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DOI: 10.1177/0001839212453456
2012 57: 269 originally published online 21 June 2012Administrative Science Quarterly
Leigh Anne Liu, Ray Friedman, Bruce Barry, Michele J. Gelfand and Zhi-Xue Zhang
The Dynamics of Consensus Building in Intracultural and Intercultural Negotiations
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Administrative Science Quarterly
57 (2)269–304
Ó The Author(s) 2012
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DOI: 10.1177/0001839212453456
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The Dynamics of
Consensus Building in
Intracultural and
Intercultural
Negotiations
Leigh Anne Liu,
1
Ray Friedman,
2
Bruce Barry,
2
Michele J. Gelfand,
3
and Zhi-Xue Zhang
4
Abstract
This research examines the dynamics of consensus building in intracultural and
intercultural negotiations achieved through the convergence of mental models
between negotiators. Working from a dynamic constructivist view, according
to which the effects of culture are socially and contextually contingent, we the-
orize and show in two studies of U.S. and Chinese negotiators that while con-
sensus might be generally easier to achieve in intracultural negotiation settings
than intercultural settings, the effects of culture depend on the epistemic and
social motives of the parties. As hypothesized, we find that movement toward
consensus (in the form of mental model convergence) is more likely among
intracultural than intercultural negotiating dyads and that negotiators’ epistemic
and social motives moderated these effects: need for closure inhibited consen-
sus more for intercultural than intracultural dyads, while concern for face fos-
tered consensus more for intercultural than intracultural dyads. Our theory and
findings suggest that consensus building is not necessarily more challenging in
cross-cultural negotiations but depends on the epistemic and social motivations
of the individuals negotiating.
Keywords: negotiation, culture, mental models, concern for face, need for
closure
Negotiation is a communicative exchange (e.g., Putnam, 1983) through which
participants ‘‘define or redefine the terms of their interdependence’’ (Walton
and McKersie, 1965: 3). It is a pervasive form of social interaction that arises
not just in formal arenas, such as international relations, industrial relations, and
manager-subordinate relations, but also in informal contexts, such as
1
Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University
2
Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University
3
Department of Psychology, University of Maryland
4
Guanghua School of Management, Peking University
interpersonal relations and marital decision making (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993).
Arriving at optimal outcomes depends, in part, on creating a common under-
standing of the situation (McGinn and Keros, 2002). As Van Boven and
Thompson (2003), Olekalns and Smith (2005), and Swaab et al. (2002) found,
consensus making provides the very basis for economic success in negotia-
tions, at least for negotiations that have the potential for joint gain through log-
rolling (in which each party gives up issues that are low in value for them but
high in value to the other side) and information sharing. Dyads with more simi-
lar ‘‘mental models’’—psychological representations of a situation (Craik,
1943)—are more likely to find joint gains than those whose mental models
diverge (Van Boven and Thompson, 2003). Beyond negotiations, similarity in
mental models has been shown to be critical for effective team functioning
(e.g., Mathieu et al., 200; Lim and Klein, 2006) and has been studied in areas
as diverse as natural resource management (Jones et al., 2011) and campus
sustainability efforts (Olson, Arvai, and Thorp, 2011) to examine whether and
how communities of people see problems in the same way. Techniques involv-
ing mental models have also been proposed as a way to overcome stake-
holders’ knowledge limitations in effective risk communication (Morgan et al.,
2002).
The study of mental models and consensus building is especially important
for cross-cultural negotiations. Prior research has revealed cultural variation in
perceptions of uncertainty (Gudykunst and Nishida, 1984), persuasion and influ-
ence styles (Johnstone, 1989; Brett and Okumura, 1998), and judgment biases
(Gelfand et al., 2001) and has identified systematic differences in cognitions
(Nisbett, 2003) and values (Schwartz, 1994) when comparing people from dif-
ferent cultures. These variations should have a major impact on mental models
in negotiation and help us understand why cross-cultural negotiations can be
more difficult than within-culture negotiations. When negotiators from different
cultures meet, their mental models are more likely to be different than when
the other party is from the same culture, and these differences may account
for variations in the quality of negotiation results. It is not only mental models
at the outset of negotiation that matter most for the development of consen-
sus, however; the critical process for consensus building is change in mental
models, specifically their convergence, during the course of the negotiation.
The process of mental model convergence and the effects of culture on that
convergence are the focus of the theory developed below and the two studies
we report.
The relationship between culture and consensus building via mental model
convergence is complex because culture’s effect on social interaction is not
static or deterministic. The challenges encountered when managing negotia-
tions cross-culturally do not inevitably inhibit negotiated agreements. Rather,
the impact of culture depends on other individual and situational factors. Here,
we adopted a dynamic constructivist view of cultural influence, which holds
that culture affects individual cognition and behavior through the activation of
knowledge structures via cultural, motivational, and contextual cues (e.g.,
Briley, Morris, and Simonson, 2000; Chiu et al., 2000; Hong et al., 2000; Morris
and Fu, 2001; Morris and Gelfand, 2004; Fu et al., 2007). Dynamic constructi-
vist research explores how behavioral propensities rooted in culture are altered
by social experiences and motivational states (Morris, 2011).
270 Administrative Science Quarterly 57 (2012)
Although there may be cultural differences in mental models, especially at
the start of negotiation, we theorize that negotiators’ tendency to constrain
their views to culturally informed knowledge structures are likely to vary with
individual needs and motivations, in particular, the need for closure which is a
form of epistemic motivation (Webster and Kruglanski, 1994), and concern for
face, a form of social motivation (Cheung et al., 1996). These motivational fac-
tors affect whether mental models converge during cross-cultural negotiations
and, in doing so, influence the quality of the negotiated outcome. A dynamic
constructivist view of culture helps us see that effects of cultural differences
can be at times diminished and at times amplified. It is important, therefore, to
look not just at how mental models may differ between negotiators from differ-
ent cultures, but also at factors that enhance or constrain change and conver-
gence in mental models in cross-cultural settings. This view moves beyond the
simplistic assumption that all cross-cultural negotiations are alike and suggests
that while cross-cultural negotiations do involve challenges, there are important
factors that moderate these effects. We investigate these factors in two stud-
ies, which compare intra- and intercultural negotiating dyads.
CONSENSUS BUILDING AND CROSS-CULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS
Shared Mental Models
In literatures on communication and psychology, there is a rich and long-
standing body of work showing how two parties interacting come to a common
understanding of the situation (Grice, 1975; Clark and Brennan, 1991), some-
times called ‘‘grounding.’’ The basic notion that individuals create meaning by
building consensus around ideas developed in conversation traces back at least
as far as the work of the early cognitive psychologist Frederic Bartlett (1967;
cited in Kashima, 2000). This process of consensus building—of creating a col-
lective purpose and understanding during conversation—is critical because ‘‘all
collective actions are built on common ground and its accumulation’’ (Clark and
Brennan, 1991: 127). This is no small accomplishment, as people in conversa-
tion have to come to a common understanding of both the content of the con-
versation (talking about the same thing) and the process of conversation (who
talks, when, and how). They have to overcome many barriers, such as speak-
ers’ variability and lack of proximity (Kraljic, Samuel, and Brennan, 2008), as
well as computer mediation (Brennan, 1998). Yet, more often than not, this pro-
cess is successful, as the two parties attend to each other’s statements,
moves, and signals and adjust to each other.
Inherent in the process of consensus building is the convergence of mental
models. Mental models are cognitive representations that help individuals
make sense of a situation (Craik, 1943). Mental models include many intercon-
nected elements of the situation perceived by the individual, forming a ‘‘net-
work of elements’’ in which an element’s meaning is derived from its structural
relation to other elements (Carley and Palmquist, 1992).
Mental models share common features with but can be distinguished from
other cognitive structures people use to make sense of their surroundings.
These include scripts (Abelson, 1976), schemas (Brewer and Nakamura, 1984;
Fiske and Taylor, 1991), frames (Minsky, 1975), and belief or knowledge struc-
tures (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). These concepts all pertain to processes through
Liu et al. 271
which an individual sorts out information in his or her environment. Scripts are
concerned with event sequences in linear temporal order and patterns that
guide behavior (Schank and Abelson, 1977), while mental models are snap-
shots of perceived relationships at a given point in time. Knowledge structures
emphasize the framework for organizing, relating, and retaining information in
memory (Mayer, 1992), while mental models are the specific knowledge struc-
tures being used for sense making on a certain occasion. Schemas or frames
represent established ways of perceiving a situation (e.g., having a ‘‘relation-
ship’’ frame; Pinkley, 1995) that are not necessarily derived from the particulars
of a situation, whereas mental models are built around the actual circum-
stances at a given point in a specific situation. Mental models differ from these
other concepts in that mental models are situation dependent, the construction
of a mental model yields an integrated network of relations among perceived
elements in a situation, and therefore a mental model reflects a holistic and
specific cognitive experience.
The elements of mental models include complex concepts with meanings
that are independent of the structural links (e.g., Thompson and Loewenstein,
2003; Liu and Dale, 2009). In a negotiated exchange, the process of interact-
ing should create shifts in perceptions such that mental models are more
similar at the end of the ne gotiation than at the beginning of negotiations.
Three comparisons between mental models in a situation like this are possi-
ble. First, each party comes to the situation with a pre -negotiation mental
model; these models may be more or less different between the parties, in
terms of which el ements are seen as relevant, which are connected to each
other, and which are more central. Second, the mental model held by one
party before the negotiati on may be more or less similar to that same party’s
model after the negotiation, indicating the degree of change in mental mod-
els that occurs for that individual as a result of the negotiation process. Third,
the two parties’ mental models after the negotiation can be assessed to
determine how similar they are; if they are more similar after the ne gotiation,
we say that the two parties achie ved mental model convergence during the
negotiation.
The convergence of mental models—the building of consensus and greater
similarity in mental models—is critical in negotiation because when negotiators
share mental models, they are better able to understand one another and bet-
ter able to exchange information accurately and efficiently (Van Boven and
Thompson, 2003). Self-verification theory holds that people seek out verifying
information for epistemic and practical reasons. Knowing that one’s beliefs are
similar to others’ helps feed perceptions that one’s own beliefs are sensible;
moreover, when interaction partners hold similar expectations and self-views,
social interactions are less conflictual and better coordinated (Swann, Pelham,
and Chidester, 1988). The similarity between an individual’s self-views and oth-
ers’ appraisals of that individual constitutes the interpersonal congruence
between them, which in turn promotes smooth and productive interactions
(Polzer, Milton, and Swann, 2002). The similarity of mental models also fosters
feelings of coherence, control, and predictability, enhancing understanding and
collective efficiency (Swann, Stein-Steroussi, and Giesler, 1992). More similar-
ity between the mental models of two negotiators creates a stronger basis for
exchange that is more open and interactive, with a greater likelihood that one
272 Administrative Science Quarterly 57 (2012)
party will learn from the other. This can be especially important in negotiations
in which there is a potential for joint gain.
Consensus based on similarity and adjustment of mental models can also
affect the objective quality of the final results. Reduced to its essence, negotia-
tion is a joint decision-making process aimed at allocating resources under con-
ditions in which negotiators have divergent preferences and utilities (Bazerman
and Carroll, 1987; Neale and Northcraft, 1991). Weingart and colleagues
(Weingart et al., 1990; Weingart, Bennett, and Brett, 1993) showed that exten-
sive information exchange generates trust and cooperation during the negotia-
tion process, resulting in better outcomes for both parties when the
negotiation has integrative potential. There is also evidence that negotiation
pairs with higher summed perspective-taking ability (i.e., the ability to look at
problems from another’s perspective) achieve higher joint profits than pairs
with lower summed perspective-taking ability (Kemp and Smith, 1994). When
there is similarity among important elements of individuals’ mental models, that
similarity facilitates or, at a minimum, reflects understanding of each other’s
perspective.
We take as a starting point, therefore, the idea that interacting parties pro-
gressing toward mutually satisfactory outcomes harbor mental models that are
more similar at the end than at the beginning of the interaction. Similarity or
consensus in mental models, in other words, is a potential marker of progress
toward mutual gain and mutual satisfaction to the extent that it reflects the
coordination of communications between parties, more accurate interpreta-
tions of each other’s interests and messages, and a mutual understanding of
key issues during decision making. Several studies of mental models in nego-
tiation between people in the same culture support this view, showing that
when mental models converge, producing greater consensus in perceptions,
negotiators are able to achieve higher levels of joint gain (Van Boven and
Thompson, 2003; Olekalns and Smith, 2005; Adair and Brett, 2005). Figure 1
illustrates the consensus-building process resulting from change in mental
models in the direction of convergence that these prior studies have supported.
This foundation is a particularly useful base for studying consensus building in
cross-cultural negotiations.
Culture has been conceptualized as ‘‘a loose network of domain-specific
cognitive structures’’ (Hong and Mallorie, 2004: 63), including theories and
beliefs that shape people’s patterns of feeling, behaviors, systems of thinking,
Figure 1. Consensus Building in Mono-cultural Negotiation Research
Party1
Mental Model
INITIAL SIMILARITY
IN MENTAL MODELS
CONSENSUS
Pre-Negotiation Post-Negotiation
JOINT OUTCOMES
Individual
Mental
Model
Change
Party 2
Mental Model
Party
1
Mental Model
Party
2
Mental Model
Individual
Mental
Model
Change
Liu et al. 273
and cognitive processes (Triandis, 1972; Hofstede, 1997; Nisbett et al., 2001).
Culture influences factors and processes that are particularly relevant to deci-
sion making in general and negotiation in particular. This has been shown in
studies of culture (e.g., Nisbett et al., 2001) and in studies of negotiators’ per-
ceptions (e.g., Mannix, Tinsley, and Bazerman, 1995; Brett and Okumura,
1998; Gelfand et al., 2001, 2002; Adair and Brett, 2005). Thus we can expect
that negotiators from different cultures will have mental models that are more
likely to differ from each other than will negotiators from the same culture. If
convergence of mental models is key to negotiation outcomes involving mutual
gains, achieving those outcomes is likely to be a greater challenge for negotia-
tors who come from different cultures, because they will start with mental
models that are more different and need to undergo greater change of mental
models to achieve consensus.
But the effects of culture need not be regarded as static (e.g., Hofstede,
1980) or deterministic. A dynamic constructivist view of culture emphasizes
the malleable nature of culture (Kashima, 2000), contending that the strength
of culture’s influence in a given moment or situation varies a great deal (e.g.,
Morris and Gelfand, 2004; Morris, 2011). For example, marketing research
shows that the impact of culture on consumers’ decision making can be ampli-
fied simply by requiring people to provide reasons for their choices (Briley,
Morris, and Simonson, 2000). Cultural differences are also amplified by individ-
uals’ levels of need for closure (Fu et al., 2007; Chiu et al., 2000) and by requir-
ing accountability for individual behavior (Gelfand and Realo, 1999; Liu,
Friedman, and Hong, 2012). Thus the presence of differences in mental models
at the start of cross-cultural negotiations may pose more or less of a challenge
to the process of building consensus under different conditions. To understand
how a convergence of mental models can be achieved even when large differ-
ences between models exist at the start of interaction, we need to assess fac-
tors that generally enhance or inhibit the flexibility of mental models in
negotiation.
Motivation and Culture in Mental Models
Proposing a motivated information processing model, De Dreu and Carnevale
(2003) suggested that interpersonal processes and outcomes are influenced by
two types of motivations: epistemic motivation and social motivation. An
important epistemic motivation is the need for closure, the motivation to reach
judgments that are conventional and stable (Kruglanski, 1989: 236). Social moti-
vation includes the concern for relations with others. De Dreu and Carnevale
(2003) used a more specific definition of social motives, focused on the desire
to help or hurt the payoff to the other party. While this particular expression of
social motives is important for negotiation, the driver of the desire for those
payoffs is concern for the quality of the relationship with the other party, which
is core to the broader definition of ‘‘social motivations.’’ We focus here on the
broader definition of social motives. As Forgas, Williams, and Laham (2005: 5)
put it, ‘‘humans need meaningful social contact, and the motivation for such
contact is crucial to the maintenance of a healthy sense of adjustment and a
sense of identity.’’ One example of this type of social motivation is concern for
face, which is the motivation to enhance one’s self-image and avoid loss of rep-
utation (Cheung et al., 1996). The epistemic motivation of need for closure and
274 Administrative Science Quarterly 57 (2012)
the social motivation of concern for face are likely to have different effects on
mental model convergence and consensus.
Need for closure. Need for closure is an individual characteristic pertaining
to cognitive style that researchers have connected with both social interactions
and culture. It is known to lead individuals to seek answers that concur with
the group consensus (Kruglanski and Webster, 1996) and resolve conflicts (Fu
et al., 2007). Having a high need for closure implies a lack of flexibility in dealing
with uncertainty. Need for closure represents the desire for definite structure,
an affective discomfort occasioned by ambiguity, urgency for closure in judg-
ment and decision making, desire for predictability in future contexts, and
closed-mindedness and unwillingness to be confronted (Kruglanski, Webster,
and Klem, 1993; Webster and Kruglanski, 1994; Kruglanski and Webster,
1996). Individuals high in need for closure tend to ‘‘seize and freeze’’ informa-
tion early on during social interaction (De Dreu, Koole, and Oldersma, 1999).
Consequently, once one has frozen a mental model, he or she is more likely to
dismiss information inconsistent with the model and less likely to adapt to new
information than those who are low in need for closure (Kruglanski, 1989;
Kruglanski and Webster, 1996; Jost, Kruglanski, and Simon, 1999; De Dreu,
Koole, and Oldersma, 1999).
Thus we expect that change in mental models will be lower for those high in
need for closure, and as a result, consensus between interacting parties at the
conclusion of negotiation will be less among those who are higher in need for
closure than those who are lower in need for closure. Because consensus
leads to more desirable joint outcomes, if high need for closure is associated
with less change in mental models and less consensus, then we would expect
joint outcomes to be lower for negotiators with high need for closure.
Hypothesis 1a: Individual change in mental models during a negotiation is smaller for
negotiators high in need for closure than for negotiators low in need for closure.
Hypothesis 1b: Consensus (or convergence in mental models between negotiators)
at the end of the negotiation is less in dyads of individuals with higher need for
closure than dyads of individuals with lower need for closure.
Hypothesis 1c: Joint outcomes are lower for negotiating dyads of individuals with
higher need for closure.
Need for closure and cultural match. Though need for closure has effects
on negotiations in general, we expect that the effect will be especially strong in
intercultural negotiations, in which there is a weak cultural match between
negotiators. In intercultural interactions, heightened need for closure will lead
negotiators not only to ‘‘freeze’’ the mental model early but also to instigate
stereotypical judgments toward culturally distant others because they feel
negatively disposed toward those with different opinions and cultural traits
(Kruglanski and Webster, 1996). Adherence to group norms provides cognitive
closure (Kruglanski et al., 2006), which should be comforting for those with
high need for closure facing uncertain situations such as an intercultural nego-
tiation. Freezing the mental model makes it difficult to absorb new information
or update one’s analysis of the negotiation and leads one to forego
Liu et al. 275
opportunities to discover integrative potentials that can lead to joint gains.
Therefore high need for closure makes it more difficult to reach agreement,
and more so in intercultural negotiations.
Research has shown that high need for closure tends to amplify cultural ten-
dencies (Chiu et al., 2000; Fu et al., 2007), and this appears especially true for
those who desire consistent cultural identity (Hong et al., 2003). Fu et al.
(2007: 203) argued that high need for closure activates cognitions that are con-
ventional in one’s home culture and thereby provides the ‘‘epistemic security
of consensual validation.’’ Thus in intercultural situations, individuals high in
need for closure may exhibit an additional layer of rigidity on top of the general
rigidity we would expect for those with high need for closure. Cultural tenden-
cies toward change of mental models over the course of the negotiation and
the quality of outcomes in negotiations are amplified when need for closure is
high and the negotiation context is intercultural.
Hypothesis 1d: The negative effect of high need for closure on consensus is stron-
ger for intercultural negotiation pairs than for same-culture pairs.
Hypothesis 1e: The negative effect of high need for closure on joint outcomes is
stronger for intercultural negotiation pairs than for same-culture pairs.
Concern for face. Concern for face, a form of social motivation, is an indi-
vidual characteristic that encompasses motivation to enhance one’s public
image and to avoid a loss of reputation (Goffman, 1959; Ting-Toomey, 1988;
Cheung et al., 1996; Earley, 1997). Face represents a claimed sense of self in a
relational situation. Ting-Toomey (1988) argued that even though those in inter-
cultural encounters differ in the way they manage face, face is a universal phe-
nomenon in that everyone prefers to be respected, and everyone benefits from
a sense of self-respect. Although the concept of face has its origin and holds
more importance in Asian cultures (Hu, 1944), measures of face as an individ-
ual difference construct have been validated in both Eastern and Western cul-
tures (Ting-Tommey et al., 1991; Cheung et al., 1996, 2001; Liu, Friedman, and
Chi, 2005). Many texts have emphasized the importance of dealing with the
other parties’ face in conflict management and negotiation in order to recognize
and respect their social identity and status (e.g., Brett, 2001).
In contrast with need for closure, which is theorized epistemically to hinder
mental model convergence, concern for face should facilitate the convergence
of mental models. As a reflection of one’s desire for social acceptance, concern
for face is associated with a claimed sense of social esteem that an individual
wants others to have for him or her. Face is a vulnerable identity resource in
social interaction because it can be enhanced, threatened, or bargained over
(Ting-Toomey, 1988; Erez and Earley, 1993; Cocroft and Ting-Toomey, 1994;
Earley, 1997). Because high concern for face indicates that one is more sensi-
tive to how others view him or her, we expect greater awareness of the other
party and his or her needs among individuals high in concern for face. Cheung
et al. (1996, 2001) found that concern for face is linked to higher levels of inter-
personal relatedness, relationship orientation, and social sensitivity. Given this
added attention to the other party, concern for face ought to enhance conver-
gence of mental models with effects that are the inverse of need for closure.
276 Administrative Science Quarterly 57 (2012)
Hypothesis 2a: Individuals’ mental model change during negotiation is larger for
those high in concern for face than for those low in concern for face.
Hypothesis 2b: Consensus (or mental model convergence between parties) at the
end of a negotiation is greater in dyads composed of individuals with higher con-
cern for face than dyads composed of individuals with lower concern for face.
Hypothesis 2c: Joint outcomes are greater for negotiation dyads composed of indi-
viduals with higher concern for face.
Concern for face and cultural match. Concern for face, as a manifestation
of social motivation, encourages pro-social behaviors and attention to others,
which leads to more information absorption and opportunities to discover inte-
grative potential in negotiation. We expect that these effects will be especially
strong in intercultural negotiations. Given greater initial differences in mental
models between the two parties in intercultural situations, convergence
requires more individual mental model change over the course of the interac-
tion; in that situation, the amount of perceptual and cognitive attention paid to
the other party can be especially beneficial. In intercultural negotiations, individ-
uals experience a heightened awareness of self-identity, because they may
attempt to be positive role models of their culture (Latane, 1981), as well as a
heightened awareness of how others perceive their culture. Negotiators with
high concern for face will see the intercultural situation as an especially impor-
tant opportunity to display the positive side of their culture and personality,
while those with lower concern for face may attend less to situational differ-
ences between intercultural and same-culture contexts. Accordingly, we pro-
pose that intercultural negotiation provides a context in which the effects of
concern for face on mental models will be amplified.
Hypothesis 2d: The positive effect of high concern for face on consensus is stronger
for intercultural negotiation pairs than for same-culture pairs.
Hypothesis 2e: The positive effect of high concern for face on joint outcomes is
stronger for intercultural negotiation pairs than for same-culture pairs.
METHODS
Pilot Study
We conducted a pilot study to establish the measurement of mental models
within a two-party negotiation simulation called Cartoon (Brett and Okumura,
1999). The simulation involves the sale of syndicated rights of a children’s tele-
vision cartoon. Participants in the U.S. and in China were assigned to either the
buyer or seller role and were given confidential role information, in their native
languages, the day before the negotiation. The seller is a major film production
company that is prepared to negotiate a fixed five-year, 100-episode contract.
The buyer is an independent television station in a large metropolitan area. The
parties negotiate five issues. One issue is distributive: the price of each epi-
sode. Two integrative issues—financing terms and runs (the number of times
each episode may be shown in the five-year period)—create a logrolling oppor-
tunity: it is more important for the seller to have payment up front and for the
buyer to have a greater number of runs. There is one common-value issue:
Liu et al. 277
another cartoon (‘‘Strum’’), which will be available in the future, with the poten-
tial to add value for both parties. The last issue is an opportunity to fashion a
contingent contract (Bazerman and Gillespie, 1999) if the parties realize the
potential to base payments on their different rating expectations. This simula-
tion was ideal for this research for two reasons. First, it is well suited to a study
of mental models because it covers multiple issues in a way that compels both
parties to use relatively sophisticated thinking processes and provides opportu-
nities for measuring a variety of mental model patterns. Second, other scholars
have found it well suited to cross-cultural research (e.g., Brett and Okumura,
1998; Adair and Brett, 2005). With children’s television cartoons common in
most countries, the Cartoon negotiation is salient in both same-cultural and
intercultural negotiation. At the time of our study, the Chinese version of the
Cartoon negotiation had been translated, back-translated, and validated for its
conceptual and structural equivalence to the English version (Brislin, 1986;
Zhang and Han, 2007).
Identifying mental model elements in the Cartoon negotiation. Because
mental models are conceptualized as networks (Carley and Palmquist, 1992),
we used network analysis techniques (e.g., UCINet; Borgatti, Everett, and
Freeman, 2002) to investigate empirically how concepts are connected to each
other and which ones are more central to negotiators (Freeman, 1979; Scott,
2000). Because mental models are subjective and situation dependent, study-
ing them empirically presents a significant challenge—it is impossible to mea-
sure exactly what goes on in someone’s mind. Nevertheless, research on
cognitive maps, social networks, and social cognition has led to the develop-
ment of two techniques that elicit the elements of a knowledge network from
an individual’s perception: concept mapping and paired judgments (Collins and
Quillian, 1969; Novak, 1990; Wandersee, 1990; Huff, 1990; Mathieu et al.,
2000; Van Boven and Thompson, 2003; Kane and Trochim, 2006). In the pilot
study, we used the qualitative technique of concept mapping to generate
inductively a list of unique concepts associated with the Cartoon negotiation
simulation and a set of general categories of mental model elements. Those
concepts and categories were used in Study 1 for the quantitative measure-
ment of mental models through the technique of paired judgments. We used
the categories of mental model elements in Study 2.
Concept mapping provides an intuitive and qualitative measure of mental
models through graphic representation that utilizes spatial thinking (Kane and
Trochim, 2006). The advantage of concept mapping is that it is qualitative and
open ended, allowing participants to report on their concept map any ideas or
issues that they see as relevant to the negotiation. Forty-eight participants, 24
at two U.S. universities and 24 at two similar Chinese universities, were asked
to complete a concept map of the Cartoon negotiation before the negotiation
started. The instructions on how to create a concept map were as follows:
(1) think about concepts that are important to this negotiation; (2) spatially
arrange these concepts, and ( 3) link the concepts based on how they relate to
each other. The instructions included a concept map of ‘‘plants’’ (Novak, 2000)
as an example. The result was that each participant produced a diagram repre-
senting his or her mental model of the concepts relevant to this negotiation,
including whether or not each concept was related to each other concept.
278 Administrative Science Quarterly 57 (2012)
After creating the concept map, participants negotiated in pairs. At the conclu-
sion of the negotiation, they were asked to create another concept map, even
if they thought they had the same concept map as before the negotiation. It
took the participants 5 to 20 minutes to create each concept map. The first
author then debriefed them about the negotiation and interviewed the partici-
pants to learn about their experience. As long as a concept appeared in any of
the lists provided by the participants, we included it in the final list, although
we did collapse concepts with the same root; for example, we put ‘‘relation,’’
‘‘relational issues,’’ and ‘‘relationship’’ together for ‘‘relationship with the other
party.’’ Together, the American and Chinese participants came up with 11
unique concepts for the Cartoon negotiation (1) Price/episode, (2) Financing
terms, (3) Runs/episode, (4) Second cartoon, (5) Rating, (6) Win-win,
(7) Competition, (8) Profit of my company, (9) Relationship with the other party,
(10) My emotions, and (11) Other party’s emotions. This set of concepts was
then used in Study 1, in which we employed the paired judgment method to
measure mental models. The paired judgment method is more manageable in
a large-scale study than the concept mapping approach, because the set of
concepts available to all participants is the same. We categorized these mental
model elements into informational, relational, and emotional element cate-
gories that included both case-specific and general concepts. We used these
categories to generate mental model elements in Study 2, which involved use
of a different negotiation simulation.
Overview of Research
Based on the measures established in the pilot study, we conducted two stud-
ies, using different negotiation scenarios, to test our hypotheses and validate
the findings. The first study, as in the pilot study, used the Cartoon negotiation
(Brett and Okumura, 1999), and the second study used a modified version of a
simulation known as the Alpha Beta Robotics negotiation (Gladwin, Weiss, and
Zerkin, 2003). Data for both studies were collected from the U.S. and China
and included three cultural conditions: American same-culture negotiations,
Chinese same-culture negotiations, and American-Chinese intercultural negotia-
tions. Same-culture negotiations were conducted in the U.S. and China, in
English or Chinese, respectively. The intercultural negotiations were conducted
in the U.S. in English, but all Chinese negotiators in the intercultural negotia-
tions were provided with both the English and Chinese versions of the materi-
als. These Chinese negotiators were graduate professional students or post-
doctoral research associates in highly selective and competitive programs at
major U.S. universities. They had all been in the U.S. for less than three years,
so they were not so distant from their cultural roots and could fairly represent
‘‘Chinese’’ negotiators. Also, given their admission to major U.S. universities,
they were proficient in English. All participants reported having had a previous
negotiation class or workshop training and experience, and all had at least a
bachelor’s degree. The participants with a background in science noted that
their previous negotiation training and experience were from negotiation or con-
flict management workshops offered either on campus or at their professional
development conferences. Table 1 shows the demographic details of each
study group.
Liu et al. 279
STUDY 1
Participants and Procedures
All 294 participants in this study were volunteers who were either enrolled in
graduate professional programs or were post-doc fellows in business, law, and
science in two professional schools in the U.S. and two equivalent schools in
China. The participants were recruited through professors who were teaching
negotiation, mediation, or campus-wide negotiation and conflict management
workshops. We had 41 American pairs and 86 Chinese pairs in intracultural set-
tings, and 30 intercultural pairs. Participants in same-cultural conditions partici-
pated for extra credit in their respective business, law, negotiation, mediation,
or conflict management classes. Each participant in the intercultural condition
received $25 as remuneration.
In all three conditions of this study, the participants provided demog raphic
information and completed t he Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz, 1992) to
assess cultural differenc es seven to ten days before the negotiation. All parti-
cipants received role materials and a pre-negotiation questionnaire measuring
their pre-neg otiati on mental models two to three days before the ne gotiation.
At the negotiation se ssion, responses from the pre-negoti ation questionnaire
were collected before the negotiation started. Participants were told that
they had up to 60 minutes to engage in the negotiation; most pairs were fin-
ished after 45 minutes. Immediately foll owing the negotiati on, the partici-
pants submitted a form recording their agreement and then compl eted the
post-negotiation questio nnaire, which included measures for post-negotiation
mental models and questions about sati sfaction with the negotiation out-
come, satisfaction with the negotiation p rocess, and expectation for a
future rel ationsh ip. At their option, participants were either debriefed in a
session followin g the negotiation or receive d a summary of the debriefi ng
materials via e-mail. The first author field ed follow-up questions from partici-
pants by e-mail.
Table 1. Demographic Descriptions of Participants in All Study Groups
Study N Culture
Mean
age (yrs.) Gender
Mean work
experience
Major area of
academic study
Pilot study 48 24 American
24 Chinese
31.2 31% female 6.7 yrs 64% business, 19% law,
17% science
Study 1
American intracultural 82 82 American 35.8 35% female 8.8 yrs 76% business, 24% law
Chinese intracultural 152 152 Chinese 33.9 37% female 8.3 yrs 65% business, 23% law,
12% science
Intercultural 60 30 American
30 Chinese
31.7
31.3
40% female
33% female
6.9 yrs
6.1yrs
50% business, 30% law,
20% science
Study 2
American intracultural 38 38 American 33.2 40% female 7.8 yrs 100% business
Chinese intracultural 36 36 Chinese 29.7 47% female 6.9 yrs 100% business
Intercultural 36 18 American
18 Chinese
32.9
32.1
44% female
39% female
7.6 yrs
7.2 yrs
92% business,
8% science
280 Administrative Science Quarterly 57 (2012)
Measures
Mental models. We used the technique of paired judgments (Mathieu
et al., 2000) to measure mental models. Concept mapping in the pilot study
generated 11 items for the Cartoon negotiation; participants in this study made
paired judgments based on these 11 elements from the concept maps.
Whereas the concept mapping approach identifies two concepts that are
related in a subject’s mind by having him or her draw a link in a diagram, the
paired judgment method identifies a link by having the participant evaluate
every feasible pairing among concepts and score them in terms of how related
or unrelated each pair is. Given that we had identified 11 concepts in the Pilot
Study, there were 55 conceptual pairs [(11 x 10)/2]. These were presented to
participants with random ordering both by pairs and within pairs. Participants
were asked to rate the relatedness of each pair of concepts on a 9-point scale
from –4 (negatively related, a high degree of one requires a low degree of the
other) to + 4 (positively related, a high degree of one requires a high degree of
the other) (Mathieu et al., 2000). With this procedure, as with concept map-
ping, we were able to capture the pattern of relationships among key concepts
the participant saw in this negotiation. What the paired judgment procedure
provides that concept mapping does not provide is a participant’s sense of how
strong a given relationship is. In concept mapping, we know if participants saw
a link or not, but not if some ties were deemed stronger while others were
deemed weaker. The result for each participant was a matrix showing his or
her perceived set of ‘‘concept relatedness’’ that could be analyzed using social
network analysis; we used UCINet6 (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman, 2002).
Mental model similarities, consensus, and change. We used the
Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) within UCINet6’s consensus analysis
to create an index of convergence and association between two networks (i.e.,
between the mental models of two individuals in a negotiating dyad or
between one individual’s mental model before the negotiation and his or her
mental model after the negotiation). Data from the participants’ paired judg-
ments were first converted to matrices to provide input for QAP, which gener-
ates the correlation between two matrices and assesses correlations between
a cell/element in one network with cells in another network (Hubert and
Schultz, 1976; Krackhardt, 1987, 1988; Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman, 2002).
The QAP algorithm first computes a Pearson correlation coefficient, as well as
a simple matching coefficient, between corresponding cells in the two data
matrices. Then it randomly permutes rows and columns (synchronously) of one
matrix and recomputes the correlation. This second step iterates hundreds of
times in order to compute the proportion of times that a random correlation is
larger than or equal to the observed correlation calculated in step one. A low
proportion ( < .05) suggests a strong relationship between the matrices that is
unlikely to have occurred by chance. We used the QAP correlation (QAPr) as
the measure of similarity of participants’ mental models at the beginning of the
negotiation and consensus at the end of the negotiation. For the same negotia-
tor, the similarity between his or her mental models pre-negotiation and post-
negotiation shows how much his or her mental model changed: the more simi-
larity, the less change. We used [1 – QAPr] to calculate mental model change.
Liu et al. 281
Figure 2 provides samples of mental models illustrating change and conver-
gence from pre- to post-negotiation.
Social and epistemic motivation. We measured concern for face (CFF)
using the 11-item scale from Cheung et al. (1996), with both Chinese and
English versions three to seven days before the negotiation. We measured
need for closure (NFC) using a 12-item instrument originally developed in
English (Neuberg, Judice, and West, 1997). Based on methodological guide-
lines provided by Brislin (1986), it was translated into Chinese and back-
translated by bilingual translators to ensure semantic equivalence between the
two versions. Cronbach’s alpha for concern for face and need for closure in
Study 1 (N = 294) was .83 and .79 overall, respectively, and above .75 in any
subgroup.
Negotiation outcomes. All pairs reached agreement. We measured two
joint outcomes. First, the economic outcomes of the negotiation came from
the payoff structure built into the Cartoon negotiation; we calculated a percent-
age of each pair’s joint gains against the potential maximum gains (Liu, Chua,
and Stahl, 2010). Second, we used a three-item measure for individual
Figure 2. Sample pre- and post-negotiation mental models for buyer and seller in Cartoon
Negotiation.
282 Administrative Science Quarterly 57 (2012)
satisfaction with the negotiation, including satisfaction with the negotiation pro-
cess, outcome, and expectation for future relationships (Oliver, Balakrishnan,
and Barry, 1994; Liu, Chua, and Stahl, 2010); Cronbach’s alpha for the overall
sample was .81. We aggregated satisfaction within dyads for all dyad-level
analyses. In dyad-level analyses, we treated need for closure, concern for face,
satisfaction, and joint gains as additive constructs, while consensus was mea-
sured directly at the dyad level (Kozlowski and Klein, 2000).
Other measures. We used the 57-item Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz,
1992) to confirm that American and Chinese participants were culturally differ-
ent. This survey measures six culture-level values (embeddedness vs. auton-
omy, hierarchy vs. egalitarianism, mastery vs. harmony) and ten individual-level
values (self-direction, conformity, power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation,
universalism, benevolence, tradition, and security) that can be clustered
into four higher-level values: self-transcendence, openness to change, self-
enhancement, and conservation. Values of Cronbach’s alpha for the ten
individual-level cultural values were above .78 for the whole sample as well as
for any subgroup: American same-culture, Americans in intercultural,
Americans in both same-culture and intercultural negotiation, Chinese in same-
culture, Chinese in intercultural, Chinese in both same-culture and intercultural,
both Americans and Chinese in same-culture and intercultural negotiations.
We collected demographic information on age, gender, education, and work
experience. All of these measures were completed by participants before the
negotiation. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics and intercorrelations
among variables involved in the study at the individual level.
Validation of Assumptions and Cultural Profiles
Before testing our hypotheses, we tested core assumptions regarding cultural
differences and mental models. First, we expected that Chinese and American
samples would vary on cultural values. Consistent with that expectation, we
found significant differences between our American and Chinese samples
along values of the Schwartz inventory, showing that the sample embodied
theoretically expected cultural differences used to justify our hypotheses.
Specifically, Americans value self-transcendence (mean
American
= 5.89, S.D. =
1.75; Mean
Chinese
= 3.71, S.D. = 1.03; 13.45, d.f. = 292, p < .01) and openness
to change (mean
American
= 5.52, S.D. = 1.76, mean
Chinese
= 3.98, S.D. = 1.25;
t = 8.75, d.f. = 292, p < . 01) more than Chinese, while Chinese value conser-
vation (mean
American
= 3.09, S.D. = 1.63; mean
Chinese
= 5.82, S.D. = 2.81; t =
9.36, d.f. = 292, p < .01) and self-enhancement (mean
American
= 5.09, S.D. =
2.05; mean
Chinese
= 5.67, S.D. = 2.11; t = 2.32, d.f. = 292, p < .05) more than
Americans. In addition, we compared Chinese negotiators based in the U.S.
with Chinese negotiators based in China, because those in the U.S. might have
already become more westernized. We did not find statistically significant dif-
ferences in values between these two sets of Chinese study participants.
Next, we tested the assumption that there were different patterns in
American and Chinese negotiators’ mental models. We did so by comparing
the centrality of elements within American vs. Chinese mental models.
Centrality captures the extent to which an element is seen by the individual as
Liu et al. 283
related to many other elements in the mental model. In social networks, for
example, centrality summarizes the connections through which individuals or
entities interact or otherwise act interdependently; a node’s high degree of cen-
trality is an indicator of its structural influence. In the case of a negotiator’s
mental model, more centrality signifies a concept’s relative importance in his or
her understanding of the negotiation. For our purpose, degree centrality is mea-
sured by the number of links from the central element to other elements. In
other words, an element is central when it stands at the center of attention
and has a large number of connections with other elements (Scott, 2000). In an
analysis of variance on measures of pre-negotiation centrality, we found signifi-
cant differences in element centralities between American and Chinese mental
models. Specifically, the centralities of ‘‘price’’ (the distributive issue) and
‘‘competition’’ were both generally higher among American than Chinese nego-
tiators (p = .07 and .02, respectively). The centrality of ‘‘runs’’ and ‘‘financing’’
Table 2. Overall Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations for Study 1 (N = 294)*
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Gender (female) 36%
2. Age 35.23 6.32 .03
3. Education 3.86 .59 .07 .10
4. Work experience 8.07 5.85 .12 .23
••
–.09
5. Need for closure 3.60 .83 –.08 .02 .11 .10 (.79)
6. Concern for face 5.05 1.02 .05 –.05 .08 –.08 .07 (.83)
7. Price/episode 22.15 5.07 .02 –.05 .00 .09 .08 .07
8. Financing terms 18.32 4.31 –.07 .02 –.05 .03 .09 .08 .47
••
9. Runs/episode 17.01 5.73 .02 .04 .02 –.02 –.08 .08 –32
••
.31
••
10. Second cartoon (Strum) 10.92 4.88 .03 –.01 .02 .00 –.03 .10 .19
•
.08
11. Rating 12.76 3.33 .03 .04 .01 .05 –24
••
–.03 –.07 .08
12. Profit of my company 21.00 4.15 –.06 .05 –.03 .05 .15
•
.14
•
.41
••
.25
••
13. Competition 30.21 6.61 –.05 –.05 .03 –.04 .12
•
–.09 .45
••
.33
••
14. Win-win 29.48 7.53 .04 .01 –.06 .01 .07 .17
•
.25
••
.32
••
15. Relationship with other party 21.17 6.26 .03 –.03 .02 .01 –.04 .15
•
.11
•
.18
•
16. My emotions 3.86 1.02 –.07 –.08 .03 .01 .05 .07 –.02 –.03
17. Other party’s emotions 3.17 1.02 –.06 –.08 .04 .04 .02 .06 –.01 .03
18. Individual mental model change .58 .33 .05 .08 .04 .04 –39
••
.22
••
.15
•
.15
•
19. Satisfaction 5.09 3.39 .06 –.05 –.05 –.07 –.06 –.07 .12
•
–.08
Variable 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
10. Second cartoon (Strum) .11
•
11. Rating .23
••
.09
12. Profit of my company .15
•
.16
•
.22
••
13. Competition .22
••
.12
•
.28
••
.42
••
14. Win-win .17
•
.21
••
.31
••
–.19
•
–.20
••
15. Relationship with other party .15
•
.17
•
.30
••
–.18
•
–.21
••
.38
••
16. My emotions –.01 .02 .03 –.03 –.03 .02 .02
17. Other party’s emotions –.01 –.01 .03 –.02 –.03 .02 .02 .11
•
18. Individual mental model change .18
••
.17
••
.08 .13
•
.12
•
.17
••
.20
••
.12
•
.15
•
19. Satisfaction –.08 .11
•
.05 .14
•
–.15
•
.15
•
.17
•
.08 .08 .15
•
(.75)
•
p < .01;
••
p < .001.
* Numbers on the diagonal, in parentheses, are Cronbach’s alphas. Variables #9–19 are mean centrality scores
obtained from UCINet for post-negotiation mental models.
284 Administrative Science Quarterly 57 (2012)
(the integrative or trade-off issues), ‘‘second cartoon’’ (the common value
issue), ‘‘win-win,’’ and ‘‘relationship with the other party’’ were generally higher
among Chinese than Americans (p = .06, .06, .05, .07, and .03, respectively).
Finally, we revisited our assumption that the mental models of negotiating par-
ties progressing toward mutually satisfactory outcomes (that is, those that reach
an agreement) are more similar at the end of the negotiation than at the begin-
ning. Using all 147 dyads in the main study, we found that the average buyer-
seller similarity is smaller before the negotiation (QAPr = .20, p < .05) than after
it (QAPr = .33, p < .01). The difference is significant (Z = 5.82, p < .01), indicat-
ing that mental models tend to shift in the direction of convergence in negotia-
tions in which agreement is likely, validating the assumptions embedded in figure
1, above. We also assumed that cross-cultural negotiators have mental models
that are more different than same-culture negotiators. Supporting this assump-
tion, we found that mental model similarity between cross-cultural negotiators
was lower than mental model similarity between same-culture negotiators at the
beginning of the negotiation (.15 vs. .32, Z = 6.01.p < .01).
Results
We predicted that need for closure (NFC) would have a negative effect on men-
tal model change (hypothesis 1a). Table 2 showed that at the individual level,
the correlation between NFC and individual mental model change is –.39 (p <
.001). Because negotiators were nested in dyads, we also examined the
correlation between NFC and individual mental model change separately for
buyers (–.39, p < .001) and sellers (–.37,p < .001). These results support
hypothesis 1a.
To test hypothesis 1b, that negotiators with higher need for closure would
reach less consensus, we examined the relationship between aggregated dya-
dic need for closure and dyad consensus, using regression. That is, within each
dyad, we combined the need for closure scores for buyer and seller. Results
are shown in table 3. These tests show that controlling for pre-negotiation men-
tal model similarity, dyadic need for closure has a negative relationship with
consensus (b = –.26, p < .01), suggesting less consensus for high need for
closure negotiators, supporting hypothesis 1b.
1
Testing hypothesis 1c, dyadic-
level need for closure showed a negative effect on joint gain (b = –.22, p <
.01) and dyadic satisfaction (b = –.21, p < .01), providing support for this
hypothesis.
To test hypotheses 1d and 1e, we examined interactions between aggre-
gated need for closure and cultural condition (same-culture vs. intercultural)
using regression analysis. As shown in table 3, the interaction effect is
1
Because our data contain both individual-level and dyad-level variables, we also tested the hypoth-
eses using two alternative methods: (1) multilevel analyses with the program Mplus (Croon and van
Veldhoven, 2007; Lu
¨
dtke et al., 2008; Muthe
´
n and Muthe
´
n, 2010) and (2) clustering individual-level
variables into high (one S.D. or more above the mean ) or low (one S.D. or more below the mean)
categories and then comparing differences between the corresponding dyad-level variables. The
first alternative analysis allowed us to predict consensus (a dyad-level dependent variable) with
individual-level need for closure. The second alternative analysis allowed us to compare the degree
of consensus of dyads that were both high on need for closure, both low on need for closure, and
high/low on need for closure. These alternative analyses were conducted for all hypotheses, involv-
ing both need for closure and concern for face, with results from both methods consistent with the
main analyses in all cases. Details are available upon request from the authors.
Liu et al. 285
significant for consensus (b = –.19, p < .01), joint gain (b = –.17, p < .01), and
dyadic satisfaction (b = –.18, p < .01), showing that the negative effects of
need for closure on consensus and joint gain are stronger for intercultural nego-
tiations, supporting hypotheses 1d and 1e. Using the Aiken and West (1991)
method, we illustrate these interactions in figure 3, which shows that NFC is
more predictive of consensus and joint gains when negotiation is intercultural
rather than same-culture.
To test hypotheses reg arding concern for face (CFF), we performed analy-
ses that parallel those reported for need for closure. Table 2 showed that at
the indivi dual level, the correlation between concern fo r face and individual
mental model change is significant a nd positive (.22, p < .001). The correla-
tion betwe en concern for face and indi vidual mental model change is also
positive l ooking just at buyers (.26, p < .001) and sellers (.23, p < . 0 01).
These resul ts provide support for hypothesi s 2a. The bo ttom half of table 3
shows that controlling for pre-negotiation m ental model similarity, dyad-level
concern for face is positively relate d to consensus (b = .23, p < .01),
supporting hyp othesis 2b. Dyad-level concern for face shows positive effects
on joint gain (b = .21, p < .01) and dyadic satisfaction (b = .25, p < .01 ),
supporting hyp othesis 2c.
To test hypotheses 2d and 2e, we examined interactions between aggre-
gated concern for face and cultural conditions (same-culture vs. intercultural).
As table 3 reveals, the interaction term is significant for consensus (b = .15,
p < .01), joint gain (b = .16, p < .01), and dyadic satisfaction (b = .18,
Table 3. Regression Analysis of the Interactive Effects of Need for Closure (NFC), Concern for
Face, (CFF) and Cultural Conditions in Study 1
*
Consensus Joint Gains Aggregated Satisfaction
H1b H1d H1c H1e H1c H1e
Variable Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2
Pre-negotiation similarity .23
•
.22
•
.25
••
.21
••
.22
••
.22
••
Aggregated NFC –.26
•
–.23
•
–.22
•
–.21
•
–.21
•
–.20
•
Cultural conditions –.18
•
–.18
•
–.16
•
Agg. NFC x Cultural conditions –.19
•
–.17
•
–.18
•
DR
2
.09
••
.07
••
.07
••
Adjusted R
2
.17 .26 .16 .23 .16 .23
D.f. 2, 145 4, 143 2, 145 4, 143 2, 145 4, 143
H2b H2d H2c H2e H2c H2e
Variable Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2
Pre-negotiation similarity .23
•
.22
•
.25
••
.21
••
.22
••
.22
••
Aggregated CFF .23
•
.21
•
.21
•
.22
•
.25
•
.23
•
Cultural conditions –.17
•
–.17
•
–.17
•
Agg. CFF x Cultural conditions .15
•
.16
•
.18
•
DR
2
.08
••
.06
••
.07
••
Adjusted R
2
.15 .23 .16 .22 .16 .23
D.f. 2, 145 4, 143 2, 145 4, 143 2, 145 4, 143
•
p < .01;
••
p < .001.
* Cultural conditions were coded 0 = intracultural and 1 = intercultural.
286 Administrative Science Quarterly 57 (2012)
p < .01), showing that the positive effects of concern for face are stronger for
intercultural negotiations, supporting hypotheses 2d and 2e. These interactions
are illustrated in figure 4, revealing that concern for face is more predictive of
Figure 3. Interactions of need for closure (NFC) and cultural conditions in Study 1.*
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Low High
Dyadic Need for Closure
Consensus
Intercultural
Intracultural
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Low High
Dyadic Need for Closure
Joint
Gains
Intercultural
Intracultural
* The grap hs are pl otted fo r ‘‘ l ow’’and ‘‘ h i g h’’dyad ic esti mat es of N F C. The y axis of joi n t gai ns shows the per-
centage of the maxi mum jo i nt ga i ns in the Cartoon negot iati o n , wh ich is $5.1m i l l i o n .
Figure 4. Interactions of concern for face (CFF) and cultural conditions in Study 1.*
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Low High
Consensus
Intercultural
Intracultural
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Low High
Dyadic Concern for Face
Joint
Gains
Intercultural
Intracultural
* The graphs are plotted for ‘ ‘ low’’and ‘‘hig h’’ dyadic estimates of CF F . The y axis of joint gains shows the per -
centage of the maxi mum jo i nt ga i ns in the Cartoon negot iati o n , wh ich is $5.1mi l l i o n .
Liu et al. 287
consensus and joint gains when negotiation is intercultural rather than within
the same culture.
Study 1 showed support for our main hypotheses, namely, that although
cross-cultural negotiations present challenges for consensus building, there are
important conditions that moderate these effects. As hypothesized, need for
closure exacerbated difficulties in consensus building, yet concern for face atte-
nuated difficulties in consensus building, and this was more pronounced in
intercultural negotiations. We conducted a second study to assess the general-
izability of the patterns we found in Study 1. We sought to demonstrate that
the effects and interactions theorized and found using the Cartoon simulation
in Study 1 were not confined to one particular context and scenario. This is par-
ticularly important in cross-cultural research when there could be rival hypoth-
eses accounting for the results, including differential reactions to the task,
experimenters, and measures (Gelfand, Raver, and Ehrhart, 2002).
STUDY 2
Participants and Procedures
We used a modified version of the Alpha Beta Robotics negotiation (Gladwin,
Weiss, and Zerkin, 2003) in the U.S. and China with graduate students who
had similar profiles and negotiation experience as those in Study 1. Table 1,
above, provides descriptive statistics on the sample. The simulation is a con-
tract negotiation between company Alpha in the U.S. and company Beta in
China over robotics used to produce batteries in electric cars. There are four
issues to be negotiated: technology transfer and royalty are distributive issues;
volume and models are integrative issues. We chose this simulation for three
reasons. First, the roles in Alpha Beta incorporate cultural stereotypes, provid-
ing a priming approach that differs from the measurement approach to cultural
values in the first study. The priming materials asked Chinese participants to
behave and communicate in a collectivist, indirect, and high-context way;
American participants were asked to behave and communicate with an indivi-
dualistic, direct, and low-context approach. Second, similar to the Cartoon
negotiation in Study 1, the multiple issues to be negotiated provide cognitive
complexity and hence suitable opportunities to gauge variance in mental mod-
els. Third, there is a higher probability for impasse in this negotiation, allowing
us to compare differences in mental models between those who reached
agreement and those who did not. In the intercultural negotiation, we assigned
Chinese graduate students with less than three years of experience in the U.S.
(similar to the Chinese intercultural participants in Study 1) to the Beta role, and
Americans who were born in the U.S. to the Alpha role.
Measures
We used the same measures for need for closure, concern for face, mental model
change, consensus, and satisfaction as in Study 1. For mental models, we asked
participants to draw an open-ended concept map, and we also used the paired
judgment technique. Participants made paired judgments of 10 elements, four spe-
cific to the Alpha Beta simulation, and six general elements in informational, rela-
tional, and emotional categories that surfaced in the pilot study. For simulation-
specific elements, we replaced the five elements in the Cartoon negotiation used
288 Administrative Science Quarterly 57 (2012)
in Study 1 with the four issues negotiated in Alpha Beta: (1) Technology transfer,
(2) Royalty, (3) Volume, and (4) Models. The six general elements were (5) Win-
win,(6)Competition, (7) Profit of my company, (8) Relationship with the other
party, (9) My emotions, and (10) Other party’s emotions. All participants created an
open-ended concept map and performed paired judgments both before and after
the negotiation. The QAP correlations between concept map and paired judgment
were .65 before the negotiation and .71 after the negotiation, providing reliability
evidence for our measure of mental models in this context and scenario.
2
As in
Study 1, we used estimates from paired judgments in hypothesis testing. About
one third of the pairs did not reach agreement (7 out of 19 pairs in the American
intracultural condition, 6 out of 18 pairs in the Chinese intracultural condition, and 7
out of 18 pairs in the intercultural condition). The negotiation outcome variable was
whether or not the dyad reached agreement; we compared the mental models
between those who reached an agreement and those who did not; agreement
was treated as a dichotomous variable in analyses.
Results
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for variables in this
study. At the individual level, the correlation between need for closure and indi-
vidual mental model change was –.42 (p < .01). Because negotiators were in
dyads, we computed the correlation between need for closure and individual
mental model change separately for buyers (–.45,p < .01) and sellers (–.39,
p < .01). These results support hypothesis 1a.
3
The regression analysis
reported in table 5 shows that controlling for pre-negotiation mental model
similarity, aggregated dyadic need for closure has a negative effect on consen-
sus (b = –.15, p < .05) and dyadic satisfaction (b = –.16, p < .05), supporting
hypotheses 1b and 1c. We also find via logistic regression an effect of aggre-
gated need for closure on the dichotomous agreement/impasse outcome (odds
ratio = .63, Wald statistic = 2.69, p < .05). An odds ratio smaller than 1 indi-
cates a negative effect, supporting hypothesis 1c.
Table 4 shows that at the individual level, the correlation between concern
for face and individual mental model change is .29 (p < .01). Once again, we
also computed the correlation between concern for face and individual mental
model change separately for buyers (.31, p < . 01) and sellers (.27, p < . 01).
These results support hypothesis 2a. Controlling for pre-negotiation mental
model similarity, regression analyses in the bottom half of table 5 show that
aggregated dyadic concern for face has a positive effect on consensus (b = .16
p < .05) and dyadic satisfaction (b = .18, p < .05), supporting hypotheses 2b
and 2c. We also find via logistic regression an effect of aggregated concern for
face on the dichotomous agreement/impasse outcome (odds ratio = 3.78,
Wald statistic = 3.72, p < .05). An odds ratio larger than 1 indicates a positive
effect, lending further support to hypothesis 2c.
2
To calculate a QAP correlation between concept maps and paired judgments, concept maps are
first converted into matrices with each element coded as 0 (no link drawn in the map between a
pair of concepts) or 1 (link present). In paired judgment matrices, each element is the number
between –4 and + 4 provided by the participant for that concept pair.
3
We conducted the same two alternative analyses as in Study 1, and the results again produced
patterns similar to those reported in the text.
Liu et al. 289
Next, we examined interactions between dyadic need for closure and the
cultural conditions to test hypotheses 1d and 1e. As table 5 shows, the nega-
tive effects of dyadic need for closure on consensus (b = –.16, p < .05) and on
aggregated satisfaction (b = –.12,p < .05) are stronger for intercultural negoti-
ations, supporting hypotheses 1d and 1e. In logistic regression, the negative
effect of dyadic need for closure on reaching agreement is stronger for intercul-
tural than for same-culture dyads (odds ratio = .06, DX
2
= 3.85, Wald statistic =
3.92, p < .05), further supporting hypothesis 1e.
Last, we examined interactions between dyadic concern for face and the
cultural conditions to test hypotheses 2d and 2e. Regressions in table 5 show
that the positive effects of dyadic concern for face on consensus (b = .13, p <
.05) and on aggregated satisfaction (b = .15, p < .05) are amplified for intercul-
tural negotiations, supporting hypotheses 2d and 2e. In logistic regression, the
positive effect of dyadic concern for face on reaching agreement is amplified
Table 4. Overall Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations for Study 2 (N = 110)*
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Gender (Female) 47%
2. Age 31.82 7.51 .05
3. Education 3.36 .53 .03 .11
4. Work experience 7.30 7.85 .03 .27
••
–.09
5. Need for closure 3.52 .76 –.02 .03 .11 .10 (.73)
6. Concern for face 5.38 1.65 .05 –.05 .06 –.08 .07 (.76)
7. Technology 12.22 4.35 .03 –.05 .03 .07 .05 .06
8. Royalty 10.67 3.91 –.04 .02 –.04 .03 .09 .08 –.31
••
9. Models 15.70 6.29 .00 .04 .05 –.02 –.08 .06 –.32
••
–.20
•
10. Volume 16.53 6.82 .03 –.01 .03 .00 –.03 .11 .19
•
.16
•
11. Profit of my company 17.95 7.26 –.06 .05 –.03 .08 .18
•
.16
•
.41
••
.27
••
12. Competition 15.23 5.18 –.06 –.05 .03 –.06 .15
•
–.12 .43
••
.30
••
13. Win-win 12.82 3.91 .05 .01 –.05 .03 .06 .18
•
.25
••
.29
••
14. Relationship with other party 12.95 4.26 .06 –.03 .02 .01 –.07 .17
•
.15
•
.17
•
15. My emotions 3.24 1.05 –.07 –.08 .05 .02 .07 .08 –.03 .03
16. Other party’s emotions 3.07 1.02 –.06 –.08 .05 .05 –.05 .07 –.03 .02
17. Individual mental model change .52 .27 .05 .08 .02 .04 –.42
••
.29
••
.15
•
.16
•
18. Satisfaction 3.97 1.38 .06 –.05 –.05 –.08 –.08 –.07 .16
•
–.07
Variable 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
10. Volume .13
•
11. Profit of my company .13
•
.18
•
12. Competition .24
••
.15
•
.33
••
13. Win-win .15
•
.17
•
–.17
••
–.27
••
14. Relationship with other party .15
•
.14
•
–.16
•
–.22
••
.35
••
15. My emotions –.03 .03 –.05 –.05 .15
•
.07
16. Other party’s emotions –.03 –.02 –.03 –.03 .03 .05 .15
•
17. Individual mental model change .17
•
.16
•
.15
•
.15
•
.21
••
.16
•
.16
•
–.04
18. Satisfaction –.06 .15
•
.15
•
–.09 .15
•
.16
•
.16
•
.08 .17
•
(.72)
•
p < .05;
••
p < .01.
* Numbers on the diagonal, in parentheses, are Cronbach’s alphas. Variables #7–10 are mean centrality scores
obtained from UCINet for post-negotiation mental models.
290 Administrative Science Quarterly 57 (2012)
for intercultural dyads (odds ratio = 2.11, DX
2
= 5.37, Wald statistic = 5.02,
p < .05), further supporting hypothesis 2e.
DISCUSSION
Our research investigated consensus building in intracultural and intercultural
negotiations and found that individual motivations amplify or diminish cultural
barriers to consensus building by enabling or limiting change in mental models
in different partner combinations and cultural contexts. Among both American
and Chinese negotiators, we found that a common psychological mechanism—
the epistemic motivation of need for closure—hindered change in mental mod-
els, consensus building with the other party, and the achievement of higher
joint outcomes. Another common psychological mechanism—the social moti-
vation of concern for face—facilitated change in mental models, consensus
building with the other party, and the achievement of higher joint gain. Given
the greater divergence of negotiators’ mental models in cross-cultural negotia-
tions, compared with same-culture negotiations, the detrimental effect of need
for closure on consensus in mental models and negotiation outcomes is more
pronounced in cross-cultural negotiations. Similarly, compared with within-
culture negotiations, the beneficial effect of concern for face is more pro-
nounced in cross-cultural negotiations than same-culture negotiations. Put dif-
ferently, the difference in mental models that occurs in cross-cultural
negotiations is more easily overcome when the parties are higher in concern
Table 5. Regression Analysis of the Interactive Effects of Need for Closure (NFC), Concern for
Face (CFF), and Cultural Conditions in Study 2
*
Consensus Aggregated Satisfaction
H1b H1d H1c H1e
Variable Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2
Pre-negotiation similarity .18
•
.16
•
.17
•
.16
•
Aggregated NFC –.15
•
–.11
•
–.16
•
–.13
•
Cultural conditions –.15
•
–.12
•
Agg. NFC x Cultural conditions –.16
•
–.12
•
DR
2
.06
•
.05
•
Adjusted R
2
.09 .15 .10 .15
D.f. 2, 53 4, 51 2, 53 4, 51
H2b H2d H2c H2e
Variable Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2
Pre-negotiation similarity .18
•
.16
•
.17
•
.16
•
Aggregated CFF .16
•
.12
•
.18
•
.15
•
Cultural conditions –.15
•
–.13
•
Agg. CFF x Cultural conditions .13
•
.15
•
DR
2
.05
•
.03
•
Adjusted R
2
.10 .15 .08 .11
D.f. 2, 53 4, 51 2, 53 4, 51
•
p < .05.
* Cultural conditions were coded 0 = intracultural and 1 = intercultural.
Liu et al. 291
for face but is amplified when the parties are higher in need for closure. Hence,
we have shown that the effects of culture on negotiation are dynamic, not uni-
form or absolute. The effects of cultural differences depend on the adaptability
of the individuals’ mental models, which is driven by epistemic and social
motives.
These findings inform theory on the impact of culture on negotiations and
other aspects of work and organizations (Morris and Gelfand, 2004; Morris,
2011). One stream of research treats demographic variables as proxies for cul-
tural orientation and culture’s influence on negotiators’ behavior as stable and
static (e.g., Graham, Mintu-Winsatt, and Rodgers, 1994; Paik and Tung, 1999;
Graham and Lam, 2003). Much of the cross-cultural research in the last few
decades falls into this camp, providing insights into cultural variations in persua-
sion styles (Johnstone, 1989), perceptions of uncertainty (Gudykunst and
Nishida, 1984), and holistic versus analytic thinking styles (Nisbett, 2003). In
the field of conflict and negotiation, scholars have found cultural differences in
judgment biases and constellations of strategies (e.g., Gelfand and
Christakopoulou, 1999; Tinsley, 2001).
The influence of culture depends not just on an individual’s nationality or the
socialization process that went along with it, however, but also on his or her
epistemic and social motives, which moderate how much that socialization will
manifest in current behavior, particularly in intercultural interactions. Culture’s
influence is not uniform across its members or consistent in each individual
across situations. An alternative approach, dynamic constructivism, treats cul-
ture as a series of situational cues that stimulate or constrain culturally conven-
tional cognition and behaviors (Gelfand and Realo, 1999; Hong et al., 2000;
Gelfand et al., 2001; Morris, Menon, and Ames, 2001; Fu et al., 2007; Savani
et al., 2011). While previous studies have shown that need for closure moder-
ates the effects of cultural norms on a single decision (e.g., Fu et al., 2007), our
work advances the dynamic constructivist approach in two ways. First, our find-
ings provide evidence that social motivation (concern for face) as well as epis-
temic motivation (need for closure) can alter the impact of cultural differences
at the negotiation table. Second, we show that epistemic and social motives
affect not just reactions in a given moment, but also the degree to which peo-
ple are able to change their mental models over time and how those changes
are driven by social interactions across the bargaining table. Thus we capture
more fully the dynamic aspects of the dynamic constructivist theory of culture.
To be sure, knowing mean differences between people from different cultures
is important. Nonetheless, this dynamic constructivist approach highlights the
insight that, in practice, the factor most important for effective cross-cultural
negotiation is not necessarily how different the two sides are, but whether the
people coming to the table are open to changes in perceptions of the situation.
This work has important practical implications. It suggests that successful
cross-cultural negotiation can be fostered by the selection of people to negoti-
ate who, despite fully understanding their home culture, are open to change.
Those who have greater concern for face, and perhaps other social motivations
that can now be studied, are more attentive to the other side and more willing
to adjust their views. Those who are more concerned with confirming existing
world-views are more likely to have inflexible mental models, yielding lower
joint outcomes in integrative bargaining situations. Moving from trait-based
need for closure and concern for face, there may also be ways to trigger these
292 Administrative Science Quarterly 57 (2012)
motives. Triggers that enhance need for closure, such as time pressure (Fu
et al., 2007), should be avoided, while triggers of concern for face or other pro-
social motivations could be encouraged. Cultural intelligence is a prime factor
that could affect consensus building through such epistemic and social
motives. Imai and Gefand (2010), for example, found that cultural intelligence is
related to lower need for closure and higher prosocial motivation and that cul-
tural intelligence helped negotiators achieve integrative sequences and higher
outcomes in intercultural negotiations. The current research suggests that cul-
tural intelligence, through its effects on epistemic and social motivation, likely
helps negotiators to build consensus as well.
Mental models, as holistic cognitive networks, manifest the dynamic interac-
tions between individual motivations and cultural conditions. Change in mental
models in intercultural conditions suggests cultural ‘‘adaptation’’—psychologi-
cal and behavioral adjustment that people make to fit into a new cultural
environment—that helps people overcome cultural barriers in international
encounters (Weiss, 1994; Adair, Okumura, and Brett, 2001). Evidence from
studies of business meetings (Francis, 1991; Pornpitakpan, 1999) and leader-
member interactions (Thomas and Ravlin, 1995) show that when people make
adaptations in intercultural settings, they are more likely to build mutual attrac-
tion, liking, and trust. Research on cultural intelligence (Earley and Ang, 2003)
proposes that individuals with an ability to adapt to other cultures will be more
successful in international encounters. The advanced ability to adapt cross-
culturally is associated not only with knowledge of other cultures, but with will-
ingness to engage in new cultural circumstances and to proactively adapt one’s
behaviors in negotiation (Imai and Gelfand, 2010; Friedman et al., 2012). Our
finding that need for closure constrains but that concern for face encourages
change in mental models carries both theoretical and practical implications for
understanding critical triggers of intercultural adaptation.
Our studies also contribute to research on epistemic and social motives in
negotiation. Extending De Dreu and colleagues’ (De Dreu, Koole, and
Oldersma, 1999; De Dreu and Carnevale, 2003; De Dreu, 2004; De Dreu,
Nijstad, and van Knippenberg, 2008) research, we show that need for closure
is related to consensual validation processes in negotiation. In particular, we
show that need for closure impedes consensus because parties are less apt to
change mental models and are less able to achieve convergence in mental
models through negotiation. Similarly, we extend previous research on social
motives, which often focuses on prosocial motivation—the idea of wanting to
help the other party as a factor that enhances joint outcomes and produces
other benefits. We show that other aspects of social motives—such as con-
cern for face, which focuses simply on caring how one is viewed by others—
create an openness of mind, regardless of actual inclinations to help the other
side.
We also introduce a novel methodology to the study of cross-cultural negoti-
ations. A unique element of the research reported here is the use of network
analysis, similar to the methods used by Van Boven and Thompson (2003) and
Olekalns and Smith (2005), to map the structure of relationships between ele-
ments of negotiators’ mental models. This is among the first efforts to inte-
grate cognition, motivation, and cultural processes into a comprehensive
network approach in negotiation contexts.
Liu et al. 293
Limitations and Future Research
Although we hypothesized and measured mental models both before and after
negotiations, we cannot draw a causal conclusion about the relationship
between consensus and negotiation outcomes, as the vision and expectation
for an agreement may have influenced the construction of consensus. Drolet,
Larrick, and Morris (1998) and Epley, Caruso, and Bazerman (2006) showed
that under some conditions, taking the other side’s perspectives hinders joint
effectiveness in integrative negotiation. Future research could manipulate the
consensus-building process while measuring mental models at more points in
time during a negotiation process to tease out the causal relations between
consensus building and negotiation outcomes.
One limitation to the approach we have taken is that, consistent with the
dominant approach to mapping mental models, we identified and measured
links between concepts but did not specifically theorize about whether the
negotiator saw the direction of a relationship between concepts to be positive
or negative. Because UCINet takes into consideration both the strength and
the direction of ties when mapping negotiators’ mental models, we believe
such information has enhanced the predictive power of similarity in mental
models. In the next iteration of research on mental models, it would help to spe-
cifically hypothesize and investigate how positive and negative ties influence
the patterns of negotiators’ mental models and negotiation outcomes. It is also
possible that the patterns of results we found reflect the rather general nature
of the mental models’ elements. Future studies could study more specific and
nuanced mental model elements and their consequences in negotiation.
Although we measured the content of mental models based on an extensive
pilot study, we did not allow more idiosyncratic elements to surface in the main
study. Even with constrained sets of elements in mental models, we were still
able to find significant patterns of variance across motivations and cultural con-
texts in two scenarios. Given that, we regard our findings as a conservative test
of the role of change in mental models. Future research may further investigate
and categorize the highly individualized elements in mental models, in conjunc-
tion with the consensual types of elements in mental models.
Another limitation is our reliance on simulation studies. Although our lab-based
bargaining tasks provide a rich context for examining same-culture and intercultural
negotiations with complex issues, they have the limitation of being just two
instances of negotiation interactions, and some mental model elements were una-
voidably constrained specifically to fit the scenarios. Further research on negotia-
tors’ mental models could investigate mental models using additional scenarios
with different structural features, such as situations in which power is asymmetri-
cal. Studies are also needed that draw from field observations of practicing negotia-
tors and that examine the cultural influences of mental models, exploring the emic
and etic aspects of negotiators’ cognition and behavior in cross-cultural settings.
We acknowledge that for the intercultural negotiations, Chinese negotiators
may have been somewhat acculturated to the U.S. We also recognize that this
sample does not represent the general population in terms of education level
or international exposure (of Americans or Chinese), and this is a limitation.
Nevertheless, we believe that our sample does resemble the training and spe-
cialty profile of many practitioners in real-world intercultural negotiations, who,
after all, are self-selected to be active players of international exchange. We
294 Administrative Science Quarterly 57 (2012)
are aware through personal experience in international negotiation training that
many practitioners engaging in intercultural negotiations usually come to the
encounter having had some sort of cultural training or experience. Given the
highly competitive nature of a contemporary multicultural, internationally experi-
enced workplace, it may be unusual to find someone with minimal cultural
experience or knowledge placed in this kind of negotiation. Moreover, the idea
that our Chinese participants may have been partly acculturated to the U.S.
would only weaken our results—finding differences between cross-cultural and
same-culture negotiations despite this methodological constraint should pro-
vide more, not less, confidence in our findings.
Lastly, in this research, as in much of the work in the area of international
negotiation, we have assumed that one-on-one negotiation is the natural unit of
negotiation analysis for both Chinese and American negotiators. This assump-
tion may be culturally biased, and its use in studies of intercultural bargaining
may prime participants toward a competitive mindset. Depending on the situa-
tion, however, group negotiations may also activate perceptions about ingroups
(one’s own negotiation team) and outgroups (the other negotiating sides), elicit-
ing a competitive frame. To clarify these cultural assumptions, future research
can use qualitative methods to survey individuals’ beliefs and suppositions
about which conditions compose a ‘‘typical’’ or ‘‘logical’’ negotiation unit (indi-
viduals versus groups) from participants in different cultural contexts.
Despite these limitations, we have provided evidence that mental models
matter and that differences in mental models are especially impactful in cross-
cultural negotiations. Moreover, cultural constraints that may limit the conver-
gence of mental models in negotiations depend on negotiators’ motivations.
We have learned that these special challenges are influenced by characteristics
of negotiators that reflect social and epistemic motivations. Those high in con-
cern for face, a form of social motivation, are more likely to overcome the chal-
lenges of mental model convergence in cross-cultural settings, while those
high in need for closure, a form of epistemic motivation, are likely to be less
able than others to overcome cultural barriers in negotiation. An avenue for
future exploration is the even more interesting situation in which intra-dyadic
motives conflict, such as when a negotiator high in need for closure and one
high in concern for face find themselves across the table from each other.
We’ve just begun to explore such complexities.
Acknowledgments
We thank Frank Flynn, Kathleen McGinn, Ed Rigdon, and the anonymous reviewers for
helpful comments, and Claudia Dale, Townsend Bailey, Yulan Han, Jason Stansbury,
and Wei Cai for research assistance. Financial support for this research was provided to
Leigh Anne Liu in the form of dissertation grants from Vanderbilt University and faculty
summer research grants from Georgia State University’s Robinson College of Business,
in part by the U.S. Army Research Laboratory and the U.S. Army Research Office under
grant number W911NF-08-1-0144 to Michele Gelfand, and in part by the National
Natural Science Foundation of China under grant number 70872002 to Zhi-Xue Zhang.
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Authors’ Biographies
Leigh Anne Liu is an associate professor of international business at Georgia State
University’s Robinson College of Business, Atlanta, GA 30302-3989 (e-mail:
laliu@gsu.edu). Her research explores culture’s dynamic influence on negotiation, con-
flict, relationship, identity, and paradox. She received her doctorate in organizational
behavior from Vanderbilt University.
Ray Friedman is Brownlee O. Currey Professor of Management at Vanderbilt
University’s Owen Graduate School of Management, Nashville TN 37203 (e-mail:
ray.friedman@vanderbilt.edu). His research looks at conflict, negotiation, diversity, cul-
ture, and Chinese management. He received his doctorate in sociology from the
University of Chicago.
Bruce Barry is Brownlee O. Currey Jr. Professor of Management at Vanderbilt
University’s Owen Graduate School of Management, Nashville, TN 37203 (e-mail:
bruce.barry@vanderbilt.edu). His research looks at ethical decision making, social influ-
ence, negotiation, freedom of expression at work, and corporate political behavior. He
received his doctorate in organizational behavior from the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill.
Liu et al. 303
Michele J. Gelfand is Professor of Psychology and Distinguished University Scholar
Teacher at the University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742 (e-mail: mgelfand@umd
.edu). Her research focuses on cross-cultural social and organizational behavior, conflict,
negotiation, revenge, and forgiveness. She received her doctorate in psychology from the
University of Illinois, Urbana Champaign.
Zhi-Xue Zhang is a professor of organization management at the Guanghua School of
Management, Peking University, Beijing, China 100871 (e-mail: zxzhang@gsm.pku.
edu.cn). His research examines team process, negotiation, conflict management, leader-
ship behavior in the Chinese context, and cross-border management. He received his
doctorate in social psychology from the University of Hong Kong.
304 Administrative Science Quarterly 57 (2012)
