Genetic Privacy from Locke's Point Of View

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GENETIC PRIVACY FROM LOCKE’S POINT OF VIEW
The Journal of Value Inquiry 38: 241–251, 2004.
© 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
Genetic Privacy from Locke’s Point of View
LUDVIG BECKMAN
Department of Government, Uppsala University, 751 20 Uppsala, Sweden; e-mail:
Ludvig.Beckman@statsvet.uu.se
1.
Genetic privacy concerns the right of an individual to control the access and
use of genetic information that may be detracted by analyzing samples of tis-
sue or blood from her body. Today there is much concern that legal protection
of genetic privacy is inadequate in many countries. Employers, and insurance
and pharmaceutical companies, have an interest in collecting genetic infor-
mation of potential economic value. In this sense, there is a clear and well-
recognized conflict between economic interests, on the one hand, and genetic
privacy on the other. Less frequently recognized, however, is the latent con-
flict between social justice and genetic privacy.
The conflict appears clearly when we consider the implications of the no-
tion that in a just society there is respect for the ideal of equality of opportunity.
On an egalitarian interpretation, equal opportunities exist when the benefits and
burdens that individuals obtain are the consequence of their ambitions and
choices only. Thus, unchosen qualities of individuals, including genetic op-
portunities, cannot legitimately provide the basis for any benefits or burdens
in society and should therefore be compensated for or redressed. There is
consequently an argument in terms of social justice for leveling out the un-
equal consequences of genetic differences among people. The measures re-
quired by this claim might include genetic screening in order to map differences
necessitating claims of compensation, or even genetic enhancements of the
genetically unfortunate. Such actions, if adopted as official policy, would
conflict with the interest of an individual to control his or her genetic infor-
mation.1 There is a conflict between the perception that there are rights to
genetic privacy and the ideal of social justice as involving equality of oppor-
tunity. Recognizing this conflict, Ronald Dworkin suggests that our concern
with preserving bodily integrity may “one day have to be qualified” in order
to secure “more fundamental” aims of justice and welfare.2
Whether the aims Dworkin notes are indeed more fundamental is contro-
versial, however. If, as some people assume, a person’s genes are his or her
property, there is a strong case for observing the right to genetic privacy.3
Moreover, as the owner of her genetic identity a person may insist on the right

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to undergo varieties of genetic enhancements that could provide her with
genetic advantages. Genetic property and privacy rights may not just prevent
measures promoting social justice but also permit measures that exacerbate
genetic differences. Given this conflict, the task to examine the normative basis
of genetic privacy rights should be of great interest not only to bioethicists
but for political philosophers generally.
Arguably, a strong case for justifying rights of genetic privacy can be con-
structed on the basis of John Locke’s notion of self-ownership. Genes are part
of our bodies and if self-ownership applies anywhere it should apply here.
Thus, Locke’s premise that people own their bodies lends support, according
to Adam Moore, to “a fairly strong presumption in favour of [genetic] pri-
vacy.”4 In fact, genetic privacy rights seem inevitable once the idea of self-
ownership has been accepted. However we should question the impression
that strong genetic privacy rights inevitably follow from a Lockean perspec-
tive. The reasoning from Lockean self-ownership to strong rights of genetic
privacy must make use of methodological assumptions that are far from un-
controversial. An important task in assessing the Lockean argument should
be, then, to separate the normative principles involved from the methodological
assumptions. Once this is achieved it will become clear that the normative
implications of self-ownership is a function of a choice on methods. Hence,
the assumptions of self-ownership and genetic privacy may be compatible with
the demands of justice.
2. Locke’s Method
Locke famously stated that “every man has a Property in his own Person.”5 A
primary purpose for Locke was to demonstrate under what conditions the
extension of this right to other objects is justified. From the notion that people
have property in their own person, it might seem to follow that people are
entitled to property in genetic information extracted from their genes. The right
to genetic privacy would be as natural as our right to self-ownership. Hence,
Locke’s argument would serve not as the beginning of a contractarian argu-
ment for genetic privacy, but as the end of it.
There is some support to be found in Locke’s text for the conclusion that
self-ownership would include genetic information and therefore be in no need
of justification. The cases discussed by Locke as requiring justification are
essentially concerned with resources not previously the property of any indi-
vidual. God, Locke reminds us, gave the earth, “to Mankind in common.”6
But the genetic profiles of individuals plausibly belong to the domain of per-
sons, not to the earth, and therefore would not count as common property.
Thus, it might seem to follow that genetic information is the property of indi-
viduals by default. However, the extension of self-ownership to genetic prop-

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erty rights, including the right to control access to and use of personal genetic
information, is not self-evident even from Lockean premises. Genetic infor-
mation is not something we have, that is already there, but something that has
to be extracted from the DNA, RNA, or proteins by analyzing samples of tis-
sue or blood.7 Arguably, the appropriation of the results of this process, the
genetic information, would require some kind of justification.
The justification appealed to by followers of Locke, like Adam Moore, is
inspired by Locke’s remark that ownership in external objects is achieved by
somehow mixing our labor with them. Moore speaks about intellectual ef-
forts that may justify the extension of self-ownership to information and
thereby creating property in them.8 However, whose rights are confirmed by
such efforts is less than clear from a Lockean perspective. One the one hand,
Locke is adamant that labor contributes proportionally much more value than
land. Unlabored land, Locke says, would “scarcely be worth anything.”9 There-
fore we may want to conclude that most rights should be given to those per-
forming the analysis and not to the individual providing the bodily samples.
On the other hand, Locke argued in a famous paragraph that the “turfs my
servant has cut [of my land] becomes my property.”10 What is ours remains
so, even when we let someone else work it for us. Analogously, the genetic
information collected from our body should still be considered as our prop-
erty. Either way, the important observation is that none of these arguments
are contractarian. Whatever Moore meant by appealing to Locke’s theory of
original acquisition, there is no mention of property rights being established
by a contract or agreement among people. Thus, all that the argument requires
is that people have a natural right to their bodies and, therefore, to their genes
as well as the information extracted from them.
Locke’s problem is different. To claim that property is a natural right is
one thing. To claim that property is a legal right is another. Although Locke
believed that rights to property were established by natural law, Locke also
believed that the institutions of property rights were conventional in the sense
of being shaped by political and legal arguments and deliberations. From
Locke’s standpoint, each individual may have a natural right to the genetic
information extracted from his genes. But the shape and extent of the corre-
sponding legal right is not evident. The rights of property found in natural
law are not, in Locke’s word, “settled.”11 Providing the natural rights with a
legal interpretation requires a different kind of argument, certainly consistent
with but not derived from the notion of a law of nature.12 The contractarian
parameters of Locke’s argument are of great relevance if we want to assess
an argument that Locke might have accepted for institutionalizing genetic
privacy and property rights.
Contractarian arguments are characterized by the idea that principles or
rights are justified if they would have been or actually were agreed on among
people in specified circumstances. The extent to which a contractarian argu-

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ment is convincing will hinge on the reasonableness of the assumptions con-
cerning the agreement. We need to determine the motives for the agreement
and the circumstances in which the agreement is reached. To do so we should
observe an important distinction between portraying justice as either the out-
come of a bargaining process, or as the result of deliberations about fairness,
representing two strands within the contractarian method.13
The first contains the assumption that justice is always advantageous to
the parties involved. Two claims are presumed on this view. One is that jus-
tice depends essentially on perceptions of self-interest. The other is that the
distribution of wealth before the agreement provides a yardstick for agree-
ments on justice. Initial inequalities are preserved or even accentuated by the
agreement. When these assumptions are present we have, in effect, what Brian
Barry calls justice as mutual advantage. Such accounts, Barry contends, are
doubtful since it is not evident what in particular is just by outcomes of a
bargaining process between unequals.
3. Framing the Contract
In examining a Lockean contract on genetic property rights we need to ex-
plore the motivations and circumstances characterizing the contract. What
motivates people, according to Locke, to establish a legal framework protecting
natural rights? To what extent is this contract established in circumstances
characterized by equality?
The answer to the first question is that people realize that securing their
rights will be beneficial to all. Indeed, well known is Locke’s claim that the
“great and chief end” that moves people to leave the state of nature is “the
Preservation of their Property.”14 Hence, the only intention for accepting
obligations to a political authority is that people believe this will “preserve
their Liberty and Property.”15 It is tempting to understand in these remarks an
appeal to the interest of people in maintaining and protecting their material
possessions. That conclusion is premature however. Readers of The Second
Treatise of Government are frequently reminded that Locke uses property in
a wider sense, not merely referring to material possessions but to rights and
liberties as well. The chief end why people decide to form society is less re-
lated to preserving material possessions and more concerned with preserving
their rights in general.
But less related does not mean unrelated. The emphasis on material pos-
sessions remains, and is evident in instances where Locke substitutes property
for fortunes as in the statement that the purpose of society is the preservation of
“life liberties and fortunes.”16 This provides some evidence for the conclu-
sion that Locke did not appeal to loftier motives than the self-interests of people
in the justification of government. In this Locke was not exceptional but most

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plausibly echoed the dominant psychological assumptions of his times. How-
ever, if true, it means that Locke portrays the rationale for political and legal
institutions as little concerned with matters of fairness and justice. It is not
inappropriate therefore to conclude that Locke’s theory “was as egoistic as
that of Hobbes.”17 The reason why people form society and government is
that they find it beneficial to their own interests. Given the assumption that
the social contract is based on the self-interests of people it is not difficult to
imagine that the institutions agreed to will allow for vast inequalities in terms
of the distributions of benefits and burdens. The logic of mutual advantage
may in fact produce results that would seem to have very little to say in their
favor in terms of justice. The reason is simply that the rich and genetically
advantaged have little reason, given that they act on their self-interests only,
to accept any deal that will not make them even more rich and genetically
advantaged. At the same time, the poor and genetically disadvantaged may
be contended with any deal that gives them some benefit, however marginal,
compared to their present situation. As Alan Ryan observes, Locke envisaged
that the poor would “get a good bargain, not the best possible.”18 Since a good
bargain is whatever constitutes a marginal improvement compared to status quo
this could be, for example, the right to purchase gene enhancements at the same
price as the rich. Even if the poor are unable to buy them they can hope for other,
rival, treatments to become cheaper or at least that their descendents will one
day afford them.19 These are marginal improvements at most.
Self-interest is only partially responsible for these conclusions. Equally
important are the circumstances of the contract and the extent to which the
parties of the agreement are equal or not. In fact, it seems as though they are
not equal, since they are already aware of their relative advantages. If you
know you are wealthy, for example in genes, self-interest will impel you to
preserve and improve that asset. In being ignorant on these matters, alterna-
tively knowing that genetic endowments are roughly equal, the situation would
be very different. Under such, more equal, circumstances the risk that the
agreement only reflects pre-existing advantages would not exist. Accordingly,
advocates of justice as impartiality writes that they want to “throw out the
non-agreement point of a ‘state of nature’ as a generally relevant place at which
to start.”20 The question is whether Locke envisaged the inhabitants of state
of nature as roughly equal or not. Writing in the seventeenth century, Locke did
not assume that people had any knowledge of their genetic make up. But Locke
did assume something when characterizing the state of nature as a “state of
Equality” where “no one having more than another.”21 The baseline for the so-
cial contract is consequently said to be equality. This could mean that inequali-
ties, including genetic differences, should not affect the reasoning people may
do about the shape of legal and political institutions. However, demonstrat-
ing that Locke presumed, to the contrary, that the social contract was made
in a state of inequality does not require much interpretative work. That the

246 LUDVIG BECKMAN
people in the state of nature are unequally well off actually follows neatly
from the fact that the accumulation of wealth, by means of labor and money,
has already begun. Inequalities have therefore developed well before the com-
pact takes place.
The first indication to this effect is found in Locke’s remarks on the rela-
tive value of labor and land. Locke insisted that labor, not land, is responsible
for most of wealth enjoyed by man. This point might seem fairly unimpor-
tant. After all, why bother about the sources of wealth if, as Locke says, land
is equally available to all? However, the reason why the role of labor is im-
portant is that it explains, indeed justifies, the inequalities that may occur
between people originally appropriating equal amounts of land.22 In illustrat-
ing his point, Locke compares a “King of a large and fruitful territory” in
America with the a “day-laborer in England,” two people of which one ap-
parently is even more wealthy than the other in terms of land.23 The point Locke
makes is that advantages in amounts of land matters little compared to the
advantage of recognizing the property created by labor. Thus, the day laborer
is better off than the Indian King, because only in England is the value of labor
recognized. The conclusion is that a state of initial equality may produce huge
inequalities and still be preferable to all.
The next indication of the inequality that reigns in the state of nature is
found in Locke’s exposé of the “little piece of yellow metal.”24 Before money
is introduced, “man has no temptation to labor for more than he can get use
of.”25 Hence few inequalities are to be expected. But, Locke argues, every-
one is better off in a regime that recognizes money that may “be hoarded up
without injury to anyone.”26 The benefits of employing our labor more effi-
ciently and strenuously than others, or by enlarging our land more extensively
than others, is not harmful if what is hoarded up is money and not the fruits,
corns, or stocks that are supposed to be of real use to people. The essential
point is not the extent to which Locke convincingly argues for the recogni-
tion of labor and money. The point is that Locke describes these developments
as taking place in the state of nature, before either society or government is
established. “This partage of things,” Locke writes, “men have made practi-
cable out of the bounds of Socitetie, and without compact.”27 The state of nature
that Locke argues for is not static but developing. This is why Locke’s insist-
ence that men are by nature “free, equal and independent” is unlikely to be
true for very long.28 At the moment when rules of justice are institutionalized,
the state of nature has evolved into a place where possessions, wealth and
property are already unequal.
Locke’s contractarian argument is easy to understand. The reason why
people in the state of nature decide to form government is that it is considered
to be conducive to the self-interests of each person. The compacts people make
will settle what is to be regarded as the just distribution of property. Because
property is unequally distributed in a state of nature, self-interested individu-

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als will settle for the legal protection of unequal distributions of property. There
is no just initial position at the time of the social contract. In the field of genet-
ics, this would mean that the commercial use of genetechnology, including the
potential use of gene enhancement techniques, precedes the institutionalization
of genetic property rights. In a state of nature people have already begun the
process of manipulating and screening their genetic disposition in order to
benefit themselves. The inequalities generated by this process, as well as
knowledge of pre-existing inequalities, constitute the baseline of the contract,
the distribution to which the just society is to be compared. In such circum-
stances, self-interested individuals will no doubt opt for a system of rights
that preserve rather than reduce genetic inequalities.29
4. Taming the Contract
While a Lockean social contract is characterized by initial inequality and self-
interested motivations, assuming that people are self-interested does not im-
ply that people act on the basis of self-interest alone. There is consequently a
strategy for making Locke’s theory of justice less Hobbesian, even when the
self-interested nature of individuals as Locke describes them has been ac-
cepted. There is a widespread belief that Locke condoned the hoarding of
wealth only conditionally, that there were virtues at work moving people to
recognize the limits of appropriation and wealth set up by the law of nature.
This suggests that people will not always make use of all available technolo-
gies for genetic intervention and analysis prior to their regulation. Perhaps
people are virtuous in the sense that they do not undertake genetic enhance-
ments prior to their regulation or virtuous in the sense that they do not search
for knowledge about their genetic make up until the social contract is settled.
Given the existence of such virtues, the contractarian character of Lockean
genetic privacy rights would change dramatically.
Some writers sympathetic to Locke certainly believe that there is a basis
for believing in a virtuous state of nature from a Lockean point of view. One
virtue supposedly present in the state of nature is that goods and wealth must
not be spoiled and wasted. Furthermore, Locke is famously held accountable
for the view that appropriation of land and resources is legitimate only when
there is enough and as good left to others. Adam Moore interprets Locke as
affirming the principle that property rights are legitimate only in so far as they
cause no harm to others.30 A sense of responsibility and restraint is thus be-
lieved to tamper self-interest among the inhabitants of the state of nature. At
a more general level, the view that Locke believed there were virtuous peo-
ple around must be granted right away. There is little doubt that some notion
of “natural political virtue” is effective in the state of nature, since otherwise
it would have been very difficult for him to assume that this place was peace-

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ful. 31 But while Locke may have assumed that the inhabitants of a state of
nature were peaceful, he did not assume that they were virtuous in any other
sense. There is no textual basis for the conclusion that the social contract was
preceded by any virtues restricting the hoarding of goods and wealth. Evidence
for this conclusion is found more in what Locke does not say than in what he
says. Although Locke speaks about a number of restrictions on the accumula-
tion of goods he rarely ever speaks about them as effective restrictions. No at-
tempt is made by Locke to demonstrate that the virtues not to spoil things and
to leave enough to others have an important role to play in a state of nature.
All of this is reminiscent of the point made by Jeremy Waldron in relation
to the virtue of leaving enough and as good left for others. Waldron draws
attention to the fact that Locke never asserts that people should not but only
that they will not appropriate more than what leaves enough and as good to
others.32 Typically, Locke is saying that appropriation of land in the state of
nature was of no “prejudice to any other Man, since there was still enough,
and as good left.”33 Locke describes the circumstances in which appropria-
tion takes place, not the virtues supposedly guiding it. Locke writes that the
circumstances were such that enough and as good would be left to others, not
that people had an obligation keep it that way. No such claim is ever made in
the Second Treatise of Government. Waldron observes, moreover, that the
circumstances so characterized are to be found only in the first period of what
Locke describes as a state of nature.34 As soon as money is introduced people
will be able to hoard goods in order to sell them on the market. As a conse-
quence it will be profitable to appropriate more land than one can make use
of and there is no longer enough and as good of left for all. Yet these increas-
ing inequalities are, as we know, accepted by all and therefore legitimate. They
are accepted, since the inequalities will increase the amount of wealth avail-
able to everyone.
Even if preserving to others enough and as good had been a virtue there
would be no need to endorse it either before or after the introduction of money.
When there is no money, people will always find enough and as good things,
and when there is money everyone will accept the fact that there are not enough
and as good things. Waldron take it for granted that Locke endorses the sec-
ond virtue, not to spoil God’s creation.35 There is textual evidence for the
conclusion that this is what Locke is saying.
It will perhaps be objected [that] any one may ingross as much as he will.
To which I answer Not so. [...] the Law of Nature [...] bound that Property
too. [...] To Enjoy. As much as anyone can make use of to any advantage of
life before it spoils; so much he may by his labor fix a Property in.36
Apparently Locke presents the Law of Nature as implicating a constraint
on the appropriation of goods and land. While Locke says that a person’s

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property may not exceed what he or she can take advantage of before it spoils,
what he says after makes this virtue superfluous. Already in the same para-
graph some doubt is expressed about its relevance. Locke reminds his read-
ers about “how small apart” of nature’s goods a man can possibly “ingross”
in on his own.37 This is close to saying that there is little need for virtue be-
cause people cannot take more than they have use for. The same considera-
tion that explains why there would always be enough and as good left to others
is displayed once again. There are further indications to the effect that the virtue
not to spoil God’s creation is rare or even strange. In discussing the wasting
and spoiling of goods Locke notes that amassing “plumbs that would have
rotten in a week” is “a foolish thing.”38 Unless men are foolish, people will
not spoil anything. In fact Locke writes that “Men will not be apt” to gather
anything that is not both “lasting and scarce.”39 More likely and fully consist-
ent with the law, people will trade perishable goods for goods that last, bar-
tering the plumbs for “nuts that would last good for his eating a whole year.”40
Thus, as long as men are not foolish, there will rarely be occasion for the vir-
tue not to spoil the bounties of nature. Once money is introduced things get
even worse in terms of virtue. Money is naturally more lasting than goods
and there are consequently even fewer occasions for virtue. If plumbs will be
traded for nuts, nuts will now be traded for gold and silver which “men might
keep without spoiling.”41 In a monetary economy there is no need to worry
about spoiling. Numerous commentators have made the point that, in Locke’s
theory, the use of money finally transcends and makes irrelevant the virtues
of non-spoilage.42 That this virtue is hardly relevant even before is a point not
equally well appreciated.
Locke provides no basis then for the assumption that the state of nature is
virtuous with respect to the use and appropriation of natural resources. The
implication is that there is no obligation to restrict the use of gene testing,
screening and interventions prior to their institutionalization. Genetic inequali-
ties can legitimately be screened and created in the state of nature. Genetic
inequality will consequently provide the baseline for the contract regulating
rights of genetic property and privacy.
5. Conclusions
The doctrine of self-ownership constitutes a powerful ideal in morality and
politics. However, its implications for genetics remain largely unclear. The
implications of assuming a natural right to self-ownership ultimately depend
on methodological assumptions. Turning to Locke, we find not just the doc-
trine of self-ownership but, more importantly, a particular brand of con-
tractarianism. In disentangling these distinct ideas it becomes clear that
appealing to a wholeheartedly Lockean argument for genetic privacy may be

250 LUDVIG BECKMAN
less than attractive. Taken together, the Lockean position amounts to a con-
tractarian argument for genetic privacy among self-interested people in a state
of inequality. A follower of Locke would not object to people being informed
of their genetic dispositions or to people already taking full use of available
technologies before their regulation. This is truly justice as mutual advantage.
People realize that they have nothing to lose from agreeing on strong protec-
tion of genetic property rights, thereby reinforcing naturally as well as artifi-
cially created genetic differences.
Thus what is wrong with a Lockean argument is not that it gives too much
weight to ideals of self-ownership or rights of property and privacy but that it
leaves out any place for considerations of fairness and justice. In exploring
what norms of genetic privacy our society should adopt, we should be less
concerned with what is beneficial from the perspective of the present, unregu-
lated, situation. Justice requires us to deliberate on what uses of genetic in-
formation, genetic testing and genetic enhancement techniques that we, as
equals, are prepared to accept in our society. Arguably, the belief in a funda-
mental right to self-ownership is compatible with such an egalitarian method
of justice.43
Notes
1. See R. L. Zimmern, “Genetic testing a conceptual exploration,” Journal of Medical Ethics
25 (1999), p. 152.
2. Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000),
p. 450.
3. See George Annas, “Genetic Privacy: There Ought to Be a Law,” Texas Law Review 4
(1999), p. 13. See also Graeme Laurie, Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico Legal
Norms, (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 315ff.
4. Adam Moore, “Owning Genetic Information and Gene Enhancement Techniques: Why
Privacy and Property Rights May Undermine Social Control of the Human Genome,”
Bioethics 14 (2000), p. 119.
5. John Locke, Second Treatise on Government, ed. Peter Laslett, (Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 287.
6. Ibid., p. 286.
7. See Thomas Murray, “Genetic Exceptionalism and ‘Future Diaries’: Is Genetic Infor-
mation Different from Other Medical Information?”, in Mark Rothstein, ed., Genetic
Secrets: Protecting Privacy and Confidentiality in the Genetic Era (New Haven Conn.:
Yale University Press, 1997), p. 64.
8. Moore, op. cit., p 100.
9. Locke, op. cit., p. 43.
10. Ibid., p. 288.
11. Ibid., p. 299.
12. See Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge, England: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), pp. 79 & 82.
13. See Brian Barry, Theories of Justice (London: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1989).
14. Locke, op. cit., p. 350.

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15. Ibid., p. 353.
16. Ibid., p. 296.
17. George Sabine, History of Political Theory (Fort Worth, Tex.: Harcourt Brace, 1973),
p. 487.
18. Alan Ryan, Property and Political Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p. 42.
19. See Moore, op. cit. p. 117.
20. Barry, op. cit. p. 370.
21. Locke, op. cit. p. 4.
22. See G. A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality (Cambridge, England: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1995) p. 178.
23. Locke, op. cit., p. 296.
24. Ibid., p. 294.
25. Ibid., p. 302.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., pp. 269f., 283 & 330.
29. See Colin Farrelly, “Genes and Social Justice: A Rawlsian Reply to Moore,” Bioethics
16 (2002), p. 16.
30. See Moore op. cit., pp. 100, 103 & 109.
31. Peter Laslett. “Introduction,” in Peter Laslett, ed., Second Treatise on Government (Cam-
bridge England: Cambridge University Press), pp. 110f.
32. See Jeremy Waldron, “Enough and as Good Left to Others,” Philosophical Quarterly
29 (1979), pp. 319ff.
33. Locke op. cit., pp. 288, 291 & 292.
34. See Waldron, op. cit., p. 321.
35. Ibid., p. 320.
36. Locke, op. cit., p. 290.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., p. 300.
39. Ibid., p. 301. See also Tully, op. cit., p. 148.
40. Locke, op. cit., p. 300.
41. Ibid.
42. See Macpherson, op. cit., pp. 204ff.
43. I want to thank Emil Uddhammar, Mats Lundström, and Jörgen Ödalen for helpful criti-
cism of earlier versions of this paper.

252 LUDVIG BECKMAN