Politics, Policy Development and Political Communication during Opposition:The Federal Liberal Party of Australia 1983 – 1996 and 2007– 2013

Abstract

This thesis argues that opposition is an opportunity to study our major political parties in the ‘raw’. Parties without the support of government departments and the resources of incumbency must rely on their own internal structures and the skill set of their Senators and Members of Parliament. It is in opposition that we can truly examine and assess how well party processes function and their capabilities. The Liberal Party of Australia (LPA) represents an interesting case study for parties in opposition because its inexperience at opposition offer political scientists a rare opportunity to observe a party attempting to learn new skill sets. Through an historical comparative study this thesis examines the LPA (and to some extent its coalition partner) in opposition between 1983-1996 and 2007-2013. It examines how, over time, the LPA attempted to prepare itself for government by examining its approach parliament, internal party management, its policy-making processes and political communication strategies. The study draws on several methodological approaches in order to triangulate results — interviews with key actors, private papers maintained by leading Liberal party actors, as well as publicly available documentation and media reports. This study finds that the practice of opposition in intensely political, contrary to most common conceptualisations in the literature. It argues for a more complex understanding of the LPA’s leadership ethos — one that recognises the expectations of shadow ministers and the backbench and the reciprocal nature of the leadership in the LPA. The study also finds evidence of increasing professionalism in the LPA’s use of media since 1983 and the mediatisation of politics. It explores why political parties become mediatised, arguing that the reason lies in party actors’ assumptions about what will help them capture office. The study argues that for most of the 1980s, the LPA aspired to be a credible alternative government and a constructive opposition with thought-out policy proposals. Policy was central to political actors’ assumptions about effective political communication, even if it struggled to achieve this and its resources often proved inadequate to the task. Not until losing the ‘unlosable election’ in 1993 did the LPA abandon policy advocacy as its idealised key strategy for attempting to win office. By contrast, the opposition between 2007 and 2013 (and particularly 2010 to 2013) pursued an overwhelmingly negative approach to opposition designed to destroy the Gillard government’s credibility rather than build up its own.Political actors’ assumptions about the purpose of policy had dramatically altered. Policy was no longer a vital tool to build-up credibility and win office. Instead, actors believed that strategically managing issues in the media was more important. As a result of the hung parliament and the lessons learned from the 1980s, the emphasis of the post-2007 Opposition had shifted to capturing office, because this was considered the most effective way to make political change. Thus, the study demonstrates how the party became increasingly mediatised between 1983 and 1996 and argues that between 2007 and 2013 that the party had internalised ‘media logics’ to the extent where the opposition invested only minimally in policy development during this period and political success was used as a justification for limiting the amount of information given to voters about their intentions for government. This study raises important implications about whether or not parties are adequately preparing for government in opposition.