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Self-Centeredness and Selflessness: A Theory of Self-Based Psychological Functioning and Its Consequences for Happiness

June 2011
Review of General Psychology 15(2):138-157

June 2011
15(2):138-157

Authors:

Université Clermont Auvergne, UCA

The theoretical model presented in this paper emerged from several different disciplines. This model proposes that the attainment of happiness is linked to the self, and more particularly to the structure of the self. We support the idea that the perception of a structured self, which takes the form of a permanent, independent and solid entity leads to self-centered psychological functioning, and this seems to be a significant source of both affliction and fluctuating happiness. Contrary to this, a selfless psychological functioning emerges when perception of the self is flexible (i.e., a dynamic network of transitory relations), and this seems to be a source of authentic-durable happiness. In this paper, these two aspects of psychological functioning and their underlying processes will be presented. We will also explore the potential mechanisms that shape them. We will conclude with an examination of possible applications of our theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

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Self-Centeredness and Selﬂessness: A Theory of Self-Based Psychological

Functioning and Its Consequences for Happiness

Michae¨l Dambrun

Clermont Universite´

Matthieu Ricard

Mind and Life Institute

The theoretical model presented in this paper emerged from several different disciplines. This model proposes

that the attainment of happiness is linked to the self, and more particularly to the structure of the self. We

support the idea that the perception of a structured self, which takes the form of a permanent, independent and

solid entity leads to self-centered psychological functioning, and this seems to be a signiﬁcant source of both

afﬂiction and ﬂuctuating happiness. Contrary to this, a selﬂess psychological functioning emerges when

perception of the self is ﬂexible (i.e., a dynamic network of transitory relations), and this seems to be a source

of authentic-durable happiness. In this paper, these two aspects of psychological functioning and their

underlying processes will be presented. We will also explore the potential mechanisms that shape them. We

will conclude with an examination of possible applications of our theory.

Keywords: self-centeredness, selﬂessness, ﬂuctuating happiness, and authentic-durable happiness

Traditionally, western psychology has been more rooted in

understanding the negative aspects of human psychological func-

tioning rather than the positive ones (Simonton & Baumeister,

2005). However, since the early 1990s, the movement of positive

psychology has attempted to correct this imbalance by promoting

the study of the conditions and processes which contribute to the

optimal functioning of individuals, groups and institutions (Gable

& Haidt, 2005; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). From this

point of view, the study of well-being and happiness has gradually

become a ﬁeld of primary importance (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi &

Hunter, 2003; Diener, 2000; Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, & Schakde,

2005). Moreover, a substantial amount of research has been done

in this ﬁeld, making it possible to identify several factors impli-

cated in the regulation of these phenomena (e.g., Ryan & Deci,

2001; Veenhoven, 1997). In this paper, we propose that attaining

authentic happiness is linked to the way we relate to the notion of

a self, and more particularly to its nature. We defend the idea that

the perception of a structured self in the form of a seemingly solid,

permanent and independent entity, favors a self-centered psycho-

logical functioning, which is the source of unstable, ﬂuctuating

happiness. In opposition to this, we propose that selﬂess psycho-

logical functioning emerges from the perception of the self as

being ﬂexible (i.e., a dynamic experience) and that this constitutes

a source of authentic and durable happiness.

The theoretical model, which we have developed, lies at the

crossroad of different disciplines. It aims to integrate knowledge

from western psychology and philosophy (i.e., social and cognitive

psychology, intercultural psychology, developmental psychology,

philosophy of the mind), with insights derived from eastern tradi-

tions. Recently, parallels between western and eastern psychology

have been made. Some contemplative traditions, such as those

using attention-vigilance (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991),

offer interesting new perspectives (e.g., Ekman, Davidson, Ricard,

& Wallace, 2005; Ricard, 2006; Wallace & Shapiro, 2006; Walsh

& Shapiro, 2006), which also underline various approaches taken

in by both western and eastern psychology (e.g., Depraz, Varela, &

Vermersch, 2000; Lutz & Thompson, 2003; Thompson, 2004;

Varela & Shear, 1999). In dominant western psychology, human

behavior is investigated from the outside (i.e., the “third person’s”

perspective), while in the attention-vigilance approach psycholog-

ical processes are assessed through direct introspection (i.e., the

“ﬁrst person’s” perspective) using various techniques of mental

training. Until recently, a rather low status has been given to

introspection by western science (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), as

it was considered to be unreliable (Wallace, 2000). Recent studies

suggest that the two approaches are complementary and provide

congruent knowledge (e.g., Wallace & Shapiro, 2006). The two

approaches must be combined constructively, and this has created

new ﬁelds of investigation. They include the “contemplative neu-

rosciences” and the clinical applications of mental training (e.g.,

Brefczynski-Lewis, Lutz, Schaefer, Levinson, & Davidson, 2007;

Davidson et al., 2003; Ekman et al., 2005; Kabat-Zinn, 2003; Lutz,

Greischar, Rawlings, Ricard, & Davidson, 2004; Lutz, Lachaux,

Martinie`re, & Varela, 2002; Lutz, Slagter, Rawling, Francis, Gre-

ishar, & Davidson, 2009; Rosch, 1999; Shapiro & Walsh, 2003;

Walsh & Shapiro, 2006).

Accordingly, we have constructed a theoretical model that pro-

poses to identify the mechanisms that are either conducive or

detrimental to authentic happiness. Referring to the two kinds of

happiness discussed in section I (i.e., ﬂuctuating happiness and

authentic-durable happiness), we investigated the mechanisms

through which the structure of the self affects our style of psycho-

logical functioning, in particular as it relates to our affective

experiences and the quality of our happiness (section II and III). In

section IV, we studied a variety of factors that we hypothesized

regulated styles of psychological functioning as it related to the

structure of the self (e.g., cultural background, parental and school

Michae¨l Dambrun and Clermont Universite´, Universite´ Blaise Pascal,

CNRS; Matthieu Ricard, Mind and Life Institute, Shechen.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Michae¨l

Dambrun, Clermont Universite´, Universite´ Blaise Pascal, 34 Avenue Car-

not, 63037 France. E-mail: michael.dambrun@univ-bpclermont.fr

2011, Vol. 15, No. 2, 138–157 1089-2680/11/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0023059

138

education, religiosity and spirituality, special life experiences,

etc.). In section V we examined some potential applications of our

model and some preliminary conclusions were discussed.

I. Two Types of Happiness: Fluctuating and

Authentic-Durable

According to Ryan and Deci (2001), hedonic happiness occurs

when one is primarily seeking pleasant feelings and avoiding

unpleasant ones, while eudemonic happiness is conceptualized

more in terms of optimal functioning. Ryff (1995) describe eude-

monia “as the striving for perfection that represents the realization

of one’s true potential” (p. 100). These two views of happiness

illustrate two traditions whose philosophic roots are signiﬁcantly

divergent. While in hedonistic philosophy the aim of life is to

maximize pleasure (e.g., Aristippus, Bentham, DeSade, Hobbes),

other philosophers and religious thinkers do not agree with this

conception. Aristotle, for example, considers hedonic happiness as

vulgar insofar as it condemns man to be a slave of his desires (e.g.,

Schopenhauer, Stoicism). According to the Stoic Epictetus, hap-

piness does not involve enjoying pleasures, but rather occurs when

one is free from desires. This latter conception shows some sim-

ilarities with Buddhism. The Buddhists use the term sukha to

qualify authentic happiness, and this term closely resembles eude-

monic happiness. Sukha can be deﬁned “as a state of ﬂourishing

that arises from mental balance and insight into the nature of

reality. Rather than a ﬂeeting emotion or mood, aroused by sensory

and conceptual stimuli, sukha is an enduring trait that arises from

a state of mental balance and entails a conceptually unstructured

and unﬁltered awareness of the true nature of reality” (Ekman et

al., 2005, p. 60).

Hedonic and eudemonic happiness reﬂect two distinct psycho-

logical states. By trying to maximize pleasures and avoiding dis-

pleasures, the hedonic approach induces a ﬂuctuating happiness in

which phases of pleasure and displeasure alternate repeatedly. The

experience of pleasure is by nature ﬂeeting and dependent upon

circumstances. It is unstable and the sensations it evokes soon

becomes neutral (hedonic adaptation; e.g., Brickman, Coates, &

Janoff-Bulman, 1978). In addition, we have very little control over

pleasant and unpleasant sensations, even though we try hard to

achieve the ﬁrst and avoid the latter. We strive for pleasure,

experiencing it temporarily or not at all. We try to avoid all

unpleasant experiences and yet are confronted with them repeat-

edly. If pleasant feelings are only the result of satisfying desires for

material goods, money or power, they will probably be short-lived.

All such pleasures are linked to a variety of outer conditions

which, when they disappear, result in a loss of associated pleasure.

The alternation of positive and negative phases provokes ﬂuctu-

ating happiness of short duration. Consistently, Csikszentmihalyi

and Hunter (2003) found that reported happiness varies signiﬁ-

cantly both with time of day and day of week. To understand

hedonism, one thus must take into consideration the positive costs

associated with satisfying pleasure, as well as the negative costs

associated with the impossibility of fully satisfying our desire for

pleasant sensations. It is important to make a distinction between

the hedonic quest (i.e., reaping maximum pleasure and avoiding

displeasure) and hedonic happiness. The latter is characterized by

repeated alternation between periods in which the quest for plea-

sure is momentarily satisﬁed and periods during which it is not

(i.e., phase of dissatisfaction and displeasure). From our perspec-

tive, a high level of alternation between phases of pleasure and

displeasure characterizes a high level of ﬂuctuating happiness, and

vice versa. In other words, to study the complete spectrum of

hedonic happiness, one must take in account the variations be-

tween phases of happiness and phases of discontent, the latter

being associated with the nonsatisfaction of desires (i.e., nonmaxi-

mization of pleasure and nonavoidance of displeasure).

According to many philosophical and spiritual traditions, it

would seem that hedonism, which is based on stimulus-driven

pleasures of all kinds, does not allow one to achieve authentic and

durable happiness. As observed by Wallace and Shapiro (2006),

“clinging to such stimuli as the actual source of one’s happiness

can easily give rise to at least intermittent, if not chronic, anxiety

as one faces the possibility, likelihood, or certainty that stimuli will

not last” (p. 692). Authentic happiness is not dependent upon

circumstances, but rather gives a person the inner resources to deal

with whatever comes his or her way in life. It is not linked to an

activity but reﬂects a “state of being,” a profound emotional

balance. Authentic happiness is understood here as an optimal way

of being, a state of durable plenitude based on a quality of

consciousness that underlies and imbues each experience, emotion

and behavior, and allows us to embrace all the joys and the pain

with which we are confronted. Plenitude, bliss, peace of mind,

serenity, inner peace, or fulﬁllment would be some of the markers

of authentic happiness. In other words, authentic-durable happi-

ness, as opposed to ﬂuctuating happiness, would be a lasting state

that could be maintained through the various upheavals of life. It

would not be intrinsically dependent on the positive and negative

feedback that we are constantly receiving, but rather give one the

inner resources to deal with the variability of the world and be a

source of continuous optimal adaptation to external conditions.

What is speciﬁc about our proposed model is that we are predicting

that these two types of happiness are related to different kinds of

self-based psychological functioning.

II. The Concepts of “Self-Centeredness” and

“Selﬂessness”

The notion of self or ego has an important place in research in

psychology. The self and the ego are sometimes used interchange-

ably (e.g., Greenwald, 1980). However, depending on the disci-

pline, one of the concepts is often emphasized more than the other.

Clinical psychologists using Freudian concepts often make refer-

ence to the me or the ego (e.g., ego-psychology, Hartmann, 1939),

but the various meanings attributed to the ego or the self are often

quite different (e.g., Deikman, 1982; Epstein, 1973; Freud, 1953;

Hartmann, 1939; Janet, 1907; Jung, 1966; Kohut & Ornstein,

1978; Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975). Other areas of scientiﬁc

research often refer to the self as well, but they approach this

notion in various ways and the models they propose often have

little in common (e.g., Allport, 1968; Baldwin, 1897; Cooley,

1902; Galin, 2003; Goffman, 1959; Greenwald, 1980; Harter,

1983; James, 1890; Kelly, 1955; Kihlstrom & Canto, 1984; Lewin,

Heider, & Heider, 1936; Maslow, 1971; Markus, 1977; Markus &

Kitayama, 1991; Mead, 1934; Strawson, 1997). The lack of unity

among these various approaches makes it difﬁcult to put forth a

standard deﬁnition of the self, or ego.

139SELF-CENTEREDNESS, SELFLESSNESS, AND HAPPINESS

In the present model, self refers mainly to the perception that we

have of our identity, which takes the form of a speciﬁc mental

construct and results in a particular conception of self. Unlike

works where the concept of self focuses on its content (i.e., the

way in which one describes oneself) or self-esteem (i.e., the way

in which one evaluates oneself), we are more interested here in the

structure of the self, its organization and the mental concepts

associated with it. As will be detailed, the self can have different

mental conﬁgurations; it can, for example, take the form of a solid

entity, which is constant and relatively well separated from the rest

of the world (i.e., autonomous, independent). Such a structure

would generate a speciﬁc kind of psychological functioning. More-

over, we propose that there are very different styles of psycholog-

ical functioning where the self is concerned. They can be as

diverse as those which characterize a dictator who is concerned

only with himself and dreams of a world tailored to the image of

his desires; and a genuine altruist who is ready to confront danger

to help others and believes that all living beings are part of a vast

family (Monroe, 1996). These reﬂect markedly different structural

organizations of the self. These conceptions of self not only shape

our relation to the world and to others, but also affect our own

well-being.

2.1. Deﬁnition of Self-Centeredness and Selﬂessness

The present theoretical model postulates the existence of two

qualitatively distinct aspects of psychological functioning related

to the self. We propose to qualify the ﬁrst psychological function-

ing as “self-centeredness.” Two principal dimensions underlie this

style of functioning: self-centeredness and an exaggerated sense of

importance given to the self. By self-centeredness, we mean that

the self takes on a central point of reference with regard to many

psychological activities (i.e., conation, motivation, attention, cog-

nition, affect/emotion, and behavior). The exaggerated importance

given to the self emerges mainly from self-centeredness and refers

to the increased degree with which the individual considers that his

own condition is more important than that of others and this takes

unquestionable priority. Self-centered psychological functioning

includes characteristics such as biased self-interest, egoism, ego-

centrism, and egotism.

In contrast, we use the term “selﬂessness” to qualify the self’s

alternative psychological functioning. It is characterized by low

levels of self-centeredness and a low degree of importance given to

the self (i.e., not exaggerated). This style of psychological func-

tioning is closely related to characteristics such as altruism, kind-

ness, respect, empathy, compassion (including the self; e.g., Neff,

2003) and the search for harmony. Unlike self-centered psycho-

logical functioning, a selﬂess functioning is based on a weak

distinction between self and others, and self and the environment

as a whole (e.g., Leary, Tipsord, & Tate, 2008). Thus, selﬂessness

is intimately related to self-transcendence (e.g., Cloninger, Svra-

kic, & Przybeck, 1993; Levenson, Jennings, Aldwin, & Shiraishi,

2005; Piedmont, 1999), wisdom (Ardelt, 2008), and a quiet ego

(e.g., Bauer & Wayment, 2008; Leary, 2004).

By proposing two different categories of self, self-centered and

selﬂess, we realize that we are simplifying reality to a certain

degree. Before introducing the characteristics, which justify this

heuristic approach, some distinctions and nuances must be ad-

dressed. First, categorization tends to accentuate intercategorical

differences and intracategorical similarities (Tajfel & Wilkes,

1963), favoring the emergence of watertight categories. To coun-

teract this, we propose to envisage these two types of psycholog-

ical functioning as a single continuum varying along an important

variety of characteristics. There is little likelihood that the two

types of functioning proposed can operate simultaneously, the two

having a tendency to be in conﬂict and in opposition to each other.

However, they are proposed to consist of speciﬁc characteristics

which generate qualitatively different processes. Second, we do

not conceive that self-centeredness and selﬂessness are ﬁxed types

of psychological functioning wherein which each individual acts in

a rigid and unchangeable manner. On the contrary, the plasticity of

human functioning allows for a certain degree of malleability (e.g.,

Davidson, Jackson, & Kalin, 2000; Eriksson, Perﬁlieva, Bjork-

Eriksson, Alborn, Nordborg, Peterson, & Gage, 1998; Kelly &

Garavan, 2005; Maguire, Gadian, Johnsrude, Good, Ashburner,

Frackowiak, & Frith, 2000; Markus & Kunda, 1986; Roberts,

Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006; Tang, DeRubeis, Hollon, Amster-

dam, Shelton, & Schalet, 2009; Schlaug, Norton, Overy, & Win-

ner, 2005; Wall, Xu, & Wang, 2002). More to the point, we

propose that the propensity to adopt a particular style of psycho-

logical functioning operates on two levels. Level 1 reﬂects the

basic temperament and personality of the individual. The term

personality trait is often used to refer to this level. In our model we

believe that the basic level corresponding to temperament and

personality is shaped strongly, but not irreversibly, by variables

such as culture, education, and so forth. These variables favor the

adoption of a particular style of functioning which can become

dominant and, consequently, lasting. However, other variables,

including acculturation and life experiences, can also strongly

affect the dominant tendency of an individual. We propose that this

dominant style of psychological functioning (i.e., self-centeredness

or selﬂessness), can be modiﬁed on a long-term basis by various

variables, which will be shown in section IV. Level 2, the second

level, refers to the situational or contextual variables, which affect

self-centeredness and selﬂessness. While the basic level refers to a

dominant and lasting predisposition, the situational and contextual

level refers to temporary and transitory states. So we propose that

the dominant tendency to operate in a self-centered manner can be

supplanted by a selﬂess type of functioning. Altered states of

consciousness, some contemplative states or the use of certain

drugs seem to be able to temporarily induce a selﬂess type of

functioning in individuals having a dominant tendency toward

self-centered functioning. Consequently, rather than conceiving of

self-centeredness and selﬂessness as two exclusive styles of func-

tioning, we suggest that they are both present in each individual

and that the tendency to adopt one or the other is largely a question

of degree, and depends on a large number of variables that are

explored in section IV. Before examining the processes underlying

the two types of functioning affecting self and happiness, we

present both the characteristics and structure of the self and the

mental processes that underlie them.

2.2. Characteristics of Self-Centeredness

and Selﬂessness

The dichotomy proposed in this paper (i.e., self-centeredness vs.

selﬂessness) might be considered to be a general one, because it

intersects with and encompasses several other speciﬁc dichoto-

140 DAMBRUN AND RICARD

mies. These will be presented brieﬂy and it will be shown how they

can be integrated into a wider perspective.

2.2.1. Independent/Interdependent self. Markus and Ki-

tayama (1991) distinguish between an independent self and an

interdependent self. They postulate that individuals have strikingly

different concepts of their self, and these variations are a function

of differences in cultural settings. These different self-constructs

affect the ways in which individuals experience themselves and

others, and also affect their cognitions, emotions, and motivation.

According to the present model, an independent self would be

characterized by “self-centeredness,” while an interdependent one

would function in a “selﬂessness” way. An independent self is

characteristic of an individual who perceives himself as being

fundamentally separate from others, autonomous from the world

and relatively unique. Individuals with a self that is interdependent

have a strong feeling of connectedness with others. The emotions,

which are expressed most spontaneously by individuals with an

independent self are ego-centered. These include jealousy, anger

and pride (i.e., ego-focused emotions). Conversely, individuals

with an interdependent self experience mental states and emotions

that are more centered on others (i.e., other-focused emotions).

Examples of these include “feeling indebted to someone” or “feel-

ing in harmony with someone” (Kitayama & Markus, 1990).

Concerning motivation, attaining personal goals is more strongly

linked to an independent self, while goals involving the concerns

of others is characteristic of an interdependent self. Regarding

self-evaluation and self-presentation, those who perceive the self

as interdependent have a modest self, while those with a strong and

independent self are inclined to self-enhancement or self-

promotion (e.g., Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004).

According to Markus and Kitayama (1991), “independent” and

“interdependent” styles are mainly considered in relation to the

social context. When they deﬁne an independent self as being apart

from the social context and an interdependent self as being con-

nected to the social context, they are referring mainly to the self as

it relates to others. In our conception, the independence-

interdependence continuum includes additional dimensions, en-

compassing all the elements with which we interact on various

levels of integration and is not limited to relations with other

people. In other words, one can perceive oneself as being con-

nected with other human beings (intraspecies interdependence),

but using a broader perspective, one can also perceive oneself as

being connected to all of the different elements with which we

interact (e.g., human beings, animals, plants, etc.; Leary et al.,

2008). This state of profound interdependence is similar to a

“transpersonal state” in which one’s identity goes beyond the

individual and encompasses everything that surrounds him, includ-

ing other individuals, life and even the cosmos (Walsh & Shapiro,

2006). This is what William James referred to as “cosmic con-

sciousness” in its most extreme form (Walsh & Vaughan, 1993).

Consequently, we propose the existence of a continuum going

from a perception of moderate interdependence or moderate con-

nection (e.g., self-others) to a very strong one (e.g., self-cosmos).

“Selﬂessness” is here linked to a perception of strong connections

with others, but possibly also to the perception of a connection

with all of the elements in the environment (i.e., connected to the

whole). Contrary to this, a self-centered psychological functioning

is based upon the perception of being naturally independent of

other people (i.e., separation self-others), and also of the environ-

ment as a whole (i.e., separation self-world).

2.2.2. Insider and outsider phenomenologies. Cohen,

Hoshino-Browne, and Leung (2007) have proposed a second di-

chotomy, which is relevant to our discussion. By studying people’s

phenomenological experience of themselves in the world, they

have discovered the existence of two types of phenomenologies

related to the self, which they have called “insider” and “outsider”

phenomenologies. According to these authors, “In the “outsider”

form of experience, a person experiences himself or herself from

the point of view of an outsider looking at the self. In the “insider”

form of experience, a person does not see himself or herself as

others would; instead, the insider dwells in his or her own private,

internal experiences and may end up either (1) projecting those

experiences onto others or (2) mistaking the private, internal

experience for something that is actually “out there” in the world”

(Cohen et al., 2007, p. 2). The concept of the “insider” is charac-

teristic of a self-centered psychological functioning, while that of

the “outsider” reﬂects, at least partly, what we call a selﬂess

psychological functioning. The empirical research of these authors

consistently shows insider/outsider differences in egocentric bias

that derive from dwelling too much on one’s own internal expe-

rience (e.g., Cohen & Gunz, 2002; see also Gilovich, Medvec, &

Savitsky, 1998; Vorauer & Ross, 1999). In 1980, Greenwald

proposed three types of cognitive biases of the ego: (1) egocen-

tricity (i.e., self as the focus of knowledge), (2) “beneffectance”

(i.e., perception of responsibility for desired, but not undesired,

outcomes), and (3) cognitive conservatism (i.e., resistance to cog-

nitive change). According to this author, these biases reﬂect nor-

mal human cognition. From the perspective of Cohen et al. (2007),

as well as from that of the model that we are proposing, these

cognitive biases are characteristic of a predominantly self-centered

type of functioning.

2.2.3. Permanent/Impermanent self. While this dichotomy

is quasi nonexistent in psychological literature, we believe that it

is fundamental to our subject. In western psychology, this distinc-

tion between permanent self and impermanent self ﬁnds its origin

in the intersection of the philosophy of the mind and the tradition

of attention-vigilance (Varela et al., 1991). According to Varela

and his colleagues (1991), most of the introspective traditions in

human history have questioned the temporal discontinuity of ex-

perience and the absence of a substantial self. However, the

solution of this problem varies largely from one philosophical

tradition to another.

Everyone can observe the temporal discontinuity of experience

as Hume (1973) has noted: “As for me, when I dwell more

intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on one or

another particular perception of hot or cold, of light or darkness, of

love or hate, of suffering or pleasure. At no moment can I grasp

myself by myself without a perception, and I can never observe

anything other than the perception.” The experience is perception

and each perception appears suddenly and vanishes at each instant.

Consequently, it seems that the experience is discontinuous. The

study of the rhythmicity of the structuring of sensorial activity

shows that the brain functions in a discontinuous manner when

focusing on perceptual framing (e.g., Varela, Toro, John, &

Schwartz, 1981). If the experience is discontinuous, where does

the perception of a substantial self come from? It is interesting to

consider how different introspective traditions deal with the phe-

141SELF-CENTEREDNESS, SELFLESSNESS, AND HAPPINESS

nomena that give rise to distinct conceptions of the self. As stated

by Descartes, “I cannot discover in myself any parts, but I clearly

know that I am a thing absolutely one and complete” (cited in

Bogen, 1986). Several authors suggest the existence of a perma-

nent and uniﬁed self, which, however, remains inaccessible (e.g.,

Sherrington, 1947). In the Criticism of Pure Reason, Kant postu-

lates the existence of a transcendental my-self based on a tran-

scendental consciousness, the latter preceding all experience and

being responsible for our feeling of unity (Kant, 1976). The idea of

an impermanent self has, however, always been central in eastern

psychology. In Buddhist analytical investigations, conducted using

logic and contemplative introspection, the self has been found to

be impermanent, nonunitary, and no more than a convenient con-

cept attached to the dynamic ﬂow of ever-changing experience,

which is itself intimately interdependent with others and the envi-

ronment at large. The quest for a self is considered to be at the

center of every moment of experience (see Varela et al., 1991).

This property of the self has lead Buddhist philosophers to distin-

guish between the existence of a relative, conventional self, which

is a mere conceptual imputation, from the belief in the existence of

an absolute, ontological self that could stand as a unitary, auton-

omous entity (e.g., see Ricard, 2006; Varela et al., 1991). This

distinction between a relative, nominal self and an autonomous,

truly existing one echoes the distinction we proposed earlier be-

tween an independent and interdependent self. In Buddhist psy-

chology, impermanence and interdependence are directly linked

and underlie the concept of a relative, nominal self, while perma-

nence and independence underlie a representation of self endowed

with an intrinsic existence.

Despite of the interest in questions such as these, the main point

of the present work is not to determine if the self is endowed with

an intrinsic or a conventional existence (see Varela et al., 1991, for

an interesting discussion), but rather to examine the impact of

these kinds of self-perceptions in terms of psychological function-

ing and happiness.

Using this dichotomy, we propose that there is a distinction

between a conception of the self as a permanent distinct entity,

with its conception as impermanent, with the latter being based on

various streams of personal experience. While a permanent self

would be perceived as a stable unity over time, an impermanent

self would be perceived as a continuum based on moment-to-

moment experiences (i.e., discontinuous experience). Regarding

the style of psychological functioning, the permanent self would

appear to us to be characteristic of a self-centered type functioning,

while a impermanent self would be involved in more selﬂess

psychological functioning.

2.3. The Structure of Self-Centeredness and

Selﬂessness

Based on the characteristics proposed, we can associate two

types of psychological functioning with two distinct structures of

the self (see Figure 1). A “self-centered” structure of the self would

be underlined by an entity with sharp boundaries. This kind of

1. Continuum of Experiences

2. Entification Process:

Solidification of Experiences

3. Reification Process:

4. Structure of the Self

5. Style of Self-Based Psychological

Functioning

Interdependent

and discontinuous

based experiences

Interdependent

and continuous

based experiences

Independent and

continuous based

experiences

Self as an

impermanent and

interdependent

dynamic network

Self as a

permanent and

interdependent

quasi entity

Self as a

permanent and

independent entity

Extreme

Selflessness Selflessness Self-centeredness

(Irrelevant

process)

Connected quasi

entity without

sharp boundaries

Entity with sharp

boundaries

Belief in a

dynamic network

of evanescent

relations with a

causal coherence

Belief in a

connected quasi

entity without

sharp boundaries

Belief in an entity

with sharp

boundaries

Figure 1. The genesis of self structures.

142 DAMBRUN AND RICARD

individual perceives himself as a special entity with well-deﬁned

boundaries between himself and others, as well as between himself

and all the diverse elements of the environment (i.e., independence

of the self). Like every entity, the self-entity is part of a dualistic

perception in which the other entities that make up the environ-

ment, are profoundly separated from the self-entity. This entity is

perceived as being autonomous, singular, and endowed with an

intrinsic existence (i.e., absolute per se). Finally, this entity is also

perceived as being endowed with a durable and relatively stable

existence (i.e., permanent self). We call this structure the self-

entity (i.e., self as a permanent and independent entity).

When the structure of the self is perceived as selﬂess, it is more

subtle and complex (see Figure 1). We propose that it varies along

a continuum, which goes from the perception of a “quasi self-

entity” without sharp boundaries to an absence of self-entity (i.e.,

“no-self”). When the individual has the perception of being con-

nected to others (i.e., interdependence of the self) and also per-

ceives that he is the object of a relatively continuous experience

(i.e., permanent self), its structure is a quasi entity without sharp

boundaries. The duality of self-other is greatly lowered by the

perception of interdependence, favoring a relatively ﬂexible and

open boundary between self and others. However, when the indi-

vidual combines a strong perception of interdependence (e.g.,

“cosmic consciousness”) with an impermanence of the self (i.e.,

discontinuity of the experience), no entity is established. There is

a no-self, in the sense of an absolute self with a proper existence.

In this last case, it is likely that the structure of the self takes the

form of a continuum of experience devoid of intrinsic existence, in

profound interconnection with the other elements. According to

Galin (2003), in the Buddhist tradition “the self is seen, not as an

entity, or as substance, or as essence, but as a dynamic process, a

shifting web of relations among evanescent aspects of the person,

such as perceptions, ideas, and desires.” This form of self is close

to a “dynamic open network of relations.” In the different eastern

and meditative traditions, this structure of the self can be compared

to a state of no-self or egolessness (Collins, 1982; Garﬁeld, 1995).

In Buddhism, for example, anatta is the term used to describe the

concept of no-self, which does not mean the inexistence of the self,

but the inexistence of a self-entity with an intrinsic existence. On

a quite different level, it also seems that a state of no-self and a

transpersonal state can also occur in a relatively spontaneous and

transitory manner (e.g., Beauregard & Paquette, 2006; Blanke,

Ortigue, Landis, & Seeck, 2002; Maslow, 1971; Vailt et al., 2005).

In the west, such phenomena are often identiﬁed as altered states

of consciousness (ASC; Ward, 1989), and are said to reﬂect an

abnormal psychological functioning. This contrasts with the vari-

ous eastern traditions where the concept of no-self is often asso-

ciated with an optimal way of being, awareness, and wisdom.

2.4. The Mental Processes Underlying the Genesis of

Self-Structure

Entiﬁcation and reiﬁcation. Understanding the structure of

the self involves questioning the mental processes which are at the

origin of the self and its structure. The process of categorization is

fundamental insofar as it underlies our cognitive activities and

inﬂuences the way in which we think about the world, including

others, and also the self (Lakoff, 1987; Rosch, 1978). This process

leads us to develop simpliﬁed mental constructions of reality. With

regards to the self, this process results in the development of a

simpliﬁed mental construct of the self.

Concerning the genesis of the structure of the self and it’s

subsequent psychological functioning, two distinct mental pro-

cesses seem to be particularly important: entiﬁcation and reiﬁca-

tion (Galin, 2003). Entiﬁcation refers to the mental process by

which we simplify a complex whole by creating an entity. For

example, the crystallization of experience favors the ediﬁcation of

a self-entity. Reiﬁcation is a distinct process where the mental

entity is treated as real. In other words, once the entity is mentally

constructed (i.e., entiﬁcation), a sense of a real self with the form

of a solid entity emerges (i.e., reiﬁcation). As seen in Figure 1,

when the individual has the perception of a relatively continuous

and independent experience, the processes of entiﬁcation and

reiﬁcation result in a structured self in the form of an entity with

well deﬁned boundaries (i.e., self as a permanent and independent

entity). The perception and/or the understanding of interdepen-

dence gradually dissolve the boundaries of the self. The fact of

perceiving, for example, a strong connection between self and

others (i.e., self-others interdependence) weakens the boundaries

between self and others. In this case, the process of entiﬁcation

leads to a crystallization of experiences based on interdependence

with others. The self then takes the form of a quasi-entity without

a sharp boundary between the self and others. In the end, the

structure of the self is a permanent and interdependent quasi-entity.

A third structuring of the self can be identiﬁed in certain eastern

traditions. When the perception of interdependence combines with

a perception of impermanence, the process of entiﬁcation does not

occur because the crystallization of experiences is based on a

perception of some degree of permanence. When there is no

entiﬁcation of experiences, the self is perceived as a dynamic

network of evanescent relations that have a causal coherence (i.e.,

self as an impermanent and interdependent dynamic network). On

the basis of the dichotomy proposed by Minsky (1986) between a

“self” with a small “s” and a “Self” with a capital “S”, Varela and

his colleagues (1991) deﬁne this type of self as “a convenient way

of referring to a series of mental and bodily events and formations,

that have a degree of causal coherence and integrity through time”

(p. 179). On the other hand, the Self with a capital “S”, which

refers to the self-entity, “does exemplify our sense that hidden in

these transitory formations is a real, unchanging essence that is a

source of our identity and that we must protect” (p. 179). We

propose that these two conceptions of the self (self and Self) reﬂect

two distinct forms of structuring, which in turn lead to different

kinds of psychological functioning that have notable consequences

on happiness. While a Self with a capital “S” underlies a self-

centered type of functioning, a self with a small “s” implies a

selﬂess psychological functioning.

III. Self-Based Psychological Functioning

and Happiness: Self-Centeredness and Selﬂessness

in Action

In our model (see Figure 2), we propose that there are two

principal types of psychological functioning that are linked to the

self: self-centeredness and selﬂessness. These two processes are

seen as a single continuum characterized by speciﬁc functions. By

psychological functioning, we refer to all the interconnected psy-

chological components that operate on different levels (i.e.,

143SELF-CENTEREDNESS, SELFLESSNESS, AND HAPPINESS

conation, motivation, attention, cognition, affect, and behavior).

The processes involved in self-centeredness are discussed ﬁrst,

followed by those which are generated by a selﬂessness type of

functioning.

Self-Centered Psychological Functioning

As stated above, we postulate that self-centeredness is based on

the belief in a “Self” that has the form of a real entity with sharp

boundaries. According to the bio-social psychological model de-

veloped by Laborit (1979), each entity (or organized structure in

the form of an entity), which aims at its preservation, is led to favor

gratiﬁcations (i.e., positive, agreeable, socially valued things) that

positively reinforce it, and to avoid negative, disagreeable, and

demeaning things that threaten its homeostasis. In other words,

self-centeredness and the exaggerated importance given to the self

which comes out of it, leads one to approach gratifying things and

experiences and to avoid those that are unpleasant or threatening.

This process corresponds to the “hedonic principle” (e.g., Higgins,

1997), which states that individuals are motivated to obtain plea-

sure (i.e., approach) and to avoid displeasure (i.e., avoidance). It is

known that approach and avoidance are two fundamental adaptive

mechanisms involved in affects, cognitions and human behaviors

(e.g., Atkinson, 1964; Bowlby, 1969; Elliot & Thrash, 2002;

Festinger, 1957; Freud, 1950; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The

perception of the self as being a permanent and independent

self-entity results in impulses of attraction and repulsion (i.e.,

approach and avoidance).

By favoring the mechanism of approach/avoidance (i.e., hedonic

principle), self-centeredness inﬂuences activity at many psycho-

logical levels. Intentions and volitions (i.e., conations) are orien-

tated toward seeking pleasant stimuli and avoiding unpleasant

ones. These two impulses produce speciﬁc motivations and affects

associated with approach (i.e., desire for gratifying stimuli) and

avoidance (i.e., aversion for disagreeable stimuli). As a result there

is a strong focus on stimuli favoring satisfaction and self-defense,

both of which are generally devoid of mindfulness (i.e., mindless-

ness attention; Wallace & Shapiro, 2006). Expectations about the

value of objects (e.g., belief that acquiring agreeable stimuli is

indispensable to one’s well-being) affects both cognitions and

behaviors. Cognitive distortions, resulting from various egocentric

biases, are also associated with self-centeredness (e.g., Cohen,

Hoshino-Browne, & Leung, 2007; Gilovich, Medvec, & Savitsky,

1998; Greenwald, 1980; Pelham, Mirenberg, & Jones, 2002;

Vorauer & Ross, 1999). Self-centered behaviors involve frequent

impulses toward pleasurable stimuli and away from unpleasant

ones. Speciﬁc affective reactions are associated with this style of

psychological functioning. We differentiate two types of affective

Self-centeredness Selflessness

Conation

Motivation

Attention

Cognition

Affect

ehavio

Hedonic principle

Approach/Avoidance

Harmony principle

Self-environment

harmony, including

others

Affective

Reactions Afflictive

affects

Fluctuating

Happiness

Style of Self-Based

Psychological

functioning

Authentic-Durable

Happiness

Stimulus-

driven

pleasures

Happiness

Feeling of

being in

harmony

Emotional

stability

Structure of the Self

Shaping Factors

 Cultural Background

 Parental Education

 School Education

 Social Role and Professional

Environment



Religiosity and Spirituality

 Mental Training or Meditation

 Special Life Experiences

 Age Related Developmental

Processes

Figure 2. The Self-Centeredness/Selﬂessness Happiness Model (SSHM).

144 DAMBRUN AND RICARD

reactions: transitory pleasure (i.e., stimulus-driven pleasures) and

afﬂictive affects.

Attaining priority objectives (i.e., obtaining gratiﬁcation and

avoiding disagreeable stimuli) creates a feeling of pleasure, joy

and transitory satisfaction. These stimulus-driven pleasures are

contingent upon the appearance or disappearance of certain stim-

uli. When the stimulus is present, the pleasure associated with it

appears. However, as soon as the stimulus disappears or is sup-

planted by a new stimulus, the positive feeling fades. The appear-

ance or disappearance of the stimulus itself is linked to a variety of

phenomena, which are not under the control of the individual.

Hence, when the hedonic principle applies the pleasure generated

is transitory. Moreover, as soon as it is attained, a new stimulus can

supplant the initial one. A replacement of the initial stimulus by

another one can cancel the positive effect that was generated by the

ﬁrst one. In other words, even when a goal is attained, a new goal

can be deﬁned with the main consequence of interrupting the

pleasure which was associated with attaining the ﬁrst objective.

Hedonic adaptation refers to the process by which people quickly

become accustomed to the positive (or negative) effects of new

stimuli and eventually return to their baseline level of happiness.

For example, studies of lottery winners conﬁrm that these individ-

uals exhibit only a temporary increase in well-being before return-

ing to their base level of happiness (Argyle, 1986; Brickman et al.,

1978). Additionally, a recent study has conﬁrmed that the well-

being resulting from hedonic behaviors is not stable (Steger, Kash-

dan, & Oishi, 2008).

The second type of affective reaction involves the emergence of

afﬂictive affects. We qualify these affects as afﬂictive for two main

reasons: ﬁrst, as will be shown, this type of affect damages our

physical and mental health as well as our well-being. These affects

are self-reinforcing insofar as they reactivate a self-centered psy-

chological functioning based on the process of approach-

avoidance. The impossibility of attaining valued objectives gives

rise to affects such as frustration, anger, hostility, hatred, jealousy,

fear, the feeling of being threatened, pride, and so forth. The

experience of such affects impairs our well-being. Fluctuating

happiness is characterized by the alternation of positive phases

(e.g., satisfaction) and negative phases (e.g., dissatisfaction).

While “stimulus-driven pleasures” are at the origin of positive

phases, negative phases cause the appearance of afﬂictive affects.

In the end, the recurring experience of these affects is likely a

source of problems for both physical and mental health. This

hypothesis has found some support in the existing literature. Neg-

ative affectivity in general which groups affects such as annoy-

ance, hostility and fear, is strongly linked to both anxiety and

depression (Watson, Clark, & Carey, 1988). Other studies have

shown that hostility can have a particularly “toxic” effect, and this

has been observed in coronary morbidity (Miller, Smith, Turner,

Guijarro, & Hallet, 1996; Siegman & Smith, 1994). Thus, there is

much evidence to show that this type of affect has harmful effects

on health. Additionally, we argue that these affects are afﬂictive

because they are self-reinforcing insofar as they have a tendency to

reactivate the approach-avoidance process at many psychological

levels. For example, when an obstacle makes it impossible to

satisfy a desire, a feeling of frustration and anger would be directed

toward that obstacle. As well there would be a feeling of jealousy

toward the person who has succeeded in satisfying that same

desire. Moreover, these affective states will result in a reactivation

of the original desire and the processes associated with it. Simi-

larly, the impossibility of avoiding disagreeable stimulation can

generate anxiety and fear and this experience can result in avoid-

ance (e.g., Frijda, 1986). So we can see that approach and avoid-

ance favor the emergence of afﬂictive affects, which, in turn, have

a tendency to be reactivated, thus instigating a circular process of

self-reinforcement.

In the end, all of these processes generate ﬂuctuating happiness

which is characterized by the alternation of phases of well-being

and ill-being. It seems to us that this type of happiness, if it can be

qualiﬁed as such, also has a tendency to be self-reinforcing.

Because the phases of well-being are of short duration, the indi-

vidual runs the risk of ﬁnding himself in a state where he or she is

perpetually seeking new gratiﬁcations to maximize his or her

well-being. In other words, a self-centered style of functioning

produces a circular effect in which the individual is, in a way, the

prisoner of an “egoistic and hedonic” spiral.

Our theoretical approach does not envisage self-centeredness

and its subsequent psychological functioning as being inevitable.

On the contrary, we propose that an alternative form of psycho-

logical functioning is conceivable; it is what we call selﬂessness.

Selﬂess Psychological Functioning

According to our model (see Figure 2), selﬂess psychological

functioning has as its basis a structuring of the self which ranges

from a quasi-entity without sharp boundaries (i.e., self as a per-

manent and interdependent quasi entity) to a dynamic network

(i.e., self as an impermanent and interdependent dynamic net-

work). The degree of selﬂessness is then dependent on the type of

structuring of the self. When the self is organized in the form of a

quasi-entity without sharp boundaries, it can be inferred that psy-

chological functioning will be less strongly oriented toward self-

lessness than when the self is organized in the form of a dynamic

network of ever changing relations with a causal coherence.

As opposed to self-centered functioning that has as its basis the

hedonic principle, selﬂessness is based on the principle of harmony

(see Figure 2). Harmony means there is perfect agreement between

the diverse parts of whole. When the self is perceived as being an

impermanent and interdependent element of the whole, a person’s

psychological functioning becomes more mindful and respecting

of all the elements comprising this whole. Here the whole is meant

in its broad sense. It is constituted of the totality of elements which

make up our environment, including not only oneself and other

human beings, but also animals and all forms of life and our

natural environment (e.g., Leary et al., 2008). In other words, the

perception of interconnectedness underlies a speciﬁc psychologi-

cal functioning by which the individual adjusts harmoniously to all

of the elements of the environment.

Selﬂess functioning favors harmonious adjustment and de-

centering, and this affects the operation of various psychological

elements. By harmonious adjustment, we refer to a psychological

functioning in which the individual adjusts optimally to the dif-

ferent elements of the environment. As we have seen above, this

environment can be restricted to intraspecies (i.e., self-other), but

it can also be enlarged to encompass relations with nature. It

appears that the understanding of this interconnectedness is inti-

mately linked to human qualities such as altruism, love, kindness,

empathy, compassion, tolerance, and paciﬁsm. In fact, these var-

145SELF-CENTEREDNESS, SELFLESSNESS, AND HAPPINESS

ious qualities involve speciﬁc psychological processes. Conations

(i.e., intentions and volitions), motivations, cognitions (i.e., be-

liefs, etc.) as well as behaviors, are oriented toward harmonious

adjustment. The intention to ease the suffering of another

(conation), for example, would be linked to speciﬁc goals, as well

as to consistent cognitions (e.g., genuine altruism is the basis of

harmonious relations) and will favor altruistic behaviors (e.g.,

respect for others, genuine altruism, etc.). We propose that this

type of psychological functioning is also associated with a partic-

ular quality of attention, which can be qualiﬁed as “mindfulness”

(e.g., Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004; Brown & Ryan, 2003; Wallace

& Shapiro, 2006). “Mindfulness” is characterized by undistracted

attention, free of distorting bias. Such mindfulness is oriented to

the present moment, but it is also combined with a meta-awareness

such that one remains aware of one’s state of mind over time. On

the affective level, this kind of psychological functioning is asso-

ciated with speciﬁc affects such as compassion, empathy, and

respect. We propose to show how these benevolent affects have a

beneﬁcial effect on a person’s level of happiness.

Several authors have proposed and shown that empathy (being

in tune with the sentiments of others) and compassion (the desire

that others be free from suffering) are the driving forces behind

prosocial behaviors such as altruism and social support (e.g.,

Batson, 1995; Davis, 1996; Dovidio & Penner, 2001; Sprecher &

Fehr, 2005). From a social perspective, these affects are clearly

beneﬁcial for others, but they also seem to be beneﬁcial for the

person expressing them. Several works indirectly support the idea

that prosociality affects health in a positive way. Caprara and Steca

(2005) note that generosity toward others is associated with higher

levels of well-being (e.g., Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, & Penner,

2006; Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, & Schkade, 2005; Post, 2005; Sim-

mons, 1991; Weinstein & Ryan, 2010; Williamson & Clark, 1989;

Yinon & Landau, 1987). A “loving-kindness meditation” signiﬁ-

cantly increases positive emotions (Fredrickson, Cohn, Coffey,

Pek, & Finkel, 2008), and signiﬁcantly decreases psychological

distress (e.g., Carson, Keefe, Lynch, Carson, Goli, Fras, & Thorp,

2005). The experience of positive emotions such as love during

youth increases longevity (Danner, Snowdon, & Friesen, 2001).

Grateful thinking improves positive affects and well-being (Mc-

Cullough, Emmons, & Tsang, 2002; Watkins, Woodward, Stone,

& Kolts, 2003).

According to the model, at least two processes make it possible

to understand this phenomenon. First, we propose that benevolent

affects enhance emotional stability. Contrary to affects linked with

self-centeredness, benevolent affects are not affected by variations

in the environment. When expressing genuine compassion or un-

conditional love one is not expecting anything in return and these

emotions are not dependent on the way others treat us (Ricard,

2010). As noted by Sprecher and Fehr (2006), “compassionate

love may be experienced for someone to whom love is not recip-

rocated” (p. 228). Because of this disinterested nature, benevolent

affects are unconditional and therefore independent of feedback

from the environment. Since this affective activity is not very

sensitive to environmental variations, it is relatively stable and

contributes to the establishment of sustainable happiness (i.e., not

ﬂuctuating). Works showing a positive link between emotional

stability and well-being corroborate this point of view (e.g., Hills

& Argyle, 2001). In our view, benevolent affects also generate a

feeling of being in harmony with the environment (Ricard, 2006).

When we carry out an act of disinterested kindness and we are

fully compassionate, the well-being that we feel is authentic and

powerful because it is underlined by the feeling of being on the

same wavelength as the superorganized harmony that governs the

whole (i.e., transpersonal harmony), as well as in harmony with

our intrinsic intentions and motivations (i.e., harmony with one-

self). This speciﬁc feeling is intimately linked to characteristics of

authentic happiness such as inner strength, serenity, completeness,

inner peace, and fulﬁllment.

In the end, it appears to us that selﬂessness establishes a circle

in which psychological activity favors stable and authentic happi-

ness and this happiness reinforces the harmony principle. Once it

has taken root, the state of mind linked with eudemonia pervades

every experience in life. Thus, it is likely that this way of func-

tioning will be self-reinforcing.

IV. The Variables That Shape the Style of

Self-Psychological Functioning

In this section, a number of variables expected to both modulate

and directly affect the tendency to adopt one style of psychological

functioning rather than another are proposed.

Cultural Background

In the model proposed by Berry, Poortinga, Segall, and Dasen

(2002), cultural and social transmission is one of the principal

variables that shapes the individual. Enculturation,socialization

and acculturation are the processes by which cultural transmission

takes place. The concept of enculturation comes from cultural

anthropology (Redﬁeld, Linton, & Herskovitz, 1936). As the term

suggests, an individual in a particular culture acquires, through

learning, what the culture deems necessary. According to Berry et

al. (2002): “there is not necessarily anything deliberate or didactic

about this process; often there is learning without speciﬁc teach-

ing” (p. 29). The concept of socialization derives from sociology

and social psychology, and can be deﬁned as “the process by

which the human individual learns and internalizes the sociocul-

tural elements of his environment throughout his life, integrates

them in his personality under the inﬂuence of experiences and

signiﬁcant social agents, and thereby adapts to the social environ-

ment in which he must live” (Rocher, 1969, p. 105). When cultural

and social transmissions come from contact with another culture,

the term acculturation is used (e.g., Redﬁeld et al., 1936).

The term “cultural background” designates the culture in which

the individual is immersed. The heritage of a speciﬁc culture is an

important factor that shapes the psychological functioning of an

individual and, most likely, the functioning of his self.

The recent works done by Le and Levenson (2005) on wisdom

show direct links between what we call a selﬂess type of function-

ing and various cultural indicators (i.e., individualism and collec-

tivism). Individualism and collectivism are measured in their re-

search as interindividual differences. Differences exist between

cultures (i.e., intercultural differences), and also within cultures.

Triandis and his colleagues (e.g., Triandis & Gelfand, 1998), Le

and Levenson (2005) measured horizontal individualism (i.e., self-

freedom without competition and inequality), vertical individual-

ism (i.e., self-enhancement with inequality and competition), hor-

146 DAMBRUN AND RICARD

izontal collectivism (i.e., harmony and cooperation) and vertical

collectivism (i.e., conformity imposed by hierarchical authority).

Interestingly, they deﬁned wisdom as a kind of self-transcendence

clearly linked to what we call selﬂessness. Speciﬁcally, according

to them, “self-transcendence refers to the ability to move beyond

self-centered consciousness, and to see things as they are with

clear awareness of human nature and human problems, and with a

considerable measure of freedom from biological and social con-

ditioning” (p. 444). Although the notion of self-impermanence is

not explicitly mentioned, there is an obvious link between this kind

of self-transcendence (characterized by a high level of self-

interdependence) and selﬂessness. Using the Adult Self-

Transcendence Inventory (Levenson et al., 2005; including items

such as “I feel that my individual life is part of a greater whole” or

“Material things mean less to me”) and a measure of compassion-

ate love (e.g., “I can love without expecting anything in return”),

Le and Levenson examined the relationship between various types

of individualism and collectivism. The results showed that cultural

indicators are directly related to selﬂess psychological functioning.

While horizontal collectivism and horizontal individualism were

positively linked with selﬂess functioning (i.e., self-transcendence

and compassionate love), vertical individualism was negatively

linked to it. In other words, certain cultural values, such as coop-

eration, harmony with others, individual freedom to explore and to

experience, favor selﬂessness. On the other hand, cultural values

linked to egoism, competition and the cult of self seem to hinder

selﬂess functioning. As Le and Levenson (2005) point out: “Pre-

sumably, vertical individualists are more self-centered, placing an

emphasis on distinguishing themselves as unique and different

from others through competition and achievement. This self-

centered focus reinforces one’s sense of separation from others and

thus becomes an obstacle to the experiential knowledge of the self

as a construction” (p. 453). It seems that these speciﬁc cultural

dimensions affect the degree of a person’s self-centeredness more

than the culture as a whole. By favoring either interdependence or

independence and self-impermanence versus permanence, speciﬁc

cultural elements can shape one’s style of self-psychological func-

tioning in a lasting way. Regarding human values (e.g., Schwartz,

1992), it is likely that the cultures that favor universalism (i.e.,

understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the wel-

fare of all people and for nature), and benevolence (i.e., preserva-

tion and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is

in frequent personal contact) are more likely to encourage self-

lessness. Conversely, individuals from societies in which the sa-

lient values are those of power (i.e., social status and prestige,

control or dominance over people and resources), achievement

(i.e., personal success through demonstrating competence accord-

ing to social standards), and/or hedonism (i.e., the pursuit of

personal pleasure and sensory gratiﬁcation), have a tendency to

develop a self-centered type of functioning. We propose testing

this assumption empirically in future research.

The process of acculturation is also particularly interesting for

our study. It represents an effective way in which an individual’s

original cultural roots can be profoundly modiﬁed. It is likely that

the process of acculturation can elicit lasting changes in terms of

self-psychological functioning. For example, a self-centered per-

son, through contact with a society in which both horizontal

individualism and horizontal collectivism are valued, can be led to

acquire new cultural elements which are capable of shaping and

modifying the structure of his self and, subsequently, his psycho-

logical functioning. It therefore seems possible that through con-

tact with a new cultural environment, the (culturally) dominant

tendency of an individual to function in a certain way could be

modiﬁed over the long-term, thereby illustrating the concept of the

malleable personality to which we subscribe. This point of view

has led us to propose future research where the impact of speciﬁc

acculturations (e.g., religious acculturation, acculturation linked to

human values) on the style of self-psychological functioning will

be examined.

Parental Education

In the context of what we call parental socialization, the parents

are the principal agents of cultural and social transmission. They

may intentionally transmit to their child values, skills, beliefs,

emotions, and even motivations. When parental socialization is

only implicit and not direct the child is shaped without any speciﬁc

training. We suggest that both these processes shape the style of

self-psychological functioning in a lasting way.

The process of attachment is particularly important for the

parent– child relationship (Ainsworth, 1979; Bowlby, 1969). Ac-

cording to Bowlby (1969), the main function of attachment is to

protect the child from danger and to maximize his chances of

survival. However, interindividual differences exist regarding

styles of attachment, and these result in markedly different behav-

iors, emotions and expectations. The secure attachment style is

generally distinguished from the insecure attachment style by the

degree of avoidant-attachment and anxious-attachment. Avoidant-

attachment refers to a tendency to lack conﬁdence in the interper-

sonal relationship and to consequently maintain a behavioral and

affective independence in relation to the partner. In anxious-

attachment there is fear or anxiety that our partner will abandon us

or will not be present when we are in need of him. A low level of

avoidant-attachment combined with a low level of anxiety-

attachment is characteristic of a secure attachment style. Contrary

to this, an insecure attachment style is the result of a high level of

avoidant-attachment and/or anxious-attachment. The hypothesis

that a secure attachment style would favor a selﬂess type of

functioning while self-centered functioning would be partly related

to an insecure attachment style ﬁnds some support in the literature.

Several correlational and experimental works carried out by Mi-

kulincer and his colleagues have shown that attachment security

facilitates empathy, strengthens self-transcendent values, fosters

tolerance, is associated with volunteering to help others in every-

day life, and fosters compassionate love and altruistic behaviors

(Mikulincer, Gillath, Halevy, Avihou, Avidan, & Eshkoli, 2001;

Mikulincer, Gillath, Sapir-Lavid, Yaakobi, Arias, Tal-Aloni, &

Bor, 2003; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001; Mikulincer, Shaver, Gil-

lath, & Nitzberg, 2005). Conversely, insecure attachment, as mea-

sured by the avoidant-attachment scale, is negatively linked to

compassion and altruism. The higher the individual’s level of

avoidant-attachment, the less likely he is to be compassionate and

the less inclined he will be to engage in altruistic behaviors (e.g.,

Mikulincer et al., 2005).

Similarly, the works carried out by Kasser, Ryan, Zax, and

Semeroff (1995) show a direct link between styles of parental

education (i.e., warmth vs. cold) and the development of selﬂess or

self-centered values in the child (i.e., prosocial values or materi-

147SELF-CENTEREDNESS, SELFLESSNESS, AND HAPPINESS

alistic values). More speciﬁcally, teenagers who evaluate materi-

alistic values as more important than prosocial ones have mothers

who are colder and less nurturing. Because materialistic values are

negatively linked to well-being and happiness (e.g., Kasser &

Ryan, 1993), it appears that the style of parental instruction,

whether it be intentional or not, ultimately inﬂuences the child’s

values and well-being. Recent research even suggests that positive

affects experienced during childhood are associated with a longer

life expectancy. For example, Danner et al. (2001) have found that

positive emotional content in early life autobiographies was

strongly associated with longevity six decades later. Referring to

our model, a secure caring and warm parental style favors expe-

riencing benevolent affects (e.g., compassionate love, empathy,

etc.), generating self-reinforcing authentic-durable happiness,

which contributes positively to physical and mental health. From

this perspective, the link between positive affects during childhood

with health and longevity can be better understood. An insecure-

cold parental style seems to favor self-centeredness. It is associated

with insecurity regarding protection, reliability and security, and

ultimately raises the individual’s level of distress. In an attempt to

alleviate this distress the individual must focus his energy on

himself.

A second way that parents inﬂuence their children is through

social learning. Children can learn from their parents by imitation.

Social learning theory proposes that children develop beliefs and

behaviors by imitating people who they consider to be important

(Bandura, 1997). As we have just seen, the attachment theory

suggests that children internalize the expectations and the values of

their parents insofar as the latter offer them a secure-attachment

style (see also Bretherton, Golby, & Cho, 1997). Allport (1954)

proposed that because children desire the affection and approval of

their parents, parents can have a very strong inﬂuence on their

children’s development (e.g., Maccoby, 2000; Maccoby & Martin,

1983). Recent studies conﬁrm this by showing a strong connection

between parents’ values and those of their children (i.e., positive

correlation), but only among children who strongly identiﬁed with

their parents (see Sinclair, Dunn, & Lowery, 2005). Children who

have a low level of identiﬁcation with their parents tend not share

their parents’ values (i.e., negative correlation). In other words,

studies suggest that there are two distinct phenomena: a process of

social learning by assimilation (e.g., assimilation of parental val-

ues) and a process of social learning by opposition (e.g., nonas-

similation of parental values, even assimilation of opposing val-

ues). This conceptual framework makes it possible to consider a

rather direct transmission from parent to child of their level of

self-centeredness/selﬂessness. Moreover, we predict that when

children strongly identify with their parents they will, through a

process of social learning, adopt a similar self-psychological func-

tioning. Strong parental identiﬁcation seems to occur when there is

secure attachment, and a powerful desire for parents’ affection and

approval. When there is a low level of identiﬁcation with the

parents one expects a weaker correlation between the style of

psychological functioning of parents and children.

School Education

In many countries, a considerable part of education is done at

institutions–schools (including high school and the university)

during childhood, adolescence and sometimes early adulthood.

The school is a special environment where the transmission of

cultural and social values and behaviors occurs. The educators, as

well as peers, are the principal agents of this transmission. Not

only does the child acquire cognitive and executive skills, but also

goals, values, beliefs, and ideologies, which shape him over the

long-term.

Studies in the psychology of education, mainly carried out in the

west, suggest that some educational practices cause children to

develop psychological functioning that is self-centered. Schemat-

ically, two styles of educational practices can be distinguished:

ﬁrst, there is learning that emphasizes competition between stu-

dents and social comparison. This approach focuses mainly on

performance, as well as the demonstration of competencies, skills,

and abilities. The second type of learning is more concerned with

cooperation between students and the commitment to a better

understanding of academic work. There is also an emphasis on

being competent, and obtaining the intrinsic satisfaction that often

accompanies learning. These two styles of education affect the

scholastic objectives of the students as well as their motivational

goals (see Ames & Archer, 1988; Anderman & Maehr, 1994;

Dweck, 1986; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Maehr & Midgley, 1991;

Maehr & Pintrich, 1991; Meece, 1991; Nicholls, 1989; Nolen,

1988; Urdan & Maehr, 1995). While the ﬁrst type of education is

concerned with performance and ego goals, the second style gen-

erates what can be qualiﬁed as task or master goals.

Several studies indicate that performance and ego goals are

encouraged in western schools while task goals (master goals) are

not. In the United States, Midgley, Anderman, and Hicks (1995)

have shown that middle school students were more oriented to-

ward performance goals, and less oriented toward task goals, than

were upper elementary school students (see also Anderman &

Midgley, 1997). Thus, the cultural and social transmission, oper-

ating within the western school system, seems to favor self-

centered rather than selﬂess psychological functioning. Studies

that have examined the links between these differing goals and the

well-being of children conﬁrm our point of view. Research carried

out by Kaplan and Maehr (1999) has shown, for example, that

when schools encourage task goals and are perceived as encour-

aging these goals, students are happier. Conversely when schools

encourage performance goals and are also perceived as encourag-

ing these goals, the children are less well adjusted (see Tuominen-

Soini, Salmela-Aro, & Niemivirta, 2008, for similar results).

According to our model, western education encourages self-

centered psychological functioning that contributes to an individ-

ual’s ﬂuctuating happiness and then is the source of psychological

and physical distress. Education of this type, which focuses pri-

marily on performance or ego goals, conforms to hedonic princi-

ples. The consequence is that students are driven toward stimulus

driven pleasures and afﬂictive affect. This can negatively affect the

tendency of some young people to function in a selﬂess manner

since the various aspects of selﬂessness will be negatively affected

by performance goals and by the perception that this type of goal

is valued by the school system. We predict, for example, that

mindfulness (i.e., undistracted attention which is unaffected by

distorting bias and attentive to the present), a quality of attention

that underlies selﬂessness, will be negatively affected by the en-

couragement of performance goals. We expect that, with time, the

pursuit of performance goals will foster inattention to the present,

rumination about the past and future, and the seeking of pleasur-

148 DAMBRUN AND RICARD

able sensory stimuli—all of which will decrease the possibility of

experiencing peace of mind. On a phenomenological level, the

perception of an independent and permanent self can be enhanced

by educational practices focused on performance. Conversely,

educational practices that encourage cooperation, creativity and

prosocial values, along with a more holistic worldview, should

favor the perception of interdependence and selﬂessness. Gaskins

(1999) notes that the current (western) school system does not

allow children to be fulﬁlled or ﬁnd inner peace and authentic

happiness. According to him, “if teachers can develop classroom

contexts that loosen the grip of conceptualization (including the

self) and open students to the interfusion of all things, they will

have weakened the structure of impediments that must be removed

for students to realize true freedom and function with wisdom,

compassion and contentment throughout their lives” (p. 213).

Social Role and Professional Environment

Professional activities are a primary source of socializing during

adulthood. A particular job implies a speciﬁc social role within a

particular organizational setting. In choosing a profession, the

individual takes on the norms, values, attitudes and behaviors that

are attached to it and shared by other members (Guimond,

Dambrun, Michinov, & Duarte, 2003; Harris, 1995). According to

the theory of social dominance, it is important to distinguish two

types of social environments: the Hierarchy-Enhancing (HE) en-

vironment and the Hierarchy-Attenuating (HA) environment (e.g.,

Haley & Sidanius, 2005; Sinclair, Sidanius. & Levin, 1998). These

environments are made up of organizations or institutions that

strengthen or weaken social inequalities and intergroup domina-

tion. Each particular environment is governed by speciﬁc norms.

In some ways the army, the police and some large companies are

examples of antiegalitarian normative environments because they

facilitate the allocation of negative social status to subordinated

groups (see Sidanius, Pratto, Martin, & Stallworth, 1991). Con-

versely, social services, humanitarian and charitable associations,

some unions, and human rights organizations are examples of

proegalitarian normative environments (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Their main function is to combat social inequalities so as to

establish an equitable redistribution of services and resources. A

number of studies show that most individuals belonging to HE

environments endorse fewer prosocial values and behaviors (e.g.,

antiegalitarianism, intolerance toward disadvantaged groups) than

members of HA environments (e.g., Haney, Banks, & Zimabordo,

1973; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Two processes seem to be respon-

sible for this effect: selection (i.e., the least prosocial individuals

select—and are selected by—HA roles and environments) and

group socialization (i.e., transmission and acquisition of antiegali-

tarian values, etc.). We propose that HE environments are not

conducive to the development of selﬂessness, while some types of

HA environments and social roles favor selﬂessness.

Religiosity and Spirituality

Religion and spirituality are often meaningful variables in the

personal development and the education of individuals. While

some authors predicted an important decline in religiousness dur-

ing the 20th century (e.g., Leuba, 1916), several recent statistics

have shown that religious devotion and spirituality endure. A

survey conducted in the United States in 2005, for example, shows

that 88% of Americans describe themselves as being religious or

spiritual. Only 7% of them state that spirituality is not at all

important in their daily life (Newsweek, 2005). However, it is

important to differentiate religion and spirituality as these two

terms are not synonymous. According to Koenig, McCullough,

and Larson (2001), religion refers to an organized system involv-

ing beliefs, practices, rituals, and symbols which allow the indi-

vidual to connect to the sacred or the transcendent (God, a prin-

cipal superior organizer, or ultimate truth). Spirituality refers more

to a personal quest about meaning in life and to a path of inner

transformation. Spirituality is not necessarily associated with a

religious practice or membership in a religious community, and

can therefore develop without adherence to a particular religion

(e.g., Moreira-Almeida, Lotufo, & Koenig, 2006).

Because both prosocial affects (e.g., empathy and compassion)

and behaviors (e.g., altruism) are central characteristics of most

religious and spiritual traditions (e.g., Underwood, 2002), one may

expect that religiousness and spirituality encourage the develop-

ment of a selﬂess type of functioning. A large number of studies

have focused on the effect of religion and spirituality on affects,

prosocial behaviors, well-being, and health.

Recent experiments suggest that religiosity is associated with

prosocial behaviors (e.g., Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008; Saroglou,

Pichon, Trompette, Verschueren, & Dernelle, 2005). A study done

by Shariff and Norenzayan (2007), for example, has shown that

experimentally induced religious thoughts reduced rates of cheat-

ing and increased rates of altruistic behavior toward strangers.

Religiosity has also been associated with prosocial affects such as

kindness (e.g., Hardy & Carlo, 2005).

Several works also suggest that religiosity and spirituality are

positively associated with well-being. In a recent review of the

literature, Moreira-Almeida, Lotufo, and Koenig (2006) concluded

that: “the majority of well-conducted studies found that higher

levels of religious involvement are positively associated with

indicators of psychological well-being (life satisfaction, happiness,

positive affect, and higher morale) and with less depression, sui-

cidal thoughts and behavior, drug/alcohol use/abuse” (p. 242).

However, several authors have emphasized the importance of

distinguishing intrinsic religiosity from extrinsic religiosity. Ac-

cording to Donahue (1985), the latter is a “religion of comfort and

social convention, a self-serving, instrumental approach shaped to

suit oneself” (p. 400). On the other hand Donahue has described

intrinsic religiousness as “a meaning-endowing framework in

terms of which all of life is understood” (p. 400). As noted by

Allport and Ross (1967), the main difference between these two

types of religiosity is that “the extrinsically motivated people use

their religion, whereas the intrinsically motivated live their reli-

gion” (p. 434). As would be expected, several studies have shown

that only intrinsic religiosity is associated with a sense of meaning

and purpose in life (e.g., Ardelt & Koenig, 2006; Bolt, 1975). The

research has shown that only intrinsic religiosity is associated with

beneﬁcial and salutogenic effects (e.g., Ardelt & Koening, 2006).

Research done by Underwood and Teresi (2002) has also shown

that the daily experience of spirituality is a factor that favors

well-being. With regards to social values intrinsic religiosity is

positively linked to prosocial values, while extrinsic religiosity is

linked negatively (Donahue, 1985).

149SELF-CENTEREDNESS, SELFLESSNESS, AND HAPPINESS

These studies seem to indicate that intrinsic religiosity and

spirituality could favor selﬂessness. However, it appears to us that

certain religions are more directly linked with the concept of

selﬂessness than others. In Buddhism, in particular, there is a belief

that clinging to a concept of the self which is conceived as an unitary,

independent entity, is a distortion of reality and a fundamental cause

of suffering. A body of Buddhist contemplative practices, including

analytical meditations, aim at freeing a person from perceiving a self.

Rather, they see the self as a conceptual fabrication attached to

mind-body aggregates. Thus, although religiosity and spirituality

seem to favor prosocial behaviors and well-being, it can be seen that

certain spiritual traditions enhance selﬂessness more than others.

Studies pertaining to mental training and meditation should provide

interesting answers to these kinds of questions.

Mental Training or Meditation

According to Cahn and Polich (2006), “the word mediation is

used to describe practices that self-regulate the body and mind,

thereby affecting mental events by engaging a speciﬁc attentional

set” (p. 180). Different techniques of meditation exist. Some focus

on obtaining insight into the nature of reality and the mind, as well

as altruistic love and compassion. This is believed to free the mind

from afﬂictive mental states and deconstructive self-clinging (e.g.,

Vipassana meditation), Other forms of meditation have as their

goals the cultivation of inner calm and attention (e.g., Samatha

meditation, Transcendental meditation). Numerous studies have

examined the effects of long and short term meditation practices

on both brain and psychological functioning, while other studies

have focused on the clinical application of meditation.

A review of the literature in neuroscience by Cahn and Polich

(2006) has shown that meditation appears to be associated with

changes in the anterior cingulate cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal

areas. The studies carried out by R. J. Davidson’s team have

highlighted the potential for change linked to the practice of

meditation. In this vein, Lutz, Greischar, Rawlings, Ricard, and

Davidson (2004) have shown that when practitioners meditate on

compassion (i.e., Buddhist practitioners with 10,000 to 50,000

hours of mental training), an increase of a high magnitude in rapid

oscillations in the so-called gamma frequencies is produced, par-

ticularly in the left prefontal area that is an area of the brain linked

to positive emotions. This modiﬁcation of the electroencephalo-

graphic baseline does not occur in students who have been trained

for one week in meditation (control group). This same team

concludes in recent longitudinal research “that plasticity in brain

and mental function exists throughout life and illustrates the use-

fulness of systematic mental training in the study of the human

mind” (Slagter, Lutz, Greischar, Francis, Nieuwenhuis, Davis, &

Davidson, 2007, p. 1228). This shows that mental training can be

a way of generating psychological modiﬁcations.

From the perspective of our model, it is interesting to examine

research which has studied the effects of meditation on self-

psychological functioning, and on well-being and health. As ob-

served by Cahn and Polich (2006): “State changes from the med-

itative and religious traditions are reported to include a deep sense

of calm peacefulness, a cessation or slowing of the mind’s internal

dialogue, and experiences of perceptual clarity and conscious

awareness merging completely with the object of meditation, re-

gardless of whether a mantra, image or the whole of phenomenal

experience is the focal point” (p. 181) (see also Wallace, 1999).

Several works conﬁrm the idea that the practice of meditation can

encourage selﬂessness. Research carried out by Emavardhana and

Tori (1997) illustrates that the practice of meditation can affect

levels of self-psychological functioning. In their study, two cohorts

of participants who attended separate 7-day Vipassana meditation

retreats and an untreated control group were compared. The results

showed important changes in both self-perception and ego defense

mechanisms. The participants in the “Vipassana mediation” group

showed a signiﬁcant increase in self-acceptance at the end of the

retreat. They were also less affected by external stimuli and sexual

impulses than the control groups. Moreover, those in the medita-

tion groups were less likely to use the defenses of displacement,

projection (i.e., attributing unacceptable feelings to others) and

regression (i.e., immature behaviors) following the retreat. More

recently, Wayment, Wiist, Sullivan, and Warren (2010) found a

positive correlation between meditation experience and a quiet ego

(e.g., altruism, wisdom). Concerning social relations, a loving-

kindness meditation signiﬁcantly increased feelings of social con-

nection and was associated with more positive feelings toward new

individuals (Hutcherson, Seppala, & Gross, 2008). Regarding at-

tention, a research study done by Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Kriete-

meyer, and Toney (2006) showed that meditation was signiﬁcantly

linked with Mindfulness. Meditation based on mindfulness im-

proved interpersonal relations by favoring a larger acceptance

of—and openness toward— other people (Carson, 2003). The

research done by Mendenhall (2006) conﬁrmed this point by

showing that when incarcerated juvenile delinquents practiced

meditation their emotional problems and aggressiveness were sub-

stantially diminished. Finally, several studies have indicated that

meditation helps in reducing stress, anxiety, and depression (e.g.,

Kabat-Zinn, 2003; Kam-Tim & Orme-Johnson, 2001; Segal, Wil-

liams, & Teasdale, 2002), and improves well-being (e.g., Smith,

Compton, & West, 1995) and longevity (Alexander, Langer, New-

man, Chandler, & Davies, 1989). Several works suggest that

mindfulness at least partly mediates the positive effect of medita-

tion on well-being (Brown et al., 2003; Baer et al., 2006; Baer,

Smith, Lykins, Button, Krietemeyer, Sauer, Walsh, Duggan, &

Williams, 2008).

In conclusion, the practice of meditation seems to offer a mode

of intervention capable of signiﬁcantly modifying the tendency of

individuals to function in a self-centered manner, and this at any

age. Meditation can therefore affect long-lasting change.

Special Life Experiences

While cultural transmission and socialization can affect self-

psychological functioning in a relatively permanent way, speciﬁc

life experiences, sometimes unexpected, can also affect self-

psychological functioning, sometimes in a temporary way and at

other times in a more lasting manner.

End of life and terminally illnesses. The period at the end of

life, whether it follows old age or illness, obviously takes on a

particular signiﬁcance. Some individuals cultivate their selﬂess

dimension to face this transition. Research done on aging shows

that the elderly who are the happiest are those who have a high

intrinsic religiosity, and have developed a sense of purpose in life

(e.g., Ardelt & Koenig, 2006). They have also developed some

wisdom including self-transcendence (Ardelt, 1997), and have a

150 DAMBRUN AND RICARD

sense of meaning in their lives (Steger, Oishi, & Kashdan, 2009).

Intrinsic religiosity also helps one to accept death (Ardelt, 2003).

When one’s search for meaning occurs only later in life there are

deﬁcits in the person’s well being (Steger et al., 2009). The few

works done on patients suffering from incurable illnesses (e.g.,

cancer, AIDS) point in the same direction. Coward (1994), for

example, has found that women with AIDS continue to ﬁnd

meaning and purpose in their lives through experiences of receiv-

ing from others, giving to others and maintaining hope. Spirituality

decreases both hastened death and suicidal ideation, and increases

hopefulness among terminally ill cancer patients (McClain, Rosen-

feld, & Breitbart, 2003). Self-transcendence decreases the distress

of illness and increases well-being in women with advanced breast

cancer (Coward, 1991). Spirituality and a sense of meaning are

important resources for coping with emotional and existential

suffering as one nears death (Breithbart, Gibson, Poppito, & Berg,

2004; Daaleman & VandeCreek, 2000). All of these works suggest

that selﬂessness makes death easier. One may speculate that as

death approaches, some individuals would have the tendency to

become more selﬂess in their functioning because this would favor

a more peaceful and calmer death (Coward & Reed, 1996). Studies

with people who are in various stages of approaching death indicate

that some individuals end up “letting go” by transcending their own

ego (Coward & Reed, 1996; Kubler-Ross, 1969; Smith, 1995). This

indicates that “self-clinging” (self-centeredness) prevents a peaceful

experience of death.

Near death experience (NDE). Since the 1970s, there have

been numerous reports about people who were near death, sur-

vived, and described similar unusual experiences (Moody, 1975).

Several characteristics seem to appear recurrently in the reports

about these experiences—which are commonly called Near Death

Experience (NDE)—such as the sensation of being outside of

one’s body (out of body experience), the feeling of very positive

emotions (i.e., feeling of harmony and peace), meeting deceased

persons, and/or the impression of moving though a tunnel toward

a bright light (e.g., Moody, 1975; Parnia, Waller, Yeates, &

Fenwick, 2001; van Lommel, van Wees, Meyers, & Elfferich,

2001). This phenomenon is not yet well understood but, in any

case, these type of sudden experiences, despite of being of short

duration, can have major and lasting consequences on the post-

NDE life of survivors. Van Lommel and his colleagues (2001)

have compared the changes in lifestyle of survivors of cardiac

arrest after 2 years and 8 years; 12% of the survivors experienced

NDE. The comparison between the two cohorts (i.e., cardiac arrest

with vs. without NDE) showed striking differences. The survivors

who had a NDE exhibited signiﬁcantly more prosocial attitudes

than the others (i.e., acceptance of others, more loving and empa-

thy, improved understanding of others, involvement in their fam-

ily). They also became more religious and spiritual (i.e., under-

standing the purpose of life, sense of the inner meaning of life,

interest in spirituality). It seems that the intense, yet short experi-

ence of NDE results in people having a more selﬂess orientation.

Brain Lesions. The recent story of Jill Bolte Taylor (see

Taylor, 2006) is particularly interesting in this regard. This neu-

roscientist suffered a stroke during which she lost a certain amount

of cognitive abilities. After the stroke, she also found herself

immersed in a state of extreme selﬂessness. “I felt like a genie

liberated from its bottle,” she later wrote (Kaufman, 2008). She

also mentions having felt a state of harmony and happiness that she

had never felt before. This testimony leads us to consider the

relationship between having a sense of self and speciﬁc brain

functions. While it is particularly difﬁcult to determine the self and

its cerebral correlates (Legrand & Ruby, 2009), some preliminary

works indicate interesting directions. According to Wheeler, Stuss,

and Tulving (1997), lesions to the right fronto-temporal cortex led

in some cases to the experience of cognitive detachment from self.

A ﬁrst tentative study suggests that the right prefrontal cortex is

involved in the meditative state of self-dissolution (Lehmann,

Faber, Achermann, Jeanmonod, Gianotti, & Pizzagalli, 2001).

These data suggest a neurological basis for selﬂessness. But, of

course, more research is needed to understand these intriguing

phenomena.

Mind-altering drugs. It is known that the use of certain drugs

such as LSD, psilocybin, and mescaline provoke temporary states

of modiﬁed consciousness in which individuals sometimes have

the feeling of losing their self-boundaries, and experience mystical

and spiritual states (e.g., Pahnke & Richards, 1966). Borg, Andre´e,

Soderstrom, and Farde (2003) have argued that this same serotonin

system may serve as a biological basis for spiritual experiences. It

is possible that the use of certain drugs occasionally generates

what we call selﬂessness. Such experiences are temporary, as they

depend on the psychopharmacological actions of the substances.

Nevertheless, as suggested by psychedelic research (e.g., Walsh &

Grob, 2005, 2006; see also James, 1936/1958), it seems that such

experiences can effect lasting modiﬁcations (e.g., understanding of

the nature of the mind, interest in spirituality, meaning in life, etc.).

Whatever the case, it seems that there is a possible psychoneurobio-

logical basis for the experience of selﬂessness as well as for its

plasticity.

Age Related Developmental Processes

It appears that during life, speciﬁc developmental processes are

associated with styles of self-based psychological functioning. We

are interested mainly in two processes: cognitive egocentrism,

which occurs during childhood, and maturity and wisdom that

comes with age.

Piaget and Weil (1951) have divided the cognitive development

linked to egocentrism into three stages. Egocentrism refers to the

self-centered understanding that children have of their world; they

assume that others experience the world as they do. From 4 to 7

years of age, children are particularly egocentric. From 7 to 10

years, they decenter from themselves but become centered on the

groups to which they belong (e.g., groups of boys, of girls, etc.).

From 10 to 15 years of age, children undergo more extensive

decentering. This three-staged model predicts consequences con-

cerning self-psychological functioning. At the peak (between 4

and 7 years), for example, it is possible that cognitive egocentrism

produces self-centered behaviors and affects (e.g., self-interested

behaviors, afﬂictive emotions). At the same time, the limited

centering on others should inhibit empathetic and compassionate

emotions, as well as prosocial behaviors. While young children (2

years old) are quite capable of experiencing affective empathy

(e.g., Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner, & Chapman, 1992),

the capacity for cognitive empathy (the ability to understand the

thoughts and perspectives of another person) appears to take

somewhat longer to develop (e.g., Selman, 1980). According to

Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, and Penner (2006): “they will be

151SELF-CENTEREDNESS, SELFLESSNESS, AND HAPPINESS

unlikely to spontaneously come to a person’s aid in an unfamiliar

situation—not because of a lack of caring, but because of a lack of

understanding. Note what is being suggested here: Very young

children are not selﬁsh—they are just egocentric.” (p. 197).

Complementarily, the work showing a development of infantile

intolerance and egocentrism parallel to sociocognitive develop-

ment supports our hypothesis (e.g., Aboud, 1988). Finally, if

cognitive egocentrism tends to diminish from the age of 10, it can

be expected that other variables, such as those involved in scho-

lastic education (e.g., promotion of ego goals) can limit the like-

lihood that self-centeredness will be reduced (see above the section

“School education”).

It seems that processes linked to aging affect the style of

self-based psychological functioning. Vaillant (1977) proposes

that there is an increase in wisdom and a decrease in immature

defense styles with age. Maslow (1968) suggests that lifelong

personality growth occurs as people satisfy more and more needs.

According to Erikson (1963), maturity (e.g., ego-transcendence)

increases during the last part of life (see also Peck, 1968). Inter-

estingly, some authors propose that individuals become more

altruistic and prosocial with age (Midlarsky & Kahana, 1994). In

a paper entitled “Getting Older, Getting Better,” Sheldon and

Kasser (2001) not only conﬁrm that maturity, measured by various

indices, increases with age, but it also mediates an increase in

well-being. They show, for example, that with age, the individual

tends to have a better understanding of himself, can transcend his

ego through spirituality, and can also perceive more unity and

cosmic order. They also observe an increase in self-determination

and intrinsic orientation (in comparison to extrinsic orientation).

All of these studies help to explain why one tends to be happier

with age. Ardelt (1997) conﬁrms that life satisfaction among the

elderly is closely linked to wisdom (measured by various indices

including tolerance, empathy, and compassion). Works on the

presence of, and the search for, meaning in life show that the

elderly report more meaning in their lives, while the young are

more often searching for meaning (Steger et al., 2009). Having

meaning in one’s life is positively linked to well-being and hap-

piness, and negatively linked to depression (Steger, Frazier, Oishi,

& Kaler, 2006; Steger et al., 2009). All of these studies suggest a

linear and positive relationship between age and selﬂessness, as

well as a linear and negative relationship between age and self-

centeredness. One can expect an increase in a selﬂess type of

functioning and a decrease in self-centered functioning with age.

VI. Applied Perspectives and Concluding Remarks

What are the implications of the proposed model at the applied

level? How does one free oneself from being involved with purely

hedonic pursuits? How can authentic happiness be attained?

According to Self-Determination Theory, well-being is closely

related to the fulﬁllment of three basic needs: autonomy, compe-

tence, and relatedness (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan, Huta, & Deci,

2008). Ryff and Singer (2008) emphasize six factors that are

involved in eudemonia and that favor eudemonic well-being and

health: self-acceptance, positive relations with others, personal

growth, purpose in life, environmental mastery, and autonomy.

Waterman (1993) emphasizes the importance of participating in

activities that make people feel alive, engaged, and fulﬁlled (see

also Waterman, Schwartz, & Conti, 2008). These few examples

illustrate the varieties of factors that have been proposed as affect-

ing happiness and its attainment. Rather than focusing on psycho-

logical qualities that foster happiness, the present model takes into

account the nature of the self, and the self based psychological

processes that are basic to our psychological functioning. We

argue that our psychological functioning is determined by the

structure of the self, and that authentic happiness can be obtained

when selﬂessness, rather than self-centeredness, occurs. It is im-

portant to take into account the fact that when methods of attaining

pleasure are suggested sometimes ﬂuctuating happiness will result.

For example, by indicating to an individual that authentic happi-

ness can be obtained by the cultivation of selﬂessness (e.g., altru-

istic behaviors) and the avoidance of self-centeredness (e.g., ego-

ism, materialism), it is possible that the individual will become

involved in the approach/avoidance aspects of the hedonic princi-

ple. It is important to realize that the search for happiness some-

times involves a self-centered orientation. Therefore, prescriptions

(approach), and proscriptions (avoidance) should be used with

caution. To the extent that some activities (e.g., mental training

and meditation) can lead to self-decentering, they represent a

valuable solution in helping people to both reduce their self-

centered tendencies, and live a quality of life ﬁlled with inner

peace, fulﬁllment and serenity, as opposed to a life ﬁlled with

ruminations based on hopes and fears and impulses of attraction

and repulsion. In the long run, because of its self-reinforcing

nature, this kind of happiness would involve selﬂessness. Decen-

tering activities, by virtue of their indirect nature, would seem to

provide productive effects on happiness. While more research is

needed, we hope that the point of view presented in this paper will

help scholars, practitioners, and other people, approach the pursuit

of happiness in a more articulate way.

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Received September 4, 2010

Revision received February 1, 2011

Accepted February 2, 2011 䡲

157SELF-CENTEREDNESS, SELFLESSNESS, AND HAPPINESS

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Jun 1982

Steven Collins

This book seeks to explain carefully and sympathetically the Buddhist doctrine of anatta ('not-self'), which denies the existence of any self, soul or enduring essence in man. The author relates this doctrine to its cultural and historical context, particularly to its Brahmanical background, and shows how the Theravada Buddhist tradition has constructed a philosophical and psychological account of personal identity and continuity on the apparently impossible basis of the denial of self.

Psychotherapeutic Interventions at the End of Life: A Focus on Meaning and Spirituality

Article

Jun 2004

Medical and psychological discourse on end-of-life care has steadily shifted over the years from focusing primarily on symptom control and pain management to incorporating more person-centred approaches to patient care. Such approaches underscore the significance of spirituality and meaning making as important resources for coping with emotional and existential suffering as one nears death. Though existential themes are omnipresent in end-of-life care, little has been written about their foundations or import for palliative care practitioners and patients in need. In this article, we explore the existential foundations of meaning and spirituality in light of terminal illness and palliative care. We discuss existential themes in terms of patients' awareness of death and search for meaning and practitioners' promotion of personal agency and responsibility as patients face life-and-death issues. Viktor Frankl's existential logotherapy is discussed in light of emerging psychotherapeutic interventions. Meaning-centred group therapy is one such novel modality that has successfully integrated themes of meaning and spirituality into end-of-life care. We further explore spiritual and existential themes through this meaning-oriented approach that encourages dying patients to find meaning and purpose in living until their death.

Handbook of Religion and Health

Book

Jan 2001

The Search for the Self: Selected Writings of Heinz Kohut: 1950-1978

Book

May 2018

Heinz Kohut

Self-Centeredness and Selflessness: A Theory of Self-Based Psychological Functioning and Its Consequences for Happiness

Abstract and Figures

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