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Representation, Vol. 46, No. 4, 2010
ISSN 0034-4893 print/1749-4001 online/10/040425-14
© 2010 McDougall Trust, London DOI: 10.1080/00344893.2010.518089
PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF COMPULSORY
VOTING: EXPLAINING THE AUSTRALIAN
CASE
Lisa Hill
Taylor and FrancisRREP_A_518089.sgm10.1080/00344893.2010.518089Representation0034-4893 (print)/1749-4001 (online)Original Article2010Taylor & Francis464000000November 2010LisaHilllisa.hill@adelaide.edu.au
This paper explores the reasons behind public acceptance of compulsory voting in Australia and
canvasses some of the effects on political culture of its proper use. After providing some history and
background to the Australian situation, the paper offers explanations for high public tolerance
towards compulsory voting. The last part of the paper considers reforms to the Australian system that
could enhance public tolerance still further. Findings will be useful to those contemplating the adop-
tion of compulsory voting but who are concerned about public resistance.
Introductory Remarks
Declining voter turnout in industrialised democracies worldwide is now an almost
universal phenomenon. Various experiments in raising turnout in voluntary settings have
met with mixed-to-poor success but there is one method with proven efficacy: compulsory
voting. Accordingly, there have been calls for its introduction in the UK, the United States,
Canada, New Zealand, India and even Jordan.
Although a ‘significant minority of citizens in voluntary voting states are open to the
idea’ of making voting compulsory (Birch 2009: 144) the majority continue to find the idea of
being compelled to vote objectionable. Public resistance is therefore a major obstacle to the
introduction of compulsory voting in settings where it could significantly boost turnout.
Exploring this resistance and finding ways around it using the Australian system as a case
study is the key theme of this paper; understanding how compulsory voting works in
Australia also throws light on some of its positive effects on political culture. Some of the
findings will assist prospective adopters of compulsory voting in their efforts to overcome
public scepticism about the practice.
It has been noted that ‘data on how voters feel about compulsory voting are extremely
limited’ (Irwin and van Holsteyn 2007: passim; de Winter 2009).1 It has been also noted that
explaining support for compulsory voting ‘is handicapped by a lack of theory’ and that ‘no
published work has been found relating any variable to support for compulsory voting’ (Irwin
and van Holsteyn 2007: 4).2 This paper seeks to partly address these knowledge deficits and
in the process offer insight into the successful management of a compulsory voting regime.
In the Australian context, support for compulsory voting has always been high but the only
theory advanced thus far is that this high level of support ‘is probably a reflection of the large
number of voters who have grown up under the system, together with the absence of any
political debate concerning its advantages or disadvantages’ (Mackerras and McAllister 1999:
221). Although it is undoubtedly true that ‘custom accustoms’, in a sense this hypothesis only
describes the phenomenon it seeks to explain: to say that compulsory voting is a longstanding
LISA HILL
426
social norm that is rarely challenged in public debate is just another way of saying that the
institution is well tolerated. The question still remains to be answered: why has compulsory
voting survived for so long without serious public contestation? After all, despite being a long-
standing practice in both the Netherlands and Belgium, it was contested in the Netherlands
and subsequently abolished in 1970 while in Belgium its acceptability is hotly debated at
election time (Pilet 2007).3 By contrast, in Australia the mandatory vote is rarely, if ever, an
election issue and excites little debate in public fora.
The attempt to explain why compulsory voting is so well tolerated in the Australian
setting is effected partly by filling the ‘theory gap’—for the Australian case at least—to which
Irwin and van Holsteyn allude. The fact that the type of longitudinal survey data missing for
the Dutch and Belgian settings is available for the Australian setting means that the theory
gap to be filled below can be, at least partly, supported by data.
After providing some history and background to the Australian situation and clearing
up misunderstandings around exactly what it is that the law compels, the paper establishes
levels of tolerance across social groups and offers explanations for high public tolerance
towards compulsory voting. The last part of the paper considers reforms to the Australian
system that could enhance public tolerance still further.
1. History and Background
Australia has one of the oldest systems of compulsory voting and, arguably, ‘the most
efficient’ of any of the advanced democracies (Mackerras and McAllister 1999: 217). There are
good grounds for this claim, as will be shown; nevertheless—as will also be shown—there is
still room for improvement. Queensland was the first Australian state to introduce compul-
sory voting in 1914. At the federal level, compulsory enrolment was introduced in 1911 but
voting itself did not become mandatory until 1924. It wasn’t until as late as 1984 that it
became compulsory for Aboriginal people and Torres Strait Islanders to register and vote.
Compulsory voting was introduced to address the problem of low voter turnout and it
proved to be an extremely decisive and successful remedy. At the last federal election imme-
diately prior to the introduction of compulsory voting (1922) the average turnout of regis-
tered voters was 59% (RV) but turnout at the first federal election after 1924 (in 1925) surged
dramatically to an average of 91% (RV). The net increase over time since the introduction of
compulsory voting has been 30.4 percentage points. Turnout rates among the voting age
population in Australia have remained consistently high and against the pattern that has
emerged in the rest of the industrialised voluntary-voting world. Here, either trendless
fluctuations or—more commonly—steadily declining voting participation have been the
norm. In the post-war period the average turnout rate for Australian national elections has
remained steady at around 83% of voting age population (VAP) and 95% (RV) (the pattern at
the state level has been almost identical). These high turnout figures have obviously been
aided by the fact that voting registration is compulsory in Australia; however, compulsory
registration alone is no security against a gradual decline in turnout, as the cases of New
Zealand, Denmark and Finland have shown.
2. Enforcement of the Law
The penalties in Australia for failure to attend a polling booth are fairly mild and cases
of recalcitrance are handled in an orderly and predictable fashion but without zealotry.
PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF COMPULSORY VOTING 427
Initially, the Electoral Commission sends the absentee a ‘please explain’ letter with the
option of paying a $20 fine to settle the matter. If a satisfactory reason for abstention is
provided the matter is dropped. There is some ambiguity about what is a satisfactory reason.
This is because the Australian and various state electoral commissions refuse to publicly
declare the full range of acceptable excuses (their mission is, after all, to maximise voting
participation). However the Commonwealth Electoral Act (1918) Section 245 (1) does specify
that non-voters are exempt from prosecution if they are ‘dead’, were ‘absent from Australia
on polling day’ or ‘ineligible to vote at the election’. Subsection 17 of Section 245 further
exempts those who are ‘itinerant’, living abroad or based in the Antarctic at the time of the
election. There is also the rather cautiously worded caveat found in subsection 14 that:
without limiting the circumstances that may constitute a valid and sufficient reason for not
voting, the fact that an elector believes it to be part of his or her religious duty to abstain
from voting constitutes a valid and sufficient reason for the failure of the elector to vote.
This exemption is also offered in some state jurisdictions: for example Section 85 (8) of the
South Australian Electoral Act (1985) states that non-voters with a ‘conscientious objection,
based on religious grounds, to voting at the election’ are excused.
Aside from the suggestion that religious grounds might be acceptable and the conces-
sion that being dead, ineligible or living far from a polling place provide immunity from the
imposition of a fine, no explicit or complete list of ‘valid and sufficient’ reasons is provided by
any of the electoral authorities. Nevertheless, most Australians know that illness or
misadventure is an acceptable excuse. But if there is a dispute about the reasonableness of
the explanation the non-voter may be taken to court and a fine of $50 imposed in addition
to legal costs. Such cases are uncommon and well below 1% of the electorate is faced with a
fine or court attendance in any given election (Mackerras and McAllister 1999: 224). That
fines are rare (and compliance high) is reflected in the fact that 80% of Australians admit they
do not know what the fine is for failure to vote (Bean et al. 2008). This all makes sense in light
of the fact that compulsory voting enjoys a high level of public approval in Australia.
3. Public Approval and its Sources
3.1. Approval Levels
Extensive survey data show steady support of around 70%+ for compulsory voting
over four decades. Furthermore, such support has increased over the last three election peri-
ods (Bean et al. 2008; Bean et al. 2005; Gibson et al. 2002).4 Latest figures (following the 2007
federal election) show that 77% of Australians favour compulsory voting over voluntary
voting. This support is strong across all social groups with some—usually slight—variations.
The most significant variation relates to party affiliation. Labour voters are most approving
(at 83%) while least approving are supporters of the conservative National Party (66%).
Significantly, those who failed to identify with any political party were most disapproving
(63%). This is a predictable result given the well-known relationship between strength of
party identification and propensity to vote.
Despite generally high levels of support, the acceptability of compulsory voting is
sometimes contested in Australia, although not to any noticeable—let alone fatal—degree.5
There are occasional bursts of concerted protest and resistance but it is never enough to
stimulate a robust mainstream public debate, undermine approval for the institution or
LISA HILL
428
threaten its existence.6 This may be contrasted with the Belgian case, where support or
opposition for compulsory voting is often an important election issue and a way for parties
to distinguish themselves from one another. Further, survey data show that some major
political parties in Belgium stand to gain substantially from the abolition of compulsory
voting (Pilet 2007: 5–8).7 In Australia, it is generally believed that a voluntary voting regime
would likely benefit the more conservative Liberal Party (Jackman 1999; Mackerras and
McAllister 1999) and, predictably, this is from where most of the opposition to compulsory
voting has emanated.8 But such efforts have failed to inspire a groundswell of public
antipathy. A significant majority of the population therefore approve of the institution while
the vast majority of eligible voters (around 95% VAP) regularly comply with the laws.
The next section examines likely reasons for such high levels of public tolerance and
seeks to explain why Australians have little trouble accepting an obligation that many other
citizens might consider objectionable, at least in theory.
3.2. History and Political Culture Congenial
At a general cultural level, high public tolerance for compulsory voting is probably
related to the fact that the relationship between Australians and the state has always been a
relatively amicable one, often characterised as either Benthamite, utilitarian or social demo-
cratic in nature. Unlike many places where compulsory voting would be unthinkable (such
as the United States) Australian political culture is not particularly Lockean in its orientation
to state activity. Rather, Australians have historically perceived the state in quasi-idealist
terms as a benign provider of goods and a co-ordinating mechanism for the delivery of
positive rights rather than as an unwelcome violator of negative rights. Given its colonial
heritage and the constraints imposed by a scattered population living on an immense and
harsh continent, the Australian state was perceived, not so much as ‘a leviathan threatening
individual rights’, as a ‘vast public utility’ for ‘collective and developmental purposes’ and the
provision of ‘decent standards of living for all’ (Hancock 1961: 235; Galligan 1994: 60–1, 70).
The International Social Survey Program 2005 Citizenship Survey found that when asked
what they regarded as the most important marks of a good citizen Australians ranked highly
(after voting and obeying the law) ‘never trying to evade taxes’. Such a ranking suggests that
Australians have a strong sense of political community and a conviction that everyone
should ‘make a fair contribution to financing collective societal resources’ (cited in Donovan
et al. 2007: 61–2).
Australia never had a rights culture understood in the classical liberal sense of individ-
ualised rights with trumping claims. Instead, Australians seemed more interested in utility,
fairness and equality. From the outset, Australian political culture was oriented towards
egalitarianism, pragmatism and a concern for substantive over formal equality. That
Australia does not have a strong rights culture understood in the classical liberal sense is
reflected in the fact that it is the only Western democracy without a bill of rights. But
Australians have, perhaps unconsciously, substituted a concern for individualised rights
protection with an obsession with electoral fairness.
The absence of entrenched rights in the Australian Constitution did not denote a lack
of concern on the part of the ‘founding fathers’ for rights protection but reflected a belief
that the common law generated by a popularly elected parliament was the best safeguard
of rights. Parliament’s right to determine the law was seen, not as a weakness, but a strength
‘because Parliament itself was seen as a manifestation and defence of another form of
PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF COMPULSORY VOTING 429
liberty—the right to be represented and participate, through voting, in the formulation of
laws’ (Patapan 2000: 42). This was more than just an abstract right or an imagined ideal of
political equality; in reality it meant that virtually everybody participated—albeit indirectly—
in the community of law-makers. Since Australia’s birth as a nation in the early twentieth
century almost everyone has voted. The 1902 Commonwealth Franchise Act immediately
doubled the electorate by enfranchising women, and by 1925—by which time compulsory
voting had been introduced—over 90% of Australians were regularly participating in federal
elections. A parliament democratically elected by virtually all the people, via an electoral
process perceived to generate legitimate outcomes, was the foundation of Australian
political culture. The result is that considerable effort and resources were devoted to refining
Australian electoral practice in order to maximise electoral access and fairness. It is also
relevant to note here that Australia emerged as a nation not by revolution, but at the ballot
box through a protracted series of referenda (Sawer 2001: 1–26).
Australia’s geography and colonial heritage, coupled with the Australian peoples’
obsession with fairness, its faith in parliament and majoritarianism, and its generally posi-
tive attitude towards the state as the best vehicle for delivering equity and political
community, thus combined to make a congenial environment for the institution of
compulsory voting.
3.3. Voting Perceived as a Duty
An emphasis upon elections as the chief pathway to the good society has undoubtedly
coloured the Australian public’s conception of the good citizen and, with it, the view that
everyone has a duty to vote. In political cultures where voting is perceived as a right—and a
right only—resentment towards the idea of being forced to exercise that right is understand-
able. But what if voters see voting as not only a right but a duty? In their study of attitudes
towards compulsory voting in the Netherlands, Galen Irwin and Joop van Holsteyn (2007: 18)
found the highest level of support for compulsory voting among those who felt ‘that there
is a duty by the citizen to vote in elections’. Although no Australian study has tested specifi-
cally for a relationship between these two attitudes, it exists in an aggregate sense: when
Australians were asked what it took to be a ‘good citizen’ the majority (69%) listed first
‘always voting in elections’. Further, the International Social Survey 2005 Citizenship survey
found that, while Australia is not alone in rating voting as the most important duty of a
citizen, out of the 29 countries surveyed, Australia was ranked highest in its emphasis on
voting as the mark of a good citizen. Australians also ranked highly the importance of
‘keeping watch on the actions of government’ (cited in Donovan et al. 2007: 61–2). The idea
that voting is more about duty towards the political community than about the expression
of individualised rights has doubtless fed the view that compulsory voting is an acceptable
imposition on individual autonomy.
3.4. Transaction and Opportunity Costs Minimised
The Australian attitude towards the state as a co-ordinating mechanism for the
achievement of democratic community is mirrored in the realities of state-sponsored elec-
toral activity. Voting in Australia is a comparatively painless affair for voters because the
Australian state meets almost all of the opportunity and transaction costs involved. Australia
has been described as ‘the most voter-friendly country in the world’ (Mackerras and
LISA HILL
430
McAllister 1999: 223) and it would certainly be difficult to find another system with such low
transaction and opportunity costs to voters. In Australia, the state (via electoral commissions)
assumes a high degree of responsibility for making feasible what it demands of voters.
Electoral commissions go to considerable lengths in order to accommodate ageing and
immobile people, the homeless, those living in remote regions, prisoners, people who have
a disability, are ill or infirm, housebound, living abroad, approaching maternity, hospitalised,
have literacy and numeracy problems, or are from a non-English speaking background.
There are also special provisions for ‘silent enrolment’ (for those who believe that having
their name on a public roll endangers either themselves or their families) and itinerant
enrolment (‘for homeless people, or people who travel constantly and have no permanent
fixed address’).9 In any given federal election up to 500 mobile teams will visit 2000 special
hospital locations; mobile teams will visit 300 or so remote outback locations and over
40 prisons; there will be hundreds of pre-poll voting centres and around 100 overseas polling
places to which approximately three tonnes of election-related and staff training material
will be air-freighted immediately prior to polling. Finally, Australians living in the Antarctic
and based on Antarctic supply ships will be supplied with voting material and facilities.10
None of this is to suggest that there are no residual exclusion problems within the Australian
electoral system; there are and they are not all trivial. Nevertheless they are not on the scale
of exclusions in voluntary settings; further, the attitude of most (not all) successive govern-
ments and all electoral offices is that such exclusions are unacceptable and their remedy a
matter of urgency.
In Australia, no one, no matter how marginalised, isolated or immobile, is expected to
meet the potentially high transaction and opportunity costs of voting; costs which the state
would be unlikely to offset were voting voluntary (which is, in fact, the case in most voluntary
systems). Since Australian electoral commissions actively seek and assist with registration;
provide electoral education; offer absent voting, mobile polling and postal voting; ensure
that elections are held on a Saturday and that polling booths are generally close at hand,
voters don’t have to sacrifice much in terms of cost and opportunities for work or leisure in
order to vote. Doubtless, the low transaction and opportunity costs of voting in Australia
have been an important factor in keeping any potential antipathy towards the compulsion
to vote at bay.
3.5. Sanctions Mild but Consistently Applied
Another likely source of high public acceptance of compulsory voting is that the vari-
ous state and federal electoral offices are systematic but not overly zealous about policing
non-compliance. While they recognise that it would be unwise to abandon penalties for non-
voting due to the likely drop in turnout11 they also recognise that such penalties do not have
to be applied harshly in order to work well. Most cases of non-compliance are dealt with via
‘please explain’ letters, an honour system whereby abstainers are invited to give reasons for
their abstention. No documentation to support the excuse is required. If the reasons are
deemed to be ‘valid and sufficient’ no penalty is applied. Prosecutions are rare; less than 1%
of the Australian electorate is faced with a fine or court attendance in any given election
period (Mackerras and McAllister 1999: 224). It is worth noting here that voting is so easy in
Australia that failure to vote is far more troublesome than voting. It is easier to stop at any of
the numerous and conveniently located polling places than it is to write a letter of excuse for
failure to do so.
PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF COMPULSORY VOTING 431
3.6. High Levels of Electoral Integrity and Perceived Legitimacy of
Electoral Process and Outcomes
The comparatively high standard of service delivered by Australian electoral offices
has partly been driven by the fact that voting is compulsory: high turnout levels coupled with
the expectation that no Australian, however disadvantaged or isolated, should be excluded
from the electoral process has led to a rigorous regime of electoral management. This high
standard of service has, in turn, reinforced the view that being required to vote is an accept-
able infringement on liberty; under less rigorous conditions compulsion might easily have
earned the reputation as nothing more than a mechanism to manufacture consent.
Australian elections are generally free from corruption and rigging scandals. Electoral
offices are organised, integrated (despite federalism), professional, well-funded, indepen-
dent, accountable and apolitical.12 As a result, there is a very high level of trust around the
election process and its outcomes. Though it has sometimes been claimed that the extent
of electoral fraud within the Australian system is ‘sufficient to change the result of an elec-
tion’ (Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters [JSCEM] 2005: 36) no evidence of
systemic fraud or organised schemes of dummy enrolments have ever been uncovered.
There have been some highly publicised cases of enrolment fraud but these were few in
number and were all picked up by AEC officers and duly reported to the Federal Police
(Hughes and Costar 2006: 38–43). Similarly, an allegedly high level of multiple voting has
been found to be wildly exaggerated. For example, at the 2007 federal election, 20,633
cases of ‘apparent multiple voting’ were detected by the AEC after the polls had closed but
87% of those cases were resolved as clerical errors or ‘honest mistakes’. Of these, 98%
involved voters who were aged over 70 or were elderly residents of nursing homes who had
cast a postal vote beforehand and then absentmindedly voted again when their families
took them out to vote on voting Saturday. In the end only ten cases were referred to the
Federal Police (Costar 2009). Between 1998 and 2007 not a single Australian was prosecuted
for multiple voting (JSCEM 2009: 1). This is noteworthy considering that proof of identity is
not required in Australia in order to vote. In other words, voter fraud is not part of Australian
political culture. Independent inquiries and audits carried out on the integrity of the federal
electoral roll have found that the roll is reliable, accurate and of ‘high integrity’ (Hughes and
Costar 2006: 38–43; Costar 2009). Through its habitation reviews and electronic data match-
ing regime the federal electoral roll has been well maintained, with the Australian National
Audit Office review (2002) rating it as ‘over 96% accurate, 95% complete and 99% valid’ (Orr
et al. 2003: 16).
According to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
(IDEA) (Wall et al. 2006: 71) electoral legitimacy is strongly enhanced where electoral
authorities are perceived to be impartial and free from political interference. Within its
typology of electoral authorities (‘independent’, ‘government’ and ‘mixed’), IDEA has classi-
fied the Australian system as independent, that is, institutionally independent from the
executive (Kelly 2008: 78; Wall et al. 2006: 9). The AEC and all state electoral offices are
fastidiously apolitical, partly because they have historically operated within a broader
Westminster tradition whereby civil servants are duty-bound to be politically neutral. For
example, applicants for any politically sensitive position with the AEC may not be
politically or electorally active (Maley 2001: 26).13 To ensure this, the AEC is exempt from
federal legislation that makes it an offence to enquire about the existence or nature of a
job applicant’s political affiliations.
LISA HILL
432
The independence of electoral management bodies is also ensured by legislation
regulating the length and security of a commissioner’s tenure, while the type of reporting
procedures in place ensure transparency; on this model, officers report directly to parlia-
ment rather than the government. This ensures that information ‘is accessible to all politi-
cal stakeholders at the same time’ and prevents governments from exploiting any
advantage gained by having prior access to information about politically sensitive issues
(Kelly 2008: 93).
Another factor insulating Australian electoral administration from party political inter-
ference is that its development predated the emergence of a strong party system. Further,
while the Commission does not have wide powers to alter electoral arrangements, neither is
it bound to comply with demands made by the government of the day because its duties are
set out in detailed legislation that can only by altered by more legislation. Although the AEC
is not subject to ministerial direction, it is still held accountable through transparency.
Australia has robust freedom of information legislation and well-defined mechanisms for
judicial review of administrative decisions, all of which means that the Commission’s
activities are closely scrutinised (Maley 2001: 28–9).
It is significant—and not coincidental—that Australians exhibit fairly high levels of
trust in government compared to citizens in other advanced democracies. They also indi-
cate high levels of approval for ‘how well democracy is working’, high levels of internal
(though not external) political efficacy and ‘very low levels of perceived political corruption’
(Donovan et al. 2007: 102). (In general, compulsory voting has been shown to lower levels
of political corruption and is correlated with high levels of ‘satisfaction with democracy’
(Birch 2009: 132–3)). Australians have also been found to ‘place more value in obeying laws’
and voting than citizens in comparable voluntary-voting settings (Donovan et al. 2007:
102). The most recent large-scale study of Australian political attitudes found that 85.5% of
voting age Australians are ‘satisfied with the way democracy is working in Australia’. Only
10.8% believe that ‘[i]t doesn’t make any difference who is in power’ while 91.1% believe
that ‘who people vote for can make a big difference’; 91% indicate that they care which
party wins in federal elections (Bean et al. 2008). These trends are consistent with the cross-
national finding that ‘compulsory voting has a strong and significant impact on satisfaction
with democracy’ (Birch 2009: 113). But this is not to suggest that Australians don’t have any
negative attitudes about government or cynicism towards politicians; they do, just like citi-
zens in any other democracy (for example, most Australians see politicians as primarily self-
interested (see Bean et al. 2008)). Further, although their high levels of internal efficacy14
are doubtless related to their high rates of voting participation, such participation has not
been able to dispel external efficacy levels that are as low as those reported by many of
their voluntary-voting counterparts. Nevertheless, Australians do seem to have faith in
the mechanics of their electoral process and perceive their polity as a reasonably well-
functioning democracy.
4. Improving Public Acceptance of Compulsory Voting
It has been argued here that Australia’s compulsory voting system is both effective and
well tolerated; nevertheless there is considerable room for improvement. The measures
outlined below would partly offset the complaint that compulsion is an unjustifiable
imposition on personal liberty. Their adoption might also reduce Australia’s high rate of
informal votes and help to maintain—and even enhance—public acceptance of compulsory
PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF COMPULSORY VOTING 433
voting, particularly among the not insignificant minority of Australians who continue to find
the compulsion objectionable.
4.1. Clarify Existing Requirements
One means for offsetting the coercive aspect of compulsory voting is to ensure that
the law is re-framed so as to clarify that it is only registration and attendance at a polling
place that is mandatory rather than marking the ballot or voting invalidly. A system (similar
to that which existed in the Netherlands) could be instituted whereby the law explicitly
stipulates that it is only attendance at a polling place that is required.15 The Dutch referred
to this obligatory attendance as opkomstplicht (Birch 2007: 1).
In South Australia, this aspect of electoral law has been successfully clarified. Here s
85(2) of the State Electoral Act of 1985 provides that an elector who leaves the ballot
paper unmarked ‘but who otherwise observes the formalities of voting does not breach
the compulsory voting requirement’ (Twomey 1998). Other Australian jurisdictions (and
prospective adopters of compulsory voting) might benefit from imitating South Australia’s
example by clarifying the law to the effect that it is only registration and attendance that
is compulsory. This would, at least, forestall the common objection that mandatory voting
either limits democratic choice, forces voters to lie or operates as a mechanism to
manufacture consent. It would also protect the institution from attack should it ever be
tested against a bill of rights (which Australia may have in the near future) in the manner
of X v. Austria Appn. No. 4982/71 (European Commission and European Court of Human
Rights 1972: 468–72). In this case the Court found that compulsory voting did not violate
the appellant’s civil and political rights provided there was no requirement to mark the
ballot.
4.2. Optional Preferential Voting
Another means by which to offset criticism of the compulsion to attend and vote
would be to improve Australia’s preferential voting system so that it expands democratic
choice.16 At present New South Wales, Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory all
have partial (and in some houses full)17 optional preferential voting systems for elections to
their respective state/territory legislatures. The use of this method would meet an objection
sometimes expressed by compulsory voting critics, that having to number each square in
order to record a formal vote compels them to express a preference that they may not have,
or else forces them to endorse candidates they positively dislike. This could be interpreted as
a derogation of the democratic principle—enshrined in the sections 7 and 24 of the
Australian Constitution—that representatives should be chosen by the people (Twomey
2000: 148).18 This strategy would also lower levels of invalid voting (see Hill and Young 2007).
4.3. Expand Voters’ Option for Political Expressions
Another strategy for meeting the objection that compulsion limits democratic choice
is to design and provide ballot papers that capture a much wider repertoire of political
responses. Ballots could offer options that record disaffection or could contain a ‘protest
vote’ category with a blank space for respondents to write their own comments. Both formal
and intentional informal voters could use the space to register comments and protest. Voters
LISA HILL
434
could also be enabled to record positive abstention: for example, until recently, Russian
presidential elections offered voters the option: ‘Against All’ (in some electorates there have
been times when ‘Against All’ won the greatest number of votes) (Myers 2004). Apart from
making voting a less onerous duty for those who object to the compulsion, learning about
the views and preferences of such electors would undoubtedly be of value to those intent on
improving the current system.
Concluding Remarks
Though there is dissent in some quarters, Australians continue to embrace their
compulsory voting arrangements both in terms of compliance and approval. While the
institution and its rationale occupies an awkward place in terms of liberal democratic theory,
it is nevertheless defensible within such a framework, especially where it is effectively and
uniformly administered by electoral offices with high levels of demonstrable and perceived
integrity; where electoral outcomes are accepted as legitimate; where sanctions are applied
consistently but without zealotry; and where the state meets the imposed obligation with a
commitment to making voting as costless as possible. All these conditions are met in the
Australian case. In addition, Australia’s distinctive history and political tradition has rendered
citizens unusually receptive to the voting compulsion. Nevertheless, the objections of
dissenters and objectors should not be disregarded and several possibilities by which their
objections might be accommodated without abandonment or significant compromise of
the present system have been canvassed.
Based on the previous discussion one could theorise that support for compulsory
voting is maximised under conditions where the transaction and opportunity costs of voting
are low; where there is high public confidence in the outcome of elections; where there is a
strong sense of mutual civic responsibility among the population; and where there is a
majoritarian perception that a democratically elected parliament is the best guard of basic
rights. It could also be argued that compulsory voting, managed properly, can itself generate
such conditions.
If Australia wants to retain its good levels of public support for compulsory voting, it will
maintain its commitment to the high quality of electoral management that has prevailed for
some time; this will involve, among other things, ensuring that its electoral authorities remain
independent and well resourced. For those contemplating the adoption of compulsory voting
as a solution to low turnout, the above findings offer useful lessons. Achieving high turnout
rates by simply introducing compulsory voting laws is not enough: the compulsion must be
accompanied by a recognition that compulsory voting is pointless—and may even be
counterproductive—in the absence of the right conditions, some of which can be realised
through the judicious use of resources, expertise and management. Prospective adopters
might also consider adding features currently missing from the Australian regime, such as
optional preferential voting19 and ‘non-of-the-above’ type options. Such measure would
expand electoral choice, offset the compulsion and thereby enhance public acceptance.
NOTES
*For the sake of simplicity (bearing in mind that Australia is a federal system) most of the
evidence and arguments used here relate to federal elections. Nevertheless, most of the
claims about federal voting arrangements are applicable to state and territory jurisdictions.
PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF COMPULSORY VOTING 435
1. For example, data on how well compulsory voting was tolerated while it was in force in the
Netherlands (1917–70) (which, Belgium, is one of the few advanced democracies with levels
of enforcement and management comparable to the Australian system) have been
inconclusive (Irwin and van Holsteyn 2007: passim). There are no ‘solid figures’ or ‘longitu-
dinal data’ on levels of support for compulsory voting in the Belgian setting (De Winter 2009).
2. Their own survey data turned up virtually no strong relationship (religious convictions
aside) between support for compulsory voting and a range of socio-demographic variables
(Irwin and van Holsteyn 2007: passim).
3. In 2005, the VLD introduced a bill into the Belgian senate proposing the abolition of
compulsory voting. Further, in Belgium only 39.3% of voters declare that they would always
vote even if compulsory voting were abolished while a mere 14.3% would vote most of the
time (Dandoy et al. 2007).
4. Between the 2001 and 2004 elections, public support for compulsory voting rose from
69.6% to 74.1% (Bean et al. 2005; Gibson et al. 2002); by 2007 it had risen to 77% (Bean et al.
2008).
5. For example, it has sometimes been suggested that Australia’s relatively high informal
voting rate is linked to antipathy towards the compulsion. This claim has been shown to be
faulty (Hill and Young 2007).
6. However, one notable exception occurred in 1994, when a bill providing for a return to
voluntary voting passed the South Australian Legislative Assembly under a Liberal
government. It failed by one vote to pass the state’s upper house when the ALP and
Australian Democrats combined. But a revised bill repealing the compulsory registration
law did pass.
7. Although, generally speaking, compulsory voting offers no significant partisan benefit
(Birch 2009: 140).
8. For example, on two occasions the party’s Federal Council (the party’s peak forum) passed
motions calling for a repeal of compulsory voting. In 1997, while the Liberal Party was in
power at the federal level, the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters tabled a
report in parliament recommending that the compulsory voting requirement for federal
elections and referendums be repealed (JSCEM 1998). In 2004 the JSCEM recommended
that a full and separate inquiry be held into voluntary and compulsory voting.
9. This enables them to vote. Their details are later checked in order to determine why their
name did not appear on the roll.
10. Voting is not compulsory for Australians living in the Antarctic due to the impossibility of
ensuring secrecy (AEC 2004).
11. Democratic regimes that impose penalties for non-voting have turnout of
approximately 10 to 13 percentage points higher on average than those which do not
(Hirczy 1994: 64–5).
12. Nevertheless, because executive governments have the power to appoint the heads of
electoral commissions ‘bi-partisanship over appointments’ can occasionally ‘deteriorat[e]’
(Orr et al. 2003: 400).
13. ‘Four jurisdictions (NSW, Victoria, Tasmania and the ACT) prevent people who have been
members of a political parties within the previous five years from being eligible for appoint-
ment to a commissioner’s position. Queensland limits the prohibition to existing members
of political parties. In addition, four jurisdictions (Western Australia, Tasmania, ACT and the
Northern Territory) place restrictions on current or previous members of parliament’ (Kelly
2008: 88).
LISA HILL
436
14. Australia may be the exception here to the general finding that compulsory voting tends to
have a negative effect on political efficacy.
15. Compulsory voting was abolished in the Netherlands in 1970.
16. Under an ‘optional preferential’ voting system, an elector shows by numbers his/her
preference for individual candidates but does not need to show a preference for all
candidates listed for the vote to be formal.
17. New South Wales (NSW) uses Optional Preferential for its lower house and Optional
Preferential Proportional Representation for its upper house. Queensland uses Optional
Preferential for its only house, the Legislative Assembly. In the NSW Upper House
15 numbers are needed if you vote below the line. In the ACT at least as many squares as
there are candidates to be elected in a district must be numbered.
18. See also Twomey (1996: passim) .
19. It is not available at the federal level but Queensland and NSW do offer this option. This
recommendation assumes the presence of a preferential system; switching to such a
system is strongly advised since compelling people to vote under a plurality system—
where the chances of gaining some representation is much lower—will understandably
exacerbate public resistance to the compulsion.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author wishes to thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this paper, her research assistants Glynn Evans and Kelly McInley for their
able assistance, and the Australian Research Council whose generous funding made the
completion of this article possible.
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Lisa Hill is Professor of Politics, School of History and Politics, University of Adelaide,
Australia. Her research interests are in political theory, history of political thought and
electoral studies. Recent publications include ‘Compulsory voting: reply to Lever’
(British Journal of Political Science 40(4): 917–923); ‘Voting attitudes and behaviour
among remote Aboriginal peoples’ (with Kate Allport, Australian Journal of Politics and
History 56(2): 242–258); and The Politics of Human Rights in Australia (Melbourne:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), with Louise Chappell and John Chesterman.
Email: lisa.hill@adelaide.edu.au
