers of industrial design. The process of harmonizing the interests of different groups of participants in the dynamics of project coop...
Chapter
In the present paper we analyze data obtained in experiments of resource allocation games with two mechanisms: the Yang-Hajek’s mechanism (YH) and mechanism based on the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM). Previous research has shown that there is some correlation between consensus achievement and share of certain types of behavior....
Article
Results of four-year experimental trials of a Gaming Lab for understanding power markets are presented in here. The main goal of Gaming Lab was to illustrate the effects of strategic behavior on electricity markets, recognize pricing mechanisms and analyse the issues that emerge from competitive electricity markets. Evidences for reproducibility of...
Article
Cooperative Game Theory has recently attracted attention in power systems research as a tool for expansion planning analysis. However, this analysis is usually performed in an ex-post manner, i.e., planning and operation decisions are separated from the allocation mechanisms themselves. This paradigm implies selecting an allocation rule to share th...
Chapter
Full-text available
An approach to the selection of structure for integrated rating mechanism to be identified given complete learning dataset is suggested. Theoretical assertions and derived from them constructive algorithm for full binary tree selection are described. Challenges for the extension of the approach suggested to incomplete data sets are outlined.
Article
In recent years, mechanisms of cooperation in power systems have attracted increasing attention from academia and industry. Such mechanisms require sharing the benefits of cooperation among participants based on some rational and obvious principles. In this regard, Cooperative Game Theory (CGT) provides a rich theoretical background for the analysi...
Article
We describe prerequisites for the emergence of the key concept of incentive compatibility in the theory of active systems and mechanism design and give a survey of approaches to this problem, which have led to stating the fair play and revelation principles, and of current trends in this branch of scientific knowledge. Potential difficulties and d...
Article
We present an approach to discrete datasets analysis on the basis of integrated rating mechanisms identification approaches, developed recently. On the basis of three data sets, the results of the work of the method for identifying integrated rating mechanisms on incomplete data are demonstrated. The results obtained and the benefits from the appli...
Article
Motivated by research works on Zeuthen-Hicks bargaining, which leads to the Nash bargaining solution, we analyze experimental data of resource allocation gaming with Groves-Ledyard mechanism. The games were designed in the form of negotiation to allow players to reach consensus. Behavior models based on best response, constant behavior, and Nash ba...
Article
Full-text available
Motivated by research works on Zeuthen-Hicks bargaining, which leads to the Nash bargaining solution (Vetschera, 2018), we analyze data obtained during experimental resource allocation gaming with Yang-Hajek's mechanism from the class of proportional allocation mechanisms. Games were designed in the form of negotiation to allow players to reach con...
Article
In this paper, we present a framework for analyzing cross-border power interconnection projects based on Cooperative Game Theory. Compared to existing studies, we not only quantify the benefits of interconnections and suggest cost-benefit allocation techniques, but also analyze the stability of the allocations, which is a crucial aspect in regions...
Conference Paper
Full-text available
Cross-border electrical interconnection projects are getting more attention all over the world. In this context, the cost-benefit allocation is especially important due to the need for fair sharing of power trading benefits among the countries as well as allocating the investments in capital-intensive power lines. One convenient way of dealing with...
Conference Paper
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We present a conceptual framework that allows investigating problems and possibilities for cooperation in Arctic development. This is accomplished through a coopetition model that allows considering simultaneously cooperative and competitive interaction among different decision-makers. The conceptual framework is based on a multi-level approach to...
Conference Paper
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The report describes the approach for concordant integrated evaluation of projects on the basis of strategy-proof expert procedures, implementing the principles of program-goal approach to management of development of complex systems. The method is intended for ranking and selection of R&D projects for formation of programs for the creation of scie...
Article
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We provide results of experimental comparison of several resource allocation rules suggested for implementation in multiagent systems and distributed decision-making environments. We show that their performance is worse than theoretical expected and offer approach for explanation why it happens.
Article
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The present paper discusses the comparative analysis results of resource allocation rules using experiments in the form of business games. The comparative analysis involves five rules. The resource allocation mechanism that gives the efficient solution of the problem without transferable utility, implementing it as dominant strategy equilibrium in...
Article
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Application of efficient distributed optimization algorithms in multi-agent systems designed for socio-economic problems demands additional conditions for algorithms to be satisfied. In particular, the algorithm should be incentive compatible, i.e., the model of behaviour of any agent should be in concordance with interests of a particular economic...
Article
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A method is proposed to support management policy design and verification in complex cyber-physical & human systems (CPHS). A hierarchy of interconnected formal models is built to provide the multi-faceted view of the conflict situation lying in the core of a certain management problem. Game-theoretical analysis reveals the problem and mechanism de...
Article
Full-text available
This paper discusses theoretical problems connected with analysis of integrated control mechanisms for the organizational- technical systems (OTS). The existing classification of these systems is extended using transition from separate control mechanisms to integrated ones. A detailed consideration is given to a key problem, i.e., efficiency assess...
Article
Full-text available
This paper discusses theoretical problems connected with analysis of integrated control mechanisms for the organizational- technical systems (OTS). The existing classification of these systems is extended using transition from separate control mechanisms to integrated ones. A detailed consideration is given to a key problem, i.e., efficiency assess...
Article
Full-text available
This paper gives an analytical characterization for the strategy-proof sequential allotment mechanisms of a limited resource that are equivalent to the straight and reverse priority mechanisms. The previously known equivalence of the anonymous priority mechanisms is extended to the non-anonymous case by establishing the following fact: for an arbit...
Article
Full-text available
Обсуждены теоретические проблемы, возникающие при исследовании комплексов механизмов управления организационно-техническими системами. Предложены расширения классификации организационно-технических систем, возникающие при переходе от рассмотрения отдельных механизмов управления к комплексным. Подробно рассмотрены две ключевые проблемы – оценка эффе...
Article
Full-text available
This paper designs an allotment mechanism for a limited amount of an infinitely divisible good (resource) among a finite number of agents under transferable utility. The mechanism is efficient in the sense of total agents’ utility maximization. As a solution, we introduce an adaptation of the Groves–Ledyard “quadratic government” that was initially...
Article
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In order to present theory of control in organizations for elementary school graduates, a classical game which describes tragedy of commons problem, based on Cournot oligopoly model was adopted. We present results of first conducted games, which show that kids familiar with basic arithmetical operations can understand and exhibit different decision...
Book
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Introduction to Theory of Control in Organizations explains how methodologies from systems analysis and control theory, including game and graph theory, can be applied to improve organizational management. The theory presented extends the traditional approach to management science by introducing the optimization and game-theoretical tools required...
Chapter
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In the preceding chapters, we have described e-expertise by assuming (implicitly or, par excellence, explicitly) that all participants of expert activity follow the primary goals of expertise, i.e., to provide maximum complete, adequate and reliable information on the object or subject of expertise for Principal’s decision-making.
Chapter
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This chapter pretends to be a navigator over expert technologies. It describes the basic stages and methods of expertise, methods of expert grouping, typical errors, as well as the general technology of expertise organization and its principles. Finally, we discuss some prediction problems. The exposition par excellence proceeds from generalization...
Chapter
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Figure 3.1 demonstrates the institutional organization of e-expertise. In what follows, we discuss it in detail, i.e., provide a list of feasible technologies, study different forms such as polling, electronic brainstorming, etc.
Chapter
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Traditionally, theoreticians represent the process of decision-making as a block diagram of choosing a certain decision from several alternatives to achieve formulated goals using accumulated experience and available resources. It is necessary to define assessment criteria for evaluating the alternatives with respect to the goals and a current situ...
Chapter
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Expert finding for specific e-expertise is a multidisciplinary problem at the junction of strategic analysis, decision-making theory, synergy, inverse problem solution, human capital and emotional potential assessment, motivation control, quantum semantics, knowledge management, organizational analysis, information retrieval (acquisition, indexing,...
Article
Full-text available
We demonstrate that any sequential allotment rule enjoying strategy-proofness on the domain of single-peaked preference functions can be represented in the form of a strategy-proof mechanism of active expertise on the domain of multidimensional single-plateaued preference functions, i.e., a generalized median voter scheme with a tie-breaking rule.
Article
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This paper studies the resource allocation problem based on agents' opinions with possible delegation. In other words, any agent can report just some components of the allocation vector as his request. We describe symmetrical anonymous generalized median voter schemes supplemented with delegation procedures; they can be applied for solving the pose...
Conference Paper
Full-text available
The problem of Pareto-efficient resource allocation among rational agents is considered. The mechanism that implements efficient allocation as Nash equilibrium in case when utility is transferable among agents is offered. The approach to solution of allotment problems as multicriteria public choice problems lies in the basis of this mechanism, that...
Article
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Problems of control mechanisms integration are formulated and discussed in the framework of mechanism design for organizational behavior control. Unified schemes for control mechanisms description and design are proposed. An example of the integrated production cycle optimization mechanism is considered.
Article
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Basics are surveyed of a version of mechanism design theory tailored to solve management problems. The concept of a mechanism of organizational behavior control is introduced. Methodological grounds of the theory are discussed along with mechanisms classification. Mechanism implementation process is characterized. Also, basic mechanisms are sketche...
Book
Full-text available
Mechanism Design (MD) is a branch of game theory which deals with conflict situations involving a principal and a set of active agents (usually in the presence of asymmetric information). Mechanism design theory delivers a solution to many management problems in the form of a control mechanism, (i.e., a formalized routine of decision-making). Forma...
Article
Full-text available
We survey basics of a version of the mechanism design theory tailored to solve management problems, and introduce the core concept of a mechanism of organizational behavior control. We discuss methodological grounds of the theory, give classification of mechanisms, and characterize the mechanism implementation process. Finally, we sketch basic mech...
Article
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Анализируется место теории управления организационными системами (исторически берущей свое начало в теории активных систем) в системе научных и научно-практических направлений, исследующих организационное управление. Для этого выбирается единая система классификаций, кратко перечисляются современные научные направления, исследующие проблемы теории...
Conference Paper
Full-text available
Barberá, Massó and Serizawa (1998) provided full characterization for class of strategy-proof social choice functions for societies where the set of alternatives is any full dimensional compact subset of a Euclidean space and all voters have generalized single-peaked preferences. They proved that this class is composed by generalized median voter s...
Book
Full-text available
Работа посвящена рассмотрению технологий экспертной поддержки принятия управленческих решений, основывающихся на использовании современных информационно-коммуникационных технологий (ИКТ). В первом разделе «Сетевая экспертиза» кратко рассматривается роль сетевой экспертизы в процессах принятия решений, вводится система классификаций процедур сетевой...
Article
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The dynamic models of informational control in social networks were considered. The problems of analysis and design of the optimal controls were posed and examined.
Article
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We investigate the problem of strategy-proofness in the active expertise process where the decision making are based on the messages of experts who can distort the information for their benefit. In our model the expertise result is the arithmetic mean of expert messages and the opinion space is the multi-dimensional strictly convex compact set. We...
Article
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Mechanisms of multicriteria active expertise are represented in the form of generalized median voter schemes for collective decision-making in the terms of families of right and left coalition systems. This approach allows for applying the results, obtained in the theory of social choice, to designing strategy-proof mechanisms.
Article
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We study properties of strategy-proof mechanisms of multicriteria expertise representable by generahzed voter median schemes that allow to decrease the complexity of verification of the so-called intersection property. The latter is necessary and sufficient for the outcome of the expertise to belong to the set of feasible results. The algorithm is...
Conference Paper
Full-text available
Models, which allow to formulate and solve the reputation forming problems, being used in further information control, are considered.
Article
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Рассмотрены динамические модели информационного управления в социальных сетях. Сформулированы и исследованы задачи анализа и синтеза оптимальных управлений.
Article
Full-text available
This paper gives an analytical characterization for the strategy-proof sequential allotment mechanisms of a limited resource that are equivalent to the straight and reverse priority mechanisms. The previously known equivalence of the anonymous priority mechanisms is extended to the non-anonymous case by establishing the following fact: for an arbit...
Book
Full-text available
Учебник представляет собой вводный курс по теории управления организационными системами, рассчитанный на студентов ВУЗов и аспирантов инженерных, управленческих и экономических специальностей. Приводится общая модель управления организационными системами и технология решения соответствующих задач управления. Достаточно подробно рассматриваются след...
Article
Full-text available
В работе проиллюстрирована возможность использования распределения Парето для моделирования индивидуальных различий в эффективности деятельности сотрудников. В математических терминах сформулирован «закон Парето». Построен оптимальный механизм стимулирования в двухуровневой организационной системе в условиях неполной информированности руководящего...
Article
Full-text available
For the one-agent active system with internal uncertainty and asymmetric information, the incentive problem regarded as the exchange scheme was solved using the principle of open control, that is, constructing an incentive mechanism with revelation of information, where revelation of the true parameters of income function is the dominant agent's st...
Article
Full-text available
A lot of problems of the theory of active systems can be reduced to the exchange problems when an element exchanges available resources with other elements. The stimulation problem in a single-element active system with internal uncertainty and asymmetric information is considered as an exchange scheme and solved on the basis of the open control co...

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