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21© Africa Institute of South Africa AfricA insight Vol 48(4) – March 2019
Exploring the Political
Economy of Water and Food
Security Nexus in BRICS
Victor Ogbonnaya Okorie
Post-doctoral fellow, Depar tment of Urban and Region al Planning, University of the Free State, South Africa
Thulisile Numisile Mphambukeli
Senior Lecturer, Department of Ur ban and Re gional Planning, Universit y of the Free State, South Africa
Samuel Olalere Amusan
Depar tment of Politics and International Relations, Nor th-West University, South A frica
Abstract
Access to water and food remains critical to the survival and stability of any nation.
Insecurity of food and unequal distribution of water rights are active drivers of instability
and violent conflicts. These crises are no less evident in Brazil, Russia, India, China and
South Africa (BRICS). Studies addressing the crises in BRICS are localised, making the
articulation of water and food policy for BRICS as a body a necessity. This paper therefore
undertakes a review of the political economy of the water and food security nexus in BRICS.
In doing so, the paper identifies areas of cooperation and collaboration, such as virtual water
importation and reduction of the water footprint, among BRICS. The paper also offers policy
options in the context of the BRICS long-term strateg y.
Introduction
A nexus implies one or more connections linking two or more concepts or ideas together. It is
a conceptual tool, which allows us to deal with complex phenomena. There are many nexuses
in the literature of development studies and related disciplines. Such nexuses include the health-
food-energy nexus and the water and food security nexus. Water and food have many connections
including virtual water, which is the water consumed in the production process of an agricultural
or industrial product. This paper interrogates the water and food security nexus to highlight and
explore ways in which water and food can be secured in BRICS.
Access to water and food remains critical to the survival and stability of any nation. Insecurity
of water rights as well as unequal distribution of water rights are active drivers of instability and
22 AfricA insight Vol 48(4) – March 2019 © Africa Institute of South Africa
Exploring the Political Economy of Water and Food Security Nexus in BRICS | Victor Ogbonnaya Okorie, Thulisile Numisile Mphambukeli and Samuel Olalere Amusan
violent conicts. History is replete with cases of food riot and water protest. Exemplars of such
instabilities are evident in Cochabamba1 of Bolivia, QwaQwa of South Africa, Bangalore2 of India,
and San Raphael of Brazil.
Water and food crises are worsening thanks to the intensication of climate change, rapid
urbanisation, nutrition transition and population growth.3 Solutions to these crises partly lie in
cooperation and collaborations among nation states, regional economic commissions, and global
power brokers.4 Such cooperation and collaborations are highly needed among BRICS nations,
which are not only in the throes of water crises and undernutrition but also overnutrition. Besides
contributing to sustainable food and water security, the collaborations would galvanise and engen-
der healthy relationships in other domains of common interest among these emerging economies.
Narratives addressing food and water crises in BRICS are country-specic and localised.5
Studies with a wider coverage and an enlarged scope are therefore needed to lay a solid founda-
tion for the emergence of common policy options for BRICS as a body.6 Such studies are, however,
relatively recent and few.7 This paper, therefore, seeks to contribute to this growing body of knowl-
edge.8 The paper undertakes a review of the political economy of the water and food security nexus
in BRICS.9 In doing so, it presents key lessons that BRICS as a body may learn from each country’s
experiences. It also identies areas of cooperation among BRICS countries.
The methodological approach is basically an assemblage of data from secondary sources. A
desk-top study was carried out: Key words and phrases such as ‘water security’, ‘food security’,
‘malnutrition’, ‘overnutrition’, ‘water supply in BRICS’, ‘agriculture’, ‘political economy’, ‘virtual
water’, ‘extension’ were typed into the Google search engine. Results of the search were screened
and analysed using content analysis. Findings from the content analysis were organised in line
with the paper’s objectives.
The paper comprises six sections. This introductory section is followed by a critical exploration
of the history of water and food security across the globe. The third section documents varying
experiences of BRICS with water and food crises. The fourth examines the political economy of
the water and food security nexus in BRICS, while the fth highlights implications for the BRICS
long-term strategy. The nal section is the conclusion.
Water and food security: meanings, history and conceptual clarifications
Concerns for water and food are not a phenomenon of recent origin. They are ancient, and their nar-
rations often take on mythological signicance and symbolism. In Christian belief, for instance,
food is implicated in the great rebellion that ushered miseries into the world, just as water is a
crucial element in both African and Greek mythologies. The meanings of water and food thus tran-
scend their instrumental values to include the symbolic. Water and food need not be understood
only in terms of their functions for human physiology. Their implicit and explicit roles in human
sociality and spirituality are no less important. Water and food either separately or collectively
qualify for what Mauss called a ‘social total fact’.10 As such, they have multiple careers. Framing
their meanings should be based on a nuanced articulation of their comprehensive biographies,
while security of water and food should be geared towards securing the biographies.
23© Africa Institute of South Africa AfricA insight Vol 48(4) – March 2019
Water and food have biological, physical, chemical, economic, legal, social, political, cultural
and spiritual dimensions11 that must nd a clear expression in every statement about their mean-
ings and security.
Although water security is pivotal to food security and its extension, nutrition security, the
term ‘food security’ evolved before both water and nutrition security. Nutrition security developed
from the multisectoral nutrition planning approaches and conceptual framework of the United
Nations International Children Emergency Fund in the 1970s.12 While water security, along with its
sympathetic concept ‘environmental security’, emerged from security studies in the 1960s,13 ‘food
security’ evolved from the ashes of World War I and II.
Following concerns about malnutrition in the wake of World War I, the League of Nations (LN)
mandated its health division to investigate its severity and advise accordingly.14 An alarming
report from the investigation brought many doctors and nutritionists into a serious discussion
with national diplomats in the LN ofce. However, while the discussion was ongoing, diplomats
were also in discussion with lobbyists. This second meeting focused on international commodity
trade and tariff barriers. It considered whether a reduction of food production would contribute to
rising prices of agricultural commodities, which were on a downward trend following the economic
crisis.15 Each of these meetings produced a set of recommendations.
The LN, taking into consideration the recommendations of the meetings, nally resolved ‘that
increasing food production to meet human needs would bring prosperity to agriculture’, which
would overow into industry and bring the needed expansion of the world economy. The LN called
its nal decision the ‘marriage of health and agriculture’. Today this marriage, variously described
as an unequal partnership, continues to inform and enlarge scholarly and policy debates, not only
on meanings, but on methods of achieving food security.
Food security is thus seen as a child of the asymmetrical marriage. This marriage has cong-
ured methods of achieving food security, which have inclined more towards politics and agricul-
tural or economic policies than feeding the hungry. This is evident in various methods adopted by
some global actors to solve food crises. For instance, the need to absorb surplus cereals in North
America informed and fuelled food aid as a means of stemming food insecurity in developing
countries.16
The need to dispense the surplus continued to drive approaches to achieving food security
even after the demise of the LN and the consequent rise of the United Nations (UN) and its Food
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) at the end of World War II.17 In 1952, the FAO established a
Committee on Commodity Problems to address issues of glut in agricultural production. By 1954,
the FAO adopted the committee’s study endorsing the use of food surpluses in food-for-work pro-
jects; food stabilisation programmes; special feeding programmes for the most vulnerable target
groups; and in support of government programmes to subsidise consumption in developing coun-
tries. In 1954, the US also established the Public Law 480, which nances food aid activities. The
FAO’s study and the Public Law 480 collectively forged a new alliance for dispensing agricultural
surplus.
The alliance was further strengthened on 27 October 1960, when the UN General Assembly
passed a resolution on ‘the provision of food surpluses to food-decit people through the United
Nations systems’;18 hence, establishing the World Food Programme. The UN resolution recognised
24 AfricA insight Vol 48(4) – March 2019 © Africa Institute of South Africa
that the ultimate solution to the problem of hunger lies in the economic development of developing
countries. It therefore stated that large amounts of surplus food would be utilised for multilateral
development purposes, including selling of the highly subsided surplus food aid in recipient coun-
tries to generate funds for other development projects. The sale of the highly subsidised surplus
inadvertently set up a competition with unsubsidised local farmers in the recipient countries.
By 1974, the FAO began a series of World Food Summits, which evaluated previous efforts aimed
at achieving food security, including the use of subsidised surplus.19 In one of its summits, the FAO
declared it to be an ‘unacceptable fact that about 780 million people in developing countries did not
have access to enough food to meet their basic daily needs’. The World Food Summit has become a
crucible for the production and reproduction of meanings and methods of achieving food security.
In 1992, the FAO and the World Health Organisation (WHO) jointly organised the International
Conference on Nutrition in Rome. The conference declaration has become a major milestone in the
recent development and denitions of food and nutrition security.
The declaration indicates that food and nutrition security exist at multiple scales, such as indi-
vidual, household, community, national and supra-state levels. At national level, food security may
be dened as maximising domestic food production to minimise the country’s reliance on food
imports.20 At individual level, food and nutrition insecurity lead to malnutrition, which is ‘decien-
cies, excesses, or imbalances in a person’s intake of energy and/or nutrients’,21 whereas two forms
of malnutrition – undernutrition and overnutrition – may coexist in the same households. Food
security in the FAO and the WHO’s joint declaration ‘exists when all people, at all times, have
physical, social and economic access to sufcient, safe and nutritious food’.22 Nutrition security, on
the other hand, implies ‘access by all people at all times to the adequate utilisation and absorption
of nutrients in food, in order to be able to live a healthy and active life’.23
Food and nutrition security collectively are thus a condition in which all people at all times have
physical, social, cultural and economic access to food, which is consumed in sufcient quantities
and qualities to meet their dietary needs and food preferences, and is supported by an environment
of adequate sanitation, health services and care, allowing for a healthy and active life.24 The key
elements of food and nutrition security are availability, affordability, accessibility, consumption,
utilisation and stability,25 hygiene and sanitation.26
Food and nutrition security cannot be achieved without water security. Yet, in contrast to food
and nutrition security, the denition of water security is still evolving. A working denition has,
however, emerged from the UN:
The capacit y of a population to safeguard sustainable access to adequate quantities of acceptable quality
water for sustaining livelihoods, human well-being, and socio-economic development, for ensuring protec-
tion against water-borne pollution and water-related disasters, and for preser ving ecosystems in a climate
of peace and political stabilit y.27
This denition apparently encapsulates various biographies of water, which any water-security
inter ventions must secure.
Securing the biographies is highly desirable, yet ways of achieving such security along with food
and nutrition security are hotly debated. In the joint 1992 International Conference on Nutrition,
25© Africa Institute of South Africa AfricA insight Vol 48(4) – March 2019
participant member states declared their ‘determination to eliminate hunger and to reduce all
forms of malnutrition’.28 The participants agreed that hunger and malnutrition are unacceptable in
a world that has both the knowledge and resources to end this human catastrophe. They further
declared that ‘access to nutritionally adequate and safe food is a right of each individual’, that
‘globally there is enough food for all’, and that ‘inequitable access is the main problem’.29
The underlying assumptions of the declaration are that sufcient food is available and that
it adequately meets the individual’s nutritional needs. The problem of food security is caused by
inequitable access. So making food an issue of human rights would facilitate equitable access
and distribution. Nonetheless, the declaration surprisingly failed to put the obligation of feeding
everyone on government provisions. Nation states are to feed only those whose access to food is
hampered by circumstances beyond their control, such as wars and natural disasters.
The declaration, despite its limitations, has become an ideological catalyst animating and pro-
pelling debates across, not only foodscapes, but also waterscapes. Proponents of the Human Right
to Water and Sanitation (HRWS) are insisting that it is the obligation of nation states to supply
water and sanitation to everyone because water is a human rights issue.30 Opponents of HRWS,
however, insist that the ‘right’ to supply water and sanitation should be given to the private sector
because governments, especially in the developing countries, are too poor.31
With respect to food, the advocates of the private sector’s involvement, in contrast to the dec-
larations of the joint 1992 International Conference on Nutrition, locate the problem of food and
nutrition crises in production; and vehemently argue for the adoption of a neoliberal production
approach as the solution. Their suggestions include increased dependency on corporate sellers of
agricultural inputs, adoption of methods of biotech rms, just as their justication lies in the ef-
ciency of the invisible hand of the market. Critics, however, argue that the invisible hand of the
market reduces biodiversity; displaces smallholder farmers; and undermines smallholder farmers’
control over food supply. The invisible hand accordingly erodes food security among smallholder
farmers. The critics noted that privileging efciency of market over equity and equality would lead
to quagmires in various waterscapes and foodscapes across the globe.32 The critics coined the term
‘food sovereignty’ to indicate that people who produce, distribute and consume food should control
the mechanisms and policies of production and distribution, rather than corporations and market
institutions.33
While the debates rage on among epistemic communities and policy makers bicker and differ
among themselves, the overarching question remains: Which political economy would offer ad-
equate food and water to over nine billion people across the globe? Political economy refers to
conditions under which goods and services are produced and consumed in a given nation state.
The debates have thrown up various models: state-centric (supply-driven, government), market
(demand-driven, private sector), collective action (people’s self-help initiatives), coproduction
(government, non-governmental organisations, people and private sector), and build, operate and
transfer (private and public sectors).34
Each of the models has varying degrees of efciency, equality and equity. It is important to note
that the fate of 22.9 per cent who are in the painful grip of undernutrition and nearly 30 per cent
of the world’s population who languish under the burdens of overnutrition, depends on striking a
delicate balance among the issues of efciency, equality and equity that the models emphasise.
26 AfricA insight Vol 48(4) – March 2019 © Africa Institute of South Africa
Similarly, the hope of 2.1 billion and 4.5 billion people who respectively lack access to potable
water and safely managed sanitation, depends on effective actions and not necessarily on declara-
tions of critical stakeholders.35
The FAO, WHO, and their member states collectively declared and pledged in 1999 to reduce
the number of hungry people by 50 per cent in 2015; however, the number almost doubled by the
said date.36 The increasing number of people facing malnutrition and water insecurity is cause for
gloom. And the statistics are no less grim in BRICS, which collectively constitute 40 per cent of the
world’s population. The next section narrates the situation of food and water in BRICS.
Water and food crises: the experiences of BRICS
Concerns over the water and food security nexus insecurity are rising globally.37 Many countries
have recently experienced decreasing agricultural yields due to diminishing streamows and
falling water tables.38 Such declines and their consequences are evidently seen in BRICS.39 Water
and food security in BRICS rural and urban areas have attracted substantial scholarly debates
and policy discourses.40 Emerging consensus is that the water and food security nexus is threat-
ened just as nutrition security continues to be a nightmare in urban and rural areas of BRICS.41
Availabilit y, affordability and quality of food are increasingly threatened. Worse still, overnutrition
and undernutrition, due to dietary transition, now coexist in the same households. As a result, the
double burden of malnutrition has plagued many households in BRICS.42
A startling paradox, therefore, exists in the BRICS waterscapes and foodscapes. For instance,
Brazil is currently one of the leading agricultural producers in the world. Agricultural production
grew signicantly in recent years due to technological advances in production. The country has a
gross virtual water export of 67.1 billion m3/year. Its net virtual water export, mainly to Europe,
was about 54.8 billion m3/year. Europe imports 41 per cent of the virtual water. The average water
footprint of Brazilian food consumption is 16.19 billion m3/person/year. Beef contributes most (21
per cent) to this total.43 However, about 66 million people are food insecure; 12 million are in
the throes of extreme food insecurity; just as 6.2 million lack access to basic water. Sao Paulo,
an industrial hub of Brazil as well as a megacity in the Western hemisphere, is experiencing the
greatest water crisis in almost a century.44 The city, even though Brazil is a country once called
‘the Saudi Arabia of Water’ for having as much water as the Middle East country’s oil, is nding
it increasingly more difcult to supply water and food to its 20 million residents.45 The percentage
of household income spent on food was 16 per cent in 2017. The overall food security index, a
composite mean of availability, affordability and quality of food on a scale of 100, was 67.7 per
cent in 2017. Intensity of food deprivation was 10 kcal/person/day, affordability 69.2 per cent, and
availability 63.6 per cent, while quality and safety was 75.3 per cent. The prevalence rates of over-
and undernutrition were 20.6 per cent and 5.0 per cent, respectively.46 The prevailing coexistence of
overweight and underweight in the same household was 11.0 per cent.47
Water and food situations in Moscow, the economic hub of Russia, are no less worrisome.
‘Russia imports 8.1 billion m3/year of virtual water, mainly in the form of sugar, beef, and pork
(4.0, 2.9 and 1.2 billion m3/year)’,48 respectively. About 70 per cent of the Russian population gets
27© Africa Institute of South Africa AfricA insight Vol 48(4) – March 2019
their drinking water from surface water resources. Forty per cent of the surface water do not
comply with hygienic norms. Furthermore, about 28 per cent of the Russian population consumes
drinking water that has a high mineral content of 1.6 to 10 g per litre, which can promote the risk
of diseases.49 Russia, both outside and within the year under review, has remained a net importer
of food, while the percentage of household income spent on food was 34 per cent. Russia’s overall
food security index was 66.2 per cent in 2017. Intensity of food deprivation was 8.0 kcal/person/
day, affordability 70.7 per cent, and availability 58.7 per cent, while quality and safety was 75.7
per cent. However, the prevailing rates of over- and undernutrition were 23.1 per cent and 5.0 per
cent respectively.50 The prevailing coexistence of overweight and under weight in the same house-
hold was 8.0 per cent.51
India, despite its economic growth, is not insulated from the global food and water crises. The
country recently lost its status as a net exporter of food to become a net importer. It imported and
exported US$23.7 billion and US$22.4 billion worth of food, respectively.52 The crises bedevilling
the country plagued both urban and rural areas. Mumbai, including its numerous slums, is facing
severe water and food crises arising from a rapid increase in population and an alarming rise in
pollution levels in surface water bodies and groundwater. The water supply requirement of Mumbai
is around 3 900 million litres per day, while only 3 100 million litres per day of water is supplied
for domestic, commercial and industrial purposes.53 But then India is a net virtual water exporter.
The food situation of the country is very precarious. India ranks sixty-sixth of 88 countries in
the Global Hunger Index and has a quarter of the world’s hungry people. The food security status
of 377 million inhabitants of India’s urban areas, of which one fourth live in extreme poverty,
is highly insecure.54 The percentage of household income spent on food was 24 per cent. India’s
overall food security index was 48.9 per cent in 2017. Intensity of food deprivation was 109 kcal/
person/day, affordability 41.1 per cent, and availability 55.9 per cent, while quality and safety was
48.8 per cent.55 However, the prevailing rates of over- and undernutrition were 3.6 per cent and 33
per cent, respectively.56
China epitomises the problems intrinsically connected to the global water and food crises. With
respect to water, 13 per cent of China’s lakes have disappeared in the last 40 years, along with
half of its coastal wetlands. The country is also a net virtual water importer. Accordingly, the UN
identied China as one of the 13 countries faced with extreme water shortages. China’s annual per
capita water resources amount to 2 079 m3, compared to a global average of 6 225 m3. 57
The country’s per capita arable land is half the world’s average, and only 28 per cent of the total
national terrestrial surface is available for agricultural activities.58 Feeding one fth of the world’s
population from less than a tenth of its arable land and freshwater has signicantly contributed
to many challenges, such as severe land and water pollution, land scarcity, farmland decline, ac-
celerated urbanisation, and industrialisation.59 The percentage of household income spent on food
was 31 per cent. China’s overall food security index was 63.7 per cent in 2017. Intensity of food
deprivation was 74.0 kcal/person/day, affordability 63.6 per cent, and availability 61.2 per cent,
while quality and safety was 74.7 per cent. However, the prevailing rates of over- and undernutri-
tion were 7.8 per cent and 9.3 per cent, respectively. The prevailing coexistence of overweight and
underweight in the same household was 8.0 per cent.60
28 AfricA insight Vol 48(4) – March 2019 © Africa Institute of South Africa
South Africa is a water-scarce country. It is currently the thirtieth driest country in the world.61
Temporal variations and spatial distribution of rainfall have signicantly contributed to the coun-
try’s water scarcity. The current urbanisation processes and drought have contributed signicantly
to the increase in water and food demand.
The single most pressing challenge for the country ... has been the severe drought resulting from even less
than normal rainfall for most parts of South Africa.62
Food insecurity at household level is becoming a challenge in most South African cities, including
Johannesburg. About 56 per cent of households are food insecure with 27 per cent severely food in-
secure in Johannesburg.63 Water crises also threaten many households in South Africa. Although at
the national level statistics indicate an improvement,64 the lived experiences of many households,
especially in urban slums, show that the water crisis is on the increase. In such settlements, water
is inadequately provided while pit latrines are often cut off from most public services.65 Water
crises in Cape Town are very depressing. The city’s water supply has been curtailed and authorities
declared a water emergency in early 2018.
Moreover, in South Africa some crops are irrigated, which counts for about 60 per cent of all
water abstracted.66 This poses a signicant risk, not only to rain-fed crops but also to those de-
pendent on irrigation as water supply becomes increasingly stressed. Crops such as wheat and
maize are critical for food security, while others such as apples and grapes are exported to earn
foreign exchange in order to purchase crops such as rice. South Africa is both a net virtual water
and food importer. The average percentage of household income spent on food was 22.0 per cent.
In 2017, South Africa’s overall food security index was 64.0 per cent. Intensity of food deprivation
was 13.0 kcal/person/day, affordability 62.7 per cent, and availability 66.8 per cent, while quality
and safety was 59.7 per cent.67 However, the prevailing rates of over- and undernutrition were 5.0
per cent and 26.5 per cent, respectively.68
These conditions are rooted in the prevailing water and food regimes in BRICS. Achieving water,
food and nutrition security requires the repositioning of various water and food regimes of BRICS
countries. The next section examines the prevailing forms of political economy for the water and
food security nexus in BRICS.
Political economy of water and food in BRICS
Political economy analysis interrogates how economic and political processes such as market and
political alliances at multiple scales shape the distribution of power, identity and wealth among
critical stakeholders in various waterscapes and foodscapes. Waterscapes and foodscapes are so-
cially and culturally meaningful, sensorially active places in which humans interact with water
and food as well as with each other.69 The political economy’s analytical framework thus illumi-
nates how market, social and moral dynamics create, sustain and transform shifting waterscapes
and unstable foodscapes. This framework also illuminates ways in which the chang ing ‘scapes’ are
overtly and covertly negotiated, contested, reied, and eventually embodied in critical stakehold-
ers’ lived experiences as prot, poverty and malnutrition.
29© Africa Institute of South Africa AfricA insight Vol 48(4) – March 2019
Diverse water and food situations across BRICS reect the varying conditions under which
water and food are produced and distributed in these countries. The situations are an idiom of the
(in)efciency, (in)equality, (in)equity and (in)effectiveness of the conditions in providing water and
food for instrumental and symbolic purposes. The conditions comprise issues of who, how, where,
when and what to source to meet food and water needs of people living in BRICS. This include
standards, roles, responsibilities and regulations over the ownership of means of production and
distribution of water and food.
In a context where the responsibility of providing water lies solely on the nation state, the
dominant way of supplying water is known as supply-driven. But where the responsibility rests
on the private sector, the approach is called demand-driven. Where the masses solely take the re-
sponsibility, the approach becomes a collective action. A combination of the rst and the second is
known as public-private partnership, whereas a combination of all three is known as coproduction.
The rst and the second approaches are respectively known as state-centric and market models of
water provisioning. They reect dominant ideologies within many political economies.
In BRICS varying combinations of the approaches exist. Brazil operates a mixed economy.70 As
such, the responsibility of providing potable water is shared between public and private sectors,
while the masses participate by paying user fees. The public sector undertakes relatively more
responsibility. Besides providing water and sanitation infrastructure and policies, the sector pro-
vides water and sanitation through public companies to the majority of the population, even those
in rural settings, an area which the private sector considers relatively less protable. The sector is
substantially decentralised. While federal government has more power than the state and the state
has more power than the municipality, it is the municipality that provides water and sanitation
to the people. The water sector relative to telecommunication and health is less deregulated. The
sector is characterised by a state-centric model, although heavily laced with a growing private
partnership. It also has potential for coproduction.
With respect to food, Brazil has undertaken a series of reforms, often at the insistence of social
movements and activists, to improve land distribution. Its agriculture sector has both smallholders
and big commercial farmers. The government regulates irrigation and importation. It established
an agricultural credit system, which provided large amounts of subsidised credit to domestic
producers, particularly to those with higher capacity to respond to policy incentives, i.e. medium
and large farmers; increased investment in agricultural research; and provision of agricultural
extension and technical assistance services.71 Access to nancing for farmers in 2017 was 100
per cent just as agricultural import tariffs comprised 85.0 per cent. The presence of food safety
programmes was 100 per cent. These interventions contribute immensely to moving Brazil from
a food-importing to an exporting country. It is the largest exporter of coffee, beef, broiler, orange
juice, sugar, ethanol and soybeans in the world, and it is among the three main foreign sellers of
corn, cotton, bananas and pork.72
Russia, like Brazil, operates a mixed economy. However, the privatisation programme of Russia
has prevailed for less than three decades.73 Government still controls a higher percentage of the
economy, especially the energy and defence sectors. Water supply regulation is partially decen-
tralised to the municipality level. The water sector is characterised as state-centric, with limited
30 AfricA insight Vol 48(4) – March 2019 © Africa Institute of South Africa
public-private partnership. The non-revenue water for 2009 was 59.70 cubic metres per kilometre of
distribution network per day.74 The sector has no evidence for possible coproduction.
Relative to water, the agricultural sector in Russia has higher private sector participation.
Russia has undertaken some land reforms leading to the emergence of three main types of farms:
corporate, household and peasant. While the rst and the second have existed since the Soviet
period, the third emerged only after 1990, during the post-Soviet transition. Russia’s move from
collectivisation to individualisation increased the share of the private sector in gross agricultural
output from 26 per cent in 1990 to 59 per cent in 2005.75 This suggests higher productivity on
individual farms relative to corporate farms. Access to nancing for farmers in 2017 was 100 per
cent, just as agricultural import tariffs was 83.7 per cent. Presence of a food safety programme was
100 per cent.76
India too has a mixed economy.77 The water sector is substantially decentrialised.78
Decentralisation has allowed for the participation of other actors, although at varying degrees.
The participation of the private sector is on a relatively gradual increase. Similarly, a number of in-
novative ways to involve the masses have emerged since the early 2000s.79 As a result, the supply-
driven model, demand-driven approach, and coproduction mechanism exist at varying degrees in
India’s water sector. The sector’s policy is a prerogative of state governments. Tariffs are also set by
state governments, which often subsidise operating costs. The non-revenue water of India in 2009
was 119 cubic metres per kilometre of distribution network per day,80 the highest in the BRICS.
After its independence, India had taken some land reforms to ensure efcient use of land and
social justice. Such reforms include tenancy regulation to improve contractual terms, including
security of tenure; a ceiling on landholdings to redistribute surplus land to the landless; consolida-
tion of disparate landholdings; and encouragement of cooperative joint farming.81 The government
also invests in agriculture through Research and Development (R&D) and funding of extension
service delivery. The private sector is, however, making inroads into India’s agriculture. The sec-
tor’s participation in agricultural R&D has been on the increase. Recent estimates reveal that busi-
ness funding (largely private) for agricultural R&D constituted about 11 percent of the total R&D
funding.82 The largest private investment occurred in chemicals (pesticides and fertilisers) and food
processing, followed by seed and machinery. More recently, growth has been in plant breeding and
biotechnology, animal health and poultry. Access to nancing for farmers in 2017 was 75 per cent,
just as agricultural import tariffs was 46.8 per cent. The presence of food safety programmes was
50 per cent.83
China has a socialist market economy.84 Government is at the centre of business enterprises as
well as welfare provisioning. The water sector is fully decentralised to municipality level. Policy
formulation for the sector is done at the national level by ve ministries. Provincial governments
play a relatively limited role in the water sector, providing some limited nancing for rural water
supply. Municipalities play a major role, providing a substantial share of nancing and owning
water supply and sanitation companies that are the main service providers in urban areas. In
smaller towns, local government sometimes provides services directly. Village committees operate
water systems in rural areas. It is government policy to fully recover costs for water supply and
sanitation through user fees. The participation of the private sector mostly takes the form of Build
Operate and Transfer contracts. Non-revenue water in 2009 was 50.8 cubic metres per kilometre of
distribution network per day.85
31© Africa Institute of South Africa AfricA insight Vol 48(4) – March 2019
With respect to food, China has undertaken several land reforms. Beginning with the elimina-
tion of landlordism, the reforms established a dual system of collective ownership and individu-
alised use rights.86 Urban land belongs to central government, whereas rural land is for rural col-
lectives – administrative villages with leaders selected through election. Under this arrangement,
farmers do not own land but have inalienable use rights known as the Household Responsibility
System, which guarantees farmers’ access to collectively owned land based on their membership
in rural villages. This form of ownership has been associated with the reduction in rural poverty
and malnutrition. Therefore land reform has brought many of the gains advocates of privatisation
would like to see without the disruption that privatisation would cause. About 82.5 per cent of
the local extension organisations are fully funded by government and have sufcient equipment
and stable funding. The private sector, including non-governmental organisations, fund 17.5 per
cent of extension service delivery.87 Government’s investment in R&D has a signicant percent-
age earmarked for extension service delivery. This combination ensures that research focuses on
practical problems and that extension programmes are informed by scientic research. Access to
nancing for farmers in 2017 was 75 per cent, just as agricultural import tariffs was 75.6 per cent.
The presence of food safety programmes was 100 per cent. 88
South Africa has a mixed economy.89 The water sector is under the control of government and
it is fully decentralised. While the Department of Water Affairs and Sanitation undertakes the for-
mulation and implementation of policy on water resources, municipalities are responsible for dis-
tribution of water and provision of sanitation. Municipalities supply water and sanitation through
municipal enterprises or private companies. The participation of the private sector often takes the
form of contracts for specic services and long-term concessions. Coproduction is currently lacking.
In informal settlements, the collective action mechanism is dominant. As the municipalities and
the Department of Water Affairs do not really pay attention to non-revenue water issues, the need
for monitoring and measurement of water has become crucial. In a report by the Water Research
Commission it was mentioned that ‘the total volume of municipal water supply shows that the
current level of Non-Revenue Water estimated for the country as a whole is 36,8 per cent’.90
South Africa’s post-apartheid land reforms are yet to make signicant changes in the use of
land. Although some apartheid land polices such as the Natives Land Act have been abolished, cur-
rent reform efforts seeking restitution, land tenure reform, and land redistribution have not been
successful. As a result, apartheid legacies still drive production of food and land use. Privately
owned commercial farms dominate South Africa’s agricultural sector and account for the higher
proportion of total food produced in the country. The production of food is thus dependent on
commercial farms. Government invests in R&D and funds agricultural extension delivery for both
commercial and a few smallholder farmers. In line with the post-apartheid policy thrust, agricul-
tural extension messages are coded in eleven languages as opposed to two used in the apartheid
period.91 Access to nancing for farmers in 2017 was 75 per cent, just as agricultural import tariffs
was 85 per cent. Presence of food safety programmes was 100 per cent.92
It is important to note that BRICS countries are all members of the World Trade Organization
(WTO). Their memberships contribute to the conditions under which water and food are produced.
These conditions are highly important to the BRICS long-term strategies, which are explored in the
next section.
32 AfricA insight Vol 48(4) – March 2019 © Africa Institute of South Africa
Lessons and implications for the BRICS long-term strategies
Information gleaned from the brief history of food security across the globe, as well as from BRICS
experiences with the water and food security nexus, is highly important for the long-term strategy
of BRICS. The strategy is anchored in ve pillars: promoting cooperation for economic growth and
development; political and economic governance; social justice, sustainable development and qual-
ity of life; peace and security; and progress through sharing knowledge and innovation.
The rst implication is that the BRICS notion of ‘promoting peace and security’ must be broad-
ened to include water, food and nutrition security. The BRICS methods for achieving food and nutri-
tion security among its member states should avoid the pitfalls of food aid interventions driven by
the US hegemony. Lessons to be learned concern how to handle food aid programmes to streng then
and not weaken the recipient countries. This is imperative given that the current food aid driven
by the US hegemonic power has been associated with the vitiation of local food production in the
recipient nations. Highly subsidised food aid does not only change the dietary taste of recipient
countries. It often weakens the ability of local farmers in the beneciary nations to compete in
local and global markets. As such, over time the recipient nations become permanent customers of
the benefactors.
Although such an impact of food aid on recipient nations is often seen by some pundits as
inadvertent, it perfectly ts into the unspoken but widely accepted expectation of some farmers
who produced crops at the inception of the USAID program. A liberal senator from American who
headed the Food for Peace Program was quoted as saying, ‘Those who we assist today with our
food will be our customers tomorrow’.93 Therefore, the BRICS long-term strategy for food and nu-
trition security should be geared towards stimulating domestic production and consumption by
removing obstacles impeding smallholder farmers’ productivity.
The BRICS long-term strategy of ‘promoting cooperation for economic growth and develop-
ment’94 can leverage on virtual water trade among its members. As revealed in the previous section,
Brazil exports virtual water through sugar and other agricultural products, while Russia imports
virtual water in the form of sugar and other products. But these transactions occur outside the
BRICS member states. There is therefore a need for collaborations through export and import to
boost virtual water trade among BRICS members. Such a trade is an instrument for improving
water use efciency and for achieving water security in water-poor countries.
The overarching implication here is for BRICS to evolve a strategy that offers its members the
best virtual water trade options. Existing types and levels of collaborations through trade may
include the following:
●Free trade area, where BRICS member states eliminate tariffs with respect to the exports and
imports of the identied food products among themselves, but keep their own tariffs against
the rest of the world.
●Customs union, wherein BRICS member states eliminate tariffs with respect to the exports and
imports of the identied food products among themselves and adopt a common tariff against
the rest of the world.
●Common market, characterised by BRICS member states eliminating tariffs with respect to the
exports and imports of the identied food products among themselves, adopting a common
33© Africa Institute of South Africa AfricA insight Vol 48(4) – March 2019
external tariff, and removing impediments to movement of factors of production among the
member countries.
●Economic union, which entails members moving beyond a common market to coordinating and
harmonising economic policies.
●Monetary union, where members share a common currency and monetary policy.
These are the options for BRICS with respect to achieving food and water security through virtual
water trade. The implication is that the agricultural import tariffs of Brazil (85.0 per cent); Russia
(83.7 per cent); India (46.8 per cent); China (75.6 per cent); and South Africa (85.0 per cent) should
be reviewed.
While collaboration and cooperation through trade is pivotal among member countries, the
BRICS long-term strateg y should consider the limits and possibilities of various conditions under
which food and water are produced in the countries. China, for instance, never subscribed to the
logic of the Western market in its land reforms. Yet it attained higher reduction in malnutrition
prevalence relative to India, which imbibed more of the Western market imperatives.
The lesson here is that the invisible hand of the market alone cannot solve the water and food
crises facing BRICS. The invisible hand in the BRICS waterscape and foodscape need not be left
unregulated. This is because there is no general positive relation between water demand and avail-
ability. Moreover, while the invisible hand is good at locating monetary prices to right quantities of
water, it often falls short of equity, which signals the retreat of social justice. The BRICS long-term
strategy must strike a delicate balance between market and equity imperatives.
The BRICS long-term strategy of promoting progress through sharing knowledge and innova-
tion could be realised through cooperation and collaboration on critical challenges in the water and
food security nexus, like non-revenue water. India loses 119 cubic metres per kilometre of distribu-
tion network per day, the highest in the BRICS countries. Russia loses 59.70, China 50.8, South
Africa 35.30, and Brazil 32.66 cubic metres per kilometre of distribution network per day. There is
a need for the sharing of innovations on reducing non-revenue water, especially for India. Water
conserving technologies should also be given adequate attention in the BRICS long-term strategy.
Moreover, addressing the water and food security nexus crises requires the sharing of
innovations among BRICS countries on genetic and social dimensions of the demand for water. A
genetic approach to reducing the water footprint entails manipulations at molecular level to alter
the quantity of water required for normal bodily functioning of an organism. To reduce the demand
for water, BRICS should share innovations on bringing about changes at the DNA level that would
make crops and animals thrive optimally with less water.95
The social dimension is concerned with the multiplying and transferring of such innovations
to end users. There is therefore a need for research on cost-effective ways of reaching end users
with water footprint-reducing innovations. Other aspects of the social dimension encompass not
only agronomic and animal husbandry practices but also domestic and industrial uses of water,
such as ushing toilets and processing. For agronomic and husbandry practices, there is a pressing
need for research activities on innovative ways of supplying water to crops and animals such that
water loss through evaporation and run-off is signicantly reduced. Similarly, research activities
on redesigning toilets, especially the urinar y section – where over nine litres of water is used to
34 AfricA insight Vol 48(4) – March 2019 © Africa Institute of South Africa
ush less than one cubic centimetre of urine – are timely in the context of managing the water and
food security nexus crises.
Combining social and genetic approaches would enable humankind to produce more with less
water footprint. The principle of producing more from less is the basis of precision agriculture,
which holds the key to sustainable production. Precision agriculture is about estimation and ap-
plication of exact quantities of inputs, including water and nutrients needed for the production of
a given crop or the raising of a particular livestock. Innovations on preservation are also needed
in BRICS. Preservation of food will reduce the increasing demand for water in agricultural produc-
tion. Over one third of all food produced globally – equivalent to 1.3 billion tonnes worth around
US$1 trillion – ends up rotting in the bins of consumers and retailers, or spoiling due to poor trans-
portation, har vesting and preservation practices. The argument here is that research is urgently
needed for better preservation and conservation of water and food.
The BRICS long-term goal of promoting social justice, sustainable development, and quality
of life needs to address the double burden of malnutrition. As demonstrated in the previous sec-
tion, overweight and underweight now coexist in the same households in BRICS. The prevalence of
overnutrition is higher than undernutrition in BRICS member states, except in India. This implies
that the apparent increase in quantity and quality of food and water has not resulted in nutrition
security. Having the right quantity and quality of water and food does not guarantee nutrition
security, especially at the individual level and household levels. The BRICS long-term strategies
should promote high quality of life through information that improves the sanitation and hygiene
under which food is consumed. Promotion of water, sanitation and hygiene activities may help
BRICS as a body.
Conclusion
This paper explored the varied conditions under which food and water are produced and consumed
in BRICS. The paper examined the raging debate on which form of political economy offers the
best option for the emergence of food, water and nutrition security. It showed the extant combina-
tions of demand-driven, supply-driven, collective action, and coproduction mechanisms in various
foodscapes and waterscapes across BRICS. The paper demonstrated that market efciency – often
touted by its proponents as a magical bullet – does not always guarantee equitable access to fac-
tors of production, let alone access by all people at all times to the adequate utilisation and absorp-
tion of nutrients in food in order to be able to live a healthy and active life.
Drawing from the history of food aid, the paper noted that issues of equity and equality can
never be overemphasised in any efforts to achieve food security. It argued that BRICS should focus
on stimulating domestic capacity for production. The paper pointed out areas of collaboration in
line with the BRICS long-term strategy to include sharing of innovations on the reduction of non-
revenue water, crops and animals water footprint, and the double burden of malnutrition. It also
identied virtual water trade as another area of cooperation and suggested the following trade
options: customs union, common market, economic union, and monetary union.
35© Africa Institute of South Africa AfricA insight Vol 48(4) – March 2019
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