Robot Caregiver or Robot-Supported Caregiving?

Abstract

Much has been written—not least in this journal—about the potential, the benefits, and the risks of social robotics. Our paper is based on the social constructivist perspective that what a technology actually is can be decided only when it is applied. Using as an exemplar the robot baby seal PARO, which is deployed in Germany mainly as activation therapy for elderly people with dementia, we begin by briefly explaining why it is by no means clear at the beginning of the development phase what a technology is actually going to be. Rather, this is established in the light of, and in coordination with, the context of application. We then present some preliminary results from our ongoing study of the way in which this social robot is applied by professional care workers in a nursing home for the elderly. The underlying theoretical assumption on which our study is based is that the appearance and the performative deployment of a technical artifact are interdependent. Only in combination with experiences—the experiences of others, imparted in diverse forms as knowledge, and first-hand experience of using the technology—are the design and the technical functionality of the device of relevance to its appearance, that is, to what it is regarded as being. Our video-assisted ethnographic study of persons with dementia shows that, on the one hand, PARO is deployed performatively as an occasion for communication and as an interlocutor, and, on the other, it is applied as an observation instrument.

Full text

Int J of Soc Robotics
DOI 10.1007/s12369-015-0284-0
Robot Caregiver or Robot-Supported Caregiving?
The Performative Deployment of the Social Robot PARO in Dementia Care
Michaela Pfadenhauer ·Christoph Dukat
Accepted: 13 January 2015
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
Abstract Much has been written—not least in this journal
—about the potential, the benefits, and the risks of social
robotics. Our paper is based on the social constructivist per-
spective that what a technology actually is can be decided
only when it is applied. Using as an exemplar the robot baby
seal PARO, which is deployed in Germany mainly as activa-
tion therapy for elderly people with dementia, we begin by
briefly explaining why it is by no means clear at the begin-
ning of the development phase what a technology is actually
going to be. Rather, this is established in the light of, and in
coordination with, the context of application. We then present
some preliminary results from our ongoing study of the way
in which this social robot is applied by professional care
workers in a nursing home for the elderly. The underlying
theoretical assumption on which our study is based is that
the appearance and the performative deployment of a tech-
nical artifact are interdependent. Only in combination with
experiences—the experiences of others, imparted in diverse
forms as knowledge, and first-hand experience of using the
technology—are the design and the technical functionality of
the device of relevance to its appearance, that is, to what it is
regarded as being. Our video-assisted ethnographic study of
persons with dementia shows that, on the one hand, PARO is
deployed performatively as an occasion for communication
and as an interlocutor, and, on the other, it is applied as an
observation instrument.
M. Pfadenhauer (B)
Institute of Sociology, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
e-mail: michaela.pfadenhauer@univie.ac.at
C. Dukat
Institute of Sociology, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT),
Karlsruhe, Germany
e-mail: christoph.dukat@kit.edu
Keywords Sociology of knowledge ·(Post-) phenom-
enology ·Socio-technical arrangement ·Ethnography ·
Spatio-temporal communication setting
1 Introduction
The robot seal PARO is a social, or “socially assistive” [1],
robot that has already passed the prototype stage. In other
words, it is no longer being built and tested at a service
robotics R&D laboratory but is already being commercially
marketed in—Japan since 2005 and in Europe and the U.S.
since 2009. PARO is deployed mainly in nursing homes for
the elderly especially in dementia units and occasionally
in hospitals. Only in its country of origin, Japan, are over
half (60%) of the units sold owned by private customers
[2, p. 2530]. To date, approximately 1,500 units have been
sold worldwide: some 1,300 in Japan, 100 in Denmark, and
100 in other countries (see [3]). In contrast to other robots,
therefore, PARO is not a bestseller on the (entertainment)
robotics market. Nor is it intended to be, according to its
designer, who stresses that he designed PARO as a hand-
made therapeutic instrument rather than a mass-produced
consumer product, which is why he does not pursue a market-
ing strategy (personal communication on 14 February 2014).
PARO’s use as an artificial companion (cf. [4,p.3])bypri-
vate individuals has taken second place. However, the robot
seal has been finding its way into private households in Ger-
many and Switzerland—encouraged by concerted efforts to
deploy it during house calls within the framework of out-
patient dementia care (cf. Demenzladen Basel, Beziehungen
pflegen).
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2 Technological Architecture
(Post)phenomenology does not define technology ontologi-
cally. In other words, it does not ask what a technical arti-
fact is or what it can do not to mention what it ‘does’.
Rather, it defines technology according to how it appears
to human consciousness.1Although the American post-
phenomenologist and philosopher of technology Ihde [6]
emphasizes “appearance”, he focuses on the ways in which
technology is used. However, in our view, Ihde neglects the
aspect of performance—that is, the actual execution of a pro-
jected act.2For, it is not just a question of “what it (the robot)
does to us” [9, p. 219], but also what we do with it—or, more
precisely, how we do something with it (cf. [10]).
Not only does PARO’s robotic nature go unnoticed at
first glance, but also the fact that it is a work of technol-
ogy. For, because its zoomorphic shape is modeled after
a baby harp seal, the technical system (technisches (Sach)
system,[11]), which comprises a number of hard- and soft-
ware components, is hidden beneath artificial white fur that
has been treated with an anti-bacterial agent to comply with
the hygiene requirements of its field of use, the health sec-
tor. Hence, before one notices its weight—approximately
2.7kg—and the almost inaudible hum of its motors when
it moves its ‘head’, ‘eyelids’, or ‘flippers’, ones first impres-
sion is that PARO is just a plush toy.
The hardware components of PARO’s technical architec-
ture include a variety of sensors, two loudspeakers, a num-
ber of actuators, and two 32 Bit CPU RISC processors.3As
the central control unit, these processors form the core of the
device (cf. [12]). In keeping with the expertise of its designer,
PARO has five types of sensors: the posture sensor and the
temperature sensor are located at the center of the device;
there are two light sensors in the ‘nose’; the ‘whiskers’ are
touch-sensitive; and beneath the fur there is a “ubiquitous
surface tactile sensor”, which the designer describes as his
owninvention[13].4In addition, the device is equipped with
auditory sensors, or microphones, with which sounds can be
localized.
PARO’s behavior generation system comprises two hier-
archical layers of processes: proactive and reactive [14].
Prompted by sounds and other signals or stimuli, these
processes are initiated through the interaction of the afore-
mentioned hardware components with a behavior gener-
1“What matters for the human–robot relation is how the robot appears
to human consciousness” [5, p. 199].
2On the meaning of “performance” in the phenomenological sociol-
ogy of knowledge, (cf. [7]); for an understanding of the execution of a
projected act following the planning and decision phases, (cf. [8]).
3The advantage of these CPU processors is that they initiate processes
very quickly, efficiently, and without any noticeable delay.
4These sensors were developed collaboratively with a company for
Clinical Diagnostics.
ation system based on a behavior model (software) and
an underlying algorithm [12]. “Reactive behavior” means
that the robot simulates reactions to a sudden stimulus, for
example to a sudden loud sound [12, p. 2576]. “Proactive
behavior”, by contrast, refers to simulations that are gen-
erated by an “internal state system” (cf. [12, pp. 1054–
1055]). PARO’s proactive behavior is generated on two lay-
ers: a behavior-planning layer and a behavior-generation
layer [14]. In robotic research in the social sciences in Ger-
many, the extent of processes such as these is referred to
as the “degree of automation” (Selbsttaetigkeit)5or “auto-
matic control” (Eigensteuerung) of the technical artifact [16,
p. 131].
With the help of actuators a type of motor that transforms
signals or impulses into movement integrated in the ‘eyelids’,
the ‘neck’, and the front and hind ‘flippers’ of the robot, sys-
temic states are communicated to the user of the technology
by means of motor expression. The interaction of the actua-
tors with the tactile sensors conveys the impression that the
robot can move its ‘head’, ‘eyelids’, and front and hind ‘flip-
pers’ automatically, and that it therefore responds to touch.
In addition to motor expression, PARO’s repertoire
includes vocal expression. Various seal noises are simulated,
which can be interpreted as signs of pleasure or displeasure.
The microphones, which act as sound receivers, serve as a
complement to the loudspeakers, which transmit electron-
ically generated sound. The interplay between these audi-
tory sensors and the actuators enables the ‘head’ to turn in
the direction of sound sources, including the human voice,
thereby conveying the impression of attentive listening.
In contrast to the tactile and auditory “channels” (cf.
[17])—which are two-way channels, as it were—the visual
channel is underdeveloped insofar as PARO is not equipped
with a camera but merely has light sensors that enable a
diurnal rhythm of morning, daytime, and night to be sim-
ulated. However, as the actuators on the eyelids cause the
oversized—typical baby face—eyes to open and close, the
observer can interpret this as ‘seeing’ or ‘looking’.
Because PARO reacts when touched or spoken to—these
technical functions are greatly enhanced by the thick fur that
covers its seal-shaped body—it can be classified as an exam-
ple of “emotional robotics” (cf. [18]), which stands in the tra-
dition of “affective computing” [19].6For, on the one hand,
PARO was designed with an emphasis on the display—in par-
ticular the vocal display—of ‘emotional states’ by the robot.
And on the other, the design aims to arouse the impression
that the robot is reacting to the emotions expressed, espe-
cially through tactile gestures, by the human counterpart.
5Cf. Knoblauch [15, p. 39], who uses the term Selbsttaetigkeit (automa-
tion) in relation to the movements of a divining rod.
6The designer himself considers the choice of “emotional” as a label
for this research area to be unfortunate.
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In the following, we shall outline PARO’s location in the
field of robotics in general, and in human–robot interaction
(HRI) research in particular, on the basis of a brief account
of its development process.
3 Technological Development
The development of the artificial baby harp seal PARO began
in 1993 at Japan’s National Institute of Advanced Industrial
Science and Technology (AIST). Initially, research focused
on so-called genetic algorithms for the effective control of
mobile robotic systems in a variety of settings—not least
in industry. The development of so-called aesthetic objects
began against the disciplinary background of electronics and
mechanical engineering. Aesthetic objects are defined as
“artifacts that affect people mentally” [20, p. 1025, Fig. 1],
[21, p. 169]. From a computer science perspective, this desig-
nation emphasizes that aesthetic objects are the exact oppo-
site of “automatic machines” [20, p. 1025, Fig. 1] and heralds
a new direction in robotics research.
3.1 PARO and the Paradigm Shift from AI to HRI
Between 1995 and 1998, while he was working at MIT’s
Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, the designer collaborated
with Kazuyoshi Inoue and Robert Irie on the Artificial Emo-
tional Creature Project, which aimed to “explore a new area
in robotics” [22, p. 466]. Their research focused on HRI, and
especially on the stimulation of emotions by robotic systems
[22, p. 466].7
Hence, the development of PARO took place against the
background of two innovations in the field of robotics: first,
the establishment of social interactivity as a target at the tech-
nology development stage; and second, the related aspect of
emotions—both the registering of the emotional state of the
human user by means of tracking systems (sensors) and the
simulation of the expression of emotions in, or by, the arti-
fact itself. Both innovations took place in the context of a
long-standing debate on intuitive user interface design (e.g.
[24–26]), the implementation of artificial intelligence (AI) to
control the behavior of mobile robotic systems [27], in par-
ticular the debate on autonomy (e.g. [28,29], and adaptive
behavior control, e.g. [30]), and affective computing [19,31].
7The results of the application of functional near-infrared spectroscopy
(fNIRS) at Nihon University in order to investigate brain activities and
functions in student subjects during interaction with PARO [23]are
considered to be empirical confirmation of the fact that PARO is per-
ceived as having emotions. In principle, the paradigm shift in the field
of robotics, whereby robots are regarded as mechanisms of emotional
HRI, has led to a change in the methods of scientific evaluation. Shibata
et al. [22, p. 466] stress that subjective assessments rather than objective
measures (such as speed, accuracy, etc.) are decisive for the evaluation
of interactive, emotion-stimulating robots.
This focus was accompanied by a paradigm shift in the
field of robotics, whereby robots are no longer regarded
as convenient tools but rather as mechanisms of emotional
HRI [22, p. 466].8This shift was also related to the fact
that robotics increasingly distanced itself from “classical” AI
research approaches and gradually moved closer to design-,
acceptance-, and effectiveness research.9
3.2 Influence of Design-, Acceptance-, and Effectiveness
Research on PARO
The choice of a zoomorphic design was informed by the
desire to enhance HRI through emotional bonding [22,p.
466]. This approach was guided, first, by the argument that
domestic pets are very common companions and are there-
fore familiar, and second, by the success stories in the area
of animal-assisted therapy (AAT). In adopting this approach,
the designer oriented himself toward the research strand of
animal-like robotics within the debate on the design of social
robots, which up to then had focused mainly on humanoid
design (e.g. [40,41], [42,p.1]).
10
Contrary to the cultural–historical argument that people
are used to dealing with domestic pets and are therefore capa-
ble of interpreting the behavior of an animal-like robot [42,p.
8], the designer, after evaluating various animal shapes (dog,
cat, seal), came to the conclusion that a robot modeled after
a non-familiar animal would meet with much greater accep-
tance ([12,20,21,32], [3, p. 382], [2, p. 2530]).11 He thus
endeavored to circumvent the problem that technical repro-
ductions of familiar animals such as dogs and cats appear
deficient in comparison to their live models and that they
may also be rejected by people who have had negative expe-
riences with these animals see also [47].
Hence, research on the acceptance of social robotics
had an influence on PARO’s design. The new paradigm of
“robot believability” [48] follows the maxim that design ele-
ments should not arouse expectations that cannot be fulfilled.
8However, with regard to the purpose of such devices, the focus con-
tinues to be on the assistive function. As Shibata et al. [32, p. 444]
stress, “the artificial emotional creatures exist to assist people in every-
day life”. Therefore, in contrast to the EU-funded HOBBIT project,
which is based on such a mutual-care concept [33], these robots are not
designed to care for humans and to be cared for in return.
9Researchers from a diverse range of disciplines have dealt with AI
and the possibility of imitating human thinking [(e.g. [34–36]), (cf. [37,
p. 221])]. On the debate within AI research, cf. Meister [38]; on “the
paradigm shift in AI”, cf. also Brooks [39].
10 Drawing on cognitive science theories, such as simulation theory
[43] and the theory of mind [44], researchers in the area of HRI design
consider this empathy to be a basis for “expressive and rich interactions”
with robots [45,46].
11 Shibata and Wada [3, p. 382] assign PARO to the second of the
following three categories of animal-like robots (1) familiar animals,
(2) non-familiar animals, and (3) imaginary animals or characters.
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Int J of Soc Robotics
Analogous to the criticism of anthropomorphism in the field
of human–computer interaction (HCI), this means that life-
like reproductions should also be avoided when designing
animal-like robots [42, p. 8]. The life-like agent hypothe-
sis that a very life-like design enhances HRI [49,50]was
succeeded by the “matching hypothesis”, which states that
the more appearance and behavior modeling conform to the
expectations of the human interaction partners, the more suc-
cessful interaction is [51], cf. also [52,p.5].
After more and more studies reported positive effects of
the robot seal in the area of care for the elderly—and espe-
cially in dementia care—the designer classified his proto-
type as a “mental commitment robot.” In so doing, he and
his team entered the relatively young specialized field of
robot-assisted therapy: “The pet robots will be applied to
heal people as mental commit (sic) robots” [20, p. 1024].
Later, the designer described these robots as “human inter-
active robots for psychological enrichment” [53, p. 1749],
with the declared aim of providing a service “by inter-
acting with humans while stimulating their minds” [53,p.
1749].
Over the last decade, the deployment of social robots to
support therapeutic and activation interventions has estab-
lished itself as a further research strand within HRI research
by combining findings from the field of animal-assisted activ-
ity (AAA) and animal-assisted therapy (AAT) with the argu-
ment that the replacement of animals with technical artifact
is advantageous (cf. [2, p. 2527ff], [3, p. 381], [54,p.58],
[42,p.5],[55,p.408]).
PARO is currently the most well-known representative of
this young research field. This is due, on the one hand, to its
relatively wide dissemination and, on the other, to the efforts
of its designer to furnish tangible evidence of its potential
effectiveness by means of quantitative and qualitative stud-
ies.12 Effectiveness research generally focuses on the effects
and potential of such technical artifact to bring about mea-
surable health improvements [55, p. 414]. On the strength of
a number of studies modeled after medical–pharmaceutical
effectiveness research studies, the designer now expressly
describes PARO as a device that can be used for the care
of persons with dementia: “PARO is an advanced interac-
tive robot developed by AIST, a leading Japanese industrial
automation pioneer. It allows the documented benefits of ani-
mal therapy to be administered to patients in environments
such as hospitals and extended care facilities where live
12 PARO is not the only social robot designed for therapeutic use [56].
So-called “robotherapy” or “robotic psychology” [56, p. 1792], for
example, employs the cat-like robot NeCoRo [56]. A teddy bear robot
called the Huggable [57], which features a “sensitive skin” that detects
very light touch, is deployed as a “therapeutic robotic companion for
relational, affective touch” [55,58]. And the robot dog Homie, designed
as an “artificial companion for elderly people”, simulates various emo-
tional states with the aim of facilitating emotional bonding [59,p.1].
animals present treatment or logistical difficulties” (www.
parorobots.com).
3.3 PARO and the Shift in Perspective on Care
Arrangements
As even this brief outline of PARO’s development path
clearly shows, the development of technology does not take
place in a societal vacuum. Contrary to what linear models of
innovation suggest, no technological product emerges ‘fully
formed’ from the development stage and is then deployed
in accordance with its intended purpose. Rather, technology
is developed with the help of ideas and ‘discoveries’—and
even more so on the basis of existing possibilities and avail-
able personnel, financial, and material resources—and it is
developed further in complex processes of negotiation with
social groups (cf. [60]).
It can take years, or even decades, of development before a
technology is ready for commercial application as a ready-to-
use artifact. As a result of debate within and outside science,
anticipated applications continually undergo changes, func-
tions are extended, and the technological design is re-oriented
toward specific trajectories within scientific-technological
paradigms ([61,62], cf. also [38]).
Even though research and development takes place in lab-
oratories at first, by the time the prototype is being built, at the
latest, the technological development process becomes itera-
tively intertwined with possible application contexts. This is
the typical course that modern innovation journeys take. At
some point during this journey, external researchers—who
are often from the humanities or the social sciences—start to
observe the development of the new technology, while, at a
societal level, debate on its risks, benefits, etc. intensifies. As
a result, designers adapt or redefine the technology. Besides
scientific aspects, economic considerations and public debate
on social and demographic trends also play a considerable
role in this regard [63].13
Hence, in the development context itself (cf. [65–67]) and
in numerous publications on the development and applica-
tion of social robots in geriatric care, reference is made to the
challenges posed to society by demographic change a phe-
nomenon that is often negatively connoted (cf. [68,69]). In
this connection, the debate on the deployment of technology
in general, and of social robots in particular, is character-
ized mainly by two normative topoi: the preservation of the
autonomy of the sick and the elderly, and the support and
substitution of human work in the context of long-term care
(for an overview, cf. [70, p. 93ff]).
13 Besides the model of innovation proposed by Van de Ven et al.,
research on technological development has yielded numerous other
models for the analysis of the genesis of new technologies (cf. [64]).
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Int J of Soc Robotics
Krings et al. [70, p. 105ff] reasonably advocate the
replacement of this technology-push perspective with a
demand-pull perspective in order to overcome the one-
dimensional focus on the potential of the technology and to
focus on the needs of elderly people, who should be perceived
as being integrated in a complex system of arrangements for
long-term care. These arrangements are interlinkages of pro-
fessional and informal activities, employment relationships,
cultural orientations, and technical equipment, in which tech-
nology is therefore only one of many factors [70,p.75].In
order to emphasize the relevance of the technical artifact in
a socio-technical arrangement, Haeussling [71] refers to the
design concept (see below).
4 Sociological Research Question
In what follows, we shall not be commenting on the potential
therapeutic effectiveness of PARO, which numerous stud-
ies14 have endeavored to prove by means of physiological
and psychological testing.15 Nor shall we be venturing to
assess the risks associated with the deployment of the robot
in caregiving settings (cf. [70]). For, as sociologists, we do
not furnish evidence of technological effectiveness, nor do
we conduct technology assessment (TA) that is, assessment
of whether robotics is ethically, economically, or therapeuti-
cally justifiable. Rather, we endeavor to understand the social
order into which humans are integrated and which is, at the
same time, a product of human activity. In so doing, we do not
look at society through a wide-angle lens. Instead, we zoom in
on the institutional framework and the organizational constel-
lations under specific socio-historical conditions and focus
on situative encounters between the individuals who make
up the universe of interest to us as sociologists—namely, the
social world.
When we deal with technology in our capacity as soci-
ologists, we are interested in its connection with the social
world. The general view of this relation is that every soci-
ety has its ‘own’ technology and that, figuratively speak-
ing, every technology is an expression of its time. From
this perspective—and in view of the fact that social robot-
ics, with its promise of interaction or even partnership, has
14 The period of investigation—in view of the novelty effect—and the
problem of comparison groups are just two very striking problems that
beset the research design of these studies. The artificiality of the exper-
imental design, which is necessary to control other factors that could
potentially influence the effect, basically cancels out the advantage that,
in contrast to many other artifacts developed in this field, PARO has
already been applied in professional caregiving settings.
15 Apart from these studies, the alleged advantages of the robot seal
compared, for example, to therapy animals are stressed by the distribu-
tors on online platforms and in deployment tests and demo videos that
are available on the Internet.
very high social ambitions—one would ask: What kind of
society brings forth this kind of technology?
However, rather than taking a correlative perspective, our
viewpoint is one that integrates the technical and the social
in such a way that “the technical is always socially con-
structed and the social is always technically constructed”
[72, p. 273f]. Viewed from this perspective, technical arti-
facts must be treated not only as engineering constructions
but also as social constructions, and social formations must
be examined in the context of the technical relations that
stabilize them.
Following Bijker ([72, p. 326]), we consider concepts such
as “(socio-)technical system” and “actor/actant-network”
([73], cf. also [74]) to be problematic because of the notion
of order inherent in the systems concept and the unbounded-
ness inherent in the network concept. Hughes [75] describes
the electric light and power system as a complex system of
interconnected and clearly identifiable technical and social
components, while Ropohl [11, p. 328ff] takes the notion of
order one step further by explicitly using the concept of the
socio-technical system to describe an “organized structure”
(Popper 1960 cited in [11, p. 329]). This contrasts sharply
with the equally problematic unboundedness characteristic
of the network concept. The problem with the network con-
cept is not that the principle of symmetry on which it is based
erases the boundary between humans and non-humans. For
this boundary is indeed socially constructed (cf. [76]). Rather,
the problem is the price to be paid for portraying the socio-
technical system as an actor/ actant network in which human
and non-human actors must be described in the same terms
[73], namely that processes of action and meaning–making
are disappeared into a black box, at it were, thereby reifying
them.
The advantage of Bijkers “sociotechnical ensemble” con-
cept, which systematized the social construction of technol-
ogy (SCOT) approach that he developed in collaboration with
Pinch, is that it identifies a number of social groups involved
in the social construction of the artifact, while at the same
time placing the focus on the socially constructed techni-
cal artifact. However, unlike Latours actor-network-theory
(ANT), Bijkers concept does not exalt artifacts to the rank of
“non-human actors” [73]; nor does it demote them to mere
props or to a “standing reserve” (Heidegger 1977, p. 77 cited
in [75, p. 47]). However, the sociotechnical ensemble owes
its clear structure to an empirically untenable selection of
participant actor groups, who are observed in isolation from
each other without taking their local and historical context
into account, thereby leveling their potential influence [in
relation to this criticism (see [77])].
A stronger focus on technology is manifest in Rammerts
“sociotechnical constellation” concept [78]—a “network of
heterogeneous elements and processes that form the oper-
ative context of the technology and determine the nature
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and manner of its integration and effectiveness within the
contexts of its use” ([79, p. 140], our translation). On the
basis of a concept of gradual agency, Rammert argues from
a pragmatistic perspective that agency is distributed between
people, machines, and programs. Thus, “agency is really
built into technologies as it is embodied in people” ([80,
p. 6], emphasis in the original). Even though Rammert and
Schulz-Schaeffer [79] developed their concept of “distrib-
uted agency” in explicit critical contradistinction to ANTs
symmetry thesis (cf. [79, p. 140f]) and its concept of flat
hierarchy [81], the fact that they use the concepts “intera-
gency” and “interactivity” reveals that they have not com-
pletely abandoned the notion that machines act. By “interac-
tivity” Rammert [82] means a form of social action through
technology that is brought about by the interaction between
action and technology (cf. [83, p. 308]).
Haeussling [71, p. 143], by contrast, places the design
concept center stage. Explicitly following Rammert [78], he
describes designers as “arrangers of social constellations”.
With the “arrangement” concept, Haeussling [71, p. 144]
focuses on the nexus between the designedness of an object
and its formative effect, which engenders “new social prac-
tices in everyday life” [84, p. 25] via the affordances provided
by, and the individual appropriation of, technology. Apply-
ing a relational16 perspective to Baeckers [86] systems theory
approach, Haeussling postulates that design constitutes the
interface—or the touch surface—between the non-social and
the social, that is between the artificial–technical artifact and
the person who uses it to position him- or herself. ‘Touch’
is meant literally here, as designers give the materiality of
the object a shape and structure behind which they conceal
its technical functions. They equip this shape and structure
with symbols—that is, operating elements which are aimed
at unambiguousness. Users carry out (fine) motor movements
that, on the one hand, correspond to the design(ers) specifi-
cations and, on the other, are a meaningful element of self-
willed performance.
Hence, a two-way relationship between the producer and
the user comes about via the object. Haeussling [71, p. 151]
understands the design process as communication on the part
of the designer with an anticipated user, whereas Schuetz [87]
differentiates the perspective of the user in such a way that he
or she can see a designed object in a subjective or an objective
meaning-context. The artifact can be interpreted as evidence
(of what went on in the mind of the producer) or as a prod-
16 Fuhse and Muetzel [85, p. 7] describe as “relational” those network
research approaches that also adopt a cultural rather than a solely struc-
tural perspective on their research subject. In contrast to Baecker, Haeus-
sling does not understand design merely as an interface between humans
and technology but also as an “arrangement”. By this he means a “social
nexus that is formed and that forms” ([71, p. 144], our translation) and
in which technology, consciousness, the body, and communication rep-
resent the central connection points.
uct (endowed with a general, that is a currently prevailing,
sociohistorical meaning), whereby “as an objective meaning-
context, as a product, it refers back to a highly anonymous
ideal type of producer. (...) The artifact stands, as it were, at
the end of the anonymization line in whose typifications the
social world of contemporaries is constituted” ([87, p. 269],
our translation).
When socio-technical arrangements are viewed from such
a microperspective, the focus is on the (artificial) object.
However, this object is not elevated to the status of an act-
ing entity. Rather, by taking the objectivation process into
account, it is linked to the actor who designed it, and inte-
grated into the meaningful—cognitive and physical—acts
of the actor who uses it. As a result, the object establishes
a “They-relationship” (Ihr-Beziehung)17 between these two
types of actor. Analogous to the designers communication
offer to the anticipated user, the use of the artifact can also
be interpreted in the context of the user as an offer of com-
munication.
In the case of interest to us here—the use of a techni-
cal artifact—this is not merely an offer of communication in
the broadest sense of the word, for example in the sense of
a status symbol. Rather, it is a very concrete offer of com-
munication extended by one type of person to another. Our
research in this regard focuses on the process of action—that
is, the performance of the deployment of social robotics. This
performance points to competence in the sense of a subjec-
tive dimension (quality) and a social dimension (appropri-
ateness) of social action (cf. [89,90]). Both dimensions are
passed on to others in the form of knowledge of how to handle
the technical artifact correctly in order to achieve a certain
intended effect. Technical artifacts are “objects in action”
that require interpretation (cf. [83, p. 309]), and, moreover,
technology must be understood as an institution (cf. [91]).
The general questions that guide our project can be formu-
lated as follows: How do people incorporate social robotics
into their social interactions, thereby changing these inter-
actions? In what way do people use social robotics in their
everyday private and professional lives and in non-everyday
situations,18 thereby changing not only their everyday lives
but also culture in the present context, the culture of profes-
sional caregiving, for example?
5 Methodological Remarks
Against the background of our basic sociological understand-
ing, which integrates the social and the technical, what is
17 Schuetz [88, p. 210] distinguishes distant “They-relationships”
between contemporaries, who are by definition “highly anonymous
ideal types”, and “We-relationships” between consociates.
18 In non-everyday situations, we use robots as vehicles to cultural
worlds of experience (cf. [10,92,93]).
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Int J of Soc Robotics
of concrete interest to us in what follows is how—and as
what—care workers deploy PARO, the “socially assistive”
[1] robot, in a residential geriatric care setting, and especially
in dementia care. Since the spring of 2013, we have been con-
ducting long-term ethnographic research at a church-funded
residential care center for the elderly in which two PARO
units are being deployed. These units are applied exclusively
by so-called “additional care workers” (zusaetzliche Betreu-
ungskraefte), an occupation that was introduced only a few
years ago. To qualify as an additional care worker, one must
successfully complete a qualification measure comprising
160h of instruction and a 2-week internship at a caregiving
facility.19 The qualification and the job tasks are regulated
under section 87b of Book XI of the German Social Code
[SGB]. As the job of additional care worker is not highly
qualified, it can be classified as semi-professional.
In accordance with the Richtlinien nach 87b Abs. 3 SGB
XI zur Qualifikation und zu den Aufgaben von zustzlichen
Betreuungskraeften in Pflegeheimen [Guidelines under Sec-
tion 87b Subsection 3 of Book XI of the German Social
Code (SGB) Relating to the Qualification and Tasks of Addi-
tional Care Workers in Nursing Homes; our translation] of
19 August 2008, which are referred to in the following as
the Betreuungskraefte-RI, the main task of these care work-
ers is to “work closely and in professional consultation with
the nursing staff and nursing teams to improve the qual-
ity of care and the quality of life of nursing home resi-
dents whose ability to cope with activities of daily living is
severely and permanently restricted as a result of dementia-
related incapacitation, mental illness, or mental disability,
and who are therefore in need of a high level of supervision
and care.”
The fact that our research focuses on persons with demen-
tia is not determined by our research question but rather by
the situation encountered at the research site. The criterion
for the selection of the research site was the deployment
of PARO in practice as opposed to in a research laboratory
or under artificial conditions. Most of the studies on PARO
have been conducted under such controlled conditions either
because no setting could be found in which PARO was being
deployed in practice or because controlled conditions were
considered to be an essential prerequisite for establishing its
effectiveness.20
The deployment of PARO at our research site is also a ‘test
run’ insofar as the use of a robot for the care and activation of
19 The qualification measure is preceded by 5days of practical work
experience for orientation purposes. After they qualify, additional care
workers are required to attend at least one further-training course per
year [section 4 of the Betreuungskraefte-RI].
20 Cf. by way of example the study currently being conducted by Moyle
et al. [94]. In a pilot randomized controlled trial, Moyle and her team
have already established the positive effect of PARO on the quality of
life of nursing home residents with dementia.
nursing home residents is not explicitly mentioned on the list
of care and activation measures in section 87b subsection 3
of the Betreuungskraefte-RI. However, this list of examples
of the measures that care workers are expected to use to moti-
vate nursing home residents to undertake activities of daily
living [section 2 subsection 2, Betreuungskraefte- RI]ispref-
aced by a passage stating that, in principle, any “measures
and activities that can positively influence the well-being,
the physical condition, or the psychological mood of per-
sons in care (may) be considered” [section 2 subsection 1,
Betreuungskraefte- RI; our translation].
After the nursing home management decided to pur-
chase PARO, and the church funding body approved this
decision, two of the ‘additional care workers’ employed
by the home underwent the ‘introductory training’ recom-
mended and delivered by the distributor of the device in Ger-
many. In addition, one of the two care workers attended a
regional meeting of users, which served to exchange expe-
riences. Moreover, the facility was given access to the dis-
tributor’s ‘interactive’ e-learning platform, which is intended
to replace individual on-site introductions in future. One of
the two care workers has since changed employers. Before
she left, she spent 2h passing on to a third care worker the
experiences she had gained when deploying PARO. Hence,
the device is still being applied by two ‘additional care
workers’.
In the facility under research, PARO is by now firmly
established among the many activation measures, which
range from activation with singing bowls and Snoezelen ther-
apy through ‘reminiscence breakfasts’, church services, the-
atre, and active groups, to activation with therapy dogs.21
Like all other activation measures, the deployment of the
robot within the framework of the activation program drawn
up on a monthly basis is handled in a flexible way. In other
words, its deployment depends on the availability of person-
nel and on other considerations. During the 1-year observa-
tion period, a rhythm of, on average, three PARO applications
a month has become apparent. With just one exception, the
situations in which PARO has been deployed have been so-
called group-activation sessions. This is in keeping with the
statutory guidelines, whereby “group activities [are] a suit-
able instrument for the prevention of social isolation that is
threatened or has already occurred” (section 2 subsection 3,
Betreuungskraefte- RI).
Participant observations and videographic documentation
of this (group) activation with the robot seal constitute the
21 The facility cooperates with a dog-training school, which trains its
dogs on site at the home under research to interact with elderly people
and people with dementia. Moreover, one of the additional care workers
deploys her own dog. (The animals suitability for deployment in this
context was established beforehand).
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Int J of Soc Robotics
core of our data material.22 In order to be able to recognize the
salient characteristics of this form of activation, we applied
the principle of minimax contrasting to select measures for
additional observation. From the broad range of activation
measures we selected those measures that we deemed to
be structurally similar (for example activation with therapy
dogs or singing bowls) and those that are clearly different
(reminiscence breakfasts, active group). Our body of data,
which comprises approximately 15h of video footage, 50
photos,23 20 recordings of informal conversations and team
discussions, and 20 observation protocols, is currently being
extended to include exploratory interviews with persons who
are responsible for the activation of people with dementia, on
the one hand, and for marketing and distributing the robot,
on the other.24
When interpreting the audio data, transcripts of which are
gradually becoming available, and the video data, which we
examine straight away, we employ what is referred to in the
hermeneutic sociology of knowledge (cf. [99]) as a “quasi-
Socratic interpretation technique” [100, p. 215]. This tech-
nique entails confronting the interpreters everyday interpre-
tation skills with the basic problem facing the social science
interpreter—namely, to make transparent how he understands
what he believes to understand, and how he knows what he
thinks he knows. This succeeds best in a group setting, where
the social scientist in question is requested to give his peers
an exhaustive account of his (ad-hoc) interpretation of a text
passage or a video sequence. The ensuing discourse prompts
him to selfcritically reflect upon and, if necessary, revise the
interpretation. Hence, collaborative interpretation in a group
setting is an ideal solution (cf. [101]).
6 Results
In contrast to many other robots, PARO cannot move inde-
pendently. This is of relevance for its handling as it cannot
22 Cf. Pfadenhauer and Grenz [95] on participant observation and Tuma
et al. [96] on videography. Participant observation continually tends
toward observant participation. Rather than being intended, this is deter-
mined by the situation in the field (cf. [97]) for example, when PARO
cannot be deployed as planned because the additional care worker is on
sick leave, and we find ourselves equipped with the device and sitting
among residents of the home. In this case, instead of observation data,
we acquire experiential data, which are particularly valuable with regard
to the experience of lapses in communication and the use of PARO to
overcome them.
23 On visual protocoling within the framework of which photos acts as
a form of knowledge, (cf. [98]).
24 Our research acquires contextualization—the results of which can-
not yet be reported here—by virtue of the fact that we are also studying
the deployment of PARO during house calls within the framework of
outpatient dementia care (home visit services in Germany and Switzer-
land). Moreover, we are interested in the (organizational and national)
cultural differences in the way in which this artifact is used.
enter a room independently but must be carried in. We have
empirically identified several different carrying techniques.
This fact is worthy of mention because the possibilities for
action created for the residents of the home vary according
to the way in which the care workers carry the robot. None of
the qualified care workers whom we have accompanied carry
the device as if it were a mere accessory; and none of them
would ever think of carrying it in its storage box. This obser-
vation does not allow any conclusions to be drawn about the
subjective meaning that the care workers associate with their
carrying techniques, which meaning can vary from individual
to individual. However, one thing can be ruled out—namely,
that they regard the artifact as a mere tool.
All the care workers carry PARO demonstratively in their
arms, with the result that residents spontaneously talk, or
react, to the device.25 We call this ‘activation in passing‘.
It comes about particularly when the care worker slows her
pace and when she has already switched the device on before
the encounter. The so-called ‘Fliegergriff ‘ technique caught
our attention. It entails laying the robot seal along the fore-
arm with the head nestling in the crook of the arm. Literally
translated as the ‘airplane hold’, it is known in English as “the
colic carry” or the “tiger-in-the-tree hold” and is employed to
provide relief to babies suffering from colic. The advantage
of this technique—as opposed to the more commonly used
technique of carrying the robot under ones arm—is that the
switch can be easily reached and the device can therefore be
switched on relatively unobtrusively. This carrying technique
is recommended during the operator training delivered by
the distributor of the device.26 The technique was applied—
in other words, it was adopted as knowledge—by the care
worker who qualified as a certified operator. She had been
familiar with the technique beforehand as she had used it
when her children were babies and it had proved its worth at
the time.
When the care worker approaches a resident or a group of
residents, this carrying act becomes a gestural act—namely,
proffering. The transition from demonstrating to proffering is
universal because, as our observations reveal, it occurs irre-
spective of the identity of the care worker or the resident. As
long as the care worker proffers the device in this way, the
residents situative attentiveness is ensured even if no con-
25 Because of its size and color, PARO is hard to miss—provided, of
course, one is a “normal, wide-awake adult” (Schuetzs term; on devi-
ation from the norm as a result of dementia, (cf. [102]). However, if
a person has impaired vision, which can be exacerbated in dementia
patients by a decreased sensitivity to the color white, PARO may not be
noticed.
26 Germany is not the only country in which the distributors urge cus-
tomers to take advantage of user training when they purchase PARO.
Our ethnographic study confirms Pedersen’s related to Denmark thesis
[103, p. 44] that participants are trained not only in the correct applica-
tion of the device but also in the correct attitude to the technology.
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Int J of Soc Robotics
versation ensues. This gestural sustaining of the situation,
which the care worker supports verbally and through her
facial expression, creates a space for communication, which
the resident may—but is not obliged to—avail of.27
Even when the care worker approaches residents who are
seated in a seating area or at a table, and even when several
persons in the group react to PARO, activation does not take
the form of group activation. In other words, in contrast to
the act of greeting, the care worker no longer addresses the
group as a whole but rather one resident in particular for how
long depends on the resident’s reaction.28
Hence, even in the group setting, the deployment of PARO
takes the form of individual activation. This activation may
take a variety of forms. However, it makes a difference
whether the care worker succeeds in making contact with the
resident, in other words, whether the proffering of PARO,
which is always accompanied by a direct address, prompts
a reaction. This reaction may be, but need not be, due to
PARO. Where contact is successfully established, we can
contrast two variants of the deployment of the artifact. In the
first case (Variant 1), the care worker continually presents a
conversational stimulus, takes up a broken thread of conver-
sation, encourages the resident to stroke PARO’s fur, com-
ments on its forms of expression, or invites the person to
interpret them (“Do you think he likes that?”). In the second
case (Variant 2), she holds back almost completely.
The first case resembles the typical course of everyday
conversational situations in the presence of house pets: first,
the pet is spoken to directly; this quickly gives way to a con-
versation about the animal; the conversation then switches
to other topics; and it then switches back to the animal if
its behavior attracts attention or the conversation falters (cf.
[104]). In the second case, the attitude of the care worker
resembles that of a psychoanalyst, who generates an artifi-
cial conversational atmosphere by means of a self-imposed
reserve that evokes narration on the part of the analysand.
In this situation, the care worker is not so much an inter-
locutor but rather an observer whose gaze switches back
and forth between PARO and the resident. In this situation,
the communicative burden on the care worker is lightened
by the presence of the robot. This facilitates the kind of
“free-floating attention” (freischwebende Aufmerksamkeit)
that Freud describes as the necessary state of mind of the
analyst during a psychoanalytic session: it is expressly not a
question of focussing on a particular detail but rather of pay-
27 Throughout this paper we use feminine personal pronouns in relation
to care workers and residents in order to make it clear that we were able
to observe only female care workers and that the share of males among
the residents is also very low. Hence, our data cannot be used as a basis
for gender-specific statements.
28 Wehave not yet been able to identify the selection criterion. However,
it is probable that, because of the presence of the researcher, the selection
is determined at least in part by a ‘demonstration motive’.
ing attention to all details (cf. [105, p. 89]). The care worker
interprets the way in which the resident interprets PARO and
whether the resident makes a connection between her (the
residents) own actions and the (re)actions of the device.
In the same way as there is a typical seating arrangement in
psychoanalysis—the analyst sits next to or behind (the head)
of the analysand—the positioning of the care worker during
the deployment of PARO is also significant. When assuming
the role of observer, she typically squats down diagonally
opposite the seated resident and can therefore focus both on
PARO and, more importantly, on the face of the resident.
By contrast, the role of interlocutor is not characterized by
a particular positioning. When the care worker exercises this
role, the conversation is opened up to other residents. How-
ever, it is by no means only on the initiative of the care worker
that the other residents are brought into the technology-
mediated dyadic constellation. This also takes place on the
initiative of the resident herself. This constellation may be
regarded as “mediatized” [97] if one considers the robot to be
media technology by means of which the original direct face-
to-face constellation—and thus the experiences of the par-
ticipant persons—changes. The fact that the role of the care
worker has undergone differentiation, and that her role set
now includes an observer role, could be a indication of this.
7 Discussion
We have observed two variants of the deployment of PARO.
In one case, the care worker acts as a participant (in the
conversation with the resident). In the other, she acts as
an observer (of the resident’s interaction with the robot).
In the latter situation, the topic is typically selected by the
resident—and not by the care worker, which is otherwise
usually the case. For the purpose of interpreting these obser-
vations with a view to generalizing them, we consider a
(post)phenomenological approach to technology to be help-
ful because it focuses on the ways in which technology is
used, thereby rendering the “sensory-corporeal dimension
of things accessible to analysis” ([106, p. 23]; our transla-
tion). More so than Ihde [6], we emphasize the importance
of performance (the execution of the act of deploying a tech-
nical artifact) for appearance (what the artifact is regarded
as being). From the perspective of a phenomenologically
oriented sociology of knowledge—as opposed, for exam-
ple, to a praxeological perspective—performance consti-
tutes an entity comprising consciousness activity (meaning-
establishment), the corporeality of the execution of the pro-
jected act, and the technical artifact, which is always endowed
with meaning (knowledge).
Variant 1: Structurally speaking, the deployment of the
technical artifact creates an occasion for conversation or even
a situation in which the residents treat the robot as an inter-
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Int J of Soc Robotics
locutor. The automation (Selbsttaetigkeit) that is character-
istic of a robot constantly provides both participants with a
potential topic of conversation to which they can refer should
the conversation threaten to wane. However, in the case of
persons with dementia, that is precisely what often brings
encounters to an end—although the participants do not nec-
essarily want this to happen.
In Variant 1, humans29 and technology have what Ihde [6,
p. 97] describes as an “alterity relation”, in which technol-
ogy displays a fascinating “quasi-otherness”. As Ihde notes,
“[w]hat makes it [technology] fascinating is this property of
quasi-automation, the life of its own” [6, p. 100]. In addition
to children’s toys and computer games, Ihde explicitly uses
the example of a robot, while taking care to distance his con-
cept from the anthropomorphizing that is characteristic of AI
research.30
It is not the advanced nature of the technology that is
decisive for the establishment of alterity relations. Rather,
it is its “disobedience”—which should not be equated with
technical malfunctioning (cf. [6, p. 99]). Disobedience is, so
to speak, the flip side of what roboticists call the systems
“ability to learn”. From the perspective of a care worker who
uses the robot in a goal-directed way by incorporating it into
the execution of her projected acts, the diverse output variants
of the system may also be quite a challenge. The inability to
predict whether PARO is going to do anything at all, and
what he is going to ‘do’, is what brings the care workers
to regard the conversational situation with the residents as
special or out of the ordinary. However, the challenge posed
by the situation should not be overlooked. We interpret our
observation that the care workers are constantly stroking the
device to be an indication of the strenuousness of their efforts
to cope with PARO’s “disobedience”.
Variant 2: Structurally speaking, this variant of the deploy-
ment of the technical artifact creates an optional spatio-
temporal communication setting (Kommunikationszeitraum),
which the care worker sustains for a relatively long time.
She does so performatively—that is, a) physically, through
her posture and positioning, b) gesturally,byprofferingthe
device to the resident and by touching it herself when plac-
ing it on the table in front of the resident or (rarely) on the
resident’s lap, c) through facial expression, that is through
eye contact, and d) sometimes also verbally, by thematically
referring to PARO.
In this variant, humans and technology have what Ihde
[6, p. 80] calls a “hermeneutic relation”, which means that
technology helps the person to find out something about the
29 In keeping with our research question, the term ‘humans’ refers here
to the care workers. On the problems associated with gaining access to
the perceptions of persons with dementia, (cf. [102,107]).
30 Anthropomorphizing has been a controversial topic in HRI for some
time now (cf. [108–111]).
world by producing signs that have to be interpreted. Ihde
[6, p. 84] uses a thermometer as an example: the tempera-
ture cannot be apperceived directly but rather via symbolic
representations (figures, calibration marks on the mercury
column); and the necessary ‘translation’ effort is even more
pronounced when the unit of measurement (e.g. Fahrenheit
instead of Celsius or vice versa) is unfamiliar.
That the performative deployment of the robot seal con-
stitutes “hermeneutic technics” is evidenced by the fact that,
from the point of view of (one of) the care workers, what
is special about this technology is that PARO—and only
PARO—opens, or can be used to open, the “heart doors of
memory” [Interview Oct. 2013]. By this, the care worker
does not only mean access to particularly valuable biographic
experiences that have been buried by dementia. According to
our interpretatively acquired insight, “heart doors of mem-
ory” connotes the shimmering through of the personality—
or the former “personal identity” [112]—of the resident in
question, which is hidden by the disease.
“Hermeneutic transparency” in the “hermeneutic relation”
corresponds to “disobedience” in the “alterity relation”. Ihde
[6, p. 82] uses the example of navigational chart reading to
illustrate what he means by “hermeneutic transparency”, not-
ing that “[it] is apparent from the chart example that the chart
itself becomes the object of perception while simultaneously
referring beyond itself to what is not immediately seen”. This
manifests itself in the behavior of the care workers whom we
have observed. On the one hand, they focus their attention on
the robot’s acoustic sounds and autonomous movements—
that is, its “signs”—and, on the other, they look through them,
as it were, and focus on the actions and reactions of the res-
idents (cf. once again [106, p. 18]).
In this post-phenomenological understanding, it is indeed
the human–technology relation that causes the appearance of
something—namely, in the care workers view, the personal-
ity of the resident (here, too, cf. once again [5]).
8 Outlook
Our aim in this paper was to show how—and as what—care
workers deploy PARO as an activation therapy for nursing
home residents with dementia. In other words, we wanted
to identify the kind of performance elicited by the special
type of technology known as social robotics. We demon-
strated how the care workers internalize knowledge on the
one hand and generate different forms of communication on
the other. The institutionalization of these forms of commu-
nication by virtue of their being passed on to, or adopted
by, the next generation can already be observed. The main
insight yielded by our study is that the combination of the
deployment and the characteristic features of the technology
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Int J of Soc Robotics
performatively establishes a relatively stable spatio-temporal
communication setting (Kommunikationszeitraum).
This spatio-temporal communication setting, in which the
resident is under no pressure to act and the care worker is
shielded from distraction, is based on an understructured
situation. The “professional performance” [113] of the care
worker is her self-imposed, deliberate reserve, without which
the resident would be unable to act (as opposed to merely
reacting). The fact that this variant (Variant 2) calls for an atti-
tude that is special, non-routine, and strenuous could explain
why it is observed less frequently than Variant 1 and is not
applied by all three additional care workers observed by us.
A systematic analysis is called for to determine when this is
the case and whether it is dependent on certain persons or
circumstances.
Our data contain nothing to suggest that PARO could be
used to replace manpower—one of the fears voiced in the
aforementioned robotics debate. This is due not least to the
fact that it literally has to be carried into the caregiving situa-
tion, As we have endeavored to demonstrate, the robot is not a
substitute for the additional care workers but rather supports
them in their work in (at least) two different ways. Just as
the deployment of robotics in industry can also be assessed
in terms of the increase of productivity, so too could one
ask in the further investigation whether its use as an observa-
tion instrument (Variant 2) improves the quality of caregiving
insofar as it enables the care workers to find out more about
those in need of care—including things that cannot be dis-
covered by other means.
And although it might appear paradoxical at first glance,
the integration of this kind of technology could indeed bring
about a change in caregiving culture by pushing profes-
sional caregiving in the direction of the principle of self-
determination enshrined in various legal norms—in Ger-
many, for example, in section 2 subsection 2 of the Law
on Long-Term Care Insurance [Book XI of the Social Code
[SGB]; our translation]: “The aim of long-term care insur-
ance benefits is to help those in need of care to lead as inde-
pendent and self-determined a life as possible despite their
need for care, which fulfils [the right to] human dignity.”
The deployment of PARO described in Variant 2 could make
at least a small contribution to this because the creation of
a spatio-temporal communication setting not only increases
the chances of initiating a conversation in the first place. It
also gives the residents a chance to select the topic of con-
versation to a certain extent.
We agree with Meister [114, p. 113] that further research
in this setting is essential—in particular, research from
an organization-sociology and sociology-of-professions per-
spective. As Meister notes: “What is evidentially missing
are articles dealing with the meso-level, that is the conse-
quences of an integration of robots in organizational settings.
The introduction of a care-giving robot (e.g. PARO) will evi-
dently not only create new human–robot interactions, but will
also change the organizational setting in nursing homes with
respect to workload, work description and hierarchies” [114,
p. 113].
Our empirical research has indeed identified signs of ten-
sion between nursing and professional caregiving, in which
the young occupational field of professional caregiving and
activating must assert itself against the long-standing profes-
sion of nursing. It cannot be denied that technical artifacts
such as PARO enhance the standing of caregiving and activat-
ing measures delivered by low-skilled “additional care work-
ers”. If these artifacts are recognized as therapeutic devices,
which is something that is currently being driven ahead vig-
orously,31 and if steps are taken to increase the qualifications
of these care workers, this could give rise to a completely
new balance of power.
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Michaela Pfadenhauer is a professor of Sociology at the University
of Vienna (Research Area Knowledge and Culture). She has a Ph.D.
in Sociology at Technical University Dortmund in 2002. 2014 she was
a visitor professor at Boston University. From 2007–2014 she was a
professor of Sociology at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT). She
is a member of the board of the German Sociological Association and
the National delegate for Germany in COST European Cooperation
in Science and Technology domain “Individuals, Societies, Cultures
and Health” (ISCH). Her research interests include New Sociology of
Knowledge, Social Constructivism as a Paradigm, Mediatization and
Social Robotics. She is the Co-Editor of “Social Robots and Artificial
Companions. Contributions from the Social Sciences”, Special Issue
Science, Technology and Innovation Studies Vol 10, No 1 http://www.
sti-studies.de/ojs/index.php/sti. Her article “The Contemporary Appeal
of Artificial Companions. AC Technologies as Vehicles to Cultural
Worlds of Experience” will be published in The Information Society
31(3), May 2015.
Christoph Dukat is a research fellow at the Karlsruhe Institute of
Technology (KIT). He studied Historical Science and Sociology at
Karlsruhe University and Social Science at Heinrich Heine Univer-
sity Duesseldorf. His research interests include Sociology of Knowl-
edge and Trust, Qualitative Contributions to Network Analysis, Cloud
Computing and Social Robotics. Publications: Caton, S.; Dukat, C.;
Grenz, T.; Haas, C.; Pfadenhauer, M.; Weinhardt, C. 2012 Foundations
of Trust: Contextualising Trust in Social Clouds. 2nd International Con-
ference on Social Computing and Its Applications (SCA 2012). (Xiang-
tan, Hunan, China). 424429; Dukat, C.; Caton, S. 2013 Towards the
Competence of Crowdsourcees: Considerations on the Mismatching
of Quality and Qualification Tests. International Workshop on Crowd
Work and Human Computation, co-located with the 3rd International
Conference on Social Computing and Its Applications (SCA 2013).
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