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Design and Governance of Platform Ecosystems – Key Concepts and Issues for Future Research

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The purpose of this paper is to give an overview of current research in IS on the design and govern-ance of platform ecosystems. To this end, we conduct a literature review of relevant journals and conferences. We show that platform ecosystems have been analysed from two different perspectives: technology and market-oriented. Thereby, most studies take on the viewpoint of the platform owner. Furthermore , we summarize key concepts on the design and governance of platform ecosystems that have been discussed in literature. As most relevant concepts we identify the definition of roles, pricing, boundary resources and openness. Based on this analysis, we derive issues for future research: the integration of market-and technology-oriented perspectives, an individual level of analysis to include complementors and end-users and the role of data as boundary resource in platform ecosystems. This paper contributes to the understanding of platform ecosystems in IS literature by structuring existing research with regard to different perspectives and concepts and by providing starting points for future work. In addition, it lays out which concepts practitioners need to consider when designing and governing platform ecosystems.
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Twenty-Fourth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), İstanbul,Turkey, 2016
DESIGN AND GOVERNANCE OF PLATFORM
ECOSYSTEMS KEY CONCEPTS AND ISSUES FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH
Research
Schreieck, Maximilian, Technical University of Munich, Munich, Germany,
maximilian.schreieck@in.tum.de
Wiesche, Manuel, Technical University of Munich, Munich, Germany, wiesche@in.tum.de
Krcmar, Helmut, Technical University of Munich, Munich, Germany, krcmar@in.tum.de
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to give an overview of current research in IS on the design and govern-
ance of platform ecosystems. To this end, we conduct a literature review of relevant journals and con-
ferences. We show that platform ecosystems have been analysed from two different perspectives: tech-
nology- and market-oriented. Thereby, most studies take on the viewpoint of the platform owner. Fur-
thermore, we summarize key concepts on the design and governance of platform ecosystems that have
been discussed in literature. As most relevant concepts we identify the definition of roles, pricing,
boundary resources and openness. Based on this analysis, we derive issues for future research: the
integration of market- and technology-oriented perspectives, an individual level of analysis to include
complementors and end-users and the role of data as boundary resource in platform ecosystems. This
paper contributes to the understanding of platform ecosystems in IS literature by structuring existing
research with regard to different perspectives and concepts and by providing starting points for future
work. In addition, it lays out which concepts practitioners need to consider when designing and gov-
erning platform ecosystems.
Keywords: Platform ecosystem, platform governance, boundary resource, literature review.
Schreieck et al. /Governance of Platform Ecosystems
Twenty-Fourth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), İstanbul,Turkey, 2016 2
1 Introduction
Proliferating digital platforms will be at the heart of tomorrow’s economy, and even government”,
The Economist stated last year, referring to the dominance of platform ecosystems in today’s economy
("Something to stand on," 2014). In a broad sense, platforms can be defined as “foundational products,
services, or technologies upon which additional complementary products, services or technologies can
be developed” (Gawer, 2009b). The term platform ecosystem refers to the platform and all stakehold-
ers interacting on the platform (Gawer & Cusumano, 2013). The dominance of platform ecosystems
can be underlined by two numbers: six out of ten of the most valuable brands in the Interbrand index
have platform-based business models ("Best Global Brands," 2014) including Apple and Google with
their platform ecosystems dominating the market of smartphones. At the same time, all ten start-ups
included in the list of the most trending start-ups in 2015 are, to a certain extent, based on platforms
("SpotRocket - Quantitative rankings of the world's hottest startups," 2015). The list includes for ex-
ample Uber, Airbnb and Spotify as platforms connecting providers and consumers of services, and
cloudera, a technological platform for processing big data.
Platform ecosystems need to attract and coordinate two or more different target groups also referred to
as sides (Gawer, 2009b) in most cases complementors and customers (Tiwana, 2014) for example
drivers and passengers in the case of Uber or developers and end-users in the case of an app store. The
right design and a suitable governance concept are therefore key to orchestrating a successful platform
ecosystem with all stakeholders (Smedlund & Faghankhani, 2015). As described by Tiwana,
Konsynski, and Venkatraman (2013) in a special issue of the Journal of Management Information Sys-
tems on IT governance, new organizational forms enabled by IT such as platform ecosystems raise the
questions “Who is governed?”, “What is governed?” and “How is it governed?”. Answering these
questions in the right way is crucial for platform owners especially in view of the fierce competition
between ecosystems (Mantena & Saha, 2012). The owners of platform ecosystems constantly compete
with others to gain market share both in the group of end-users and complementors. For example, Am-
azon is trying to gain ground in the market for mobile device applications which is dominated by
Google and Apple. Amazon has just launched the program “underground” as an attempt to undermine
the Google Play Store on Android as marketplace for mobile applications (Dillet, 2015).
Since the late 1990s, motivated by Microsoft’s unpreceded success with its operating system platform
Windows, IS research tries to understand how successful platform ecosystems in the IT industry need
to be designed and governed (Bakos, 1998; Messerschmitt & Szyperski, 2003; Selander, Henfridsson,
& Svahn, 2010). Researchers analysed the technical requirements of software platforms (Baldwin &
Woodard, 2008), characteristics of successful platforms (Tan, Pan, Lu, & Huang, 2015), optimal pric-
ing for platform-based businesses (Lin, Li, & Whinston, 2011) and control mechanisms applied on
platforms (Goldbach & Kemper, 2014). These aspects all relate to how platform ecosystems are de-
signed and governed (Hein, Schreieck, Wiesche, & Krcmar, 2016; Tiwana, Konsynski, & Bush,
2010). However, the growing base of literature builds on different understandings of the term platform
and different perspectives on platform ecosystems. While some researchers view platforms as an IT
artefact (Baldwin & Woodard, 2008), others define it as an abstract construct that brings together dif-
ferent parties (Bakos & Katsamakas, 2008). As a result, findings on the design and governance of plat-
form ecosystems lack conceptual consensus.
Several authors have already contributed to structuring the research field of platforms. Thomas, Autio,
and Gann (2014) provide a comprehensive review from a management research point of view that not
only includes platform ecosystems but also organizational platforms, product family platforms and
market intermediaries. This analysis needs to be concretized for the IS field. Existing literature re-
views on platform ecosystems in IS provide a focus on specific concepts related to platform ecosys-
tems and do not provide an overview of concepts (Porch, Timbrell, & Rosemann, 2015; Smedlund &
Faghankhani, 2015). In order to understand the role of design and governance in platform ecosystems,
Schreieck et al. /Governance of Platform Ecosystems
Twenty-Fourth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), İstanbul,Turkey, 2016 3
it is necessary to structure existing contributions based on their perspectives on platform ecosystems
and the various concepts of design and governance they focus on. We thereby build on the framework
developed by Tiwana et al. (2010) which is the first to integrate concepts of design and governance of
platform ecosystems.
Towards this end, we conducted a literature review, condensing different perspectives on platform
ecosystems in the first step. We determine that platform ecosystems have been analysed from two dif-
ferent perspectives: technology- and market-oriented. Thereby, most studies take on the viewpoint of
the platform owner. In the second step, we present key concepts of the design and governance of plat-
form ecosystems identified in literature. By discussing these concepts, our review reveals major open
issues related to the design and governance of platform ecosystems: the integration of the two perspec-
tives on platform ecosystems when discussing design and governance concepts, an individual level of
analysis to consider characteristics of the actors in platform ecosystems and the role of data as bounda-
ry resource in platform ecosystems. Addressing these open issues will significantly contribute to our
understanding of platform ecosystems and in particular of the key concepts of design and governance.
The results will prove useful for practitioners that set up or run platform ecosystems and lack a struc-
tured overview of influencing factors on and within the platform ecosystem.
In the remainder of the paper, we first describe the process of literature search. Then, we present the
results by structuring contributions according to different perspectives on platform ecosystems and by
presenting the compiled concepts for the design and governance of platform ecosystems. Based on
these findings, we discuss themes for future research.
2 Design of the Literature Review
In this review, we looked for publications that (a) focus on the platform ecosystem as unit of analysis
and (b) derive explicit or implicit insights on how to design and govern platform ecosystems. Towards
this end, we screened relevant outlets drawing on the guidelines by Webster and Watson (2002) and
vom Brocke et al. (2009) and subsequently coded the studies with regard to their key results on plat-
form ecosystems.
First, we conducted an all-field search (title, abstract, keywords, references) with the key word “plat-
form” in the journals included in the Senior Scholars Basket of Journals of the Association for Infor-
mation Systems. We screened the abstract of all 367 articles and identified 30 publications that
matched both search criteria (a) and (b). If the match to our search criteria was unclear after reading
the abstract, we read the full text to decide on the inclusion of the respective articles. Second, we per-
formed a forward and backward search based on the publications gathered so far. This resulted in 40
additional articles from a variety of outlets. The sample includes books, such as the textbook “Plat-
forms, Markets and Innovation” by Gawer (2009a), dissertations, e.g. from Qiu (2013), and articles
from economic journals as long as they are related to the field of IS. Third, we extended our search to
the leading IS conferences to include the most recent research topics. We focused on contributions
published at the following conferences since 2013: International Conference on Information Systems
(ICIS), European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), Hawaii International Conference on
System Sciences (HICSS), Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS) and Wirtschafts-
informatik (WI). We restricted the search to title, abstract and keywords and excluded research-in-
progress papers. Compared to the search in journals, we used the more specific search term “platform
AND (ecosystem OR architecture OR governance OR control)” in order to end up with a manageable
amount of hits. Again, the articles that resulted from the search were screened and selected according
Schreieck et al. /Governance of Platform Ecosystems
Twenty-Fourth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), İstanbul,Turkey, 2016 4
to the criteria defined above. This step yielded another 27 articles (Table 1). Finally, 6 articles were
added to the sample based on suggestions by the reviewers
1
, leading to a total of 103 articles.
We then coded the selected articles along three main coding dimensions, using an explorative coding
process which was repeated iteratively to develop conclusive coding constructs for each of the catego-
ries (Lacity, Khan, Yan, & Willcocks, 2010). The first dimension represents the research method used
in the articles. An overview of the predominant methods in a field of research helps to assess its ma-
turity and to identify methods for future studies that complement existing research (Edmondson &
McManus, 2007). The second dimension covers the articles’ perspectives on platform ecosystems.
This builds on previous literature reviews that have identified different streams of literature on plat-
forms and helps to take a holistic perspective on platform ecosystems. The perspective also includes
whether the studies focus on the platform owner, the complementors or the end-users. The third di-
mension comprises all concepts related to the design and governance of platform ecosystems that are
discussed in the respective article. In addition to the main coding dimensions, we gathered information
on the cases and examples used in the studies. By summarizing the insights along the coding dimen-
sions, we can carve out the focal points of existing research and identify issues for future research.
Outlet
Search
Hits
Selected
Top journals
MISQ
“platform”
in
all fields
52
8
JAIS
35
1
ISR
59
8
JMIS
76
3
ISJ
12
4
JIT
60
4
EJIS
45
0
JSIS
28
2
Top confer-
ences
ICIS
“platform AND (ecosystem OR architecture OR governance
OR control)”
in
title, abstract and keywords
(published since 2013, no RIPs)
99
5
ECIS
89
8
AMCIS
150
6
HICSS
33
4
WI
21
4
Other
Other journals
Forward and backward search
(for articles in top journals)
-
22
Other confer-
ences
-
2
Dissertations
-
3
Books / book
chapters
-
6
Other
-
7
Total
728
97
Table 1. Summary of the literature search process. Six additional articles were added during
the review process.
3 Research on Platform Ecosystems
In this part of the literature review, we summarize the insights from the selected and coded articles on
platform ecosystems in IS following the three main coding dimensions: research method, perspectives
on platform ecosystems, and concepts of design and governance of platform ecosystems.
1
Articles suggested by the reviewers: Wareham, Fox, and Cano Giner (2015), Boudreau (2012), Tiwana (2015), Liu, Au, and
Choi (2014), Selander, Henfridsson, and Svahn (2013), Kude, Dibbern, and Heinzl (2012)
Schreieck et al. /Governance of Platform Ecosystems
Twenty-Fourth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), İstanbul,Turkey, 2016 5
3.1 Research Methods
Research interest in platforms in IS has constantly increased since the late 1990s (see Figure 1). First
platform ecosystems such as IBM’s hardware-based personal computer platform and especially Mi-
crosoft’s tremendously successful software-based Windows platform attracted the interest of IS re-
search. We analysed which research methods are used in the publications and found that the majority
of contributions is based on qualitative research.
67 publications apply qualitative methods, whereof 36 are based on case studies. These cases mostly
focus on the successful platform ecosystems of the last decades: Microsoft with its Windows ecosys-
tem (Eurich, Giessmann, Mettler, & Stanoevska-Slabeva, 2011) as well as Google and Apple with
their app store ecosystems (Manner, Nienaber, & Schermann, 2013). Another 25 studies apply various
qualitative approaches such as theory building based on qualitative insights (Grover & Kohli, 2012) or
expert interviews (Bergvall-Kåreborn & Howcroft, 2014). Quantitative insights are presented in 28
studies. Researchers apply data analysis (Basole & Karla, 2011), experiments (Goldbach & Benlian,
2014), surveys (Goldbach & Benlian, 2015), simulations (Butler, Bateman, & Gray, 2014) as well as
mathematical models to understand the formation of prices (Bakos & Katsamakas, 2008) or to under-
stand processes and relationships in platform ecosystems.
Plotting the data over time reveals that the share of quantitative research has increased over the last
decade (see Figure 1). According to Edmondson and McManus (2007) who evaluate the maturity of
research fields, this increase in the share of quantitative studies shows that the topic platform in IS is
currently evolving from a nascent to an intermediate field of research.
Figure 1. Number of quantitative and qualitative studies on platforms in IS over time (results
from conference proceedings excluded, as the search was restricted to 2013-2015).
3.2 Perspectives on Platform Ecosystems
Our iterative coding process revealed two important dimensions along which studies take on different
perspectives on platform ecosystems. First, studies have a different understanding of the platform eco-
system as unit of analysis. We therefore identify different perspectives on platform ecosystems by
bringing together definitions and viewpoints from various studies. Second, studies focus on different
stakeholders of the platform ecosystem, the platform owner, the complementors or the end-users. Both
dimensions are discussed below. Regarding the understanding of the platform ecosystem, we identi-
fied more than 20 different definitions of the term “platform” referring to the core of the platform eco-
system. Based on these definitions and on existing attempts to cluster them, we derived two character-
istics that can be used to differentiate platforms: technology- vs. market-oriented (Dibia & Wagner,
2015; Gawer, 2014; Thomas et al., 2014) and internal vs. external (Gawer, 2014; Porch et al., 2015).
As we focus our literature review on platform ecosystems, we can assume that the underlying plat-
forms are external, i.e. they bring together different actors to enable interactions that would not be
Schreieck et al. /Governance of Platform Ecosystems
Twenty-Fourth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), İstanbul,Turkey, 2016 6
possible without the platform (Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2011). We therefore focus on the character-
istic technology- vs. market-oriented (see Table 2). The analysis suggests that the characteristic tech-
nology- vs. market-oriented is not mutually exclusive. An app store, for example, is a marketplace for
apps, enabled by the underlying technology, i.e. the mobile device’s operating system and its applica-
tion programming interfaces (APIs). We therefore see technology- and market-oriented as two per-
spectives on platform ecosystems. To a certain extent, all platform ecosystems need underlying tech-
nology and will exhibit characteristics of a market.
According to the technology-oriented perspective, a platform is defined as “a set of stable components
that supports variety and evolvability in a system by constraining the linkages among the other com-
ponents” (Baldwin & Woodard, 2008). This definition comprises software platforms such as operating
systems (e.g. Apple’s iOS) and hardware platforms such as IT infrastructure or computing hardware
(e.g. wireless networks) (Fichman, 2004). The purpose of technological platforms is to enable co-
creation of value in the platform ecosystem by complementors, for example the creation of applica-
tions for an operating system platform. Accordingly, studies taking on a technology-perspective, focus
on study variables that influence the intensity of the co-creation of value such as openness (Benlian,
Hilkert, & Hess, 2015) or the provision of boundary resources (Bianco, Myllarniemi, Komssi, &
Raatikainen, 2014).
Following the market-oriented perspective, platform ecosystems can be seen as “markets, where users’
interactions with each other are subject to network effects and are facilitated by a common platform
provided by one or more intermediaries” (Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2011). This definition
comprises e-commerce marketplaces where goods and services are exchanged (e.g. Ebay) as well as
communities where information is exchanged (e.g. Facebook). Intermediaries bring together different
parties to enable a transaction between these parties (Thomas et al., 2014). While Ebay connects buy-
ers and sellers, Facebook connects providers and consumers of information. The market perspective
on platform ecosystems is rooted in economics, where characteristics of multi-sided markets have
been an ongoing research topic (Weyl, 2010). The purpose of market platforms is to match supply and
demand on a digital marketplace. Therefore, studies taking on the market-oriented perspective focus
on study variables such as the number of market sides (Economides & Tåg, 2012) or the competitive
strategy (Armstrong, 2006) to understand price formation and the success of intermediaries.
Technology-oriented perspective
Market-oriented perspective
Definition
“A set of stable components that supports
variety and evolvability in a system by con-
straining the linkages among the other com-
ponents” (Baldwin & Woodard, 2008)
“Markets, where users’ interactions with
each other are subject to network effects and
are facilitated by a common platform pro-
vided by one or more intermediaries”
(Eisenmann et al., 2011)
Sub-categories
Software platform, hardware platform
Marketplace, community
Examples
Google Play, Apple App Store, SAP HANA
Cloud Platform, IBM Watson
Airbnb, Uber, Spotify, Facebook
Purpose
Co-creation of value, innovation
Matching of supply and demand, exchange
of information
Selected
independent
variables
Perceived openness
Boundary resources
Availability of complementary products
Control mode
Number of market sides
Network effects
Centrality
Competitive strategy
Selected
dependent vari-
ables
Number of third-party applications
Rate of innovation
Platform adoption
Platform stickiness
Welfare
Equilibrium price
Platform adoption
Table 2. Summary of the technology- and market-oriented perspective on platform ecosystems.
Schreieck et al. /Governance of Platform Ecosystems
Twenty-Fourth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), İstanbul,Turkey, 2016 7
The contributions considered in this literature review by the majority focus on one of the perspectives
(Table 3). Over all outlets, only 10 studies explicitly cover both perspectives.
Article
Perspective (Platform Ecosystem)
Perspective (Stakeholder)
Technology
Market
Owner
Comple-
mentor
End-user
Soft-
ware
Hard
ware
Market-
place
Commu-
nity
Top journals
Anderson, Parker, and Tan (2014)
X
X
X
Avgerou and Li (2013)
X
X
X
Bakos and Katsamakas (2008)
X
X
Benlian et al. (2015)
X
X
Bergvall-Kåreborn and Howcroft (2014)
X
X
Bock, Ahuja, Suh, and Yap (2015)
X
X
X
Butler et al. (2014)
X
X
X
Ceccagnoli et al. (2012)
X
X
Claussen, Kretschmer, and Mayrhofer (2013)
X
X
X
X
Eaton (2015)
X
X
X
Fichman (2004)
X
X
Ghazawneh and Henfridsson (2013)
X
X
Gnyawali, Fan, and Penner (2010)
X
X
X
Grover and Kohli (2012)
X
X
Hackney, Burn, and Salazar (2004)
X
X
Koch and Schultze (2011)
X
X
Koh and Fichman (2012)
X
X
Kuk and Janssen (2013)
X
X
X
Lin et al. (2011)
X
X
X
Lindgren, Eriksson, and Lyytinen (2015)
X
X
Liu et al. (2014)
X
X
X
Lusch and Nambisan (2015)
X
X
X
Mantena and Saha (2012)
X
X
Markus and Loebbecke (2013)
X
X
Ondrus, Gannamaneni, and Lyytinen (2015)
X
X
X
Rai and Tang (2014)
X
X
Sambamurthy and Zmud (2000)
X
X
Selander et al. (2013)
X
X
Shaw and Holland (2010)
X
X
Spagnoletti, Resca, and Lee (2015)
X
X
X
X
Tiwana (2015)
X
X
X
Tiwana et al. (2010)
X
X
Yaraghi, Du, Sharman, Gopal, and Ramesh
(2015)
X
X
X
X
Top conferences and others
70 articles
40
3
22
2
60
17
7
Total
61
5
34
9
85
31
10
Table 3. Perspectives on platforms in IS research.
In addition to the different perspectives on platform ecosystems, we coded which stakeholder the stud-
ies in our review focus on the platform owner, the complementor or the end-user (Table 3). The plat-
form owner runs the platform and orchestrates the involved parties and processes on the platform. In
most cases, the platform owner initiated the opening of the platform to enable the co-creation of value
from third-parties (Ceccagnoli, Forman, Huang, & Wu, 2012) or to establish an exchange platform he
can benefit from. In the example of the Apple App Store, Apple itself is the platform owner, running
the App Store as integrated part of the operating system iOS. The complementor is an external party
Schreieck et al. /Governance of Platform Ecosystems
Twenty-Fourth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), İstanbul,Turkey, 2016 8
not directly related to the platform owner that contributes to the platform ecosystem (Eisenmann,
Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2008). App developers who publish apps on the Apple App Store can there-
fore be referred to as complementors. The end-user or customer accesses the platform to consume a
service available on the platform (Tiwana et al., 2010). The user of an Apple device is likely to visit
the Apple App Store to download and install applications.
Of those articles, that exhibit a clear focus, 85 take the platform owner’s perspective while only 31
consider the complementor, as for example Goldbach and Benlian (2015), and only 10 consider the
end-user as for example Koh and Fichman (2012) (Table 3). This observation needs to be taken into
account for the discussion of concepts for the design and governance of platform ecosystems as well
as for the deduction of open issues for future research.
3.3 Design and Governance of Platform Ecosystems
Our results show that researchers’ main interest has been to understand why and how platform ecosys-
tems in the IT industry arise and become successful in order to identify the underlying mechanisms of
successful platforms. Ultimately, guidelines how practitioners can design and govern successful plat-
form ecosystems are derived (Benlian et al., 2015; Ondrus et al., 2015; Spagnoletti et al., 2015;
Yaraghi et al., 2015). The success of platforms is usually measured by its size, e.g. number of users,
complementors or complementary products or services (Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2013). For com-
mercial platforms, size alone is not sufficient but has to be complemented by a profitable business
model. While for example the success of the non-profit knowledge platform Wikipedia is measured by
the number of articles, the success of an e-commerce platform such as Ebay also includes the revenue
and profit Ebay generates as platform owner.
To contribute to our understanding of platform ecosystems, we aggregate insights on the design and
governance of platform ecosystems across all studies identified as relevant in our literature search.
Following Tiwana (2014), we differentiate insights on architecture and governance of platform eco-
systems. However, we replace the term architecture by design, broadening the rather technical defini-
tion by Tiwana. He defines the architecture of a platform ecosystem as “a conceptual blueprint that
describes how the ecosystem is partitioned into a relatively stable platform and a complementary set of
apps that are encouraged to vary, and the design rules binding on both”, whereas our understanding of
the design of a platform ecosystem refers to a conceptual blueprint of the whole ecosystem, including
the partners and processes interacting on the platform and that includes both the technology- and mar-
ket-oriented perspective. Governance, the “partitioning of decision-making authority between platform
owners and app developers, control mechanisms, and pricing and pie-sharing structures” (Tiwana,
2014), covers tactical decisions that impact the processes within the platform ecosystem. Governance
is related to both the technology- and market-oriented perspective as it covers technological aspects
such as providing APIs and market-related aspects such as setting prices.
We identified eight key concepts focusing on the design and governance of platform ecosystems (Ta-
ble 4). Some concepts are relevant for both design and governance of platform ecosystems; some pri-
marily affect either design or governance. Furthermore, as depicted in the last three columns of the
table, the concepts have been discussed from a technology- or market-oriented perspective, in some
cases both. In the remainder of this section we will briefly present these concepts.
The definition of roles within a platform ecosystem is an important factor of ecosystem design and
covers for example the number of sides it connects (Gnyawali et al., 2010), the ownership regimes
(Bakos & Katsamakas, 2008), the distribution of power which can be centralized or decentralized and
the relationship to stakeholders of the platform ecosystem (Bullinger, Rass, & Moeslein, 2012). For
example, a platform ecosystem for mobile payment must balance ownership and power of three sides
in the ecosystem (banks, dealers and customers) and establish relationships to partner companies that
can increase its popularity (as airlines and hotels do for credit cards). Roles in platform ecosystems are
Schreieck et al. /Governance of Platform Ecosystems
Twenty-Fourth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), İstanbul,Turkey, 2016 9
discussed from both a technology- and market-oriented perspective, but few studies have integrated
the perspectives.
Pricing and revenue sharing has been studied as a governance mechanism in platform ecosystems.
Pricing and revenue sharing refers to payment flows within the platform ecosystem and how they are
distributed between the different stakeholders. These concepts can be used to support network effects
and to overcome the chicken-and-egg problem in the initial phase of a platform ecosystem (Suarez &
Cusumano, 2009). For example, Microsoft paid software developers to create first apps on the Win-
dows phone platform in order to attract more users. Later on, the developers had to generate revenues
by selling their apps to the end-users or displaying advertisements. Pricing and revenue sharing is
mostly discussed from a market-oriented perspective. However, some studies take the technology-
oriented perspective, for example when pricing for hardware components is analysed (Bresnahan &
Greenstein, 1999).
Boundary resources are tools, regulations or other resources that are used to govern co-creation of
value in platform ecosystems (Eaton, 2015). Most of the publications that cover boundary resources
focus on APIs or software development kits (SDKs) that are used to facilitate co-creation of value.
However, boundary resources can also stunt co-creation of value. For example, rigid regulations for
the approval of complementary products or services on a platform may decrease the complementor’s
motivation (Eaton, 2015). A boundary resource that is gaining importance in practice is data which is
provided by the users of a platform and can be made accessible for the complementors (Gawer, 2014).
While data is mentioned as boundary resource in literature, its role is not yet analysed in detail.
Boundary resources are analysed from a technology-oriented perspective as they impact the technical
details of contributing to a platform but also complementors’ motivation. Again, only few studies inte-
grate a technology- and market-oriented view.
Openness refers to “to the easing of restrictions on the use, development and commercialization of a
technology” (Boudreau, 2010). Following Boudreau (2010), a platform ecosystem can be opened by
granting access to the platform or by partially giving up control over the platform. For example, Mi-
crosoft grants access to the Windows platform for application developers but stays in control, whereas
in the Linux platform, the underlying technology has been made completely available to stakeholders
(Ondrus et al., 2015). While choosing the right degree of openness is part of the design of a platform
ecosystem, it can also be adjusted dynamically to govern the ecosystem as shown in case studies on
Android and iOS (Homscheid, Kilian, & Schaarschmidt, 2015). So far, openness is mostly discussed
from a technology-oriented perspective as it is closely related to how access is granted to technology.
Few studies also consider the market-oriented perspective or both perspectives.
In addition to these concepts, we identified control, technical design, competitive strategy and trust as
relevant concepts discussed by several authors. Control, in general, is used to “direct attention, moti-
vate, and encourage organizational members to act according to organizational goals and objectives
(Wiesche, Schermann, & Krcmar, 2011) and IS play a key role to implement control mechanisms
(Schermann, Wiesche, & Krcmar, 2012; Wiesche, Berwing, Schermann, & Krcmar, 2011). In platform
ecosystems, control refers to how the platform owner governs the processes within his platform eco-
system and can be divided into formal control mechanisms (e.g. output control) and informal control
mechanisms (e.g. clan control) (Tiwana, 2014). Technical design comprises the modular architecture
of the platform (Tiwana et al., 2010), the definition of its interfaces and the compatibility to relevant
systems. Competitive strategy describes whether competition, collaboration, or the mélange of both,
co-opetition, is the most suitable strategy to establish a platform ecosystem among competing ones
(Mantena & Saha, 2012). Trust as counterpart of power is a basic prerequisite for a platform ecosys-
tem to succeed (Hurni & Huber, 2014). It is relevant for the relationship between platform owner and
complementors as well as for the relationship between customers and the platform ecosystem as a
whole. Similar to the concepts described above, only few studies integrate the technology- and market-
oriented perspective when discussing control, technical design, competitive strategy and trust.
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Twenty-Fourth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), İstanbul,Turkey, 2016 10
Concept
Aspects
No. of studies
technology-
oriented
market-
oriented
both
Roles
Number of sides
Ownership
Distribution of power
Relationship to stakeholders
15
14
2
Pricing and revenue sharing
Achieving network effects
Barriers to market entry
Subsidizing of one or more sides
8
16
3
Boundary resources
Software tools (API, SDK)
Documentation
Data
14
7
2
Openness
Granting access to technology
Giving up control over technology
13
3
2
Control
Informal control mechanisms
Formal control mechanisms
12
1
2
Technical design
Modularity
Interfaces
Compatibility
10
4
1
Competitive strategy
Competition
Co-opetition, collaboration
Single vs. multihoming
1
5
1
Trust
Relationship complementor platform
owner
Relationship end-user platform
1
1
1
Table 4. Concepts of design and governance of platform ecosystems.
4 Central Issues for Future Research on Platform Ecosystems in IS
In this section, we discuss central issues for future research on the design and governance of platform
ecosystems in IS based on the insights gained in the analysis of existing literature. We discuss three
major issues: the integration of the different perspectives on platform ecosystems when analysing de-
sign and governance concepts, an individual level of analysis in platform ecosystems and the role of
data as boundary resource in platform ecosystems. We suggest that future research on these issues will
deepen our understanding of platform ecosystems and allow to derive recommendations for their im-
plementation and management in practice.
4.1 Integrating Different Perspectives on Platform Ecosystems with Design
and Governance Concepts
Future research can gain additional insights on how to design and govern ecosystems by integrating
the technology- and market-oriented perspective on platform ecosystems. None of the platform-based
businesses can be described with only one of the perspectives (Basole, 2009). An app store, for exam-
ple, is a marketplace that matches demand for and supply of applications on mobile devices. At the
same time, the app store is the platform owner’s vehicle to co-create value on his technological plat-
form, i.e. the operating system of the mobile devices. To understand such platform ecosystems that
can be interpreted as two interlaced platforms a technology and a market platform the technology-
and market-oriented perspectives have to be integrated. Existing literature rarely adapts an integrated
view, as shown in our review.
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Twenty-Fourth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), İstanbul,Turkey, 2016 11
All of the constructs related to the design and governance of platform ecosystems that we have identi-
fied in our literature review, can be viewed from a technology- and a market-oriented perspective. For
example, providing boundary resources such as APIs or development tools is, on the one hand, a tech-
nological aspect of governance used to incentivize developers to contribute to a platform ecosystem.
On the other hand, providing boundary resources will also impact the platform ecosystem as a market-
place by increasing the competition between developers. Similarly, the agreement on decision rights
for the different stakeholders within the platform ecosystem is influenced by technology- and market-
oriented considerations: decision rights for developers on a platform may include the tools and frame-
works used but also the prices that can be set in the market.
First contributions integrate the different perspectives with regard to specific phenomena. For exam-
ple, Claussen et al. (2013) discuss incentives for developers of Facebook apps while interpreting the
Facebook app store as market and technological platform. Yet, many concepts related to the design
and governance of platform ecosystems still need to be evaluated against the integrated view.
Cusumano (2010) stated that “[w]ho wins and who loses these competitions is not simply a matter of
who has the best technology or the first product. It is often who has the best platform strategy and the
best ecosystem […].” In order to come up with the best strategy for a platform ecosystem, research
and practitioners need to consider both the technology- and the market-oriented perspective.
In doing so, research should not only focus on case studies of successful platform ecosystems, as “suc-
cessful […] platforms are the exception” (Hagiu, 2014). Insights from failed platform ecosystems can
enhance the field and provide additional insights. Within multiple-case studies of successful and non-
successful platform ecosystems, patterns for successful design and governance strategies could
emerge. As a starting point, a case survey of existing case studies as described by Jurisch, Wolf, and
Krcmar (2013) could provide valuable insights.
4.2 An Individual Level of Analysis for End-users and Complementors
Our review revealed that most studies focus on the platform owner, neglecting the perspective of the
end-user or complementor. For example, Table 3 shows that no study with a technology-oriented per-
spective takes on the end-user perspective although the end-user is also affected by technological deci-
sions of the platform owner. The complementor’s perspective, even though adapted by several more
recent publications (Bergvall-Kåreborn & Howcroft, 2014; Goldbach & Benlian, 2015; Hurni &
Huber, 2014), is based on an abstract representation of the complementor, its characteristics are not
considered on an individual level of analysis. Bergvall-Kåreborn and Howcroft (2014) argue that
complementors and end-users need to be seen as individuals because their different characteristics can
impact the relationship they establish to the platform ecosystem. Including the complementors and
end-users into the analysis, will also allow to discuss a bottom-up approach in the design and govern-
ance instead of interpreting it as a top-down approach only a gap that has recently been shown by
Constantinides and Barrett (2015).
A software developer from an open source community might be incentivized by open interfaces and
the freedom to decide on the tools and frameworks to use. A start up, on the other hand, might focus
on reliable, documented interfaces and adequate pricing and revenue sharing. Depending on which
types of complementors a platform owner wants to attract, different design and governance concepts
may prove useful. To understand the role of individual complementors and end-users, future research
should take on an individual level of analysis. Experiments or simulations could generate insights de-
tached from specific cases as for example in the experiment by Goldbach and Benlian (2014) who
compare different control mechanisms in platform ecosystems. Similar to Schilling, Laumer, and
Weitzel (2011) who evaluate the motivation of open source software developers depending on their
personality, personality traits and more specific characteristics such as a complementor’s self-efficacy
or goal setting could be evaluated. In doing, so it could be worthwhile to not only analyse current
Schreieck et al. /Governance of Platform Ecosystems
Twenty-Fourth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), İstanbul,Turkey, 2016 12
complementors and end-users of a platform but also complementors who failed with their product and
end-users who have already turned their back on the platform ecosystem.
Complementors and end-users are not necessarily individuals. Especially in the case of business-to-
business platform ecosystems, complementary products are created by and sold to companies. Instead
of a large crowd of developers, the platform owner has to govern a group of partner companies. Some
of them might be strategic partners that enhance the platform ecosystems value for customers signifi-
cantly. With regard to the customer companies, a platform needs to provide firm-specific solutions that
are still based on the same technological platform, a challenge that for example all ERP system pro-
viders are facing at the moment. Based on research on interfirm networks, the role of relationships and
strategic partnerships could be a worthwhile area for future research.
4.3 Data as Boundary Resource in Platform Ecosystems
In our analysis of existing literature, we identified the concept of boundary resources as one of the
most important governance mechanisms. At the same time, Gawer (2014) depicts the importance of
data as boundary resource. However, no article explicitly analyses the role of data as boundary re-
source in platform ecosystems. In practice, many of today’s platform ecosystems are fuelled by data.
For example, Google and Facebook use the aggregated user data to sell personalized advertisements,
attract developers by providing selected data streams via API (Gawer, 2014) and build additional ser-
vices such as Google’s real-time traffic information service based on movement data of Android users
(Barth, 2009). As data is usually provided via APIs, it is also worthwhile to analyse how these inter-
faces define standards for data exchange and how these standards change over time. This might affect
the optimal design and governance of platform ecosystems.
Data that is aggregated in a platform ecosystem can even be a threat. Developers can use the data ag-
gregated by their own apps to strengthen its competitive position vis-à-vis the platform owner. For
example, fitbit, a seller of fitness trackers, uses the data aggregated by its iOS and Android apps to
establish its own ecosystem based on wearables perhaps one reason why Apple and Google push
their own fitness and health ecosystems Apple Health and Google Fit (Pressman, 2015). The way the
data flow is handled in platform ecosystems is therefore an important aspect of platform governance,
largely neglected in existing literature.
First publications have touched the topic of data in platform ecosystems in the context of open data
(Ponte, 2015), wearables (Sun, Lou, Li, & Wang, 2015), and inter-organizational collaborations (van
den Broek & Veenstra, 2015) but did not explicitly consider its role as boundary resource. A first step
would be to evaluate how data is used to govern platform ecosystems in practice and to generalize the
findings. This will enhance research on governance of platform ecosystems and address a topic that is
highly relevant in practice.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we summarized recent literature on platform ecosystems and derived open issues for fur-
ther research based on the results. We analysed the methodology applied by the studies in our review,
determined different perspectives research takes on platform ecosystems and condensed the key con-
cepts of design and governance of platform ecosystems. In doing so, we identified three major issues
for further research. First, we suggest to integrate the market- and technology-oriented perspective
when discussing phenomena on platform ecosystems. This is in particular relevant for design and gov-
ernance concepts such as boundary resources or openness that are implemented technically but impact
the market-related processes on the platform. Second, we think that future research needs to integrate
complementors and end-users into the analysis in addition to the platform owner. An individual level
of analysis would further contribute to our understanding as each contributor and end-user is different.
Third, we recommend to study data as boundary resource in more detail. Data has been mentioned in
Schreieck et al. /Governance of Platform Ecosystems
Twenty-Fourth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), İstanbul,Turkey, 2016 13
several contributions as boundary resource fuelling platform ecosystems and is highly relevant in prac-
tice.
By reviewing existing literature and deriving issues for future research, our study contributes to IS
governance literature in several ways. First, we provide a holistic overview on research related to the
design and governance of platform ecosystems. The overview integrates contributions that were previ-
ously not related due to a heterogeneous understanding of platforms and platform ecosystems. There-
by, we provide a unified foundation for future research on design and governance of platform ecosys-
tems. Second, we summarize concepts related to the design and governance of platform ecosystems
across all studies. In doing so, we identify the key challenges relevant for all platform ecosystems and
reference the current state of research regarding these challenges. Third, we derive specific issues for
future research that are rooted in existing research but show how our understanding of platform eco-
systems and their governance can be enhanced. Finally, our study is relevant for practice by laying out
which concepts practitioners need to consider when designing and governing a platform ecosystem.
Currently, digital platforms spring up like mushrooms while others are withering and practitioners try
to figure out how to bring them to success. The issues we identified will provide useful in practice and
will further advance the applicability of the scientific findings on platform ecosystems.
The results of our study underlie several limitations. First, the literature search might not cover all rel-
evant studies due to the choice of outlets and keywords. For example, alternative terms for the concept
of platform ecosystems such as software ecosystem, partnership network, etc. might yield additional
relevant articles. Second, the coding process we conducted simplifies the results of the studies to make
them comparable. Similar concepts were merged to superordinate concepts, as summarized in Table 5
in the appendix. In the course of this process, some insights might have been lost and are not repre-
sented in our results. A greater level of detail within studies that focus on specific concepts might gen-
erate additional insights. Third, our twofold perspective on platforms in IS, market- and technology-
oriented needs to be concretized with further cases from practice. While the perspectives are based on
existing literature on platforms, we could not clarify all communalities and differences between the
perspectives within the scope of this review. Fourth, the issues for future research that we derived
from our results may be influenced by the authors perspective and the topic. Further open issues might
therefore exist and can be discovered by future work.
Acknowledgment
We thank the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy for funding this research as
part of the project 01MD15001D (ExCELL).
Appendix
Omitted concept
Comment
Business model
merged with competitive strategy
Features and functionalities
merged with technical design
Information and transparency
merged with boundary resources
Decision rights
merged with roles
Resolve conflicts
merged with roles
Network effects
merged with pricing and revenue sharing
Data
merged with boundary resources
Table 5. Omitted coding constructs of governance and design of platform ecosystems.
Schreieck et al. /Governance of Platform Ecosystems
Twenty-Fourth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), İstanbul,Turkey, 2016 14
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... (2) Decision and Control Rights: This dimension refers to the distribution of decision rights (e.g., authority and responsibility) and formal control (Tiwana, 2014). This includes establishing and enforcing rules and agreed protocols for exchanging information and resources to encourage desirable behavior according to the platforms' objectives (Halckenhaeusser et al., 2020;Schreieck et al., 2016). In addition, it encompasses defining rights and duties for the involved stakeholders (Huber et al., 2017;Wareham et al., 2014). ...
... (3) Access: Access refers to restrictions in terms of usage, development, participation, and technological decisions (Boudreau, 2010;Schreieck et al., 2016). It defines who is allowed to access the platform through, e.g., screening mechanisms or access fees (Chen et al., 2022a). ...
... (4) Boundary Resources: Boundary resources are used to arrange and determine the nature of the value co-creation in and around the platform and to facilitate complementary innovations (Gawer, 2014;Schreieck et al., 2016). They can be technical Application Program Interfaces, Software Development Kits, and other types of social resources, such as knowledge and organizing developer conferences for community building (Foerderer et al., 2019;Chen et al., 2022a). ...
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... David-West et al. (2018) argue that while the economic perspective provides insights into platform competition, the technological perspective primarily focuses on innovation. In this regard, the platform serves as a foundation where innovation takes place within its modules (Gawer 2014;Schreieck et al. 2016). This understanding of the technological perspective of platforms is also well captured by Tiwana et al. (2010), who define a platform as "the extensible codebase of a software-based system that provides core functionality shared by the modules that interoperate with it and the interfaces through which they interoperate" (David-West et al. 2018). ...
... However, these scholars also point out that the drawback of this perspective is that it tends to view the platform solely as a piece of software and fails to consider it as a comprehensive business model (David-West et al. 2018;Gawer 2014;Gawer and Cusumano 2014;Li et al. 2023;Patel et al. 2020). While research adopting the technological perspective of platforms neglects to consider pricing, revenue sharing, or competitive strategy, its counterpart that adopts the economic perspective pays less attention to issues of control, openness, and technology design (Schreieck et al. 2016). Recognising the limitations of these two categorisation domains, researchers have recommended integrating both views, as no single perspective can fully capture the complexity of a platform (Gawer 2014;Schreieck et al. 2016). ...
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... Platform owners use governance mechanisms to control complementors' interactions and influence their value-creating innovations (Eisenmann, Parker and Van Alstyne, 2006;Scholten and Scholten, 2012). Platform governance is defined as the rules and standards set by platform owners to control and coordinate interactions among users and complementors (e.g., developers, third-party service providers) (Tiwana, Konsynski and Bush, 2010;Schreieck, Wiesche and Krcmar, 2016). Platform governance is deeply intertwined with the technical design of digital platforms (Tiwana, Konsynski and Bush, 2010). ...
... This study advances the comprehension of the interplay between platform governance and signals by illustrating how governance concepts can concurrently exert signaling effects. Critical components of platform governance, such as technical boundary resources and input control, structure the interactions in the ecosystem (Schreieck, Wiesche and Krcmar, 2016). However, changes to these (e.g., opening or differentiation) also signal the intentions of the platform owners (Scholten and Scholten, 2012). ...
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In digital ecosystems, the fusion relation between business and technology means that the decision of technical compatibility of the offering is also the decision of how to position the firm relative to the coopetive relations that characterize business ecosystems. In this article we develop the Digital Ecosystem Technology Transformation (DETT) framework for explaining technology-based transformation of digital ecosystems by integrating theories of business and technology ecosystems. The framework depicts ecosystem transformation as distributed and emergent from micro-, meso-, and macro-level coopetition. The DETT framework consists an alternative to the existing explanations of digital ecosystem transformation as the rational management of one central actor balancing ecosystem tensions. We illustrate the use of the framework by a case study of transformation in the digital payment ecosystem.
Thesis
Mobile digital platforms provide an architectural basis for third party innovation of platform complements. Platform owners have property rights, enabling them to establish a boundary of permissible innovation demarcating the permitted from the prohibited. This allows for the curation of complements, which provides a means of controlling for value creation. Consequently, platform innovationthe innovation of platform complements is occasionally refused by platform owners. When this occurs tensions may arise between the two parties over where the boundary of permissible innovation should lie. Tussles may break out, embodied in complex interactions, as each party attempts to get its way. Eventually an outcome is achieved, and a platform innovation is either allowed or prohibited. A body of platform innovation literature is emerging from fields including information systems. Whilst this literature considers many aspects of platform innovation, the dynamics concerning the control of the innovation of platform innovation complements is overlooked. This research attempts to address that gap. Its relevance to information systems concerns the digitalisation of platforms as systemsdigital infrastructures, which affects their capacity for innovation and regulation. This research uses the method of narrative networks to analyse 45 examples of contested platform innovation. This approach, informed by empirical data sourced from over 4500 blog entries, identifies patterned sequences of actions across the examples. These sequences describe how tension builds, how control is asserted, and how control is then resisted. A theory of formal managerial control is used to explain how mechanisms of control are applied by platform owners as well as how developers respond to control. The principle contribution of this research is to theory. It develops and presents a theory to describe and explain the dynamics of contested innovation of complements on curated digital platforms. In doing so, iIt challenges the understanding that the platform owner alone controls platform design rules and concerning which platform complements are allowed, and which are notthe boundary of permissible innovation. Furthermore, tThe study indicates opens up the possibility that the forces of digitalisation provide third parties with the power to affect influence platform architecture, but at the cost of additional means of being controlled.
Article
If you listed the blockbuster products and services that have redefined the global business landscape, you'd find that many of them tie together two distinct groups of users in a network. Case in point: The most important innovation in financial services since World War II is almost certainly the credit card, which links consumers and merchants. The list would also include newspapers, HMOs, and computer operating systems-all of which serve what economists call two-sided markets or networks. Newspapers,for instance, bring together subscribers and advertisers; HMOs link patients to a web of health care providers and vice versa; operating systems connect computer users and application developers. Two-sided networks differ from traditional value chains in a fundamental way. In the traditional system, value moves from left to right: To the left of the company is cost; to the right is revenue. In two-sided networks, cost and revenue are both to the left and to the right, because the "platform" has a distinct group of users on each side. The platform product or service incurs costs in serving both groups and can collect revenue from each, although one side is often subsidized. Because of what economists call "network effects," these platform products enjoy increasing returns to scale, which explains their extraordinary impact. Yet most firms still struggle to establish and sustain their platforms. Their failures are rooted in a common mistake: In creating strategies for two-sided networks, managers typically rely on assumptions and paradigms that apply to products without network effects. As a result, they make many decisions that are wholly inappropriate for the economics of their industries. In this article, the authors draw on recent theoretical work to guide executives negotiating the challenges of two-sided networks.
Article
Online discussion communities play an important role in the development of relationships and the transfer of knowledge within and across organizations. Their underlying technologies enhance these processes by providing infrastructures through which group-based communication can occur. Community administrators often make decisions about technologies with the goal of enhancing the user experience, but the impact of such decisions on how a community develops must also be considered. To shed light on this complex and underresearched phenomenon, we offer a model of key latent constructs influenced by technology choices and possible causal paths by which they have dynamic effects on communities. Two important community characteristics that can be impacted are community size (number of members) and community resilience (membership that is willing to remain involved with the community in spite of variability and change in the topics discussed). To model community development, we build on attraction-selection-attrition (ASA) theory, introducing two new concepts: participation costs (how much time and effort are required to engage with content provided in a community) and topic consistency cues (how strongly a community signals that topics that may appear in the future will be consistent with what it has hosted in the past). We use the proposed ASA theory of online communities (OCASA) to develop a simulation model of community size and resilience that affirms some conventional wisdom and also has novel and counterintuitive implications. Analysis of the model leads to testable new propositions about the causal paths by which technology choices affect the emergence of community size and community resilience, and associated implications for community sustainability.
Article
Platform Ecosystems is a hands-on guide that offers a complete roadmap for designing and orchestrating vibrant software platform ecosystems. Unlike software products that are managed, the evolution of ecosystems and their myriad participants must be orchestrated through a thoughtful alignment of architecture and governance. Whether you are an IT professional or a general manager, you will benefit from this book because platform strategy here lies at the intersection of software architecture and business strategy. It offers actionable tools to develop your own platform strategy, backed by original research, tangible metrics, rich data, and cases. You will learn how architectural choices create organically-evolvable, vibrant ecosystems. You will also learn to apply state-of-the-art research in software engineering, strategy, and evolutionary biology to leverage ecosystem dynamics unique to platforms. Read this book to learn how to: Evolve software products and services into vibrant platform ecosystems. Orchestrate platform architecture and governance to sustain competitive advantage. Govern platform evolution using a powerful 3-dimensional framework. If you're ready to transform platform strategy from newspaper gossip and business school theory to real-world competitive advantage, start right here! Understand how architecture and strategy are inseparably intertwined in platform ecosystems. Architect future-proof platforms and apps and amplify these choices through governance. Evolve platforms, apps, and entire ecosystems into vibrant successes and spot platform opportunities in almost any-not just IT-industry.
Article
Software ecosystems (SECOs) driven by platform business models have changed how consumer software is produced and marketed. Also in the enterprise software segment, value networks in the form of SECOs are replacing traditional business models and linear value chains. These SECOs involve three main types of actors: platform sponsor, complementors, and customers. Platform sponsor strategies have been researched broadly, but not the view of complementors. Further, there are few studies of real-world SECOs. In our research, we have investigated the complementor's perspective on SECOs and their partnership with the platform sponsor. Through exploratory qualitative research using a practical case from the enterprise software industry, we have developed a partner management framework comprising the complementors' value creation process, goals, enablers, and instruments. The model can be used generally to gain a better understanding of complementors, and by platform sponsors to improve their partner management processes.
Conference Paper
In the design of wearable device, the focus is normally put on the device itself and functions serving individual users. However, as a product widely spread out over a large population, the consolidated data collected from the devices could be used to bring to users functions or services far beyond personal scope and increase the value of services for individual users as well. When the focus of design is switched from individual product to the overall landscape involving large amount of devices, a central data platform, and services supported by the data platform, a systematic planning of the working mechanism and services at both individual and social level become possible as the result of the scope expansion. We introduce in this paper our in-depth analysis of key issues involved in the design in this new type of ecosystem. Specifically, we use E-Wearable, a wearable device-based platform for environment protection and environmental information service to exemplify the concepts and methods we propose.