Content uploaded by Michael Schedelik
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Michael Schedelik on Mar 05, 2024
Content may be subject to copyright.
The Role of the State in Shaping the Competitiveness and
Internationalisation (of Firms and/or Sectors) in the Twenty-First Century
Competition & Change
2023, Vol. 0(0) 1–26
© The Author(s) 2023
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/10245294231205506
journals.sagepub.com/home/cch
Brazil’s national champions strategy
(2007–13): A critical appraisal
Judit Ricz
Centre for Economic and Regional Studies and Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest, Hungary
Michael Schedelik
Goethe University Frankfurt, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Abstract
The recent multiple crises have led to a renaissance of the role of the state in the economy
throughout the world. Hence, industrial policy is once again back at the agenda of academic and
policy debates in advanced as well as emerging economies. We want to contribute to this debate by
discussing the controversial results of a recent case of industrial policy—the “national champions”
strategy of the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) between 2007 and 2013. Being the
centerpiece of Brazil’s move toward a more state-led economic model in the late 2000s, its
successes and failures should be of great importance to the ongoing debate about industrial policy,
state capitalism, and development. The national champions strategy has become an integral part of
contemporary state capitalist models, with China being the most outstanding example. By looking at
the Brazilian case, an upper-middle income democracy, and therefore a more representative case
for countries with similar political settings, the paper aims to provide a critical appraisal of revived
industrial policies in the early 21
st
century as a separate policy tool of the newly emerging variety of
state capitalism. We apply a political economy approach to highlight the context-sensitivity and
institutional embeddedness of firms and the complementarities between several institutional
spheres as resources and constraints for companies’competitiveness and internationalization. The
paper aims to contribute to the current debate about state-financed firm internationalization in
general and the viability of a national champions strategy in particular.
Keywords
Industrial policy, state capitalism, new developmentalism, Brazil, Brazilian National Development
Bank, national champions
Corresponding author:
Judit Ricz, Department of World Economy, Corvinus University of Budapest and Institute of World Economics, Centre
for Economic and Regional Studies, Budapest 1097, Hungary.
Email: ricz.judit@krtk.hu
Introduction
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008, the role of the state in capitalist economies
around the globe has significantly expanded after two decades of neoliberal reforms of privatization,
deregulation, and liberalization (Mazzucato, 2021). This trajectory has been reinforced by the
ongoing COVID-19-pandemic and is likely to be a crucial issue for the time to come (N¨
olke, 2022).
One important aspect of the “return of the state”is a renaissance of neo-mercantilist arguments and
industrial policies such as Made in China 2025,Saudi Arabia Vision 2030, the US CHIPS and
Science act of 2022 as well as the recently announced European Tech-Champions Initiative which
are proliferating around the world (Schindler et al., 2022). One important question concerning this
revival of industrial policies is whether they should target particular firms—“national champions”—
to turn them into global players or expand their market share in world markets (Strange, 1996: 56).
National champions strategies, that is, active state support for privately owned enterprises or fully
state-owned enterprises, have long been abandoned by most governments due to the inherent risks
of cronyism and corruption (Falck et al., 2011).
This much debated topic cuts across several literatures in International Business Studies,
Comparative and International Political Economy, and Development Economics. International
Business scholarship, for instance, investigates the internationalization of state-supported enter-
prises, mainly from emerging capitalist economies (Finchelstein, 2017;Hennart et al., 2017). Here,
the focus lies on the interplay between home country government support, corporate strategies, and
host country policies toward inward foreign direct investment (FDI) (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2018;
Kalasin et al., 2020). A related literature in Comparative and International Political Economy
focusses on the reemergence of state capitalism around the globe, analyzing the institutional and
political environment of corporate actors in national capitalist systems (Alami and Dixon, 2020;
N¨
olke, 2014). This literature stresses the importance of structural differences between types of
capitalism, highlighting varieties and variations in advanced as well as emerging capitalist
economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001;N¨
olke et al., 2020).
Furthermore, debates on new industrial policies as a viable and necessary instrument for
economic policy making, in particular for developing and emerging countries, have gained traction
in the field of Development Economics since the great financial crisis (Aiginger and Rodrik, 2020;
Bulfone, 2022). The meagre growth performance of middle-income countries in the recent decades,
possibly related to a so-called “middle-income trap”(Aiyar et al., 2018) and resulting in a lack of
cross-country convergence of income levels between developing and advanced economies (Johnson
and Papageorgiou, 2020), has added further momentum to this literature. Finally, a recent inter-
disciplinary literature investigates the resurgence of national development banks around the globe as
arguably the most important institution for implementing industrial policies (Griffith-Jones and
Ocampo, 2018;Mertens et al., 2021). This literature highlights the persistence of market failures in
financial markets, especially for long-term credit lines, and the rationing of private lending during
the recession following the global financial crisis as justification for the important role of national or
regional development banks.
By drawing on insights from these different literatures and looking at the recent experience of the
Brazilian case where subsequent governments led by the Workers’Party (Partido dos Tra-
balhadores, PT) actively pursued a national champions strategy in the 2000s, we aim to inform the
current debate about the viability of this policy tool in general and for developing and emerging
economies in particular. Most studies analyzing the internationalization of national champions have
focused on China as the most outstanding case (Gaur et al., 2018;Tu et al., 2021). Brazil, by
contrast, is an upper-middle income democracy and therefore a more representative case for
2Competition & Change 0(0)
countries with similar political settings, especially in Latin America, but also elsewhere (Schneider,
2013;Taylor, 2020). Although the literature on Brazilian firm internationalization abound
(Goldstein, 2007;Caseiro and Masiero, 2014;N¨
olke, 2014;Hennart et al., 2017;May, 2020), most
contributions tend to have a rather narrow focus on firms and are not discussing the viability (and
risks) of state-led national champions strategies in weak political institutional settings (but see, e.g.,
Mussachio and Lazzarini 2014).
The Brazilian state has traditionally exercised control and influence over national champions
during the era of import substitution industrialization (ISI). Since the millennium, state support was
revived, diversified, and explicitly focused on the internationalization of firms (Almeida et al.,
2019). The Brazilian National Development Bank (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento
Econˆ
omico e Social, BNDES) became a key player in supporting the international expansion of
Brazilian firms through a variety of new measures of state ownership, state control, and subsidies,
which make Brazil an interesting example of the new generation of state capitalisms. In addition, an
analysis of the Brazilian case might also add to a better understanding of the rise of emerging
markets multinationals and especially the role of home country governments therein, while also
shedding light on inherent risks related to a weak institutional context. Thus, our analysis of the
Brazilian case offers important insights for other less developed economies with similar institutional
settings that aim to pursue new industrial policies and the state-financed nurturing of national
champions.
The existing literature on state-led firm internationalization in general—and related to the
Brazilian case in particular—tends to look at recent changes either from an international business
perspective (Musacchio and Lazzarini, 2014;Finchelstein, 2017;Hennart et al., 2017) or via the
lenses of comparative capitalism (N¨
olke et al., 2020;Morgan et al., 2021). In line with this special
issue, we aim to combine these two approaches and to put firm internationalization into a broader
political economy context (see also Jackson and Deeg, 2019;Becker-Ritterspach et al., 2021). Such
an approach goes beyond merely incorporating contingent political factors as a variable, as
commonly done in international business scholarship and economics more generally. In contrast to
these literatures, which tend to rely on a rather thin and de-contextualized notion of institutions
(Jackson and Deeg, 2019), our approach draws on a much more historical and context-sensitive
understanding of political economies, common in the comparative capitalism research program in
comparative political economy (on this see, e.g., Streeck and Thelen, 2005;May and N¨
olke, 2015).
Hence, the contribution of this article is twofold: (1) theoretically, it combines comparative
capitalism and business-centered theories to advance a more context-sensitive political economy
approach to firm internationalization; (2) empirically, it applies this framework to analyze the
Brazilian national champions strategy and to evaluate its strengths and weaknesses. Methodo-
logically, we operate with a single (crucial) case study approach. In our research techniques, we
draw on descriptive statistics from various international and Brazilian sources, document and
secondary literature analysis, and expert interviews with Brazilian officials which were conducted
during field research in March 2017 and November 2019.
Against this backdrop, the article proceeds as follows. The second section takes a historical
perspective on industrial policy in emerging economies and shows how policy instruments and key
protagonists have changed over time. It also outlines a heuristic for studying new forms of industrial
policy in the 21
st
century. The third section analyzes the Brazilian national champions strategy along
the lines of this heuristic. The fourth section traces the outcomes of this industrial policy in terms of
several performance indicators, highlighting both positive and negative effects. The final
section concludes by formulating avenues for further research and some policy recommendations.
Ricz and Schedelik 3
National champions strategies in historical perspective: From old to
new industrial policies
Historically, lots of countries pursued a national champions strategy in order to nurture indigenous
firms in high-technology or strategic sectors which proved to be of vital concern in several de-
velopment processes (Chang, 2003: 19-51). Creating and supporting national champions has been at
the heart of industrial policies from its inception, yet the logic of intervention, the main protagonists,
and policy instruments have changed over time, which is why we can differentiate between “old”
and “new”industrial policies (Bulfone, 2022). While this has been a global phenomenon, most
academic attention focusing on the resurgence and renaissance of industrial policies has analyzed
the cases of more advanced economies, such as the US, European, or East Asian countries—the
latter being the homeland of selective industrial policies (Szalavetz, 2015;Bulfone, 2022). In this
section, we review main continuities and changes between old and new industrial policies in
developing and emerging economies more broadly, including Latin America and with a special
focus on Brazil.
State interventionism gained weight already in the interwar period following the great depression
of the 1930s, when governments had to support their failing primary export industries, for example,
Brazilian coffee, due to collapsing demand in industrialized countries and falling commodity prices
(B´
ertola and Ocampo, 2012: 140-147). Yet, the heydays of more proactive industrial policies started
in the postwar era. In many developing and emerging economies, the decades between 1950s and
1970s have been marked by inward looking (import substitution) industrialization and mainly
focused on forced development of the domestic economies. Latin American countries were among
the most “aggressive practitioners”of this type of industrialization (Devlin and Moguillansky, 2013:
276), with Brazil under the Vargas and Kubitschek administrations being the most emblematic
example (Sikkink, 1991;Schneider, 2015). Import substitution industrialization (ISI) initially
focused on the creation of new economic sectors to overcome supply shortages of manufactured
goods for domestic consumers following the world wars. In the light of increasing domestic
demand, subsidizing local production and channeling productive investments into the local
manufacturing sector was—at least initially—a logical and spontaneous response to a changing
international context (Kingstone, 2018: 35).
This policy did not lead to decreasing imports but rather pushed the import structure toward
capital goods and led to recurring trade imbalances. Recognizing this fact, and the potential
knowledge, technology and productivity spillovers from the production of capital goods, led many
governments to refocus on the capital goods sector during the later stages of (structured) ISI (Peres,
2011: 1). In a nutshell, ISI combined trade protectionism with investment promotion, in order to
foster domestic industrialization and provide basic goods and services to meet domestic demand.
During this period, the state apparatus and state-owned enterprises (including some of today’s
national champions, such as the Brazilian aerospace manufacturer Embraer) were the main actors of
industrial policies, along with the national development banks (such as BNDES in Brazil or
Nacional Financiera in Mexico)
1
in charge of financing development projects. Policy instruments
were designed in a top-down fashion and mainly centered around fiscal and financial tools
(subsidies and subsidized credits), as well as trade protectionist measures, such as tariffs and import
quotas (Baer, 1972: 98). However, in order to cover the funds needed for the large-scale infra-
structure and industrialization projects undertaken, Latin American governments in particular
increasingly borrowed abroad, mainly from US commercial banks awash in petro dollars in the
wake of the oil price hikes in the 1970s (Frieden, 1991).
4Competition & Change 0(0)
In the early 1980s, most governments were unable to service their massive debt burdens and,
beginning with Mexico in 1982, defaulted and entered into lengthy negotiations to restructure their
foreign debts. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank formed part of these re-
structuring efforts, demanding strict conditionalities as part of their structural adjustment
programs—usually a whole package of liberalization, privatization, and other market-oriented
reforms (B´
ertola and Ocampo, 2012: 213-218). Widespread disenchantment with the ISI model
paved the way for an ideological shift toward the neoliberal policy paradigm in the 1980s and 1990s,
firmly backed by the international financial institutions (the so-called Washington Consensus).
Major limits of the ISI model had become apparent, especially the danger of creating uncompetitive
and highly inefficient industries, unable to realize sufficient economies of scale in their relatively
small domestic markets. Already in the 1960s, Ra ´
ul Prebisch, the intellectual father of ISI in Latin
America, had declared that “the proliferation of industries of every kind in a closed market has
deprived the Latin American countries of the advantages of specialization and economies of scale,
and owing to the protection afforded by excessive tariff duties and restrictions, a healthy form of
internal competition has failed to develop, to the detriment of efficient production”(Prebisch, 1963,
cited in Hirschman, 1968: 2). As a result, the turn toward market-oriented reforms led to a large-
scale retreat of industrial policies, though not their full vanishing. Due to path-dependencies and
strong lobbying power of the large business groups, some incentives and interventions survived, yet
rather in an ad hoc manner (Hochstetler and Montero, 2013).
The slow comeback of industrial policies started around the millennium when the governments
of many emerging and developing economies, especially the newly elected center-left ones in Latin
America, became increasingly disillusioned by two decades of slow growth, persistently high
inequality, and burgeoning informal sectors (Devlin and Moguillansky, 2013). However, the return
of industrial policies did not mean the replication of ISI policies. On the contrary, a new set of policy
instruments emerged in the context of open economies, a surge in foreign direct investment, and
increasingly globalized supply chains (Gereffi, 2014). Furthermore, the majority of the once au-
thoritarian states pursuing ISI had become democratic during the 1980s and 1990s, leading to
substantially different challenges to industrial policy making than those prevalent in the post-World
War II period (Robinson and White, 1998).
Hence, the rationale behind new industrial policies became more complex, including not only the
conventional aim of building domestic industrial supply chains and, thus, structural transformation,
but also industrial upgrading in global value chains, interacting and linking up to transnational
corporations, and, finally, nurturing globally competitive firms (Hauge 2020). Thereby, the pro-
motion of national champions slowly returned to the policy agenda, but less for supplying domestic
markets and deepening domestic industrialization, but to successfully entering global markets and
creating globally competitive corporations (for the Chinese experience, see Li and Chen, 2020).
Thereby, policymakers sought to overcome the inherent limits of the old ISI model concerning
efficiency and economies of scale. Consequently, the focus on strategic sectors was revived, yet
complemented by horizontal interventions to boost international competitiveness. The former
hostile or at least selective stance toward foreign direct investments (FDI) was moderated and
complemented with active state support to promote outward FDI (N¨
olke, 2014). Direct incentives
were largely restored, while more emphasis was put on maintaining balanced public finances and on
complying—at least partially—with the requirements of the international economic institutions,
such as the World Trade Organization. These instruments were coupled with a variety of indirect
incentives such as regulatory tools, organizational support, and diplomatic measures (Bazuchi et al.,
2013).
Ricz and Schedelik 5
The state came back as a central actor in promoting structural transformation, yet the channels
and tools of state interference were diversified. For instance, regarding the corporate governance of
national champions, governments now favored minority ownership over majority ownership,
leaving business operations and strategies largely to private entrepreneurs (Musacchio and
Lazzarini, 2014). Direct interventions gave way to more indirect support via a more complex
institutional setting, including parastatals and semi-public institutions. Finally, substantial insti-
tutional development took place along with improvements in terms of coordinating and involving
several stakeholders, such as through public–private dialogue schemes and competitiveness
councils (Schneider, 2015). However, this was a rather gradual process, and many limitations in
terms of effectiveness remained (Devlin and Moguillansky, 2013: 308).
As sketched above, new industrial policy involves a much broader set of actors, relying upon a
much more diverse set of instruments and thus requires a more complex and broader—political
economy—analysis (see also Andreoni and Chang, 2019). In the following, we exemplify this by
using the elements outlined in Table 1 as a heuristic for our analysis of the Brazilian national
champions strategy.
Brazil’s national champions strategy, 2007–2013
Brazil is a good laboratory for active state support to promote national champions and their in-
ternationalization. The largest Latin American economy with strong roots of state interventionism
and old industrial policies from the ISI era (see section 2) has turned toward state-led capitalism and
enacted new industrial policies in the 2000s. This new era started with the election of Lula da Silva,
the Workers’Party candidate in Autumn 2002, and led to substantial state influence, partly exercised
via the emblematic national development bank, BNDES, but also through a variety of new channels,
to encourage the expansion of large Brazilian national champions abroad.
Table 1. Old (ISI) and New Industrial Policy in Emerging Economies.
Type of
industrial policy Timeframe Protagonists Policy instruments
Old industrial
policy (ISI)
1930s–
1980s
(Semi-)Authoritarian central
governments
State-owned enterprises
National development banks
Fiscal and financial tools, such as
subsidies and subsidized loans
Trade protection
New industrial
policy
2000s–now (Semi-)Democratic central (and
subnational) governments
Private companies and partially state-
owned companies (minority state-
ownership)
Development banks, sovereign wealth
funds, and pension funds
Specialized agencies, business
associations, and chambers
Set of (direct and indirect) policy
instruments
- Coherent policy framework
(signalling)
- Subsidies and subsidized loans
- Shareholder participation
- Competition policy and antitrust
regulation
- Diplomatic support
- Organizational support
- State-business relations
Source: Own elaboration.
6Competition & Change 0(0)
The rise and fall of the Brazilian national champions strategy
Promoting the international expansion of Brazilian national champions became an explicit strategy
in 2007, with some preceding measures. The first direct instrument to support the international-
ization of Brazilian companies goes back to 1998,
2
yet the number of overseas infrastructure
projects funded by BNDES gained momentum in 2007, adding up to almost 100 projects with an
annual average spending of 1.1 billion USD over the following five years (Caseiro and Masiero,
2014: 242).
The second instrument aiming at directly financing Brazilian companies’internationalization
was enabled in 2002 by a modification of BNDES’statute and included both loans and subscription
of securities. Yet, it was only in 2005, when based on this new credit line, BNDES supported the
acquisition of the Argentine subsidiary of the US company Swift by the Brazilian meat processing
company JBS (Sennes and Mendes, 2009). According to the original regulation, Brazilian com-
panies could request credit for the acquisition of productive assets abroad, upon the condition that
they increased their net exports in an equal amount to their foreign investments within a six-year
period. In 2007, a new law abolished the export requirement, thus transforming this credit line into
an “unconditioned”opportunity of financing international expansion (Masiero et al., 2014: 137).
Finally, the third instrument to promote Brazilian outward FDI (OFDI) was enacted by the
Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) in 2005, by removing the prior authorization requirement for all
OFDI projects above a 5 million USD threshold. This regulatory easing significantly reduced the
costs and administrative burden for Brazilian firms’foreign expansion.
Along with these regulatory measures and new credit lines, the promotion of international
champions explicitly entered the political agenda under the Workers’Party administration.
President Lula urged Brazilian companies to go global already in 2003 at a meeting of the Por-
tuguese Industrial Association in Lisbon: “It is time for Brazilian businessmen to abandon their fear
of becoming multinational businessmen”(UNCTAD, 2004:1).
Nevertheless, until 2007 there was no coherent policy framework in Brazil to support firm
internationalization. The Productive Development Plan (PDP)—a new industrial policy document
adopted in 2007—represented a critical juncture in this regard, by aiming at keeping or positioning
Brazilian multinationals amongst the top five world exporters or global players in their respective
sectors. Its explicit strategic goal of expanding and consolidating the international leadership of
Brazilian multinational enterprises (MNEs) focused on those strategic industries, in which Brazil
already possessed considerable international competitiveness, such as aeronautics, oil and gas,
petrochemicals, ethanol, mining, steel, pulp and paper, and meat processing (MDIC, 2008). Then-
president of BNDES, Luciano Coutinho, explained this logic behind this strategy: “We chose
sectors in which Brazil had superior competitiveness, agribusiness and commodities […] Brazil was
a great exporter, but it was not possible to prop up international companies in these sectors. For this
reason, we defined that, whenever there was competitive capacity, such internationalization would
be implemented”(cited in Musacchio and Lazzarini, 2014: 265), given the fact that “[a]ll the big
developing economies have their big multinationals”(cited in ibid.: 210).
In line with the PDP, there was a sharp increase in BNDES lending activities to support the
internationalization of Brazilian companies, with lending rates significantly lower than market
rates.
3
In the following years, BNDES became a crucial actor in the implementation of the national
champions policy. It not only substantially financed OFDI projects to help Brazilian MNEs to
expand beyond the Brazilian market by acquiring foreign assets or establishing greenfield in-
vestments, but it also supported their domestic acquisitions, leading to significant industrial
consolidation within the domestic market. Consequently, by strengthening the positions of national
Ricz and Schedelik 7
champions at home, it also enabled these companies to concentrate finances and development efforts
on global markets and pursue an active going global strategy. BNDES also provided credit for
foreign governments or companies to buy Brazilian goods and services, especially in infrastructure,
aviation, and engineering (Armijo, 2017: 236).
Due to massive capital inflows—spurred by low interest rates in the major financial markets—
and increasing important penetration from Chinese manufacturers, there was a shift in political
priorities in the governing coalition, exemplified by the succession of Lula by Dilma Rousseff
(Schedelik, 2023: 100). In 2011, a new industrial policy was launched—the Greater Brazil Plan
(Plano Brasil Maior)—aiming to help “Brazilian industry reap the benefits of a booming domestic
market instead of outside adventurers,”as stated by then-Finance Minister Guido Mantega in his
speech during the release of the plan (cited in Almeida et al., 2019: 455). Reflecting the worries over
deindustrialization and declining competitiveness of Brazilian industry, the new plan reoriented
industrial policy priorities toward trade protection. In terms of firm internationalization, the major
change was the widening of the scope of OFDI support, by eliminating the formerly exclusive focus
on the already highly competitive sectors and extending it to almost all economic sectors. It also
included the new objectives of obtaining foreign technologies and/or access to new markets.
Besides this new focus, however, no specific goals or further policy instruments were added and,
thus, no implementation followed. In the interpretation of Luciano Coutinho the number of those
sectors, in which Brazilian companies were internationally competitive enough to be promoted as
potential global champions, was limited and there were no other sectors with a similar potential
(Caseiro and Masiero, 2014: 244). Consequently, the policy aiming at supporting the interna-
tionalization of Brazilian national champions had run its course and finally phased out in 2013,
when Coutinho declared: “The promotion of competitiveness for large multinational companies is
an order of business that has been concluded. […]It’s a policy that had its merits and went as far as it
could go”(cited in Reuters, 2013).
Beyond the official rhetoric however, the phasing out of subsidizing national champions was also
driven by financial constraints and political pressures. Several of the selected commodity-producing
champions ran into trouble when commodity prices started to decline in 2011 onward (Schedelik,
2023: 215). Public pressure to end the policy heightened when Eike Batista’s oil company, OXC,
after having received more than 3 billion USD from BNDES and 2.2 billion USD from another
state-owned bank, Caixa, failed to meet drilling forecasts and lost nearly 90% of its share value in
2012 (Leahy, 2013). Most importantly, however, the multidimensional Brazilian crisis from
2014 onward put a definite end to active state support for large corporations, as fiscal constraints led
to serious cutbacks in BNDES’budget (see section 4.1). Crucially, the majority of Brazilian national
champions were involved in the huge corruption scandals and kickback schemes, which have been
uncovered since then starting with the Lava Jato (Car Wash) operation (see section 4.2). This has
been a major driving force for many companies to oversee their investment strategies and announce
divestment plans.
Brazil’s national champions strategy: Direct and indirect measures
To synthetize Brazilian experiences and to fully account for the diversity of measures to support the
internationalization of Brazilian national champions, we can identify formal and informal channels
of state influence (Bazuchi et al., 2013) and differentiate between direct and indirect types of
measures (Becker-Ritterspach et al., 2021).
In terms of formal mechanisms, at least six channels can be differentiated. The first channel is the
explicit prioritization of the international expansion of Brazilian national champions via a coherent
8Competition & Change 0(0)
policy framework and substantial institutional coordination. As presented above, the PDP was the
first industrial policy document to explicitly prioritize and support the aim to keep or position
Brazilian EMNEs among the top five global players in those strategic industries where Brazil
already possessed international competitiveness. It established a set of goals
4
to enable the
monitoring of policy outcomes; however, these were defined on the macro-level and did not enable
to monitor firm-level performance and to withdraw subsidies from under-performing companies
(Almeida et al., 2019: 454-455).
Second, subsidies and subsidized loans, mainly provided by BNDES on below-market lending
rates, were of crucial importance and by the end of the 2000s all of the 30 largest Brazilian
multinationals had received BNDES loans. Between 2005 and 2011, BNDES disbursements for
direct support of Brazilian firms’internationalization increased twentyfold and added up to ap-
proximately 6.8 billion USD (Masiero et al., 2014: 138). Total subsidies, that is, a mix of industry-
and firm-specific tax exemptions, subsidized credit, and other transfers devoted to support firms,
amounted to approximately 4.5% of GDP by 2016 (Dutz, 2018: 6).
The third instrument was shareholder participation, as the equity arm of the BNDES,
BNDESpar, along with state pension funds—with the three biggest ones being Previ of Banco do
Brasil, Petros of Petrobras, and Funcef of Caixa Econˆ
omica Federal—took a central role in this
strategy (May et al., 2019). These funds often became direct shareholders of internationalizing
Brazilian companies via facilitating and participating in their M&A operations or foreign acqui-
sitions, such as in the already mentioned case of JBS. By 2011, BNDES and BNDESpar held shares
in 154 Brazilian companies, including 13 Brazilian MNEs, the so-called national champions
(BNDES, 2011). Looking at the net loan portfolio of BNDES (Figure 1), one can also see a sharp
rise until 2015, when it peaked at almost 700 billion R$ (equalling approximately 210 billion US$
5
),
which represents a sevenfold increase in nominal terms since 2003, a more than threefold increase in
real terms. This outstanding rise of lending activity made BNDES comparable to the World Bank (in
terms of net outstanding loans), and substantially outpacing the latter’s annual disbursements.
The figure shows that the multidimensional crisis unfolding from the mid-2010s in Brazil had a
major impact on BNDES and its pivotal role in the Brazilian economy. During Dilma Rousseff’s
second mandate, the role of BNDES started to diminish gradually. After her impeachment in 2016,
the general orientation of BNDES and its lending activities changed completely, from industrial
development and firm internationalization to more horizontal measures such as infrastructural
development and innovation finance for small and medium enterprises (Frischtak et al., 2017). Net
outstanding loans decreased almost as dramatically in the second half of the 2010s as they had risen
in the previous period, while annual disbursements plummeted even more sharply. This shift in
lending becomes evident by looking at the concentration of BNDES’gross loan portfolio (Table 2).
Whereas in the period from 2003 until 2012 BNDES loans were heavily concentrated—more than
50%—on the ten largest clients, the eleven largest clients received only around 25% of the loans in
the period from 2017 until 2022. Conversely, the share of BNDES’loans going to the smallest
clients combined (the “other”category in Tables 2, i.e., all but the 160 largest from 2003 to 2012 and
all but the 181 largest from 2017 to 2022, respectively) increased from 7-13% in the former period to
roughly 20% in the latter.
The fourth type of formal state support was exerted indirectly. Domestic competition policy and
antitrust regulation enabled large Brazilian companies to consolidate their position domestically
and become strong enough to compete successfully in global markets (Love and Baer, 2009). It was
only in 2011, following the adoption of the new Brazilian Competition Act (Law 12.529/11), when
the Brazilian competition authority (Administrative Council for Economic Defence, CADE) ini-
tiated some changes to act toward to a more efficient control of mergers and acquisitions, such as the
Ricz and Schedelik 9
introduction of a pre-merger review system (Drago and Nogueira, 2013). But far from interpreting
its new mandate in a strict sense, CADE and other government institutions, such as the central bank
and BNDES, directly supported the consolidation of large domestic companies with an eye on future
international expansion (Finchelstein, 2017: 584). The merger of Sadia and Perdigao into Brazil
Foods in 2009 and the Ita´
u-Unibanco merger in 2008 are just two of the most prominent examples.
Consequently, the number of mergers and acquisitions sharply increased from 2003 onward and
remained consistently high throughout the 2010s (Figure 2), although state-supported high-profile
mergers declined drastically after the end of the national champions strategy.
Figure 1. BNDES loan portfolio (2003–22, R$ billion). Source: Own elaboration based on BNDES financial
reports.
Table 2. Concentration of BNDES’Gross Loan Portfolio, in Percent.
2003 2007 2012 2017 2022
Largest client ———5,23 5,33
10 largest clients 55,73 52,27 52,09 19,27 20,13
20 next largest clients ———17,42 17,90
50 next largest clients 23,71 24,29 20,74 19,33 21,78
100 next largest clients 13,05 11,97 13,81 17,51 15,94
Other 7,51 11,48 13,36 21,24 18,91
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Own elaboration based on BNDES Individual and Consolidated Financial Statements (BRGAAP).
Note: In 2015, there was a change in providing the data. Therefore, strictly speaking, the “10 largest clients”category in 2017
and 2022 should read “10 next largest clients.”
10 Competition & Change 0(0)
The fifth (indirect) instrument of state support for the internationalization of Brazilian companies
was diplomatic support. This entailed the establishment of international representatives, embassies,
and consulates to facilitate information flows and network building for Brazilian companies in-
vesting abroad. It also relates to the mediating role of the Brazilian diplomacy in conflicts between
foreign governments and Brazilian companies (Silva Rego and Roder Figueiredo, 2017: 19).
Diplomacy assistance ranged from formal cooperation among ministries, investment promotion
agencies, and companies to organized bilateral trade and investment missions and informal ne-
gotiations. Lula was especially active on the diplomatic front. He visited 21 countries in Africa to
promote the Brazilian leadership in the Global South and support the market entry of large Brazilian
companies in the oil, mining, and construction sectors into the African continent (Stuenkel, 2013).
Last, but not least, a sixth—formal, yet indirect—measure has to be mentioned, namely, or-
ganizational support. Examples include the establishment of new agencies such as the Brazilian
National Agency for Industrial Development (ABDI), or several public–private councils including
representatives from business, such as the National Council for Industrial Development (CNDI) and
the Council for Economic and Social Development (CDES) (De Toni, 2013). These entities were
created to support the design and implementation of new industrial policies and coordinating the
activities of relevant stakeholders. However, the latter rested heavily on Fernando Furlan, a
businessman and then-minister of industry and foreign trade, and fell into disuse soon after he left
the ministry in 2007 (Schedelik, 2023: 97). Institutional changes within BNDES also supported its
active role in the international expansion of Brazilian companies: BNDES established new de-
partments inside the bank, such as the International Division, and opened representation offices
abroad—leading to the internationalization of BNDES itself. For instance, BNDES opened an office
Figure 2. Number of mergers and acquisitions in Brazil (2003–2021). Source: Own elaboration based on
KPMG data (2022).
Ricz and Schedelik 11
in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 2013, with one of the main aims being to enable Brazilian
companies to more easily enter the African infrastructure market and to compete with Chinese
companies. Institutional changes took place also in related ministries to directly support the ex-
pansion of firms abroad.
Besides formal mechanisms to support the international expansion of national champions, more
fluid and informal channels of influence also considerably contributed to firm internationalization in
this period. Hence, state-business relations based on personal networks between domestic (often
family-owned) big business and public decision-makers were crucial in informally coordinating
strategic mergers and subsequent internationalization projects (N¨
olke et al., 2020). The Brazilian
political and business elite has traditionally been held together by a dense network of informal ties
based primarily upon personal acquaintances, going back at least to the 1930s’Vargas era. Recent
studies, examining more than 800 companies between 1996 and 2009, have revealed that this
intertwining of major political and business actors has not only remained strong during the pri-
vatization wave of the 1990s, but was also further strengthened under the governments of the
Workers’Party (Lazzarini, 2011).
The systematic overview of home-country measures to support firm internationalization in Brazil
has revealed a set of formal and informal channels of state influence, employing both direct and
indirect tools. At this stage, we can conclude that the Brazilian national champions strategy has
much more focused on easily attainable policies rather than on building lasting institutions. In the
next section, we turn to an empirical assessment of these policy instruments, considering also the
broader political economy and institutional context in which they were embedded.
Brazilian state-led firm internationalization in comparative perspective
By looking at the outcomes of the state-supported internationalization of Brazilian national
champions, this section sheds light on the legacy of recent industrial policies in Brazil. The aim of
this endeavor is to formulate insights and lessons for other countries, which are currently supporting
the internationalization of their respective national champions or are considering similar going
global strategies.
The rise of Brazilian multinationals
From an aggregate perspective, Brazil’s objective to nurture “world-class companies”has been (at
least partially) successful. In comparison to other large emerging economies, also the BRICS
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) economies, the rise of multinational enterprises as
measured by outward foreign direct investments (OFDI) has been impressive (Figure 3)(Szunom´
ar,
2020). OFDI from Brazil gained momentum in 2004, outperforming most of its regional peers
6
as
well as other large emerging markets (except for Russia), and in 2006—an exceptional year—it even
surpassed China. Nevertheless, yearly OFDI flows remained volatile throughout this period, a
typical characteristic of latecomer economies. Consequently, one large transaction heavily affected
yearly figures, such as Vale’s acquisition of the Canadian mining company Inco in 2006.
As a consequence, Brazilian OFDI stock has grown significantly during the last two decades,
from 50 billion USD in 2003 to almost 300 billion USD in 2021 (WIR, 2022). In comparative
terms, Brazil ranks third among the BRICS, beyond China and Russia, while outperforming
India and South Africa. Compared to other Latin American countries, Brazil stands out not only
in absolute volume of outward investment flows and stock but also in numbers of large in-
ternationalized firms. Out of the twenty-nine large firms with sales over 1 billion US$ having
12 Competition & Change 0(0)
assets abroad, Finchelstein (2017: 585) identified twelve Brazilian national champions,
7
being
in the global top ten of their respective industries.
The largest Brazilian firms have done undoubtedly well during the 2000s. In 2005, there were
only three Brazilian companies in the world’s top 500 largest companies (by revenue), and in
2013 this number had already risen to eight. By 2020, this has declined slightly to seven (Fortune,
2022). Thereby, Brazilian companies have outpaced both their Indian and Russian counterparts—
and also their Mexican regional rivals for that matter—while lagging behind China’s even more
impressive performance.
Looking at the most internationalized Brazilian companies between 2007 and 2018 (Table 3), we
observe a steady increase of their internationalization level.
8
Strikingly, all companies in Table 3—
except one, the market research company IBOPE—received BNDES loans during this period
(BNDES, 2023). More specifically, the emergence and sudden rise of some newcomers stands out,
such as JBS or Marfrig, which received substantial amounts of state support in the context of the
national champions strategy.
Probably, the most outstanding example is the meteoric rise of JBS between 2007 and 2013. The
Brazilian meat company became a global player in its respective industry (animal protein) starting
from very low levels. BNDES support to JBS added up to 4.4 billion USD and resulted in a very
aggressive strategy of acquisitions, both domestically and globally. First, in 2005, it acquired the
Argentine subsidiary of its American competitor, Swift, and just two years later it bought the parent
company itself. The outstanding rise of JBS can also be illustrated by its ranking domestically: JBS
was not among the largest 400 firms in Brazil in 2002, placed 61
st
in 2006 and becoming 5
th
among
Figure 3. Outward FDI flows from BRICS countries (2000–2021, million USD). Source: UNCTAD data (WIR
2022).
Ricz and Schedelik 13
Table 3. Twenty Most Internationalized Brazilian Companies (2007–2018).
Rank
2007 Company
Internationalization
index Rank 2013 Company
Internationalization
index Rank 2018 Company
Internationalization
index
1 Gerdau 0,464 1 JBS 0,589 1 Fitesa 0,764
2 Vale 0,292 2 Gerdau 0,542 2 Odebrecht 0,718
3 Sabó 0,285 3 Stefanini 0,496 3 InterCement 0,706
4 Marcopolo 0,274 4 Magnesita 0,457 4 CZM 0,658
5 Odebrecht 0,273 5 Marfrig 0,433 5 Stefanini 0,646
6 Embraer 0,233 6 Metalfrio 0,427 6 Iochpe-
Maxion
0,63
7 WEG 0,218 7 IBOPE 0,364 7 JBS 0,576
8 Tigre 0,202 8 Odebrecht 0,349 8 Minerva
foods
0,558
9 Camargo
Corrˆ
ea
0,19 9 Sabó 0,333 9 Metalfrio 0,554
10 Duas Rodas 0,176 10 Minerva
foods
0,32 10 Tupy 0,543
11 Andrade
Gutierrez
0,172 11 Tigre 0,306 11 Votorantim 0,433
12 Artecola 0,169 12 Vale 0,283 12 Braskem 0,39
13 CSN 0,162 13 WEG 0,28 13 DMS 0,378
14 Metalfrio 0,158 14 Suzano 0,271 14 Marfrig 0,356
15 Itautec 0,149 15 BRF 0,271 15 Gerdau 0,345
16 Portobello 0,146 16 Camargo
Corrˆ
ea
0,25 16 Tigre 0,337
17 Natura
Cosm´
eticos
0,135 17 Embraer 0,231 17 WEG 0,33
18 Petrobras 0,119 18 Ci&T 0,208 18 Jacto 0,3
19 ALL 0,117 19 Marcopolo 0,195 19 Tec mobile 0,298
20 Perdigão 0,11 20 Artecola 0,194 20 Marcopolo 0,289
Source: Own elaboration based on FDC (2020) data.
14 Competition & Change 0(0)
all firms—even 1
st
among nonfinancial firms—by 2010 (Almeida et al., 2019: 461). The rise of JBS
is also unprecedented globally. By 2010, it became the largest animal protein-processing company
in the world, entering the elite club of Fortune Global 500 firms—in 2010 it ranked 496, climbing up
to rank 275 by 2013
9
—becoming without any doubt a real global player. BNDES loans and
ownership shares held by BNDESpar, peaking 17% in 2010, have undoubtedly played a central role
in this success story.
10
However, not all state-financed efforts to create national champions were successful. The merger
of Brasil Telecom and Telemar/Oi is an emblematic case, which provides a telling story of failed
state intervention. In 2008, the aim to create a Brazilian national champion in the telecommunication
sector—and to reduce the foreign dominance in that industry—was financed by BNDES and Banco
do Brasil with co-funding of 1.5 billion USD and 2.5 billion USD, respectively. Additional support
came from the state pension funds, such as Previ and Petros, adding up to an ownership stake of
34%. Finally, the merger was also enabled by preferential treatment, that is, the relaxing of antitrust
regulations (Almeida et al., 2019: 461). Further mergers took place in 2013 and the following years
in European and African markets.
11
Nevertheless, the company failed to meet mandatory goals for
the expansion of its fixed-line network: amidst high debt and poor management it filed for
bankruptcy protection in 2016—in fact, the largest bankruptcy request in Brazil’s history—and
operates ever since under a court-supervised reorganization (Leahy, 2016). The company completed
divestments from its Portuguese and later from its African assets, including the sale of its mobile
phone operations, with the aim to refocus its activities on offering corporate, digital, and fiber-based
data transportation services. Hence, the failure of Oi teaches us the truism that state support is no
panacea but has to be complemented by the right corporate strategy and an efficient management.
Additionally, the Brazilian state had ownership stakes in the majority of most internationalized
companies via BNDES (Figure 4) or indirectly via pension funds and other institutional investors. In
2014, fourteen of the top twenty Brazilian multinationals were partially state owned. By 2016, this
number was down to ten (Sheng and Carrera, 2016,2018). BNDES’retreat as owner of large
Brazilian companies is an ongoing process.
The Brazilian state consistently and aggressively promoted the concentration of large domestic
companies and the formation of globalized national champions focusing on those sectors that were
already competitive in the early 2000s.
12
This has reinforced the dominance of resource-based
industries and commodities in the Brazilian economy. Looking at the breakdown of the foreign
assets of the top twenty BMNEs by main industries in 2016, oil and gas, mining, food processing,
metallurgy, and pulp and paper accounted for more than 90% (Sheng and Carrera, 2018). This
sectoral composition overlaps almost perfectly with those sectors explicitly named in the PDP. Thus,
from a policy implementation and evaluation perspective, the goals have been achieved. Never-
theless, if we contrast this result with the structuralist argument of favoring structural change and
technological upgrading, one has to conclude that new industrial policies in general and the national
champions strategy in particular failed to promote any reasonable structural change in Brazil. To
underscore this point, Figure 5 reveals significant changes in BNDES’loan portfolio since 2012 and
demonstrates that the share of agribusiness and infrastructure sectors in BNDES loans has risen
considerably, at the cost of industry in particular.
As a consequence, and in contrast to other emerging economies such as China or India, strong
OFDI promotion was targeted at already highly competitive firms in sectors with low technological
potential (Caseiro and Masiero, 2014: 250). Brazilian multinationals mostly did not internationalize
due to efficiency, cost reducing, or new market exploration motives but primarily due to geo-
graphical proximity, improved financial conditions, and the availability of skilled labor in host
markets (De Alcˆ
antara et al., 2016). Accordingly, the rates of return from OFDI have been
Ricz and Schedelik 15
comparatively low, 1% compared to almost 8% for Chilean companies and 6% for Chinese and
Russian companies in 2011 (Knoerich, 2017: 448).
Brazil’s national champions strategy in political context
As mentioned above, informal state-business relations were an important ingredient of Brazilian
industrial policies, facilitating knowledge flows between state officials and business representatives.
Although starting as an outsider to the dense network of socioeconomic elites in Bras´
ılia, members
of the PT administrations also cultivated close contacts with several entrepreneurs such as Blairo
Maggi (agribusiness), Sergio Andrade (construction), Jos´
e Pinheiro Filho (construction), Marcelo
Odebrecht (construction), Eike Batista (diversified), Carlos Jereissati (retail and telecommunica-
tions), and the Batista brothers (meat packing) who benefitted greatly from subsidized BNDES
loans and government contracts while supporting the PT coalition heavily through campaign
donations (Abu-El-Haj, 2016:211;Boas et al. 2014). State-business relations and the industrial
policies analyzed above were, however, embedded in a distinct political setting, with a substantial
impact on the content and effects of the respective policies. Subsequently, we are addressing this
topic in more detail.
Brazil’s distinct multiparty presidential political system features several complementarities to the
wider economic system (Schneider 2013: 141-149). Due to the porous nature of the open-list
electoral system, business tends to target individual legislators with pivotal positions in committees,
ministries, or as House-leaders and invest in long-term relations with them (Schneider, 2013: 144).
In particular, the large family-owned construction conglomerates have built a symbiotic relationship
Figure 4. BNDES’ownership share in major Brazilian companies (2006–2020). Source: Own construction
based on BNDES financial reports.
16 Competition & Change 0(0)
with the state that dates back to the construction of the capital Bras´
ılia under Juscelino Kubitschek in
the 1950s. The sector has its own powerful lobby group in Congress, the so-called Bancada de
Empreiteiras e Construtoras, consisting in 2016 of 228 deputies from various parties—the largest
number of deputies for a lobby group and ahead of business with 208 and agribusiness with 207
(Medeiros and Fonseca, 2016). Lobbying via bancadas has proven highly successful in getting
legislative approval for industry’s political preferences. The Lava Jato scandal has brought to light
the magnitude of the political influence of the major construction companies over virtually every
party in congress (Taylor, 2020: 150-151).
Next to personal contacts and lobbying via bancadas, large Brazilian companies supported
political parties and candidates also via financial donations during the electoral campaigns (and even
after the elections) in order to get access to BNDES loans and government contracts as part of the
industrial policies pursued by the PT governments (Boas et al., 2014). Corporate donations to
political parties were legally allowed until 2016 and underwent a sharp increase in the 2000s. In
2004, the share of company donations was 38.8%, by 2014 it had almost doubled, reaching 76.4%
of total campaign costs. They were concentrated among around 70 very large firms and con-
glomerates that donated more than 50% of this sum (Mancuso 2015: 157). This tendency can be well
illustrated by the case of JBS, which donated over 6 million USD to candidates and political parties
between 2006 and 2010 (it was the largest donor of the Workers’party) and by 2014 its donations to
different campaigns surged to 145 million USD
13
(Almeida et al., 2019: 466). For perspective,
Brazilian electoral costs have been among the highest in the world during the period of investi-
gation. Adjusted for GDP per capita, they were even considerably higher than US presidential
elections, totaling 1.4 billion US$ in 2010 and 1.6 billion US$ in 2014 (Avelino and Fisch, 2019:
161). Therefore, it comes as no surprise that campaign spending by elected candidates increased
Figure 5. BNDES loan portfolio by sector, 2012–2022. Source: Own elaboration based on BNDES (2022);
latest data is of 31 March 2022.
Ricz and Schedelik 17
dramatically in the last two decades. Dilma Rousseff spent 123 million US$ in her 2014 campaign,
736% more than the 14 million US$ Lula spent in his first campaign in 2002 (Avelino and Fisch
2019).
Many of the largest Brazilian corporations were the major contributors to campaign finance
during this period. Among this group of companies, we can discern a clear sectoral concentration
that varies marginally over time: construction, finance, metallurgy, beverages, meat processing, and
mining are responsible for the largest share of corporate donations. Strikingly, there is a clear
overlap between those companies receiving state support via BNDES loans or equity investments
and campaign donations (see Table 3 and Figure 4 and Table 4;Boas et al., 2014;Musacchio and
Lazzarini, 2014). In Lula’s 2006 reelection campaign, for instance, the largest individual corporate
donors were mining giant Vale, the steel producers Gerdau and CSN, the meat packing firm JBS,
beverage producers Cutrale and Ambev, and several banks such as Ita´
u, Bradesco, and Unibanco
(Lazzarini 2011). Practically, the same group of companies appears on the list of the major corporate
donors in the 2010 presidential election (Table 4). In the 2014 presidential election, the same pattern
is observable. Several sectors account for the bulk of corporate donations, above all construction
with 85 million R$ equaling 28.5% of all corporate donations. As in the previous campaigns, the
construction conglomerates, Andrade Gutierrez with 14 million R$, OAS with 10 million R$, and
Odebrecht with 7 million R$, are among the top corporate donors (Muramatsu et al., 2020: 186).
The donations from the banking sector amount to 85 million R$ or 14% of all corporate contri-
butions. Consumer goods, especially beverages and meat processing, and steel represent the lion’s
share of corporate donations in the manufacturing sector, totaling 248 million R$ or 40.6% of total
donations. The meat processing giant JBS, with its deep ties to the PT and other parties, was by far
the largest corporate donor with an astonishing 47.6 million R$, with 31.2 million R$ for Rousseff’s
campaign alone (Muramatsu et al., 2020: 189).
Table 4. Major Corporate Donors in the 2010 Presidential Campaign.
Company Industry Donations (R$) % of corporate donations
Camargo Corrˆ
ea Construction 113,182,120 5.1
Bradesco Finance 93,872,000 4.2
Queiroz Galvão Construction 71,166,020.5 3.2
Andrade Gutierrez Construction 63,146,000 2.9
Vale Mining 58,170,000.01 2.6
JBS Meat processing 54,653,000 2.5
OAS Construction 48,264,301 2.2
BMG Finance 34,145,000 1.5
Gerdau Metallurgy 33,930,000 1.5
CSN Metallurgy 30,591,493.55 1.4
Oi (Contax S.A.) Telecommunication 26,180,000 1.2
Galvão Engenharia Engineering/construction 24,195,730 1.1
Petrópolis (Leyroz de Caxias) Beverages 23,350,000 1.1
UTC Engenharia Engineering/construction 23,164,667 1
Ita´
u Unibanco Finance 22,880,100 1
Subtotal 15 major donors 32,5
Other companies 67,5
Total 100
Source: Own elaboration based on Mancuso (2015).
18 Competition & Change 0(0)
As in St. Francis of Assisi’s proverb “´
e dando que se recebe”—for it is in giving that we receive;
the Brazilian version of quid pro quo—these firms and sectors benefitted greatly from the industrial
policies and investment programs implemented by the PT governments. Accordingly, Mancuso
et al. (2020) found a statistically significant correlation between corporate donations and legislation
favoring particular sectors. Beyond that, several major corruption scandals involved basically all the
large conglomerates that benefitted from Brazil’s national champions strategy. To name only the
most visible scandals: Lava Jato (Petrobr´
as and several construction firms), Carne Fraca (BRF and
JBS), Operation Bullish (JBS), Odebrecht (construction), and Operation Calicute (EBX) (Taylor,
2020: 147-152). This inglorious record of corruption and malfeasance sheds a negative light on
Brazil’s industrial policies in the 2000s. The vast bribery and kick-back schemes involved, amongst
others, the state-owned oil company Petrobr ´
as, several construction companies like Andrade
Gutierrez and Odebrecht, and numerous politicians from virtually every party in congress (Valarini
and Pohlmann 2019). The scandals not only gave a deathblow to the trust of Brazilians in their
democratic institutions but also had severe repercussions all over Latin America and elsewhere.
However, corruption scandals, which historically only scratched the surface of the illicit un-
derbelly of Brazil’s political system, have not been unique to the Workers’Party governments but
accompanied Brazilian democracy from its inception (Katz, 2018: 88-95). All presidential ad-
ministrations faced major scandals of malfeasance and political corruption, Collor was even
impeached due to one such scandal (Juc´
a et al., 2016: 6-10). Even the Cardoso administration was
plagued with corruption allegations including those surrounding the Banestado scandal of money
laundering by illegal foreign exchange traders linked to several high-profile politicians in Cardoso’s
presidential coalition (Juc´
a et al., 2016). In fact, the PT had traditionally been the least corrupt party
in Brazil, distinguishing itself successfully in an environment of non-programmatic, clientelistic
parties, enmeshed in recurring corruption scandals (Hunter, 2007). Rousseff, herself incorruptible,
even pursued an “ethical clean sweep”campaign since she took office, leading to the paradox of
being impeached chiefly because she did not stop the corruption investigations.
14
Hence, the
Brazilian case shows clearly that the (political) institutional context is crucial for understanding the
content and effectiveness of (new) industrial policies in emerging economies. This is not to say that
industrial policies by necessity fall prey to rent-seeking by entrenched interests or are even the
product of corruption schemes, but that, empirically, we tend to observe a correlation between active
industrial policies and corruption (Ades and Di Tella, 1997; on the nevertheless highly successful
Korean case, see Kang, 2002). However, this correlation and the ultimate effects on investment and
growth are highly dependent on the political institutional context (Saha and Sen, 2021). In such
weak political settings as the Brazil one, it becomes very challenging to shield large-scale in-
vestment programs and industrial policies from the various channels of influence big business has at
its disposal.
Conclusions
This article contributes to the emerging debate about the viability of a national champions strategy
as an industrial policy for emerging economies. First of all, we have shown that industrial policy in
the 21
st
century is fundamentally different from that prevalent in the 20
th
century, especially in those
economies having pursued ISI-led growth strategies. Against this backdrop, we applied a political
economy approach to the study of new industrial policies in today’s emerging economies. Sub-
sequently, we have used this perspective for analyzing the Brazilian national champions strategy in
the 2000s as a more representative case of a middle-income democracy pursuing state-led firm
internationalization than the emblematic autocratic Chinese case. We traced the evolution of this
Ricz and Schedelik 19
industrial policy until its phasing-out and located it in the broader political economy and insti-
tutional context of the Brazilian political economy under the Workers’Party governments. Finally,
we pointed to several major achievements of this policy as well as some shortcomings and negative
side effects.
Among the achievements, the emergence of a range of globally competitive and internationalized
Brazilian companies within only a few years stands out. This is in large part due to the various forms
of state support outlined throughout the paper with a pivotal role for the Brazilian development
bank, BNDES. However, we highlighted the fact that the impressive firm internationalization
mainly took place in commodity and resource-intensive sectors, which already featured strong
comparative advantage. Among the negative side effects is the revelation of a series of corruption
scandals, predominately in those sectors covered by the industrial policy. The numerous bribery and
kickback-schemes as well as vast amounts of campaign donations cast doubt on the social benefits
of this industrial policy for Brazilian society at large. It is beyond the scope of this study to quantify
these social benefits—for example, in terms of increased employment, higher tax revenues, or
BNDES returns to shareholdings. Yet, our results seem to be in line with Saad-Filho and Morais’
(2018) findings, who describe this period as “developmental neoliberalism.”They argue that public
money paid out in terms of BNDES loans led to higher profits for private owners but did not
contribute much to domestic investment or inclusive growth—in contrast to other policies enacted
by the PT such as the minimum wage policy, for instance.
Nevertheless, the pervasiveness of corruption within the Brazilian political economy, as in other
emerging economies as well, underscores the necessity of taking the broader institutional context of
industrial policies into account. Future research should, therefore, not only refine the interplay
among economic institutions, industrial policy, and firms’internationalization strategies but has to
focus more explicitly on political institutions. This implies that international business scholars are
well advised to engage both with political economists and political scientists. Policy makers in
emerging economies should be wary of the negative aspects of the Brazilian experience described in
this paper. Although the strategy to nurture national champions on a global scale was in fact
successful, vast sums were spent on several already competitive companies, mainly in construction
and meat packing. Given the low-technology profile of these companies, the policy had only
marginal effects on structural change and technological upgrading in the Brazilian economy. We
would argue that this was too much of a good thing. BNDES lending is a very powerful devel-
opmental tool that should be deployed more targeted at sectors with greater technological potential.
Acknowledgments
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at SASE’s 33rd Annual Conference, 2–5 July 2021, at the 7th The
Role of State in Varieties of Capitalism Conference, 29–30 November 2021, and at an internal workshop of this
special issue, 25 May 2022. We are grateful to all participants and in particular Magdolna Sass and Dorottya
Sallai for helpful comments.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.
20 Competition & Change 0(0)
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or pub-
lication of this article: This work was supported by the Hungarian National Research, Development and
Innovation Office under Grant No. 124573 and the German Research Foundation under Grant No. 218893009.
ORCID iDs
Judit Ricz https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4371-142X
Michael Schedelik https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1536-3210
Notes
1. Although there were many similarities between Latin American countries, this process was, of course, not
homogenous. For instance, many of the smaller countries did not have major development banks.
2. In 1998, a separate credit line was introduced by BNDES to help foreign governments—principally in
Latin America and Africa—to realize large infrastructure projects by hiring Brazilian companies, mainly in
the construction sector. These BNDES loans were essential to make Brazilian companies competitive
against the expanding Chinese companies, that were also supported by their government.
3. BNDES lending rates were around 9%/year in 2006 and went down to 6%/year by 2009 (Masiero et al.,
2014: 137).
4. Such as to increase the investment rate to 21% of GDP by 2010; to raise private spending on R&D to 0.65%
by 2010; and to increase the share of Brazilian exports in the world exports to 1.25% by 2010, among
others (Kupfer et al., 2013: 331).
5. The annual average exchange rate of 2015 (namely, 0.305) was used to convert the Brazilian real into US
dollar.
6. Controlling for country size and looking at OFDI flows as a share of the GDP, Brazil is only second to Chile
in Latin America.
7. Petrobras, Odebrecht, JBS, Vale, Gerdau, Brasil foods, Camargo Correa, Copersucar, Embraer, Marfrig,
Natura, and Iochpe-Maxion.
8. The internationalization index is the mean of assets abroad as a share of total assets, revenues abroad as a
share of total revenues, and employment abroad as a share of total employment.
9. The latest available ranking is 202 in 2021.
10. The success story of JBS is still ongoing despite the corruption scandal, hitting the company in 2017,
leading to paying penalties above 2 billion USD, and it could even scale up its performance during the
COVID pandemic, reporting record net revenues for 2021 exceeding 72 billion USD (approximately 30%
increase on year-on-year basis). Its global presence can be illustrated by more than 450 production facilities
in 20 countries around the world (JBS, 2022).
11. Oi acquired Portugal Telecom in October 2013, followed by taking control of East Timorese telco Timor
Telecom, a 75% stake in Netherlands-registered Africatel Holdings (owning stakes in Angola, Sao Tome
and Principe, Namibia, and Cabo Verde).
12. This defensive strategy to promote OFDI in the already highly competitive domestic sectors can be
contrasted to the Chinese more offensive strategy, which has aimed at acquiring strategic resources via
OFDI promotion (Caseiro and Masiero, 2014).
13. https://english.tse.jus.br/noticias-tse-en/2015/Agosto/tse-chief-justice-discusses-fairness-in-elections-
during-latin-american-conference
14. In a famous recording, the influential PMDB-senator Romero Juc´
a spoke of the necessity of “an im-
peachment”to “change the government to stop the bleeding”(Da Ros and Ingram 2019, 353).
Ricz and Schedelik 21
References
Abu-El-Haj J (2016) Brazilian left Bonapartism and the rise of finance capital: a critique of the internal-
Bourgeoisie thesis. Latin American Perspectives 43(2): 207–216.
Ades A and Di Tella R (1997) National champions and corruption: some unpleasant interventionist arithmetic.
The Economic Journal 107(443): 1023–1042.
Aiginger K and Rodrik D (2020) Rebirth of industrial policy and an agenda for the Twenty-First century.
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 20: 189–207.
Aiyar S, Duval R, Puy D, et al. (2018) Growth slowdowns and the middle income trap. Japan and the World
Economy 48: 22–37.
Alami I and Dixon AD (2020) State capitalism(s) redux? Theories, tensions, controversies. Competition &
Change 24(1): 70–94.
Almeida M, Lima-de-Oliveira R and Schneider BR (2019) Left government, business politics, and the revival
of industrial policy. In: Ames B (ed), Routledge Handbook of Brazilian Politics. New York: Routledge,
pp. 447–469.
Andreoni A and Chang H-J (2019) The political economy of industrial policy: structural interdependencies,
policy alignment and conflict management. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 48: 136–150.
Armijo LE (2017) The public bank trilemma Brazil’s new developmentalism and the BNDES. In: Kingstone
PR and Power TJ (eds), Democratic Brazil Divided. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
pp. 230–247.
Avelino G and Fisch A (2019) Money, elections, and candidates. In: Ames B (ed), Routledge Handbook of
Brazilian Politics. New York: Routledge, pp. 161–174.
Baer W (1972) Import substitution and industrialization in Latin America: experiences and interpretations.
Latin American Research Review 7(1): 95–122.
Bazuchi K, Zacharias S, Broering L, et al. (2013) The role of home country political resources for Brazilian
multinational companies. Brazilian Administration Review 10(4): 415–438.
B´
ertola L and Ocampo JA (2012) The Economic Development of Latin America since Independence. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Becker-Ritterspach FAA, Lange KSG and Allen MMC (2021) Dominant modes of economic coordination and
varieties of firm internationalization support. International Business Review 31: 101975.
BNDES (2011) Annual Report 2011. Available at: https://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_en/
Hotsites/Annual_Report_2011/. (accessed: 01 July 2021).
BNDES (2022) Financial Reports. Available at: https://ri.bndes.gov.br/en/financial-information/results-center/
bndes/. (accessed: 29 June 2022).
BNDES (2023) BNDES Home. Available at: https://www.bndes.gov.br/wps/portal/site/home. (accessed: 4 July
2023).
Boas TC, Hidalgo FD and Richardson NP (2014) The spoils of victory: campaign donations and government
contracts in Brazil. The Journal of Politics 76(2): 415–429.
Bulfone F (2022) Industrial policy and comparative political economy: a literature review and research agenda.
Competition and Change. 27: 495. DOI: 10.1177/10245294221076225.
Caseiro L and Masiero G (2014) OFDI promotion policies in emerging economies: the Brazilian and Chinese
strategies. Critical Perspectives on International Business 10(4): 237–255.
Chang H-J (2003) Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective. London: Anthem
Press.
Cuervo-Cazurra A (2018) Thanks but no thanks: state-owned multinationals from emerging markets and host
country policies. Journal of International Business Policy 1(3–4): 128–156.
22 Competition & Change 0(0)
Da Ros L and Ingram MC (2019) Law, courts, and judicial politics. In: Ames B (ed), Routledge Handbook of
Brazilian Politics. London: Routledge, pp. 339–357.
de Alcˆ
antara JN, Paiva CMN, Bruhn NCP, et al. (2016) Brazilian OFDI determinants. Latin American Business
Review 17(3): 177–205.
De Toni J (2013) Novos arranjos institucionais na pol´
ıtica industrial do governo Lula: a força das novas ideias
e dos empreendedores pol´
ıticos. PhD thesis. University of Bras´
ılia.
Devlin R and Moguillansky G (2013) What’s new in the new industrial policy in Latin America? In: Stiglitz JE
and Lin JY (eds) (2013) The Industrial Policy Revolution I. The Role of Government beyond Ideology.
London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 276–317.
Drago BDL and Noguiera MRV (2013) Brazil: Abuse of Dominance. Global Competition Review. Available at:
https://globalcompetitionreview.com/review/the-antitrust-review-of-the-americas/the-antitrust-review-
of-the-americas-2014/article/brazil-abuse-of-dominance. (accessed 10 September 2022).
Dutz M (2018) Brazil’s Promise: Boosting Productivity for Shared Prosperity. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Falck O, Gollier C and Woessmann L (eds), (2011) Industrial Policy for National Champions. Cambridge, MA:
The MIT Press.
FDC (2020) Ranking FDC das Multinacionais Brasileiras 2020. Fundação Dom Cabral. Available: https://
trajetoriasinternacionais.fdc.org.br/o-ranking-fdc-das-multinacionais-brasileiras-2018/. (accessed: 15 June
2021).
Finchelstein D (2017) The role of the state in the internationalization of Latin American firms. Journal of World
Business 52(4): 578–590.
Fortune (2022) Global Fortune 500 companies in 2020. Available at: https://fortune.com/global500/2020/
search/?fg500_country=Brazil. (accessed: 1 August 2022).
Frieden JA (1991) Debt, Development, and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 1965-
1985. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Frischtak C, Pazarbasioglu C, Byskov S, et al. (2017) Towards a More Effective BNDES. Finance and Markets
Global Practice Report No: 117304. Washington DC: The World Bank.
Gaur AS, Ma X and Ding Z (2018) Home country supportiveness/unfavorableness and outward foreign direct
investment from China. Journal of International Business Studies 49(3): 324–345.
GereffiG (2014) A global value chain perspective on industrial policy and development in emerging markets.
Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 24(3): 433–458.
Goldstein A (2007) Multinational Companies from Emerging Economies. Composition, Conceptualization and
Direction in the Global Economy. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Griffith-Jones S and Ocampo JA (2018) The Future of National Development Banks. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Hall PA and Soskice D (eds), (2001) Varieties of capitalism The Institutional Foundations of Comparative
Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hauge J (2020) Industrial policy in the era of global value chains: towards a developmentalist framework
drawing on the industrialisation experiences of South Korea and Taiwan. The World Economy 43(8):
2070–2092.
Hennart J-F, Sheng HH and Carrera JM Jr (2017) Openness, international champions, and the internation-
alization of Multilatinas. Journal of World Business 52(4): 518–532.
Hirschman AO (1968) The political economy of import-substituting industrialization in Latin America. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 82(1): 1–32.
Hochstetler K and Montero AP (2013) The renewed developmental state: the national Development Bank and
the Brazil model. The Journal of Development Studies 49(11): 1484–1499.
Hunter W (2007) The normalization of an anomaly: the Workers’party in Brazil. World Politics 59(3):
440–475.
Ricz and Schedelik 23
Jackson G and Deeg R (2019) Comparing capitalisms and taking institutional context seriously. Journal of
International Business Studies 50: 4–19.
JBS (2022) JBS Financial Information, Results Center. Available at: https://ri.jbs.com.br/en/financial-
information/results-center/. (accessed: 24 May 2022).
Johnson P and Papageorgiou C (2020) What remains of cross-country convergence? Journal of Economic
Literature 58(1): 129–175.
Juc´
a I, Melo MA and Rennó L (2016) The political cost of corruption: scandals, campaign finance, and
reelection in the Brazilian chamber of deputies. Journal of Politics in Latin America 8(2): 3–36.
Kalasin K, Cuervo-Cazurra A and Ramamurti R (2020) State ownership and international expansion: the
S-curve relationship. Global Strategy Journal 10(2): 386–418.
Kang D (2002) Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Katz AS (2018) Making Brazil work? Brazilian coalitional presidentialism at 30 and its post-Lava Jato
prospects. Revista de Investigações Constitucionais 5(3): 77–102.
Kingstone P (2018) The Political Economy of Latin America Reflections on Neoliberalism and Development
after the Commodity Boom. New York: Routledge.
Knoerich J (2017) How does outward foreign direct investment contribute to economic development in less
advanced home countries? Oxford Development Studies 45(4): 443–459.
KPMG (2022) Operações de fusões e aquisições em 2021 alcançaram melhor desempenho dos ´
ultimos
25 anos. Available at: https://home.kpmg/br/pt/home/insights/2022/03/volume-fusoes-aquisicoes-
alcancou-recorde-2021.html. (accessed: 17 September 2022).
Kupfer D, Ferraz JC and Marques FS (2013) The return of industrial policy in Brazil. In: Stiglitz JE and Lin JY
(eds), The Industrial Policy Revolution I. The Role of Government Beyond Ideology. London: Palgrave
Macmillan, pp. 327–339.
Lazzarini SG (2011) Capitalismo de Laços. Os donos do Brasil e suas conexões. Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier.
Leahy J (2013) Brazil: The Creaking Champions. Financial Times.
Leahy J (2016) Oi Files Brazil’s Biggest Bankruptcy Protection Request. Financial Times.
Li C and Chen M (2020) National champions, reforms, and industrial policy in China. In: Oqubay A, Cramer C,
Chang H-J, et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Industrial Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
pp. 716–748.
Love JL and Baer W (eds), (2009) Brazil under Lula. Economy, Politics, and Society under the Worker-
President. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mancuso WP (2015) Investimento eleitoral no Brasil: balanço da literatura (2001-2012) e agenda depesquisa.
Revista de Sociologica e Pol´
ıtica 23(54): 155–183.
Mancuso WP, Santos ML, da Silva Resende CA, et al. (2020) Financiamento eleitoral e comportamento
parlamentar: a relação entre doações da ind´
ustria e proposição de leis. Texto para discussão 2578. Rio
de Janeiro: IPEA.
Masiero G, Ogasavara MH, Caseiro L, et al. (2014) Financing the expansion of Brazilian multinationals into
europe: the role of the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES). In: N¨
olke A (ed), Multinational Cor-
porations from Emerging Markets. State Capitalism 3.0. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 130–152.
May C (2020) Globalizing state capitalism? Selective internationalization of MNCs from emerging economies.
In: Mikler J and Ronit K (eds), MNCs in Global Politics. Pathways of Influence. Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar, pp. 30–46.
May C and N¨
olke A (2015) Critical institutionalism in studies of comparative capitalisms: conceptual
considerations and research programme. In: Ebenau M, Bruff I and May C (eds), New Directions in
Comparative Capitalisms Research: Critical and Global Perspectives. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
pp. 83–100.
24 Competition & Change 0(0)
May C, N¨
olke A and Schedelik M (2019) Institutional complementarities in Brazilian industrial policies: the
case of finance. In: Balestro M and Gait´
an F (eds), Untangling Industrial Policy: Ideas and Coordination
between State and Business. Verbena: Bras´
ılia, pp. 110–134.
Mazzucato M (2021) Mission Economy. A Moonshot Guide to Changing Capitalism. UK: Penguin Books
Limited.
MDIC (2008) Pol´
ıtica de desenvolvimento produtivo. Minist´
erio do Desenvolvimento, Ind´
ustria e Com´
ercio
Exterior. Available at: www.mdic.gov.br. (accessed: 03 July 2017).
Mertens D, Thiemann M and Volberding P (eds), (2021) The Reinvention of Development Banking in the
European Union: Industrial Policy in the Single Market and the Emergence of a Field. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Morgan G, Doering H and Gomes M (2021) Extending Varieties of Capitalism to Emerging Economies: What
can We Learn from Brazil? New Political Economy 26(4): 540–553.
Muramatsu R, Scarano PR and Almeida GVLde (2020) The (un)seen in the contributions to political funding:
lessons from the 2014 Brazilian presidential campaign finance, corruption scandals and new directions in
the electoral rules of the game. Revista de Economia Mackenzie 17(2): 169–202.
Musacchio A and Lazzarini SG (2014) Reinventing state capitalism. Leviathan in Business, Brazil and beyond.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
N¨
olke A (2014) Multinational Corporations from Emerging Markets. State Capitalism 3.0. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.
N¨
olke A (2022) Post-corona capitalism. The Alternatives Ahead. Bristol: Bristol University Press.
N¨
olke A, ten Brink T, May C, et al. (2020) State-permeated Capitalism in Large Emerging Economies. New
York: Routledge.
Peres W (2011) Industrial Policies in Latin America. UNU-WIDER Working Paper No. 2011/48.
Prebisch R (1963) Towards a Dynamic Development Policy for Latin America. New York: United Nations. Medeiros
´
E and Fonseca B (2016) “As bancadas da Cˆ
amara: Maiores grupos de parlamentares da Cˆ
amara são pautados
por interesses corpora-tivos, conservadores ou por ambos; mapeamos quem defende o quˆ
e.”Publica, February
18.
Reuters (2013) Brazil’s BNDES No Longer Fostering National Champions. Reuters.
Robinson M and White G (eds), (1998) The Democratic Developmental State: Political and Institutional
Design. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Saad-Filho A and Morais L (2018) Brazil: Neoliberalism versus Democracy. London: Pluto Press.
Saha S and Sen K (2021) The corruption–growth relationship: does the political regime matter? Journal of
Institutional Economics 17(2): 243–266.
Schedelik M (2023) The Political Economy of Upgrading Regimes: Brazil and beyond. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Schindler S, Alami I and Jepson N (2022) Goodbye Washington Confusion, hello Wall Street Consensus:
contemporary state capitalism and the spatialisation of industrial strategy. New Political Economy 44:
1–18.
Schneider BR (2013) Hierarchical Capitalism in Latin America. Business, Labor, and the Challenges of
Equitable Development. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Schneider BR (2015) Designing Industrial Policy in Latin America: Business–State Relations and the New
Developmentalism. New York: Palgrave.
Sennes R and Mendes CR (2009) Public policies and Brazilian multinationals. In: Ramsey J and Almeida A
(eds), The Rise of Brazilian Multinationals: Making the Leap from Regional Heavyweights to True
Multinationals. Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier, pp. 157–174.
Sheng HH and Carrera JM Jr (2016) Leading Brazilian Multinational Enterprises: Trends in an Era of
Significant Uncertainties and Challenges. Emerging Market Global Players (EMGP) Project Report
Ricz and Schedelik 25
January 2016. New York and São Paulo: Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) and Columbia Center on
Sustainable Investment (CCSI).
Sheng HH and Carrera JM Jr (2018) The Top 20 Brazilian Multinationals: A Long Way Out of the Crises.
Emerging Market Global Players (EMGP) Project Report January 2016. New York and São Paulo:
Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) and Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI).
Sikkink K (1991) Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina. Cornell University Press.
Silva Rego BF and Roder Figueira AC (2017) Business, government and foreign policy: Brazilian construction
firms abroad. Brazilian Political Science Review 11(1): 1–28.
Strange S (1996) The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Streeck W and Thelen K (eds), (2005) Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political
Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stuenkel O (2013) Brazil in Africa: Bridging the atlantic? KAS International Reports 1: 28–39.
Szalavetz A (2015) Post-crisis approaches to state intervention: new developmentalism or industrial policy as
usual? Competition & Change 19(1): 70–83.
Szunom´
ar ´
A (ed), (2020) Emerging-market Multinational Enterprises in East Central Europe. Cham,
Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
Taylor MM (2020) Decadent Developmentalism: The Political Economy of Democratic Brazil. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Tu W, Zheng X, Li L, et al. (2021) Do Chinese firms benefit from government ownership following cross-
border acquisitions? International Business Review 30(3): 101812.
UNCTAD (2004) Outward FDI from Brazil: Poised to Take off? Occasional Note. Available at: http://unctad.
org/en/docs/iteiia200416_en.pdf. (accessed: 06 July 2017)
Valarini E and Pohlmann M (2019) Organizational crime and corruption in Brazil a case study of the “Operation
Carwash”court records. International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 59: 100340.
WIR (2022) International Tax Reforms and Sustainable Investment. World Investment Report 2022, Geneva:
United Nations. Available at: https://worldinvestmentreport.unctad.org/world-investment-report-2022/.
(accessed: 01 August 2022).
26 Competition & Change 0(0)
