A Business Model Framework to Characterize Digital Multisided Platforms

Abstract

Businesses grounded upon multisided platforms (MSPs) are found in a growing number of industries, thanks to the recent developments in Internet and digital technologies. Digital MSPs enable multiple interactions among users of different sides through information and communication technologies. The understanding of the characteristics and constituents of MSPs is fragmented along different literature streams. Moreover, very few empirical studies have been carried out to date. In order to fill this gap, this paper presents a three-level framework that describes a digital MSP. The proposed framework is based on literature analysis and multiple case study. On the one hand, the framework can be used to describe MSP as it provides an operationalization of the concept through the identification of specific dimensions, variables and items; on the other hand, it can be used as an assessment tool by practitioners, as exemplified by the three empirical applications presented in this paper.

Full text

Journal of Open Innovation:
Technology, Market, and Complexity
Article
A Business Model Framework to Characterize Digital
Multisided Platforms
Marco Ardolino , Nicola Saccani , Federico Adrodegari * and Marco Perona
Department of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering, University of Brescia, Piazza del Mercato, 15,
25121 Brescia BS, Italy; marco.ardolino@unibs.it (M.A.); nicola.saccani@unibs.it (N.S.);
marco.perona@unibs.it (M.P.)
*Correspondence: federico.adrodegari@unibs.it
Received: 23 December 2019; Accepted: 31 January 2020; Published: 2 February 2020


Abstract:
Businesses grounded upon multisided platforms (MSPs) are found in a growing number
of industries, thanks to the recent developments in Internet and digital technologies. Digital MSPs
enable multiple interactions among users of different sides through information and communication
technologies. The understanding of the characteristics and constituents of MSPs is fragmented
along different literature streams. Moreover, very few empirical studies have been carried out to
date.
In order
to fill this gap, this paper presents a three-level framework that describes a digital
MSP.
The proposed
framework is based on literature analysis and multiple case study. On the one
hand,
the framework
can be used to describe MSP as it provides an operationalization of the concept
through the identification of specific dimensions, variables and items; on the other hand, it can
be used as an assessment tool by practitioners, as exemplified by the three empirical applications
presented in this paper.
Keywords: multisided platforms; business model; descriptive framework; multiple case study
1. Introduction
Digitalization is transforming the competitive landscape, challenging incumbent firms and leading
to business model (BM) innovations [
1
]. In recent years, there has been a sharp diffusion of web-based
businesses that enable and facilitate demand matching, the so-called digital multisided platforms
(MSPs) [
2
]. These businesses are characterized by the presence of a focal firm, the platform manager,
providing the infrastructure that enables interactions and transactions among the users of two or more
sides [
3
–
7
]. Examples of MSPs are online marketplaces of products and services [
8
], mobile software
applications [9], social networks [10], crowdsourcing [11], dating [12] and job-seeking platforms [13].
MSPs have disrupted competition in industries. For instance, the nature of exchange in retail
businesses has changed as the introduction of digital marketplaces has enabled the direct connection
between customers and independent suppliers [
14
], shifting the inventory risk from the retailer to
the supplier. Moreover, the development of a digital MSP (DMSP) is always characterized by the
creation of peculiar networks and ecosystems which facilitate social interactions and in particular
value cocreation and coinnovation [
15
–
17
]. Even though the most well-known platforms have been
introduced in “pure service” B2C contexts, manufacturing companies are also developing digital MSPs
aimed at collecting and processing data from installed base to provide advanced services like predictive
maintenance or “pay per use” models [18,19].
Although multisided platforms have been discussed in the literature, little research has dealt
with the characterization of this type of business [
20
,
21
]. Most studies develop analytical models
focusing on a specific feature of MSPs, such as price structure, network externalities or competition
(e.g., [
4
,
14
,
22
,
23
]), while a holistic approach to characterize the MSP is lacking. In addition, in spite of
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J. Open Innov. Technol. Mark. Complex. 2020,6, 10 2 of 23
the great diffusion of companies grounded on DMSP model, very few studies investigate these kinds
of businesses empirically either through a single case study (e.g., [
24
,
25
]) or multiple case studies [
26
].
In order to fill those gaps, this paper develops a three-level framework for the characterization
of MSPs. The development of the framework is based on the literature (literature analysis) and on
a multiple case study (preliminary study), aimed at identifying the possible configuration options
for the framework variables. The application of the complete framework to three case studies is also
illustrated in the paper (main study).
The purpose of the framework presented in this paper is twofold. On the one side, it has a
descriptive purpose and it may be used to identify the variables which characterize MSPs. This can
certainly help traditional businesses to evaluate which are the aspects to be evaluated for a business
model innovation towards a DMSP. Indeed, the developed tool thus allows practitioners to make
in-depth reflections on their business model by evaluating any changes in the structure of one or more
characterizing dimensions.
On the other side, practitioners can use the framework as an assessment tool to benchmark
with competitors.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2provides the conceptual background of the research.
Section 3illustrates the objectives and the methodology. Section 4presents the three-level platform
framework, while Section 5presents the empirical application of the framework. Section 6discusses the
empirical findings, while conclusive remarks and directions for future research are drawn in Section 7.
2. Background
2.1. Perspectives on the Platform Concept
Research on platforms has progressed simultaneously in different directions. Piezunka [
20
] points
out three main research domains where the concept of platform has been adopted, namely: new
product development, technology management and industrial organization. A brief description of the
three perspectives is provided in Table 1.
The first research stream builds on several classic product development studies. According to
this stream, a platform is a set of subsystems and interfaces characterized by a common structure
from which a company can efficiently develop and manufacture a family of products [
27
]. A notable
example of the application of this concept is Sony’s Walkman in the 1980s, whose modularity has
provided a way to increase scalability for the company [28].
The second perspective draws on research related to technology management. The key concept
of this research stream is the industry platform, that is a product, service or technology which
serves as a foundation upon which other firms can build complementary products, services or
technologies [
5
,
29
]. The Intel microprocessor represents a typical example of industry platform. Indeed,
the company focused on the control of microprocessors’ architecture, while giving away to other
actors in the complementary markets the opportunity to develop compatible connectors (e.g., chipsets,
motherboards) and applications [
30
]. This perspective has its roots in the concept of open innovation,
as it is based on the idea that creation of new products or services might effectively come from external
resources [
15
]. Platform businesses also generate ecosystems capable of amplifying innovative power,
thanks to external knowledge, and providing improvements both locally and globally [31].
Finally, the third perspective is related to the industrial organization stream. In this context the
platform is intended as a business intermediating two or more distinct groups of users, generally
matching supply and demand and enabling interactions among them. This stream uses the term
multisided platforms to differentiate them from one-sided platforms, where the business enables
interactions between users of one group only [32].

J. Open Innov. Technol. Mark. Complex. 2020,6, 10 3 of 23
Table 1. The platform concept in different research domains.
Research Domain Concept Perspective Example References
New product
development Product platform
The platform is a product that
meets the needs of a core
group of customers but is
designed for easy modification
into derivatives through the
addition, substitution or
removal of features. The
platform allows to save costs
and increase efficiency in
product development through
the reuse of common parts
and ease in the manufacturing
of a large number of
derivative products.
Sony Walkman [20,27,28]
Technology
management
Industry
platform
The platform is a product,
service or technology that is
developed by one or several
firms and that serve as the
foundation upon which other
firms can build
complementary products,
services or technologies.
Intel
microprocessor [5,29,30]
Industrial
organization
Multisided
platform
The platform intermediates
between two or more distinct
groups of users enabling
interactions among them.
Therefore, a multisided
platform consists of a shared
facility in which the
interactions take place among
the users.
E-bay [3,4,20,32,33]
2.2. Digital Multisided Platforms
The concept of multisided platform has been extensively debated particularly in the information
systems and management literature but only in recent years has the subject been approached with the
logic of BM [
26
]. Scholars often use the term MSP interchangeably with other ones such as multi-sided
markets [4,33], platform-based markets [34], platform ecosystems [19,35] and marketplaces [26].
The disruptive success of digital platforms such as Airbnb and Uber have given great popularity
to this BM [
36
]. Multisided platforms, however, have existed for a long time: traditional “brick and
mortar” shopping malls, for instance, bring together retailers and shopper, providing the physical
facilities and services such as maintenance operations for retailers and babysitting for shoppers’
children [
37
]. However, internet, mobile and digital technologies have been the catalyst for the
massive diffusion of digital multisided platforms [
16
], increasing the reach of connecting platform
sides, improving match-making mechanisms, enabling more efficient transaction management and
more effective trust-building [
2
]. Furthermore, the combination of the platform model with Internet
technology greatly improves the perceived utility and ease of use, ensuring better satisfaction as well
as greater security and transparency [
38
]. Amazon, for example, from a pure retailer business, has
moved to a MSP model over time, opening its business and combining its own inventory with that of
independent suppliers [
8
]. Based on the literature, in this paper we define a multisided platform as a
BM [7,39] that is:
1.
based on the presence of a virtual or physical place (the “platform”) which enables and facilitates
the interactions between two or more different groups of users [3,33,40,41];

J. Open Innov. Technol. Mark. Complex. 2020,6, 10 4 of 23
2.
characterized by interdependent relationships among the sides, because of the presence of indirect
and bilateral positive network effects [8];
3. potentially able to track the interaction events between the users involved [42].
This paper addresses digital multisided platforms i.e., MSPs based on digital and internet technologies.
2.3. Characterizing a Digital Multisided Platform
The literature helps to identify the main characteristics of a digital multisided platform (DMSP).
First of all, multisided platforms differ from traditional BMs because of the presence of interactions
and transactions among users of two or more participating sides [
43
,
44
]. Therefore, it is fundamental
to implement a structure able to maximize the size of the sides [
45
]. Typically, it is possible to identify
a supply side, the group of users offering or providing a product or a service, and a demand side,
consisting of the users who use or benefit from the contents (product or services) provided by the
supply side [
10
,
46
,
47
]. A critical role in MSPs is the platform manager, who mediates users’ interactions
and serves as the users’ primary contact point with the platform [
46
]. In addition, advertisers may be
present as a third side involved [
48
,
49
]. DMSPs also have peculiar pricing and revenue models. Since
there are two or more sides involved, the platform manager needs to deal with the pricing issue of
whether and how much the different sides charge [40].
Another peculiar aspect that differentiates MSP from traditional businesses is competition.
Platforms are in fact affected by two distinct types of competition [
50
]. Inside competition occurs
between users inside the same platform side, such as the competition among the different sellers for
gaining customers in a marketplace. In turn, “outside competition” instead occurs among platforms as
they compete to get the users on board their platform.
The literature investigated several aspects of MSPs, including network effects, pricing, integration
and control, engagement, competition, advertisement and regulation and antitrust. Table 2summarizes
the main issues addressed by the literature in each area.
Table 2. Investigation areas about multisided platforms.
Area Description Reference
Network effects/Network
externalities
Network effects (or network externalities) are a
distinctive feature of a multisided platform, arising
when the growth in usage by one side increases the
value for the other side. Such interdependencies
often lead to a feedback loop in which the number of
participants on both sides affect each
other recursively.
[3,4,40,50,51]
Pricing
The pricing structure in a MSP generally makes the
revenue model very complex. For instance, the price
for one side can be zero and the profit by the
platform manager is made only on the other side(s).
Moreover, platform managers can choose among
different kinds of fees to be applied.
[3,10,44,51]
Integration and control
Platforms involve several users on each side. It is
important to control the behavior of the users
participating in the platform and contents provided.
[14,22,33,35]
Engagement
Due to the presence of network effects (externalities),
attracting users presents peculiar challenges,
differently from traditional businesses, such as the
so-called chicken and egg dilemma. Users on side
“A” would not participate without users on side “B”
and vice-versa. It is important to implement
appropriate strategies to incentivize participation to
all the sides of the platform.
[48,50,52]

J. Open Innov. Technol. Mark. Complex. 2020,6, 10 5 of 23
Table 2. Cont.
Area Description Reference
Competition
Platforms are subject to two main forms of
competition: (1) outside competition—competition of
the platform business with other similar businesses;
(2) inside competition—competition among the users
participating in the same side.
[53–55]
Advertisement
Advertisement is an element often present in
platform-based businesses. On the one hand, it is an
important source of revenue for many businesses.
On the other hand, it could be counterproductive
because it causes frictions in interactions among
the sides.
[48,49,56]
Regulation and antitrust
Multisided platforms can provide new alternatives to
conventional BMs and that tests the limits of existing
regulatory policies. Traditional businesses and policy
makers generally wonder and debate if MSPs
conform to regulations and antitrust laws.
[56–58]
The literature contributions mainly concern the application of analytical models aimed at
investigating specific aspects in the areas identified in Table 2, e.g., equilibrium, allocative efficiency
and competition between two different multisided platforms [
59
,
60
]. Studies holistically addressing
the MSP configuration are lacking. Quite surprisingly, the literature also lacks detailed empirical
studies that analyze the configuration and features of existing DMSPs, in order to compare them and
define archetypes [21].
Osterwalder and Pigneur [
39
] have used the BM Canvas to describe a MSP. The Canvas has
also been used by Muzellec, Ronteau and Lambkin [
52
] to develop a model of the evolution of the
marketing strategies of two-sided Internet businesses. Moreover, it has been adopted by Wang, Tang
and Jin et al. [
10
] to investigate the dynamics of revenue streams in mobile social networks. However,
the BM Canvas has some limitations related to its general purpose as it lacks the focus on peculiar
aspects of MSP, such as network externalities and the relationships among the sides involved, as well
as between each side and the platform manager. More specifically, the BM Canvas does not encompass
the features to describe the interactions between the users, that are instead merely considered as
customer segments.
An original framework for the analysis of MSPs has been proposed by Raivio and Luukkainen [
61
],
even though it does not analyze the characteristics of the sides and the configuration options.
Furthermore, that model has not found applications neither in the literature nor in practice. Finally,
Täuscher and Laudien [
26
] develop an original integrative framework, used for analyzing 100 MSPs in
order to develop an empirically grounded taxonomy but it focuses only on marketplaces.
3. Research Objectives and Method
Given the paucity of studies investigating the main constituents of a DMSP, the research
focus of this paper is on exploration and theory building; the paper develops and presents a
framework encompassing the dimensions and variables to be analyzed in order to characterize
and categorize DMSPs.
Qualitative research is therefore particularly appropriate [
62
] and the research process adopted
can be ascribed to “iterative-grounded” theory [
63
], as done by other works in the field of MSPs
such as the one of de Oliveira and Cortimiglia [
16
]. This method combines empirical data with the
relevant literature in order to fill in the gaps. This procedure has allowed for evaluation of the features
characterizing a MSP and has revealed aspects neglected by the literature. The proposed framework
is based in fact on the combination of a literature analysis and data about representative cases of

J. Open Innov. Technol. Mark. Complex. 2020,6, 10 6 of 23
DMSPs, expanding the corpus of knowledge on the elements characterizing a multisided platform and
their options.
Figure 1illustrates the three research steps and how they contributed to the outcome of this study.
J. Open Innov. Technol. Mark. Complex. 2020, 6, x FOR PEER REVIEW 6 of 23
Figure 1. Platform descriptive framework.
3.1. Initial Framework Development
To point out the key research topics and findings about digital MSPs we searched the databases
Scopus and WoS, through the keywords “multisided platform”, “digital multisided platform” and
their variations. The contents emerged from the literature have been codified and grouped into
thematic categories (see Table 2). The results of this analysis provided the inputs for the identification
of the dimensions and variables of the first two hierarchical levels of the framework (Figure 1).
For developing the framework, we adopted the morphological analysis method. Morphological
analysis can help to identify attributes and specifications of a specific object of interest [26,64,65].
Witt, Stahlecker and Geldermann [66] acknowledge the creative nature of this technique since it can
also be used to figure out new configurations that have not yet been adopted. Thus, we developed a
framework characterized by a structure made of morphological boxes [67]. Each morphological box
represents a specific constituent of the MSP BM and it is characterized by a number of variables and
items. In this way it is possible to explore all the alternative configurations for a MSP BM.
3.2. Exploratory Case Study and Framework Refinement
In order to complement and refine the results of the literature analysis and the initial framework
development, we conducted an empirical analysis which was characterized by two distinct processes:
an exploratory and a main study [68]. The exploratory study allowed for further development of the
framework, through the identification of the third-level items (Figure 1).
The exploratory study sample consists of 26 DMSPs. The case selection was based on the
following criteria: (a) adequate coverage of the functions enabled by a multisided platform; (b)
adequate maturity level (companies which are at least three years old have been selected) and (c)
availability to share information and participate in the study.
The main information about the cases is summarized in Table 3. Company names are not
reported for confidentiality reasons.
Table 3. Case studies description.
Case Description Role of Person
Interviewed
Case
1 Crowdsourcing graphic design company Vice President
Engineering
Case
2 Online marketplace for renting vacation homes Host Operations Lead
Figure 1. Platform descriptive framework.
3.1. Initial Framework Development
To point out the key research topics and findings about digital MSPs we searched the databases
Scopus and WoS, through the keywords “multisided platform”, “digital multisided platform” and their
variations. The contents emerged from the literature have been codified and grouped into thematic
categories (see Table 2). The results of this analysis provided the inputs for the identification of the
dimensions and variables of the first two hierarchical levels of the framework (Figure 1).
For developing the framework, we adopted the morphological analysis method. Morphological
analysis can help to identify attributes and specifications of a specific object of interest [
26
,
64
,
65
].
Witt, Stahlecker
and Geldermann [
66
] acknowledge the creative nature of this technique since it can
also be used to figure out new configurations that have not yet been adopted. Thus, we developed a
framework characterized by a structure made of morphological boxes [
67
]. Each morphological box
represents a specific constituent of the MSP BM and it is characterized by a number of variables and
items. In this way it is possible to explore all the alternative configurations for a MSP BM.
3.2. Exploratory Case Study and Framework Refinement
In order to complement and refine the results of the literature analysis and the initial framework
development, we conducted an empirical analysis which was characterized by two distinct processes:
an exploratory and a main study [
68
]. The exploratory study allowed for further development of the
framework, through the identification of the third-level items (Figure 1).
The exploratory study sample consists of 26 DMSPs. The case selection was based on the following
criteria: (a) adequate coverage of the functions enabled by a multisided platform; (b) adequate maturity
level (companies which are at least three years old have been selected) and (c) availability to share
information and participate in the study.
The main information about the cases is summarized in Table 3. Company names are not reported
for confidentiality reasons.

J. Open Innov. Technol. Mark. Complex. 2020,6, 10 7 of 23
Table 3. Case studies description.
Case Description Role of Person Interviewed
Case 1 Crowdsourcing graphic design company Vice President Engineering
Case 2 Online marketplace for renting vacation homes Host Operations Lead
Case 3 Classifieds operating in second-hand cars and
vehicles industry Founder
Case 4 Booking platform for hotels and other kinds of
accommodations Regional Director
Case 5 Food delivery platform Analytics Manager
Case 6 Crowdfunding platform Founder
Case 7 E-commerce product marketplace Head of Marketplace
Case 8 Crowdfunding platform Founder
Case 9 Self-service ticketing platform
Business Development Manager (UK)
Case 10 Peer to peer car sharing platform Vice President
Case 11 Social eating platform Founder and CEO
Case 12 Couponing platform operating in products,
beauty and travels Country Communications Manager
Case 13 Marketplace for smartphone reparation services Country Manager
Case 14 Classifieds operating in second-hand machinery
industry Cofounder
Case 15 Job seeking platform Marketing Manager
Case 16
Platform enabling purpose-built industrial IoT
applications to ensure connectivity to devices,
applications, and data sources across industrial
organizations.
Country manager
Case 17 Dating platform Country Manager
Case 18 Lead generator platform for service centers Founder and CEO
Case 19 Caregiving services marketplace Analytics Manager
Case 20 Meta search engine in travel industry Senior Growth Strategist
Case 21 Classifieds platform for products Product director
Case 22 Household services marketplace Chief architect and Technical
Cofounder
Case 23 Metasearch engine for holiday accommodations Country manager Italy and Portugal
Case 24 Peer to peer car sharing platform Director of International Expansion
Case 25 People transportation services marketplace Marketing Manager
Case 26 Cloud-based, open IoT operating platform for
plants, systems and machines. Country Business Developer
Single semi-structured interviews were carried out with managers within the selected companies
and the interview guide was based on the two framework levels developed from the literature analysis.
In particular, the questions were aimed at evaluating the configuration of each framework variable and
dimension identified thanks to the literature analysis. That ensured that the researchers were able to
understand how the firms could be positioned according to the investigated elements. Each interview
lasted between one and two hours. To enhance the study’s reliability, two researchers participated in
the interviews simultaneously and minutes and main messages were sent to the informants for review.
The evaluation of the consistency of information has been evaluated through independent coding and
cross-checked by the researchers. Moreover, the information gathered has been complemented and

J. Open Innov. Technol. Mark. Complex. 2020,6, 10 8 of 23
triangulated with secondary sources (such as reports, media interviews and web data) for conducting
case studies appropriately, without biases.
The exploratory analysis has been conducted through a pattern-matching logic. Indeed, according
to the results of the literature analysis [
2
,
6
,
40
,
46
], a MSP may perform one or more of three specific
functions, namely: (i) matchmaking; (ii) transaction; (iii) maker. The matchmaking function allows
the match between two or more users within the platform based on their characteristics and needs.
The transaction function provides users with the ability to provide a content (product or service) in
exchange for a sum of money through the platform. Finally, the maker function guarantees users the
opportunity to create content within the platform. These functions will be detailed in Section 4.1.
Therefore, we have identified seven patterns, each one based on the coverage of one or more of the
above-mentioned functions (Figure 2). Each analyzed case was then positioned in one of the 7 patterns.
For example, all the cases performing only matchmaking functions have been positioned in pattern
1 while the cases performing both matchmaking and transaction functions have been positioned in
pattern 4.
J. Open Innov. Technol. Mark. Complex. 2020, 6, x FOR PEER REVIEW 8 of 23
researchers were able to understand how the firms could be positioned according to the investigated
elements. Each interview lasted between one and two hours. To enhance the study’s reliability, two
researchers participated in the interviews simultaneously and minutes and main messages were sent
to the informants for review. The evaluation of the consistency of information has been evaluated
through independent coding and cross-checked by the researchers. Moreover, the information
gathered has been complemented and triangulated with secondary sources (such as reports, media
interviews and web data) for conducting case studies appropriately, without biases.
The exploratory analysis has been conducted through a pattern-matching logic. Indeed,
according to the results of the literature analysis [2,6,40,46], a MSP may perform one or more of three
specific functions, namely: (i) matchmaking; (ii) transaction; (iii) maker. The matchmaking function
allows the match between two or more users within the platform based on their characteristics and
needs. The transaction function provides users with the ability to provide a content (product or
service) in exchange for a sum of money through the platform. Finally, the maker function guarantees
users the opportunity to create content within the platform. These functions will be detailed in Section
4.1.
Therefore, we have identified seven patterns, each one based on the coverage of one or more of
the above-mentioned functions (Figure 2). Each analyzed case was then positioned in one of the 7
patterns. For example, all the cases performing only matchmaking functions have been positioned in
pattern 1 while the cases performing both matchmaking and transaction functions have been
positioned in pattern 4.
This has been done in order to ensure that the theoretically emerging patterns are creamed off,
excluding combinations with no matches in the reality [69]. The exploratory analysis revealed that
only three of the seven possible patterns make sense in the DMSP domain (Figure 2).
Figure 2. The structure of the empirical analysis.
The main study followed the exploratory study and consisted of three in-depth case studies, one
for each of the three patterns identified in the previous phase. The three in-depth case studies are
summarized in Table 4.
Table 4. Exploratory case: company descriptions.
Company Description Geographic
Coverage
Platform
Sides
Role of
Respondent
Figure 2. The structure of the empirical analysis.
This has been done in order to ensure that the theoretically emerging patterns are creamed off,
excluding combinations with no matches in the reality [
69
]. The exploratory analysis revealed that
only three of the seven possible patterns make sense in the DMSP domain (Figure 2).
The main study followed the exploratory study and consisted of three in-depth case studies, one
for each of the three patterns identified in the previous phase. The three in-depth case studies are
summarized in Table 4.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with managers covering key executives in marketing
and sales functions. Both secondary data and interview transcripts have been used to fill in the
developed framework. This analysis allowed to both generalize the framework and to carry out
comparisons among the analyzed cases.

J. Open Innov. Technol. Mark. Complex. 2020,6, 10 9 of 23
Table 4. Exploratory case: company descriptions.
Company Description Geographic
Coverage Platform Sides Role of
Respondent
Alpha
Italian company providing a
solution to help customers and
taskers to meet, interact and
close good deals. Customers
request for price quotation
filling out a specific form on
the platform with all the
detailed information of the
service needed. Taskers are
able to see this request and, if
interested, they pay a fee to
obtain the contact information
of the customer in order to
provide a price quotation. The
customer can receive up to 5
price quotations.
Italy Customers
Taskers
1 interview
Role:
Company CEO and
founder
Beta
Multinational French
company operating in
long-distance ridesharing.
Through a large community of
users, Beta enables
interactions between drivers
and passengers willing to go
to the same destination and
share the cost of the journey.
Europe, Brasil,
India, Mexico
Drivers
Passengers
2 interviews
Roles:
(1) Marketing
manager
(2) Public relations
manager
Sigma
Multinational American cloud
computing company that
provides business software
solutions on a subscription
basis. The company is well
known for its on-demand
customer relationship
management (CRM) solution
offering users with a customer
community, developer
community and an app
exchange marketplace.
Global Customers
App developers
1 interview
Role:
Exclusive Sigma
app developer
4. A Framework for Characterizing Multisided Platforms
4.1. Structure and Methodological Approach
In order to develop the framework for our study, we investigate BM constituents and their potential
options [
39
,
70
], only considering the relevant elements in the domain of digital multisided platforms.
The framework structure is depicted in Figure 1and it is hierarchically organized in three levels,
namely:
1.
Level 1—Dimensions (D): The first level of the framework consists of six dimensions covering the
main features of MSPs. The dimensions have been defined based on the findings of the literature
analysis, that have been matched with the BM constituents [39] relevant for MSPs
2.
Level 2—Variables (V): A set of variables has been identified in order to characterize each
dimension of the first level of the framework. The variables derive from the literature analysis
with some refinement from the exploratory study;

J. Open Innov. Technol. Mark. Complex. 2020,6, 10 10 of 23
3.
Level 3—Items (I): the third level of the framework encompasses a set of items that operationalize
the variables of the second level. They have been defined based on the exploratory study of the
26 MSPs listed in Table 3.
The framework covers all the investigation areas found in the literature (Table 2) except for
“Regulation and Antitrust”. In fact, this study is not interested in policy, regulation and antitrust or
other environmental factors but only focuses on the endogenous characterization of a DMSP.
The third level of the framework translates each variable into one or more measurable items.
In particular, there are three types of items, namely:
1.
Binary items—They measure the presence of a specific platform feature, in the platform under
investigation, and take the value “yes” or “no”;
2.
Configuration items—they can take a value among a set of predefined ones, which represent the
possible configuration options;
3.
Open items—they are qualitative items for which it has not been possible to identify pre-defined
set of configuration options, so an open description is allowed.
The six dimensions with the respective variables and items are illustrated in the following sections.
4.2. Platform Value Proposition
The value proposition indicates the reason why users join the platform [
39
]. The platform
achieves the value proposition enabling specific interactions between the sides and exploiting network
externalities. Moreover, the platform may carry out three distinct functions: matchmaking, transaction
and maker. The variables that are used to describe this dimension are (Table 5):
1.
Value proposition. The value proposition strongly depends on both the industry in which
the platform operates and the services offered [
71
]. Indeed, an unclear definition of the value
proposition may cause the failure of a business since it represents the main pillar of a BM.
2.
Function. DMSPs are diffused in several business sectors and may perform one or more of three
different functions, namely: matchmaking, transaction and maker [
53
,
72
]. The matchmaking
regards the capability to match the demand and offer among the sides. The transaction function
refers to the possibility to make a transaction, between demand and offer, with the corresponding
payment process through the platform. Finally, the maker function denotes the provision of
specific tools or instruments that can be used by the users of a side to create, within the platform,
a content to be transacted.
Table 5. Variables, items and configuration options for the “value proposition” dimension.
Variables Items Item Type Options
Value proposition Value proposition
Open
Function Function Configuration Matchmaking; Transaction; maker
4.3. Platform Sides
The peculiar characteristic of a MSP is the presence of two or more sides [
3
,
46
]. This framework
dimension aims at scrutinizing the characteristics of each side involved in the platform. The variables
that describe this dimension are (Table 6):
1.
Sides. This variable aims at defining how many sides participate in the MSP and their roles [
5
,
10
].
Not all the roles pointed out may be covered by the sides because this strongly depends on the
functions performed by the platform as well as the industry in which the platform operates;
2.
Segmentation. The platform may create a segmentation of different types of users within each
side (e.g., premium users with additional functions or facilitations) [43];

J. Open Innov. Technol. Mark. Complex. 2020,6, 10 11 of 23
3.
Engagement incentives. This variable investigates the presence of mechanisms that incentivize
users in the platform to invite others to join [44];
4.
Direct externalities. This variable analyses the presence of mechanisms that make more valuable
the joining of a potential user in one side based on the number of users already present in the
same side [21].
Table 6. Variables, items and configuration options for the “platform sides” dimension.
Variables Items Item Type Options
Sides Number of sides Configuration From 2 to N sides
Sides type Configuration Supply; Demand; Peer; Maker;
Advertisement
Segmentation
Presence Binary Yes; No
Segment participation
criteria Configuration
Payment of a fixed fee; Payment
of an interaction extra-fee;
Achievement of a specific
objective; Platform registration
Benefits Configuration Enhanced services and/or
functions; Enhanced visibility
Benefit standardization Configuration Standard; Customized
Engagement incentives
Presence Binary Yes; No
Reward Binary Yes; No
Reward type Configuration
Amount of money to be spent in
the platform (for both users);
Amount of money to be spent in
the platform (only for the user
already present to the platform);
Amount of money to be spent in
the platform (only for the user
invited to join the platform);
Reward different from an
amount of money to be spent in
the platform
Reward setting Open
Direct externalities
Presence Binary Yes; No
Direct externalities
characteristics Open -
4.4. Platform Revenue Model
The revenue model concerns how economic flows (types, frequency, entity, sides involved) are set
in a DMSP. They are (Table 7):
1.
Affiliation fees. Affiliation fees are paid by the users to the platform manager, in order to join the
platform [3,73];
2.
Interaction fees. Interaction fees are paid by the users to the platform manager whenever an
interaction is carried out by the platform users [3,60];
3.
Financial flows between sides. A financial flow between sides may be present between users
of two different sides and it is generally related to a transaction payment for the exchange of a
product or a service [74];
4.
Referral fees. Referral fees represent economic flows that are given to a specific user of a side as a
reward for its specific actions [75].

J. Open Innov. Technol. Mark. Complex. 2020,6, 10 12 of 23
Table 7. Variables, items and configuration options for the “platform revenue model” dimension.
Variables Items Item Type Options
Affiliation fees
Presence Binary Yes; No
Payer Configuration
[All the sides involved in the
platform]
Standardization Configuration Standard; Customized
Frequency Configuration Una tantum; Regular
frequency [specify]
Amount Open
Interaction fees
Presence Binary Yes; No
Payer Configuration
[All the sides involved in the
platform]
Standardization Configuration Standard; Customized
Interaction charged Open
Calculation Configuration
Fixed fee per each
interaction; Percentage of an
economic flow related to the
interaction
Amount Open
Financial flows between sides Presence Binary Yes; No
Transaction object Open
Referral fees
Presence Binary Yes; No
Recipients Configuration Sides involved in the
platform
Amount Open
4.5. Platform Control
Since a MSP enables the interactions between different users, control mechanisms should be set to
prevent inappropriate behaviors and actions by the users that can damage the image and reputation of
the platform [11,53,55].
The variables identified to describe the platform control are (Table 8):
1.
Control mechanisms. The mechanisms arranged by the platform aim at controlling the behavior
and the activities of the users as well as the contents provided through the platform [35].
2.
Rating and review system. The presence of a rating and review system helps both users in
choosing the best match for their need and the platform manager in verifying potential incorrect
behaviors [76].
3.
Exclusive agreements and contents. The presence of exclusive agreements between the platform
manager and users allows the former to provide exclusive services or products so users are forced
to join that platform [77].
4.6. Platform Competition
This dimension investigates the presence of both inside and outside competition [
8
]. The variables
analyzed are (Table 9):
1.
Inside competition. Inside competition is the competition within one side. This generally might
occur among the users of the supply side [47];

J. Open Innov. Technol. Mark. Complex. 2020,6, 10 13 of 23
2.
Outside competition. Outside competition refers to the competitors of the DMSP under
study. Competitors could be either MSPs or traditional businesses providing a similar value
proposition [77];
3.
Multihoming. This variable evaluates how easy it is to multi-home since the platform manager
can make it difficult with some expedients (e.g., investment costs, learning curves), creating an
entry barrier towards competitors [47,78].
Table 8. Variables, items and configuration options for the “platform control” dimension.
Variables Items Item Type Options
Control mechanisms
Presence Binary Yes; No
Type Configuration
Identity check; User requirements;
Contents (products/services) quality;
Respect of the rules of the platform
Timing Configuration Ex-ante; ex-post
Rating and review
system (R&R)
Presence Binary Yes; No
Sides involved Configuration [All the sides involved in the
platform]
R&R direction Configuration Unilateral; Bilateral
R&R privacy Configuration Public; Partially public; Private
Exclusive agreements
and contents
Presence Binary Yes; No
Side(s) involved Configuration [All the sides involved in the
platform]
Benefits
characteristics Open
Table 9. Variables, items and configuration options for the “platform competition” dimension.
Variables Items Item Type Options
Inside competition
Presence Binary Yes; No
Sides involved Configuration [All the sides involved in the
platform]
Platform manager
influence presence Binary Yes; No
Platform manager
influence type Configuration
Enhanced visibility respect others
users; Showing ratings results;
Specific recognitions by the
platform manager
Outside competition
Main competitors
organization model Configuration Platform business; Traditional
business
Main competitors
value proposition Configuration Similar value proposition; Partial
overlapping value proposition
Main competitors
geographical market Configuration Same geographical market;
Different geographical market
Multihoming Multihoming Configuration Allowed; Partially allowed;
Forbidden

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4.7. Platform Architecture
The platform architecture consists of the infrastructural organization of the digital platform,
focusing in particular on technological aspects and the interfaces with the users [
2
,
20
]. The variables
included in this dimension are (Table 10):
1.
User registration. The registration of the user might be needed or not to join the platform [
79
–
81
];
2.
Boundaries between sides. The boundaries between the sides in a platform may be blurred
since the same user may belong to one side or to another one based on the role performed in the
interaction [43,82];
3.
Versioning and update. This variable aims at understanding in which way the platform updates
are arranged by the platform manager and how the versioning is organized [83];
4.
Platform access. This variable aims at investigating which are the “access ways” that the users
can adopt in order to interact with other users [84];
5.
Openness. The openness in a platform concerns the freedom, for the users of the sides, to access
and modify the source code of the platform in order to enable coinnovation, as well as the freedom
to access the data gathered [5,17].
Table 10. Variables, items and configuration options for the “platform architecture” dimension.
Variables Items Item Type Options
User registration User registration Configuration
Registration necessary to access;
Registration necessary to interact;
No registration needed but it allows
to benefit from customized services;
No registration envisaged in the
platform
Boundaries between
sides
Boundaries between
sides Configuration Clear distinction between sides; No
distinction between sides
Versioning and
update
Versioning and
update Configuration
Platform versions automatically
updated with no charge; Platform
versions automatically updated
with charge; Platform versions
"updatable" with charge; Platform
versions "updatable" with no charge
Platform access
Web portal
implementation Binary Yes; No
Dedicated
application
implementation
Binary Yes; No
Operating system
(app) Configuration iOS; Android
Openness Platform openness Configuration Closed; Open
5. Main Study: Description of Companies
5.1. Alpha
Alpha is an Italian DMSP for professional services, meant to match the demand by private users
with the offering by plumbers, photographers, personal trainers, etc. A customer may request up to
five quotations for a specific task and (s)he can directly select and contact the preferred professional
based on the quotations received. Alpha aims to help companies find new clients without investing
in advertisement.

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The business was launched in 2013 in four large Italian cities. At the early stages, Alpha was
focused only on household services and acted as a commission-based intermediary. However, after six
months, the company realized that the success rate of professional taskers was low, and the platform did
not get enough revenue. The revenue model thus changed to the current one, in which the professional
pays a fee for each quotation made, while the transaction is arranged outside the platform. Currently
the company employs about 20 people and has a community of about 20,000 professional taskers.
5.2. Beta
Headquartered in France, Beta is Europe’s foremost ride sharing company and the largest
community in the world for shared trips by car. It enables interactions between drivers and passengers,
allowing drivers to “sell” seats in their cars for long distance rides. In this way, the drivers can cover at
least their driving costs and passengers can gain access to cheaper travel.
However, the ride price cannot be set freely by the drivers but must be within a minimum and
a maximum price, set by the platform, depending on the length of the journey. The booking and
payment of the ride is arranged through the platform. The passenger (driver) pays (gets money) every
time it rides (drives) and the company takes a 10% cut on average. At the early stages, the company
only enabled the matching between drivers and passengers while the payment was carried out outside
the platform. In recent years Beta has become an online booking platform where the transaction
is arranged directly on the platform. Currently Beta employs about 400 people and operates in 15
different countries, with an average of more than 6 million rides per month.
5.3. Sigma
Sigma is a global cloud computing company that provides business software on a subscription
basis and it is well-known for its customer relationship management (CRM) solution. The revenue
model of the company has not experienced particular changes from the early years and its solution
represents a relatively low-risk undertaking, exploiting the so-called software-as-a-service model.
The Sigma website was launched in August of 1999, and a month later, the company had five
corporate customers. A radical change occurred in 2006 with the introduction of the multisided platform
model. The company decided to open the software, providing several independent developers with
the opportunity to build applications to be sold in a virtual store. The store allows the user to customize
its experience with Sigma based on its needs.
6. Findings and Discussion
This section organizes the findings from the three case studies in light of the framework presented
in Section 4and discusses the configuration of the variables and items.
6.1. Value Proposition
The value proposition may be subject to significant changes over time, particularly in the early
stages of a DMSP (Figure 3). Alpha has experienced an in-depth change in its value proposition.
At the
beginning, the platform was configured as a marketplace for professional services, performing
both the matchmaking and transaction functions. However, this strategy changed as soon as the
company figured out that the services provided by the supply side were very customizable and it was
difficult to force a client to pay in advance. Then the company decided to only enable the matching
between customers and suppliers and let them arrange the transaction privately, outside the platform.
The opposite
journey was carried out by Beta, which started with the objective to only match drivers
and passengers (matchmaking function). In this way, the platform was able to reach the critical mass of
users, achieving a high level of trust. Then, the platform began also performing the transaction function,
introducing a payment process that requires passengers to pay in advance for the ride. Differently
from Alpha, the services provided by Beta are standard and not significantly customizable by the
demand side. The commoditization level of services and products transacted through the platform

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fundamentally affects the functions enabled by the platform itself. A DMSP promoting the provision
of commoditized services, such as Beta, aims at removing as much friction as possible, enabling the
transaction and the related payment inside the platform. In turn, the service requests by the demand
side in Alpha might be very varied and customized.
J. Open Innov. Technol. Mark. Complex. 2020, 6, x FOR PEER REVIEW 16 of 23
which a maker function is present are those of software, videogames and applications for mobile or
desktop operating systems (OS).
Figure 3. Evolution of value proposition and functions in the three case studies.
6.2. Platform Sides
In a DMSP there could be varying numbers and types of sides (Figure 4); there are at least two
sides involved, a supply side and a demand side. If the “maker function” is performed, then generally
the supply side also performs the role of maker side. In addition, an advertisement side may exist
with different effects on the functioning of the platform. On the one hand, it might be a source of
revenue for the platform manager; on the other hand, it may create snags and frictions for users in
achieving the interactions and transaction with the users of the other sides. Among the three main
cases, only Alpha presents an advertisement side promoting product or services related to the
businesses in which the professional taskers operate. If the platform performs the transaction process,
the platform manager generally manages to achieve enough revenue in order to cover the costs of
maintaining the platform. Conversely, if only the matchmaking function is performed, the revenue
achievement may be more difficult, so the introduction of an advertisement side might be needed.
Within a side, the platform may create specific sub-groups configured as segmentations. For
instance, MSPs may create a “premium segment” to allow users to benefit from enhanced services in
exchange for a (higher) fee. In other cases, a segmentation in the supply side might be aimed at
enhancing the visibility of a group of users towards the demand side. Another way to segment a side
may be related to the achievement of a specific objective of quality concerning the services provided.
As an example, Beta drivers who have achieved specific quality targets become “premium users” and
can exploit enhanced visibility in the platform.
None of the three main cases have engagement incentives currently, even though they had used
them in the past. Typically, incentives are set at the early stages of platform inception for increasing
the user base. Direct externalities in a DMSP may arise due to the presence of services enabling
networking and social dynamics among the users (e.g., web chat) or when the contribution of several
users in the same side may increase the probability of achieving a specific result or reducing costs.
Beta presents both these aspects because a large number of passengers increases the probability of
finding other passengers for a trip and reduces the costs since expenses are shared.
Figure 3. Evolution of value proposition and functions in the three case studies.
As regards the “maker function”, it strongly depends on the context in which the platform operates
and in particular on the contents transacted. This function is generally performed when one-to-many
transactions are possible, that is the user can use the same content a theoretically infinite number of
times (applications in the virtual store of Sigma). More generally, typical examples in which a maker
function is present are those of software, videogames and applications for mobile or desktop operating
systems (OS).
6.2. Platform Sides
In a DMSP there could be varying numbers and types of sides (Figure 4); there are at least two
sides involved, a supply side and a demand side. If the “maker function” is performed, then generally
the supply side also performs the role of maker side. In addition, an advertisement side may exist with
different effects on the functioning of the platform. On the one hand, it might be a source of revenue for
the platform manager; on the other hand, it may create snags and frictions for users in achieving the
interactions and transaction with the users of the other sides. Among the three main cases, only Alpha
presents an advertisement side promoting product or services related to the businesses in which the
professional taskers operate. If the platform performs the transaction process, the platform manager
generally manages to achieve enough revenue in order to cover the costs of maintaining the platform.
Conversely, if only the matchmaking function is performed, the revenue achievement may be more
difficult, so the introduction of an advertisement side might be needed.
Within a side, the platform may create specific sub-groups configured as segmentations.
For instance
, MSPs may create a “premium segment” to allow users to benefit from enhanced
services in exchange for a (higher) fee. In other cases, a segmentation in the supply side might be aimed
at enhancing the visibility of a group of users towards the demand side. Another way to segment a side
may be related to the achievement of a specific objective of quality concerning the services provided.
As an example, Beta drivers who have achieved specific quality targets become “premium users” and
can exploit enhanced visibility in the platform.

J. Open Innov. Technol. Mark. Complex. 2020,6, 10 17 of 23
J. Open Innov. Technol. Mark. Complex. 2020, 6, x FOR PEER REVIEW 17 of 23
Figure 4. Platform sides in the three case studies.
6.3. Platform Revenue Model
The type and setting of the revenue streams in a DMSP can be very complex (Figure 5).
The affiliation fee has to be paid independently from the number of interactions enabled by the
platform and it is generally set when it is expected that the user adopts the platform very frequently.
In Sigma, the demand side pays an affiliation fee (with regular frequency) in order to get the right to
access the platform and download all the suitable applications. This usually happens in platforms
performing maker function such as mobile and desktop operating systems as well as in videogame
platforms. In other cases, the affiliation fee may be related to a premium service. A well-known
example is the “Prime” service by Amazon that lets the users of the demand side benefit from one-
day delivery in exchange for an annual fee.
The interaction fee, instead, is required each time an interaction occurs. In Alpha and Sigma the
interaction fee is paid by the supply side, while in the case of Beta is paid by the demand side. If the
platform performs the transaction function, the interaction fee is usually a percentage of the amount
of money transacted. Conversely, if the MSP has no transaction function, such as in the case of Alpha,
the platform may set a fixed fee per interaction achieved through the platform.
Besides affiliation and interaction fees that contribute to the platform manager profit, financial
flows between the sides can also be present. That is the case of Beta and Sigma since they perform the
transaction function. In Alpha, instead, the transaction is achieved outside the platform and the
platform only enables the lead generation.
Figure 5. Revenue model in the three case studies.
Figure 4. Platform sides in the three case studies.
None of the three main cases have engagement incentives currently, even though they had used
them in the past. Typically, incentives are set at the early stages of platform inception for increasing the
user base. Direct externalities in a DMSP may arise due to the presence of services enabling networking
and social dynamics among the users (e.g., web chat) or when the contribution of several users in the
same side may increase the probability of achieving a specific result or reducing costs. Beta presents
both these aspects because a large number of passengers increases the probability of finding other
passengers for a trip and reduces the costs since expenses are shared.
6.3. Platform Revenue Model
The type and setting of the revenue streams in a DMSP can be very complex (Figure 5).
J. Open Innov. Technol. Mark. Complex. 2020, 6, x FOR PEER REVIEW 17 of 23
Figure 4. Platform sides in the three case studies.
6.3. Platform Revenue Model
The type and setting of the revenue streams in a DMSP can be very complex (Figure 5).
The affiliation fee has to be paid independently from the number of interactions enabled by the
platform and it is generally set when it is expected that the user adopts the platform very frequently.
In Sigma, the demand side pays an affiliation fee (with regular frequency) in order to get the right to
access the platform and download all the suitable applications. This usually happens in platforms
performing maker function such as mobile and desktop operating systems as well as in videogame
platforms. In other cases, the affiliation fee may be related to a premium service. A well-known
example is the “Prime” service by Amazon that lets the users of the demand side benefit from one-
day delivery in exchange for an annual fee.
The interaction fee, instead, is required each time an interaction occurs. In Alpha and Sigma the
interaction fee is paid by the supply side, while in the case of Beta is paid by the demand side. If the
platform performs the transaction function, the interaction fee is usually a percentage of the amount
of money transacted. Conversely, if the MSP has no transaction function, such as in the case of Alpha,
the platform may set a fixed fee per interaction achieved through the platform.
Besides affiliation and interaction fees that contribute to the platform manager profit, financial
flows between the sides can also be present. That is the case of Beta and Sigma since they perform the
transaction function. In Alpha, instead, the transaction is achieved outside the platform and the
platform only enables the lead generation.
Figure 5. Revenue model in the three case studies.
Figure 5. Revenue model in the three case studies.
The affiliation fee has to be paid independently from the number of interactions enabled by the
platform and it is generally set when it is expected that the user adopts the platform very frequently.
In Sigma
, the demand side pays an affiliation fee (with regular frequency) in order to get the right to
access the platform and download all the suitable applications. This usually happens in platforms
performing maker function such as mobile and desktop operating systems as well as in videogame
platforms. In other cases, the affiliation fee may be related to a premium service. A well-known
example is the “Prime” service by Amazon that lets the users of the demand side benefit from one-day
delivery in exchange for an annual fee.
The interaction fee, instead, is required each time an interaction occurs. In Alpha and Sigma the
interaction fee is paid by the supply side, while in the case of Beta is paid by the demand side. If the

J. Open Innov. Technol. Mark. Complex. 2020,6, 10 18 of 23
platform performs the transaction function, the interaction fee is usually a percentage of the amount of
money transacted. Conversely, if the MSP has no transaction function, such as in the case of Alpha,
the platform may set a fixed fee per interaction achieved through the platform.
Besides affiliation and interaction fees that contribute to the platform manager profit, financial
flows between the sides can also be present. That is the case of Beta and Sigma since they perform
the transaction function. In Alpha, instead, the transaction is achieved outside the platform and the
platform only enables the lead generation.
6.4. Platform Control
DMSPs have to implement mechanisms in order to control both the behavior of the users and the
contents transacted. A Rating and Review (R&R) system is present in several DMSPs and may be set
according to different configurations. In the exploratory study, we found that the rating is general
unilateral (from the demand side to the supply one) in B2C and B2B contexts (Alpha and Sigma), while
it is generally bilateral in P2P contexts, as in Beta. Furthermore, the ratings achieved by the users
of the supply side are generally used by the platform manager in order to check the quality of the
products or services provided by the supply side. For example, in Beta, drivers who received a number
of bad reviews are automatically banned by the platform manager. The same occurs for professionals
in Alpha.
The analysis of the exploratory case studies also revealed that R&R systems are quite common in
DMSPs, especially if the transaction function is performed; that is because the platform manager has
higher responsibility with respect to the quality of product or services transacted and needs, keeping
the trust level high.
Finally, a platform manager may set exclusive agreements with specific users participating in the
platform. This choice depends on the industry context. Typically, this happens in DMSPs operating in
computer and software industry like videogames, desktop and mobile OS rather than in food delivery
where it is possible to set exclusive agreements with specific restaurant chains.
6.5. Platform Competition
Depending on the industry in which the MSP operates as well as the strategy adopted by the
platform manager, inside competition is often present. This might be due to the price of products and
services, such as in Alpha or Beta, or the skills and competences in developing an application as in
Sigma. If inside competition is present within the platform, the platform manager may influence with
specific mechanisms. For example, it may give the opportunity to show the products or services of a
specific user, in the supply side, on the “top of the page” of the results of a search query. This is the
case of Beta and Sigma. Another potential way to influence the inside competition is to publicly show
the results of the ratings about the users participating in the platform. The ratings are publicly shown
in Beta and Sigma. At the same time, the platform manager might influence the inside competition
by giving a recognition to virtuous users. Beta drivers who achieve a set target quality level gain a
specific acknowledgment visible in the platform.
However, the preliminary study showed that it is possible to have a MSP without inside competition
and this happens when the matching between users of demand and supply side is carried out directly
by the platform. This is the case of the famous business Uber, which provides a standard taxi service to
get passengers from point A to B.
The outside competition concerns the competitors of the platform manager. Competitors might
be platforms providing a similar value proposition or traditional businesses that partially cover the
offer provided by the MSP in object.
For example, the competitors of Sigma are both MSPs, e.g., CRM solutions with a store where
applications are sold and traditional CRM software.

J. Open Innov. Technol. Mark. Complex. 2020,6, 10 19 of 23
6.6. Platform Architecture
Depending on the policy set by the platform, the user might be subject to a registration and this
makes the platform manager able to gather information about the user and to carry out analysis about
its behavior and preferences. In several platforms the user registration is mandatory and leads to a
customized experience based on the user’s preferences. For instance, Sigma provides suggestions
to the user of the demand side based on the applications previously downloaded. In some cases,
the registration can be seen as an obstacle for some users to access the platform.
Another peculiar feature concerning the platform architecture is the boundaries between sides.
How much such boundaries are rigid or blurred depends on the type of platform, the industry,
its architecture
and organization. Therefore, there are two potential configuration options for this
variable: (1) there could be different “access channels” for each side involved in the platform as in
the case of Alpha and Sigma; (2) there could be only one channel or login access for the users of the
platform. In Beta there is a single channel to access the platform. The user can then decide whether to
search for a ride or to offer a trip to other users. In P2P DMSPs, the access is generally the same for
both the demand and supply side.
Furthermore, the openness level of the platform depends on the operating context of the business.
The platform may be open or not because of the presence of specific tools such as APIs and widgets.
Most of the MSPs are closed, even though there are exceptions in some platforms performing a maker
function such as Sigma where users of the demand side are able to customize the CRM software
through coding.
7. Conclusions and Limitations
7.1. Scientific Contributions
This paper addresses digital MSPs, the ever-growing businesses grounded on digital and internet
technologies aimed at enabling specific interactions among different groups of users. MSPs have
been investigated in the literature but a lack of a holistic approach to their organizational features is
clear. In addition, investigation methods based on empirical analyses (e.g., surveys, case studies) have
been rather neglected in the literature. Therefore, this paper attempts to bridge this gap. Researchers
provide three main contributions to research on the topic.
First, this paper systematizes the research areas about MSPs, summarizing the main research
findings to date. These areas are: network effects, pricing, integration and control, engagement,
competition and advertisement.
Second, based on the literature analysis, a hierarchical three-level descriptive framework is
developed in order to fill the absence of holistic models to characterize MSP. With the notable exception
of the work by Täuscher and Laudien [
26
] that focuses solely on marketplaces, this is the first model
adopting such an encompassing perspective. The literature analysis has provided the elements for the
identification of the dimensions (level 1) and variables (level 2) of the framework, while a multiple case
study based on the analysis of 26 MSPs has supported its refinement and operationalization (level 3).
The third contribution stands in having actually carried out an extensive empirical research.
Indeed, 26 case studies have been performed to define the items of the third level of the framework
and their operationalization. Previous research is not fully substantiated by empirical evidence besides
the focus on just one single specific aspect of MSPs. In the literature, theoretical studies predominate
and the achieved results are generally not empirically tested.
7.2. Managerial Implications
This work can support practitioners in organizing and managing a MSP. Indeed, the proposed
framework formalizes the key features of digital MSPs to be configured by the platform manager. This
is useful to both start-up companies and “traditional” ones willing to move towards a multisided

J. Open Innov. Technol. Mark. Complex. 2020,6, 10 20 of 23
platform BM. There are in fact several examples of incumbent companies that are seeking to innovate
their BM, partially or completely, to remain competitive in the market.
The operationalization of the variables also allows practitioners to visualize the possible options
for configuring the different variables. In addition, the framework can be used as a tool by MSP
managers, since it helps to describe the current configuration, evaluating evolution over time and
potential future development and innovation. Indeed, the literature states that platform businesses
can be significantly improved through following a structured innovation strategy [
85
]. The evaluation
of all the dimensions and variables identified in the framework can help in formulating innovation in
the whole business model.
Finally, the framework can be used as an assessment tool for benchmarking a company’s business
with competitors in the same or other industries.
7.3. Future Research Trends and Limitations
As with any study, this one comes with some limitations that also pave the way to future research
developments. Further research is needed to refine and empirically test the framework. Even though
the framework was developed thanks to a multiple-case study analysis, the number of selected cases
might be too narrow. Moreover, it is suggested to perform an explanatory survey to test the variables
and the theoretical configurations identified in this study as well as the emergence of new variables.
Wider empirical research may lead to determining typical clusters or archetypes of DMSPs,
grounded on both theory and empirical analysis. Indeed, commonalities in the configuration of
a specific framework variable can potentially highlight specific platform configuration patterns.
Moreover, further scientific applications may concern the analysis and identification of relationships
among specific environmental features and DMSP configuration. For example, it would be possible to
identify potential impacts of outside competition on the organization of the revenue model. Based
on the identification of archetypes of DMSP configuration and the analysis of the relationships with
external factors, it would be possible to develop prescriptive or normative models that identify the
most suitable DMSP configuration for specific contexts.
Finally, the framework can be used as a base to conduct longitudinal case studies concerning a
specific MSP. Indeed, the evaluation of the evolution of the configuration of the variables allows one to
identify possible innovation patterns in the BM.
Author Contributions:
All listed authors have made substantial intellectual contributions to the research and the
manuscript. Conceptualization, M.A., F.A. and N.S.; methodology, M.A and M.P.; validation, M.A., F.A., N.S. and
M.P.; formal analysis, M.A. and F.A.; writing—original draft preparation, F.A., M.A., N.S.; writing—review and
editing, M.A and F.A. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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