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DEFENDING THE RIONI VALLEY: CIVIC RESISTANCE
TO CORPORATE TAKEOVER IN WESTERN GEORGIA
Lasha Tchantouridzé
is article presents an example of civic resistance to the
construction of a giant hydropower plant (HPP) in the Republic
of Georgia. Extractive economic and political institutions,
the primary sources for spreading poverty and conict in
the developing world, survive and prosper because they are
supported and encouraged by international entities such as
multinational corporations, international nancial institutions,
and the governments of wealthy nations. e new hydropower
plant threatened the Rioni Valley in western Georgia with
large-scale ecological destruction and the extraction of natural
and human resources. e opposition movement to the plan
unied civic groups that represented the broadest political
representation in the country. e civic opposition successfully
halted an international megaproject through joint eort and by
employing peaceful means only.
INTRODUCTION
e neoliberal model of economic production is not sustainable because
of the growing global population and increased competition worldwide
for the means of production. Our planetary resources cannot support the
ever-increasing thirst for energy, land, water, and raw materials. Predictions
for 2030 suggest that global consumption is likely to increase over 2016
PEACE RESEARCH
e Canadian Journal of Peace and Conict Studies
Volume 54, Number 1 (2022): 1-28
©2022 Peace Research
PEACE RESEARCH | Vol. 54, No. 1 (2022) F3F2 Defending the Rioni Valley
economic institutions are critical for determining whether a country is poor
or prosperous, it is politics and political institutions that determine what
economic institutions a country has.”2 e Namakhvani HPP examined
in this article was prepared and organized in secrecy by the government of
Georgia under the alleged goals of “economic development” and “foreign
investment.” However, the government could not have developed this
massive project without assistance from powerful international bodies:
two multinational corporations, foreign governments, and international
nancial institutions. In this case, the multinational corporations, which
enjoy strong political backing by their governments, have struck a deal with
the government of Georgia to take advantage of extractive institutions in
that country in concocting a billion-dollar project funded with loans from
international nancial institutions.
is article also reports on the valiant and successful eort by groups of
citizens in the Republic of Georgia to resist the attempts of the multinational
triangle of interests intent on seizing signicant portions of a major river
and its valley in western Georgia. e government of Georgia’s vision of a
gigantic HPP in western Georgia was planned in a secret deal with Norwegian
and Turkish corporations backed by their respective governments and the
blessing of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). e deal was premised
on a considerable international loan to be repaid by the Georgian taxpayer,
with projected meager economic returns to the country.
For most of the twentieth century, HPPs were considered the only source
of renewable energy. Since their inception in the late nineteenth century,
thousands of HPPs have been built worldwide, with the industrialized
world leading in both numbers and size of the dams. Most of the massive
hydroelectric dams in North America and Europe were constructed in the
1920s and the 1930s, and then after World War II. However, new dam
development slowed down signicantly in the late 1960s and ceased
altogether in the United States in the 1970s, and in Europe in the 1980s.3
Initially, new large HPPs stopped being planned because dam constructions
had already used all the prime locations.
However, by the late twentieth century, researchers started to understand the
immense cost that giant HPPs imposed on society and the environment. In
addition to the greater-than-anticipated cost of operationalizing HPPs, these
dams disrupt river ecology, cause substantial deforestation, damage aquatic
estimates by 35 percent for food, 40 percent for water, and 50 percent for
energy.1 As populations’ incomes rise, the food types that are in higher
demand—dairy, meat, sh, sugar—have an especially signicant impact
on energy and water. According to experts, the interconnectivity between
trends in climate change and resource scarcity further amplies this impact,
as climate change can reduce agricultural productivity by a sizable margin.
Unsurprisingly, poor and developing countries and their resources represent
easy targets for governments of wealthy countries, international nancial
institutions, and multinational corporations. Acting in concert with
corrupt or incompetent national governments of developing countries, the
neoliberal model of economic production creates a fertile ground for full-
scale exploitation of populations of poor and developing countries and their
natural resources. Such alliances of corrupt or incompetent government
ocials, international nancial institutions, and foreign corporations act as
triangles of exploitation that have immense power to seize natural resources
in their quest of furthering their economic and political goals.
is article argues that it is possible for civic groups to use peaceful means
to halt the development of massive destructive projects primarily designed
to extract natural resources for the benet of multinational corporations.
e case presented in this essay is civic resistance to the construction of a
giant hydropower plant (HPP) in western Georgia. Extractive economic and
political institutions, the primary sources for spreading poverty and conict
in the developing world, survive and prosper because they are supported
and encouraged by international entities such as multinational corporations,
international nancial institutions, and governments of wealthy nations. In
Why Nations Fail, Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson explore the
failure of certain states as a function of extractive institutions dominant in
the failed states over extended periods. Institutions or regularized patterns of
behaviour are the foremost determinants of whether or not nations develop
economically and politically, their geographic location, demography, culture,
and so on being secondary factors. By design, extractive institutions exclude
the majority of people in a given state from political and economic decision
making and income distribution, as opposed to inclusive institutions that
enable the broadest layers of society possible in economic production and
political governance. In contrast to theories that explain inequality through
geography, culture, or ignorance, Acemoglu and Robinson advance an
institutionalist explanation for world inequality. ey argue that “while
PEACE RESEARCH | Vol. 54, No. 1 (2022) F5F4 Defending the Rioni Valley
1978. e Enguri Dam boasts the second-highest concrete arch dam in the
world, with a height of 271.5 metres. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev
ordered this immense project in 1961, and it was not fully completed until
1987. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly independent
Georgia inherited this massive dam with no funds or resources to maintain
it. To keep the Enguri Dam intact and its HPP operational, Georgia had to
borrow more than USD$150 million from 1999 to 2011.13 Currently, there
are more than 140 hydropower plant projects in Georgia in various stages
of development.14
BACKGROUND TO THE NAMAKHVANI HPP PROJECT
e idea for a giant HPP on the Rioni River of Georgia was rst proposed in
the 1970s. e Soviet government of Georgia commissioned a multi-agency
feasibility study for such a project, which took more than fteen years to
complete. e study’s conclusions were far from encouraging, and Soviet
authorities rst delayed the project and then never had a chance to develop
it after the Soviet Union collapsed. e end of Soviet rule in Georgia has
not changed much in the minds of those who think that gigantic HPPs are
a key to a bright and prosperous future, with former communist ocials
aided and pushed along by Western nancial institutions and multinational
corporations. Even though almost all Western countries stopped building
gigantic hydropower plants in the 1970s and 1980s, former Soviet states
and developing countries in general have continued to construct enormous
HPPs that cause wholesale destruction of vast ecological areas. Giant cascade
dams, including those built in the Soviet Union, have similarly caused the
environment great damage.15 Furthermore, evidence suggests that more
than 90 percent of the dams built in the 1930s were more expensive than
anticipated. Currently in the developing world, an estimated 3,700 dams,
large and small, are in various stages of development—many of them
supported and promoted by Western investors or donors.16 According to
the conclusions of the study “Sustainable Hydropower in the 21st Century,”
large-scale HPPs in the developing world are not sustainable because of the
very high costs of operation, maintenance, and external damage.17
e rst feasibility study for constructing a two-step HPP in the upper
Rioni Valley was approved by the USSR’s Ministry of Energy in 1972.
Subsequently, Soviet authorities commissioned a group of scientists in
and land biodiversity, aect the food systems near them, displace many
of thousands of residents and deteriorate sanitary conditions, agriculture,
water quality, and public health. HPPs also release greenhouse gasses and
contribute to climate change.4 Furthermore, all hydroelectric dams have a
nite lifespan. e older they get, the more likely they will collapse either
because of their aging materials or the accumulation of sediment behind
the dam impoundment. Collapsed dams can cause signicant economic
damage,5 ooding,6 dispossession,7 and loss of life.8 Because of the danger
they represent and environmental damage they cause, thousands of dams
have been removed in North America and Europe. Repairing a small dam
can cost three times that to remove it—an essential factor in the growing
trend to remove them.9
At the same time, there are thousands of HPP projects in various stages of
completion in the developing world. Developing countries push through
giant HPP projects to increase their share of renewable energy in the global
mix according to sustainable development goals. ese hydropower projects
aect the vital river basins around the world, including the Amazon, the
Congo, and the Mekong. e projects create enormous ecological disruptions
in these regions, with extensive hydrologic consequences manifesting as
sharp declines in available freshwater as a result of dam construction. Socio-
economic problems are also extensive, primarily for those resettling because
of dam construction. According to the World Commission on Dams, 40 to
80 million people were displaced in the twentieth century without having
been relocated properly.10 In addition, the living conditions and food
security of communities living downstream are often severely aected by
the loss of sheries or ood recession agriculture or other natural resources.
According to a conservative estimate, 472 million people worldwide have
been negatively aected downstream from dams.11
e rst hydropower plant in Georgia was built in the late nineteenth
century to provide energy for the Russian emperor’s favourite vacation spot.12
However, a variety of projects started to develop soon after the country
was annexed by Soviet Russia in 1921. e Soviet government was keen
on creating all sorts of power plants following Vladimir Lenin’s GOELRO
slogan, according to which communism was equal to “Soviet power plus
the electrication of the whole country.” Georgia’s mountainous geography
attracted Soviet dam construction, and while most of the HPPs were small
or medium sized, the rst giant HPP, Enguri, was put into operation in
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increased, not to mention the phenomenon of climate change, which
may be the most problematic issue in this project. It would be hard, if
not impossible, to include climate change impacts in such models because
climate change eects are typically unpredictable. It is worth emphasizing
the fact that no study on the ecological, economic, or social impact of the
Namakhvani project has been conducted since the early 1980s: both the
government of Georgia and its international partners have continuously
relied on the old Soviet studies in their assessment of the Namakhvani
HPP’s impact on the geography, climate, ecology, and population of western
Georgia. Enka, a multinational corporation from Turkey that “won” the
Namakhvani contract, has produced precious little of its own research,
primarily relying on supercial assessments.26
Acemoglu and Robinson’s theory of world inequality in Why Nations Fail
centres on national economic and political institutions as the prime cause
for poverty and underdevelopment in impoverished countries. Indeed,
political and legal institutions can inuence economic development and
national prosperity a great deal—if through nothing else, at least through
property rights that are the bloodlines of the capitalist mode of production.27
However, contemporary political and economic institutions should not be
considered within purely national contexts. ey are genuinely aected and
inuenced by much larger international institutions, some of which make
the economic development of emerging countries their primary business. In
the case of Georgia’s Namakhvani project, these international institutions
played a crucial role by supporting and advancing a half-baked idea for a
gigantic cascade HPP that could have severely damaged the country’s natural
environment and economy.
THE INVOLVEMENT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
e international corporations that currently hold a licence from the
government of Georgia to build a large HPP in western Georgia did not
initially divulge their true identities and intentions. In 2017, the tender
to construct the Namakhvani HPP was awarded to a group of Norwegian
entrepreneurs who had created a shell company called Clean Energy Group,
backed by undisclosed investors.28 e Turkish multinational corporation
Enka used a Norwegian shell company to obtain the rights to Namakhvani
Georgia to study the Namakhvani project and examine the sustainability
issue alongside other aspects of constructing two large-scale dams in this
part of the country. As a result of research that demonstrated problems
with the two-step cascade design, including the potential to trigger massive
landslides and ood some of Georgia's most fertile agricultural lands,18
by 1983 the HPP design had changed to a three-step cascade design. e
Soviet government commissioned relevant studies, which resulted in 125
volumes of technical documentation. e construction of the three-step
cascade started in 1988 but was halted in 1989 as the Soviet Union began
to experience a series of political crises, and old ideas and projects were
re-examined.19 e total area allocated for the construction of the giant
HPP was 1,743.13 hectares, of which 924.71 hectares were supposed to be
ooded, including 296.94 hectares of prime agricultural land.20 e cascade
project was supposed to have two separate HPPs—the Lower Namakhvani,
rated for 333 MW (megawatts), and the Upper Namakhvani, rated for 100
MW. e total surface area for both reservoirs was expected to be 6.1 square
kilometres.21
e area that would be aected has high-quality ancient viticulture
producing a unique vine appellation, Tvishi, which would be lost, and tea
plantations—it is the northernmost tea growing area in the world. is area
of the Rioni Valley is relatively densely settled with private farms and gardens,
most of which would be destroyed. e cattle breeding farms would be
aected as well, because the project imposes a prohibitively high cost upon
the cattle farmers in the form of biomass processing facilities.22 e project
could also trigger a return of malaria in Georgia, which was eradicated by
1970. In addition, scientists preparing the feasibility project in the 1980s
identied at least twenty-seven archeological and historical monuments in
the region, most of which would be lost.23 A more recent assessment has
shown that the cascade dams threaten a critically endangered sh species in
the Rioni River.24 e Black Sea beaches near Poti would be aected as well
as the city itself as a result of decreased delivery of hard deposits by the Rioni
River to the seaside area.25
It should be noted that the Soviet-period feasibility study, now more than
forty years old, used 1970s Soviet standards for health, water, and climate
change assessments. e 1970s study concluded that water quality, public
health, and climate would not be impacted much. However, since then
the standards of assessing threats to public health and water quality have
PEACE RESEARCH | Vol. 54, No. 1 (2022) F9F8 Defending the Rioni Valley
government of Georgia resurrected several old HPP projects, among them
that of Namakhvani, and asked the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) to assess the Namakhvani project and its feasibility.34
In 2006, USAID looked at almost every aspect of the Rioni River HPP
project, focusing on its commercial feasibility. In all other facets, the USAID
analysis relied on the research done by Soviet Georgian researchers in the
1970s and the 1980s. e USAID study concluded that if the Namakhvani
project were to cost USD$600 million, it would only be protable and
sustainable if electricity were to go primarily for export, or if the domestic
electricity price charged to consumers increased. e American analysis
estimated output by a cascade of three dams, since the Soviet research had
concluded that a two-dam cascade would cause massive landslides.35 In
December 2009, Georgia’s National Movement government signed an
agreement with an international consortium to build the Namakhvani
HPP for $800 million. South Korea’s energy company KEPCO led the
consortium, which included the construction company SK E&C, also from
South Korea, and Nurol of Turkey.36 In early 2012, the consortium collapsed
after Korea’s KEPCO pulled out of the consortium, ostensibly due to the
problems associated with the Great Recession. Later that year, the Georgian
government invited the Korean corporations to resume the Namakhvani
agreement, but they declined.37 It is important to note that although
more ecologically and economically sound means to generate renewable
energy, such as wind turbines and solar power batteries, have existed for
some time now, development of the Namakhvani project has been pushed
since 2006.38 Technology for both wind and solar power generating plants
is improving, and as they improve, they get more ecient and aordable.
Furthermore, Georgia can develop other alternative sources of energy, for
instance, through wave power or geothermal plants.
e most questionable aspect of the deal has been the fact that the Turkish
multinational Enka, under the cover of a Norwegian shell company, acquired
a large swath of Georgian territory for ninety-nine years. Prior to Georgia’s
gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Georgia and Turkey
were not as amicable as they are today. From the time Turkish tribes showed
up in Asia Minor in the eleventh century, Georgia has experienced several
major Turkish invasions. Turkish attacks on Georgia were particularly
severe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the Ottoman Turks
dominated western Georgia. Incidentally, this is where the large swath of
HPP. e Norwegian shell company is aliated with the privately held
Norwegian company Norsk Mineral, identied as “the majority owner
in Clean Energy Invest.”29 Together with ocials from the Georgian
government, the Norwegian and Turkish corporations coordinated this act
to avoid additional questions from Georgian civil society.
According to the original contract, the Norwegian company owned a
stake in the project of at least 90 percent, the rest belonging to Enka, a
Turkish construction rm.30 Soon after winning the tender, however, this
arrangement changed diametrically: the Norwegian company “sold” its 90
percent stake to the Turkish multinational while keeping the other 10 percent
of the share. e project managers also subcontracted an Italian company to
develop an engineering design for the HPP.31 e Georgian government did
not raise objections to these developments and went along without asking
any questions about this remarkable change in the project’s ownership.
32Indeed, the ownership switch between two international corporations was
dramatic: Norway is far away from Georgia, while Turkey is a neighbour
that has historically contested the territory of western Georgia, where the
gigantic power plant was supposed to be built. Moreover, according to the
contract, the Turkish multinational, which the Turkish government strongly
backs, would own the upper valley of the Rioni River for ninety-nine years.
Rioni is the second-largest river in Georgia, the primary source of both
drinking water and an agricultural irrigation network. e largest river
in Georgia, the Mtkvari (Kura), which crosses Georgia from west to east,
originates in Turkey. e Norwegian-to-Turkish ownership change looked
even more suspicious since the contract details were condential and not
released to the public.33
e nearly forgotten giant HPP on the Rioni River, in the form of the
Namakhvani cascade, less than twenty-ve kilometres north of Georgia’s
second-largest city, Kutaisi, was resurrected soon after the National
Movement party came to power in Georgia in 2004. Under the National
Movement, Georgia upgraded its economic and political institutions to meet
the demands of a newly independent country, specically those governing
economic activities and investments. e Georgian government also started
to improve communications and transportation networks and initiated
signicant projects to modernize the country’s electricity production and
distribution. Once again, Georgia’s geographic location became attractive
to those who wanted to build and operate new HPPs. For this purpose, the
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Hydro-Québec inspected the Enguri Dam. ey found the dam in a state
of severe disrepair and dilapidation. To x the Enguri Dam problems, the
Georgian government had to borrow a massive amount for a developing
country that gets international aid every year. At the same time, its
population primarily survives due to large remittances from Western nations
and Russia.43
Many hydropower supporters argue that water is a renewable resource.
ey believe that it does not contribute to climate change and decreases
the consumption of coal, oil, and gas for power generation. is argument
is especially prevalent in Russia.44 However, it misses the point that there
is a dramatic dierence between giant and micro HPPs. e former inict
tremendous damage on the environment, while the latter cause only
minimum harm. Moreover, in Georgia’s case, the country is excessively
dependent on hydropower, while electricity from renewable resources such as
wind, solar, tide, is non-existent. e cost of the Namakhvani HPP project,
almost 1 billion dollars, has been justied with energy independence and
security in mind. However, Georgia could meet its energy independence
goals by developing wind and solar power farms capable of generating the
same amount of electricity for less money and much less damage to the
environment. As solar, wind, and tide power generation develops, the cost
per kilowatt of electricity decreases. On the other hand, the cost of generating
electricity through hydropower increased by 25 percent from 2010 to 2018.
At the same time, the cost for wind power per kilowatt electricity decreased
by 25 percent during the same period, while solar power became 76 percent
cheaper.45
Although wealthy Western nations do not approve of giant HPP development
within their national borders, especially near large metropolitan areas, the
same reluctance does not apply to developing countries. e Namakhvani
HPP construction was planned just north of Kutaisi, the largest city in western
Georgia and second-largest city in the country, in an area known for seismic
activity and in a river valley where there is signicant potential for massive
landslides because of partial deforestation. e approval and promotion of
like projects through such institutions as the International Monetary Fund
and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as well as
through various diplomatic activities, are justied with the buzz words of
“sustainable development,” “renewable energy,” “economic development,”
“cooperation,” “eradication poverty,” and so on. Many of these terms are
Georgian land Enka was supposed to get for ninety-nine years is located.
Turkey’s last acquisition of Georgian land was in 1921, when western
Georgia and Armenia were divided between Soviet Russia and the new
Turkish republic under the Treaty of Kars.39 Although it is not an ocial
position of the Turkish government, Turkish nationalists, especially those
of Georgian descent—among them the current President of Turkey Recep
Erdoğan—have been noted as having irredentist designs for southwestern
Georgia.40
Enka’s backdoor acquisition of the Namakhvani project happened under
opaque and suspicious circumstances. Oddities associated with the plan to
build a giant HPP in western Georgia did not end there. Enka also amended
and changed the original designs for the cascade of dams, including the
locations where the dams were supposed to be constructed.41 is change
was made without conducting detailed research or examining the impact of
the changed design on the environment, agriculture, soil, local communities,
aquatic or terrestrial ora, and fauna. When Georgian engineers drew the
original Namakhvani plans in the 1980s, the research took over fteen
years and 125 volumes to address all aspects of the HPP’s impact on the
environment and society. With tacit approval by the Georgian government,
Enka set all that aside and moved the dams’ location on the Rioni River
without ever producing anything that addressed the changes to the project.
Most crucially, Enka decided to build a two-dam cascade HPP instead of the
original three-dam design, even though the researchers in the 1980s warned
that such a design would trigger massive landslides.42 e switch from a
three-dam to a two-dam cascade was probably motivated by the desire to
save funds for construction, even though the project’s estimated cost had
increased by USD $250 million from the USAID’s 2006 assessment of $600
million for a three-dam project.
e government of Georgia should have anticipated that the Namakhvani
HPP carried signicant risks for the country and that the project would
trigger considerable resistance and opposition from civil society. Since
obtaining independence from the Soviet Union and gaining complete
control over its energy resources and infrastructure, Georgia has had bad
experiences with operating giant HPPs. During Soviet rule, Georgia’s most
notorious giant HPP was constructed on the Enguri River. is HPP boasts
a very tall and relatively narrow dam, erected in the 1970s, with the HPP
itself becoming fully operational in 1987. In the mid-1990s, engineers from
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precondition for this partnership to have legal standing.52 Around the
same time, the government of Norway opened its embassy in Georgia with
Ambassador Helene Sand Andresen in charge. She later played an active
role in promoting and supporting the Namakhvani HPP project, acting
more like a consortium ocial than an ambassador. e Turkish-Norwegian
consortium then worked to secure loans from the Asian Development Bank,
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Institute
of International Finance (IIF), with the government of Georgia serving as a
guarantor for the massive loans.
THE PEOPLE’S RESISTANCE TO THE PROJECT
Under the broad umbrella of societal opposition to the construction of
the Namakhvani HPP were three distinct groups: local residents, NGOs
representing various causes, and the religious right. e initial opposition to
Enka’s giant HPP project was organized by a small group of residents headed
by Varlam Goletiani, the son of a local priest. is group started protesting
in the early fall of 2020 in the location that was expected to be ooded.
Just as Enka was starting its construction work, some of the details of the
Namakhvani HPP project were published, which triggered the protests. e
group initially demanded that the project be reviewed and construction be
halted until the review was completed.53 is group of locals, known as the
Defenders of Rioni Valley, was soon joined by the second, broader group
of opponents to giant HPPs, represented through environmental activists,
NGOs, social-political movements, and informal organizations primarily
based in the capital city, Tbilisi.
e leading environmental NGO in Georgia opposed to Namakhvani
HPP’s construction and to the development of new giant HPPs has been
Green Alternative. From its founding in the mid-2000s, the organization’s
mission has been to develop and promote economically viable and socially
desirable development alternatives and to protect Georgia’s environment and
biological and cultural heritage.54 e Namakhvani project attracted Green
Alternative’s attention soon after the organization had started operations
in the second half of the 2000s. After the outlines of the contract between
the government of Georgia and Enka leaked out, Green Alternative began
to lobby the government and publicize the topic through the mass media.
Georgia’s Greens, or the Green Movement of Georgia, have been an active
borrowed from the UN document entitled “Transforming Our World: e
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”46 Even though projects like
Namakhvani have the opposite eect, it is very dicult for civil society to
counter the tides of such propaganda when national governments combine
forces with international economic institutions, and diplomats from wealthy
countries try to ram things through.
One more essential item missing in the discourse designed to promote and
justify giant HPPs is the question of fresh water. Water is a critically vital
resource, and this fact is especially pronounced in poor and developing
countries.47 According to the World Health Organization, water scarcity
impacts 40 percent of the world’s population, and “as many as 700 million
people are at risk of being displaced as a result of drought by 2030.”48 In
Georgia, 6 percent of the population has no regular access to fresh water,
while almost half of all families lack access to clean drinking water. In rural
and remote areas of Georgia, only one third of the population has regular
access to clean drinking water.49 e Rioni River is the most crucial source
of fresh water in western Georgia. It ows from the Caucasus Mountains
south and then southwest, feeds the important Vartsikhe reservoir, a
signicant source of fresh water for people, cattle, and agriculture in western
Georgia. By privatizing the upper valley of the Rioni River, the Georgian
government essentially was selling this vital source of fresh water in western
Georgia to a Turkish multinational corporation, which subsequently could
have controlled the ow of water downstream for economic gain or political
objectives.
Georgia’s state institutions have been oriented toward the extraction of
natural resources at a very high cost to environment and society; however,
they could not have achieved much without encouragement and support
from international institutions. e Georgian government presented the
Namakhvani HPP project to the IMF at least twice as a project designed
to alleviate poverty and promote economic development.50 e IMF did
not raise objections to the project, which gave the government of Georgia
the green light to attract potential investors. After Clean Energy Group, as a
cover for Enka, won the bid for the giant HPP, the government of Georgia
immediately accepted the latter as a legitimate contractor with a new
uncontested deal, which Georgia’s own Ministry of Justice recommended
against.51 Moreover, Georgia’s Ministry of Finance later revealed that it
had never authorized a partnership deal with Enka, which was a necessary
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join. Mainstream political leaders displayed snobbish attitudes toward the
protesters, many of whom were women or elderly or from rural Georgia.59
e most unusual opponent of the Namakhvani HPP was Georgia’s alt-right
group. A group of individuals loosely associated with the Alt-Info streaming
channel generally condemn Western values, globalization, and liberalism of
all sorts, and position themselves as proponents of an authoritarian style
of governance. Religious and extreme right-wing groups allied themselves
with those opposing the giant HPP by focusing primarily on the fact that
the government of Georgia had sold a large part of Georgian territory for
ninety-nine years to a Turkish corporation closely tied with the Turkish
government for what amounted to USD$5.60 In return, the promoters and
sponsors of the Namakhvani HPP charged their opponents with xenophobia
and Turkophobia. However, at the same time, the Namakhvani protests
received favourable coverage in leftist Turkish publications. A publication by
Turkey’s leftist union movement noted that Enka, a corporation of Turkish
oligarchs, was following a “familiar” scenario in Georgia.61 A Marxist
environmentalist group pointed out that although there were some anti-
Turkish slogans during the Namakhvani protests, the movement’s leaders
had distanced themselves from anti-Turkish and anti-Islamic sentiments
and stressed their friendship with the Turkish people. Further, Polen Ekoloji
accused Enka of participating in “a massacre of the environment” in Georgia
and employing predatory methods in Georgia by “using law enforcement
there and sponsoring manipulative rhetoric by the Turkish Embassy.”62 e
publication added that the sponsors and supporters of the giant Namakhvani
HPP were hiding behind familiar buzzwords such as “energy security” and
“energy independence.”63
Supporters of the Namakhvani project were alarmed that the resistance
movement had attracted groups from across Georgia’s political spectrum.
rough the eorts of green movements and social justice groups, by
October 2020 the protests around the Namakhvani project had spread and
started to attract the attention of national media outlets, including those
working primarily for the ruling party. From then on, the protest action
became impossible to ignore. A range of mass media outlets in Georgia that
usually sympathize with various political parties and follow their lead could
no longer ignore the mass protests around Namakhvani. At the same time,
most media outlets did not know how to understand and report on the anti-
HPP demonstrations—it was an unusual protest movement in Georgia. For
opponent of giant HPP projects for even longer. Founded during the Soviet
period of perestroika, the Greens started opposing the gigantic HPP plans in
the 1990s, when the government started discussions about resurrecting the
massive Hudoni HPP venture. Social networks and the internet in general
have played a crucial role in mobilizing resistance to the Namakhvani HPP
dams. In fall 2020, the group called For Justice in Energy Policy started
organizational eorts to support the Defenders of the Rioni Valley and
coordinate their actions with environmental movements and NGOs. e
group’s objective was to transform the small protest action by residents in
the Rioni Valley into a broader civil resistance movement,55 which they
accomplished by late 2020. is informal group, among other things,
organized fundraising eorts to support those manning protest lines in the
Rioni Valley. In addition to environmental groups, social justice groups as
well as those representing sexual minorities, scholars, and human rights
organizations have all opposed the Namakhvani HPP construction.
e third broad association of societal actors actively campaigning against the
Namakhvani HPP has been the religious right. Several clergy, among them
at least one bishop, have voiced their opposition to the Namakhvani project.
On 29 October 2020, religious activists organized a march to the place
designated for one of the dams, carrying a massive iron cross. Police tried
to intervene and stop the procession, but the activists prevailed and erected
the cross in its intended place.56 Right-wing religious groups also played an
essential role in organizing mass protests in western Georgia; specically,
in March 2021 protests rallies were held in Kutaisi. Once again, rally
participants carried crosses and national and religious symbols. According to
Nino Antadze and Kety Gujaraidze, traditional rituals laden with religious
symbolism could be signicant tools for resisting injustices observed in
energy production and distribution.57 e mass rallies, processions, and
protest vigils organized by these diverse groups from October 2020 to June
2021 attracted tens of thousands of participants from all over Georgia. In
May 2021, the protest rallies reached the country’s capital, Tbilisi, where
tens of thousands of people showed up for the rally just before Georgia’s
Independence Day on 26 May. Speakers included leaders of the Defenders of
the Rioni Valley and other activists, and striking workers and representatives
of other dissatised groups that warned against abusing natural resources.58
e Namakhvani protest in Tbilisi was highly unusual in that no mainstream
political party joined it, nor did the organizers of the rally invite them to
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to mislead the public and demonize the protest groups, the campaign
accelerated in spring 2021. Several pro-HPP round tables were organized,
some of them televised. Sympathetic news media interviewed supporters
of the project, some with technical backgrounds in HPP operations. Enka
prepared an animated segment for television broadcast depicting how HPPs
work.67 e campaign amplied the old message that giant HPPs are
absolutely safe, eradicate poverty, and promote progress and development.
rough the misinformation campaign, the Georgian government and
Enka spokespeople, among them the Turkish ambassador, tried to explain
the widespread civil resistance to their plan by invoking Russian inuence
and even Russian funding as the moving force in the protest movement.
ey used the presence of the religious right in the resistance movement,
alleging close collaboration between Orthodox Christian groups in Georgia
and Russia. Still, they could not convincingly explain why Russia’s religious
right would support Georgia’s Western-oriented liberals, environmental
groups, or those representing sexual minorities, all equally vocal opponents
of the Namakhvani HPP.
To remove the protesters’ camp from the Rioni Valley, the government
rst dispatched a couple of senior ocials to convince the Defenders of
the Rioni Valley that they were in grave error. In March 2021, Minister
of the Economy Natela Turnava and her ocials met the Defenders of the
Rioni Valley and valley residents. It did not take long to discover that the
government ocials had nothing but empty assurances and were utterly
unprepared for the meeting. Earlier in the Rioni Valley protests , the
government had resorted to a heavy-handed approach, sending police forces
to remove protesters camping on the public land just outside one of the dam
construction sites. A police force was also tasked with disrupting the vigil
kept by the Defenders. Police forcefully removed the vigil site and detained
several people in the process.68 Undeterred, the Defenders relocated near
the original protest site and continued their vigil. In order to keep the
protesting groups from the original vigil site, police erected a tall metallic
wall across the only road connecting northern and southern portions of the
valley, disrupting travel and commerce for the villagers residing beyond the
police barricade.69
e most signicant opportunity to break up the broad-spectrum opposition
to the Namakhvani HPP presented itself on 5 July 2021. is was the day a
small group of Georgian LGBTQ had planned to hold a March for Dignity
the rst time since the early 1990s, social and political groups ranging across
the political spectrum were united around the same socio-economic issue.
At the same time, none of Georgia’s numerous political parties, a couple of
them large and many small, managed to hijack the protest movement. e
ruling party, Georgian Dream, ended up rmly on the wrong side of the
debate with Enka and the Turkish and Norwegian embassies.
EFFORTS TO DEFEAT THE PEOPLE’S RESISTANCE
e anti-HPP protests that erupted in Georgia in the fall of 2020 were
themselves noteworthy and attracted national attention because societal
groups of very diverse interests and orientations were active participants.
Social and non-governmental groups not usually seen together found a unied
voice, which disturbed the Georgian government and the Namakhvani
project’s foreign backers alike. By presenting a united front, the opposition
to the Namakhvani HPP prevented the government and its foreign sponsors
from branding the group with a particular political moniker that would
have discredited them in the public’s eye. Instead, the government resorted
to using police force to break and subdue protests, specically the ones
organized by the local population of the upper Rioni Valley.
Both the Turkish ambassador to Georgia, Fatma Ceren Yazgan, and the
Norwegian ambassador Helene Sand Andresen, made public appearances
in support of the corporate entities from their respective countries that were
involved in the Namakhvani project. e Turkish ambassador took a rather
aggressive stance early in 2021 by admonishing the Georgian government
for not doing enough to suppress the protests and making veiled threats
toward those she saw opposing Turkish interests in Georgia.64 During the
protests, Yazgan exaggerated the scope and signicance of anti-Turkish
sentiments around Namakhvani and reported to the Turkish public through
Turkish mass media that the “anti-Turkish and anti-Islamic propaganda”
was continuing “in Georgia throughout this [2020] year,” which was
more than a slight exaggeration.65 A leftist Turkish publication noted that
throughout the protests, Ambassador Yazgan acted like an ocer of Enka
or an investment specialist for Turkish capitalists, while always “playing the
role of a victim.”66
Late in the fall of 2020, the government of Georgia, Enka, and their
supporters launched a nationwide misinformation campaign. Designed
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aecting Indigenous peoples’ rights, the protection of cultural heritage,
gender issues, the assessment and management of environmental and social
impacts, information disclosure, and engagement with local communities
and other stakeholders.76
Fearing a complete deadlock and collapse of the Namakhvani HPP project, in
early June 2021 the government of Georgia agreed to hold negotiations with
all the stakeholders, with two senior ocials from the European Energy Union
mediating the process.77 e negotiations ocially commenced in mid-June
with all the stakeholders joining except Enka. Enka has never satisfactorily
explained why it refused to join the mediation process. According to Green
Alternative, Enka saw the writing on the wall: it looked doubtful that the
European Energy Union would endorse the half-baked Namakhvani HPP
plan.78 e best outcome that the Turkish multinational could expect was a
directive to substantially revise the giant HPP construction plan. However,
that would also require more time and investment. e worst outcome for
Enka and the best outcome for the people of Georgia would have been the
mediators recommending not to pursue the project at all. In mid-September
2021, the Defenders of the Rioni Valley left the mediation process, citing
some unsatisfactory factors that they found increasingly dicult to accept.79
In their statement, the grassroots group noted that with respect to the pre-
conditions for the mediation process, the government had fullled only one
promise— dismantling the metal wall blocking the only road in the valley.
Nor had the government made any eort to ensure that Enka joined the
mediation process. Instead, the Turkish multinational was trying to operate
as if nothing was amiss around the Rioni Valley, staging attempts to enter
the construction sites that the protesters blocked.80
Finally, at the end of September 2021 Enka withdrew from the Namakhvani
HPP project, citing “long-standing breaches of contract and force majeure.”81
e contact between the government of Georgia and Enka, kept secret by
both sides but made public through the eorts of the investigative group
ifact.ge, listed many circumstances that would allow Enka to pull out,
among them “protests [that] threaten or hinder construction for more than
21 days within any six-month period.”82 Observers have noted that by not
joining the mediation process and behaving as if it was, in fact, attempting
to pursue the construction project from June to September 2021, Enka
positioned itself to drop the project and seek a monetary settlement with
the government of Georgia or, failing that, seek compensation through an
in the centre of Tbilisi. It is well-known that such demonstrations for the
rights of sexual minorities can trigger a violent reaction from right-wing
vigilante groups. Police usually show up in sizable numbers to separate
the opposing groups, but they did not on that day. e LGBTQ activists
postponed their rallies, but the right-wing extremists attended a rally
organized by the alt-right group in large numbers. A number of them started
to look for trouble, and after failing to locate anyone from the LGBTQ
community, they attacked the journalists covering the event. e attacks
took place simultaneously and appeared to be coordinated and organized in
advance. e few police ocers present tried to intervene, but they were not
equipped with riot gear and could not do much without proper support. As
a result of these attacks, at least fty-three journalists sustained injuries.70
Extremist groups participating in this mass disturbance also attacked oces
of one of the youth opposition groups and that of Tbilisi Gay pride. ese
violent acts by thugs aliated with the religious right broke the unity of the
anti-Namakhvani protest movement. e 5 July 2021 events signicantly
weakened the movement and undermined the credibility of the common
cause.71
e protest movement against the Namakhvani HPP was not the rst one
in recent Georgian history. Residents of the mountainous Svaneti region
have actively opposed another project for the giant Hudoni HPP since the
late 1980s. e local population has strongly resisted this on-again-o-again
HPP pattern with mass protests and rallies held as soon as the government
remembers to revive the Hudoni plan. Objection to this massive project,
seen as alien, destructive, and threatening to the local population, has
strengthened a sense of community and unity among the residents of this
remote and mountainous area of Georgia.72 In June 2021, the government
of Georgia reported that the developer of the Hudoni HPP, India’s Trans
Electrica, had abandoned it.73 Yet another new HPP in southwestern
Georgia, the Shuakhevi dam, completed in 2017, had its tunnels collapse
two months after its launch.74 e problem has since been xed and
the power plant reopened but without inspiring condence in the local
population.75 In the case of another giant HPP, called Nenskra, independent
review bodies found in September 2020 that two international nancial
institutions backing the project, the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and the European Investment Bank, had both violated their
own human rights and environmental protection policies, specically those
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weight to political and economic institutions but largely ignores civic ones.
e civic resistance to the Namakhvani HPP demonstrates that it is possible
to stop and reverse harmful activities by extractive institutions. Civic
institutions may not be able to change or reform the damaging behaviour
of extractive institutions, but they are capable of stopping or pausing their
destructive activities.
e Namakhvani case is noteworthy for the unique reason that made it
successful: it unied civic groups in Georgia from all points in the political
spectrum. e internet amplied their messages, specically through various
social networks, so the mainstream media could not ignore their eorts.
Once the problem achieved national prominence, the government was
forced to explain its policy, which it could not do reasonably and rationally.
At the same time, the enthusiastic propaganda machine funded by the
Turkish multinational Enka, together with the arrogant behaviour displayed
by the Turkish and Norwegian ambassadors toward Georgia, triggered
more questions and suspicions about the workings of this disgraceful
alliance between Georgia’s extractive institutions and their international
supporters. In the end, unwilling to become embroiled in a multi-year
losing battle with Western-oriented liberals, environmental activists, local
population, nationalists, the religious right, and right-wing extremists, the
Turkish multinational made the only reasonable decision: it abandoned the
Namakhvani HPP project.
international arbitration process.83
CONCLUSION
Destructive national institutions guided by false ideas or desires to extract
maximum resources from the environment and society are powerful
instruments of exploitation and environmental destruction, especially
since they are almost always aided and sponsored by international nancial
institutions and multinational corporations. However, they can be deterred
and even pushed back if civic groups manage to deploy a unied front across
the broadest political spectrum possible: this is what the popular resistance
to the Namakhvani HPP plan in Georgia demonstrated. e departure of
the Turkish multinational corporation marked a signicant victory for the
civic groups opposed to the predatory conditions of the destructive project.
Especially remarkable has been the resilient eorts by the grassroots group
Defenders of the Rioni Valley, which kept an uninterrupted vigil in the
valley for more than a year.
Scholars who identify institutions as primary obstacles to economic
development argue that institutions are powerful because they inuence
economic and political processes. Once established and entrenched in
societies, they are challenging to change. Indeed, institutions have lives of
their own, and their inuence often goes beyond what their original designers
may have intended. Both formal and informal institutions can contribute
to furthering underdevelopment, resource exploitation, and environmental
damage. Such processes may seem overwhelming if national extractive
institutions are supported and encouraged by powerful international ones.
e case of the Namakhvani giant HPP project demonstrates that national
economic and political institutions alone are not sucient to pursue hugely
destructive projects without powerful international support. e same is
likely valid for national extractive institutions in operation elsewhere in the
developing world.
e model oered by Acemoglu and Robinson, which singles out national
institutions as the reason for ongoing poverty and underdevelopment in
impoverished countries, has many merits. However, besides missing the role
of international institutions altogether, the model appears to be static. e
extractive institutions in this model are indenitely xed regardless of what
and where they are. e Acemoglu and Robinson model attaches much
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11 Brian D. Richter, Sandra Postel, Carmen Revenga, ayer Scudder
et al. “Lost in Development’s Shadow: e Downstream Human
Consequences of Dams,” Water Alternatives 3, no. 2 (2010): 14–42.
12 “Istoria” (in Georgian), Ministry of Energy of Georgia, http://energy.
gov.ge/energy.php?id_pages=54&lang=geo.
13 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, “Enguri Hydro
Power Plant Rehabilitation Project,” 1998, archived at https://web.
archive.org/web/20080527202746/http://www.ebrd.com/projects/
psd/psd1998/4304.htm.
14 Rusudan Panozishvili, “Fears Revive in the Villages of Shuakhevi
as One of Georgia’s Biggest Hydropower Plants Starts Operation,”
Bankwatch Network, 17 April 2020, https://bankwatch.org/blog/
fears-revive-in-the-villages-of-shuakhevi-as-one-of-georgia-s-biggest-
hydropower-plants-starts-operation.
15 V.V. Loginov and D.B. Gelashvili, “Vred vodnym biologicheskim
resursam vodokhranilishch Volzhsko-Kamskogo kaskada ot vozdeistiia
gidroelektrostantsiy” (in Russian), Printsipi ekologii 4 (2016): 4–25.
16 Matt McGrath, “Large Hydropower Dams ‘Not Sustainable’ in the
Developing World,” BBC, 5 November 2018, https://www.bbc.com/
news/science-environment-46098118.
17 Moran, Lopez, Moore, Müller et al., “Sustainable Hydropower in the
21st Century.”
18 USAID, Pre-Feasibility Review of Namakhvani Cascade of Hydro Power
Plants, prepared by CORE International, Inc. for USAID, 5 July 2006,
https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADK353.pdf.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid, 20.
21 “About Namakhvani,” Enka, https://namakhvani.enka.com/en/
about-us/about-namakhvani-hpp/.
22 USAID, Pre-Feasibility Review of Namakhvani Cascade, 22.
23 Ibid., 23
24 Pearly Jacob, “Critically Endangered Sturgeons reatened by Proposed
Dams in Caucasus,” National Geographic, 6 July 2021.
ENDNOTES
1 National Intelligence Council, as cited in “Climate Change and
Resource Scarcity,” PWC, in https://www.pwc.co.uk/issues/
megatrends/climate-change-and-resource-scarcity.html.
2 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: e
Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York: Crown Business,
2012), 40–43.
3 e World Commission on Dams, Plotiny y razvitie: Novaya
metodicheskaya osnova dlia priniatiia resheniy (in Russian) (Moscow:
WWF, 2009), https://wwf.ru/upload/iblock/6a0/cd_plotiny_i_
razvitie.pdf.
4 Emilio F. Moran, Maria Claudia Lopez, Nathan Moore, Norbert
Müller et al., “Sustainable Hydropower in the 21st Century,”
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America 115, no. 47 (5 November 2018): 11891–98, https://www.
pnas.org/content/115/47/11891.
5 Bureau of Reclamation, “Teton Dam History,” https://www.usbr.gov/
pn/snakeriver/dams/uppersnake/teton/index.html.
6 “China Blows Up Dam as Death Toll from Flooding
Rises,” Los Angeles Times, 20 July 2020, https://
www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-07-20/
china-blasts-dam-to-release-oodwaters-as-death-toll-rises.
7 American Rivers, “Dam Safety for Downstream Safety: Revisiting
the Oroville Dam Spillway Failure,” 4 March 2020, https://www.
americanrivers.org/2020/03/dam-safety-for-downstream-safety-
revisiting-the-oroville-dam-spillway-failure/.
8 Bureau of Reclamation, RCEM—Reclamation Consequence Estimating
Methodology: Dam Failure and Flood Event Case History Compilation
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Interior, June 2015).
9 Moran, Lopez, Moore, Müller et al., “Sustainable Hydropower in the
21st Century.”
10 World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: A New
Framework for Decision-Making, Report of the World Commission on
Dams (London: Earthscan, 2000).
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Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 12 October 2021, https://www.
rferl.org/a/treaty-of-kars/31505112.html.
40 Nick Danforth, “Turkey’s New Maps Are Reclaiming the Ottoman
Empire,” Foreign Policy, 23 October 2016.
41 Interview with Mr. Chipashvili.
42 USAID, Pre-Feasibility Review of Namakhvani Cascade.
43 “Georgia Remittances,” Trading Economics, https://tradingeconomics.
com/georgia/remittances.
44 On 5 October 2021, President Putin, in a government meeting,
among other things directed his ocials to pay due attention to coal-,
gas-, and oil-red power plants, stressing that he is a supporter of a
gradual approach in transitioning to renewable resources. As reported
on Russian TV channel Rossiya-24, 5 October 2021.
45 IRENA, Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2018 (Abu Dhabi:
IRENA, 2019).
46 Department of Economic and Social Aairs, “Transforming Our
World: e 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” United
Nations, 25 September 2015, https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda.
47 E.V. Gribova, “ekologicheski ustoychivoe upravlenie vodnymi
resursami” (in Russian), Strategia Razvitiia Ekonomiki 2, no. 287
(2015): 22–33.
48 “Drought,” WHO, https://www.who.int/health-topics/
drought#tab=tab_1.
49 Nastasia Arabuli, “atasobit ojakhi sufta sasmeli tsklis gareshe”
(in Georgian), Radio Tavisupleba, 8 April 2020, https://www.
radiotavisupleba.ge/a/30542335.html.
50 Government of “Georgia: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic
Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding,”
letter to the IMF, 4 December 2018, https://www.imf.org/external/
np/loi/2018/geo/120418.pdf.
51 Interview with Ms. Rekhviashvili.
52 “Namakhvanhesze kanonit gatvalitsinebuli daskvna gatsemuli ar
gvaqvs—nansta saministro” (in Georgian), Publika, 18 October
25 USAID, Pre-Feasibility Review of Namakhvani Cascade, 24.
26 Interview with Mr. David Chipashvili, Green Alternative, 22 September
2021.
27 Hernando de Soto, e Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs
in the West and Fails Everywhere Else (New York: Basic Books, 2003).
28 “Namakhvani,” Clean Energy Group, http://www.cleanenergygroup.
no/projects/.
29 “Georgia and Clean Energy’s Hydro Assets.”
30 “Georgia and Clean Energy’s Hydro Assets,” Clean Energy Invest,
2017.
31 “Namakhvani Hydropower (Georgia),” SP Studio Pietrangeli Consulting
Engineers, https://www.pietrangeli.com/cascade-hydropower-georgia.
32 Interview with Ms. Lela Rekhviashvili, PhD, For Justice in Energy
Policy, 3 September 2021.
33 “Details of Namakhvani Dam Cascade Tender Are Condential,”
ifact.ge, Tbilisi, 31 January 2017, https://ifact.ge/en/
details-namakhvani-dam-cascade-tender-condential/
34 USAID, Pre-Feasibility Review of Namakhvani Cascade.
35 Ibid.
36 “Turkish Company Cancels Hydro Electric Project in Georgia,”
Democracy and Freedom Watch, Tbilisi, 14 February 2012, https://
dfwatch.net/turkish-company-cancels-hydro-electric-project-in-
georgia-96699-5524.
37 “Georgia Says South Koreans May Bid for $800 Million
Hydro Plant,” Eco-Business, Singapore, 7 March
2012, https://www.eco-business.com/zh-hans/news/
georgia-says-south-koreans-may-bid-for-800-million-hydro-plant/
38 David Milborrow, “Energy Cost Analysis 2020: Wind Is Ready
for Zero-Subsidy Future,” Windpower Monthly, 31 January
2020, https://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1671659/
energy-cost-analysis-2020-wind-ready-zero-subsidy-future.
39 “More Turkey: e Soviet Border before and after the Treaty of Kars,”
PEACE RESEARCH | Vol. 54, No. 1 (2022) F27F26 Defending the Rioni Valley
64 Footage of the speech was leaked and posted on Youtube on 31 March
2021: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHjyleJGnPc.
65 “Türkiye’nin Tiis Büyükelçisi Yazgan: Türkiye ve Gürcistan 2020’de
dayanışma konusunda iyi bir sınav Verdi” (in Turkish), aa.com,
2 January 2021, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/turkiye-nin-
tiflis-buyukelcisi-yazgan-turkiye-ve-gurcistan-2020-de-dayanisma-
konusunda-iyi-bir-sinav-verdi/2096082.
66 “Gürcistan’da Tanıdık Ellerle Doğa Katliamı.”
67 Interview with Mr. Chipashvili.
68 “e Signatory Organizations Respond to the Dispersal of the Rally
of Opponents of the Construction of the Namakhvani Hydropower
Plant Using Police Force,” Social Justice Center, 15 November 2020,
https://socialjustice.org.ge/en/products/khelmomtseri-organizatsiebi-
ekhmaurebian-namakhvani-hesis-msheneblobis-motsinaaghmdegeta-
aktsiis-sapolitsio-dzalis-gamoqenebit-dashlas.
69 “Police Erect Iron Wall in Rioni Gorge amid Protests against
Namakhvani HPP,” agenda.ge, 4 April 2021, https://agenda.ge/en/
news/2021/984.
70 “Update: 53 Journalists Attacked by Right Wing Activists Protesting
Tbilisi Pride Day,” agenda.ge, 5 July 2021, https://agenda.ge/en/
news/2021/1856.
71 Interviews with Ms. Zhvania and Ms. Rekhviashvili.
72 Antadze and Gujaraidze, “e Role of Traditional Rituals in Resisting
Energy Injustice.”
73 “Economy Minister Talks Khudoni HPP Deal Withdrawal, Project
Fate,” Civil Georgia, 29 June 2021, https://civil.ge/archives/429766.
74 Tornike Mandaria, “Turkish Company Pulls Out of Controversial
Georgian Hydropower Project,” Eurasianet, 24 September 2021,
https://eurasianet.org/turkish-company-pulls-out-of-controversial-
georgian-hydropower-project.
75 Dean Brox, “Hydropower Watercourse Failures—Risks and Causes,”
TunnelTalk, March 2020, https://www.tunneltalk.com/TunnelTECH-
Mar2020-Hydro-waterway-collapses-causes-and-recommendations.
2021, https://publika.ge/namakhvanhesze-kanonit-gatvaliswinebuli-
daskvna-gacemuli-ar-gvaqvs/?fbclid=IwAR0OK7YK3uM8SxU2m35
plIj3Msh5nFADYR606jy04q8UJG5_f60sXzi93H0.
53 Interview with Ms. Liza Zhvania, Greens of Georgia, 19 August 2021.
54 “About Us,” Green Alternative (Tbilisi), https://greenalt.org/
who-we-are/.
55 Interview with Ms. Rekhviashvili.
56 “’jvris da karvebis agheba surt’—namakhvanis hesebis teritoriaze
politsiaa mobilizebuli” (in Georgian), netgazeti.ge, 30 January 2021,
https://netgazeti.ge/news/515471/.
57 Nino Antadze and Kety Gujaraidze, “e Role of Traditional Rituals
in Resisting Energy Injustice: e Case of Hydropower Developments
in Svaneti, Georgia,” Energy Research and Social Science 79 (September
2021), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102152.
58 “Massive Protest Against Namakhvani HPP Underway in Tbilisi,”
Civil Georgia, 23 May 2021, https://civil.ge/archives/421830.
59 Sopo Japaridze, “Dam Protests Demonstrate Bankruptcy of Georgian
Politics,” Eurasianet, 28 May 2021, https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-
dam-protests-demonstrate-bankruptcy-of-georgian-politics.
60 e government charged a symbolic price of 16 lari, equivalent
to about USD$5. “576 heqtari 16 larad, 99 tslit—rionis kheoba
namakhvanhesis kompanias gadastses” (in Georgian), Mtis Ambebi, 5
February 2021, https://mtisambebi.ge/news/ecology/item/1266-576-
beqtari,-16-larad,-99-xlit-rionis-xeoba-namaxvanbesis-kompanias-
gadaszes.
61 “Gürcistan’dan “tanıdık” bir rant hikayesi: ENKA Holding’in HES
projesine karşı direniş” (in Turkish), sendika.org, 24 May 2021,
https://sendika.org/2021/05/gurcistandan-tanidik-bir-rant-hikayesi-
enka-holdingin-hes-projesine-karsi-direnis-619488/.
62 “Gürcistan’da Tanıdık Ellerle Doğa Katliamı” (in Turkish),
Polen Ekoloji, 23 May 2021, https://www.polenekoloji.org/
gurcistanda-tanidik-ellerle-doga-katliami/.
63 Ibid.
PEACE RESEARCH | Vol. 54, No. 1 (2022)F28
php.
76 “Georgia’s Billion Dollar Dam Violates International Standards,”
Bankwatch Network, 9 September 2020, https://bankwatch.org/
press_release/georgia-s-billion-dollar-dam-violates-international-
standards
77 “Economy Minister: European Energy Union High-Ocial to Arrive
in Georgia,” First Channel, 5 June 2021, https://1tv.ge/en/news/
economy-minister-european-energy-union-high-ocial-to-arrive-in-
georgia/.
78 Interview with Mr. Chipashvili.
79 “sainitsiativo jgufma mivighet gadatskvetileba davtovot es formati” (in
Georgian) Info Imereti, 17 September 2021, https://infoimereti.ge/.
80 “Anti-Namakhvani HPP Group Quits Mediation,” Civil Georgia, 18
September 2021, https://civil.ge/archives/441009.
81 Mandaria, “Turkish Company Pulls Out of Controversial Georgian
Hydropower Project.”
82 “namakhvani: ras gvakarginebs da ras gvadzlevs?” (in Georgian),
ifact.ge, 7 February 2021, https://ifactimereti.ge/namakhvani/?fbclid
=IwAR0phF_2Fz2eGZsNwHkVBQ746x9iUr4A7c
BqUMyaSaVLgHVehNI9hWRKlnA.
83 Interview with Mr. Chipashvili.
