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Ctrl+ALT-RIGHT: reinterpreting our knowledge of white supremacy groups through the lens of street gangs

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For the last 30 years, gang scholars have explicitly disregarded white youth who are active in groups with overt or implicit ties to neo-Nazi/skinhead or white power ideologies from street gang research. This article argues that this decision to keep these two groups separate stems from a misinterpretation of the realities of these groups and this decision has had a long-standing impact on how researchers, law enforcement and policymakers understand and interact with youth active in these groups. The coining of the term ‘Alt-Right,’ and the re-emergence of white power youth in the international dialogue, underscores how the lack of systematic research severely limits our knowledge about youth involved in gangs with white power leanings. Based on these concerns, this article challenges the current understanding of both skinheads and their troublesome youth groups/gangs. By orienting the limited research on skinhead gangs within key street gang domains, this article draws attention to disconnects in the literature that have influenced how researchers approach the study of skinhead youth. This study’s conclusions support the purposeful inclusion of skinhead youth in future street gang research.
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Journal of Youth Studies
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Ctrl+ALT-RIGHT: reinterpreting our knowledge of
white supremacy groups through the lens of street
gangs
Shannon E. Reid & Matthew Valasik
To cite this article: Shannon E. Reid & Matthew Valasik (2018): Ctrl+ALT-RIGHT: reinterpreting
our knowledge of white supremacy groups through the lens of street gangs, Journal of Youth
Studies, DOI: 10.1080/13676261.2018.1467003
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261.2018.1467003
Published online: 25 Apr 2018.
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Ctrl+ALT-RIGHT: reinterpreting our knowledge of white
supremacy groups through the lens of street gangs
Shannon E. Reid
a
and Matthew Valasik
b
a
Dept. of Criminal Justice & Criminology, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, NC, USA;
b
Department of Sociology, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, USA
ABSTRACT
For the last 30 years, gang scholars have explicitly disregarded white
youth who are active in groups with overt or implicit ties to neo-
Nazi/skinhead or white power ideologies from street gang
research. This article argues that this decision to keep these two
groups separate stems from a misinterpretation of the realities of
these groups and this decision has had a long-standing impact on
how researchers, law enforcement and policymakers understand
and interact with youth active in these groups. The coining of the
term Alt-Right,and the re-emergence of white power youth in
the international dialogue, underscores how the lack of systematic
research severely limits our knowledge about youth involved in
gangs with white power leanings. Based on these concerns, this
article challenges the current understanding of both skinheads
and their troublesome youth groups/gangs. By orienting the
limited research on skinhead gangs within key street gang
domains, this article draws attention to disconnects in the
literature that have influenced how researchers approach
the study of skinhead youth. This studys conclusions support the
purposeful inclusion of skinhead youth in future street gang
research.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 1 August 2017
Accepted 16 April 2018
KEYWORDS
Street gangs; racist
organizations; youth
subculture; alt-right;
skinheads; myths
Introduction
Scholars and policymakers have shown a re-emerging concern about the radicalization of
youth, domestically and internationally (Dandurand 2014; Decker and Pyrooz 2011; Pyrooz
et al. 2018; Valasik and Phillips 2017). The press has been inundated with incidents and
dialogue around the mainstreaming of nationalism and xenophobia across Europe and
throughout the United States. The current political climate in the United States, and the
coining of the term Alt-Rightby white nationalist Richard Spencer in 2008, has increased
attention back to groups that had previously been labelled as the racist right (Hawley
2017; Nagle 2017; Niewert 2017). The increased visibility of these Alt-Right groups
should serve as a reminder that despite a desire to believe these individuals and groups
are nothing more than periphery, there is a subset who are members of street-oriented
delinquent youth groups (Wood 2017). In order to address the latter subset of youth,
this article has two main goals. First, demonstrating that skinheads fail to substantially
© 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
CONTACT Shannon E. Reid s.reid@uncc.edu
JOURNAL OF YOUTH STUDIES, 2018
https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261.2018.1467003
differ from street gangs and therefore, should be included in the broader study of street
gangs. Second, highlight the fact that the dismissal of skinheads from street gang research
has negatively impacted the understanding of skinhead youth and impaired policymakers
when trying to prevent/intervene with skinhead membership/behaviour. It is also impor-
tant to note that skinheadis used throughout the text as catch-all term referring to all
deviant youth groups with white power ideology and not SHARP (Skinheads Against
Racial Prejudice) or other non-racist skinhead groups.
Gang researchers, perhaps the best equipped to offer guidance to law enforcement and
policymakers on dealing with these youth groups, continue to conceptually exclude racist
skinheads from conventional street gang studies (e.g. Curry, Decker, and Pyrooz 2014).
Even with the lack of a uniform definition for a street gang, scholars generally considered
these groups to be composed of at least three members for a substantial period of time
and engage in criminal activities which reinforces the identity of the group (see Curry
2015). Such a definition would clearly include skinhead youth (see Simi, Smith, and
Reeser 2008). While skinhead youth may be captured inadvertently in street gang
surveys (e.g. the G.R.E.A.T. survey
1
), the instruments are not designed to distinguish
between skinheads and other white youth claiming gang membership.
Klein (1995, 22) states in The American Street Gang that his book is a discussion of street
gangs, not skinheads …’due in part to what he perceived as a lack of street orientation on
the part of skinhead groups. Skinheads are inside; theyre working on their written
materials; or if outside, theyre looking for a target, not lounging around(Klein 1995,
22). Other gang scholars contend, while these groups share some features in common
with gangs, they fall outside the definition of what a gang is(Curry, Decker, and Pyrooz
2014, 58). The common features referenced by these authors include engaging in criminal
activity and the presence of group membership. Curry, Decker, and Pyrooz (2014, 58)
contend that skinheads have a strong ideological set of beliefs, tend to be organized inter-
nationally, and seek to radicalize their members to take political action. The lack of sys-
tematic research on these groups, due to both the explicit exclusion of these groups by
gang scholars (e.g. Curry, Decker, and Pyrooz 2014; Klein 1995) and the implicit expec-
tation that these groups are too fringeto be concerned about, highlights the difficulties
in targeting youth at risk for joining these groups. Simi, Smith, and Reeser (2008, 755756)
argue that the exclusion of skinheads from street gang scholarship is based upon
inadequate assessments of the empirical evidencewith excessive focus being placed
upon skinheads’‘ideological perceptions, overt racism, political violence and international
connections.It is within this divergent literature that the lack of systematic, generalizable
studies of skinheads is apparent and reflective of the shortcomings of early street gang
research (Pyrooz and Mitchell 2015).
Excluding skinheads from gang studies has aggravated the lack of knowledge about
these groups, with scholars being just as uninformed about the risk factors and behav-
ioural outcomes impacting skinhead youth as they were thirty years ago. The current
article utilizes a narrative literature review
2
methodology in order to orient skinhead litera-
ture within key features of the gang literature to expose the overlap between skinhead
groups, and street gangs. Furthermore, we highlight how well-situated gang researchers
are to undertake the study of skinheads and other alt-right youth groups. Additionally,
we hope to reinvigorate scholarship into these groups since membership into an alt-
right group, just like street gangs, can induce negative consequences, short- and long-
2S. E. REID AND M. VALASIK
term, for both youth and their local communities. We also work to consolidate the research
on Alt-Right gangs and street gangs to build a useable definition for systematically captur-
ing these groups in future research.
Background
In the United States, the skinhead movement gained traction in the 1980s with the Anti-
Defamation League (ADL) reporting a membership of 10001500 in twelve states in early
1988 growing to 33003500 members across 40 states by 1993 (ADL 1995). More recent
numbers are difficult to ascertain due to variation in how law enforcement categorizes
and tracks these groupsmembership. The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) reported
78 racist skinhead groups, 99 neo-Nazi groups and 100 white nationalist groups active in
2016 (SPLC 2017). While these figures provide a helpful overview of a range of groups
active within the United States, the focus on the group offers a misleading underestima-
tion of the skinhead/Alt-Right youth population. Pyrooz and Sweeten (2015, 417) docu-
ment that youth participating in street gangs has also been grossly underrecognized
by both national surveys and law enforcement agencies attempting to estimate Americas
street gang population. Any sensible estimate for the number of American skinhead youth
is unlikely to exist. For some youth, their membership in a skinhead/Alt-Right gang will not
be captured until entry in a correctional facility, where a motivation exists to systematically
track and segregate individuals (Goodman 2008).
Researching skinheads
A majority of research on the formation of skinheads fall into two categories: subcultural
studies focusing most often on the fashion and music of skinhead youth (Forbes and
Stampton 2015; Love 2016; Moore 1993; Pollard 2016) or studies describing group-level
characteristics and formation; the latter of which often relies on small samples (see
Baron 1997; Hamm 1993; Wooden and Blazak 2001). Across both research categories,
there is a range of critiques. These include an inability to reconcile inconsistencies
between style and action (Kinsella 1996; Moore 1994; Suall and Lowe 1988); failure to
offer ground level specificity about skinheadssocial action (Asal et al. 2016; Hamm
1993; Kinsella 1996) and methodologically, having a weak ethnographic foundation or
being produced by advocacy organizations (Moore 1994).
Hamm (1993), a terrorism scholar, is one of the first to stress that skinheads should be
categorized separately from street gangs by emphasizing a skinheads ideological per-
spective, their adherence to racism, participation in political violence and connections
to international networks. Curry, Decker, and Pyrooz (2014), and initially Klein (1995),
echo this distinction and place ideology as the driver of skinheadsactivities. Adherence
to these early findings, and the failure of gang scholars to reconcile inconsistencies
between these older studies and more recent work (see Gilbert 2013; Klein 2009; Shashkin
2008; Simi 2010; Simi and Futrell 2015), has hindered this research programme for the past
three decades.
More recent studies, while prudent in their assertions, are limited in their ability to have
policy implications due to sampling limitations or by focusing solely on a particular skin-
head gang (Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008,2016). In order for the study of skinheads to
JOURNAL OF YOUTH STUDIES 3
move forward and inform policy and practice, Alt-Right youth need to be initially studied
in comparison with street gangs to test whether or not joining a group with a particular
ideology impacts a youths participation in delinquency, and other long-term outcomes.
If there are no differences in these characteristics other than their willingness to subscribe
to a range of racist beliefs, then both law enforcement and scholars need to systematically
include them in street gang studies. While a small subset of researchers (see Blazak 2009;
Blee 2017; Klein 1996; Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008) has pushed for the inclusion of skin-
heads in the broader gang literature, this call has largely been ignored.
The definitional dilemma
The disconnect in including skinheads in the canon of street gang scholarship revolves
round a definitional quandary. As with the street gang literature (see Curry 2015; Klein
and Maxson 2006; Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008), there is not a consistent definition for
a skinhead group. For instance, the subculture literature highlights basic ideological
beliefs, a particular clothing style, the role of hate-based music, and the use of particular
signs/symbols (i.e. tattoos, swastikas, SS bolts, 88) as key identifiers of these youth groups
(ADL 1995; Fangen 1998; Forbes and Stampton 2015; Love 2016; Miller-Idriss 2018; Moore
1993; Pollard 2016; Sarabia and Shriver 2004; Simi and Futrell 2015). However, the blatant
use of these visible symbols has begun to wane as some members have begun to normal-
ize and conform with mainstream society (Cooter 2006; Simi and Futrell 2015). Through a
review of the skinhead literature, the othernessof skinhead youth, as compared to street
gang youth is often focused on the mythology around skinheads as the foot soldiersof
the racist right (Baysinger 2006; Moore 1993) and bastions of the working-class ideal
(Pollard 2016) mixed with a dangerous and highly racist political identity (Baudouin
1997; Hamm 1993; Kinsella 1996) with the potential to develop into political terrorists
able to overthrow governments (Hamm 1993; Kinsella 1996; Pyrooz et al. 2018). Simi
and Futrell (2015) provide one of the most generalized descriptions typologising skin-
heads gangs as a youth subculture that has synthesized the symbolism and ideals of
neo-Nazis, form loosely organized groups and regularly congregate in free spaces,
where members reify group solidarity, cultural norms and express themselves.
Within the street gang literature, the Eurogang definition has become widely adopted
and appears regularly in publicationsand could be considered the most appropriated,
modern definition for determining what is a street gang (Maxson and Esbensen 2016, 7).
The Eurogang definition identifies a street gang as any durable, street-oriented youth
group whose involvement in illegal activity is part of their group identity(Maxson and
Esbensen 2016, 2). Under this definition, racist skinhead groups would clearly be con-
sidered a street gang, as indicated by Pyrooz et al. (2018) recent study. It seems that the
belief of skinheads as remaining outside of the street gang spectrum remains a post-hoc
decision, and their inclusion or exclusion is more fluid than would be expected given the
emphasis placed upon skinheads ideological differences. For example, Klein (2001, 17)
stated in The Eurogang Paradox:
Skinheads-more prominent in Europe than in the U.S.-stretch the meaning of street gangs;
they are less street-oriented, and more focused on a particular crime pattern, for example.
Yet I find I am comfortable placing them in the Specialty gang category of the paradigm.
4S. E. REID AND M. VALASIK
It seems that Kleins(1996,2009; Klein and Maxson 2006) reversal of now including skinheads
as specialtystreet gangs has been greatly ignored by gang scholars (e.g. Curry, Decker, and
Pyrooz 2014) that attest to skinheads being diametrically different from street gangs. While
not explicitly discussed in this article, it is important to note that in several more current
studies, skinhead youth refer to themselves as gang members (Simi, Smith, and Reeser
2008) and their group as a gang (Wooden and Blazak 2001). This self-identication is con-
sidered a reasonable standard for inclusion in gang studies and should not be dismissed
due to a desire to exclude them for unsupported reasons (Esbensen et al. 2012).
Gang scholarsdefinitional disconnect between skinheads and street gangs hinges on
ideology being the key characteristic partitioning these two archetypes. This distinction
leads to two main questions. First, is skinhead ideology more mythological, or does it actu-
ally drive the routine behaviours of skinheads? Second, if ideology is critical to skinhead
identity, is having an ideology unique to skinhead groups making them distinctively differ-
ent from street gangs?
Ideology
The ideologies referenced by skinheads are varied, and sometimes contradictory, being
centred on rudimentary notions of white power and anti-minority/immigrant sentiments
to more complicated mythologies/religious beliefs such as Odinism or National Socialism
(see Gardell 2003; Pollard 2016; Simi and Futrell 2015). Many of these beliefs are not limited
to skinhead gangs, but are disseminated throughout the larger white power movement
(Simi and Futrell 2015). There is a spectrum of how integral white power ideology is to
either a skinhead groups or an individuals identity. As Van Gemert, Peterson, and Lien
(2008, 8) point out when discussing skinheads/neo-Nazis in Europe, [t]hese groups may
or may not be linked to political organizations. In some countries, juvenile gangs exist
that merely use extremist symbols to add to their identity …’In America, the image of
skinhead gangs being the white power foot soldiers is countered with evidence highlight-
ing their lack of defined goals and shared beliefs limits their ability to be well-organized
right-wing revolutionary alarmists (Hamm 1993; Suall and Lowe 1988; Wooden and
Blazak 2001). As seen internationally, and echoed within street gangs, more recent gener-
ations of skinheads are eschewing some of the traditional garb toward more subversive
clothing and symbols (i.e. Pepe the Frog, and clothing companies such as Hoelzer
Reich, Thor Steinar, or Fred Perry) (Miller-Idriss 2018; Nagle 2017). Pollard (2016) attests
that the strict racial hierarchies of Nazism has been abandoned by skinhead gangs due
to the large influx of Slavs joining groups throughout America and Eastern Europe. The
influence of American white supremacy on skinheads has also shifted the focus away
from ethnicity and onto skin colour to achieve white racial purity, allowing for non-
Aryan members to participate and for relationships to exist between members and non-
Aryans (see Dyck 2017; Miller-Idriss 2018; Mudde 2005; Simi and Futrell 2015; Wooden
and Blazak 2001).
As for ideology being a unique feature in the formation and membership of skinhead
youth, gang scholars have demonstrated that race/ethnic based pride and/or political
ideology is not limited to skinhead youth. The marginalization of black and Latino
youth motivated street gangs to incorporate a political ideology as an attempt to grow
grassroots movements fighting for political power and producing positive social change
JOURNAL OF YOUTH STUDIES 5
within their neglected communities (Brotherton 2008; Brotherton and Barrios 2004;
Cureton 2011; Francisco and Martinez 2003; Helmreich 1973; Short 1974; Short and
Moland 1976). Street gangs have also focused on religious/spiritual principles. The
Almighty Latin Kings and Queens Nation in New York City established a spirituality of lib-
eration to resist the dominant culture dehumanizing, objectifying, and criminalizing the
gang (Brotherton and Barrios 2004). Liberation spirituality directly contributed to the
gangs social identity and established a process of acculturation for new members (Broth-
erton and Barrios 2004). Other gangs may not have a true ideology but are formed with
the intention of offering youth pride in their heritage. The formation of Mara Salvatrucha
(MS-13) in the city of Los Angeles has been associated with Salvadorian pride and identity
(Bruneau, Dammert, and Skinner 2011; Cruz 2010). Vigil (1996, 151) further notes how
initiation for Chicano gangs in Los Angeles affirms ones ethnic identification
showing they are Chicano”’ (see also Moore 1978;1991; Vigil 1996).
Overall, we argue that ideology should not be a limiting factor excluding skinheads
from larger research programme on youth gangs. Subscribing to an ideology itself is
neither adhered to in such a strict way, nor so unique to youth in skinhead groups that
it places Alt-Right youth outside of the street gang spectrum. Focusing on the ideology
of skinheads ignores/minimizes the role of ideology/ethnic pride in the formation, main-
tenance and membership of non-white street gangs. Limiting the inclusion of skinhead
youth in gang studies because of their ideology is the principle reason why scholars
today lack a comprehensive grasp about skinheads. This decision has directly impacted
how skinheads are studied, how law enforcement is trained about street gangs, and
how policies are implemented to deal with marginalized youth (Moore 1978).
Intersection of skinheads and street gangs
3
Formation
The formation of skinhead groups in the United States is connected to the growth of the
hardcore punk scene in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The subcultural literature describes
skinhead groups as a reaction to the growing economic inequality, the uneven disburse-
ment of social resources, and the political climate (Cotter 1999; Hamm 1993; Hicks 2004;
Moore 1993; Pollard 2016). As noted by Brake (1974), early skinhead youth were aware
that they lived in the worst areas of London, attended the worst schools and held the
lowest paying jobs. Studying skinheads as a subcultural movement, an amalgam of inter-
changeable youth, rather than members of distinct gangs has led to a continued focus on
macro-level economic, social, and political changes that impacts the formation and growth
of every skinhead group throughout America. This focus is a serious limitation, as it ignores
the variation in skinhead formation across smaller aggregations (e.g. neighbourhoods).
Gang research has demonstrated that smaller levels of aggregation, particularly local com-
munities, are integral for understanding not only the conditions under which gangs are
established but also how they are maintained. Gang scholars routinely indicate that an
areas local socioeconomic conditions shape where in neighbourhood street gangs mani-
fest (Densley 2013; Klein and Maxson 2006; Tita, Cohen, and Engberg 2005). Research has
consistently revealed that street gangs form and emerge in interstitial spaces within a
community (Thrasher 1927; Tita, Cohen, and Engberg 2005). Therefore, while large
6S. E. REID AND M. VALASIK
national shifts in social, economic or political indicators may explain growth in the overall
number of active skinheads, this approach fails to account for any particular influence of
variations at the neighbourhood- or city-level. In fact, early research on skinheads found
that they were directly tied to specific localities/neighbourhoods that where socially dis-
organized and rapidly deteriorating (Brake 1974; Moore 1994). Simi (2006) points out
that early skinhead gangs formed directly through strong ties between peers and conflict
with local gangs. An overreliance on subcultural studies of skinheads (i.e. Hamm 1993) has
diverted research on skinheads away from neighbourhood-level investigations limiting
scholars, practitioners, and policymakers understanding of how these groups form at
the local level (Blee 2002;2017). This is a particular avenue of research where gang scholars
would be adeptly capable of examining and unpacking more thoroughly.
Use of space
The relationship between street gangs and space has been a topic of interest since
Thrashers(1927) seminal work. For skinhead youth, there is a lack of consensus about
how territorially oriented they are. The literature generally considers skinheads as less ter-
ritorially confined than street gangs. For skinheads, there is an assumption of having
natural dominionover spaces they are occupying, taking their whiteness wherever
they venture (Simi and Futrell 2015, 55). This does not mean, however, that skinheads
refrain from being territorial. Simi, Smith, and Reeser (2008, 766) repeatedly circumscribe
the Public Enemy Number One gangs behaviour as being street orientated, keeping their
racist activities territorial and localizedin their neighbourhood. Space plays as an impor-
tant role in maintaining skinheadscollective identity and group solidarity as it does for
street gangs (Futrell and Simi 2004; Moore 1994; Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008). Conversely,
it is also important to note that not being fixed to any particular turf is not unique to skin-
heads. Valasik and Tita (2018) indicate that both within the United States and globally,
scholars have documented gang members with residential and territorial patterns that
diverge from the traditional literature. Even earlier gang research discusses the movement
away from strict territoriality (Klein 1995), with Short (1996, 238) stating that [g]angs are
more mobile now and their territories may include a shopping mall rather than (or in
addition to) a street or neighbourhood or area drug market..
Skinheads regularly gather in what Simi and Futrell (2015, 4) term Aryan free spaces
where white power members gather, openly express extremist beliefs, and coordinate
activities. Gang scholars have developed a similar concept known as gang set space,
defined broadly as a localized, geographically distinct area (e.g. street corner, park, alley,
etc.) within a gangs territory where members gather (Tita, Cohen, and Engberg 2005).
Just as the set space of a street gang becomes the groups life spacewithin their turf
(Klein 1995, 79), Aryan free spaces provide members with an indisputable place with a dis-
tinct zone of influence. It is within this sanctuary that gang members/skinheads hang
around, brag a lot, eat again, drink, hang around some moreand feel protected from
the outside world (Klein 1995, 11; Simi and Futrell 2015). Furthermore, a street gang
becomes fairly attached to a definite locality and wanders only occasionally beyond its
frontiersas a result of habitually congregating in the same spaces (Thrasher 1927, 166).
Simi and Futrell (2015) observe analogous patterns with skinheads regularly frequenting
known locations. It is within these intimate Aryan free spaces that skinheads are able to
JOURNAL OF YOUTH STUDIES 7
reify their beliefs, participate in rituals (e.g. being tattooed), espouse group norms, culture,
and values, cultivate social ties, and develop their social identity (Futrell and Simi 2004). It
is within these spaces that strong social ties and group identity are developed and bind
group members together. As with gang set space (Tita, Cohen, and Engberg 2005),
Aryan free spaces used by boisterous skinheads eventually become recognized by local
residents (Simi and Futrell 2015). One disparity between Aryan free spaces and gang set
spaces is that skinheads are thought to conceal their loitering in private spaces away
from the publics gaze, yet, these findings have potential bias within the literature given
the focus on skinheadsracist and hidden activities. Regardless of where gang members
or skinheads establish their territorial hangout a consistent feature is finding a location
that lacks social control, either informal or formal. The absence of social control agents
in these set spaces/free spaces permits gang members/skinheads to engage in inappropri-
ate and/or predatory behaviours that can be detrimental and harmful to local residents.
A number of researchers have highlighted the public nature of skinhead activities
(Ezekiel 1995,2002; Moore 1994). In fact, Baron (1997), Hamm (1993), and Ezekiel (1995)
recruited skinhead youth from public spaces (e.g. street corners) for their studies. It
seems counter-intuitive to believe that skinheads adopt a particular style of dress,
aimed at providing a clear identification of their group identity, but hide from the
public sphere. The territorial use of space is a necessary area of inquiry for policies to
be developed in dealing with these youths. Certain place-based interventions may still
be a viable tactic (e.g. nuisance abatement) to inhibit skinheads from loitering,
however, the greater reliance of congregating on private-property requires more flexible
and unique approaches to succeed.
Group structure
The organization and structure of skinhead gangs is difficult to address. An overarching
issue is that research has focused on skinheads as a subculture. Focusing on skinheads
at this scale is not conducive to investigating the structure of a localized group. Another
complication in understanding skinhead group structure is the ethnographic dominance
of the literature. While these case studies have provided insights into the structure (and
the variation) of particular skinhead gangs, a broader generalized understanding of
these groups structure is lacking. An additional complication is the inclusion of the
larger white power movement in skinhead studies. Including skinhead youth groups in
studies examining white power movements (e.g. Klu Klux Klan) gives an illusion of organ-
ization amongst skinheads that has not supported in the literature. It is only in this vein that
the group structure of skinheads is discussed, highlighting their lack of organization, man-
agement, and discipline necessary to achieve political change (e.g. Tarasov 2008). What
limited research exists on the structure of skinhead gangs discusses the unorganized
nature and highlights a lack of leadership/hierarchy (Baron 1997; Wooden and Blazak
2001). Simi (2006) finds that skinhead organization exists on a spectrum, ranging from
being a poorly organized, independent gang to a more traditional and organized structure.
A report by the ADL (1995) is one of the unique studies that discusses the size of a skinhead
gangs membership, ranging from 10 to a few dozen members. Yet, without a systematic
study of skinhead gangs, perhaps similar to Maxson and Kleins(1995) survey of law enfor-
cement, it is challenging to discuss skinhead group structure with any certainty.
8S. E. REID AND M. VALASIK
Much of gang research argues that street gangs are socially disorganized, confedera-
tions of loosely-structured individuals or small groups of friends that coalesce irregularly
over issues that emerge and vanish from the street(Decker and Curry 2002, 351). This lack
of organization allows street gangs to have greater flexibility and resilience to group inter-
ventions. Street gangs are regularly comprised of age-graded cliques, derived from resi-
dence, academic years, friendship, and shared interests facilitated by similarities in
gender, ethnicity, and age (Klein and Maxson 2006; Moore 1991). Thus, the overall cohe-
siveness of a street gang is weak to moderate, while social ties within a clique are more
tightly-knit (Klein and Maxson 2006). Street gangs, however, are described as being hier-
archically-organized, centring their criminal pursuits on economic activities (e.g. drug
sales, extortion) (Densley 2013; Padilla 1992; Stephenson 2015). Densley (2013, 43)
argues that street gangs exist on a spectrum growing naturally from their emergence as
aneighborhood group to delinquent collectives to full-scale criminal enterprises to pro-
viders of extra-legal governance.This explication makes sense. Street gangs are observed
in the literature as both disorganized and structured as criminal enterprises. Yet, street
gangs remain a localized phenomenon that develop, adapt, and evolve in relation to a
specific environment. Observed differences in the literature exist because of a groups pos-
ition on this evolutionary spectrum at the time of investigation.
Violence and criminality
Skinhead youth, like their street gang counterparts, participate in both symbolic and
instrumental crime and violence (Moore 1994). Research on skinhead criminality,
however, has been greatly impacted by scholarsfocus on hate-based crimes, although
being rarer events, that identify with skinhead ideology. Etter (1999, 19) states
[s]kinhead crimes are usually violent and chosen for their political or racial impact
rather than for profit motive …’ Skinheads have high levels of entitativity, perceiving
members of rival groups as being unified and cohesive (Vasquez et al. 2015). Entitativity
makes all members of the offending group blameworthy,a belief facilitating violence to
overflow into the civilian population (Vasquez et al. 2015, 249). Much of skinheadshate-
based violence highlights a lack of discretion in their attacks against non-whites (Mills,
Freilich, and Chermak 2017). More recently, group-based participation in protests to
protect Confederate monuments (e.g. Charlottesville, Virginia), and the dialogue that sur-
rounds these protests, continues to perpetuate the threat of race-based violence and a
desire of these groups to maintain structural racism. This perspective of collective respon-
sibility is also pervasive among street gangs catalyzing retaliatory violence (Densley 2013;
Stephenson 2015). Leovy (2015, 206) depicts a perfect example of how high levels of enti-
tativity among street gangs propagates violence, a black assailant looking to kill a gang
rival is looking before anything else, for another black male a presumed combatant,
conscripted into a dismal existence outside the lawwhether he wanted to be or not..
Focusing on status-based violence (e.g. race, ethnicity, etc.) has overshadowed skin-
head youths participation in localized criminality (Baron 1997; Simi, Smith, and Reeser
2008). Not minimizing hate-based crime, but emphasizing status-based violence ignores
routine criminality that impacts youths lives and the safety of the community more reg-
ularly. In fact, skinhead youth participate in similar patterns of cafeteria-style offending
observed in street gangs (Klein 1995, 68).
JOURNAL OF YOUTH STUDIES 9
Studies of skinhead youth discuss the cultural values encouraging violence (Baron 1997;
Moore 1994; Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008). Analogous to street gangs, violence is routinely
broadcast by skinheads as a public statement bolstering their groups status/reputation, rei-
fying boundaries, intimidating local residents, and displaying group dominance over rivals
(Brantingham et al. 2012; Papachristos, Hureau, and Braga 2013). Retributive violence, for
real or perceived slights, is supported by a youths peers and the larger skinhead gang
(Baron 1997). Chronic feuding between street gangs to redress prior grievances is also well
documented in the street gang literature (Brantingham et al. 2012; Papachristos, Hureau,
and Braga 2013). Disputes among skinheads are usually interpersonal (Baron 1997;Simi
2006; Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008), often white-on-white conflicts or focus on other street
youth (ADL 1995; Baron 1997;Hamm1993; Klein 2009; Simi, Smith, andReeser 2008). Scholars
(Baron 1997;Bjørgo2016; Fangen 1998; Klein 2009; Moore 1994; Shashkin 2008) discuss how
skinhead violence mirrors traditional gang rivalries of the street by affirming group identity
and strengthening the groups symbolic solidarity. Wooden and Blazak (2001) finds that skin-
head gangs utilize the ritual act of jumping innew members. The street gang literature
repeatedly discusses how the use of violence during initiation helps normalize violence
and solidify group identity (Moore 1991; Vigil 1996).
As with street gangs (Densley 2013; Stephenson 2015), skinheads use instrumental vio-
lence in their criminal undertakings (Freilich, Chermak, and Caspi 2009; Simi 2006; Simi,
Smith, and Reeser 2008). Skinhead youth have been shown to participate in a range of
criminal activities, including drug selling (Simi 2006), identity theft (Freilich, Chermak,
and Caspi 2009; Simi 2006; Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008), and assorted property crimes
(ADL 1995; Baron 1997; Ezekiel 2002;Simi 2006). Furthermore, the range and quantity
of participation in non-violent offending is expected to be even higher than is portrayed
by the limited literature on skinhead criminality. Concentrating on violence, especially
hate-based, by skinheads skews how drug market participation or non-violent offending
is documented. It is important to note that no evidence has been revealed to indicate
that profits from crimes are funding larger political endeavours (Simi 2006).
Risk factors for membership
The literature on discerning the risk factors for membership in a skinhead gang is also
plagued with issues discussed above. Blee (2002, 4) observes the focus on the organized
facade of racism- the structure, leadership, and propaganda issued by racist groups-
creates a strong impression of uniformity, which may be undermined by an examination
of individual racists.Focusing on the homogeneity of skinhead youth limits the inquiry
into risk factors for membership. For example, skinheads are repeatedly described as
being high school educated, abstaining from drugs, holding blue-collar employment,
and having a stable home life (Baron 1997; Fangen 1998; Hamm 1993; Hicks 2004). Yet,
more recent and rigorous research conflicts with these background characteristics (Klein
2009; Pilkington, Omelchenko, and Garifzianova 2010; Pollard 2016; Simi and Futrell
2015; Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008;2016). Repeatedly citing these early findings supports
and perpetuates a working-class mythology and limits inquiry into the existing variation of
risk factors for skinhead membership (Pollard 2016). Lacking generalizable findings on the
pushesand pullsfor skinhead membership further inhibits programmes/policies to
effectively target the risk factors for these vulnerable youth.
10 S. E. REID AND M. VALASIK
While much of the skinhead literature is methodologically qualitative, some themes
about risk factors have emerged. Examining the pushesinto membership, the literature
has found that skinhead youths age encompasses emerging adulthood (i.e. 1225 across
samples), a pattern analogous among street gang membership (ADL 1995; Klein 2009;
Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008). Males are more at risk for joining than females (ADL
1995; Ezekiel 2002; Pollard 2016). A caveat, however, as with the gang literature, female
skinhead membership is understudied (an exception is Blee 2002;2017). Skinhead
youth report residing in a single parent household (ADL 1995; Ezekiel 2002; Siedler
2011), enduring domestic discord (ADL 1995; Baron 1997; Ezekiel 2002), being unem-
ployed (Baron 1997; Fangen 1998), abusing drugs and alcohol (Baron 1997; Wooden
and Blazak 2001), dropping out of school (Baron 1997; Shashkin 2008), lacking supervision
from a guardian (Shashkin 2008), and experiencing parental unemployment (Siedler 2011).
Analogous risk factors are documented throughout the life-course of street gang members
(Curry, Decker, and Pyrooz 2014; Fox 2017; Klein and Maxson 2006; Moore 1991; Pyrooz
and Sweeten 2015). This suggests that substantial overlapin the life-courses for
members of skinheads and street gang exists (Simi, Sporer, and Bubolz 2016, 540).
Again, analogous patterns between skinheads and gang members exist when examin-
ing the pulls,or motivations for joining a group. For these youth, membership in a skin-
head gang offers a sense of strength, group belonging, and superiority(ADL 1995,5;
Miller-Idriss 2018). Researchers highlight the presence of fear and violence in many of
these youths lives and their hope that skinhead membership offers them safety (Baron
1997; Ezekiel 2002;Miller-Idriss 2018). Simi, Smith, and Reeser (2008, 759) also find
support that skinhead youth are joining for purposes of protection with the gang provid-
ing white kids with defence from other gangs.Skinheads also partake in a variety of
profit-oriented crimes (e.g. drug sales, identity theft, counterfeiting, burglary, armed
robbery) that provide financial incentives to join the group (Simi, Smith, and Reeser
2008). These are common themes found in the gang literature, with street gangs occupy-
ing multiple voids, such as a providing a collective social identity (Hennigan and Spanovic
2012), protection (Short and Strodtbeck 1965), and economic opportunities (Densley 2013;
Padilla 1992; Stephenson 2015).
Nearly a century of research has produced a broader understanding of the risk factors
for street gang membership. Motivations for joining a street gang differ between males
and females, but craving a similar social identity, protection, status, and filling a void
are common (Moore 1991). That void for males is a yearning for adventure, while
females are looking to find an emotionally satisfying familial group (Klein and Maxson
2006; Moore 1991). Risk factors for street gang membership include a range of neighbour-
hood variables, including neighbourhood poverty and disorganization (Hill et al. 1999;
Thornberry et al. 2003) and feeling unsafe in the neighbourhood (Hill et al. 1999). There
are also family and individual risk factors, including familial poverty (Hill et al. 1999; Thorn-
berry et al. 2003), single-parent households (Hill et al. 1999; Thornberry et al. 2003), low
academic achievement (Craig et al. 2002), low school attachment (Hill et al. 1999), drug
use (Bjerregaard and Smith 1993; Hill et al. 1999; Thornberry et al. 2003), delinquent
peers (Bjerregaard and Smith 1993; Hill et al. 1999), and externalizing behaviours (Craig
et al. 2002; Hill et al. 1999). While not a comprehensive list of all the factors confronting
youth at risk of joining a street gang, this overview highlights the substantial similarities
between street gang members and skinheads.
4
With members of skinheads and street
JOURNAL OF YOUTH STUDIES 11
gangs both being marginalized youth it is expected that similar risk factors are present in
both populations, however, the comprehensive list of risk factors for gang members
emphasizes the need for systematic, quantitative research that includes skinhead youth.
Without such studies scholars and policymakers are unable to develop a generalizable
set of risk factors allowing for a broader understanding of the cumulative risk for
joining a skinhead gang.
Understanding the risk factors facilitating membership into a skinhead gang is crucial
for developing effective prevention and intervention programmes/policies. As we have
seen from prevention programmes, such as the Gang Resistance Education and Training
(G.R.E.A.T.), targeting a range of risk factors for youth during crucial age ranges can help
reduce future gang membership (Esbensen et al. 2012). Unfortunately, the repetition of
stereotypical and anecdotal risk factors for membership in skinhead gangs has hindered
quantitative, generalizable research into the factors impacting the risk of joining a skin-
head gang.
Discussion
The goal of this article is two-fold. First, demonstrate why skinhead gangs should be
included in the broader street gang literature. Second, to point out how the removal of
skinheads from street gang research has disadvantaged policymakers when trying to
prevent/intervene with skinhead membership/behaviour. As argued throughout this
article, the longstanding disconnection between the literature on street gang and skin-
heads/alt-right needs to bridged. This article follows more recent attempts (see Simi,
Smith, and Reeser 2008) to remedy this gap by specifically outlining the overlap
between skinheads and street gangs on several central domains within the gang literature.
While some gang scholars (e.g. Curry, Decker, and Pyrooz 2014) still rely on cursory and
dated studies (Hamm 1993; Klein 1995), to contend that skinheads are diametrically differ-
ent from street gangs, others (Klein 1996;2009; Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008) have inves-
tigated these groups extensively ascertaining that they closely adhere to the specialty
gang category as typologised by Klein and Maxson (2006).
This article puts forth an initial effort addressing the knowledge gap that has existed for
three decades. It is an explicit investigation into how skinheads function as a street gang.
This article argues for the inclusion of skinheads in subsequent street gang studies,
suggesting that a meaningful reconciliation of the street gang and white supremacy
(e.g. skinheads, neo-Nazis, Alt-Right, white identitarians, etc.) literatures (see Blee 2017;
Gil and Lopez 2017; Holt, Freilich, and Chermak 2017; Huizinga and Schumann 2001;
Klein 1996; Pyrooz et al. 2018; Sánchez-Jankowski 2003; Simi 2006; Simi et al. 2017; Simi
and Futrell 2015; Simi, Smith, and Reeser 2008) would greatly expand our understanding
of how skinheads adopt and/or mimic the behaviours of street gangs. Due to concerns
revolving around ideology (Curry, Decker, and Pyrooz 2014; Klein 1995) gang scholars
have ignored investigating skinhead gangs stagnating our understanding of the group
dynamics, structure, risk factors, and overall life-course of these groups and their member-
ship. The gaps in the literature on female skinhead gang membership also needs to be
addressed since, as has been seen in the gang literature, female membership is often
under represented as a bias of researchers and police rather than a true reflection of
the reality of their membership. This article implies that the inclusion of skinheads into
12 S. E. REID AND M. VALASIK
mainstream street gang studies is straightforward and minimal. To aid in this process, we
propose a more inclusive characterization than skinhead as an acknowledgement to the
considerable degree of similarity with conventional street gangs, Alt-Right gangs. We
adapt the Eurogang definition, arguably the most widely adopted and used definition
for a street gang, and define an Alt-Right gang as a durable group, public-oriented
group whose adoption of signs/symbols of white separatists/nationalists/supremacists
and involvement in illegal activity is part of its group identity. Our definition integrates pol-
itical scientistsdescription of the Alt-Right as being a youth oriented, loosely structured,
right-wing political movement centred on white identity, with the groups core being a
racist movementrevolving around beliefs of white nationalism (Hawley 2017, 3) (see
also Futrell and Simi 2017; Nagle 2017; Niewert 2017). Incorporating a diverse set of litera-
tures into a singular definition for an Alt-Right gang allows for a broad description that can
also have a practical application. As this article highlights, the risk factors that contribute to
marginalized youth, actual or perceived, to join a street gang or an Alt-Right gang are com-
parable.
5
Furthermore, the Alt-Right just like street gangs is not universal monolith but is in
fact composed of a variety of factions that have conflicts with one another and regularly
feud (Hawley 2017; Lyons 2017; Nagle 2017; Niewert 2017). Utilizing a broader definition,
such as Alt-Right gang, allows for the explicit inclusion of skinhead youth in gang studies
that will allow researchers to provide law enforcement, youth outreach workers, and pol-
icymakers with the generalizable information necessary to create/adapt programmes and
policies to limit or reduce the impact of membership into an Alt-Right gang on youth and
their local communities.
While not explicitly discussed in this article, it is also important for us to consider the
role of race in the exclusion of skinheads in existing gang databases or the within the
broader gang literature. The repeated reminder that gang membership is not a minority
only problem underscores the bias towards considering minorities to be gang members
as compared to their white counterparts (Esbensen and Carson 2012). If agencies or indi-
vidual officers categorize crimes involving skinheads as being part of a racist subculture
rather than a gang-related incident, then we would not expect to find them in gang data-
bases. For instance, Klein (2009) notes that the Old Town Skins, a local skinhead gang in
Euroburg,
6
routinely use graffiti to cross out a rival gangs tags, yet, local law enforcement
does not consider the Old Town Skins to be a street gang despite this behaviour being
considered a common indicator of street gang activity. Such a categorization leads to
an underreporting of the skinhead gang problem. Without an accurate count of the
number of skinheads and skinhead gangs, the ability to effectively deal with these
youth is greatly diminished.
While these next steps and suggestions are limited due to the distinct lack of systematic
skinhead research, they are aimed at helping researchers and policymakers think about
how to move forward in how we study and intervene with skinhead youth. This is becom-
ing increasingly necessary given the current dialogue around these alt-right groups.
Within the alt-right literature, the role of youth in this movement is extolled as seen in
a Breibart article written by Bokhari and Yiannopoulis (2016, 1) where they refer to the
members of the alternative right as [y]oung, creative, and eager to commit secular here-
sies …’and state that the alt-right has a youthful energy and jarring, taboo-defying rheto-
ric that have boosted its membership and made it impossible to ignore.Despite the desire
to rely on studies that focus on the othernessof skinheads, this study is aimed at
JOURNAL OF YOUTH STUDIES 13
reminding researchers and policymakers that skinhead youth are similar to street gang
youth across several traditional domains. This reminder includes that skinhead youth
have traditionally remained autonomous and distinct from adult hate groups (e.g. the
Klu Klux Klan), and engage in a variety of crimes unassociated with their political ideology
(Baron 1997; Blee 2002; Pollard 2016; Sarabia and Shriver 2004; Simi and Futrell 2015; Tei-
telbaum 2017). As Simi et al. (2008, 756) underscore, these street oriented skinheads
possess a white supremacist orientation and are also simultaneously organized around
profit-oriented criminal activity.It is with this understanding of skinheads, that the field
of Alt-Right gang scholarship needs to be integrated into the larger research agenda of
gang scholarship. Following the street gang literature, future research should include
both quantitative research that can provide generalizable information that can be inte-
grated into prevention, intervention and suppression efforts, and qualitative research
that can better contextualize Alt-Right gangs (see Valasik and Reid 2018).
Notes
1. (See Esbensen et al. 2012)
2. See Green, Johnson, and Adams (2006) for overview of this methodology.
3. For ease of comparison, Appendix A includes a table outlining each subheading for both skin-
heads and street gangs.
4. Howell and Egley (2005) provide an extensive review of risk factors influencing street gang
membership.
5. Valasik and Phillips (2017) propose an analogous argument to explain why youth join ISIS (The
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). ISIS is a youth movement whose membership consists predo-
minantly of marginalized youth from distressed and ostracized communities. Traditionally,
these marginalized youths would have joined a local street gang or some other local near-
group, but the international reach of the Internet and social media allows such individuals
to join groups not constrained to a nearby neighbourhood or community.
6. Euroburg is an amalgam of many European citiescreated by Klein (2009, x) that experienced
street gang problems. Klein (2009, x) states that the descriptions and incidents offered in the
text are not fictionaland he seems to be referencing Sarneckis(2001) work on youth co-
offending networks, which references the offending patterns of skinheads in the Old Town
of Stockholm, Sweden.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
ORCID
Shannon E. Reid http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4318-4271
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Appendix A
Summary of Characteristics Comparing Skinheads and Street Gangs
Skinheads Street Gangs
Researcher Researcher
Group Formation
Macro-level shifts (e.g.
politics, resources)
X Cotter (1999); Hamm (1993); MIller-
Idriss (2018); Moore (1993); Pilkington,
Omelchenko, and Garifzianova (2010);
Pollard (2016); Shashkin (2008);
Teitelbaum (2017)
X Fraser and Hagedorn (2018); Hagedorn
(1998); Harding (2014); Jackson
(1991); Pitts (2008); Watkins (2017)
Local socioeconomic
conditions
X Brake (1974); Clarke (1976); MIller-Idriss
(2018); Moore (1994)
X Densley (2013); Klein and Maxson
(2006); Moore (1991); Sullivan (1989);
Thrasher (1927); Tita, Cohen, and
Engberg (2005)
Peer relationships &
conflicts
X Klein (2009); Miller-Idriss (2018); Simi
(2006)
X Brantingham et al. (2012); Papachristos,
Hureau, and Braga (2013)
Group Structure
Disorganized (e.g.
lacking a hierarchy)
X Baron (1997); Tarasov (2001,2008);
Wooden and Blazak (2001)
X Decker and Curry (2002); Fagan (1989)
Hierarchically-organized X Densley (2013); Levitt and Venkatesh
(2000); Padilla (1992); Stephenson
(2015)
Evolution of
organization
X Freilich, Chermak, and Caspi (2009); Simi
(2006)
X Ayling (2011); Densley (2013); Moeller
(2017); Sanchez-Jankowski (1991);
Thrasher (1927)
Size 10+ ADL (1995); Tenold (2018) <50 to
>100
Klein and Maxson (2006)
Use of Space
Distinct meeting areas,
lacks informal social
controls
X Futrell and Simi (2004); Simi and Futrell
(2015)
X Klein (1995); Thrasher (1927); Tita,
Cohen, and Engberg (2005)
Violence & Criminality
Symbolic (e.g. group
identity, status)
X ADL (1995); Baron (1997); Moore (1994) X Decker (1996); Densley (2013); Levitt
and Venkatesh (2000); Sanchez-
Jankowski (1991); Stephenson (2015)
Instrumental (e.g.
criminally oriented)
X ADL (1995); Baron (1997); Ezekiel (2002);
Freilich, Chermak, and Caspi (2009);
Simi (2006); Simi, Smith, and Reeser
(2008)
XDensley (2013); Klein (1995); Levitt and
Venkatesh (2000); Padilla, 1992;
Sanchez-Jankowski (1991);
Stephenson (2015)
(Continued)
20 S. E. REID AND M. VALASIK
Continued.
Summary of Characteristics Comparing Skinheads and Street Gangs
Skinheads Street Gangs
Researcher Researcher
Retributive violence X Bjørgo (2016); Fangen (1998); Klein
(2009); Shashkin (2008); Simi, Smith,
and Reeser (2008)
X Brantingham et al. (2012); Papachristos,
Hureau, and Braga (2013); Tita and
Radil (2011); Vigil (1996)
Entitativity X Mills, Freilich, and Chermak (2017);
Tenold (2018)
X Leovy (2015); Vasquez et al. (2015)
Risk Factors (Push)
Age (i.e. adolescence) X ADL (1995) X Pyrooz and Sweeten (2015)
Gender (i.e. Male) X ADL (1995); Hamm (1993); MIller-Idriss
(2018); Moore (1993); Tenold (2018)
X Klein and Maxson (2006)
Single parent home X ADL (1995); Kinsella (1996); Siedler
(2011)
X Hill et al. (1999); Thornberry et al. (2003)
Domestic discord X ADL (1995); Baron (1997); Ezekiel (2002) X Hill et al. (1999); Thornberry et al. (2003)
Unemployment X Fangen (1998); Kinsella (1996); Tenold
(2018); Young and Craig (1997)
X Levitt and Venkatesh (2000);
Stephenson (2015)
Drug abuse X Baron (1997); Wooden and Blazak (2001)X Bjerregaard and Smith (1993);
Thornberry et al. (2003)
Lack of education X Baron (1997); Shashkin (2008) X Craig et al. (2002); Hill et al. (1999)
Delinquent peers X Moore (1994) X Bjerregaard and Lizotte (1995); Hill et al.
(1999)
Externalizing behaviours X Craig et al. (2002); Hill et al. (1999)
Risk Factors (Pull)
Social identity X ADL (1995); Simi and Futrell (2015) X Hennigan and Spanovic (2012); Moore
(1978); Vigil (1988)
Financial incentives X Simi, Smith, and Reeser (2008) X Levitt and Venkatesh (2000);
Stephenson (2015)
Protection/safety X Baron (1997); Ezekiel (2002); Simi, Smith,
and Reeser (2008)
X Hill et al. (1999); Short and Strodtbeck
(1965)
Neighborhood
disorganization
X Brake (1974); Clarke (1976); Moore
(1994)
X Thornberry (1998); Thornberry et al.
(2003)
JOURNAL OF YOUTH STUDIES 21
... Proud Boys male supremacism drives much of their nostalgic, hyper masculine, and misogynistic beliefs that women are inferior to men, and women's mass entry into the workforce, due to feminism, is depriving women from being happy housewives and are cutting in line in front of deserving men and seizing opportunities owed to them (see Blazak, 2022;Campbell, 2022;Hermansson et al., 2020;Hochschild, 2016;Kitts, 2022;Park, 2022;Stern, 2019;Sunderland, 2022). Under the coded language of "western chauvinism," Proud Boys contend that Western (i.e., white) civilization is superior to all others (e.g., Orthodoxy, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, etc.) and that white privilege is not a problem in modern society (Proud Boys, 2021;Ramirez, 2023). Proud Boys argue that they are not a racist organization because they encourage non-whites to join as long as they support that (1) being white is not a problem in modern society and (2) the highest form of human development is achieved only by Western civilization (DeCook, 2018;Reid & Valasik, 2020b). ...
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Chapter
The mythos surrounding white power groups, such as racist skinheads, requires a critical analysis. This is especially true for demystifying the belief that, white power youth groups (i.e., alt-right gangs) are substantially different from conventional street gangs. This chapter aims to critically evaluate the existing gang definitions used by academics and the criminal justice system to rectify the apathy of attention by traditional gang scholars and law enforcement to the white power gang problem. This disconnect is most notably observed in the absence or under-reporting of white gang members in gang databases throughout jurisdictions across the United States. This legacy of underpolicing of alt-right gang members by legal authorities and/or racist policies is known as “white supremacy in policing.” The public resurgence of the white power movement with alt-right gangs (e.g., Proud Boys) participating in mass demonstrations and protests across liberal and progressive urban centers throughout the United States and abroad concerns community residents, policy makers, and practitioners. Yet, the lack of knowledge about how to deal with the members of these alt-right gangs is a problematic and a growing concern. Additionally, the premise that alt-right gangs as a domestic terrorist organization driven solely by racist, ideology greatly overestimates how rudimentary and unrefined the beliefs that loosely bind members together actually are. For instance, it is not uncommon for alt-right gangs to have non-white members who are drawn in by the groups’ misogyny and male supremacism. Similar distorted perceptions of existing in an organized way to achieve a common goal have existed for a variety of street gangs (e.g., Bloods, Crips, Folks, Peoples) and even transnational organizations (e.g., Mara Salvatrucha [MS-13]), exerting control over gang sets in every urban city across the globe. This misperception has tainted public perception and policy responses to these groups. As such, the use of ideology as a reason to limit the inclusion of white power youth in gang studies has impacted how gang researchers study white power groups, how they train law enforcement about street gangs, and the policies they support and help implement.
... For instance, the Eurogang definition highlights illegal activity as a central component of a gang's identity (Weerman et al., 2009). It has been demonstrated, however, such a definition picks up a wide range of groups including those not typically treated by researchers as street gangs, e.g., ravers, public drug takers (Aldridge et al., 2012), and alt-right/domestic extremist groups (Pyrooz et al., 2017;Reid & Valasik, 2018). As such, while such groups and their members may meet these definitional criteria 3 , they are not typically considered gangs and are seldom the focus of gang study. ...
... 3 Or even self-identify as gangs/gang members, which is often sufficient for inclusion in gang studies (see Reid & Valasik, 2018). 4 This is by no means the only aim of gang research and other aims arguably fall outside of this framing (e.g., research on gang identities to counter epistemic injustice, chronicling anthropologic group differences, studies of gang representations and discourses). ...
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In recent years, epistemic pluralism has received considerable endorsement as an approach to constructing scientific explanations and pursuing empirical research programs. In this article, we briefly discuss the advantages of an epistemically pluralist approach before outlining our own model of epistemic pluralism. The model we present emphasizes the specific considerations that occur when determining and justifying the selection of conceptual strategies and how conceptual strategies work together to provide task-relevant insights. By clarifying these constraint relationships, we highlight the kinds of systematic considerations that must be taken into account when selecting conceptual strategies for research tasks. We present a case study based on gang research to demonstrate how such considerations occur and the epistemic and pragmatic benefits of doing so.
... On one hand we see research on young people mobilising for racial (Carney, 2016;Hope et al., 2019) sexual (McGlashan & Fitzpatrick, 2017;Pender et al., 2019), gender (Harris, 2012;Keller, 2012), environmental justice (McGimpsey et al., 2023;O'brien et al., 2018) with campaigns like 'Why is my curriculum White?' 'Fridays for Future', 'Australian Youth Climate Coalition' and 'Rhodes Must Fall'. On the other hand, there is research on youth radicalization around nativist, racist/xenophobic, misogynist, and religious extremist ideas (Cherney et al., 2022;Reid et al., 2018;Sieckelinck et al., 2018). These groups are very influential online and have the power to translate ideas into calls for 'political' action (progressive or otherwise) e.g. the incel movement on one end, and on the other hand-K-pop fans in USA who used TikTok to co-ordinate mass ticket purchase of Donald Trump's election in rally, leaving hundreds of noticeably empty seats (Evelyn, 2020). 1 Viewing these developments side-by-side forces us to consider the modalities of competing worldviews in the political education of young people in liberal democracies. ...
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... On one hand we see research on young people mobilising for racial (Carney, 2016;Hope et al., 2019) sexual (McGlashan & Fitzpatrick, 2017;Pender et al., 2019), gender (Harris, 2012;Keller, 2012), environmental justice (McGimpsey et al., 2023;O'brien et al., 2018) with campaigns like 'Why is my curriculum White?' 'Fridays for Future', 'Australian Youth Climate Coalition' and 'Rhodes Must Fall'. On the other hand, there is research on youth radicalization around nativist, racist/xenophobic, misogynist, and religious extremist ideas (Cherney et al., 2022;Reid et al., 2018;Sieckelinck et al., 2018). These groups are very influential online and have the power to translate ideas into calls for 'political' action (progressive or otherwise) e.g. the incel movement on one end, and on the other hand-K-pop fans in USA who used TikTok to co-ordinate mass ticket purchase of Donald Trump's election in rally, leaving hundreds of noticeably empty seats (Evelyn, 2020). 1 Viewing these developments side-by-side forces us to consider the modalities of competing worldviews in the political education of young people in liberal democracies. ...
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Many studies have examined why individuals with a background in street life and crime are drawn toward extremism. This paper examines why most people with this background reject extremism. Based on ethnographic fieldwork in Oslo, we found that Muslims involved in street culture were generally opposed to jihadism because they perceived jihadists as evil people who harm innocents; bad Muslims who defame Islam; and cowards who break the 'code of the street.' This opposition resulted in avoidance behaviours, criticism and, sometimes, violence against suspected jihadists. We argue that research on the crime-terror nexus has focussed too narrowly on the similarities between street culture and jihadism, contributing to a distorted image of Muslims involved in street culture as potential terrorists.
... Due to such requirements, I argue it is necessary to consider construct validity in this stricter sense. 18 And, as Reid and Valasik (2018) note: such groups may even self-identify as gangs or gang members (e.g., some alt-right groups: Simi et al., 2008;Wooden & Blazak, 2001), which is typically considered sufficient for a group/individual to be included in a gang study . make such distinctions and that they are not relying conceptually on the Eurogang definition to carve out groups of interest. ...
Thesis
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Gangs are associated with a range of social, criminal, and economic harms. Yet, after almost a century of dedicated research, the development of effective and ethical responses to such harms has proven difficult. Recent attempts to address this have seen the establishment of the Eurogang Program; an international group of gang researchers and practitioners coordinated around a consensus definition of gangs. Since its recent inception, the Eurogang Program has quickly become the dominant framework of research and practice. While much is being staked on the success of the Eurogang Program, the suitability of such a programme for progressing gang research is yet to be thoroughly examined. In this thesis I therefore conduct a meta-theoretical examination of the state of gang research and particularly the Eurogang Program and its associated practices. By examining the frameworks underpinning gang research and drawing upon insights from the philosophy of science, I characterise the Eurogang approach as an attempt to coordinate gang research through means of unification (i.e., through the privileging of particular research perspectives and strategies to achieve coordination through consensus). I draw attention to some major limitations of these unificatory attempts and emphasise how the consensus Eurogang definition does not appropriately set up researchers to be able to develop the various kinds of conceptual and theoretical understandings of gangs required to improve gang policy and practice. Instead, I make the case for a framework known as epistemic pluralism, in which researchers do not pursue consensus but rather cultivate multiple systems of knowing to serve a variety of different research purposes. After establishing the benefit of epistemic pluralism, I examine how such a framework may be applied to the gang field. This involves specific discussion of the various aims of gang researchers and the roles that conceptual strategies (i.e., definitional, classificatory, and explanatory approaches) play in providing the pragmatic and epistemic (i.e., knowledge-related) insights required to meet them. These discussions offer a novel perspective on the roles of conceptual strategies in the process of knowledge production and justification. Having established the general kinds of strategies required for different research purposes, I then consider some specific examples of conceptual strategies that are relevant to meeting the various needs of gang researchers. This takes the form of the Conceptual Framework for Gang Research (CFGR). This novel approach offers greater opportunities for more meaningful kinds of research coordination and maximises the likelihood of establishing the conceptual and theoretical understandings of gangs required to improve gang policy and practice. The value of this thesis as a case study for pursuing epistemic pluralism in the sciences is also discussed.
... Today, many far-right online groups profile themselves as members of a new 'alt-right' movement. The term and the current political climate in the United States have brought those groups that were previously labelled as the racist right into the light (Hawley 2017;Neiwert 2017;Reid and Valasik 2018). Such subcultures are diverse, but anti-immigrant activists, conspiracy theorists, White nationalists and others appear to have primarily anti-establishment views in common, sharing similar racist, anti-feminist and anti-Semitic ideologies in their reaction against multiculturalism and globalism (Marwick and Lewis 2017). ...
Article
One of the main themes of alternative right-wing media is a strong anti-immigrant approach, which has allegedly intensified a radical and polarized world-view throughout Europe and the United States. In this article, by comparing two right-wing news sites, I examine whether commonalities in their reporting can be discerned at a transnational level. The focus is on the US-based Breitbart London and the Finnish-language MV-lehti, both founded in 2014. The comparative study approaches the research data by utilizing the method of discourse narratology to examine the similarities and differences between the two in terms of their ideological parlances. The results show that there are indisputable commonalities, with parlances that seek to undermine liberal democracy as an outspoken opponent to strengthen the homogeneous battlefront. Accordingly, right-wing news sites in Europe adhere to the shared ideology, leaning on a strong confrontation between western and Islamic countries.
Chapter
Representative Joseph Kennedy, the former president’s nephew, visited Berlin in late 1992 following a series of vicious skinhead attacks on ethnic minorities in Germany. Echoing his uncle’s famous “Ich bin ein Berliner” speech, the younger Kennedy presented his own warning to the German government that had been so slow to respond to these skinhead attacks: “Ich bin ein auslander (foreigner).” Appearing soon after on CNN’s Larry King show, Kennedy took a phone call from a listener who asked whether Kennedy didn’t think we ought to be working on the control of our own gangs here in the United States first? The inquiry raised again the question of whether ganging in one form or another is a relatively universal phenomenon or whether the American gang is special to our country. Can we learn from the experiences of other nations? Can they learn from us? On some topics, after all, we Americans have been better at telling other nations how to get their house in order than we are at handling our own social problems, How might we answer the question of whether or not American street gangs are unique? There are structures called gangs in many, many countries, ranging from the two vicious brothers.