Contemporary conflicts, cross‐border military operations, and the declining role of the UN: The case of Turkey and Saudi Arabia

Abstract

This article examines an emerging trend of cross‐border conflicts between states and non‐state actors. It looks at the narratives fronted by Turkey and Saudi Arabia to justify their operations in northern Syria and Yemen, respectively. The authors argue that the increased inaction and lack of influence by the UN in response to such operations reaffirm states as the core actors in international politics and that national security and interests continue to shape the behavior of actors at the international level. The article concludes that the UN needs to adjust to the new forms of conflicts, actors, and behavior being experienced at the international level if it is to retain its relevance as an anchor of peace and international security.

Full text

Digest of Middle East Studies. 2020;00:1–17.
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INTRODUCTION
The end of World War II marked the end of prolonged interstate conflicts and the creation of the UN
as the sole body responsible for promoting, maintaining, and enforcing international peace. It was not
long before its capabilities were tested, and in 1948 it engaged in its first peace mission in the Middle
East where it attempted to uphold a ceasefire in the Arab-Israeli conflict that pitted Israel against
seven Arab nations. Since then, the UN has been involved in over 70 conflicts in Africa, Asia, Latin
America, and Europe with a considerable degree of success (Doyle & Sambanis, 2010; Themnér
&Wallensteen, 2013). However, the events that occurred in the United States on September 11, 2001
Received: 26 December 2019
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Revised: 4 April 2020
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Accepted: 5 April 2020
DOI: 10.1111/dome.12206
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Contemporary conflicts, cross-border military
operations, and the declining role of the UN: The
case of Turkey and Saudi Arabia
Israel NyaburiNyadera1,2
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Michael OtienoKisaka3
© 2020 Policy Studies Organization. Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
1Department of Government and Public
Administration, University of Macau,
Taipa, Macau
2Department of Political Science, Ankara
Yildirim Beyazit University, Ankara,
Turkey
3Department of Sociology, Hacettepe
University, Ankara, Turkey
Correspondence
Israel Nyaburi Nyadera, Department of
Government and Public Administration,
University of Macau, Taipa 999078,
Macau.
Email: inyadera@gmail.com
Abstract
This article examines an emerging trend of cross-border
conflicts between states and non-state actors. It looks at the
narratives fronted by Turkey and Saudi Arabia to justify
their operations in northern Syria and Yemen, respectively.
The authors argue that the increased inaction and lack of
influence by the UN in response to such operations reaffirm
states as the core actors in international politics and that na-
tional security and interests continue to shape the behavior
of actors at the international level. The article concludes that
the UN needs to adjust to the new forms of conflicts, actors,
and behavior being experienced at the international level if
it is to retain its relevance as an anchor of peace and inter-
national security.
KEYWORDS
conflict, cross-border operations, Saudi Arabia, Turkey

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altered the landscape of conflict and conflict resolution, relegating the role of the UN in promoting
and maintaining peace to the periphery.
The consequent invasion of Afghanistan by the United States after the September 11 attacks became
a testament to the new trend of states taking unilateral decisions on cross-border operations without
the support of international organizations such as the UN (Nyadera and Bincof, 2019). Several other
countries have since engaged in cross-border military operations either directly or through proxies
whom they offer technical and military support. The ostensible justification for countries engaging
in cross-border operations has changed from promoting democracy to addressing national security
concerns, counter-terrorism, and supporting internationally recognized governments. According to
Themnér and Wallensteen (2013), safeguarding national security is a critical role performed by states
to gain both domestic and international legitimacy, but this has often been misconstrued by state ac-
tors to mean pursuing threats to national security beyond national boundaries—a situation that has led
to a number of cross-border military operations with devastating consequences.
The diminishing role of diplomacy is one of the reasons for the increase in cross-border military
operations where states pursue perceived terrorist groups across national boundaries. Cohen (2013)
argues that diplomacy as a mechanism of resolving or managing international conflicts is increasingly
becoming weak and that it is out of fashion in many countries in which state actors prefer military con-
frontation to negotiations when faced with security threats from non-state actors. Given the increas-
ing number of unsuccessful negotiated settlements between state and non-state actors crafted by the
UN, states are opting for protracted costly conflicts with non-state actors within and across national
boundaries (Fortna, 2004; Joshi,2012; Toft,2010). Importantly, the failure of the UN to intervene
and take a strong stance in previous conflicts, most recently in Syria (2011) and the U.S. invasion of
Iraq (2002), has emboldened state actors in countries like Turkey and Saudi Arabia to opt for military
operations. The inaction of the UN in these military interventions leads to a vacuum that is gradually
being filled by states.
But with the upsurge in cross-border military operations, scholars observe that these operations
have detrimental effects on states (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Edelstein, 2004; Nilsson,2012). Military
capabilities of states are stronger relative to those of non-state actors, but most cross-border opera-
tions have been found to have a spiralling effect leading to prolonged and protracted conflicts that are
costly to the states(Nyadera, 2018). Non-state actors' agility exposes the inadequacies of state power,
leading to diminishing public support for such operations (Spalek & Lambert, 2008, p. 268). The
capacities of states to engage in cross-border operations and whether such operations are the ultimate
solutions to international security threats form the basis of an ongoing debate that remains unsettled.
In this article, I argue that the declining role of the UN in the promotion and maintenance of peace
has opened a window of opportunity for countries to engage in cross-border military operations.
Changes in international structure and security that have seen new actors, new forms of conflicts, and
new interests, in which it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between criminal acts and conflicts,
require the UN to adjust and form a response. This study is anchored on two cases of cross-border
operations: the case of Saudi Arabia's operation in Yemen (2015) and Turkey's operation in northern
Syria (2019). These two countries, with various similarities and differences, were both involved in
operations that have attracted international reactions. Through a review of qualitative data, the article
explores the narratives given by the two states to justify transnational actions against non-state actors.
It offers insights into how regional and international actors respond to these states’ involvement in
cross-border operations.

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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The salience of states in the international arena continues to grow even with the existence of transna-
tional organizations established to foster peaceful coexistence among states. Initially, the UN played
a major role in conflict management and mediation. Through peacemaking, peace enforcement, and
peace building missions, the UN is credited for intervening in regions facing simmering tensions
and for forging peace. However, in recent years, the emergence of transnational security threats like
terrorism has seen more tensions between states and non-state actors. Although the UN is credited
with promoting inter-state peace through mediation and peace missions, the organization seems to be
increasingly isolated in controlling the actions of states in conflict situations that involve non-state
actors. The most prominent form of response by the UN to contemporary conflicts that involve non-
state actors has been to produce diplomatic proclamations and public statements calling for peace and
the cessation of hostilities. However, in most cases, both the state and non-state actors have not only
violated peace agreements but also trampled on human rights and freedoms with little regard to the
UN expression of concern.
The increasing decline of UN presence and influence in contemporary conflicts is of great concern
to proponents of international organizations and feeds a surging sense of affirmation for state-centric
thinkers. The post-September 11 global order has seen increasingly more cases of state-led cross-
border military operations, often without the backing of international actors such as the UN. These
efforts have often resulted in conflicts of devastating proportions and international humanitarian
crises. The human, economic, political, and social cost of conflicts that involve non-state actors in
Yemen, Libya, Afghanistan, Syria, the Sahel, Nigeria, Somalia, and Iraq have weakened previous
theories such as the bounded rationality theory, whose assumption regarding state involvement in
cross-border operations is often guided by rational cost–benefit analysis. Nonetheless, several analy-
ses of conflicts have established that the costs of conflicts exceed the potential benefits (Clausewitz,
1976). Recent outcomes of conflicts involving states and non-state actors have shown significant costs
that have at times outweighed the benefits, yet such conflicts have persisted.
I argue that states are resurging as the ultimate actors in international affairs with national interest
being the ultimate driver. In this, I focus on the declining influence of the UN in either stopping or in-
fluencing states’ behavior in cross-border operations. Once a state declares an operation to be against
terror groups, then its decisions and actions have very little adherence to international law or resolu-
tions of international organizations. If this trend continues, the UN, whose main goal is to promote
international peace, will be significantly affected. Given that terrorism remains a problematic concept
both in the way it is defined and the way it should be dealt with, states resort to their own national
measures whenever they feel threatened. However, in most cases such responses often threaten the
sovereignty of a third party, usually the state from which the perceived terrorist group is operating.
What makes this trend critical is that it tends to lead to direct confrontation between two states, trig-
gers proxy wars, or leads to the deployment of troops and foreign fighters in the third country. Here, I
argue that it is the complex nature of conflict involving state and non-state actors that makes resolving
these crises even more complicated. Not only because more actors are involved, but also because some
of the states taking sides in the conflict are important members of the security council. This article
thus supports the realist-centered theory that not only are states significant actors in international pol-
itics, but their actions also affect the behavior and effectiveness of international organizations.
This article examines how states justify their involvement in the cross-border military activities
that have gained prominence in the last decade. Cross-border operations are defined as the direct or
indirect involvement by a country's military in a third country to militarily engage with non-state
actors. This comparative study of Turkey and Saudi Arabia uses an in-depth content analysis of

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secondary data generated from academic publications, media reports, publications from government
and non-governmental organizations, and online sources. Turkey and Saudi Arabia have been selected
as the two cases because the two countries have important differences while following similar policies.
Turkey is an emerging democracy in the Middle East with close ties to Western democracies through
its membership in NATO and European Union candidature. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, is a monarchy
with an authoritarian political system. Yet, these two countries have in recent years been involved in
cross-border military operations involving non-state actors. This article seeks to examine the justifi-
cation for such operations.
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TURKEY'S OPERATION PEACE SPRING IN SYRIA
(2019)
Cross-border military operations are increasingly common in the international system since September
11 (Belasco,2009; Cassidy & Cassidy, 2006; Monar, 2007; Steger,2008). Their prominence has
been strengthened by narratives such as “intervention by invitation” that are used by countries such
as France in Mali (2013) (Bannelier & Christakis, 2013; Fox,2014), the United States-led Global
Coalition in the fight against ISIS, and Russia in Ukraine (2014) (Byrne,2016; Nolte,2010) as well
as the “threat to national security” rhetoric, which is used to justify these operations. However, cross-
border operations have often raised mixed reactions from other states and non-state actors due to
their knock-on effects on civilians and the challenges faced by actors in these operations. Despite the
importance of legitimacy in state actions in general, few scholars have sought to examine why cross-
border state actions have caused a mixed reaction (Sandler,2010). Next, I examine two cross-border
operations undertaken by Turkey and Saudi Arabia. This discussion offers an important background
to understand the motivation and justification of both countries' actions.
When Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stood to give his speech at the 74th UN General
Assembly on September 24, 2019, he declared an ambitious plan that would see over two million
refugees who fled the Syrian civil war to Turkey resettled in an expanded “safe zone” in northern
Syria (Wintour,2019). Details of the safe zone suggested a stretch of 480 kilometers from the town of
Jarablas to Al-Malikiyah near the border with Iraq. The safe zone would also span 18 miles (30km)
through the towns of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa deep into the Syrian territory to connect with the M4
international highway. According to the Turkish government, this safe zone would serve three broad
functions. First, it would provide a haven for Syrian refugees to return to their country after nearly
eight years. Second, it would push away from the border the Syrian Defense Forces (SDF)—a Kurdish-
led outfit Ankara considers to be an offshoot of the PKK/PYD, a group which Turkey, the European
Union, and the United States consider a terrorist organization. Third, these efforts would help the gov-
ernment of Bashar Al Assad in Damascus consolidate the Syrian territory it has struggled to control
since 2011. From the onset, this declaration seemed to be straightforward and would be advantageous
to several countries. Turkey, whose national security has constantly been under threat from terror
groups across the border, would have benefited from the buffer.
From the beginning, skeptics questioned how such an ambitious plan would be executed because,
as the Turkish President made the statement, there was little indication that the U.S. troops stationed
in over ten bases in the Kurdish-held territories of northern Syria would leave anytime soon. Given
the close working relationship between the United States and Kurdish SDF fighters under the an-
ti-ISIS global coalition, on the one hand, and Turkey's role as a NATO member and an ally of the
United States on the other hand, there was dilemma over the consequences of a possible clash between
these three actors, whose interests did not align perfectly. This dilemma ended when President Trump

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ordered the hurried withdrawal of U.S. troops from northern Syria on October 7, 2019, a move that
surprised even some of his close allies in Washington (Aziz,2020, p. 16). Trump went ahead to defend
his decision through a tweet on the same day:
Almost three years, but it is time for us to get out of these ridiculous Endless Wars, many
of them tribal, and bring our soldiers home. WE WILL FIGHT WHERE IT IS TO OUR
BENEFIT, AND ONLY FIGHT TO WIN. Turkey, Europe, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Russia, and
the Kurds will now have to… (Trump, 2019)
On October 9, 2019, Turkish President Erdogan declared that Operation Peace Spring had begun.
Turkish troops with the support of their Syrian allies were able to take the towns of Abiad, Ras Al Ain,
and Halaf in the provinces of Raqqa and Al-Hasakeh, respectively. Aware of a potential Turkish offensive,
the SDF negotiated a military agreement with the regime in Damascus paving way for the deployment of
government forces in the towns of Kobani (Ain Al Arab), Menbij, Ein Issa, Al Tabqa, and Al-Hasakeh city
in the provinces of Aleppo, Raqqa, and Al-Hasakeh, respectively (Liz etal., 2019). The operation drew
condemnation directed at both Turkey and the United States. Following increased pressure from domestic
and international actors, a cessation of hostilities was announced on October 13, following negotiations
led by President Erdogan and U.S. Vice President Mike Pence in Ankara. The negotiations resolved to
pause the confrontations for 120hr to allow for “complete” withdrawal of SDF fighters along the Turkish
border (BBC, 2019). On October 24, 2019, a meeting between the presidents of Turkey and Russia further
extended the ceasefire by 150hr in a ten-point accord signed in Sochi.
According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (2019), over 200,000 people were displaced
from northern Syria during the offensive, most of them fleeing to the Kurdish-controlled regions of
Iraq. The Kurdish authorities in Iraq deployed more troops in the Iraqi-Syria border to ensure ISIS
members did not cross over (Mohammed,2019). With the ceasefire holding, uncertainty remains over
how the safe zone will be implemented as it requires sizeable pooling of resources and coordination
to ensure the relocation is done efficiently. The Turkish operation did not receive much international
support, and perhaps due to the pressure, Ankara opted to halt the operation. Since the beginning of
Operation Peace Spring in October 2019, Turkey, its allies, and the Assad regime have gained and lost
territory; Figure1 shows a current map of northern Syria as of February 2020.
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Saudi Arabia's decisive storm operation in Yemen (2015)
The crisis in Yemen has spanned almost five years and has been one of the most devastating conflicts
worldwide in the last five decades. By October 2019, over 100,000 people were killed, among them
an estimated 12,000 children (Beaumont, 2019). With millions displaced and others facing starvation
and malnourishment, questions have been raised over the emerging trend where the security of a coun-
try can deteriorate into anarchy so rapidly without the involvement of the UN. The case of Yemen thus
provides a unique opportunity to examine the declining role of international organizations in enforc-
ing peace and security. Such understanding perhaps explains how the neighboring Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia got embroiled into what has now become a multidimensional conflict involving several actors
with diverging interests and goals (Figure2).
The root causes of the crisis in Yemen lie in the Arab Spring. Protests demanding political reforms
and an end to over three decades of President Ali Abdullah Saleh's rule began in 2011 (Antelava,2011;
Hill & Nonneman, 2011). Cracks within the military became evident when General Ali Mohsin
al-Ahmar pledged support to the protestors after demonstrators were killed. Continued violence

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and international pressure forced Saleh to resign in an agreement brokered by the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) (Whitaker,2011). The UN was equally involved in facilitating the transition to a new
government, sparking hope that the year-long crisis was coming to an end. Weaknesses of the GCC-
brokered peace agreement, which was largely seen as maintaining the status quo, sparked rebellion
among the Hirak, Houthis, and other marginalized groups. Similarly, the GCC agreement did not
FIGURE 1 Territorial control by different actors as of February 24, 2020. Source: Al Jazeera (February 24,
2020). Retrieved from https://www.aljaz eera.com/news/2020/02/turki sh-soldi ers-killed-syrian-rebels-regain-key-
town-20022 70716 03602.html
FIGURE 2 The number and nature of Events in Yemen between 2015 and 2020. Source: Armed Conflict
Location and Event Data (ACLED). The data are available at this link (Accessed April 4, 2020): https://acled data.
com/dashb oard/#/dashb oard

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address the role and possible exit of Abdullah Saleh from political activities as he continued to be in
charge of General People's Congress party (GPC)—a position he then used to form an alliance with
minority groups demanding change (Al-Akwaa,2017; Juneau,2016; Palik,2018).
At the same time, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, the new President, was attempting to consolidate power
by reshuffling top security and military officers he perceived to be loyal to the outgoing President.
This triggered a fresh round of fierce infighting and rivalry among top political and military elites.
The failed anticipated constitutional reforms, collapse in the provision of social services, rationing of
basic goods, and economic hardship pushed the country into free fall. The proposed federal system of
government was not popular among resource-rich regions. In early 2015, the Houthis occupied key
government installations in the capital Sanaa, forced the entire government to resign, and took the
President hostage. In February, Hadi managed to escape to Aden where he reaffirmed his position as
the President of Yemen. In April 2014, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2,216, recognizing
Hadi as the legitimate President of Yemen. This development had two important effects: Resolution
2,216 came to shape the attitude of international actors toward Hadi, who was seen as the “legitimate”
leader, and it also characterized the conflict as being between the legitimate state and non-state actors.
What followed was unprecedented violence between different groups, including The Ansar Allah
(Houthis), Hadi-aligned fighters, Salafi militias, Saleh-aligned forces, and the Islamic State (IS) pur-
suing different interests (Arraf,2017, p. 5). As the President was forced to flee the country, he sought
the support of regional countries led by Saudi Arabia.
Operation Decisive Storm—later renamed Operation Restore Hope—officially began on March
26, 2015, following requests by the ousted President Mansur Hadi to the GCC and the UN Security
Council for “immediate and urgent” support to stop the Houthis and other fighters from advancing
to and taking over the city of Aden (Al-Karimi,2015; Buys & Garwood-Gowers, 2018; Ruys &
Ferro, 2016). A coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE and supported by several regional and
international actors quickly mobilized troops to Yemen to fight the Houthi militias that were keen
on overthrowing the government of Mansour Hadi. Although the coalition lost its initial support fol-
lowing allegations of targeted attacks on civilians, the original goal of restoring the internationally
recognized government was not widely opposed and received support from regional and international
actors (Byman,2018, p. 147).
However, over time, the Saudi–Emirati coalition became notorious for its bombardment strategy,
drawing international condemnation. According to data collected by the Yemen Data Project,1
more
than 20,000 air raids have been carried out between 2015 and 2020. A total of 6,961 of these raids have
been directed to military objectives, 6,331 have targeted non-military objectives (residential areas,
social gatherings, communications, and political headquarters), and 6,901 targets remain unclassified.
It is evident that cross-border operations entail considerable economic and human costs; countries
that engage in such cross-border operations resort to offering justifications that aim to gain domestic
support and international legitimacy.
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JUSTIFICATION FOR CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS
Domestic actors—citizens and civil society—and the international community must be convinced
that such cross-border operations are necessary and are not inimical to international principles that
safeguard territorial sovereignty. Although countries have vastly different political systems, their jus-
tifications for such operations seemingly converge and are enabled by the UN's limited ability to stop
states from engaging in cross-border operations as countries continue to use legal, institutional, and
political rhetoric, as well as technical maneuvers to justify their actions (de Londras,2018, 2019;

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Murphy,2015). Here, I review some reasons provided by Turkey and Saudi Arabia to justify their
recent operations.
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National security
Realists would argue the threats to national security are constantly looming in the international sys-
tem (Mearsheimer,2007). This requires governments to constantly pursue policies and actions that
seek to protect their countries from internal and external threats. These concerns are also addressed in
international norms such as recent UN Security Council Resolutions no. 2,170 (2014), 1,624 (2005),
and 2,178 (2014), as well as Article 51 of the UN Charter, which emphasize a country's right to self-
defense. Turkey has been at war with the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) since 1978, with the
group calling for the formation of an independent Kurdish state (Beriker-Atiyas,1997; Özcan,2012).
Ankara considers the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Syria part of a broader Kurdish insurgency
supporting the outlawed PKK which carries out sporadic attacks in Turkey with support from other
Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria (Parlar Dal,2016; Ünal, 2016). For years, the presence of the United
States in northern Syria and its cooperation with the SDF in fighting the ISIS strained Turkey's ability
to attack the group. President Trump's decision to withdraw American troops from the Kurdish-held
territories in Syria gave Ankara an opening to limit the political and security threat posed by SDF.
Saudi Arabia justified its operation based on the “direct request” from the “legitimate” govern-
ment of Yemen for intervention (Qureshi,2020). The Hadi government considered advances by the
Houthis as a threat to the sovereignty and national security of the country (Nußberger,2017; Sharp
& Brudnick,2015; see Saudi Arabia etal. official statement dated 26 March 2015). The Saudi-led
coalition emphasized that it was responding to the request by the Yemeni government to protect the
people of Yemen against the Houthis (Buys & Garwood-Gowers, 2019). Similarly, Saudi Arabia was
concerned about the long-term effects of a successful overthrow of an internationally recognized
government on its domestic politics and an Iranian-backed Houthi regime on its regional ambitions.
For both Turkey and Saudi Arabia, the activities of these non-state actors near their border are
of significant concern. Turkey shares over 511 miles (822km) of border with Syria; and the SDF-
controlled territory in northern Syria that borders Turkey is approximately 80 miles (130km) long.
Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, shares approximately 1,100 miles (1,800km) of border with Yemen.
Riyadh's concern is that non-state actors can potentially gain control of territories along its border and
pose serious security risk.
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The threat of ungoverned spaces next door
Recent developments in Libya, Afghanistan, Somalia, Syria, and Iraq show that not only continued
internal conflicts may lead to prolonged chaos but the resulting ungoverned spaces can also provide a
safe haven for different forms of extremist groups as well as different countries to extend their influ-
ence. For Turkey, the Syrian Civil War offered the SDF an opportunity to gain territory, draw support
from the United States and other members in the global coalition against ISIS, and promote their push
for independence (Ünver,2018). Ankara hopes that sending over two million Syrians to the safe zone
would help curtain this ambition (Ryan & Danforth, 2019). For Saudi Arabia, ungoverned spaces in
Yemen would attract different groups and states to its backyard. The 2015 gruesome attack on two
Shi'ite mosques by members of the Islamic State in Sana'a, the growing support of Houthi rebels by
Iran, and the presence of al-Qaeda affiliates in the country were examples of what might lie ahead for

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the region (Kalfood,Kareem & Schmitt, 2015; Sohlman,2012). Equally, Iranian influence has been
growing in the region with allies in Damascus, Baghdad, and Beirut; allowing Yemen to fall under
the control of the Houthis would bring its adversary even closer to its southern border (Laub,2016,
p. 4). The September 14, 2019 bombing of the Kingdom's Aramco oil fields in Khurais district alleg-
edly by the Houthi militia shows that engagement in cross-border operations abroad can have serious
ramifications at home.
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Last resort
International norms and law requires the adoption of violence to be the last resort after other attempts
to solve disputes fail. Both Turkey and Saudi Arabia have sought to indicate that their operations
were a last resort. In the case of Yemen, there have been several peace efforts that have not succeeded
in ending the violence. For example, in April 2011, a process sponsored by the GCC, the EU, and
the UN led to the adoption of the Initiative on Yemen to be supported by the GCC through a set of
complementary implementation mechanisms (ICG Report on Yemen, 2012). This led to the Peace
and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA), an agreement signed on September 21, 2014 between
the Houthis and the Hadi run-government, which required the former to withdraw from territories it
had taken (Al-Madhaji etal., 2015; Buys & Garwood-Gowers, 2018). The PNPA did not only end the
crisis but worsened it when senior government officials were placed under house arrest by the Houthis
on January 22, 2015 (United States Institute of Peace, 2015). Combined with a daring attempt to cap-
ture Yemen's second-largest city after taking control of the capital Sana'a, proponents of the Saudi-led
invention argued that violence was now the only option.
In a number of instances, the government of Turkey has shown commitment to a Kurdish peace
process (Beriker-Atiyas,1997; Ensaroglu,2013). Yavuz and Özcan (2006) opine that when the Justice
and Development Party came to power, it promised to resolve the Kurdish issue through peaceful
means, citing Turkish nationalism projects as the main causes of the Kurdish question (Günay &
Yörük, 2019). Indeed, several negotiations were carried out including the 2012 Çözüm Süreci
(Solution Process) that involved discussions with the jailed PKK leader Abdulah Ocalan (Prime
Minister Erdogan interview on NTV,2012). Mistrust and sabotage are typically blamed for the failed
peace efforts and resumption of hostilities (Göksel & Mandıracı, 2016). Ankara continues to empha-
size that it has made efforts to address some of the Kurdish concerns, such as starting a Kurdish TRT
channel and allowing Kurdish political parties to participate in elections. Yet, it is difficult to dissoci-
ate the domestic and international dimensions of the Kurdish issue. If the domestic component of the
Kurdish problem finds successful resolution, the chance for a non-military solution across the border
improves significantly. Because the Turkish government views a direct link between domestic terror
attacks and support for local Kurdish groups by groups in northern Syria, a military offensive against
Kurdish armed groups within and outside its borders is viewed as legitimate targets.
4.4
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Refugee question
Both operations were justified on humanitarian grounds. Since 2011, Turkey has been hosting the
highest number of refugees in the world (Baban, Ilcan, & Rygiel,2017; İçduygu,2015). The UNHCR
(2019) estimates that around 3.7 million refugees, mostly Syrian, are currently in Turkey. Initially,
hosting Syrian refuges was a source of domestic political support for the ruling party. However, eco-
nomic challenges that saw the local currency (Lira) weaken, and, subsequently, a lack of international

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support in dealing with the refugee problem weakened support for the continued presence of Syrian
refugees in the country (Tür, 2016). This message was sent clearly to the ruling party in the 2019 local
elections, when it lost mayorships of the country's biggest city Istanbul and the capital Ankara which
the Justice and Development Party (AKP) held for nearly two decades. To deal with the growing un-
ease with the refugee question domestically, the AKP sought to create a safe zone in northern Syria
in order to repatriate some of the refugees. However, the complex nature of territorial control in Syria
meant that Ankara needed more than just the approval of Damascus, as a vast territory of northern
Syria is under the control of pro-Kurdish forces. The government has thus justified its cross-border
operation as one meant to create room for the repatriation of refugees (Koseoglu,2019).
Despite its enormous wealth and proximity to some of the countries facing ongoing conflict, Saudi
Arabia is not a major refugee host country. The Kingdom has not signed the UN Convention on
Refugees, and officials from Riyadh voted not to grant refugee status to anyone. Nonetheless, it was in
the interest of Saudi Arabia that it has not had to deal with refugees flooding its borders as a result of
the Yemen conflict which had already displaced millions internally and externally between 2011 and
2015. The Saudi operation was therefore meant to end the conflict and reduce the number of people
being displaced by the civil war (Shabaneh,2015).
4.5
|
Domestic politics
War is often considered as a “continuation of politics by other means” (Callum,2001; Esposito,1954;
Yoo,1996). The operations by Turkey and Saudi Arabia can hardly be separated from domestic po-
litical interests of the ruling elites, although such political interest certainly does not overshadow the
fact that both countries have national security concerns over the issues in question. For Turkey, the
constant shift in government attitude and policy toward Syria can be attributed to domestic political
dynamics. When the ruling AKP came to power in 2002, the party facilitated a decade of economic
growth; under those circumstances, it was easy for the government to convince its citizens that accept-
ing refugees was an act of compassion, morality, and solidarity, especially with the party's religious
orientation. This evoked emotional support for the refugees, but as the country's economic fortunes
began to dwindle, Turkish public opinion increasingly saw the refugees as central to their economic
problems. After weakening electoral performances in a series of elections between 2014 and 2019,
the AKP formed a loose coalition with the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), shifting the government
policy toward the refugees. Operation Peace Spring enjoyed broad support among both the AKP and
the opposition parties. A deep Turkish nationalist sentiment across the society renders it a political
mistake to oppose such an operation even if it is flawed. The pro-Kurdish HDP was the only party to
openly oppose the operation.
In Saudi Arabia, domestic politics were also central to the decision to undertake Operation Decisive
Storm. The expected victory in Yemen would provide King Salman a chance to promote the creden-
tials of his favorite son. The executive shakeup in the Kingdom between January and April 2015 saw
Muhammad bin Salman (MbS) become the head of CEDA (Council of Economic and Development
Affairs) and the Minister of Defense; in 2017, MbS was appointed the deputy crown prince, becoming
the heir apparent to King Salman (Cochran,2019; Hokayem & Roberts, 2016). This sparked concerns
in the kingdom, with some officials mutedly questioning the king's decision to bestow such power to
an inexperienced 29-year old (Stenslie,2015, pp. 2–3). The king saw an opportunity to attract domes-
tic support by attacking the Houthis.

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NYADERA AND KISAKA
4.6
|
Territorial integrity & stability
Both Turkey and Saudi Arabia have justified their cross-border operations on the grounds that these
operations would help Syria and Yemen, respectively, regain their territorial integrity (Directorate of
Communication, Turkey Presidency, 2019; Shabaneh,2015). For Turkey, blocking efforts to establish
an independent or autonomous Kurdish region in northern Syria assumed priority, especially follow-
ing the creation of the Iraqi Kurdistan autonomous region, due to its potential effect on Kurdish popu-
lation of Turkey for similar demands. Although Ankara was opposed to the Assad regime remaining
in power, Turkey considers a continued Assad regime the lesser evil compared to an autonomous
Kurdish region in northern Syria (Tür, 2016). In the case of Yemen, cracks between the north and
south had left the unity of the once-divided nation in limbo long before the civil war began. Al-Hirak,
a political outfit in South Yemen, had been demanding independence from the North since 2007;
the civil war gave rise to several other groups voicing similar demands. The arrival of foreign fight-
ers such as ISIL who sought to expand their influence also threatened Yemen's territorial integrity.
Therefore, the Saudi cross-border operation in Yemen was intended to defeat these groups and restore
the internationally recognized government in power.
5
|
INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO SAUDI ARABIA AND
TURKEY'S CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS
Despite the use of a similar language to justify their operations, the responses to Turkey and Saudi
Arabia's operations have been mixed. The Saudi operation received support from the United States
and most Arab and E.U. countries, while Turkey's operation received criticism from all sides.
5.1
|
United Nations
The UN has been perhaps the most consistent actor in the manner it has responded to recent interna-
tional crises. The UN has continued to uphold the diplomatic approach in most interstate conflicts that
have involved state and non-state actors. This approach has not been effective in the last two decades
as countries were drawn into some of the most devastating humanitarian crises while the UN called
for restraint and expressed concern without much action. In the Saudi operation, Farhan Haq, the
deputy spokesperson of the UN, said in a statement that the international body was “looking into more
details,” adding that “U.N. does not believe in military actions to resolve the Yemeni conflict” (UN
News,2015). The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, reflected
a similar trend of not directly condemning the operation but rather calling for restraint and showing
concern over the fate of civilians (Hussein,2018). The Security Council never passed a resolution
nor directly condemned the Saudi operations as its members were sharply divided over the operation.
In the Turkish case, the UN has not been any different in its response as it offered several vague
and noncommittal responses. For example, the UN Secretary-General António Guterres, expressed
“deep concern” in a statement and called for respect for the sovereignty of Syria (AFP, 2019). Panos
Moumtzis, the Syrian Humanitarian Coordinator for the UN, commented that “any military operation
that takes place at the moment has to take into account to ensure that we don't see any further dis-
placement” (Nebehay,2019). The Security Council was also divided as Russia and the United States
vetoed a resolution supported by the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, France, and Poland calling
on Turkey “to cease the unilateral military action” (Daily Sabah, 2019).

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NYADERA AND KISAKA
5.2
|
Arab league
The Arab League was one of the regional organizations to take a swift and firm stance on Turkey's
operation in Syria. Delegates from the member states convened an emergency meeting on October
12, 2019 in Cairo a day after the operation began. Members voted on a resolution that described
the operation in northern Syria as an act of “aggression” and “invasion” against an Arab country
(Yeranian,2019). The resolution further called for international condemnation of Ankara and called
Turkey's actions desecration of international law. Ahmed Aboul Gheit, the league's Secretary-General,
described Turkey's actions as a “blatant violation of Syria's sovereignty” (Al Jazeera,2019).
However, the Arab League's position on the operation by Saudi Arabia was a direct opposite of
their position on Turkey. Days after the Saudi-led coalition began the operation, the Arab League con-
vened a meeting on March 29, 2015, where a resolution was passed calling for a review of establishing
a joint military force. Mr. Nabil Elaraby, the then Secretary General, issued a statement supporting
the operation stating that the intervention will “continue until Houthi militias withdraw and submit
their weapons” (Los Angeles Times, 2015). Most members not only supported the operation but also
offered physical and logistical support for the operation.
5.3
|
The European union
Just like the UN, the European Union's positions on most international conflicts have been diplo-
matic and characterized by statements of concern and calls for civilians to be protected. Similarly, the
E.U.'s position as an organization does not always reflect the position of individual member states,
as will be seen in the case of Turkey and Saudi Arabia. In the case of the former, a statement by
Dimitris Avramopoulos, the Migration Commissioner of E.U., declared that “the European Union re-
mains committed to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian state,” while Federica
Mogherini—the bloc's high representative—stated that “In light of the Turkish military operation
in north-east Syria, the E.U. reaffirms that a sustainable solution to the Syrian conflict cannot be
achieved militarily. The E.U. calls upon Turkey to cease the unilateral military action” (France24,
2019). However, pressure from member states led to a unanimous resolution for imposing sanctions
and an arms embargo on Turkey. The resolution “condemned in strong terms the Turkish military
offensive” and “strong national export positions” (Brzozowski, 2019). The E.U.'s reaction to the
Saudi-led operation was mixed as the official statement from the bloc mentioned that the union was
concerned over the impact of the operation. However, some of the E.U. member states such as France,
Germany, and the U.K. individually supported the operation.
5.4
|
Non-E.U. permanent members of the security council (The United
States, China, and Russia)
The United States, China, and Russia's position on global issues is important, as they are leading
global powers. The U.S. position on the operation by Turkey is marred by confusion and an indica-
tion of inconsistency in Washington between the executive and legislative branches. On the one hand,
the White House portrayed a hands-off approach with President Trump giving mixed signals on the
situation (Singh,2019). Congress, on the other hand, outrightly condemned the operation and adopted
two resolutions calling for sanctions on Turkey and reviving the Armenian question. In the Saudi
operation, the Obama administration provided full support although the United States did not commit

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Digest of Middle East Studies
NYADERA AND KISAKA
to sending troops to Yemen (Dilanian,2015). Russia, on the other hand, condemned both operations,
with the Kremlin sending a letter to the Security Council and the Arab League calling for cessations
of hostilities in the Saudi case (Sharkov,2015), while condemning Ankara's operation in Syria and
offering to mediate between the parties involved. China expressed concern over the Yemen operation
and encouraged the parties involved to adopt peaceful means of solving the conflict (Wee,2015). In
the Syrian case, China not only expressed concern, but the Chinese foreign minister went ahead to
state that “Syria's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity must be respected and upheld”
(Wee,2015).
6
|
CONCLUSION
The growing number of cases involving cross-border conflicts between states and non-state actors
should be of concern to policy makers and academicians. The complications, costs, and threats arising
from these actions not only pose a serious risk to international security, but also continue to shape
behavior of actors at the international system and within international organizations. Here, I examined
the narratives employed by states to justify their cross-border operations and how they serve to deflect
criticisms. States tend to reaffirm their sovereignty on matters of national interest and security as far
as cross-border operations are concerned. However, it should be noted that these efforts have come
at the expense of human security and sovereignty of third-party states, and they undermine existing
international norms and institutions. States may have genuine reasons to safeguard their national inter-
ests, but the protection of such interests needs to be within the framework of international norms. The
UN needs to step up and transform itself into an organization that can act swiftly to mitigate conflicts
between states and non-state actors while ensuring the grievances of both parties are fully addressed.
ORCID
Israel Nyaburi Nyadera https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0432-6935
ENDNOTE
1 The data are available at this link (Accessed March 12, 2020): https://public.table au.com/share d/BX9CH 9GB5?:displ
ay_count =y&:origi n=viz_share_link&:embed =y
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How to cite this article: Nyadera IN, Kisaka MO. Contemporary conflicts, cross-border
military operations, and the declining role of the UN: The case of Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
Digest of Middle East Studies. 2020;00:1–17. https://doi.org/10.1111/dome.12206