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Volume 20 Numbers 3 & 4, 2010
Authoritarian deliberation on Chinese Internet
Min Jiang
UNC-Charlotte
Charlotte, North Carolina, USA
Abstract: Modern authoritarianism relies on a combination of patriotism and legitimacy based
on performance rather than ideology. As such, a modern authoritarian government has to
allow for some forms of political discussion and participation from which popular consent to
authoritarian rule is derived. With 335 million Internet users, 182 million bloggers, and 155
million netizens able to access the Internet through their mobile phones (CNNIC, 2009b),
China presents an interesting case to examine public deliberation online. Adapting the concept
of authoritarian deliberation (He, 2006a) from an offline environment to an online one, this
article proposes four types of online spaces of authoritarian deliberation extending from the
core to the peripheries of authoritarian rule: central propaganda spaces, government-regulated
commercial spaces, emergent civic spaces, and international deliberative spaces. The paper
discusses their characteristics and implications for political participation in China and argues
that democracy need not be a precursor to public deliberation. Instead, public deliberation may
flourish as a viable alternative to the radical electoral democracy in authoritarian countries like
China.
“Without legitimacy, words are invalid; invalid words lead man to nowhere” (Mingbuzheng ze
yanbushun; yanbushun ze shibucheng). – Confucius
In 1994, China connected to the World Wide Web. By mid-1998, Chinese Internet users reached one
million. Ten years later, China surpassed the United States as the world’s largest Internet market. By July
2009, China had 335 million Internet users, 25.5% of its population. Among them, 182 million have blogs
1
(China Internet Network Information Center [CNNIC], 2009b).
The exponential growth of the information sector helped China leapfrog into the digital age and galvanized
its economy. However, it also amplified voices of the masses, much to the horror of the one-party state, as
the Editor-in-Chief of People’s Net said: “What would it look like if everybody went into politics? … China
Jiang 2010: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet
Citation:
Jiang, M. (2010). Authoritarian deliberation on Chinese Internet.
Electronic Journal of Communication, 20 (3&4). Retrieved from
http://www.cios.org/EJCPUBLIC/020/2/020344.html
has more than 100 million Internet users. If they were all free to speak their minds, we would have a very
serious situation” (quoted from Lagerkvist, 2006, p. 9). It almost seems that President Reagan foresaw
fear of this sort when he remarked in 1989 that “[t]he Goliath of totalitarianism will be brought down by the
David of the microchip” (quoted from Kalathil & Boas, 2003, p. 1). Yet despite the doom and gloom about
the regime’s fate upon the arrival of information technology, the Chinese government has so far managed
to weave and guard a sophisticated authoritarian web through various means of censorship (Boas, 2006).
So, the state’s extensive Internet regulation runs against an impressive degree of Internet activism (Yang,
2006) that has led the famed Hong Kong blogger Roland Song to believe that “the dam is leaking all over
the place” (2008).
Contrary to Western mainstream media’s sketch of China’s cyberspace as nothing but highly policed and
censored, there is lively online public discussion of social, political, and policy issues, albeit largely within
the expanding boundaries consented to by the state. Those who view the Chinese citizenry as an
obedient and undifferentiated populace waiting to be enlightened and freed grossly miss the heterogeneity
and cacophony of public opinion in Chinese cyberspace today. If forms of public deliberation promise to
expand the public sphere and elevate democratic practice in the West (Gastil & Black, 2008), do they hold
any potential for China, a society under the watchful eye of a powerful government? What emergent
spaces for public deliberation, however limited, can help unlock China’s online public sphere (Lagerkvist,
2006)? In what ways has public deliberation among Chinese Internet users challenged or supported the
state? And what implications does it have for social and political pluralism and liberalization in China, if not
democratization?
This article explores the spaces, dynamics, and implications of online public deliberation in a rapidly
changing Chinese society. First, I draw upon Western theories of public sphere and public deliberation
and discuss their relevance to Chinese online public discourses. In particular, to account for pervasive
government control of Internet access and content, and increasing commercial influence in China’s online
spaces, this paper extends the concept of authoritarian deliberation developed by Baogang He (2006a,
2006b) for China’s offline deliberative experiences to Chinese cyberspace. Second, this paper examines
how China’s peculiar sociopolitical contexts shape its online deliberative spaces. I propose four major
types of spaces of authoritarian deliberation extending from the core to the peripheries of authoritarian
rule: central propaganda spaces, government-regulated commercial spaces, emergent civic sp aces, and
international deliberative spaces. I consider the dynamics of deliberation and state control in each and
finally discuss the implications of online authoritarian deliberation in China.
Democratic Deliberation and Authoritarian Deliberation
Theories of public deliberation and discursive participation, built upon a framework of representative
democracy or deliberative democracy (Chambers, 2003; Dryzek, 2006; Gastil & Black, 2008) have until
recently excluded the experience of deliberation in China (He, 2006a; Leib & He, 2006). I argue, however,
that the implicit assumption that democracy needs to be a precursor to public deliberation not only
overlooks emerging empirical evidence of public deliberation in less democratic societies (He, 2006a,
2006b; Leib & He, 2006; Yang, 2003, 2006, 2008), but also inhibits consideration of alternative routes to
liberalization and democratization in these societies. Here, I disti nguish democratic deliberation from
authoritarian deliberation. The latter is no substitute for deliberative democracy but acknowledges limited
public deliberation in countries like China, especially in online settings. The very development of public
deliberative experiences and institutions, particularly at the grassroots levels, may help cultivate a critical
citizenry and build a broader passage to increased political participation, civil liberties, and better
governance in such transitional societies.
Democratic Deliberation
Jiang 2010: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet
Rooted in theories of democracy, various definitions of public deliberation tend to agree on increasing the
legitimacy and quality of decision making through informed and popular discussions. “Public” indicates
open scrutiny as opposed to private chat (Sennett, 1977). “Deliberation” suggests rational debate between
participants. Public deliberation advocates a “talk-centric” approach to democracy instead of a “voting-
centric” one that is the cornerstone of liberal representative democracy (Chambers, 2003; Fung & Wright,
2003). It is hoped that the very practice of public deliberation can approximate the public sphere as a
social space where private individuals are able to engage in rational debate to reach a consensus free
from coercion (Habermas, 1989; 1996).
So far, much of the literature on public deliberation has rested upon a rather idealized notion of the public
sphere and a normative view of collective discursive deliberation. For instance, most recently, Gastil and
Black (2008) define public deliberation as the following: “When people deliberate, they carefully examine a
problem and arrive at a well-reasoned solution after a period of inclusive, respectful consideration of
diverse points of view” (p. 2). Combining both analytical and social aspects, this definition resonates with
both Dewey’s (1910) conceptualization of problem solving and Habermas’s writing on the public sphere.
The Deweyan perspective on problem solving is rational and analytical: creating a solid information base,
prioritizing the key values, identifying a broad range of solutions, weighing the pros, cons, and tradeoffs
among the solutions, and lastly choosing the be st solution possible. The consideration of the social
aspects of public deliberation also bears the imprint of Habermasian notions of the public sphere and
communicative action: adequate opportunity to speak, rights to comprehend, obligation to consider others’
opinions, and respect for all.
This normative approach, however, is often criticized for its idealism and instrumentalism. For instance,
Fraser (1990), Mouffe (1996), and Young (1996) have on various occasions critiqued the concept of the
public sphere for its lack of attention to coercive forms of power in public discourse, the exclusion of
affective modes of communication in favor of rational discourse, and its tendency to promote consensus
as the purpose of deliberation. As the Internet is increasingly viewed as a public sphere (Papacharissi,
2002), the Web’s potential of decentralization, egalitarian access, and interactivity is often juxtaposed to
the danger of centralization, digital divide, and loss of privacy (Harrison & Falvey, 2001). These
exchanges reflect the tension between modern, normative, and idealized discourses and postmodern, lo
cally grounded, imperfect accounts of human experiences. But this rift can be understood in productive
ways. Dahlberg (2005) argues that the pursuit of the Habermasian ideal of the public sphere does not
mean reduction of coercion is not desirable or cannot possibly be achieved. Instead, the very process of
argumentation, justification, even when flawed, has the promise to identify power imbalances and
eventually achieve equality.
A number of approaches have been proposed to bridge the gap between reality and idealized norms. For
instance, Fishkin (1995) introduces the concept of “incompleteness” to account for the less than optimal
processes of public deliberation. Dahlberg (2005) contends at a more fundamental level that in order to
fully account for power that supports existing social and political systems, a radicalized public sphere
where “counter-publics” struggle over the limits of legitimate deliberation is essential to Internet-supported
democracy. Other approaches advocate differentiation between variant forms of public deliberation.
Among Habermas’s various critics, Fraser (1990) argued that strong publics, those whose discourse
encompasses both opinion-formation and decision-making should be differentiated from weak publics,
whose deliberative practice consists exclusively of opinion-formation and does n ot encompass decision-
making. Recently, Habermas (2005) also speaks of two types of political deliberation: “(a) among citizens
within the informal public sphere and (b) among politicians or representatives within formal settings” (p.
388). The differentiation between strong and weak publics is particularly useful for understanding online
public deliberation in China. While rarely amounting to strong publics, Chinese online opinion formation
based on informal conversations between netizens can approach weak publics that often challenge the
Jiang 2010: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet
status quo power arrangement.
I do not discount the importance of normative deliberation or strong publics for collective decision making
in more democratic societies, but this paper focuses on dialogic deliberation and everyday political talk
(Kim & Kim, 2008) among Chinese netizens. Whether individuals are drawn to the like-minded, more likely
to result in a polarization effect (Sunstein, 2001) or are willing to be exposed to diverse opinions (Stromer-
Galley, 2003), dialogic deliberation helps construct the concept of the self and other, produce a sense of
community, and render public reason possible (Kim & Kim, 2008). Indeed, these are prerequisites to
deliberation involving decision-making. Thus, the emphasis here is not the production of consensus
through rational debate, but the very act of informal and spontaneous discussions on various social,
political, and policy is sues. The author does not assume a fully capable Chinese citizenry for public
deliberation or a liberal democratic framework that guarantees such institutions as the rule of law, civil
liberties, and national elections, none of which is firmly established in China.
Authoritarian Deliberation
The consideration of deliberation in an authoritarian state like China recognizes modern authoritarianism
relies on a combination of patriotism and legitimacy based on performance rather than ideology. Three
decades of Chinese reform and opening up have witnessed the erosion of planned economy, rise of an
impressive middle class, and demise of the communist ideology (Zhou, 2008). In order to engender
popular belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate for the society, in other words to
maintain the legitimacy of a political system (Lipset, 1959), a modern authoritarian government like China
has to allow for some forms of discussion, debate, and participation from which popular consent of the
authoritarian rule is derived.
Baogang He (2006a) coined the term “authoritarian deliberation” to recognize the contours of public
discourse in China. For He, Chinese public deliberation is authoritarian because decision making is
dominated by leaders who are not competitively elected. As a result, the party-state sanctions and
prescribes the boundaries of political discourses. However, the discourse is deliberative in the sense that
local people employ argumentation and reasoning to discuss collective problems. In these discussions,
evidence is presented, and solutions are proposed and justified. This type of local participation is naturally
problematic given that authoritarian regimes, by definition, can never be fully democratic (Pei, 2006).
Nevertheless, the concept of “authoritarian deliberation” acknowledges the greater civic and political
speech freedoms extant in an authoritarian state that relaxes its grip over political di scourse in exchange
for its own legitimacy and survival.
Whereas He employed authoritarian deliberation to analyze public opinion formation and procedural
decision making in face-to-face settings at the local level (2006a), I adapt the concept to study public
discussion and opinion formation on the Chinese Internet. This does not discount the importance of offline
public deliberation. Rather it acknowledges the Internet’s potential to facilitate information sharing,
discussion, and even collective action on a wide range of public issues. Such online public deliberation is
authoritarian because, similar to its offline practice, the state actively shapes the boundaries of political
discourse in Chinese cyberspace, fully aware that the online medium affords alternative access to
information and public dialogue.
Authoritarian deliberation is consistent with Nathan’s observation of institutionalization in China (2003). To
maintain political legitimacy, the Chinese government has implemented various input institutions “that
people can use to apprise the state of their concerns” (Nathan, 2003, p. 14). Such institutions include: the
Administrative Litigation Act of 1989 that allows citizens to sue government agencies for alleged violations
of government policies; Letters-and-Visits departments (Xinfangju) for citizen complaints; people’s
Jiang 2010: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet
congresses; people’s consultative conferences (where citizen grievances are addressed); and use of
mass media as the people’s tribunes (Nathan, 2003). I argue that the advent of the Internet in China has
extended and in some ways transformed such practices by adding an online dimension to many of rights-
and justice-seekin g activities.
Offline, for instance, Time Magazine reported the first deliberative poll conducted in China in 2005. It took
place in Zeguo township, Wenling City of Zhejiang Province. 257 residents, who were randomly selected
to represent the town’s 240,000 population, voted on the desirability of 30 government-proposed
infrastructure projects after grilling local officials and learning about these budgetary proposals. They
chose environmental projects over the flashier proposals of parks and bridges. The poll’s architect, James
Fishkin was gleeful with hope, “The public is smart. Under the right conditions, it’s smart in China just like
it’s smart in Britain or smart in Bulgaria” (Jakes, 2005).
The Zeguo poll was not entirely unprecedented. Over the years, a variety of indigenous deliberative
practices for collective decision-making had been adopted at both the local and national levels (He,
2006b): democratic discussion meetings (minzhu kentanhui, kentan literarily means “sincere discussion,”
or “have a heart-to-heart.”); fast track for people’s voices (minqing zhitongche); democratic political
discussion day (minzhu yizhengri); democratic budgetary meetings (minzhu licaihui); democratic public
hearings (minzhu tingzhenghui); residents’ forums (jumin luntan), and etc. Some grassroots meetings also
experiment with citizen evaluation of local leaders’ performance (Kennedy, Rozelle, & Shi, 2004). At the
national level, village elections and public hearings have been approved the central governme nt (He,
2006b; Pei, 2006; Shi, 1997).
Sure, one can reasonably argue that such deliberative practices are often times dominated by the state
and marked by lack of equality and representation of different interests. Whether online or offline, they are
approved by the state to pacify the public and maintain government legitimacy. Calling a few of China’s
local deliberative experiments acts of deliberative democracy will “let the Chinese government off too
easily” (Leib, 2005).
However, it may be counter-productive to quickly dismiss such instances of deliberation as entirely
meaningless. Both democratic and transitional societies need to aggregate public opinions. Deliberation in
China may not be fully democratic, but it is likely to force government, especially local governments, to be
more efficient and accountable for their actions. If the cultivation of public reason and consideration of
public opinion in policy making can foster what some scholars call governance-driven democratization
(He, 2006a; Warren, 2008), authoritarian deliberation may be a worthwhile route to China’s political
reforms.
The unprecedented adoption of the Internet, along with other recent adjustment of state-society
relationship in China, has made online authoritarian deliberation particularly relevant. First of all, three
decades of economic and related social reforms have transformed China in such a way that the state can
no longer dictate or monopolize the distribution of resources (Yang, 2004). Nor can it fully control public
discourses. Not only is there a swelling Chinese middle class with their faith in free enterprise and respect
for private property, there is an equally impressive civil rights movement aimed at defending individual
rights and free personal choices, including occupational, sexual, religious and other freedoms (Zhou,
2008).
Second, in such an increasingly pluralized and mobile society, public deliberation appeals to Chinese
government in a number of ways. It may: (a) serve as a safety valve allowing people to let off steam to
avoid and contain social confrontation; (b) channel public discourses in ways to support the government’s
policies and agendas; and (c) increase government legitimacy by building a more open, responsive, and
Jiang 2010: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet
democratic administrative image among the public.
Furthermore, Internet diffusion accelerates the expansion of public discourses. Paradoxically, while the
digital revolution has enhanced the Party’s ability to control, bolstered the permeation of commercial
interests in the society, and in many ways widened the digital divide (Zhao, 2007), it also has empowered
individual voices and group formation (Yang, 2007). Many Chinese are now able to: (a) access greater
alternative sources of information besides what was provided by official newspapers, radio, and TV
programs previously; (b) “talk back” to official media on issues of their concern; and (c) engage with other
societal members and overseas media through public discourse. In this context, study of online
authoritarian deliberation can provide insight into the unique nature and potential of everyday political
discourse among Chinese netizens.
Spaces of Online Authoritarian Deliberation in China
By the end of 2008, there were 2,878 million Chinese websites (CNNIC, 2009a). Like elsewhere in the
world, the Chinese Internet teems with various applications ranging from emails, news feeds, blogs,
bulletin boards (BBSs), podcasts, videocasts, social networking sites and so on. What sets China apart
from others is the state’s insistence on asserting its authority over a massive network of users and public
discourses within its jurisdiction with extensive means of surveillance and manipulation: configuration of
Internet gateway infrastructure (Boas, 2006), filtering (Zittrain & Edelman, 2003), Internet policing (Brady,
2006), regulation of Internet service providers (MacKinnon, 2009), suppression of dissident use and
discipline of cyber cafes (Chase & Mulvenon, 2002; Qiu, 2000), and most recently employment of web
commentators to shape and alter public debate (Bandurski, 2008). However, these tactics of control are
not deployed invariably across the board
2
, thus producing different types of constraints and opportunities
for public discourses.
Instead of treating the Chinese cyberspace as a monolithic entity filtered, censored, and patrolled by the
government, severed from the rest of the world by the “Great Firewall of China”
3
(Qiu, 2000), I see it as a
sphere composed of diverse yet connected spaces where the influence of the state varies, thus creating
disparate conditions for public deliberation. I recognize four types of online spaces of authoritarian
deliberation extending from the core to the peripheries of authoritarian rule: central propaganda spaces,
government-regulated commercial spaces, emergent civic spaces, and international deliberative spaces.
The state maintains a distinctive relationship to the Chinese society and/or international communities in
each space. Moreover, these spaces are not disjointed islands. Rather, they overlap, converge, and clash.
In the following section, I discuss th e features of these spaces that are not only home to mundane public
conversations between Chinese netizens but are also groundswells of radical jingoism as well as rational
discourse of public issues and policies.
Central Propaganda Spaces
Central propaganda spaces are online spaces where the Chinese government asserts its presence
through government websites and other official online media. The state’s control over these spaces is
firm, if not complete. Examples of central propaganda spaces include Chinese e-government websites as
well as state media such as People’s Net (http://www.people.com.cn/), Xinhuanet
(http://www.xinhuanet.com), CCTV Online (http://www.cctv.cn), and CNR Online (http://www.cnr.cn). In
addition to enhanced office automation, e-commerce, the state’s 1 trillion yuan investment (US$121
billion) in government IT projects since early 1990s also built an extensive government network (Yong,
2003, p. 83). Provincial, city, and county governments feature government portals at rates of 100%, 93%,
and 69% respectively (CCID, 2006). Offline government operations such as People&rsquo ;s Daily and
Jiang 2010: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet
Xinhua News Agency also have a significant online presence through People’s Net and Xinhuanet
respectively. State broadcast heavyweights like China Central Television (CCTV) and China National
Radio (CNR) quickly adopted digital platforms. Similar to the government’s manipulation of print and
broadcast media for propaganda and mobilization of its citizens, the recent development and
management of the government’s online presence helps solidify the government’s technical, symbolic,
and political power in the digital age.
Not surprisingly, control of public deliberation in central propaganda spaces is easier to achieve given the
state’s direct control over the infrastructure and dependent institutions. Not only is online content in such
spaces dominated by state “guidance of public opinion” (Yulun Daoxiang), filtered by state employed
“Internet police,” compliance with official agenda in these central propaganda institutions is also
buttressed through top leadership support and government funding.
It is worth noting, however, that despite these constraints, a considerable amount of public deliberation
occurs. Jiang’s study of 31 Chinese provincial government portals (2009) reveals a complicated picture of
government networks that have grown adept at setting public agenda, regulating public discourse,
managing social order to maintain its legitimacy. Aside from making more information available online,
government networks opened up spaces for public discourse: e-consultation functions such as Q&A with
government officials and e-petition; e-discussion features such as real-time “gov. chat” between citizens
and policy makers and policy discussion forums. Granted, the state intends these limited spaces to deflate
social tension and re-establish Party legitimacy. Nevertheless, when compared to the past, local citizens
have more access to government information, services, and means to articulate their rights and seek
socia l justice. As a result citizens are gaining access to local politics, and with it, political knowledge.
Government online media have also resorted to softer societal control, relying on more sophisticated
methods of containing public dissent and setting agenda. Similar to the use of investigative journalism in
traditional broadcast media (Zhao, 2000), official online media have both strategic and commercial
imperatives to provide some spaces for public deliberation. For instance, People’s Net has maintained a
highly popular online forum, “Strengthening the Nation Forum” (Qingguao Luntan). The forum rose out of
a nationalistic “protest forum” against NATO’s 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in former
Yugoslavia (Yang, 2003). Riding the wave of zealous sentiments, the forum was an important locus of
rising nationalism. Later, the forum became a highly popular place for debating policy issues: tackling
China’s economic problems, fighting corruption, revisiting China’s one chil d policy, improving food safety,
increasing social equality and so on. Many of the forum’s users consider the forum and the Internet in
general a freer space for public discussion of national affairs, expression of their opinions, concerns and
complaints (Yang, 2003). In a symbolic gesture of top Chinese leaders’ awareness of the Internet’s power
in shaping public opinion, Chinese President Hu Jingtao recently held a dialogue with netizens on the
forum. Some interpreted his appearance as proof that the forum influence government decision-making
(People’s Net, 2008). Notably, with the state’s strong financial backing, websites like People’s Net lead the
way in adopting the latest interactive features such as blog, podcast, videocast, social bookmarking, and
mobile delivery of news and information. So the government’s capacity to influence public deliberation in
the digita l age has strengthened, not withered.
Government-regulated Commercial Spaces
Another type of space for public deliberation is online commercial spaces. Commercial websites have
been inconsistently regulated by Internet companies following government directives. By the end of 2008,
there were 552,898 .com Chinese websites, 19.2% of all websites in China (CNNIC, 2009a). By
comparison, 77% of sites bear .cn domain names, 3% use .net, and 0.7% register as .org (see Ta ble 1).
However, many websites with .cn and .net domain names are commercial as well, such as Tianya
Jiang 2010: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet
Community (http://www.tianya.cn), the largest Chinese online forum with over 20 million users (Tianya,
2009).
Tabl e 1
Number of Websites under Various
Domain Names in China
Domain
Name
Quantity Proportion
.CN 2,216,437 77%
.COM 552,898 19.2%
.NET 87,713 3%
.ORG 21,005 0.7%
Tota l 2,878,053 100.0%
Source: 23rd CNNIC Statistical Survey
Report on the Internet Development in
China (January 2009)
Users flock to commercial websites for a wide variety of activities. The six most popular uses are music
(83.7% Chinese Internet users), news (78.5%), instant messaging (75%), search engine (68%), online
video (67.7%), and gaming (62.8%), according to a national survey conducted by CNNIC (2009a). It is
noteworthy that, in addition to online news, discursive and socializing spaces such as blogs, online
forum/BBS, and social networking sites (SNSs), are also very popular: 54.3% netizens reported having a
blog, 35.2% updating their blogs, 30.7% publishing on forum/BBS, and 19.3% actively using SNSs.
Such a pattern of use is partially driven by China’s dominant younger Internet demographic: 35.6% are
under the age of 20, 31.5% between ages 20 and 29, i.e. two-thirds of Chinese Internet users, or 200
million, are under age 30 (CNNIC, 2009a). This wired young generation, born digital or growing up digital
like their Western counterparts, defies tradition and embraces fads (Wang, 2008). They crave social
bonding, information, and entertainment (Bu, 2006). The famed Chinese Back Dorm Boys who rose to
stardom by lip syncing Back Street Boys songs and making them available on video sharing sites such as
YouTube are symbolic of a youth culture that yearns for self expression and recognition. Undoubtedly,
Chinese youth today have more self-publishing and networking tools at their disposal. Blogs, online
videos, BBS, and instant messaging platforms can help bypass traditional media gatekeepers. It is not
clear whether this generation will take the initiative to improve social justice and create social change as
“digital renegades” rather than simply turning into happy “digital captives” of consumerism and hedonism
(Morozov, 2008). Nevertheless, there is plenty of economic incentive for Chinese Internet companies to
provide a relative open environment to attract users.
These commercial spaces are “open” in relative terms because the state still defines and redefines the
boundaries of political discourses. First, the government filters “harmful” foreign web content through the
Great Firewall by controlling key international Internet gateways (Qiu, 2000). Second, both domestic and
foreign Internet companies have been asked to comply with state regulations. Notably, Baidu, Google,
Yahoo!, and Microsoft have agreed to censor their search engines (MacKinnon, 2009). Internet content
providers are ordered to follow state directives such as the Administration of Internet Electronic
Messaging Services Provisions and Administration of Internet Information Services Provisions (both
Jiang 2010: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet
issued in 2000) and the Administration of Internet News and Information Services Provisions (effective in
2005)(CNNIC 2009c). Moreover, the go vernment can easily reach out to commercial websites to assert
its presence. For example, in 2005, Beijing People’s Political Consultative Conference invited public input
on policy topics such as energy conservation, healthcare, and pension systems on Sina.com, one of the
top three Chinese commercial portals (Sina, 2005).
Nevertheless, regulating hundreds of thousands of commercial websites remains quite difficult. Although
commercial Internet firms have taken a “voluntary pledge” to keep a watchful eye over users, the finer
details of how to interpret and implement government filtering directives are left to the companies
themselves. MacKinnon’s (2009) study of censorship patterns in Chinese blogosphere reveals great
variations among blog hosting companies operating in China. Much of the variation is caused by
differences in resources, values, and perceived relationships with government and users.
Adding to the difficulty of regulation is the fact that Chinese netizens have grown adept at critiquing the
regime while avoiding harsh repression (Esarey, 2008). It is one thing to ban patently sensitive topics such
as Tibet and Falun Gong, but quite another to detect and delete farce, coded criticism, and political satire
(Esarey & Xiao, 2008). For instance, when websites are shut down by authorities, netizens openly refer to
it as being “harmonized,” a sardonic reference to the government’s ubiquitous promotion of “harmony” in
Chinese society. After that phrase became blocked, Chinese netizens started to post pictures of river
crabs wearing three watches: river crabs sound like “harmonize” in Chinese and three watches are a pun
on “the three represents.”
4
To shape and sway public opinion in these spaces, the “50 cent party” approach became popular. Started
in 2005 in Nanjing University, web commentators are reputedly paid 50 cents (or $0.07) for each positive
comment made on popular Chinese websites and message boards (Bandurski, 2008). Backed by
government Information Office and funded by commercial websites, these web commentators focus on
current affairs forums and major national and provincial portals, both official and commercial. Thus, “larger
Web sites must find a happy medium between pleasing the authorities and going about their business”
(Bandurski, 2008) in the face of increasing civic desire for free expression and accountable governance.
Emergent Civic Spaces
Despite censorship and commercialization of Chinese Internet, public discourse thrives. Emergent civic
spaces here refer to online spaces where NGOs, civic groups and organizations deliberate and coordinate
collective actions around shared interests and values, relatively independent of the state and the market.
A recent CCNIC survey (2009a) indicates civic spaces are a weak sector of Chinese Internet, with 21,005
websites registering with .ORG domain names, constituting only 0.7% of all Chinese websites. Many
officially sanctioned national civic organizations use the Internet to coordinate their efforts: China Red
Cross, China International Almsdeed Institute, and China Youth Development Foundation (CYDF). CYDF
manages the widely popular Project Hope, building elementary schools in rural areas and improving poor
students’ access to education. Recently, a few celebrity charities such as One Foundation (started by
Chinese Kong Fu movie star Jet Li), and Yumi Love Fund (pioneered by Chinese pop star Li Yuchun)
garnered a lot of media attention and a large online following.
The types of civic spaces are as varied as the types of civic organizations. Yang (2007) identifies five
types of civic organizations in China: business, environment, women’s issues, social services, health and
community development. Others organizations, such as religious and cultural ones, also maintain an
online presence. According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2008), there
were 212,000 voluntary social organizations in 2007, compared to 131,000 in 2000.
Jiang 2010: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet
While neither outwardly ideological nor political, Chinese civic organizations do not exist entirely separate
from the state. Civic organizations are expected to complement government organizations by providing
necessary social services, alleviate social malaise, convey social concerns, and maintain social order
(Wang & Zhang, 2007). The growth of Chinese civil organizations is positive in the sense that they
improve people’s experience and abilities of self-organization as well as helping define the administrative
power. However, in a society teemed with governmental “mommies and nannies” (Zhai, 2009), Chinese
civic organizations are not only required to register but also to be affiliated with related government
“supervisory bodies” (Wang & Zhang, 2007).
Much like their offline counterparts, non-commercial websites have been asked to register online. Under
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology’s (MIIT) 2005 Non-Commercial Web Site Registration
Regulation (2009), all non-commercial websites must register with the MIIT and provide contact
information or will face a significant financial penalty. This regulation applies to all personal websites and
blogs hosted in China that are accessible through an independent domain name. Blogs hosted by a
service like Sina Blogs, for instance, need not register. This regulation extends similar rules intended for
commercial websites to their non-commercial counterparts, creating a chilling effect on China’s growing
population of website owners and bloggers.
Yet despite interference from the government, civic spaces are expanding. Through a process of what
Yang (2003) calls “the co-evolution of the Internet and civil society in China,” the Web offers new avenues
for citizen participation. China’s incipient civil society, in turn, expands the Internet by providing the social
basis for communication.
When Beijing initially embraced the Internet for economic development, the Web was not seen as
inherently liberating but rather something that can be configured and controlled (Jiang, 2009). As China’s
information sector boomed, the state ability to police it has also grown broader and more sophisticated.
Meanwhile Internet adoption has also significantly increased the opportunities for Chinese people to
access information, assert their voices, and connect with fellow netizens. If civil society is “the arena of
uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values” (Center for Civil Society,
2004), the spaces of spontaneous civic actions have expanded.
Much of this development occurs within specific groups of shared cultural identities and interests. Yang’s
study of Huaxia Zhiqing Net (2003), for instance, demonstrates how the educated youth generation uses
online forums to build a virtual community based on their shared experience during the Cultural
Revolution. 1kg.org uses the Internet to coordinate Chinese tourists who travel to rural areas donate
books and other supplies for children. Independent bloggers and podcasters may also create communities
of readers and fellow writers. Don’t Think, a blog created in May 2006 by Beijing Sanlian Lifeweek
journalist Wang Xiaofeng saw more than 30 million visits as of April 2008 and is now available offline
through China’s online bookstores. The blog, connected with dozens of other intelligentsia bloggers, forms
an alternative community of voices to mainstream media. In 2005, Antiwave won the Deutsche Welle&
rsquo;s Best Podcasting Site for its sarcastic parodies of the establishment. The site’s name, Antiwave,
communicates its creators’ rejection of tradition, mainstream radio programming, indoctrination by the
official educational system, and government-controlled public discourse (Danwei, 2007). Its podcasting
emphasizes critical thinking and public discussion where the Great Talk of the People (Renmin Dahuitan)
replaces the Great Hall of the People
5
(Renmin Dahuitang). Controversial issues such as how to view
Chinese-Japanese history and freedom of expression in China are not excluded from their podcasting.
These sites are examples of an alternative social space to the Chinese mainstream media.
Besides facilitating identity formation, information sharing and public discussion, online deliberation also
Jiang 2010: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet
supports collective action on civic and policy issues. 1kg.org utilizes its website to coordinate a volunteer
network of travelers to deliver donated books and other school supplies for children in remote areas.
Moreover, the boundaries between civic, government, and commercial spaces are increasingly collapsing
as citizens move between them online. Collective Internet incidents (Wangluo Qunti Shijian), also known
as massive online incidents, cyber activism, or cyber contentions are emblematic of this trend (Cai, 2008;
Yang, 2008). Massive online petitions, protests, and Internet vigilantism (or the “human flesh search”)
constitute “radical, claims-making communicative action[s]” (Yang, 2008, p. 126). Such actions often
involve questions of corruption, socia l injustice, and nationalism (Yang, 2008).
A particularly powerful example was the death of Sun Zhigang. Sun was a college graduate who worked
for a graphic design company in Guangzhou. He was detained for not having proper identification papers
and died three days later in police custody. Sun’s death triggered a public outcry online. The online
protests eventually resulted in the abolishment of the “Custody and Repatriation” system (China Net,
2003). As momentous as the response to Sun’s death was, it was not an isolated incident. In 2007, a
Chongqin homeowner stared down powerful developers to defend her property rights. In 2008, Weng’an
county’s police building and vehicles were torched during a riot over the cover-up over a girl’s death. Also
in 2008, Chinese college students created a website to counter perceived distortions in the Western
media’s coverage of the 2008 Tibetan unrest (CNN was a favorite target). An increasingly popular online
collective action is the “human flesh search.” In these actions, large numbers of individuals use the
Internet, as well as offline sources, to identify a specific person or facts. “Human flesh searches” have
targeted both major and minor issues, from exposing corrupt officials to publicly shaming individuals for
undesirable, yet admittedly minor, activity (Yu & Shan, 2009; Zuckerman, 2009). In their often factional,
nationalistic, and incoherent manner, these Internet-based examples of public deliberation and action both
fuel and reflect the development of a more pluralized, stratified, and liberal society.
International Deliberative Spaces
Chinese public deliberation does not focus exclusively on domestic issues. International deliberative
spaces bridge China and the outside world and mediate public opinion between them. Individuals,
organizations, and government bodies concerned about China’s role in an increasingly interdependent
global environment inhabit numerous deliberative spaces. Chinese public opinion is closely observed and
monitored by actors with various backgrounds such as culture, politics, business, and academia.
The Chinese government adopts different measures of response to the various actors. Foreign content
deemed undesirable is blocked by the Great Firewall of China (Zittrain & Edelman, 2003). Such filtering
may not be perfect, but it is effective enough to maintain societal stability (Boas, 2006). The Chinese
central government has also been aggressively building its international PR operations to counter foreign
influences such as BBC and Voice of America. Among the government’s international efforts are English
versions of government websites and image-shaping official media outlets such as CCTV International
and China Radio International.
“Bridge bloggers” (Zuckerman, 2008) are among those often subject to government filtering. These
bloggers are bilingual or multi-lingual individuals who “cross” borders and traverse otherwise disparate
online communities. Websites and blogs openly critical of the Chinese government and its practices are
openly censored. Roland Song’s blog EastSouthWestNorth (http://www.zonaeuropa.com), based in Hong
Kong, is blocked within mainland China. Websites like MITBBS, very popular among overseas students
and immigrant communities, are also blocked. Beijing’s censorship of general information sources such as
Wikipedia and YouTube depends upon the sociopolitical situation of the moment. During a March 31,
2009 press conference, a reporter questioned the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about
the government’s blocking YouTube. The spokesperson res ponded, “The Internet in China is fully open
Jiang 2010: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet
and the Chinese Government manages the Internet according to the law. As for what you can and cannot
watch, watch what you can watch, and don’t watch what you cannot watch” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
2009).
Other bridge bloggers operate from within China without being blocked. Many choose some degree of
self-censorship. The Chinese Economist translating team does exactly that to balance its existence and
compliance with the government (Baio, 2009). A group of dedicated fans of the Economist newsmagazine
have been translating each issue cover-to-cover. Volunteers collaborate out of pure interest in spreading
knowledge and improving their own English skills. On touchy topics, the team puts the articles in a
protected forum that blocks access to search engine and non-members. “There’s one general rule: If the
article involves any sensitive topics, if you’re not sure whether it’s permitted or not, please don’t risk any
chance by publishing it” (Baio, 2009). A similar project is run by a group of volunteers from Tianya
community to translate Times magazine ( Tianya Bloggers, 2009).
Complete and organized international political deliberative discussions may not be accessible to Chinese
netizens. The official view tends to support projects like anti-CNN to criticize problematic Western media
reporting and cultivate nationalism although the founders of anti-CNN also vow to seek truth. Despite
online censorship, Chinese people do have more freedoms than before and there is a growing interest in
the access and understanding of foreign media content. The Internet may have a positive impact on
assisting Chinese knowledge seekers to experiment and discover after all.
Discussion
Managing everything Chinese netizens have to say is impossible. China is home to 420 million Internet
users and 231 million bloggers. 277 million Chinese enjoy Internet access through their mobile phones
(CNNIC, 2010). Modern authoritarianism relies on both patriotism and performance legitimacy for its
survival. Realizing that economic growth is the regime’s ultimate raison d’être, Chinese government tries
to leverage information technology to maintain growth while limiting people’s use of the Internet for
political activities. The combination of marketization and political closure translates into the Party’s
continued monopoly of political power while granting a measure of economic and cultural freedoms to
individuals, groups, and regions (Yang, 2003). Modern Chinese authoritarianism, resorting less to sheer
military might and downright oppression, instead relies on both patriotism and perfor mance legitimacy to
gain the favorable compliance of its citizens. So the party-state has been adopting more refined and
strategic use of economic resources and state apparatuses to maintain social order and stability. This
opens up spaces for public deliberation in China’s cyberspace.
Public deliberation holds potential for an authoritarian society like China. The pursuit of better policy and
governance is not limited to Western societies. Although authoritarianism can never be democratic, and
China has yet to develop democratic institutions such as rule of law and civil rights, it is both possible and
desirable to nourish public deliberation alongside other democratic institutions in such transitional
countries. Societies need not choose between radical and incremental change to facilitate citizens’
participation in local, regional, and national affairs. The concept of authoritarian deliberation (He, 2006a) is
a useful theoretical construct that recognizes both the reality of deliberative experiences in China and the
limitations of such practices. Indeed, a variety of deliberative spaces exist on the Chinese Internet with
different dynamics of state regulation and citizen participation.
It seems that both mechanisms of deliberation and control are expanding. Announcing the demise of the
propaganda state (Lynch, 1999) is perhaps a bit too early. The Chinese state has successfully utilized
information technology for political control. Central propaganda spaces enhance government surveillance,
maintenance of social order, and government legitimacy through both e-government networks and official
Jiang 2010: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet
government online media, have managed to. At the same time, however, central propaganda spaces are
also infused by political discussions of politics and general debate. Many government websites now
provide citizens with more access to national and local politics. Citizens, on the other hand, are
increasingly demanding government accountability. The lack of authenticity in such state-controlled
deliberation begs the question of how effective the government’s strategic concessions will be if no
substantial political reforms materialize.
Whereas mass media used to be part of the state structure, the commercialization of the Chinese Internet
has undoubtedly helped establish a platform for public discourse. This is not to evoke technological
determinism or overstate the participatory nature of the Web, but rather to acknowledge that citizens have
used the available self-publishing tools and social media for both entertainment and civic purposes.
Bulletin boards, online forums, blogs, and social networking sites have all been used to both ends.
Although individuals are not allowed to publish newspapers, personal blogs have become private papers
for many Chinese bloggers. Citizens have grown accustomed to using both emotionality (qing) and
rationality (li) in public spaces to defend their rights and seek social justice. As a result, those spaces
heavily influenced by state and commercial interests are also the very spaces where private lives and the
larger political world are bridged and where public opini on is formed.
Limited as they are, emergent civic spaces on Chinese Internet reflect the slow evolution of values and
beliefs during three decades of industrialization, urbanization, liberalization. Zhou (2008) dubs the
grassroots movements for increased civil liberties “China’s long march towards freedom.” Growing
pluralism has led to diverse group formations both offline and online. Social groups, often from the
margins of the society, gain access to public discourse, articulate their problems and opinions and in
some cases, drive public debates. Although the state apparatus reacts to monitor and control these
groups, the nearly unlimited possibilities of group formation afforded by network technologies and driven
by diverse social interests are not likely to wither away. Instead, widening social inequalities are likely to
instigate civic discourses and collective actions challenges to the regime’s legitimacy. Exposure of
corruption and violations of the rights of vulnerable individuals are likely to be intertwined with bursts of
state-orchestrated nationalism as various social groups press their reform agenda.
International deliberative spaces may also expand. More border-crossing groups discover means to
exchange information, become more adept at using circumventing technologies, and acquire experience
in negotiating the balance between self expression and censorship. As economic, cultural, and political
ties continue to strengthen between China and the outside world and as the population of sophisticated
Chinese Internet users continues to grow, censorship becomes harder for the state, not easier.
In these various spaces, the state is both repressive and adaptive at the same time. The state’s methods
of monitoring and controlling discourse vary depending on the relationship between the civic space and
Beijing. The regime must adapt as the civic space shifts further from center of authoritarian control (the
central propaganda spaces) to the periphery (international forums). While technical infrastructures such
as the Great Firewall of China and censored domestic search engines help the state filter Internet content,
different kinds of legal and personnel resources are also devoted to regulating online spaces. State
employed Internet police delete content directly. Commercial websites censor themselves. Both civic and
commercial sites are required to register with the government.
Yet the effect of the government’s presence on deliberation is not always predictable. Debate in spaces
such as the Strengthening the Nation Forum (Qiangguo Luntan accessible at http://bbs1.people.com.cn)
is sometimes more lively and robust than other commercial and civic spaces where government presence
is less palpable. While some online activities on Qiangguo Luntan are rigged by state-employed web
commentators, citizen participation is active and genuine (Yang, 2003). Known for policy debate,
Jiang 2010: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet
Qiangguo Luntan regularly attracts citizens who share strong nationalistic sentiments or deep concerns
for social issues, encouraging them to petition the government. It is a space where participants feel they
have an audience and that what they say matters. Some even feel that top Chinese leaders take notice of
people’s plight and, in some cases, take action.
Such online dynamics speak to a number of constraints for civic and political participation in Chinese
society: (a) the dominance of a strong state over a weak civil sector; (b) a paternalistic political culture;
and (c) the lack of institutional and legal means to resolve social injustices, forcing citizens to appeal to
higher authorities outside the justice system (Minzner, 2006). It is, thus, not surprising that these online
instances of demand- and complaint-making are often brought by individuals rather than groups. Groups
are more threatening to the regime. Such complaints often target lower-level officials rather than the
party-state in general (Nathan, 2003). This kind of resistance against men, not principles, argued O’Brien
and Li, is paradoxically more system-supportive than system-subversive (2006).
The unique pressures on public online discourse in China forces Chinese Internet users to structure their
discourse in other ways. Many civic-minded Chinese users employ sarcasm, parody, and humor when
criticizing the government. A fine balance between self-expression and self-censorship is critical. Many
strategically choose to criticize local government officials and isolated incidents rather than directing their
criticisms at the central government or national policies beyond the state’s tolerance (Esarey, 2008). This
tendency has grown more common as people realized that edgy commercial and emergent civic websites
like Bullog (now Bullogger accessible at http://www.bullogger.com)and Fatianxia (Legal World formerly
http://www.fatanzia.cn now accessible at http://www.yadian.cc) were ordered to close their business oper
ations or move their servers overseas (Liu, 2008). To continue their operations, many websites and
individual bloggers have toned down their criticism. However, they persistently test and push back against
restrictions, motivated by the optimistic conviction that “history is on their side” (MacKinnon, 2007, p. 46).
Conclusion
In order to harmonize social frictions and channel online public discourse to support government policies
and agendas, the Chinese government has consciously allowed for a limited sphere of public discussion
and deliberation on economic, social, and political affairs. At the same time, with expanding economic and
cultural freedoms, Chinese citizens are actively seeking greater political freedom in order to secure other
forms of liberty. Such demands have increasingly made their way into Chinese cyberspace. Granted,
many citizens may not demand democracy or elections but more and more are willing to use every means
possible to defend their personal rights and property against institutional abuse (Benney, 2007). These
defenses serve as the foundation of citizens’ increasing demands for civic and political participation
online. Individual citizens and civic groups have increasingly learned to effectively garner social attention
and mobilize public opinion.
To study the Internet’s role in fostering democratization in China, a dichotomy between “democratic” and
“non democratic” or “free” and “not free” is too simplistic. In fact, many countries occupy a place on a
continuum between the two. I suggest that it is more pragmatic and productive to consider China as a
case of authoritarian governance where there are degrees of economic, cultural, and even political
freedoms within the system while, at the same time, the state expects and ensures the consent of its
citizenry. The citizens’ consent is increasingly negotiated online in the context of growing personal
freedoms and liberties. The state’s legitimacy is never complete or unchallenged. Online discourses are
important for precisely this reason; it is where the government’s claim to power is contested.
It is also useful to differentiate the various spaces of online public deliberation in China for both theoretical
and practical reasons. While some studies tend to view the Chinese Internet from the standpoint of
Jiang 2010: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet
censorship and control (Boas, 2006; Chase & Mulvenon, 2002; Qiu, 2000), others emphasize the
Internet’s potential to foster civil society (Yang, 2003, 2006, 2007). And in certain cases, a somewhat
uncritical use of concepts like public sphere and deliberative democracy renders China’s unique political
and social contexts almost irrelevant (Zhou, Chan, & Peng, 2008). These different foci and assumptions
about the Chinese Internet tend to assert certain characteristics or potentials of the Web at the sacrifice of
others. As a result, different programs, a gendas, and policies are proposed or implemented without
enough attention to how they may affect or be affected by an opposite or complementary set of dynamics.
The contexts of public discourse and opinion formation online are critical to gaining a better understanding
of the Internet’s potential role in public deliberation. I reject a one-dimensional view of the Chinese
Internet. It is not a uniform environment but rather a varied collection of interrelated spaces embodying
multiple dialectics of government control and citizen participation.
In the case of China, the spaces for public deliberation are often factional, nationalistic, and incoherent.
There are several factors that likely encouraged these characteristics and point to some implications for
future research in online public deliberation.
First, while there are clearer distinctions between the government, business, and civil society in more
mature democratic societies, those lines are less distinct in China due to the government’s permeating
influence on the fabric of political, economic, and social life. Engaging the government to change its
institutional behavior, policy, and practices is therefore crucial to promoting public deliberation in China.
Baogang He believes “it is impossible to develop any form of deliberation without backing from
governmental officials” (2006a, p. 138). Significant changes to public deliberation mechanisms may
require identification and engagement of reform-minded Chinese bureaucrats and elites in order to push
social justice agendas forward. Perhaps, as Leib remarked after a deliberative democracy in Hangzhou of
Zhejiang Province, that “those governing simply were more in touch with the reality that the
democratization project needs to be as top-down as it will invariably be bottom up, as local grassroots
activism finds ways to engage Chinese citizens” (2005).
Second, state monitoring and control over expansion of an emergent civil society stymies potential
growth. Under the government’s restrictions, public deliberation has not been able to organize or
institutionalize itself in order to broaden its audience and be more effective. Instead, current online public
deliberation tends to be restricted to informal, dispersive, and sporadic exchanges. As the state carefully
guards against the formation of large groups based on political and ideological agendas, it is perhaps
worthwhile, for the short term, to nurture the development of humanitarian, environment, health, and
community services in China where citizens acquire the experience and skills of civic action. The social
morale and social capital generated in the aftermath of the 2008 earthquake, for instance, is a great
resource to be tapped into. Exchanges with nonprofit institutions across borders may provide more energy
to China’s emergent civil society.
Third, as public deliberation often occurs online nowadays, it is paramount to understand the mechanisms
of information sharing, civic discussions, and collective actions. Of particular interest is the explication of
how massive sharing of news and information and everyday online political talk coalesce into Internet
collective incidents that press demands for reforms at the institutional level. Furthermore, one may ask in
what ways the availability of networking tools has helped or deterred citizens to share, connect, and act
together. Furthermore, one may inquire what specific social, cultural, and political factors may have
mediated the ways Chinese citizens utilize such technologies.
Fourth, the fact that two thirds of Chinese Internet users are people under the age of thirty invites
researchers and policy makers to gain a better understanding of China’s digital generations. It is feared
Jiang 2010: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet
that as Chinese media increasingly gravitate towards commercialization and entertainment (Zhao, 1998),
a large proportion of China’s digital population may choose to ride along the “entertainment
superhighway” for entertainment and consumerism rather than engage in public affairs (CNNIC, 2007;
Morozov, 2008). Discovering ways to engage younger users in civil society may be crucial to China’s
political future in the long term.
Finally, online public deliberation’s broader and long-term implications for authoritarian China need to be
considered. Granted, government networks and popular online protests reduced rampant corruption, but
can an authoritarian government learn to discipline itself? What mechanisms can be built (online or offline)
to discipline the abuse of political power and restore a degree of social justice? How long can the central
government keep faulting local, low-level officials for corruption while maintaining public confidence in the
top leadership? And as the regime uses the Internet to win popular support, fend off criticism and social
antagonism, and give the people a way to let off steam, to what extent will the government’s political PR
and theatrical performance of “openness” appease forces of significant social and political change? Are
the Chinese people gradually losing their fear of the state as its reliance on patriotism and legitimacy a
ppears quite fragile at times of mounting economic and social problems?
It may be that the Chinese government prefers to remain in the authoritarian twilight zone forever,
somewhere between totalitarianism and democracy. In order to maintain power, the regime has
implemented various measures to include citizens in local and national politics. Online authoritarian
deliberation instills much-needed legitimacy in this process. At the same time, however, online public
deliberation may improve civil liberties and political participation as participants acquire knowledge, skill,
and experience sharing information, building connections, and engaging in collective actions. If there are
different routes to improve governance, solve social problems, and promote civic and political participation
in a complex society like China, democracy may not be a precursor to public deliberation. Instead, public
deliberation, even in an authoritarian society, may flourish as a viable route to better governance and
democracy in China.
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Notes
Jiang 2010: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet
1
A recent Chinese Internet national survey (CNNIC, 2009b) reports 35.3% of blog owners update their
blogs every six months.
2
For instance, Rebecca Mackinnon (2009) examined how censorship is decentralized among Chinese
blog service providers with great variation from company to company.
3
The Great Firewall of China refers to a technological filtering system built by the Chinese government to
monitor and block foreign Internet content deemed harmful to Chinese society.
4
The Three Represents is a set of ideological principles introduced by former Chinese president Jiang
Zemin in 2001 which then became the guiding ideology of the Chinese Communist Party at the 16th Party
Congress in 2002. It stipulates that the CCP must represent the most advanced social productive forces
and culture in China as well as the interest of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people.
5
The Great Hall of the People is used for legislative and ceremonial activities by the Chinese
government. It is the site of National People’s Congress.
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