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Journal of School Violence
ISSN: 1538-8220 (Print) 1538-8239 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/wjsv20
Contemporary Responses to Violent Attacks on
College Campuses
Michael L. Sulkowski & Philip J. Lazarus
To cite this article: Michael L. Sulkowski & Philip J. Lazarus (2011) Contemporary Responses
to Violent Attacks on College Campuses, Journal of School Violence, 10:4, 338-354, DOI:
10.1080/15388220.2011.602601
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/15388220.2011.602601
Published online: 11 Oct 2011.
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Journal of School Violence, 10:338–354, 2011
Copyright ©Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1538-8220 print/1538-8239 online
DOI: 10.1080/15388220.2011.602601
Contemporary Responses to Violent Attacks
on College Campuses
MICHAEL L. SULKOWSKI
Department of Pediatrics, University of South Florida, St. Petersburg, Florida, USA
PHILIP J. LAZARUS
Department of Educational Leadership and Professional Studies, College of Education,
Florida International University, Miami, Florida, USA
In this article, the authors review efforts to increase the availability
of crime data to students and parents, utilize security technologies
on campus, allow members of campus communities to carry con-
cealed weapons, use criminal or potential shooter profiling, employ
threat assessment techniques, and implement emergency response
plans to address attacks. Limited or no empirical support exists for
efforts to increase the availability of data on campus crime, allow
concealed weapons carriers on campus, increase security technolo-
gies on campus, and use criminal profiling techniques to identify
threatening students. However, support exists for threat assessment
procedures, strategies to increase threat reporting, and for emer-
gency management plans. Although it is impossible to rid colleges
completely of violence, this review underscores the importance of
encouraging all members of the college community to commit to
supporting safe, free, and open college communities.
KEYWORDS campus violence, school shootings, threat assess-
ment, violence prevention, emergency response
April 16, 2011, marked the 5-year anniversary of the Virginia Tech mas-
sacre in which Seung-Hui Cho killed 32 people before taking his own
life. This attack brought the most recent national scrutiny to the issue of
Received May 10, 2010; revised April 11, 2011; accepted June 30, 2011.
Address correspondence to Michael L. Sulkowski, University of South Florida, 800 6th St.
South, Box 7523, St. Petersburg, FL 33701, USA. E-mail: sulkowsm@ufl.edu
338
Contemporary Responses 339
campus violence and profoundly affected how colleges manage crises, dis-
asters, and critical incidents (Fox & Savage, 2009; Shafer, Heiple, Giblin, &
Burruss, 2010). In the aftermath of the Virginia Tech massacre, many colleges
increased the presence of security technology on campus, implemented
policies to discourage students from carrying weapons (e.g., immediate
expulsion for weapons possession), and some colleges are even consid-
ering allowing faculty members to carry concealed weapons in an effort
to prevent campus violence. However, these and other responses to vio-
lent attacks on college campuses have received little empirical or scholarly
attention (Garcia, 2003; Harnisch, 2008; Lipka, 2009). To address a paucity
of information on violence prevention in campus communities, this article
reviews research on the nature of campus communities as well as a variety
of contemporary responses to violent attacks. Specifically, we discuss ways
in which campus communities are vulnerable to attacks and current efforts
to mitigate threats of mass violence such as the enactment of the Campus
Security Act, use of security technology, allowing concealed weapons
carriers on campus, criminally profiling students, conducting threat assess-
ments, encouraging threat reporting, and implementing emergency response
plans.
VULNERABILITY OF COLLEGE CAMPUSES TO VIOLENT ATTACKS
Although college campuses are safer than their surrounding communities
are (Bromley, 1992; Volkwein, Szelest, & Lizotte, 1995), violent attacks
on college campuses have increased along with the number of students
attending these institutions. According to a recent government report on
postsecondary educational institutions in the United States, the number of
campus attacks in the 1980s (N=40) nearly doubled in the 1990s (N=
79) and then leveled off in the 2000s (N=83; Drysdale, Modzeleski, &
Simons, 2010). Further, an average of 25.5 murders occurred each year on
college campuses between 1997 and 2007 (U.S. Department of Education,
n.d.), which is a small fraction of the average of the 16,539 murders that
occurred annually in the United States during the same decade (Federal
Bureau of Investigations, n.d.). Thus, despite the relative safety of col-
lege communities, all campus homicides are tragic, and preventing even
a single attack such as the Virginia Tech massacre can save dozens of
lives.
College campuses are prime locations for violent perpetrators to stage
devastating multiple victim attacks due to their dense populations, rela-
tively low police presence, and open and welcoming nature (Boynton,
2003). Furthermore, violent campus attacks often end tragically before law
enforcement officials are able to intervene due to the highly chaotic nature
340 M. L. Sulkowski and P. J. Lazarus
if these attacks and the speed by which they are executed (Greenberg, 2007;
O’Toole, 2000). Therefore, despite the immense planning that often goes
into campus attacks, they usually last only a few minutes and provide little
time for police, college officials, or bystanders to coordinate an organized
response (Greenberg, 2007).
Colleges are also vulnerable by their nature and design. They have
multiple buildings, many entry and exit points, and frequently are popu-
lated by visitors who are not students or employees. Thus, there is no easy
way to determine who has a legitimate need to be on campus or who
may pose a threat unless everyone is required to display specific identifica-
tion information or be screened upon entry. Moreover, students who carry
weapons may contribute to the vulnerability of college campuses. According
to one study, almost 5% of students report having a working firearm at
college, approximately one half (47%) of these students endorse having
the gun for protection, and most (86%) of these students live off campus
(Miller, Hemenway, & Wechsler, 2002). Even higher rates of weapon carry-
ing have been found in other studies. For example, within a 30-day period,
about 7% of students report to have carried a weapon (e.g., gun, knife) on
campus (Patrick, Covin, Fulop, Calfas, & Lovato, 1997; Presley, Meilman, &
Cashin, 1997), and approximately 15% of the male students in the southeast
United States (e.g., Louisiana, Georgia, South Carolina) report to have car-
ried weapons on campus within the same time period (Meilman, Leichliter,
& Presley, 1998). In addition to carrying weapons, about 2% of students
report having been threatened with a gun while on campus (Miller et al.,
2002). This finding suggests that even though campus attacks are rare, a
small yet significant percentage of college students may be at risk for being
shot or experiencing distress associated with being threatened. Thus, the
significant presence of weapons on campus, the concerning percentage of
students who report being threatened with a firearm, the relative vulnera-
bility of colleges to attacks, and the negative effects campus attacks have
on communities highlight the importance of intensifying efforts to address
threats of violence in campus communities.
CONTEMPORARY RESPONSES TO VIOLENT ATTACKS
The Campus Security Act
The Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime
Statistics Act (Public Law 105–244; also known as the “Campus Security
Act” [CSA]) predates the Virginia Tech massacre. CSA was enacted with
the passage of the 1990 Higher Education Amendments Act to increase
knowledge of crimes perpetrated on college campuses and was named
after Jeanne Clery, a 19-year-old student who was raped and murdered at
Contemporary Responses 341
Lehigh University (Janosik & Gregory, 2003). CSA requires all colleges and
universities to collect and disclose information about campus crime if they
receive federal funding (Lipka, 2009). Institutional compliance with this act
has been surprisingly poor even with the oversight of the U.S. Department
of Education, which can impose civil penalties against institutions for infrac-
tions (up to $27,500 per violation) and suspend federal aid to a college.
In fact, only 25% of 4-year colleges complied with regulations imposed by
the CSA according to a study conducted on colleges’ willingness to provide
campus crime data to prospective students (Gehring & Callaway, 1997).
A similar study exploring the provision of campus security information in
2-year colleges found that an even lower percentage of these institutions
(22%) disclosed required crime data (Callaway, Gehring, & Douthett, 2000).
However, it is unclear whether compliance with the CSA actually would
improve the safety of college campuses (Lipka, 2009). Most college stu-
dents are unaware of the CSA (71%), and among those who are, few (7%)
report that campus crime statistics heavily influence their decision to attend
a specific institution (Janosik, 2001).
Security Technology
Many colleges have attempted to address safety concerns and violence
through increasing the prevalence of security technologies on campus.
During the past 20 years, countless educational institutions have spent
millions of dollars on installing and monitoring various security technolo-
gies. Some of these include video surveillance cameras, emergency phones,
metal detectors, X-ray scanners, mass messaging systems, automatic door
locks, and duress alarms. In addition, most security technologies may be
better at responding after an attack has already occurred (e.g., emergency
phones, mass messaging systems, automatic door locks, and duress alarms)
or evaluating the incident after it has already happened (e.g., video surveil-
lance cameras) than preventing the attack from occurring in the first place.
Unfortunately, little is known about the effectiveness of these measures
(Garcia, 2003). Given an absence of data supporting their efficacy, the
installation of security technologies may be too costly for many educa-
tional institutions to install or maintain, especially for institutions that face
monetary shortfalls (Garcia, 2003). Furthermore, recent increases in campus
security and security technologies pose new challenges for college adminis-
trators who must balance the need to maintain campus safety with a desire
to uphold an environment that fosters the open sharing of ideas and infor-
mation (Sewell & Mendelsohn, 2000). Therefore, the relative advantages and
disadvantages associated with using security technologies must be carefully
considered prior to their implementation.
342 M. L. Sulkowski and P. J. Lazarus
Concealed Weapons Permits
Lawmakers in several states are debating whether citizens with concealed
weapons permits should be allowed to carry weapons on campuses. As of
March 2011, only the state of Utah allows such practices, yet Students for
Concealed Carry on Campus (SCCC), a grassroots organization that advo-
cates for allowing holders of state-issued concealed handgun licenses to
carry these weapons on campus, claims to have more than 43,000 mem-
bers (SCCC, n.d.). Whether additional states will pass legislation that allows
concealed weapons on campus is unclear. Proponents of SCCC and others
who are for relaxing weapons restrictions on campuses claim that current
weapons regulations limit the ability of bystanders to protect themselves
during violent campus attacks (Harnisch, 2008). However, the belief that
increasing the number of weapons on campuses will increase campus safety
or decrease the probability of a campus attack is not supported by data.
In fact, students carrying concealed weapons may be at greater risk for
being harmed in an attack than are nonweapons-carrying students. A recent
study suggested that brandishing a firearm generally did not protect indi-
viduals from being shot in an attack. Instead, weapons-carrying individuals
were estimated to be 4.5 times more likely to be shot in an attack than were
their counterparts who did not have a gun (Branas, Richmond, Culhane, Ten
Have, & Wiebe, 2009). Additionally, most students, law enforcement per-
sonnel, and college administrators oppose provisions that allow concealed
weapons on campus (Fallahi, Austad, Fallon, & Leishman, 2009; Thompson,
Price, Mrdjenovich, & Khubchandani, 2009). The presence of lethal weapons
on campuses could escalate the lethality of conflicts among students, provide
students increased access to lethal means to commit suicide, contribute to
more shooting accidents, increase the chance for police to mistake an armed
student for an attacker, prevent some first responders (e.g., paramedics, fire
fighters) from reaching victims if weapons are drawn, and increase collateral
shootings among attackers and bystanders during attacks (Harnisch, 2008;
Siebel, 2008).
Proponents for allowing concealed firearms on college campus argue
that all members of college communities have a right to protect themselves
in the event of an attack (Lipka, 2008). However, it is unlikely that bystanders
with concealed weapons would be able to intervene effectively during an
attack. Even in-service handgun training activities for police officers may not
adequately prepare police to shoot accurately during armed confrontations
or effectively neutralize an active shooter (Morrison & Vila, 1998). Following
a review of research, Morrison and Vila (1998) concluded that police hand-
gun training courses should be improved to reflect the complex realities of
armed confrontations that may include counterfire, hostages, bystanders,
multiple assailants, and the presence of barriers. However, these com-
plex scenarios also are not reflected in concealed gun possession training
Contemporary Responses 343
sessions, which are usually completed in a single day. Instead, concealed
gun possession training tends to focus on liability issues associated with car-
rying a firearm, gun safety issues, home defense strategies, ways to defuse
confrontational situations, and practicing how to handle a firearm with
or without actually firing the weapon depending on the state or training
program (Paradis & Hendrick, 2003).
Criminal Profiling
Criminal profiles have been developed that attempt to identify potential
school shooters in K–12 schools. However, using profiling techniques to
identify future school shooters raises concerns about the selectivity and
specificity of these profiles (Cornell, 2008). Most individuals who fit a spec-
ified profile will not commit a serious act of violence, and many school
shooters do not embody some characteristics described in the extant shooter
profiles (e.g., having fascination with violence, being socially isolated; Fein
et al., 2002; Sewell & Mendelsohn, 2000). Furthermore, important differ-
ences may exist between adolescent school shooters and campus attackers.
College attackers tend to be older than the general college student popula-
tion (Mean age =28), have graduate student status, lack balance in life (i.e.,
focus solely on achievement at the expense of interpersonal relationships),
and have experienced a significant disruption in an important relationship
(Drysdale et al., 2010). However, thousands of students display these char-
acteristics at any given time, which means that their use would lead to the
gross overidentification of potential threats.
Threat Assessment Approach to Preventing Violent Attacks
The FBI’s National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime created the
School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective (O’Toole, 2000) to help edu-
cators identify and diffuse threats of violence in K–12 schools. This report
encourages schools to create a multidisciplinary team to evaluate threats
using the following characteristics: (a) the personality and behavior of the
student who made a threat, (b) the student’s family dynamics, (c) the culture
and climate of the school, and (d) the social dynamics of the larger commu-
nity. A growing body of research supports the efficacy of threat assessment
approaches for mitigating threats of violence, improving school climate, and
decreasing the use of punitive discipline in K–12 schools (see Cornell and
Allen, 2011 for review).
Similarly, many colleges have multidisciplinary threat assessment teams
that attempt to identify threatening students and review concerning behav-
iors (Cornell, 2008, 2010; Dunkle, Silverstein, & Warner, 2008; Shafer et al.,
2010). However, college and K–12 school campuses differ in ways that may
344 M. L. Sulkowski and P. J. Lazarus
affect the identification of threats (Cornell, 2008). College campuses have
buildings spread out over a larger area, are open to the public during the
day, and allow students to move freely between buildings. Students in large
college classes also may have little interaction with faculty members on a
regular basis, and faculty members may not know students well enough
to observe threatening behaviors in them (Drysdale et al., 2010). Thus,
although certain elements of the FBI’s threat assessment approach readily
transfer to the college environment (e.g., the formation of multidisciplinary
teams), other elements may be difficult to replicate. For example, it may be
difficult for members of a college multidisciplinary team to assess a student’s
family dynamics and that student’s adjustment to the campus or broader
community.
To address these problems, college officials can take steps to make it
easier for all individuals to report or refer a potentially violent/troubled stu-
dent to receive help or further evaluation. Many college police departments
now have anonymous reporting tip lines and allow students the option of
conveying received threats via e-mail. Although e-mail messages are not
anonymous, the option of contacting police through this mode of commu-
nication may reduce some barriers to threat reporting. Then, once a threat is
reported, a threat assessment team can be summoned to assess and evaluate
a threat or threatening student and help coordinate appropriate resources
and interventions to students of concern (Dunkle et al., 2008). These teams
often include student conduct officers, members of law enforcement, mental
health professionals, and other administrators (Zdziarski, Dunkel, & Rollo,
2007). As a primary responsibility, the threat assessment team should deter-
mine whether a student poses an imminent danger to self or to members
of the campus community. This may involve having the student evaluated
by a mental health professional to determine if that student may need to be
hospitalized for psychiatric reasons or arrested and detained by a campus
law enforcement officer if the student has violated a law or is a danger to
others (Dunkle et al., 2008).
In instances in which students pose a danger to the campus community,
the threat assessment team should determine the degree to which the stu-
dent is dangerous or the likelihood that this student will carry out a threat.
In some cases, members of the team may recommend the removal of the
student from the college community due to safety concerns. However, stu-
dents who are evaluated by threat assessment teams are more commonly
encouraged to take voluntary leaves of absence, medical leave, or receive
intervention services at college (Dunkle et al., 2008). In these cases, stu-
dents of concern may be required to receive regular counseling and/or
obtain clearance from a mental health practitioner that they are following a
treatment plan. In a similar vein, many colleges require suicidal students to
see a mental health practitioner, which has been shown to reduce suicide
risk in college students (Schwartz, 2006). Last, threat assessment teams must
Contemporary Responses 345
determine how they will track and monitor students of concern, who will
be in charge of monitoring students, and when follow-up meetings will be
scheduled to review student progress. Table 1 presents established threat
assessment practices for postsecondary educational institutions.
Student Threat Reporting
Research suggests that peers and siblings of potential attackers report the
majority of threats of violence in K–12 schools as opposed to adults or
figures of authority (Vossekuil, Fein, Reddy, Borum, & Modzeleski, 2000).
Perhaps in a similar vein, college students may be in a better position to
identify threatening peers than faculty members or college staff members
are. Prior to killing 32 individuals at Virginia Tech, Seung-Hui Cho’s room-
mates and classmates were concerned about his threatening behavior and
deteriorating mental health. They stopped inviting him to social functions
after he brandished a knife and repeatedly stabbed the floor at a social
gathering. These actions and other threatening behaviors, such as harassing
female students and making suicidal statements, eventually led to a tempo-
rary detention order for Cho. However, due to poor information sharing and
limited communication between important stakeholders, he was released
and remained a threat to the campus community (Virginia Tech Review
Panel, 2007). A classroom peer was even reported to have said to another
student that Cho “was the kind of guy who might go on a rampage killing,”
and after the attack, other students told the press that they were “waiting for
Cho to do something” dangerous before he actually did so (Virginia Tech
Review Panel, 2007, p. 51). Therefore, in this instance, the problem was not
the lack of identification of a student with severe emotional problems but in
being able to monitor and detain Cho in the context of an open college cam-
pus. Unfortunately, an effective threat assessment protocol was not in place
at Virginia Tech that would have allowed for his immediate identification as
a threat and permanent removal from the campus community (Dunkle et al.,
2008).
Cho’s actions and statements highlight the importance of investigating
all threats of violence in campus communities and involving members of
law enforcement on threat assessment teams who may be able to moni-
tor threatening students. Furthermore, this underscores the importance of
investigating college students’ willingness to report threats of violence in
campus communities as authority figures on campus are unlikely to hear
threats directly. To date, only one known study has investigated college
students’ willingness to report threats of violence. Sulkowski (2011) found
most college students (69%) to be “at least somewhat willing” to report a
potentially violent peer. Results of this study also suggest that students who
trust in members of the college support system (e.g., police officers, admin-
istrators) and feel connected to the campus community display an increased
TABLE 1 Established Threat Assessment Practices for Postsecondary Educational Institutions
Team formation Who is involved Key points
Develop team Include members from student affairs, law enforcement,
mental health, disability center, legal department
•The college president should support the threat
assessment team (TAT) leader
•The TAT leader often is the assistant vice president
or chief of student affairs
Designate roles The TAT leader should designate roles and responsibilities •Mental health professionals are subject to HIPAA
but other team members have greater flexibility
with sharing information
Develop threat
assessment protocol
All team members should have a voice •Protocol should be reviewed by legal team
•Will need to be periodically updated
•Should be tested in analogue situations
Implementing threat
assessment protocol
All team members will fulfill various roles •Should focus on actual threats students make and
behavior
•Protocol should differentiate between transient and
substantive threats
•Faculty should be provided with information on
contacting the TAT
Responding to threats Different team members may conduct different evaluation
components
•May need to temporary detain threatening students
•Data should be collected expediently
All team members should be aware of evaluation results •Should have procedures for cooperating with
hospitals and law enforcement
Team decisions All team members •May recommend voluntary leave, suspension, or
on-campus intervention (e.g., counseling)
•Resources must be available for each possible
decision
Progress monitoring Specific team members should track student progress and
report back to the TAT
•Should store data in a centralized location
•Need student consent to speak with a therapist
•Provide monitoring, follow-up and/or support
when the student returns to campus
Note.HIPAA=Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (P.L.104-191).
346
Contemporary Responses 347
willingness to report threats of targeted violence. However, students with a
history of delinquency display a lower willingness to report threats and stu-
dent’s fears of negative social evaluation are not related to their willingness
to report threats of violence. Thus, Sulkowski concluded that it is important
for college students to feel connected to the campus community and trust
in members of the college support system to facilitate their willingness to
report threats of violence.
Colleges and college leaders may benefit from facilitating open commu-
nication and earnest dialogue among all members of the campus community
on issues related to campus violence. In contrast to a growing tendency to
implement intrusive security measures and limit the personal freedoms of
college students, which actually may decrease students’ trust in members of
the college support system, alienate some students, and degrade the quality
of the campus environment (Fredland, 2008), colleges can help encour-
age students to communicate their concerns with administrators or police
officers about campus safety or related issues. Additionally, college leaders
can help foster closer relationships between students and other members
of campus communities through planned college events (e.g., service trips,
welcome weekends; Eyler, Giles, Stenson, & Gray, 2001). Ultimately, stu-
dents should perceive college officials and authority figures as professionals
who are committed to protecting their safety and wellbeing (Fredland, 2008).
Efforts to Improve Communication of Threats
The majority of postsecondary educational institutions have taken steps to
improve communication between students and university leaders in the post-
Virginia Tech era (Shafer et al., 2010). These efforts involve implementing
reliable mass communication systems that can be used during attacks to
reach all students. Previously, communication networks often became over-
whelmed and were rendered useless during highly publicized campus crises.
For example, a deluge of concerned students, parents, media personal, and
others overwhelmed phone lines and e-mail servers immediately following
the 1999 bonfire collapse at Texas A&M University that killed 12 students.
This communication breakdown further exacerbated stress and trauma asso-
ciated with the disaster (Zdziarski et al., 2007). However, with advances in
information technology, colleges are now using communication modes that
are less susceptible to overload and congestion to alert students of poten-
tial threats. For example, some colleges now require students to provide
their cellular phone numbers when they register for classes whereas other
colleges are providing preprogrammed cell phones to incoming freshman
so they can instantly notify students about threats via mass text messages.
Additionally, other colleges use e-mail and social networking sites (e.g.,
Facebook) to notify students of threats to safety in campus communities.
348 M. L. Sulkowski and P. J. Lazarus
A recent study found colleges and universities to use about four mass com-
munication systems on average out of nine possible systems (Shafer et al.,
2010). Researchers in the same study found e-mail (86%) to be the most
commonly used mass warning system followed by college Webpage updates
(79%), text messaging (66%), public address systems (40%), radio systems
(34%), alarms/sirens (33%), and visual systems (15%). Approximately, 6% of
sampled colleges did not have any mass notification system in place.
Recently, crisis management personnel at the University of Texas (UT)
at Austin successfully used a variety of technologies to inform students of
an active campus shooter on September 28, 2010. The shooter fired his
first shots shortly after 8:00 a.m., and mass text messages were sent to all
students by 8:15 a.m. to notify them that there was an armed suspect at
the Perry-Castaneda Library. Throughout the morning, the university sent
periodic warning messages and updates to students, faculty, and others
on Facebook, Twitter, through e-mail, and via text message, while police
cleared the campus and traced down the shooter. Due to these efforts and
UT’s quick response, no bystanders were injured in the shooting, and the
only casualty was the shooter himself who died from a self-inflicted gunshot
(Mulvaney & Garrett, 2010).
Emergency Response Plans
More than 90% of colleges and universities have implemented emergency
response plans (ERPs) to help manage campus crises (Fox & Savage, 2009).
These plans usually include threat notification systems, lockdown plans
for campus buildings, formal firearms bans, instructions to declare a state
of emergency, and procedures for increasing collaboration with local law
enforcement agencies (Shafer et al., 2010). Emergency response plans often
involve members of the university community from different backgrounds
such as police officers, administrators, mental health professionals, and fire
personnel from local communities. Fire marshals usually have supreme
authority over the majority of campus crises (e.g., natural disasters, disas-
ters that cause mass injuries). However, campus or local police officers may
lead efforts to mitigate campus attacks as they occur (Zdziarski et al., 2007).
Prior to the Virginia Tech massacre, these officers were trained to establish a
secure perimeter around a shooter (Admussen & Creswell, 1995), yet many
ERPs now require police officers to hunt down and engage active shooters
on campus (Greenberg, 2007). Additionally, some colleges employ officers
who are specially trained to respond to violent attacks and critical incidents.
These officers constitute a college’s Critical Incident Response Team (CIRT),
receive special weaponry, and can be marshaled at any hour to neutralize
a threat. Currently, about 50% of community colleges and 67% of 4-year
colleges have such officers (Reaves, 2008). However, the effectiveness of
these teams is unknown due to their relative novelty. On March 2, 2010, the
Contemporary Responses 349
University of Florida (UF) CIRT responded to a situation in which a grad-
uate student displayed paranoia about being killed if he was captured and
deported back to his home country of Ghana. Instead of deescalating this
situation, the responding officers were criticized for actively engaging the
student and playing into his delusions (i.e., delusions of being captured and
killed by authorities). After forcibly entering the student’s residence, one of
the officers shot the student in his jaw with an assault rifle after the student
threated the officers with a walking cane. After this unsettling incident, an
internal police investigation concluded that the university’s CIRT was used
inappropriately and the commanding officer on site was relieved of duty.
According to UF Police Chief Linda Stump, the UF CIRT was designed to
“respond to active shooters,” and was not “intended nor has it ever been
intended to protect an individual from harm” (Bein, 2010). Instead, Chief
Stump reports that a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team should have
managed the situation (Bein, 2010).
This incident in Florida highlights various complexities associated with
responding to and managing critical incidents in campus communities. Even
with well-developed emergency management plans and trained responders,
the right strategy must be implemented and the right team must be sum-
moned to mitigate a volatile situation. Unfortunately, no known research
or scholarship exists to guide the use of CIRT or SWAT teams or alterna-
tive crisis management strategies. Therefore, it is important for members of
threat assessment and emergency management teams to develop and test
crisis response and violence prevention plans. These plans can be tested
under a variety of situations (e.g., targeted shooter, multiple attackers, a
hostage situation) and simulated in less than ideal circumstances (e.g., with
key personnel missing) to ensure their durability. Fortunately, the majority
(78%) of colleges and universities have taken actions since the Virginia Tech
shooting to implement or improve emergency response plans and many of
these institutions test their plans with field training exercises (Shafer et al.,
2010). However, colleges and universities that have been affected by critical
incidents within the past 5 years are significantly more likely (71%) to field
test emergency response plans than are colleges that have not been recently
affected by critical incidents (52%). Thus, it is important for colleges to learn
from each other and take a proactive approach to violence prevention and
crisis management instead of allowing crises to govern violence prevention
strategies.
CONCLUSION
This article reviews contemporary responses to violent attacks on col-
lege campuses. As illustrated, no single approach is predominant or can
completely mitigate campus violence. Despite being popular with certain
350 M. L. Sulkowski and P. J. Lazarus
individuals or groups, many efforts to address campus violence have limited
empirical support and even may have serious drawbacks. Specifically, efforts
to increase public awareness of crimes committed on college campuses
(Janosik, 2001), enforce harsher disciplinary policies (Garcia, 2003), use
criminal profiling techniques (Reddy et al., 2001; Sewell & Mendelsohn,
2000), and allow concealed weapons carriers on campus (Branas et al., 2009;
Harnisch, 2008), have not been established as effective.
However, the use of threat assessment approaches may allow for better
threat identification and intervention strategies (Cornell, 2008). In support of
the use of threat assessment approaches, Cornell (2010) made the point that
prevention does not require individual prediction. For example, we do not
know which smokers will die from lung cancer, yet it is well known that
that more than 400,000 people die from tobacco-related illnesses each year.
Thus, reducing smoking among all individuals will save lives.
Threat assessment approaches do not, however, address students’ prob-
lematic tendency to underreport threatening individuals, thus limiting the
spread of important information to individuals who may be able to pre-
vent an attack. Therefore, additional knowledge of qualities related to
students’ willingness to report threats is needed to improve threat identi-
fication efforts (Sulkowski, 2011). Furthermore, it is important for colleges
to train emergency response personnel to implement and execute the
appropriate emergency response plans when crises, disasters, and critical
incidents occur. Thus, in addition to reviewing contemporary responses to
violent attacks on college campuses, this article also reviews and evaluates
the extant empirical support for each approach. Further, suggestions are
provided to help identify and apply established approaches to mitigating
campus attacks.
About one third of U.S. campus counseling centers added at least one
new staff member in the year following the tragic shootings at Virginia
Tech. However, student–counselor ratios remain high (over 2,000 to one)
in spite of these additions (Farrell, 2008). This is concerning because a
recent study suggests that approximately one half of college students with
mental health problems experience the onset of these symptoms in col-
lege (Storrie, Ahern, & Tuckett, 2010), and another study indicates that the
emotional health of college freshmen is at post-1985 nadir (Pryor, Hurtado,
DeAngelo, Palucki Blake, & Tran, 2011). Thus, lowering student–counselor
ratios to about 1,500 to one following a recommendation by the International
Association of Counseling Services (Farrell, 2008) may be an important step
toward addressing the mental health needs of students, even students at risk
for suicidal or violent behavior (Langford, 2004; Schwartz, 2006).
Similarly, it is important to enhance student–faculty connectedness,
campus climate, and respect for diverse members of the campus community
in addition to adding new members to the student-support system (Fox &
Savage, 2009; Sulkowski, 2011). Although difficult to quantify, a college that
Contemporary Responses 351
strives to prevent or intervene in threatening situations, forge meaningful
connections among students and other members of the campus community,
and provide help to troubled students “will prevent violence as surely as
a college that reduces alcohol intoxication among its students will prevent
automobile fatalities” (Cornell, 2010, p. 14). Thus, even if it is impossible
to identify, respond to, and rid colleges of all threats, all members of the
college community can become stakeholders in recognizing and reporting
them while also respecting a free and open college atmosphere. This is a
lofty goal and one worth pursuing.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We acknowledge the help of Drs. Thomas Oakland and Jeanna Mastrodicasa
for their comments on an early version of this article.
STATEMENT ON FUNDING
The Melissa Institute for Violence Prevention and Treatment Preparation
provided funding to the first author to support preparation of this article.
STATEMENT ON CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The authors claim that they have no known conflicts of interest related to
this article.
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