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Imagining our moral values in the present and future

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Abstract

Imaginary worlds allow us to safely develop, crystallize, and criticize our moral values – at times even serving as catalysts for change in the real world. Fans of imaginary worlds sometimes form groups to advocate for social change in the real world, and it is part of Leftist ideology to imagine radically different, possible futures aligned around shared moral values.
Commentary on Dubourg & Baumard: Imagining our moral values in the present
and future
Jordan Wylie, Alix Alto, Ana Gantman
Abstract word count: 58
Main text word count: 850
Reference word count: 487
Total text count: 1,518
Jordan Wylie
The Graduate Center, City University of New York
Department of Psychology
365 5th Avenue
New York, NY 10011
E-mail: jwylie@gradcenter.cuny.edu
Website: jordancwylie.com
Alix Alto
The Graduate Center, City University of New York
Department of Psychology
365 5th Ave
New York, NY 10016
agetreu@gradcenter.cuny.edu
alixalto.com
Ana Gantman
Brooklyn College
Department of Psychology
2900 Bedford Avenue
Brooklyn NY 11215
718-951-3896
ana.gantman@brooklyn.cuny.edu
anagantman.com
Abstract:
Imaginary worlds allow us to safely develop, crystallize, and criticize our moral values—
at times even serving as catalysts for change in the real world. Fans of imaginary worlds
sometimes form groups to advocate for social change in the real world, and it is part of
Leftist ideology to imagine radically different, possible futures aligned around shared
moral values.
Spending time within imaginary worlds offers two important yet unstated opportunities:
First, imaginary worlds help us to crystallize and develop our moral worldviews. They
offer a stage to share moral lessons and values across time and space, and to form
meaningful identity groups around those values. Second, imaginary worlds also allow us
to imagine new possibilities for our current reality. We can use imaginary worlds to
begin to materialize a future drastically different from the present—its own kind of
imaginary but possible world. That is, we argue that imaginary worlds serve to
communicate and crystallize our moral values, and offer a rich landscape from which
abstract moral and political beliefs can flourish not only for impossible, fictional
imaginary worlds, but for possible future ones too.
Imaginary worlds serve a critical function of allowing communication and exploration
across time and space of moral values, which are notably sensitive to psychological
distance (see Eyal et al., 2008; Mentovich et al., 2016). Indeed, even everyday
language points to this key function of imaginary worlds: “The moral of the story” is often
used to describe the most important takeaway after reading or watching an imaginary
story unfold. For example, Aesop’s fables craft the narrative around both an imaginary
world of talking animals and moral virtues. One function of fictional stories is both to
convey norms and rules across time and cultures, and create memorable worlds where
the reader can safely learn (e.g., through simulation; Mar & Oatley, 2008; Meyer et al.,
2019) about what is right and wrong. And this learning is directly applicable to the real
world: Imaginary worlds also help to define how we see right and wrong in our present
reality—even after we put the book down. Imaginary worlds can also show us moral
breakdown, which contributes to the shaping and challenging of our moral worldviews.
For example, novels like 1984, the Handmaid’s Tale and Brave New World (all named
in Table 1) reveal to us our moral values in the present by showing us an extreme
version of them in another time or place. Satire (like Gulliver’s Travels; see Table 1)
provides a veneer of fiction from which it is safe to confront (and resolve) moral
ambiguities that are present in the real world. We agree that imaginary worlds satisfy a
need to explore (as the target authors describe), but also to separate good from bad
(McHugh et al., 2021; see also Pizarro & Baumeister, 2013), crystallize our own beliefs,
desires, and values, and explore concepts like justice, power, and punishment.
Moreover, a core function of moral values is to regulate behavior and draw lines around
meaningful social groups (Yudkin, Gantman, Quidbach, & Hofmann, 2021)—as do
fandoms of imaginary worlds. Fans readily sort themselves into social groups aligned
with specific values within the imaginary worlds of the group. For example, Harry Potter
fans strongly align with their chosen Hogwarts House, each identified by a moral value
like bravery or kindness. What’s more, participation in fan culture can motivate people to
bring values from the imaginary world of the fandom into the real world. This is the case
with fan activism, a participatory practice through which members of a fan community
organize around real-world issues (Jenkins & Shresthova, 2012). Fan activists use
imagery from their imaginary world as protest symbols. For example, indigenous and
Palestinian protestors have used imagery from the movie Avatar to convey their
message of colonization and land rights (Brough & Shresthova, 2012). The relationship
between fandom and activism is also mutually reinforcing: Participating in collective
action further solidifies group identity within a particular fandom (Carriere, 2018). This
kind of fan-based collective action is an example of how participating in imaginary
worlds can help us imagine and work toward a possible, different future, where we
better live out our values or even prioritize entirely new ones.
This is especially notable because imagining a world with different moral values is
uniquely difficult (Black & Barnes, 2017; Gendler, 2000). One way that Leftist activists
have met this challenge is through the practice of radical imagination. Drawing on
radicalism as an ideology which seeks to completely transform existing institutions to
achieve an anti-oppression future (Bötticher, 2017), this practice reimagines the world
around the values of egalitarianism, solidarity, radicalism, and freedom from oppression.
It takes as a starting point an imaginary world of the future completely unlike our present
reality. The practice of imagining a radically different future, which coheres around
shared moral values, fosters collective future cognition and community organizing
(Haiven & Khasnabish, 2010). Historic and contemporary radical movements have been
theorized as organized around such radical imaginations of the future (e.g., Rickford,
2016; Kelley, 2002; Khasnabish, 2008; Rethman, 2010; Muzio, 2016)—imaginary
worlds that activists first create in their minds, and then work to make real.
In sum, imaginary worlds allow us to better understand and develop our moral
worldviews. Engaging with imaginary worlds helps us negotiate and solidify our moral
values, construct our social identities, and imagine and work toward radically different,
but possible futures aligned around shared moral values.
Conflict of interest statement: The authors have no conflicts of interest to declare.
Funding statement: We have no relevant funding to acknowledge here.
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... This is sometimes easier to do in the fictional space, where we are given sufficient information from which to make judgments. Fictional spaces also allow us to explore moral quandaries to practice and gain additional evidence of the right decision in a low-stakes environment (see Wylie et al. 2022). That is, the fictional space allows people to gain exposure to bad agents, which tend to capture interest because beliefs about them are volatile (Siegel et al. 2018) and they are less typical. ...
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