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Cybersecurity Protection of Peacetime Organizations-Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization
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Abstract and Figures
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) was established to secure international cooperation between countries through the prohibition of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons testing. The CTBTO was established in 1996, with a foundation in a treaty that has been signed by 184 countries and ratified by 167 countries.
Within this research, the concept of peace is examined through the cybersecurity protection of the International Monitoring System (IMS). The International Monitoring System is comprised of a global network of sensors that monitor the earth for signs of an explosion through the analysis of seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide data. Each monitoring station includes technology that is specifically developed to determine the effects of a nuclear explosion within that region. This research is specifically focused on the protection of CTBTO-radionuclide monitoring stations.
The concept of peace is also examined within this research through the determination of cyber-attacks that can be conducted against nuclear weapon systems that can affect the security of the CTBTO treaty. These types of cyber-attacks include: cyber-attacks against early-warning systems that indicate a false nuclear attack, cyber-attacks against the communications infrastructure that disrupts communication between officials, operators, and nuclear systems, and cyber-attacks against the supply chain that introduce malevolent code into nuclear weapons and compromise the effectiveness of those weapons.
This research will analyze the current threats to the CTBTO, and recommend safeguards within the field of cybersecurity, to ensure the security and protection of the CTBTO.
Keywords: CTBTO, treaty monitoring, cybersecurity, xenon-131m, xenon-133m
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Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) automate the control and monitoring of physical industrial and infrastructure processes such as power generation, gas pipelines, and water management. Due to the convergence of networking infrastructure, PLCs can be exposed to cyberattacks over the network with potentially catastrophic consequences. This contribution introduces the basic mechanisms by which various attacks can be detected, analyzed, and, ultimately, remedied.
Cybersecurity, which is defined as information security aimed at averting cyberattacks, which are among the main issues caused by the extensive use of networks in industrial control systems. This paper proposes a model that integrates fault tree analysis, decision theory and fuzzy theory to (i) ascertain the current causes of cyberattack prevention failures and (ii) determine the vulnerability of a given cybersecurity system. The model was applied to evaluate the cybersecurity risks involved in attacking a website, e-commerce and enterprise resource planning (ERP), and to assess the possible consequences of such attacks; we evaluate these consequences, which include data dissemination, data modification, data loss or destruction and service interruption, in terms of criteria related to financial losses and time for restoration. The results of the model application demonstrate its usefulness and illustrate the increased vulnerability of e-commerce to cybersecurity attacks, relative to websites or ERP, due partly to frequent operator access, credit transactions and users’ authentication problems characteristic of e-commerce.
A xenon dynamic adsorption setup based on granular activated carbon packed column was developed. The adsorption behavior of xenon under different experimental conditions was studied and the results used to design an appropriate adsorber column for specific conditions. The resulting radioxenon gas extraction and quantification setup was evaluated based on an inter-comparison exercise and standard sample analysis results. The results showed that the quantification setup achieves experimental rules with uncertainty of ±3%.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty bans all nuclear tests and mandates development of verification measures to detect treaty violations. One verification measure is detection of radioactive xenon isotopes produced in the fission of actinides. The International Monitoring System (IMS) currently deploys automated radioxenon systems that can detect four radioxenon isotopes. Radioxenon systems with lower detection limits are currently in development. Historically, the sensitivity of radioxenon systems was measured by the minimum detectable concentration for each isotope. In this paper we analyze the response of radioxenon systems using rigorous metrics in conjunction with hypothetical representative releases indicative of an underground nuclear explosion instead of using only minimum detectable concentrations. Our analyses incorporate the impact of potential spectral interferences on detection limits and the importance of measuring isotopic ratios of the relevant radioxenon isotopes in order to improve discrimination from background sources particularly for low-level releases. To provide a sufficient data set for analysis, hypothetical representative releases are simulated every day from the same location for an entire year. The performance of three types of samplers are evaluated assuming they are located at 15 IMS radionuclide stations in the region of the release point. The performance of two IMS-deployed samplers and a next-generation system is compared with proposed metrics for detection and discrimination using representative releases from the nuclear test site used by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
This report reviews and updates the 2002 National Research Council report, Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). This report also assesses various topics, including: the plans to maintain the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile without nuclear-explosion testing; the U.S. capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions; commitments necessary to sustain the stockpile and the U.S. and international monitoring systems; and potential technical advances countries could achieve through evasive testing and unconstrained testing. Sustaining these technical capabilities will require action by the National Nuclear Security Administration, with the support of others, on a strong scientific and engineering base maintained through a continuing dynamic of experiments linked with analysis, a vigorous surveillance program, adequate ratio of performance margins to uncertainties. This report also emphasizes the use of modernized production facilities and a competent and capable workforce with a broad base of nuclear security expertise. © 2012 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is a comprehensive, structured and logical analysis method aimed at identifying and assessing risks of complex process systems. PRA uses fault tree analysis (FTA) as a tool to identify basic causes leading to an undesired event, to represent logical dependency of these basic causes in leading to the event, and finally to calculate the probability of occurrence of this event. To conduct a quantitative fault tree analysis, one needs a fault tree along with failure data of the basic events (components). Sometimes it is difficult to have an exact estimation of the failure rate of individual components or the probability of occurrence of undesired events due to a lack of sufficient data. Further, due to imprecision in basic failure data, the overall result may be questionable. To avoid such conditions, a fuzzy approach may be used with the FTA technique. This reduces the ambiguity and imprecision arising out of subjectivity of the data. This paper presents a methodology for a fuzzy based computer-aided fault tree analysis tool. The methodology is developed using a systematic approach of fault tree development, minimal cut sets determination and probability analysis. Further, it uses static and dynamic structuring and modeling, fuzzy based probability analysis and sensitivity analysis. This paper also illustrates with a case study the use of a fuzzy weighted index and cutsets importance measure in sensitivity analysis (for system probabilistic risk analysis) and design modification. ?? 2009.
This text addresses a number of technical skills in mathematics, physics, and specific areas of nuclear engineering that will prepare the student for optimum performance in any nuclear engineering or medical physics curriculum. The book opens with fundamentals in probability and statistics, ODEs, series solutions, general differential equations, numerical methods, up through PDEs, and incorporates modeling and simulation, radiation, heat transfer, neutron diffusion problems, advanced solution methods, and engineering problem solving. The book specifically focuses on examples in nuclear and radiological engineering, and is thus a unique text for nuclear engineering students. A course using the book may range from three to four credits. Several applications in Mathematica are written to illustrate technical concepts. © 2009 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. All rights reserved.
Almost 20 years ago, on 10 September 1996, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). This Treaty, which seeks to prohibit any nuclear test explosion in any environment, including underground, was part of a carefully balanced diplomatic deal struck in 1995 that made an indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) possible. As the time span for entry into force of the Treaty was envisaged to last only a few years, States signatories of the Treaty simultaneously established a Preparatory Commission, which is under international law considered a separate international organization from the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) proper. Since 1997 the Commission has worked tirelessly to prepare for the Treaty’s entry into force, in particular by building up an elaborately designed universal verification regime. This verification regime is now largely complete and of proven effectiveness and robustness, despite the unforeseen fact that, close to 20 years after its opening for signature, the Treaty has yet to reach full legal standing. This chapter will elucidate in more detail the present legal status of the CTBT, the functioning of its verification regime as it exists to date, as well as the means for completing the verification regime as foreseen in the Treaty.
This chapter provides an audit of legal issues relevant for nuclear non-proliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear disarmament. The authors discuss existing loopholes in pertinent treaty regulation; they address the question of the development of customary international law and identify gaps in regulation. Countermeasures, sanctions and pacific settlement of disputes are discussed with a view of supporting compliance with existing obligations. Finally, some preliminary suggestions for further research and cooperation are presented.