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Social & Cultural Geography
ISSN: 1464-9365 (Print) 1470-1197 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rscg20
Refusal, circulation, refuge: young (im) mobilities
in rural Israel
Meirav Aharon-Gutman & Nir Cohen
To cite this article: Meirav Aharon-Gutman & Nir Cohen (2017): Refusal, circulation, refuge: young
(im) mobilities in rural Israel, Social & Cultural Geography, DOI: 10.1080/14649365.2017.1378919
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SOCIAL & CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY, 2017
https://doi.org/10.1080/14649365.2017.1378919
Refusal, circulation, refuge: young (im) mobilities in rural
Israel
MeiravAharon-Gutmana and NirCohenb
aFaculty of Architecture & Town Planning, Technion: Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel; bDepartment of
Geography & Environment, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
ABSTRACT
Recent years have seen the Israeli state investing considerable eorts
in the alleviation of unprecedentedly high inter-regional inequalities.
Improved transportation networks intended to better connect
peripheral residents to centrally located opportunities have been at
the heart of this policy known as ‘periphery cancellation’. In this article,
we study strategies deployed by young peripherals as they engage
with the statist call for enhanced mobility between regions. Drawing
on qualitative research conducted at ‘A Center for the Young’ in a small
town in the predominantly rural Upper Galilee, we examine the extent
to which young adults negotiate the recent state-led mobility turn.
Taking a critical nobilities approach, we argue that statist aspirations
of mobilizing peripherals to central hubs collide with socio-spatial
constraints faced by many young residents. The ocial call for mobility
is frequently met by a sense of spatial (im)mobility articulated by
young agents who deploy instead alternative strategies to achieve
socio-spatial mobility. Termed refusal, circulation, and refuge, these
strategies draw on notions of peripheral stagnation, attributed to
both state policies that have long marginalized the area as well as
rooted conventions about the social and cultural inertia of peripheral
residents. These strategies, we contend, widen existing inequalities
between central haves and peripheral have nots while solidifying a
sense of socio-spatial disenfranchisement among many of its young
inhabitants.
Refus, circulation, refuge: (im)mobilités des jeunes en
Israël rural
RÉSUMÉ
Ces dernières années ont vu l’Etat d’Israël investir de considérables
eorts pour réduire des inégalités régionales d’une ampleur jamais
vue auparavant. Des réseaux améliorés de transport en vue de mieux
relier les habitants périphériques aux opportunités situées au centre
ont été au cœur de cette politique connue sous le nom «d’annulation
périphérique». Dans cet article, nous étudions les stratégies déployées
par les jeunes de la périphérie alors qu’ils s’impliquent dans l’appel de
l’Etat pour une amélioration de la mobilité entre les régions. En nous
appuyant sur la recherche qualitative auprès «d’un centre pour les
jeunes» dans une petite ville de la région principalement rurale de
Haute Galilée, nous examinons dans quelle mesure les jeunes gens
© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
KEYWORDS
Mobility; young; rural;
periphery; transportation
MOTS CLÉS
mobilité; jeunes; rural;
périphérie; transport
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 23 March 2015
Accepted21 July 2017
CONTACT Meirav Aharon-Gutman meiravag@gmail.com
PALABRAS CLAVE
Movilidad; Jóvenes; Rural;
Periferia; Transporte
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2 M. AHARONGUTMAN AND N. COHEN
négocient le changement récent de la mobilité mené par l’Etat. A
travers une approche critique des mobilités, nous soutenons que les
aspirations étatiques de mobiliser les périphéries vers les plaques
tournantes se heurtent aux contraintes socio-spatiales auxquelles
font face de nombreux jeunes habitants. L’appel ociel à la mobilité
rencontre fréquemment un sentiment d’(im)mobilité exprimé par les
jeunes qui, à la place, déploient des stratégies alternatives pour parvenir
à la mobilité socio-spatiale. Appelées refus, circulation et refuge, ces
stratégies reposent sur des notions de stagnation périphérique,
attribuées à la fois aux politiques d’Etat qui marginalisent cette zone
depuis longtemps et aux conventions enracinées concernant l’inertie
sociale et culturelle des habitants des périphéries. Nous soutenons
que ces stratégies aggravent les inégalités existantes entre les nantis
du centre et les démunis de la périphérie en même temps qu’elles
consolident un sentiment de marginalisation socio-spatiale auprès
de nombreux de leurs jeunes habitants.
Rechazo, circulación, refugio: jóvenes (in)movilidades
en la Israel rural
RESUMEN
En los últimos años, el estado israelí ha realizado considerables esfuer
zos para reducir las desigualdades interregionales sin precedentes.
Las redes de transporte mejoradas, destinadas a conectar mejor a los
residentes periféricos con oportunidades centralizadas, han sido el
centro de esta política conocida como la ‘cancelación de la periferia’.
En este artículo, se estudian las estrategias utilizadas por los jóvenes
periféricos, al relacionarse con el llamado estatista a una mayor
movilidad entre las regiones. Sobre la base de una investigación
cualitativa realizada en ‘Un centro para jóvenes’ en un pequeño
pueblo de la predominantemente rural Alta Galilea, se examina hasta
qué punto los jóvenes negocian la reciente movilidad dirigida por el
estado. Adoptando un enfoque de movilidades críticas, se argumenta
que las aspiraciones estatistas de movilizar a gente periférica hacia
lugares centrales colisionan con las limitaciones socio-espaciales a
las que se enfrentan muchos jóvenes residentes. Frecuentemente
se responde a la llamada ocial a la movilidad con un sentido de
(in)movilidad espacial articulada por jóvenes agentes que utilizan
estrategias alternativas para alcanzar la movilidad socio-espacial.
Denominadas rechazo, circulación y refugio, estas estrategias se
basan en nociones de estancamiento periférico, atribuidas tanto a
las políticas estatales que han marginado desde hace tiempo al área,
tanto como a las convenciones arraigadas sobre la inercia social y
cultural de los residentes periféricos. Se sostiene que estas estrategias
amplían las desigualdades existentes entre personas centrales y
las periféricas, mientras que solidican un sentido de privación de
derechos socio-espacial entre muchos de sus jóvenes habitantes.
Introduction
In his keynote address at the annual Galilee Conference Israeli Prime Minister reiterated his
intention to turn Israel into a single functional economic unit by better connecting its
national core and periphery. Speaking in front of an enthusiastic audience, Mr. Netanyahu
proclaimed,
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SOCIAL & CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 3
We should cancel the periphery. There is no reason that this idea will exist – neither conceptu-
ally nor perceptually – in the State of Israel. It is a small country, so let’s utilize our advantage
of smallness and enable everybody to reach everywhere. The periphery must rst be cancelled
by [implementing] a program of transportation [which consists] of highways, interchanges and
bridges to shorten [distance] and connect the Galilee and Negev to the Center [of the country].
(Ynet Online, 31 December 2013)
The Premier’s envisioned transportational revolution has since been echoed by other poli-
ticians and civil servants. The General Manager of the Ministry of Transportation, for example,
called on the government to promote inter-regional social justice by advancing new routes
of railways, and the Central Governmental Appraiser pleaded with state ministries to accel-
erate the construction of highways because of their positive eects on real estate values in
the periphery (Barkat, 2013). The Vice President of the National Association of Contractors
and Builders similarly declared, ‘[W]e must not freeze transportation projects since they
bequeath [economic] growth’ (ibid.).
These ambitious schemes reect a pervasive trajectory, which sees speedy transportation
as a panacea to the country’s quickly widening regional inequalities between center and
periphery.1
The development of high-speed transportation networks by which to mitigate the friction
of geographic distance is articulated as a necessary means to spur economic growth. True
to its neoliberal agenda, the Israeli state conceives of transportation infrastructural projects
an enabling mechanism, a creative moment ‘[T]o promote capital mobility … and encourage
capital re-investment within strategic city-regions and industrial districts’ (Brenner &
Theodore, 2002, p. 366). The mobility reform is expected to stimulate peripheral business,
employment, and housing markets, thereby enhancing its economic and demographic
appeal for both labor and capital. No sooner after the country is ‘attened’, so the argument
goes, centrally located capital will ow into peripheral regions, revitalize their sluggish econ-
omies and reverse their negative migration balances. By signicantly decreasing travel time,
transportational wiring would simultaneously allow peripheral job seekers to nd suitable
employment in distant metropolitan areas.
Such celebratory visions of uninterrupted ows, however, clash with the capabilities of
a large proportion of peripheral subjects to take advantage of prospective opportunities.
Since ‘mobility does not consist exclusively of movement, but also a system of potentials
characterized by intentions, strategies and choices’ (Canzler, Kaufmann, & Kesselring, 2008,
p. 2), going beyond the simplied ‘logic of action’ to examine the unequal distribution of
these potentials across time and space is imperative. The potentials of mobility are inherently
biased against peripheral populations and, we argue, will remain so even in the aftermath
of the proposed reform. For instance, the envisioned fast railway network would be of little
use for carless residents of the periphery who are unable to travel to stations not served by
public transportation.2 Similarly, given the signicantly lower income in the periphery,
roughly a quarter below national average, toll highways will most likely deter even car-own-
ing individuals from the long commute to employment hubs in core areas. Grandiose trans-
portational projects will undoubtedly reproduce ‘dierential mobility empowerments’
(Tesfahuney, 1998) and have rather limited eects on the potential of mobility among many
peripheral subjects. This is particularly true for the least privileged sub-groups, dened by
class, ethnicity, gender, or age. The latter, particularly the very young, face daunting mobility
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4 M. AHARONGUTMAN AND N. COHEN
challenges, ranging from limiting social surveillance in some cultural contexts (Fotel &
Thomsen, 2002) to fear of urban crime in others (Winton, 2005).
Despite a growing body of scholarship, there is still a general agreement that research
on young mobilities ‘remains limited – both theoretically and empirically’ (Barker, Kraftl,
Horton, & Tucker, 2009, p. 1). These lacunas are induced, partially at least, by the diculty of
seeing young people as free and autonomous individuals capable of their own agency.
Although recent pleas to conceive them as social and political agents ‘in their own right, in
the here-and-now at a variety of scales’ (Barker et al., 2009, p. 2) generated a urry of studies
on young mobilities (Harker, 2009; Jackson, 2012; Wor th, 2013), the topic is still under-inves-
tigated (Skelton & Gough, 2013, p. 46), especially in non-Anglo-American contexts.
In this article, we heed to recent calls to study micro- and macro-level mobility conjointly
(Canzler, Kaufmann, & Kesserling, 2008; D’Andrea, Ciol, & Gray, 2011). By taking account of
national transportation policies and examining their impact on labor market participation
of young peripherals, we aim ‘to reveal new aspects of the mobility of people with regard
to possibilities and constraints of their maneuvers, as well as the wider societal consequences
of social and spatial mobility’ (Kaufmann, Bergman, & Joye, 2004, p. 49). Since mobilities of
the young lie at the heart of the relationship between core and peripheral regions (Kloep et
al., 2003, p. 92), shaping individual life chances while reproducing spatial inequalities vis-à-
vis their centrally located peers, studying mobilities of young adults in Israel’s periphery is
critical for the understanding the country’s widening inequalities. We document interactions
between young peripherals and ‘the state’ – embodied by sta at one of the nation’s 42
Centers for the Young. Spread throughout Israel’s development towns, these one-stop shops
help young adults access local employment and education opportunities. In so doing, our
study illuminates how conicting views of (im)mobilities are articulated state and (young)
social agents, thereby contributing to the literature on mobility narratives among young
people, primarily in rural areas (Farrugia, 2016; Porter et al., 2011; Vanderbeck & Dunkley,
2004).
Taking a ‘critical mobilities’ approach (Cresswell, 2014; Söderström, 2013), we draw on
participant observation and interviews conducted at a Center for the Young in a development
town3 in Israel’s northern periphery. We argue that statist aspirations of mobilizing peripheral
subjects to centrally based employment opportunities collide with socio-spatial constraints
faced by young residents. Our analysis shows that instead of heeding to – or accepting – the
statist call for mobility, young peripherals deploy alternative strategies of (im)mobilities.
These strategies, which we term refusal, circulation, and refuge, draw heavily on notions of
socio-spatial stagnation that are attributed to (past and future) state policies as well as more
deeply rooted conventions about cultural inertia of peripheral residents. The combined
eects of these structural and social impediments not only undermine the potential of res-
idential mobility but further widen the persistent gap between central haves and peripheral
have nots.
The remainder of the paper is organized in four parts. First, the research is set within the
broader theoretical literature on mobility and young people. The second part briey con-
textualizes Israeli state policy towardS the periphery, focusing primarily on recent projects
of transportational infrastructure. It argues that these projects reect a neoliberal ‘mobility
turn’ in policy that is geared toward the mitigation of inter-regional inequalities. Following
a note on methodology, the third part uses qualitative data to show how the ocial com-
mandment to be mobile – transmitted by local-level bureaucrats – is negotiated by young
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SOCIAL & CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 5
adults. Frustrated by its perceived irrelevance to their everyday lives, primarily in the realm
of employment, they develop instead alternative strategies of (im)mobility. The concluding
section outlines avenues for future research on young (im)mobilities in Israel and beyond.
Young (im)mobilities: a theoretical prelude
Mobility has become a commanding social scientic concept. Though its precise meaning
remains fundamentally contested, it is often understood as inclusive of both large-scale
movements of human, intellectual and material objects as well as more locally anchored
routines of travel through everyday spaces (Hannam, Sheller, & Urry, 2006). The past decade
has seen studies in sociology, anthropology, political science, and even architecture making
it a pivotal object of inquiry (Chu, 2010; Guggenheim & Söderström, 2009; Urry, 2000).
Geographers too have made important conceptual and empirical contributions to this
emerging eld of studies (Adey, 2009; Cresswell & Merriman, 2011), though they have often
taken issue with the newness of the so-called ‘new mobilities paradigm’ (Sheller & Urry, 2006).
Cresswell (2010), for example, argues that transport geography, from the 1960s onwards,
may well be considered the forefather of mobility studies within geography. However,
whereas the former was mostly concerned with ‘how to eciently get from A to B’ (ibid., p.
5), the latter oers a nuanced approach toward movement, stillness, and the links between
them (Cresswell, 2012).
A critical approach to mobility (Cresswell, 2014), or Critical Mobilities, engages with the
‘mobile constitution of society’ (Söderström & Crot, 2010). Specically, critical scholars of
mobilities have been concerned with mobile forms, which are narrated as problematic as
well as the practices deployed to sustain or undermine them (Söderström, 2013). Examples
of such forms abound and include, inter alia, undocumented migration into highly developed
countries, evacuation of informal settlers in metropolitan areas of the global South or publicly
contested, grandiose transportational projects to reduce the friction of distance in neolib-
eralizing Israel. Critical Mobilities bear ‘on an understanding of society itself as composed of
mobile assemblages’ (Söderström, 2013, p. vi) while employing a set of critical methodologies
to enhance a fundamental understanding of mobility as embedded in everyday socio-spatial
processes. Finally, it identies the limits to mobility by conceptualizing its constant interac-
tion with other modes of thinking, which rests upon sedentary (Malkki, 1992), a-mobile (Urry,
2007) or still (Cresswell, 2012) premises.
A critical approach to mobilities requires a deeper probing into the process through which
they are socio-politically produced and enacted. In this respect, mobility is conceptualized
as constituted through a combination of three dimensions, namely the physical, representa-
tional, and experiential. As ‘the raw material for the production of mobility’ (Cresswell, 2010,
p. 19), the physical dimension entails the (often) measured and mapped movement of
human, or other more or less tangible, bodies from one place to another. Physical movement
is never neutral or natural; rather, it is the outcome of uneven power relations through which
socio-political agents in dierent spatio-temporal contexts construct it. In legal courts
(Cresswell, 2006), state ministries (Mountz, 2004), and media outlets (Lynn & Lea, 2003) to
name but a few sites, (im)mobility has been coded ‘as dysfunctional, as inauthentic and
rootless and, more recently as liberating, antifoundational, and transgressive’ (Cresswell,
2010, p. 20). Finally, since mobility is practiced, namely experienced by living bodies it inev-
itably evokes any number of human feelings. Subjective reactions by mobile bodies are
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6 M. AHARONGUTMAN AND N. COHEN
contingent upon the extent to which movement is (in)voluntary and may range from fatigue
and pain on one hand to relaxation and comfort on the other.
Inasmuch as mobility produces – and is produced by – unequal power relations, it forces
us to approach it through the variegated dimensions, which endow it to some while depriv-
ing it from others (Canzler et al., 2008). Since, as Kaufmann et al. (2004) notes, access to,
competence for and appropriation of socio-spatial mobility vary according to individual and
group positioning,4 we must abandon the idealized conception of mobility, which sees it as
a cosmopolitan, world-attening feature. Recent years have thus seen a large body of knowl-
edge on the extent to which power relations make mobility a highly coveted resource, the
access to and commandment of varies along dierent markers of identity. Alongside classed,
ethno-racialized and gendered dimensions of mobility, increasing attention has been paid
to the mobilities of children, youth and young people more generally. It should be noted
that young is a fuzzy term, primarily because it is culturally constructed (Barker et al., 2009,
p. 1). Not only have most formal denitions been provided in the context of the Global North,
but the age range to which it refers is fundamentally contingent upon cultural notions of
‘the disappearance of childhood’ (Postman, 1985).
Cultural changes – such as the delaying of marriage and childbearing – prolong this stage
(Arnett, 2000), forming the category of young adults. Erikson (1968), who coined the term,
referred to the 20–39 age range, characterizing it as a formative stage in developing a sense
of love, intimacy, and commitment. Most contemporary studies set the lower limit of young
adulthood at 18 and its upper limit at 30 (Hargittai & Hinnant, 2008; Kuhnimhof, Buehler,
Wirtz, & Kalinowska, 2012; Lee, 2014), though some push it as high as 40 (Sheehy, 1999).
Denitions notwithstanding, young adults face three major challenges, which researchers
have traditionally focused on, namely assumption of self-responsibility, independent deci-
sion-making, and realizing economic independence (through, for example, participation in
the labor market) (Arnett, 2000). While they are all contingent upon mobility, the latter is of
central importance to this study. Specically, it is the age-related bureaucratization of mobil
-
ity that shapes much of young people’s chances of exercising economic freedom. Questions
pertaining to the age at which individuals are permitted to drive unaccompanied, enjoy
discounted fares on car insurance, or while riding public transportation, are at the heart of
their ability to exercise the right to mobility.
Skelton and Gough (2013) argue that understanding young mobilities is crucial for the
study of spaces and places. Not only do the changing denitions of ‘young people’ invest
them with the demographic power to shape places, but their lifestyles, which global capital
takes increasing interest in, makes them ‘important players in the circulation of products
and consumptions of ideas’ (p. 461), breathing new life into these very same places and
others that are connected to them. In this respect, research has linked young people’s quest
for independence to their questions of accessibility to dierent modes of transportation.
Raphael and Rice (2002), for example, see a causal relationship between car ownership and
the ability to attain employment. Compared with the generation of their parents, contem-
porary young adults make less use of private cars, gravitating toward more sustainable
means of transportation (Kuhnimhof et al., 2012).
Dierences in young mobilities are intimately linked to identities. Young members of
various minority groups were shown to access fewer mobility opportunities or pay a greater
price – monetary or other – for the right to use them. Holzer, Ihlanfeldt, and Sjoquist (1994),
for example, found that young African-Americans spend more time traveling, at a higher
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SOCIAL & CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 7
cost per mile, in comparison with their White peers. In non-Western context, children, youth,
and young adults were also at a disadvantageous position with respect to mobility. Since
young individuals in developing countries often play a signicant role in transporting goods,
food, and water (Porter, 2002, p. 61), access to adequate means of transportation are crucial
to their everyday lives and by extension to the welfare of their extended families. In the
context of India, Lolichen, Shenoy, Shetty, Nash, and Venkatesh (2006) found that children
were not only empowered by learning new skills directly related to their personal mobilities,
but also gained condence in more sophisticated skills such as information management
and communication. Young mobilities are also contingent upon their geographic locations.
Research on mobilities of young adults in the countryside shows that despite their idealized
image as green pastures of freedom and serenity, they often become dead-ends for inde-
pendence-aspiring young (Powell, Taylor, & Smith, 2013).
Building on these contributions, we argue that the Israeli state’s transport construction
frenzy falls short of realizing its intended objectives of promoting peripheral mobilities
among the young and reducing inter-regional inequalities. Rather than docile subjects who
move through carefully planned conduits of transportation to take up centrally located jobs,
the recent ‘turn’ reinforces instead alternative strategies of (im)mobility among young periph-
erals. Attributed to low rates of motor vehicle ownership, travel expenses beyond their
means, or routes that fail to meet their needs, as well as strong aversion toward long com-
mute, they choose to negotiate the often-heard call to be mobile. Resisting, substituting or
altogether avoiding designated conduits, these subjects need be understood as agencies
capable of (re)producing their own socio-spatial (im)mobility. We discuss these strategies
after presenting a macro-level picture of the pervasive inequalities between center and
periphery in Israel and their implications for inter-regional mobility.
Center and periphery: a tale of two nations?
Recent years have seen alarmingly growing disparities in Israel. In 2013, its Income Gini
Coecient (0.392) was the second highest among the world’s 20 most developed economies
(UNDP, 2013). Around the same time, almost one-third (31%) of its national income was
concentrated in the hands of the top decile (The World Bank, 2013). Nearly one-third (30%)
of its workforce earns salaries that are either at or below minimum wage and poverty rate
has recently been estimated at 19.9%, the highest among OECD countries (OECD, 2014).
These data led some to declare Israel’s economy as fundamentally bifurcated and that
‘Alongside the “Startup Nation” [reference to Senor & Singer, 2011], which generously com-
pensates its citizens – 10% of employees … there exists a “bottom Israel” [Yisrael shel Mata]
in which three quarters of employees earn less than the minimum wage’ (Svirsky, Qonor-Atias,
& Arian, 2013, p. 22).
Inequality in Israel is deeply spatialized, with peripheral districts (Northern, Haifa, and
Southern) fare lower on a wide range of socioeconomic indicators in comparison to Tel Aviv
and Central Districts (see Map 1). Thus, for example, the poverty rate among families in the
Northern District, of which the Upper Galilee is part, stands at 34.7% (Andelbeld, Berkly,
Gotlib, & Oren, 2014, p. 37; compared with 9.9%, respectively, in the Central District). In
addition, and given the high proportion of marginalized minority groups in peripheral local-
ities, spatial inequality often manifests itself ethnically, both within the Jewish majority (e.g.
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8 M. AHARONGUTMAN AND N. COHEN
between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim; see Haberfeld & Cohen, 2007) and between Jews and
Arabs (Lewin-Epstein & Semyonov, 1993).
With a Mizrahi-dominated population, the town where our research was conducted is a
case in point. The town, which name and other identiable social data we do not to disclose,
was established by the state in the 1950s and populated exclusively by Jewish immigrants
Map 1.Map of Israel, by administrative district. Source: author.
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SOCIAL & CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 9
from North Africa (Cohen & Aharon-Gutman, 2014). Located in the predominantly rural Upper
Galilee, it is currently ranked at the lower third of the nation’s socioeconomic index, which
measures local performance on a range of indicators, including income and educational
attainments. It has long suered from chronic shortage of employment, educational, and
cultural opportunities, exhibiting unemployment and outmigration rates that are signi-
cantly higher than the regional (district) and national values and income levels that are far
lower (Cohen & Aharon-Gutman, 2016). At the time of our research, for example, the local
unemployment rate was nearly 40% higher than the national average (8.3 and 5.8%,
respectively).
In recent years, questions of mobility have taken center stage in public discourse over
spatial inequality in Israel. Research shows that residents in central districts enjoy faster,
cheaper and more diverse and accessible transportation means and routes in comparison
with their peripheral co-nationals. For instance, with no railroads and meager air travel
options, residents of the Upper Galilee, our research area, are entirely dependent upon
highways. However, they, too, provide few and mostly inadequate opportunities for carless
residents. Buses to Tel Aviv, for example, depart hourly, take over three hours and their service
ends at 7 pm. Non-stop service is unavailable between the Upper Galilee and the capital city
of Jerusalem and travel time often exceeds three and a half hours (Egged, 2016). Similarly,
while the rate of car ownership per capita in Israel’s core districts ( Tel Aviv and Central) is
0.47, it stands at 0.31 and 0.27, respectively, in Southern and Northern districts. Paradoxically,
peripheral residents who are forced to rely more heavily on private transportation, exhibit
signicantly lower rates of car ownership than residents of the national core.
Against this backdrop, recent ocial calls to cancel the periphery by means of mega
projects of transportation were met with local distrust. Cognizant of public and civic reports
that document the eects of geographically biased state policies in inter alia health, tertiary
education,5 housing and transportation (Balas & Adler, 2009; Central Bureau of Statistics,
2010; Knesset Center for Research & Information, 2007; Ministry of Health, 2013), peripherals
questioned the designated schemes. They challenged their capacity to alleviate job scarcity,
long the primary cause for regional outmigration, chiey among young adults (Alfandari &
Sheer, 1992). The call for mobility was interpreted as a state solution for its own failure of
adequate job supply; A solution, which given the entrenched Zionist stance against leaving
– indeed abandoning –frontier/periphery areas is fundamentally awed (cf Kemp, 2002 on
the glorication of settlers in the periphery/frontier and the denigration of those leaving
them voluntarily). In this context, the strategies we elaborate on in the next section should
be seen as agency-motivated responses for this lacking solution.
Methodology
Our point of departure is that questions of mobility are best addressed at the point of
encounter between the state and young people. To examine the encounter and the ways in
which conicting notions of mobility are articulated by agents, we employed three methods
of inquiry. First, we conducted participant observations at activities and events organized
at the Center for the Young in the town. From one-on-one consultations to group training
sessions, observations were an opportune glimpse into the ongoing dialog between the
state and young peripherals. Deeply embedded in the everyday communal lives, the Center
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10 M. AHARONGUTMAN AND N. COHEN
allowed us to perform a truly localized, place-based eldwork, providing unmediated access
to sta and young individuals who consumed their ‘services’ daily.
Inspired by a research tradition which conceives of state personnel as the embodiment
of its institutional ensemble (Mountz, 2004), our ethnography of the Center was geared
toward an understanding of the moments by which young subjects encounter the variegated
rationale(s) of the state. In this respect, the state is not as a unitary actor, but as a broader
set of institutions within which conicting rationales jostle against each other and social
agents who come across it. Taking an ethnographic approach thus allowed us multiple real-
time observations into how the state exercises its power over – and negotiates its position
vis-a-vis – its own subjects. It further enabled us direct access to ways by which young adults
perform, interpret, and negotiate practices of everyday life in general, and those pertaining
to mobility in particular, as well as their strategic choices of social navigation (Langevang &
Gough, 2009).
Secondly, personal, semi-structured interviews were conducted with Centre sta and
young adults who sought their advice. Sta (four females and two males) were asked to
elaborate on their daily routine, describe common proles of advisees and challenges faced
in the realm of education and employment, and explain how they tailor a specic plan for
individuals. Sta were extremely forthcoming, sharing their (non-condential) databanks
(e.g. Job lists, vocational training courses) and specifying typical issues raised by advisees.
Sta were all Mizrahim and, save one, young adults themselves. As such, they often drew
on personal experience to illustrate specic issues. They had also put us in touch with other
town-based state ocials (e.g. Director of the Local Bureau of Labor), whose engagement
in employment-related issues they deemed important for our understanding of the eld.
Advisees were asked about the challenges faced in respect to the job market, their moti-
vations to visit the Centre, the type of assistance sought, and satisfaction from services
received. In addition, they were asked general questions about their – and their peers’ –
personal and professional experience. Data obtained through interviews rened our under-
standing of everyday lives of young peripherals. Finally, we interviewed young adults who
had used Centre services in the past and have relocated since to the Tel Aviv and Central
Districts. These interviews allowed us a thorough examination of trajectories of (im)mobilities
experienced by former peripherals and a greater appreciation of the diculties they face(d)
at both their hometown and current places of residence. Data obtained were instrumental
in formulating our nal category (‘refugees’).
Conducted in Hebrew by one – or both – authors, interviews lasted 90 min on average.
They were then transcribed verbatim and content analyzed. A common technique of qual-
itative data analysis, content analysis allows a systematic, theme-based examination of data
in specic social contexts. It is particularly suitable for geographically oriented studies
because it allows researchers to test existing categories or concepts in new socio-spatial
contexts. In analyzing the interviews, we paid careful attention to the ways by which inform-
ants (both state and non-state actors) conceive of young (im)mobilities in the periphery.
Working inductively, we then clustered these conceptions into three strategies, which we
termed refusal, circulation, and refuge (or refusers, circulators, and refugees).
Finally, primary and secondary materials pertaining to the state-led mobility reform have
been collected and analyzed. From government decisions 1421 (aka Lanes of Israel:
Transportation Program for the Development of the Negev and Galilee, 2010), 3961 (Roads in
the Periphery, 2008) and 3962 (Establishment of Mass Transportation Systems in the Periphery,
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SOCIAL & CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 11
2008) to more local-level projects, we surveyed and analyzed state-sanctioned reports and
documents related to these transportational infrastructure improvement initiatives. We fur-
ther surveyed the Hebrew (written and electronic) press for pertinent articles. Data obtained
through these sources were content analyzed to construct a suciently broad picture con-
cerning the state plans.
Between the state’s intentions and strategies of the young
Ratied in February 2010, Israeli Government Decision 1421 set
[T]o establish inter-urban, land-based transportational infrastructure avenue from Kiryat
Shmona…in the north to …Eilat in the south, to populate and develop the Negev and Galilee.
The infrastructure avenue will include vertical route of prime railways and highways, and several
horizontal axes. (Prime Minister’s Oce’s, 2010)
Founding a speedy transportation network, it was hoped, would minimize the friction of
inter-regional distance, and turn the entire country into a single economic unit by ‘cancelling
the periphery’. Twenty-seven billion NIS were designated for the implementation of the
ambitious programs, roughly 10% of which (2.5 billion) for projects in the northern periphery.
These included the construction of a brand new, 20-mile railway route from Acre to Carmiel
and massive reconstruction of Roads 65 and 85, upgrading both to four-lane, express high-
ways (see Map 2).
However, as the ndings below suggest, neither project is perceived as particularly useful
for (young) peripherals. With lower incomes (and car ownership rates) than the national core,
peripheral residents’ highway usage rates are lower than national average, yet they incur
higher cost on car maintenance (e.g. fuel, oil change, tires), which make up a higher propor-
tion of their (lower) household income. Furthermore, since peripheral commutes take longer
in both time and distance traveled than the national average (see Asidon, 2004), their car
maintenance tends to be even higher. As the next section shows, it is this combination of
socioeconomic and structural shortcomings that clash with the state’s mobility turn, pushing
an increasing number of young peripherals toward alternative strategies of labor market
(dis)engagement.
Refusal, circulation, refuge: strategies of young (im)mobilities
Although large-scale, state-sponsored, mobility-enhancing programs are depicted as a pan-
acea for peripheral (un/der)-employment, local job seekers as well as employment consult-
ants at the Center for the Young often question their rational. Highways and trains, we were
repeatedly told, would be of little use for both highly and low-qualied individuals, but for
distinct reasons. Facing a chronic shortage of skilled positions in the Galilee, members of
the former group normally give up the long commute to out-of-region jobs and choose
instead to relocate. Personal accounts about friends, classmates, and siblings who left the
Galilee for jobs in metropolitan areas like Haifa or Tel Aviv were a common theme in our
interviews, and are supported by ocial data showing negative migration balance in periph
-
eral districts. Simultaneously, the relative abundance of low-skilled jobs in the periphery
does not translate into frequent usage of highways and trains by their holders. Indeed, with
low(er) rates of automobile-ownership and household incomes, nonprofessional workers
in locally based jobs normally opt for alternative – and cheaper – modes of transportation
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12 M. AHARONGUTMAN AND N. COHEN
(e.g. electric bicycles) for their daily commute. Public transportation, though infrequent and
unreliable, is a reasonable solution for many who work locally. Others, especially those
employed in medium and large factories of traditional industries tend to rely on transpor-
tation services provided by their employers. Since workdays in factories are normally divided
into three shifts (morning, afternoon and night), factory owners prefer to arrange for employ-
ees to be transported to and from the workplace. Using private bus services that pick up
Map 2.The main roads of the northern district.
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SOCIAL & CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 13
workers from their homes or designated areas, such mobility arrangements ensure timely
arrival (and departure) of workers, thereby facilitating the economic production process.
Consequently, grandiose projects of mobility are often ‘lost’ on sizeable groups of young
individuals in peripheral locations.
In what follows we elaborate three such groups and examine alternative strategies of (im)
mobility they deploy within the context of the labor market. Termed ‘refusal’, ‘circulation’ and
‘refugee’ (or forced re-location), strategies account for young non/professionals who – by
evading inter-regional commuting – render them largely impractical. Their strategies of (dis)
engagement with/from the peripheral labor market teach us of both the limited potential
of state-sponsored, grand projects of inter-regional mobility and, by extension, the funda-
mental disconnect that presently exist between national processes of decision-making in
Israel and social and economic dynamics at the local level.
Refusal: ‘They don’t want to leave town boundaries’
Territorial extent, sparse (mostly minority) population, and physical distance from large urban
centers are the (Upper) Galilee’s main peripheral attributes. Consequently, its residents are
expected to be mobile in order to seize out-of-region opportunities, jobs included. Most of
the young-adult that participate in our research identied a mobile lifestyle as the single
most important determinant for leading full and prosperous peripheral life. The words of
one, ‘you move or get stuck’ were echoed by others, both ocials and town residents. These
acknowledgments notwithstanding, a fundamental disagreement exists over the primary
reason for the pervasiveness of immobility in the periphery. While some attributed it to
structural constraints related to the near absence of reliable and accessible modes and net-
works of transportation, others contended that ‘people’s psyche’ plays a prominent role in
‘stuckness’. Concerning the latter, local unwillingness, indeed resistance to long work-bound
travel was seen as a key component in what was described as ‘the peripheral state of mind’.
A former resident who was interviewed at her new workplace near Tel Aviv claimed
critically,
It is a local thing in [name of town]. People are xated to place. They do not want distant jobs;
[They] want to work like one meter from their home. They say, ‘To commute 30–40 minutes to
work? No way! We want something close by’. No way in the world that people would travel long
distances. It is annoying. They are xated; [They] want their comfort zone. (F, 32, Book Keeper)
Ocial sentiments toward so-called ‘mobility refusers’ were similarly unappreciative and
they were frequently blamed for being unproductive and irresponsible. In the words of one
ocial, ‘it is legitimate [to refuse minimum-wage jobs], if one has better skills, but some
people express selectiveness per se and that’s a problem’. In sharp contrast to qualities of
diligence and devotion that were associated with mobility, refusers were described as passive
individuals whose unwillingness to travel prevents them from obtaining economic success.
The following is a critical elaboration of what several people referred to as ‘a culture of
stuckness’ among some young individuals in the periphery.
A person who prefers to sign [for unemployment benets] rather than travel for 30–40 minutes
to get to work – that is a wrong attitude. And we’re not talking about old people. We are talking
about a generation that was born in Israel, but they speak as if they are still in the Atlas Mountains
[where their grandparents were born]. They have no aspirations. It is not everybody, but they
stand out. (M, 57, Employment Consultant, Centre for the Young)
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14 M. AHARONGUTMAN AND N. COHEN
Some ocials in the eld of employment consulting dened their goals as one of mediation
– between the statist command to travel and resistance to practices of mobility expressed
by some young ‘refusers’. Normalizing mobility, it was argued, was an important step in the
battle against peripheral anguish. Normalization was understood as a massively intent pro-
cess by which state representatives ought to ‘educate’ peripheral subjects of the link between
spatial and socio-economic mobility. In the words of one, ‘[I tell them that] living and working
in the same place is a peripheral perception, and that whoever lives in Tel Aviv Metropolitan
area and works in Tel Aviv also has to travel an hour each way’. Using worldly examples,
ocials set to ‘unprovincialize’ local, deeply rooted misconceptions of working close to home.
[I tell them], see this [‘Wanted’ section in the newspaper]? [Companies are looking for] techni-
cians, engineers, sales persons. [But it’s] In Afula [a city that is an hour-drive from town] … I [tell
them I] moved nine times in my life because of my work … [But] some people want their work
place in their parking lot – it doesn’t work that way. In Russia, you travel many hours to work.
Why should we complain? Why am I saying this? We are quite a large geographical area and
the supply is not so big. There are jobs, but a person who wants to work needs to compromise.
He will nd a job only if he would be willing to travel. (M, 57, Employment Consultant, Centre
for the Young)
Despite repeated assertions that peripheral low-class subjects, oppose to leaving town
boundaries in their quest for employment, informants also admitted that more objective
conditions prevent their mobility. They acknowledged the meager transportation routes in
the periphery, claiming they fall short of satisfying the needs of many residents. References
to inaccessible, inecient and infrequent public transportation services were a common
theme in interviews held with local ocials and residents alike. Examples included un/der-
served neighborhoods or whole sections of town, early ending or time-consuming bus lines
and considerable walking distance from designated stops to existing employment
clusters.
Public transportation here is unavailable and irregular. They [low-skilled residents] care about
public transportation. Only a year ago, a bus line that travels through the adjacent industrial
zone was opened. It begins [its route] at 8am, while work begins at 6:30am. We always raise the
subject. We say it is crazy. They [the state] say ‘give them shing rods instead of sh’, but a shing
rod is useless if they cannot get to the sea. (M, 57, Director of The Local Bureau of Employment)
An employment consultant who argued that a blue-collar trap has gradually been fashioned
in the periphery has eloquently elaborated the complexity. The trap, he explained, is a situ-
ation by which minimum-wage earners who are unable to purchase a car are prevented
from traveling to jobs in remote industrial zones because they are poorly served by public
transportation. Consequently, even the most ambitious and driven individuals fall prey to
the limited conduits of travel that are currently set in place across the periphery.
There are settlements the bus simply does not go into. There is a lovely woman, a technician.
She was married and moved to a small settlement in the periphery. She is stuck. She relies on
hitchhiking. There is no public transportation. One does not have a solution for people. One
cannot help if people do not have a means to go to work. If one nds his dream position, he
can maybe push towards buying a car, but a person who receives minimum wage – how is he
supposed to travel to work? (M, 45, Employment Consultant, Centre for the Young)
Circulation: ‘They work half a year and then get unemployment the other half’
A second strategy was reported concerning individuals who alternate between periods of
un/employment. A growth in seasonal demand for nonprofessional workers has given rise
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SOCIAL & CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 15
to a segment of mostly young people who deploy this strategy, which is frowned upon by
many locals (who see it as abuse of the ‘welfare state’). It should be noted that this type of
labor market circular (dis)engagement is not always voluntary, but it nonetheless provides
individuals with a fair degree of exibility, which they cherish. Still, the primary motivation
behind this pattern is economic; considering the erosion in peripheral – and other – salaries
in Israel since the early 2000s (see Globes, 2014), some individuals opt to exit the labor market
at will. Seasonal employment entitles them to unemployment benets and other forms of
public welfare (e.g. National Insurance), which total sum nears minimum wage. Director of
the Local Youth Employment Center elaborated on the strategy,
People who have been red from factories come [here]. They are red each time the volume
of work changes. Then we see waves [of laid o individuals]. We noticed that … they prefer to
work half a year and then rest at home because they can get unemployment benets the other
half year. Some people do that for years. Each departure to a new job is wasted away. Or they
refuse. In the best-case scenario, he or she goes to work for two days and returns. (F, 35, Sta at
the Local Bureau of Employment)
Her description is emblematic of the disapproving stance held by representatives of the
state toward circular mobility, namely the continuous entering into and exiting from the
local labor market. Condemning the spatially limited employment arrangement that is
deprived of the slightest prospect of long-term economic security (e.g. pension) and mobility,
a senior ocial in the municipality likened it to ‘a dead-end situation’. Whether forced or not,
walking down the circular path condemns individuals to old age poverty, the current national
rate of which exceeds 20% (Bevers, 2014).
Those who study is one story. They will move on and progress. But those who have not acquired
an education or do not intend to do so after their military service,6 would normally be the ones
who enter that vicious cycle. They will likely work in assembly-line industries and go through
a routine that will eventually dead-end and [they will be] left with nothing to return to. (F, 33,
Manager of Leadership Program, Centre for the Young)
Her words mark two clearly identiable paths of immobility for (non)professional young
adults in the periphery. While ‘those who study’ are expected to embark on a linear route of
socioeconomic and spatial mobility, the young adults that did not acquired an education
destined to long-term process of circular mobility, the end of which is a full stop, or stillness.
Thus, an alternative view of the path selected by circulators acknowledged its validity as a
strategy of temporary economic survival, which may prove benecial in the medium and
long term. An employment consultant specializing in local youth expressed one such view,
Some [of them] come here very confused. My job is to help them decide what they want to do
‘when they grow up’. Their level of disorientation and confusion is so high that it sometimes
eects their motivation. They are frustrated and suered from confusion and low self-esteem.
I work with them in order to put them on the right track, because they know something is not
working properly. (F, 36, Education Consultant, Centre for the Young)
Similarly to Jeerey’s (2010, p. 3; quoted in Cresswell, 2012, p. 650) conclusion concerning
unemployed Indian men who ‘have been compelled to wait for years … not as a result of
their voluntary movement … but because they are durably unable to realize their goals’,
stillness among some young individuals in the Israeli periphery is not always a voluntary
act. While, clearly, some may choose to stand still by opting out of the job market, others
may be overwhelmed, disorganized or simply lacking the social and cultural capital that
would make them fully (and yearly) employable. In some cases, the only resolution for what
one consultant called ‘the professional vertigo’ of young peripherals was spatial relocation.
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16 M. AHARONGUTMAN AND N. COHEN
Acknowledging the diculties of the young generation ‘to nd itself ’, in both the town and
the region, across-the-board sympathy was expressed toward the strategy selected by ‘ref-
ugees’, our nal group.
Refuge: ‘I must get out of here’
A nal strategy deployed by young, mostly highly skilled individuals, involved inter-regional
migration. Unlike previous segments, this type of mobility, which stands at the heart of a
much wider debate in Israel concerning ‘brain drain’, is perceived – by both insiders and
outsiders – as forced. In this respect, they hardly t Bauman’s famous description of those
‘high up’ who ‘travel through life by their heart’s desire and pick and choose their destinations
according to the joys they oer’ (1998, p. 86). Indeed, their regional displacement needs be
understood against the backdrop of their possession of desired educational and cultural
capital and the utter scarcity of jobs that is readily available to them in the peripheral labor
market. Thus, though nonprofessional jobs are in considerable supply within the region, the
Municipal Director of Employment admits that the opposite is true for highly skilled
positions.
Concerning jobs, we can oer – industry and nonprofessional work – the supply is relatively
wide. [But] with regards to expertise work – the supply is low. Here in this area [of the Upper
Galilee], it takes a long time before such [highly skilled] positions become available or new ones
are opened up. Even when they [the state] set up a new industrial zone, it was not a high-tech-
nology industrial park.
His assertion does not suggest that well-paying jobs do not exist regionally, but that those
that do, are few and (literally) far between. Rarity of good job opportunities leads some
young individuals to relocate in conjunction with major events along the life cycle, like
marriage or parenthood, rationalizing it by their desire to ensure sustainable employment.
In Israel’s tumultuous job market, we were told, avoiding (or minimizing) unemployment
periods are critical, especially during one’s formative years of young adulthood. As a former
resident who works as a bookkeeper outside Tel Aviv admitted, ‘[T]here are simply no jobs
for me in [name of town], and here in [name of city near Tel Aviv], I can quit right now and
line up three job interviews for tomorrow morning’. Other common reasons for departure
included the considerably lower wages oered in the periphery, even for positions that
require tertiary education. Interviewees, highly skilled ‘refugees’ in a range of professions
– from accounting to engineering, armed that employers in peripheral regions oer salaries
that are in some cases 20–30% lower than those paid for similar, centrally located jobs.
Although it may be considered ‘voluntary’, highly skilled departure was often described
to us as a forced practice. Interviewees invariably expressed positive feelings toward their
hometown – and the Upper Galilee in general – referring to its serene atmosphere, warm
people, and scenic environment. However, they simultaneously complained about the
regional labor market and its meager opportunities, especially for the highly skilled. One
former resident, who admitted she would rather stay close to family and friends, nonetheless
claimed she had to leave ‘[B]ecause it was clear to me that in order to develop, get an edu-
cation, get a job – I must get out of here’. Another, who is currently employed in one of Israel’s
most prestigious scientic institutions, shared a similar narrative of forced re-location. His
words, which bound unambiguously deep connection to (the local) place in tandem with a
strong conviction that his – and his family’s – future lies elsewhere, were telling.
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SOCIAL & CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 17
I love [name of town] and I cannot remember thinking about leaving it from an early age, but
I did know that I want to acquire [tertiary] education. I wanted to be an engineer, I wanted a
career, and for that, you must leave. Even when I was little, I was interested in things that happen
outside, in the big world. I felt that people there spoke one-dimensionally and thought ‘small’
and I wanted to experience bigger things. These are things that represent the opposite of [name
of town] – family, quiet life in your own small corner. (M, 30, PhD Student)
Though ‘forced re-locators’ often singled out limited job opportunities as the primary reason
for their departure, they also admitted that their list of determinants was considerably longer.
For some, the skimpy ‘cultural scene’ in town and the entire region has long been a strong
disincentive for staying put.
I love [name of town], but I have always known that I would leave it. From a very young age,
maybe 13 or 14, I knew that once I have the opportunity, I will run away, because nothing hap-
pens here, and opportunities are in the center [of the country] – jobs, entertainment, everything.
I had a friend whose brother was renting an apartment in Tel Aviv and we would both escape
to his place whenever we had a chance – every holiday, every vacation we had. We would stay
in his apartment and take advantage of every minute [of our time there]. [We would go to] the
beach, malls, restaurants, everything. (F, 33, Administrative Assistant)
These and other depictions mark the periphery as the center’s immobile ‘other’. Central
mobility was frequently contrasted with the periphery’s dreary stillness, which arguably
inltrates both public and private realms. Speaking of ‘a place nothing happens in’ and ‘the
routinization of home-staying’ in her hometown versus the action-lled, mobile environment
of her current place of residence, a former resident concluded, ‘I love it here because I like
the action, the mess, being busy all day – work, kids, girlfriends, go out, go places. In [name
of hometown] it does not exist…It is a dierent scene, of staying in’. These and other narra-
tives suggest that in the absence of local opportunities, even the ablest individuals – who
could have potentially used advanced highways and railways to seize jobs in distant met-
ropolitans – do not wish to remain in the periphery.
Conclusions
Recent years have seen Israeli decision-makers and bureaucrats propagating ‘a mobility turn’.
Speedy transportation networks were to alleviate the country’s widening inter-regional ine-
qualities and ultimately cancel its periphery by producing a single economically functioning
unit. Embedded in a neoliberal discourse, which links up spatial and economic mobility,
grandiose projects were intended to mitigate the friction of geographic distance, and enable
(young) residents of the periphery a smoother and faster commute to centrally located
employment opportunities.
In this article, we set to examine the apparent incongruence between macro-level state
transportation infrastructure policy geared toward periphery cancellation and micro-level
strategies of (im)mobility engaged with by employment-seeking young peripherals. We
argued that statist aspirations of mobilizing peripherals to central hubs collide with socio-spa-
tial constraints faced by many young residents, often resulting in greater social and economic
inequalities between central haves and peripheral have nots. We showed how the ocial
call for mobility has been met by a sense of spatial (im)mobility articulated by young agents
who deploy instead alternative strategies to achieve socio-spatial mobility. Drawing heavily
on notions of peripheral stagnation, attributed to both state policies that have long mar-
ginalized the area as well as more entrenched conventions about the cultural inertia of
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18 M. AHARONGUTMAN AND N. COHEN
residents, these strategies, we conclude, widen existing inequalities between central haves
and peripheral have nots while solidifying a sense of socio-spatial disenfranchisement among
many of its young inhabitants.
Our ndings suggest that young peripherals are anything but docile subjects heeding to
top–down statists schemes seeking to enhance mobility; rather, faced with formidable mobil-
ity-related structures – both social and spatial – that hinder their capacity to land stable and
satisfying jobs, they negotiate the ocial call, indeed demand, for mobility, employing strat-
egies that are congruent with their short-term needs and longer term wants. Thus, while
some disengage from the labor market altogether, others periodically alternate between
participation and withdrawal, while still others are forced to relocate to nd suitable employ-
ment and other opportunities.
Local idiosyncrasies aside, our study makes several contributions, which go beyond the
Israeli case and could possibly guide future scholarship on (young) mobilities in other
geo-cultural contexts. Three are worth mentioned here in brief. Methodologically, situating
our research at the nexus between the social space(s) of young adults and the structural
forces of the Israeli state has allowed us a meaningful vantage point onto the complex power
relations between state and subjects. Taking a critical mobilities approach to study these
seemingly mundane encounters was instrumental to our understanding of the ever-present
gaps between young people’s bottom–up desires, aspirations and wishes and top–down
state schemes. In this context, the latter, embodied by well-intended bureaucrats seeking
to improve the employability of young peripherals, sometimes enhance (always inadvert-
ently) the dierential mobility that ultimately shape – if not determine – the paths chosen
by young individuals. Marking some (e.g. the better-skilled) as mobility-able, or -worthy,
while discounting the capacity or willingness of others to do so, brings back to the fore the
normalizing power of the state, which regulates social behaviors – and, indeed, identities
– by encouraging some and denouncing others.
Second and relatedly, the conicting notions of (im)mobility articulated by social subjects
and state personnel, serve as a timely reminder for the importance of juxtaposing the two,
in both theory and policy. During our research, we were often struck by the scalar disconnect
between national policies and local needs; while ocials in Jerusalem vowed to revamp
transportation to allow faster commute from the periphery to Tel Aviv (but never vice versa),
our informants accentuated the dire need to prioritize local job-creation. And although
to-be-users cherished state investments in and around their towns, they frequently com-
plained that they were conducted with little or no meaningful involvement of local com-
munities. In the absence of true collaboration, we were told, top–down decisions – as
well-intended as they may be – ignore the genuine needs and wants of peripheral commu-
nities and increase, in the medium and long-run, their disenfranchisement from state bodies
and mainstream society alike.
Finally, our focus on the strategic choices of (im)mobility taken by young adults is indic-
ative of the creative force of social subjects, suggesting that peripheral agencies need be
taken seriously by scholars. In Israel – and elsewhere, we presume – the portrayal of periph-
eral residents as passively compliant individuals, is pervasive. Discursively constructed as
acquiescent masses who regularly act against their ethno-class interests, peripherals are
seldom seen as active shapers of their own (im)mobile destinies. While we reject an overtly
idealized picture of Israel’s rural periphery, including the objectively disadvantageous con-
ditions reigning in large parts of it, our study seeks to equally resist the pervasive depiction
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SOCIAL & CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 19
of its subjects – both young and older, as marginalized ‘others’ devoid of human agency.
Indeed, by shedding light on the variegated ways through which young peripherals access,
compete for, and appropriate their dierentiated mobilities with respect to the labor market,
we hope to have contributed to a better appreciation of their proactive approach. Future
research should further expose the multiple (im)mobilities subaltern subjects draw upon as
they strive to move on – or out – with their everyday lives.
Notes
1. In Israel, ocial denitions of the term ‘periphery’ have to) the national core, namely Tel Aviv
metropolitan area. As such, the periphery includes the following regions: Arava, Southern
Negev, Dead Sea, Upper Galilee and Golan Heights. In critical social scientic literature, however,
the term also connotes class and ethnic distinctions and accounts for the socioeconomic and
ethno-cultural marginality of its local population, the majority of whom are ethnic minorities
– both Jewish (Mizrahim) and not (Palestinian Arabs) (Tzfadia & Yacobi, 2011).
2. While the combined population of the two most peripheral districts (Southern and Northern) in
Israel is 31%, their residents own less than 25% of registered motorized vehicles in the country
(Central Bureau of Statistics, 2013a, 2013b).
3. ‘Development towns’ are mid-size urban settlements founded by the Israeli state in the 1950s
and 1960 as part of its plan to disperse the Jewish population and fortify the young nation’s
porous borders. Between 1951 and 1964, twenty-two new towns were established in the
geographical periphery of the country (mostly in the Negev and Galilee) and were populated
primarily by Mizrahim (Jews originating in Muslim countries) of low socioeconomic status. Their
channeling to isolated settlements in remote areas with limited socioeconomic opportunities
further impoverished the new residents, exacerbating inequalities with the more established,
mostly Ashkenazi (Jews originating from Europe and North America) population that dominated
Israel’s geographic core (Lipshitz, 1991).
4. Access refers to factors, which enable or constrain engagement of social agents with dierent
forms of mobility whereas competence refers to physical, administrative, and organizational
capabilities that may make them more or less prone to mobility. Finally, appropriation is the
means by which agents construe and deploy access and competence.
5. Inequalities in the realm of higher education have been persistent even in the face of the
system’s recent overhaul. Indeed, research has shown that the establishment of dozens of
regional colleges in peripheral areas have had important detrimental eects on them. Not only
are most colleges stigmatized for their inferior academic quality, but their peripheral graduates
are often b-listed when applying for prestigious jobs in the national core (Ayalon & Yogev, 2005).
6. Eighteen-year-old women and men are required by law to enlist in the IDF for two and three
years, respectively. The IDF, historically a quintessential space of producing inter – ethnic and
inter-regional inequalities, has more recently turned into an important mechanism of social
and economic mobility among minority groups – primarily Mizrahi Jews, Bedouin Arabs and
Druze (see Levy, 1998, 2007).
Disclosure statement
No potential conict of interest was reported by the authors.
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