Study on Reliable and Secure Routing Protocols on Manet

Abstract

Objectives: This survey article intent presents knowledge into the security execution issues related to steering in wireless networking like MANET's (Mobile Ad hoc Networks). Findings: The mobile adhoc networks are exposed to attacks at all the layers especially at the network layer. This study specially provides a set of solutions for the issues of various attacks like attacks on modifications, impersonation attacks, fabrication and rushing attacks. A few methodologies are analysed for prevention, detection and reaction on various attacks by malicious nodes. The study of this article has examined the methodologies meant for fathoming the implementation issues like, changes in topology, vitality utilization of stations, delay, throughput, transmit time, packet transmission ratio, systems or nodes security and administration. Conclusion: This article presents a comparison table specifying that every protocol provides security only to a limited access. Thus, there is still a prerequisite of more secured belief that can deal with the diverse asking for necessities like reliable protocols for security issues of MANET.

Full text

Indian Journal of Science and Technology, Vol 9(14), DOI: 10.17485/ijst/2016/v9i14/84433, April 2016
ISSN (Print) : 0974-6846
ISSN (Online) : 0974-5645
* Author for correspondence
1. Introduction
e security plays an important role when considered
for communication networks of wired and wireless.
e mobile adhoc networks laying its face down to
dissimilar security attacks due to lack of decentralized
administration. e achievement of mobile adhoc
network (MANET) mainly depends on condence of
the users in security aspects. e severity of the attack
depends on midway distance of the malicious nodes
between the nodes, dropping of packets, misrouting of
packets, providing false information etc. Together the
scalability and mobility of the nodes shows the impact on
the routing protocols with respect to security issues. All
routing protocol requires protected data transmission.
e various security desires of mobile adhoc networks
are analogous like infrastructure less wireless networks
or wired networks. On the other hand, the MANET’s
characteristics introduce various challenges and
opportunities to achieve secure goals9,12,15, namely
condentiality, integrity, authentication, access control,
availability and non-repudiation which are dened as
follows:
Authentication: Authentication1 safeguards the
communication or data transmission which is carried no
more than by the endorsed nodes. e suspicious node
which is demonstrating as a authorised node in the region
of the network which does not hold proper authentication
and that can badly distress the transfer of data between
the nodes.
Availability: Availability is dened as providing or
processing the various services even the attacks are in
existence. It is anxious to state that the various network
Abstract
Objectives: This survey article intent presents knowledge into the security execution issues related to steering in wireless
networking like MANET’s (Mobile Ad hoc Networks). Findings: The mobile adhoc networks are exposed to attacks at all
the layers especially at the network layer. This study specially provides a set of solutions for the issues of various attacks
    
  
         
      Conclusion:
     
there is still a prerequisite of more secured belief that can deal with the diverse asking for necessities like reliable protocols
for security issues of MANET.
Keywords:  
Study on Reliable and Secure Routing
Protocols on Manet
K. Vijayakumar1*and K. Somasundaram2
1Department of Computer Science Engineering, Vignan Institute of Engineering for Women,
Karpagam University, Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh, India;
vijay_kollati@yahoo.co.in
2Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Vel Tech High Tech Dr. RR Dr. SR Engineering College,
#60, Avadi - Vel Tech Road, Vel Nagar, Avadi, Chennai - 600062, Tamilnadu, India;
soms72@.yahoo.com

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Study on Reliable and Secure Routing Protocols on Manet
services should be oered each and every time they are
required. e systems conrming the availability in
MANET’s must take necessary care of numerous attacks
like services denial attacks, energy consuming attacks,
and also malfunction of nodes.
Condentiality: Condentiality1,12 is used to safeguards
that the intended party only is being provided with the
information. e remaining nodes which are participating
during transmission except the sender, receiver can
only read the information. By applying data encryption
techniques we can attain high security.
Integrity: e non variation of the data’s originality while
transmission by any other malicious node in the network
can be conrmed and stated by using Integrity.
Non-Repudiation: is feature non disclaimer guarantees
that any node that sends and receives data cannot reject a
transmitted message15. is factor is also used in support
to identify and separate the node which is compromised
in the network.
In addition to the previous specied problems there are
certain other problems also need to be considered to
provide security like:
Collaboration and Fairness
Location Condentiality
Trac diversion avoidance
2. Security Attacks on Manets
In communication networks where there is no
infrastructure, security inspection is a great deal as every
hub is allowed to pass through in several heading such
that the concentrated protection in such systems is no
more available. Assaults on such type of network where
there is mobility, are comprehensively partitioned into
two noteworthy classications:
Active Attacks: In this kind of attacks4,15 the attackers try
to agitate the original functionality of the transmitting
and communicating devices in the network. is task is
carried by evaluating the information and changing the
packets which contain the information, denial of neither
services13 nor changing the path desired for routing by
modifying the route specifying path, count of hops in
a path etc. ese kinds of active attacks can easily be
identied and detected when compared with the other
opposite attacks called Inactive (Passive) attacks.
Passive Attacks: ese passive attacks4,15 can be stated as
more dangerous when compared to active attacks because
it will not change or vary the normal behaviour of network
whereas the attackers attempt to pay attention silently
or reclaims the important information available with
data packets transmitted. It is very dicult to identify
this behaviour of passive attack. ese kinds of passive
assaults26 are broadly divided into four main categories is
shown in. Figure 1.
Figure 1. Various Types of Attacks on MANET.

K. Vijayakumar and K. Somasundaram
Vol 9 (14) | April 2016 | www.indjst.org Indian Journal of Science and Technology 3
2.1 Attacks using Modication
Redirection with the help of altering the route sequence
number: To determine the superlative route between the
sources to the destination, the stations should continually
depends on various parameters like sequence number,
delay, hop count etc. ese parameters should be low
in value which species the chosen path is the best. In
this kind of attack, the trac in the network is under
misleading by the suspicious station by varying the count
of hops between the nodes to a least assessment than the
earlier least value.
Hop count alteration by redirecting: In these attacks the
hop count parameter is changed to a smaller value and
the packet trac is diverted towards the malicious node
which leads to a false path.
Source route alteration and causing attacks by DoS
(Denial of Service): e attacks by denial of service are
occurred by the entire demolition of the routing function
by denial of service. In this the attacker aects in such a
way that it neither drops the network trac nor it redirects
the data packets to an unknown destination or mislead to
a lengthy path to destination to create unwanted delay in
transmission.
Tunneling: ese are another type of attacks where more
number of nodes may co-ordinated to encapsulate and
then the messages are switched over among them through
active routing paths of data. By this event there is a chance
for a single or more than one node to short circuit the
regular stream of data ow by providing a false count for
the set of connections which is guarded by two colliding
attackers.
2.2 Attacks by Impersonation
Impersonation attacks can be caused by “Spoong”. In this
kind of attacks, malicious node will alter the IP or MAC
address for all the data packets departing from the node
and the address of one node can also be used by another
node. With the help of spoong, the malicious node be
able to modify the network topology or separate some
nodes from the remaining network.
2.3 Attacks Caused by Fabrication
Fabricating route error message: ese are the attacks
in routing protocol like on-demand, which is further
exceptional, which utilises link preservation to reclaim
the damaged path. At whatever point a node alters its
present location, the closest node proliferates mistake
information to alternate nodes expressing that this
specic way is no more accessible. By sending this kind
of error information, any station can be eortlessly le.
Broadcasting erroneous routes: In this category of
incursions, the attackers accomplish the path information
from the header of data packet and modify the routing
link. is will modify the path accumulation of nearby
node.
Attacks by overow of Routing table: In this type of
assaults, where attacker performs to develop paths to
other than active links. When the sucient paths have
been developed, new paths can be no more registered in
the routing cache.
2.4 Rushing Attacks
ese categories of incursion are also takes place in
routing protocol like on-demand. In this a request packet
for link establishment is send to determine the link
to the sink node. is activity is taken as advantage by
nodes to perform rushing attacks4 by sending the RREQ
message more regularly when compared with remaining
stations such that, the path together with the adversary is
identied.
3. Security Routing Protocols of
Manet
ere are dierent security conventions for MANET’s
which can be for the most part characterized into two
noteworthy classications namely prevention and
reaction upon detection.
Prevention: In this category, the attacking stations are
blocked in order not to start any further movements
by the protocols involved in routing. is method
requires encoding techniques to validate the integrity,
condentiality, non-repudiation of routing information.
Reaction upon Detection: Detecting attacks and Reaction
upon detection attacks procedure as the name implies will
nd any malignant node or movement of any suspicious

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Study on Reliable and Secure Routing Protocols on Manet
station in the wired or wireless communicating network
and take necessary action to continue the appropriate
route in transmission of information in the network.
Based on the survey done on various protocols the
secure routing protocols26 can be categorised as shown in
Figure 2.
Instantly, the various routing protocols that concerned
in prevention of attacks schema are given in detail as:
3.1. Prevention of Attacks
3.1.1 Preventing by using Asymmetric
Cryptosystem
ARAN: An On-demand secure routing protocol, ARAN
(Authenticated Routing for Ad-hoc Network) is based
on the cryptographic certicates. ARAN utilizes a
preparatory cryptographic declaration process took aer
by end to end course verication procedure to acquire
secure path establishment.
is routing standard is a safe directing on-
interest directing convention taking into account the
cryptographic declarations. is convention
• In the preliminary certication process, the
certicates are issued by a condential armation
system, which conveys its public key to each and
every hub within the system. Each and every node in
the system is important to contain a public key and
its address is to be armed prior to taking part in the
communication and connecting to the network.
• e main aim of this end-to-end authentication is to
ensure the route discovery for reaching the intended
destination. e objective is that the source need to
check such that the destination intended was come to
or not. A digitally marked RDP (Resource Discovery
packet) starts broadcasting by the source hub. is
packet incorporates various parameters like address
of destination node, Ns a nonce, endorsement of the
starting hub, and current time. e current time and
the Nonce are available to counteract repeat assaults
and to distinguish looping and record its mark on the
packet. All the succeeding middle hubs will evacuate
the mark of the past hub, check it and ax their mark
on the packet. Similarly, along the reply packet (REP)
every hub annexes its mark before sending it to the
following hop. All the routes whether active or not
are being tracked by the nodes in order to maintain
the route. erefore if any inactive or broken node
receives a data, a blunder message indicating is
created and sent to the source hub.
Figure 2. Secure Routing Protocols.

K. Vijayakumar and K. Somasundaram
Vol 9 (14) | April 2016 | www.indjst.org Indian Journal of Science and Technology 5
3.1.2 Preventing by Using Symmetric Cryptosystem
SAR: SAR (Security Aware mobile Ad-hoc Routing)
protocol uses the metrics for security to obtain routing.
A security parameter is included within the RREQ data
packet in SAR. During the message sending or receiving,
nodes are required to have secret keys for decrypting3. If
any route is available with the required security parameter
a packet RREP is transmitted between the intermediate
station or the sink node to the source node. And a
shortest route is being marked for data forwarding in case
of dierent route is traced.
Secure Routing Protocol: is protocol uses symmetric
cryptography which is an additional routing protocol for
providing secure called Secure Routing Protocol (SRP)
which relays on route querying method. In this among the
source and destination node, a Security Association (SA)
is needed. is Security Association SA generates a key
which is normally used to perform the data encryption
as well as decryption with the help of these two nodes.
e SRP header is included with the base header and is
shown in Table 1. e packet RREQ species the output
of a key hashed function, QID a query identier and
QSEQ a query sequence number. e shared key, basic
routing protocol header and the IP header is taken by the
key hash function.
Table 1. SRP Packet header
IP HEADER
BASIC ROUTING PROTOCOL HEADER
TYPE RESERVED
QUERY IDENTIFIER (QID)
SEQUENCE NUMBER OF A QUERY (QSEQ)
MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODE (MAC)
e routing tables are being updated by the in-between
hubs on transmitting the query to the neighbour hubs. In
the event the query is dropped when their table of routing
has similar QID of the receiving node.
At the point when the receiver is achieved, the
receiver station will check for protection measurements
by assessing the message authentication code (MAC)-
key hash function. e secret key by validating, for the
source node it makes reply packet containing of route
from source to destination, QID, QSEQ. In the wake of
getting the reply packet, MAC is once again calculated by
the source node. Between the sender and the receiver we
have many routes. By using the route error message, in
this protocol route support is also additionally nished.
3.1.3 Preventing by using One-Way Hash Chain
SEAD: Secure Ecient Ad-hoc Distance Vector Routing
(SEAD) is based on Destination sequence distance vector
DSDV protocol which is a proactive and secured routing
protocol. e protocol SEAD is designed against the
modication and security attacks like Denial of Service
and attacks by unwanted resource consumption. In this
protocol, the data packet authenticity is been checked by
making use of hash chain method where the hash chain
value is taken for update the routing for transmitting.
Whenever an update of routing is received by a node, each
message entry authentication is veried. is protocol
SEAD eliminates looping by making use of destination
sequence number. e protocol SEAD protocol validates
update message of routing for the source by avoiding
loops which is being done with any one of the following
two mechanisms:
e SEAD convention likewise validates the avoiding
so as to wellspring of directing overhaul message circles
which is being nished with any of the accompanying two
systems:
• To employ broadcast authentication mechanisms,
in the adhoc networks between the nodes a clock
synchronization is being used.
• A shared secret key is provided between the node
pair.
Authentication of a routing update message between
the nodes i.e MAC (Message Authentication Code) is
provided by a secret key shared between the pair of nodes.
Ariadne: is protocol Ariadne is also one of the routing
protocols for security on-demand constructed with
the help of DSR for ad-hoc networks using symmetric
cryptography. is Ariadne protocol uses shared key for
authentication (MAC) between the nodes. is protocol
Ariadne working is stated in 3 ways as: At the point when
a hub (source hub) needs to communicate with whatever
other hub, it sends RREQ, a message for route request
which contains the source address, destination address,
an identier to nds the present route disclosure, a
measure of time called TESLA time interim representing

Vol 9 (14) | April 2016 | www.indjst.org Indian Journal of Science and Technology
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Study on Reliable and Secure Routing Protocols on Manet
to the normal entry time of the request to the destination
hub and a hash chain. At the point when RREQ is
gotten, the intermediate hub checks the TESLA time
interim legitimacy. A one way hash facility is used in
order to check the authentication. In the event that the
information packet is a legal packet then the hub attaches
its own particular location in the rundown of hubs, by
replacing the hash chain with another one comprising of
its location in addition to the old one, and adds a MAC of
the entire packet to the MAC list. Finally, the hub which
is so called destination will veries each and every step of
the route by comparing the received hash and calculated
MAC hash.
3.1.4 Hybrid Approach
SLSP: e SLSP (Secure Link State Routing Protocol) is
utilized to safeguard the revelation and the dispersion
of link state information. is convention utilizes
asymmetric key to provide high security. Initially the
hubs that participate are distinguished based on the IP
addresses of their interfaces. Secure Link State Routing
Protocol can be normally given in three steps. ey are:
• Public Key Distribution (PKD): In this protocol the
central server is not used for key distribution. e
public key distribution (PKD) is normally carried
over between the nodes that are available within its
own surrounding area.
• Neighbour discovery: e neighbour nodes discovery
process is done by the process that periodically
the information about the Link state of node is
broadcasted with the help of Neighbour Lookup
Protocol (NLP). A packet with Hello message that
contains MAC address of sender and the network IP
address is broadcasted in the network. is kind of
messages was also signed. e malicious node or any
discrepancies in the network are recognised by the
help of NLP.
• Link State Updates (LSU): e packets of LSU
are recognized with the help of initiated nodes IP
address. A sequence number of 32-bit is present in
the LSU packet which is periodically updated. In
this protocol the LSU of the intermediate nodes will
authenticate the connected signature by means of a
public key which is formerly reserved at the time of
pubic key distribution phase. e nodes traversed
eld used in LSU is set to hashed hops traversed, the
TTL is decremented and at last the packet is again
broadcasted. ese SLSP nodes are going to maintain
a list of information like apriority ranking of their
proximity nodes which depends trac control
rate in order to maintain the secure of the packet
against denial of service attacks. For the lowest rate
generated LSU packets high priorities are used. is
behaviour facilitates the neighbours of determining
the malfunctioning nodes that overow higher rate
control packets tie up the success nature of the assault.
SAODV: is Secure Ad-hoc On-demand Distance
Vector Routing Protocoll (SAODV) protocol is depended
on demand routing protocol AODV2. is protocol works
with the help of asymmetric cryptography and also by
using hash chaining. e RREQ packet which is shown in
Table 2 is digitally signed by the node when it desires to
send a message, and transmits to the neighbour nodes. At
the point when the RREQ packet is gotten, intermediate
nodes authenticates before overhauling or making
an opposite route to the host by using cryptographic
techniques.
Table 2. SAODV Protocol Header
TYPE LENGTH HASH
FUNCTION
MAX HOP COUNT
TOP HASH
SIGNATURE
HASH
e hop count values are being certied in SAODV by
using Hash chains. A seed; a random value is developed
whenever a station wants to forward a RREP or RREQ
packet. It marks a Maximum Hop Count given to the TTL
(Time to live) value in the IP header. e seed is dened
as the signature extension of the Hash range. e Top
Hash range is set to the hashed seed and the Max Hop
Count periods. At whatever point a neighbour node gets a
RREQ or a RREP it conrms the count of hop by hashing
Max Hop Count - Hop Count times the Hash eld and
check whether the resultant worth is same as Top Hash
value. When the above said both values are dissimilar
from each other, then the node will drops the data packet
and a message showing error will be given by the nodes
for the broken links.

K. Vijayakumar and K. Somasundaram
Vol 9 (14) | April 2016 | www.indjst.org Indian Journal of Science and Technology 7
3.2 Detection and Reaction
e various protocols that are designed for Detection and
Reaction representation are:
3.2.1 Byzantine Algorithm
is Byzantine algorithm is specically implemented to
safeguard the network from Byzantine2,15 collapse which
includes change of packets, discarding data packets,
incursion made by self-interested or malignant nodes.
ere are three stages26 in dening Byzantine procedure
comprise as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. ree phases of Byzantine algorithm.
Route Discovery: Whenever a source hub needs to
forward the data, it imparts link request data which
contains address of source, address of destination, a weight
list, a sequence number and private key for conrmation
to its acquaintance. On acquiring the RREQ information
the hub on the node in transition manipulates its node list
for the entry of RREQ. In the event that there is no option,
it checks the secret key for validation and includes its list
and re-imparts it to dierent entities.
A route reply message (RREP) is generated on verifying
the secret key when the sink node reaches. On accepting
the RREP message, source hub approves the private key.
It additionally coordinates the internal connection and
available route. On the o chance that the received route
is superior to anything available route, then modify this
path in its route table.
Fault Detection: Fault detection process species, every
transitional hub mentioned as a probe node forwards
acknowledgement or acquaintance to sender hub for each
and every message which it receives. If more quantity of
unacknowledged messages moves beyond the verge value,
enrol of fault is done on the route.
Link Weight Management: e protocol at this phase,
manipulates the weight or load of the routes. At the fault
detection stage if a path is determined as a faulty path,
then it is being coupled with its related weight. At the
route revelation stage path with negligible weight worth
will be considered as enhanced way.
3.2.2 Core
In this algorithm it uses a method to uphold entity to
associate all the nodes in MANET which functions
upon the cooperative behaviours of the entities. It uses
the methods of Watchdog and Reputation Table to
determine the collaborative or malicious entities. e
related reputation or ratings of the transitional nodes
are maintained in a reputation table blocks. e block
of Watchdog manipulates the function and oers the
Reputation value. CORE mechanism contains of a source
hub and a set of transition hubs. In this, at whatever point
a transition hub denies co-working with the source hub,
this CORE convention will constrain the dissent of move
hub. is may take to lessening of transitional hub from
the system.
3.2.3 Condant
Condant protocol is used to determine the non-
supportive stations. e Condant protocol comprise
of various blocks like the monitor, path manager, trust
manager and reputation system. e passive feedbacks
for each message which it sends are considered and being
monitored by the monitor block. e transition of alarm
signals is concerned by the trust manager block. When a
station locates that a host is non-functioning, it forwards
information in the form of alarm. is kind of messages
is shared among the nodes that are stated as associates.
Alarms message from other stations are given considerably
a smaller amount weightage. e reputation system
block holds a chart of station and the related evaluations.
Assessments are changed in light of a rate capacity that
makes employments of modest weights if a alarm is
managed for a getting misbehaving station and higher
weights for direct data. e path manager block manages
all link data in concern with accumulation, removal, and
changing of route based on the acknowledged message
it accepted from the reputation system. e path which
contains the identied malicious node is eliminated, if the
rating goes under a certain threshold value by calling the
path manager block.

Vol 9 (14) | April 2016 | www.indjst.org Indian Journal of Science and Technology
8
Study on Reliable and Secure Routing Protocols on Manet
3.2.4 Watchdog and Pathrater
e protocol which is specied under watchdog and
pathrater17 is used to identify the nodes which are
malicious and which will refuse in packets forwarding
where as they are admitted to exchange the packets in the
initial stage. e signicant function of Watchdog is to
investigate whether the data packets are being exchanged
or not by the next station available in the link. If the next
station is not exchanging the packet then it is noticed as
the malicious characters. e main aim of pathrater is to
estimate and identify the trusted route from the outcome
watchdog generates. Whenever a node decides to send
a packet to its neighbour node in the pathway, it rst
veries that the neighbouring node will transmit or not
and also veries that the proximity node should not alter
the contents in the packet before forwarding it. Hence
forth any node that behaves like malicious node like deny
of service or altering the data packet, then this Watchdog
protocol will enhance its rating under failure where
this failure ranking is very supportive in identifying the
trusted route between source and destination.
4. Comparison of Various Secure
Routing Protocols
e below Table 3 is specied based on various protocols
studied, and a comparison8 table is made between
dierent protocols.
e Table 3 represent that a several tasks is carried
for attacks by rushing , DoS and modifying routing table
attacks whereas to prevent tunnelling attacks still more a
lot of security protocols are needed. e routing protocol
in aspects of security is capable of handling only restricted
attacks. For e.g. ARAN and SAR convention can oer
security against surging and directing altering routing
table assaults, where as they are not reasonable for security
against Denial-of-Service and assaults by tunnelling. In
the same way, CORE provides security against Denial-of-
Service attacks. e security for tunnelling attacks can be
provided by Watchdog and Pathrater.
5. Attack Taxonomies in Manet
In MANETS there is a chance for dierent types of
attacks where few kinds of attacks are applicable for
general network, other applies to connectionless network
and few are specic for mobile adhoc networks. e
various attacks for security are broadly open based on
dierent criteria15, namely the province of the attackers,
or the methods applied in assaults. e various security
attacks in MANET and in the remaining networks can
be broadly briefed based on the following strategies like
Active or passive, External or Internal, various protocol
Table 3. Routing protocols comparison based on security aspects
Name of protocol Typ e Chances of attacks
Rushing
attack
Denial of
Service
Modifying
routing
table
Attacks by
Tunnelling
ARAN (Authenticated Routing for Adhoc
Networks)
On demand routing protocol positive negative positive negative
SAR (Secure aware Adhoc Routing) On demand routing protocol positive negative positive negative
SRP (Secure Routing Protocol) On demand routing protocol positive positive positive negative
SEAD (Secure Ecient Adhoc Distance vector
routing)
Table Driven routing protocol positive positive positive negative
Ariadne On demand routing protocol positive positive positive negative
SLSP (Secure Link State routing Protocol) Table Driven routing protocol positive positive positive negative
SAODV(Secure Ad-hoc On-demand Distance
Vector Routing Protocol)
On demand routing protocol positive negative positive negative
CONFIDANT On demand routing protocol positive negative negative positive
BYZANTINE On demand routing protocol positive positive positive negative
WATCHDOG & PATHRATER On demand routing protocol negative negative negative positive

K. Vijayakumar and K. Somasundaram
Vol 9 (14) | April 2016 | www.indjst.org Indian Journal of Science and Technology 9
layer15, Stealthy or Non-stealthy, Cryptographic or Non-
cryptographic etc. e Table 4 shows the security attacks
at various layers2,9,15 of the Internet model.
Active Attacks vs. Passive Attacks: e various attacks
of mobile adhoc networks (MANET’s) are broadly
divided keen on two main groups, specically active
attacks and passive attacks9. In the passive attacks the
data is switched in the network without interrupting the
communication process while in an active attack contains
packet disruption, alteration, or false modication,
thereby disturbing the original behaviour of a MANET.
e dierent illustrations of passive assaults are trac
investigation, eavesdropping and trac observing and
the active assaults jamming, impersonating, modication,
denial of service (DoS), and message replay.
Internal Attacks vs. External Attacks: Another form
of attacks10 can also be categorised into external attacks
and internal attacks9, related to the environment of the
assaults. Some articles specify attacks as outsider and
insider attacks. Externals assaults are kept up by stations
that don’t t in with nature of the system. Internal assaults
are from bargained stations, which are truly part of the
system. Internal assaults are less demanding when related
with external assaults subsequent to the insider knows
important and mystery data, and holds special permit
privileges.
Attacks on Dierent Layers of the Internet Model:
Further, the attacks are broadly divided by aording to
ve layers2,15 of the layered model of Internet. e above
Table 2 species a grouping of several security Attacks on
Internet layered model. Certain attacks can be launched
at various layers.
Stealthy vs. Non-Stealthy Attacks: Particular security
attacks13 use stealth, whereby the attackers try to conceal
their activities from either a individual who is observing
the system or an intrusion detection system9,15 (IDS). Be
that as it may, dierent assaults, for example, DoS can’t be
made stealthy.
Cryptography vs. Non-Cryptography Related Attacks:
Certain attacks are non-cryptography associated, and rest
are cryptographic primitive attacks. e Table 5 shows
various cryptographic primitive attacks3 with examples.
Table 5. Attacks based on cryptographic techniques
Cryptographic
technique Attacks
Example
Pseudorandom number
attack
Nonce, timestamp, Initialization
Vector (IV)
Digital signature attack RSA Signature, Elgamal signature,
Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
Hash Collision Attack SHA-0, MD4, MD5, HAVAl-128,
RIPEMD
6. Conclusion
In this article, we have portrayed the distinctive security
targets, security attacks and supporting security for
diverse existing directing system necessities. In this study,
an examination chart is given which species that every
safe convention works beneath dierent restrictions that
give security against constrained attacks. One of the
protocols can achieve all security objectives.
usly, there is still a prerequisite of more secured
convention that can deal with the distinctive asking for
necessities of MANET. is section presents dominant
part of the attack taxonomies in brief that has been
considered as the preparatory piece of study in the
introductory stages of the proposed research work. e
work gives the essential thoughts regarding the capability
of attacks and vulnerabilities in MANET that could help
for comprehension the antagonistic part of the study.
Table 4. Dierent security Attacks on Internet layered model
Name of Layer Type of Attack
Physical layer congestion, interceptions, eavesdropping
Data Link Layer Trac analysis, monitoring, disruption MAC (802.11) WEP weakness
Network layer Black Hole, Wormhole, Byzantine, Flooding attacks, Consumption of resource, location disclosure attacks
Transport Layer Session hijacking, SYN ooding
Application Layer Repudiation, data corruption
Multi- layer attacks Denial of Service, Masquerade, Replay, Man-in-the-middle.

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Study on Reliable and Secure Routing Protocols on Manet
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