Metaphor in Moral Imagination. Enacting possible ways of moral action through embodied simulation

Abstract

I defined my subject: the use of metaphor to persuade and influence in matters of morality.
I approach the subject from a pragmatist naturalist framework using empirical results from cognitive neuroscience, linguistics and psychology to show how John Dewey's notion of moral imagination/deliberation can be biologically realised. I argue that in this process of moral imagination metaphors prime, frame, obscure, and steer the ways we conceptualise, give meaning to, value, and act on matters of morality.

Full text

METAPHOR IN MORAL IMAGINATION
Enacting possible ways of moral action through embodied simulation
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Illustration+copyrights+John+Holcroft.
J. A. L. Machielsen (463154)
Master Thesis Filosofie: Ethiek van Bedrijf en Organisatie
Tilburg University
First Reader: dr. H. C. D. G. de Regt
Second Reader: dr. F. A. I. Buekens
Date: 02-10-2017

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Contents
Contents 2
Introduction 4
1 – Pragmatism and Naturalism: Method and Subject-Matter 6
1.1 – Overview 6
1.2 – Pragmatic Naturalism, a Philosophical Framework 7
1.3 – Human Life in Nature 9
1.4 – Conclusion 12
2 – Inquiry: Moral Deliberation as Problem-Solving 13
2.1 – Overview 13
2.2 – Inquiry as Empirical Problem-Solving 13
2.3 – Moral Deliberation as Inquiry 15
2.4 – Conclusion 16
3 – Inquiry: Processes of Embodied Cognition 17
3.1 – Overview 17
3.2 – Inquiry is Embodied, Embedded and Enacted 17
3.3 – Values are Affective and Natural 20
3.4 – Intuitions and Reasoning in Judgment 23
3.5 – Conclusion 25
4 – Moral Imagination as Embodied Simulation 26
4.1 – Overview 26
4.2 – Moral Imagination: Situation and Projection 26
4.2.1 – Horizon of Possibilities 27
4.2.2 – Constraints on Imagination 28
4.2.3 – Moral Imagination, an Example 29
4.3 – Moral Imagination: Enactment through Embodied Simulation 30
4.3.1 – Functional Requirements for Embodied Simulation 30
4.3.2 – What is Embodied Simulation? 32
4.3.3 – Multimodality of Sensorimotor Experience and Simulation 33

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4.3.4 – Action Structure in Simulation 36
4.3.5 – Affect and Valuation in Simulation 41
4.3.6 – From Experience to Discourse 43
4.4 – Conclusion 44
5 – Metaphors in Moral Imagination 45
5.1 – Overview 45
5.2 – Linguistic Influence on Embodied Simulation 46
5.2.1 – Abstract Concepts and Metaphors 46
5.2.2 – Embodied Simulation of Language 47
5.2.3 – Priming, Framing, Obscuring, and Steering 50
5.2.4 – Embodied Simulation of Metaphors 57
5.3 – Metaphors in Moral Imagination 61
5.3.1 – Metaphors of Morality 61
5.3.2 – Case Study: A Tsunami of Islamisation 64
5.3.3 –The Actual and The Possible 69
5.4 – Conclusion 72
6 – Where No Metaphor Has Gone Before 73
6.1 – Conclusion and Summary Findings 73
6.2 – Provocation: Metaphordances 74
Abbreviations 76
Bibliography 78

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Introduction
It is undeniably the case that rhetoric is undergoing a renaissance of sorts in both academia
and popular media outlets. Social and political upheavals in the early 21st century would
surely be observed with great interest by the classic rhetoricians like Aristotle and Cicero, not
so much the happenings themselves as ways in which commentators, politicians, and modern
media cover such events and shape public opinion and discourse on topics as diverse as
economy—we have just recovered from a systemic crisis but do we now still put our trust in
the experts to fix the economy?, immigration—are we experiencing an asylum plague or
should needful humans not be trapped by their past?, and morality—should we stay morally
strong and not degrade ourselves to the level of terrorist attackers?
Taking rhetoric to be about any speech act whatsoever we can see language to be a
unique tool for social action: “rhetoric is language at play; language plus” (Leith 2011, 6).1
The ways that humans use language, often “used unconsciously” and “understood
instinctively,” to a large extent involve consequences on behavior of our conspecifics and
what that does for us, dependent on purposes we have (ibid., 8). Like dance moves, the ways
that language twists and turns is captured by figures of speech and tropes in rhetorical style
(ibid., 131). Metaphor is one the classic Greeks appreciated for its stylistic embellishments
(Aristotle, Poetics, xxii; Rhetoric, III.i-ii). This classic view of metaphor as comparing one
thing with another was maintained well into the 20th century.
For a long time linguistics, and philosophy of language and mind were dominated by
approaches that focused on formal symbol manipulation. Language was studied as a symbol
system, and understanding consisted of syntactic operations over symbols (like a computer).
The meaning of the symbols was defined through a system in our minds encoding ideas and
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1 For more on speech acts, see Austin’s classic work How to Do Things with Words (1975/1962).

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thoughts in a mental language.2 Each word we know has a corresponding mental entry
including a definition articulated in this Mentalese, and refers to things in the world. However
elegant, powerful and appealing as the language of thought hypothesis may be, it did run into
criticism and theoretical problems.3 Since the 1970s cognitive scientists and philosophers
started thinking about meaning not in abstract symbols but in terms of experiences in the
world, with our particular bodies in particular situations we encounter. These are the ideas of
embedded and embodied cognition. It took another twenty years to transform from principle
to mechanism, the embodied simulation hypothesis (cf. Bergen 2012, 13).
Around the same time as the idea of embodiment got a foothold, the study of metaphor
took a cognitive turn with Metaphors We Live By (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003/1980), and
views of metaphor deeply held since Aristotle were challenged. Metaphor “ceases to be the
sole device of creative literary imagination” and instead “becomes a valuable cognitive tool
without which” we could not live (Kövecses 2010, xi). Metaphor was not merely about
words, but concepts. Metaphor was not mainly used aesthetically, but to understand one
conceptual domain in terms of another conceptual domain. Metaphor was not just used by
skilled rhetoricians, but by common people, daily and as widespread phenomenon.
Contemporary Theory of Metaphor (CTM), as this view is called, follows from situating
linguistics not in propositional formal logic but in the new framework of embodied cognitive
science, forming cognitive linguistics. Here the study concerns not so much whether there is
truth-value or correspondence to antecedent reality in metaphor, but what mappings and
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2 This is an idea most famously defended by Jerry Fodor (1975) and Steven Pinker (1994). I am essentially
condensing the Representational Theory of Mind and the Computational Theory of Mind here.
3 There is no room to give a respectable account here; short examples must suffice. The first is whether
identifying and arranging symbols, even if they represent things, is enough for understanding. Another is where
Mentalese came from, leading to debates about nativism. The biggest problem for me is the detail and context
that gets lost in the simplicity of symbols, leading to an inability to explain associative knowledge and individual
differences. How can we explain what you understand under the symbol ‘dog’ and what I take it to be?

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inferences follow from which metaphors. Most abstract topics are defined by multiple
conceptual metaphors offering the abstract topic different inferences from domains
characterized by corporeal logic.4
Here we have language not as formal system, but with a distinct affectivity too. The
question concerning me here is what role metaphoric conceptualisation and reasoning plays in
ways we think about, give meaning to, value, and discuss matters of morals? As I will argue,
metaphors can be said to frame and influence our moral deliberation.
1. Chapter One - Pragmatism and Naturalism: Method and Subject-Matter
“The value of experience for the philosopher is that it serves as a constant reminder of
something which is neither exclusive and isolated subject or object, matter or mind, nor yet
one plus the other. The fact of integration in life is a basic fact” (EN, LW 1:384).
1.1 Chapter One - Overview
I defined my subject: the use of metaphor to persuade and influence in matters of morality.
Before discussing this I warrant the use of my philosophical framework. Cognitive linguistics
implies wider research paradigms of cognitive science. But to critically engage and integrate
scientific results, to use empirical evidence in philosophical arguments, I need a philosophical
framework and method taking science seriously: pragmatic naturalism (cf. De Regt and
Dooremalen 2015, 39ff.). I first elucidate the pragmatic naturalistic framework as a
philosophical position, then I define some notions used in the rest of my argument.
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4 For example, a career can be metaphorically conceptualized as a building—John threw a brick through the
window and can say goodbye to his promotion now (‘say goodbye’ is a metaphor too, coincidentally); a work of
art—In his new role as teacher John finally found a way to express his unique voice; or defined in basic vertical
orientations with its included valence (up is good, down is bad)—John got his promotion. His career is on the
rise.

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1.2 Pragmatic Naturalism, A Philosophical Framework
Pragmatic naturalism is a compound term. Pragmatic refers to pragmatism as philosophical
movement originating in the late 19th and early 20th century in America in the writings of
Peirce, James, Dewey and Mead. The positive thesis of pragmatist philosophy starts in
Peirce’s ‘The Fixation of Belief’ (1877) where he contends that thinking happens because of
the necessity we have of adapting to problematic experiences (EP 1:109-123). Previous
adjustments do not always hold up in new situations, so thinking issues as adaptive process.
Our beliefs about the world must all be seen this way. Otherwise we ignore those beliefs
themselves are the result of and substance for the striving towards stability (EP 1:114-115).
Beliefs “[guide] our desires and [shape] our actions,” they form a habit, or disposition, that
“puts us into such a condition that we shall behave in some certain way, when the occasion
arises” (EP 1:114). Doubt instead gives an “uneasy and dissatisfied state”, which “stimulates
us into action until it is destroyed” (EP1:114). Peirce argues the method of science, which
alone appeals to an “external permanency”, can lead to successful settlement of doubt in the
long run (EP1:120).5 Knowledge of the world is not reached through an introspective effort
out of the safe environment of philosopher’s armchairs, as Descartes would have it. We gain
knowledge by overt experimentation, by action. The knowing process is instrumental to
solving problems. The pragmatists held it is psychologically not possible to doubt everything
at once, so all intellectual activity begins with specific doubts (cf. Eames 1977, xv). Therefore
when doubting a specific belief, other beliefs we hold are taken for granted (cf. CaT, LW
6:12). The practical purposes of knowledge are for safeguarding and expanding our well-
being in the world. The influence of Darwinist thinking is clear here: the pragmatist
anthropology shows man to be a product of a long evolutionary process where our biological
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5 Scientific method has proven to give the smallest risk in having to revise our beliefs in the future, or at the least
to make the consecutive periods between moments of doubt further apart, as well as giving the user most
“integrity of belief” (EP1:123).

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(and cognitive) nature was selected for in harmful and problematic situations (cf. De Regt and
Dooremalen 2015, 57-58; see IDP, MW 4:3-14). Evolution made humans experience feelings
of irritation or doubt in such situations and to feel pleasure in cases of stability. Having such
feelings does not indicate whether our beliefs match up with how the world is, there is no
necessary correspondence so to speak, only a functional behavioral fit between the organism
and its environment (cf. EP 1:112). Both Peirce and Dewey held that the scientific method
produced the most reliable beliefs. However, at times, given the way humans are constituted
as both feeling and thinking creatures, certain beliefs just feel easier and safer. We feel good
when we ‘get it.’6
A feeling of understanding generally indicates we posses the knowledge needed to
resolve a problematic situation (cf. De Regt and Dooremalen 2015, 60). The goal of life is the
recurrent need for achievement of stability of an organism and its environment and
knowledge is a human method of such adjustment where coping can be shifted towards ever
more ways of active control (QC, LW 4:80).7 To find a balance or harmony in this continuum
of adjustments requires intelligent action and the ability to state a problem (cf. Eames 1977,
12-13). The true purpose of science lies outside of science itself and pertains to securing those
ends that we value in practice.
Naturalism is the second part of our compound term framework. Naturalism affirms the
continuity between scientific and philosophical questions, holding there is no essential
difference. In modern times the naturalistic position also underscores the importance of
psychology and cognitive sciences. These sciences allow us to comprehend how humans
think, what the limits to our knowledge and cognitive capacities are, or to what extent certain
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6 I take this to be the central thesis of De Regt and Dooremalen in Het Snapgevoel (2015).
7 Adjustments come in two varieties. For Dewey “accommodation” reflects more particular and private life-
adjustments, whereas “adaptations” are the more environmental and public adjustments we can effect (ACF, LW
9:12-13; see also PP, LW 2:244-245). ). Social well-being can best be effected through knowing when to
accommodate and when to adapt and for this knowledge of social facts we need science as method to effect
social progress (SSSC, LW 6:68-69; cf. SAS, LW 6:53-63).

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biases and prejudices play a role in shaping our (scientific) beliefs of the world (cf. De Regt
and Dooremalen 2015, 42-43; Eames 1977). Naturalism takes seriously the problems
involved in successful navigation of our life-world and shares pragmatism’s sense of
fallibilism and reconstructive efforts of our knowledge given new insights, and importantly,
given our own evolutionary origin as exemplars of the species Homo Sapiens with all the
messy blood-and-sinew trappings this comes with.
I showed how as philosopher you can assert science to be the best source of dependable
knowledge about the world and ourselves. One can use it to elucidate and tinker with our
conceptions, our web of beliefs, so as to most successfully anticipate and control future
experience. Therefore, scientific knowledge can thus be applied in illuminating how
metaphors allow us to make sense of our moral experiences.
1.3 Human Life in Nature
Now I define the meaning of several central concepts of pragmatic naturalism. The starting
point of all inquiry is primary experience, meaning human life as it is lived (cf. EN, LW
1:361-362).8 All reflective experience arises out of primary experience (PIE, MW 3:166; EN,
LW 1:11-13), whenever situations are experienced as indeterminate or doubtful (cf. EN, LW
1:61; EKVaR, LW 14:44). All distinctions we make in reflective thought are merely
abstractions and selections from the richly complex whole that experience primarily is (cf.
Johnson 2001). Experience is the immediate, the first-person phenomenological lived life,
before it becomes experience of explicit distinctions.9 Furthermore, Dewey’s primary unit of
experience is the situation (LTI, LW 12:72). Our lives are a chain of continuous and
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8 Experience is primarily non-cognitive and pre-reflective but there is no dichotomy with reflective experience
(Alexander 2013, 57-58; cf. RTS, MW 2:298-299; EN, LW 1:74-75).
9 This is how most traditional empirical or rationalist theories conceive of experience and hence need
philosophical handiwork to make experience whole again, either in the brain or through transcendent extra-
empirical means.

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interacting situations (EE, LW 13:25). Each situation contains the whole biological and
sociocultural context and focus of this or that experience (EEL, MW 10:323; cf. EN, LW
1:369). Each situation is unique and “offers its own challenge to thought and endeavor, and
presents its own potential value” (WIB, LW 5:272). A situation, when as subject-matter
referred to in thought or language, is “a complex existence that is held together in spite of its
internal complexity by the fact that it is dominated and characterized throughout by a single
quality” (QT, LW 5:246). This pervasive quality characterizing a situation is “in and of the
entire situation”, so it is neither what philosophers traditionally characterized as subjective
feeling nor an objective aspect (Johnson 2001).10 Pervasive quality permeates every aspect of
a situation, giving them meaning and binding them together. If our situation is that of being
lost in a forest, “the quality of being lost permeates and affects every detail that is observed
and thought of” (LTI, LW 12:203). We experience this particular worrisome examination,
that spirited discussion, and yesterday’s spellbinding concert.
A second term needing qualification is belief. Belief implies objects and events; these
stand forth in their qualification of what they mean to us (EP 1:125-126; cf. EN, LW 1:132-
133). The pragmatic naturalist conceives of meaning in terms of actions and consequences
(EP 1:130-131). Our ideas are made clear and distinct not merely by semantic description, but
importantly, Peirce argues, through the practical differences they make for our beliefs and
actions (ibid.; cf. WWJ 377; cf. EN, LW 1:141ff.). In ‘How To Make Our Ideas Clear’ (1878,
EP 1:124-141) Peirce formulates the pragmatic maxim: “consider what effects, that might
conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then,
our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object” (EP1:132). The
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10 Importantly, for Dewey, thinking always involves feeling. The focus of a situation is conspicuous and
apparent, whereas the context is the background, obscured, concealed, enveloping, but a felt context (CaT, LW
6:13-14). The pervasive quality of a situation is what characterizes the whole experienced situation, and colors
all its aspects. Experience is always in medias res for Dewey, hence action is always seen as a modification of an
ongoing other interaction

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clarification of meaning in terms of action and consequences might imply consequentialism.
But the traditional Enlightenment view of reason or imagination was not taken over by the
pragmatists as it conflicted with the Darwinistic view of living organisms actively learning in
their environments.11 Furthermore, the notion of dynamic, evolving and temporal situations
rules out a metaphysics of a closed off universe and the flight to a transcendent realm for what
we wish to secure most (QC, LW 4:21, 40ff., 85-86; cf. EN, LW 1:47ff.).
Third and last is habit. Peirce defined beliefs as habits, as dispositions for action come
certain circumstances (EP 1:114). Habit is organic, and acquired through interaction with our
environments (HNC, MW 14:15; EN, LW 1:19; see also PP I:104ff.). Our impulses,
biological energies, make us engage the environment for our basic needs (EN, LW 1:194; cf.
AE, LW 10:19ff.). Recurring engagements solidify into habits and are “the basis for organic
learning” (LTI, LW 12:38). Habitual action is thus “influenced by prior activity and in that
sense acquired” (HNC, MW 14:31).12 Habits enable action efficiency, allowing for
unconscious activity dealing with the stable aspects of experience so we can cope with the
novel or unstable (P, EW 2:101; HNC, MW 14:38). Dewey makes the strong claim that
“concrete habits do all the perceiving, recognition, imagining, recalling, judging, conceiving,
and reasoning that is done” (HNC, MW 14:121). The pragmatic naturalist does not oppose
habitual action with reflective acts, rather, Dewey claims, “the real opposition is not between
reason and habit but between routine, unintelligent habit, and intelligent habit or [skill]”
(HNC, MW 14:55). Importantly, a complex set of habits interpenetrates and forms one’s
character expressed in action (HNC, MW 14:30; E 1932; LW 7:258). Our habits inform our
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11 Human understanding is instead conceived off as “imaginative understanding” (Alexander 2013, 160).
Imagination will be extensively treated later, but here we can note that it is not seen as epiphenomenal to
reasoning nor as a source of pure novel genius; it is a mode of action badly needed in a moving and insecure
world (ibid., 174).
12 Habits have both inertia and plasticity. Dewey warns habit is not formed by repetition, a view that “puts the
cart before the horse” (LTI, LW 12:39). Repeat performance is the result of habit formation, not its precondition.
Repetitive habits are due to mechanic conditions that make them so. They “are limited in their manifestation to
the rather artificial conditions in which they operate” (ibid.).

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experiences; indeterminate or problematic situations signify a disruption of fluid functioning
of habit leading to a felt problem.
I end noting the environment of the organism, in its physical, social, and cultural
contexts. Pragmatic naturalism holds that culture and social conduct are conditioned by nature
because they are continuous with nature. Consecutively, culture influences human experience
of nature (Johnson 2014, 3). The sociocultural environment influences the development of an
organism as much as biological and physical factors and allows us to conceive of
conceptualization and symbolic expression, including language, as both cultural but always of
and in nature.
As we have seen, pragmatic naturalism situates reasoning, or inquiry, within the broad
context of the whole person in action. I will now elaborate this idea further and explicate the
link with morality.
1.4 Chapter One - Conclusion
Aristotle held the means and ends of rhetoric to be involved in the deepest of human
questions. For Dewey language itself is both means and ends, involved in social exchange and
cooperation, thus a form of action, and an immediate enhancement of life (cf. EN, LW 1:144).
He states that “every thought and meaning has its substratum in some organic act ... It roots in
some definite act of biological behavior; our physical names for mental acts like seeing,
grasping, searching, affirming, acquiescing, spurning, comprehending, affection, emotion are
not just ‘metaphors’” (EN, LW 1:221). Taking basic organic action as the starting point, I
now further elucidate inquiry as reflective intelligence used in problematic situations.

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2. Chapter Two - Inquiry: Moral Deliberation as Problem-Solving
“Deferred action is present exploratory action.” (QC, LW 4:178)
2.1 Chapter Two - Overview
In the following pages I elaborate on inquiry as an adaptive capacity of humans to regain
equilibrium in the balance of organism-environment, or Œ, transactions.13 To elucidate
inquiry and its role in morality I focus on two aspects. The first is why humans engage in
inquiry. The second is the normative aspect of all intelligent conduct when humans are
deliberating as how to proceed or what values to take as ends for their strivings.
2.2 Inquiry as Empirical Problem-Solving
It is almost a commonplace to state that all living beings constantly adapt to changing
conditions in their environment: a Darwinistic evolutionary fact of life certainly true for
humans as well.14 Whereas for any animal adapting to changing conditions is “to investigate
their surroundings as to conditions of how to proceed,” (ISM, LW 16:321) for reflective
organisms like humans, inquiry is “the primary means … to achieve stability” (Hickman
1998, 167). Animals display multitudes of observable behavior, some signaling “temporary
deflections of ongoing behavior” (ISM, LW 16:321). Finding out how to proceed, what to do
next, is observed by “the sniffings, the cocking of ears, the poising of the body and head, the
turnings and fixations of the eyes” (Ibidem). All living beings actively examine their
surrounding conditions using their evolved capacities. Inquiry is one such way of life-
behavior.
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13 The Œ diphthong is notational shorthand, which reflects the “ontological inseparability” of organism and
environment—their ‘intertwinement’—far better than words like interaction or transaction can. Tibor Solymosi
inspired my use of this notational format (Solymosi and Shook 2013, 151).
14 Theirs is an environment, however, that is more complicated and diversified in its physical, interpersonal and
cultural dimensions.

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Due to the need to mediate particular situations and recover Πbalance, inquiry, is engaged in
by “the living, behaving, knowing organism” (KK, LW 16:124). Inquiry always occurs within
the emerging and evolving situation. A scientist looks for improved treatment for an illness. A
traveler lost in the forest looks for a way out. The organism acts and reacts upon “the prior
existential situation,” based on an idea, a hypothesis, which “anticipates a solution.” The
scientist has a theory about what the problem consists of and testable hypotheses. Testing this
idea out by overt manipulation, by “emphasis, selection and arrangement” of empirical
materials, further observations of the evolving situation can be had (LTI, LW 12:121). The
scientists experiments on cell cultures and registers observations of effects. Selective
emphasis occurs mostly non-conscious and automatic and does not fully capture everything
that may matter in any given situation. The “so-called percepts that have not fallen under the
doubt” inquiry tries to resolve “are simply there, and are affected with no cognitive character”
(Mead 1932, 115). The scientist formulated the problem in terms of the paradigm he operates
in. Active reflection leads to “progressive determination of a problem and its possible
solution,” (LTI, LW 12:113) and takes up “an intermediate and reconstructive position”
between a problematic situation and a provisionally temporarily controlled one (EEL, MW
10:331). Certain observed effects of cell cultures indicate potential support for the scientist’s
idea. The process culminates in a judgment or assertion as the “settled outcome of inquiry”
that has “direct existential import” (LTI, LW 12:123). The judgment reached is inseparable
from the problematic context that gave rise to inquiry. For now, this “warranted assertion” by
engaged inquiry can be relied and acted upon.
Reflection upon and reconstruction of existing tools and materials, which includes our
own beliefs and habits, can lead to “the securer, freer and more widely shared embodiment of
values in experience by means of that active control” (QC, LW 4:30).

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2.3 Moral Deliberation as Inquiry
Ever since mankind started living in social settlements there has been conflict in choice of
values and expression of shared meanings.15 Moral deliberation is needed when we are
“confronted with situations in which different desires promise opposed goods and in which
incompatible courses of action seem to be morally justified” (1932 E, LW 7:164). Morally
problematic situations bring competing possibilities of action exerting different moral
demands. Conflict and tension, as in any multidimensional situation that requires inquiry, are
the norm in our moral experience. Instead of a moral rule or univocal principle Dewey argues
for a radical pluralism of value and meaning in our experience (TIF, LW 5:279ff.). This
includes the problematic situations that we term to be distinctly moral in character.16 For a
pragmatist, moral principles provide guidance in inquiry and warn “against taking a short or
partial view of the act” deliberated and suggests “the important considerations for which he
should be on the lookout” (1932 E, LW 7:280).
Our previous experience also provides us with habits to fall back onto. In most
situations both habits and principles are sources from which initial suggestions spontaneously
occur, however vague they may be, that need to be further developed into hypotheses in
inquiry.17 Moreover, articulating the nature of the problem is the necessary first step of
deliberation, transforming an indeterminate situation into one determinate enough for possible
and relevant options to be explored. Otherwise our deliberation might miss the mark and we
run the risk of solving the tensive situation in an inappropriate and unreasonable way.
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15 Dewey situates meaning and values as emerging from and in social cohabitation, division of labor, and the use
of signs and tools, with communication as “the tool of tools” (EN, LW 1:58). His theory of meaning and
language, of human communication, is most eloquently set forth in the fifth chapter of Experience and Nature,
entitled ‘Nature, Communication, and Meaning’.
16 Johnson (2014, 38) notes that there is no special kind of moral experience as such. The traditional dualisms of
mere prudence versus morality or the conventional/moral distinctions are not differences in kind, but a difference
in degree, one that is mediated through a culturally contingent continuum. There is selective emphasis, not
ontological status, in our use of adjectives like ‘technological’, ‘moral’, or ‘aesthetic’.
17 Not considering and rehearsing such hypotheses before trying them out cuts inquiry short, and “intelligence is
abdicated” (Fesmire 2003, 73).

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Obviously the skillful activity needed for “sensitively and insightfully [identifying] the fullest
range of competing values, claims, principles, motivations, and habits” can be enacted better
or worse (Johnson 2014, 105).
Moral deliberation is a consideration of propositions as what to do, proposals for action,
eventuating in a moral judgment. For Dewey, any conduct is moral conduct. It concerns “all
activity into which alternative possibilities enter” (HNC, MW 14:193). Action that is better or
worse. All conduct is also social. Dewey observes that “Conduct is always shared … It is not
an ethical ‘ought’ that conduct should be social, it is social, whether good or bad” (HNC, MW
14:16). To explore alternative possibilities humans possess the capacity of imagination as “the
medium of realization of every kind of thing, which lies beyond the scope of direct physical
response” (DE, MW 9:245. Imagination will be taken up later. For now, we may note the
adaptive benefit of imagination: “An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences
cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable”
(HNC, MW 14:132-33).18
2.4 Chapter Two – Conclusion
I argued moral deliberation is a form of inquiry, “among the most important tools at our
disposal for learning to live together” (Hickman 1998, 186). Problematic situations become
determinate only through inquiry, and tentative solutions must always be verifiable in and by
experience as lived (Fesmire 2003, 75). Moral deliberation deals with norms and values
arising out of experience. What these sources of our values are I treat next.
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18 Any moral judgment is a judgment of practice because it involves considerations of value (Hickman 1998,
180). The moral judgment “is a judgment of what and how to judge — of the weight to be assigned to various
factors in the determination of judgment” (LJP, MW 8:36).

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3. Chapter Three - Inquiry: Processes of Embodied Cognition
“In vital experience ... the emotional phase binds parts together into a single whole;
‘intellectual’ simply names the fact that the experience has meaning; ‘practical’ indicates that
the organism is interacting with events and objects which surround it” (AE, LW 10:61).
3.1 Chapter Three - Overview
I first explicate meaning as the relations that obtain in our experiences of things before
showing values arising in and from Πinteraction. Finally, I treat dual-process theories of
cognition, to note immediate and reflective moral valuations.
3.2 Inquiry is Embodied, Embedded and Enacted
Pragmatic naturalism explains cognition in terminology of biological organisms interacting
with their environments. Dewey’s postulate of continuity provides a guiding assumption in
this project: “The primary postulate of a naturalistic theory of [cognition] is continuity of the
lower (less complex) and the higher (more complex) activities and forms.” It “excludes
complete rupture,” and “reduction of the ‘higher’ to the ‘lower’ just as it precludes complete
breaks and gaps” (LTI, LW 12:30-31). Furthermore, “ ‘Continuity’ … means that rational
operations grow out of organic activities, without being identical with that from which they
emerge” (LTI, LW 12:26).
As we have seen, an organism is always embedded in a particular existing environment.
The organism’s attentive interacting with its environing conditions is understood as a process
of transactions, of doings and undergoings. Dewey situated mind in such a biological
embedded, embodied and enactive perspective as interactive minding: exploring, navigating,
reaching, grasping, making (Fesmire, 2015, 49; see EN, LW 1:188). Minding is both
something the organism does and something in its environment that affords it that activity.

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Conscious behavior is the organism actively minding its transactions with the environment it
is situated in for purposes of being able to reflect on and share effectuated outcomes in
symbolic interaction, like social communication of values, meanings and facts. Intelligent
behavior is the organism evaluating its past experiences in order to ameliorate its future
experiences. In the circumstances mind has evolved in, it should come as no surprise that it
uses “the structures which are biological adaptations of organism and environment as its own
and its only organs” (EN, LW 1:211).19
Meaning is about relations and connections. In a process of inquiry, events of a situation
can acquire new meanings. The traveler lost in the forest hears indefinite sounds in the
distance. By consequent perception and movement he comes to discern them as the sounds of
axes cutting trees. The indefinite sounds are now significant as they point to other objects and
events, meaning a return to safety. For a pragmatist “the meaning of any object or event is the
experiences it evokes” (Johnson, 2014, 200). Meaning can relate to prior events, present
experience currently had, or possible future experience. Moral deliberation needs growth of
meaning to adequately, and intelligently, deal with moral problems.20
Inquiry, like any interaction with an environment, is not something predicated on
bifurcation of stimulus and response. Instead, Dewey holds that “the interaction of organism
and environment, resulting in some adaptation which secures utilization of the latter, is the
primary fact, the basic category” (RP, MW 12:129). The unity of organism and environment
as experiential factors can be most clearly observed in simple physical interactions where air,
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19 To redress possible objections regarding ‘emerge,’ Dewey would contend that ‘mind’ is developed by
organisms only when acquiring “a specific set of interacting functional capacities within a communal context in
a society” (Johnson 2010b, 128). ‘Mind’ is “an added property assumed by a feeling creature, when it reaches
that organized interaction with other living creatures which is language, communication” (EN, LW 1:198).
20 Dewey describes the process and type of growth: “The present is complex, containing within itself a multitude
of habits and impulses. It is enduring, a course of action, a process including memory, observation and foresight,
a pressure forward, a glance backward and a look outward. It is of moral moment because it marks a transition in
the direction of breadth and clarity of action or in that of triviality and confusion. Progress is present
reconstruction adding fullness and distinctness of meaning, and retrogression is a present slipping away of
significance, determinations, grasp” (HNC, MW 14:195).

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food, and ground are incorporated into breathing, eating, and walking through transaction
with lungs, stomach, and legs (EN, LW 1:19; HNC, MW 14:15). Dewey’s watershed 1896
essay “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology” (RACP, EW 5:96-109) first formulated his
insight that an organism achieves integration and transaction with its environment through a
feedback loop of enacted coping.21 He uses the example of a child and a candle. Conventional
psychology held the candle as the stimulus that enters consciousness and the child’s reaching
for the candle as the motor response. Dewey, however, contends that only by the already
engaged in goal-directed behavior of the child did the candle enter its conscious awareness.
Engaged sensorimotor contingencies thus play a role in the organism’s cognition and
perception.22 Their transactions are “of such a nature that the one contributes to the form and
character of the other” (MW 6:xxv). As the doing and undergoing, the reaching of the child
and the burn by flame is connected. “One comes to suggest and mean the other,” Dewey
elaborates, and experience is then had “in a vital and significant sense” (RP, MW 12:129).
We should be continually alert and attuned to the changing quality of the situation so as
to indicate us of the direction inquiry is progressing towards. When the traveler lost in the
forest learns of the relation between the sounds and the axes as sign of civilization, they
become more meaningful. They also become more valuable for the traveler, because he now
knows how to act to deliberately transform his problematic situation into one that is more
satisfactory. In short, we feel whether we are progressing or regressing toward a solution.
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21 For enactivism (O’Regan & Noë 2001; borrowing ‘enactive’ from Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991) the
central claim is that “our ability to perceive not only depends on, but is constituted by, our possession of …
sensorimotor knowledge.” This is “a kind of skillful bodily activity” of the whole organism (Noë 2004, 2).
22 Here enactivsm is indebted not only to phenomenology but to pragmatism as well. For a historical account of
the gradual realization of pragmatist relevance to 4E cognitive sciences, a good contemporary starting point is
Madzia & Jung (eds.) Pragmatism and Embodied Cognitive Science. Of note is Shaun Gallagher’s contribution
‘Pragmatic Interventions into Enactive and Extended Conceptions of Cognition’ (Gallagher, 2016).

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3.3 Values are Affective and Natural
Emotion is not dichotomous to cognition, nor is it a second-rate form of cognition. Empirical
research in cognitive neuroscience by Antonio Damasio (1994, 1999, 2003, 2010) further
illuminates why humans have emotion and feeling and what its importance for thought is.
Emotions are our affective bodily response patterns by which our Πcoupling is monitored
and adjusted, resulting in the bodily regulation of optimal Πstability, what Damasio terms
homeostasis (Damasio, 2010, 49). This often happens at a visceral level, that is, emotions and
their concomitant body states and processes are not cognitively accessible and fully
automatically gauged and adjusted.23
The motivational force of our emotional response patterns effectuates direct action in
the environment as well. Meaning can be had already at this primordial low level.24 Only
when an emotion becomes cognitively accessible do we speak of feeling, says Damasio (ibid.,
111). Emotion as conscious feeling indicates tension in experience and reorients our attention
and activity. It is easy to see how well Damasio’s account fits Dewey’s notion of inquiry. The
felt pervasive character of a situation is gauged by emotion. When a situation becomes
problematic we feel this happening and inquiry starts from this imbalance, often being
supplied by our emotional response patterns with a cognitively accessible feeling that informs
the consequent deliberation, making of distinctions, and intermediate appraisals of elements
that have meaning or value for us in this situation. In short, emotions alter what, when, and
how we experience situations, by modification of feeling, consciousness, and anticipation of
action. The impact on moral judgments is that our evolutionary development has laid down
positive feeling states as a way of generally directing us toward well-being, or what Damasio
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23 Homeostasis is a continually ongoing adjustment and enactment of a balance of processes needed for the
maintenance of life of an organism, such as the automatic mechanisms for adjustment of body temperature to a
set-point by cooling or heating. Emotions are one repertoire of such complex bodily response patterns.
24 One example is Johnson’s elucidation of the Peircean notion of doubt as a fully embodied experience: “The
meaning of doubt is precisely this bodily experience of holding back assent and feeling a blockage of the free
flow of experience toward new thoughts, feelings, and experience” (Johnson 2007, 53-54).

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describes as “the placement of the organism in circumstances conducive to survival and well-
being” (Ibid., 53). For my argument I do not need to fully explain his theories, but I need the
acknowledgment that humans feel the types of processes I am describing, such as the tensions,
blockage, and renewed flow in moral deliberation.
Furthermore, our values are both natural and relational, that is they arise out of the
processes of ongoing Œ interaction (Johnson 2014, 72). “Valuing is something we do—an
activity or dynamic process in which we are directed toward achieving a certain existential
state” (ibidem, 49). To avoid ambiguous terms like ‘innate’ or ‘intrinsic’ for values, and to
emphasize the socioculturally mediated nature of what humans value, Johnson makes a
distinction between ‘maturationally natural’ values and ‘practiced’ values. Maturational
values “will arise naturally for any organism with a certain biological makeup that developed
according to a typical plan of maturation” (ibid., 51). Practiced values are those that are
“acquired through culturally mediated practices” (ibid). My ongoing reiteration of our
inhabited environments as physical, interpersonal or social, and cultural, serves as the basic
categorization of values.
First, our bodily natures and the necessity of homeostatic control give rise to a natural
imperative of “fitness, then flourishing” (Flanagan 2007, 54). Damasio relates value directly
or indirectly to survival so that “the valuations we establish in everyday social and cultural
activities have a direct or indirect connection to homeostasis,” which explains why “human
brain circuitry has been so extravagantly dedicated to the prediction and detection of gains
and losses, not to mention the promotion of gains and the fear of losses” (Damasio 2010, 47).
The quality of human survival is what can be termed well-being (ibid., 48). Schulkin
emphasizes the dynamic, responsive nature of life-regulation with the term allostasis.25
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25 Schulkin remarks that for many species “life cycles are both predictable and unpredictable” (2011, 7).
Predictable are seasonal changes and light/dark cycles. More unpredictable events include climate change by
droughts, food shortages, and disruption of social status.

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Allostasis is “about adapting to change and anticipating the need for change, so as to restore
the base state within a new physiological or environmental context” (Schulkin 2011, 6) and
importantly entails, through expanded cognitive function, “in social groups of diverse
complexity” the capacity for “longer-term regulation” (ibid., 7).26 To sum up, we distinguish
homeostasis as stability through constancy from allostasis, or more anticipatory regulation, as
stability through change.
Secondly, our interpersonal natures give rise to values tied to our socially constituted
identities. From this developmental perspective, as a human primary give-and-take, we can
explain values needed for and expressive of “the bonding and cooperative behavior” so
necessary for survival and well-being (Johnson 2014, 57).27
Thirdly, the one-on-one encounters in our development are complemented and
eventually mostly give way to activity in diverse groups. All our social behavior is undertaken
to achieve certain goods within certain practices, each with its own historical and cultural
tradition, formed by group action.28
Since “to live is to have values” then, we are always “preferentially directed toward
specific states of affairs” in the evolving interactions with our surroundings (Johnson 2016,
161). Morality as valuation, as inquiry into valuing, thus shows that the norm for our moral
experience is that we have conflicting values ourselves, and our own values can come into
conflict with those others have. Moral deliberation suggests one “what experience he would
get … if he were to follow out a given tendency or act upon a particular desire” (LOE, 229).
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26 An important example in Schulkin’s work is how levels of cortisol are impacted by disruption of social status,
and how social adaptations such as attachment can alleviate elevated levels of cortisol. Such social behavioral
adaptations are allostatic mechanisms designed for “the regulation of the internal milieu amidst an expanding
social milieu” (2011, 9).
27 To make mutual coordination possible, values are acquired in this shared “primary intersubjectivity” (Johnson
2014, 57-58), most importantly care/nurturance and empathy, the capacity to experience another person’s
situation—“to feel with and for them” (ibid., 60).
28 This requires certain traits of character, those “necessary for social cohesion, harmony, and cooperation”
(Johnson 2014, 63).

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We would do well to reiterate at this point that deliberation is a phase of an overall action of
solving and overcoming a felt tension in a problematic situation. Deliberation is complete
when among the forecast changed conditions that would follow if this or that possibility were
chosen an option is present that we feel will restore balance and assimilate conflicting factors.
Judgment is to make a choice as “the emergence of a unified preference out of competing
preferences” (HNC, MW 14:134).29 The principal ways we value require more elaboration
now.
3.4 Intuitions and Reasoning in Judgment
One of the most pervasive philosophical dichotomies is that between intuition and reason as
the causal force of our judgment and source of knowledge about norms and values in
morality. Wherever such dichotomies are used there is always the risk of hypostatization.
Instead of intuition and reason being discerned as functions or phases in Πinteraction they
are given separate ontological status. Set up that way we are inevitably led to consider either
one of them as the leading faculty in uncovering what the real or true, as opposed to the
merely apparent, duty, good, or end of our strivings should consist of. Even our best scientific
efforts can lead to such fallacies when experience as lived is not taken as a starting point for
all inquiry.30
In the last decades cognitive science and social psychology have studied widely diverse
cognitive processes and hypothesized the existence of dual processing in higher cognition and
human behavior (Evans 2008). A broad definition of features has a System 1 with processes
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29 Certain needs “which cannot be supplied without activity that modifies the surroundings … show themselves
as restless, craving, desiring activity which persists until the acts thus induced have brought about a new
integration of the organism and its relation to the environment,” and this falls for Dewey under the idea of
“affectivity” (AT, LW 2:105). Inquiry, like other “phases of the function” for Œ stability, is “controlled by need,
desire and progressive satisfactions,” and “constantly extended and refined through experience” (ibid., 106).
30 Mostly, this reification of dichotomies is not done for explicit ontological positing of matters, of res, but such
metaphysical assumptions nonetheless function implicitly in the background of much social and cognitive
scientific research.

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operating automatically, quickly and unconsciously, with little or no effort or sense of
voluntary control; while “System 2 allocates attention to effortful mental activities that
demand it, including complex computations,” whose operations are “often associated with the
subjective experience of agency, choice, and concentration” (Kahneman 2011, 20-21; see
Evans and Stanovich 2013).
DPT are appropriated within social psychology and neuroscience to explain differences
in moral judgments. Here fast emotional responses are contrasted with slow and deliberative
cognitive processing (Haidt 2001; Greene, et al. 2001).31 Critical views of DPT show how a
progression in a widely popular research program can lead to less suggestive and more
realistic and consilient hypotheses and explanations (Evans and Stanovich 2013). Ideally such
changes would propagate back into related research programs having appropriated the
original hypotheses and explanatory ease for other phenomena. One of these is Haidt’s social
intuitionist model of morality (Haidt 2001, 2012). I have elsewhere argued that Haidt’s
conclusions concerning intuitive moral judgments and the role of reasoning in morality do not
follow from empirical evidence alone (Machielsen 2017). One of his implicit assumptions
concerning reasoning is of what nature it has to be. Haidt constrains moral reasoning to
necessarily involve cognitive accessibility of reasons for judging, to have a causal influence
on the formation of moral judgment. Haidt considers automatic judgments, like the intuitive
moral judgments people seem to be making in his research, to be incompatible with this
notion of rationality. For reason to be effective in morality one needs to be consciously aware
of the reasoning process going on and have reasons introspectively accessible. For this Haidt
gives no arguments nor evidence; the split between System 1 and System 2 processes
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31 Recently the popularity of DPT and accompanying critiques might be causing untenable positions in moral
and social psychology (Railton 2014; Kahane 2014; D’Arms and Jacobson 2014b; Sauer 2017). Something
seems to be amiss in moral explanations featuring the alleged intuitive judgments.

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underlying his research program rule out the possibility of automatic processes based on
reason by conceptual fiat alone.
The pragmatic naturalist considers intuitive processes as proof of habits effectively
operating in stable situations. “Cases in which a problem and its probable solution flash upon
an inquirer are cases where much prior ingestion and digestion have occurred” (LTI, LW
12:112). Experience and habit intuitively present problem and solution together; it feels
familiar to continue this way. As Dewey says, “immediate ... feeling of the direction and end
of various lines of behavior is in reality the feeling of habits working below direct
consciousness” (HNC, MW 14:26).
Our habits color perception, steer selective emphasis in inquiry, and by integrating
memory, perception and environmental cues make matters seem and feel intuitive to us. But
we would do well to remember that this apparent immediacy is mediated immediacy. Habit is
the primary mediation of our moral appraisals originating intuitively; in problematic or
indeterminate situations the primary material or base of subject-matter for our reflective moral
judgments of value (Machielsen 2017).
3.5 Chapter Three - Conclusion
In the previous pages I argued meaning and value are grounded in Πcouplings. I showed
both emotion and intelligence to be distinctive modes of response, where “the emotional
aspect of responsive behavior is its immediate quality” (QC, LW 4:180).
Human values “are a dime a dozen” and their genesis is not the main issue of morality;
of main import is “the nature of good moral deliberation” (Johnson, 2014, 72). When man
adapted to environmental changes mere homeostatic regulation of a permeable bodily
boundary no longer sufficed. Longer periods of searching and exploring for the means to

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equilibrium meant locomotion and perception started playing a more distinctive role in
survival, shaping foresight and imagination as functions in inquiry.
4. Chapter Four - Moral Imagination as Embodied Simulation
“Imagination is rooted in the organic embodiment of our existence and flowers in our highest
consciously articulate moments” (Alexander 2013, 194).
4.1 Chapter Four - Overview
In the following pages imagination is elaborated, including its constraints. I introduce the
notion of embodied simulation from cognitive science as neural substrate underneath
Dewey’s dramatic rehearsal.
4.2 Moral Imagination: Situation and Projection
Inquiry always starts in a situation with its own particular and unique felt context. A situation
is never the same because both objective circumstances change and engaging with previous
situations changes the person. When a problematic situation disrupts ongoing activity,
feelings suggest material for imaginative deliberation of meaning to be experienced, possible
courses of action and related anticipated consequences. Disrupted habits carry over “the goal
of the activity into a conscious ideal” making us aware of “the intentional structure of the
activity” (Alexander 2013, 170). Affective thought, “charged with the urgent force of habit,”
(HNC, MW 14:39) functions to “reorganize the blocked action” towards “objective,
embodied completion” (Alexander 2013, 170).32
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32 To take up the example of the child and the candle again, memory of felt qualities and the consequences
experienced is preserved in habits. The next time the child encounters a flickering object, the meaning is
understood as “burning” because the child reached out and got burnt by a candle before.

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4.2.1 Horizon of possibilities
Dewey explains imagination’s projective nature: “imagination [of a non-present object] is not
a self-generated, self-enclosed, psychical existence. It is the persistent operation of a prior
object which has been incorporated in effective habit” (HNC, MW 14:40). Imagination not
“merely supervenes upon conduct,” but is “intervening in conduct” (ACF, LW 9:13). We
have already begun the search to determine what is going on before discriminating the aspects
needed to determine reconstructive activity (cf. Alexander 2013, 171). Understanding what
Dewey means by intelligence hinges on the prerequisite understanding of his view of
imagination as indirect exploratory action: “Thought is, as it were, conduct turned in upon
itself and examining its purpose and its conditions, its resources, aids, and difficulties and
obstacles” (HWT, LW 8:201; cf. QC, LW 4:178). Imagination is not one more faculty,
autonomous amongst others. Imagination integrates affect, memories, and the senses in a
multimodal way.33 All active use of intelligence in life is imaginative relative to the degree it
“supplements and deepens observation” (HWT, LW 8:351).
Intelligence is thus both situated and imaginative; it is concerned with the possibilities
inherent in actual particular situations. Imagination serves for “realizing what is not present”
to our senses (LW 17:242), affording “clear insight into the remote, the absent, the obscure”
(HWT, LW 8:251). Imagination projects past actions as the meaning of present immediate
experience upon elements and aspects with similar qualities.34 The traveler lost in the forest
remembers having broken his leg by climbing and falling out of a tree in childhood. The
meaning of his current predicament is extended. The projection of a horizon of possibilities
through imagination reveals the “extended environment of a situation” beyond the presently
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33 James noted that for some “there are imaginations,” (PP II, 50) meaning that different senses can be
predominant in one’s imagination, be it visual imagery, auditory or tactile/motor images (PP II, 57).
34 Dewey states that deliberation refers to both past and future. See HWT, LW 8:208-209, on the role and
temporal aspect of imagination in “suggestions”.

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actual (Alexander 2013, 172). In reflective inquiry the normally tacit context of a situation
becomes explicit, related to the focus of our conscious thought and attention, and works to
give “the underlying sense of continuity and meaning” (ibid., 173).
4.2.2 Constraints on imagination
Imagination also has constraints regarding this extension of the actual environment into the
possible. These dynamic contextual limits are habitual, sociocultural, and situational in
nature. First, habits as result of past experiencing become the prime factor in the what, when,
where, and how felt qualities become meaningful for us (cf. Solymosi 2016, 163).
Second, the tacit aspect determining the context for possible meaning can be narrower,
depending upon the sociocultural environment. The social character of deliberation, of
cooperative creativity, is the problem of imagination: “The tacit horizon shared by a
community limits the nature of any discussion and provides for the very possibility of
communicating at all” (Alexander 2013, 173-174).
Lastly, further constraining factors are habits considered within a situation—meaning
that certain capacity for sensitivity and thoughtfulness is non-existent due to insufficiency in
present habits, or temporarily ineffective due this unique ongoing situation (cf. Hills 2012,
85). Both prior experience and the evolving transactions in the problematic situation play a
role here.
4.2.3 Moral imagination, An Example
An example of moral deliberation concerns drinking a cup of coffee.35 I enjoy my morning
cup of coffee while observing birds in my backyard. My fascination with birds came about
during traveling and observing a variety of birds. I also came to realize certain coffee
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35 This example is adapted from the one used by Steven Fesmire (Fesmire 2015, 135).

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originates from plantations where scaled industrialized operation causes ecological damage,
reducing biodiversity by destruction of nesting grounds and impacting migration due to
changing weather patterns. My awareness of such relations enlarges the meaning of my cup of
coffee and the birds I observe back home, as it allows connections to be identified,
discriminated, and employed “as means in a further course of inclusive interaction” (EN, LW
1:198). Through imagination I become attentive to significant relations between my daily cup
of coffee (habit), my past experience of birds (memory), my present observing of birds
(immediate enjoyment), the modern practices of coffee plantation and associated effects
(knowledge), and by the extension of the actual environment am able to deliberate future
behavior through foresight and weighing of the consequences of possible alternative choices
of action. If I keep drinking my coffee, and want to keep seeing birds both in my backyard
and abroad, I can take action I judge to be of value: drink fair-trade coffee, make donations to
wildlife conservation, choose only service providers that support environmental policies, vote
or become politically active regarding the environment, or even decide it is all too much
trouble and postpone taking action.
Imaginative experience, as in moral deliberation, is a projection of what is anticipated
as meaningful. Imagination thus concerns foresight and implies “evaluation of possible
destinations or pathways is as basic a function of the mind” (Seligman et al. 2016, 24) as
perception or other cognitive functions are. Our affective responses to the extended situation
guide the ongoing inquiry, playing a signaling and monitoring role towards effected problem-
solving. Cognitive science studies this psychological capacity and considers it a form of
embodied simulation. To this I now turn.

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4.3 Moral imagination: enactment through embodied simulation
I discussed how the our bodies interacting with the environment provides the grounding for
the possibility of meaningful experiences of things, events, and situations. Moreover, in
primordial Πinteraction the genesis of value takes place, and increasingly complex and
dynamic Πcoupling leads to further diversified values and goods. I also discussed large parts
of cognition and understanding operating automatically and mostly below conscious
awareness and noted affect is involved from the start. It should be clear by now that moral
imagination is psychologically and behaviorally anchored within a dynamic brain-body-
environment system. Now I explain imagination is both something we can do given our
nature—i.e. the wiring is present—and something we engage in—i.e. there is behavioral
evidence.
4.3.1 Functional requirements for simulation
While not claiming or suggesting being exhaustive, it is informative to look at the possible
ways or modes of dramatic rehearsal Dewey himself suggested. Specificity can be found in
his early Lectures on Ethics, 1900-1901. Here Dewey distinguishes four ways that people
deliberate and notes a generic pattern: (1) “Some people deliberate by dialogue.” (2) “Others
visualize certain results.” (3) “Others rather take the motor imagery and imagine themselves
doing a thing.” (4) “Others imagine a thing done and then imagine someone else commenting
upon it.” The generic pattern involved is that deliberation “represents the process of
rehearsing activity in idea when that overt act is postponed. It is, so to speak, trying an act on
before it is tried out in the objective, obvious, space and time world” (LOE, 245).
In considering empirical evidence from cognitive science we should take seriously that, for
dramatic rehearsal to play the role Dewey professes it does, our “simulations” support (1)
action structures—to imagine acting, simulations are of dynamic, temporal, and spatial

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structure; (2) means and ends-in-view inferences—to imagine alternative actions and possible
results, simulations are teleological and inferential; (3) affective qualities—to imagine
actions, consequences, and both our own reaction, and other’s reactions of (dis)approbation,
simulations are qualitative so we can feel and evaluate them; (4) a multimodal sensorimotor
character—to imagine, simulations are motor-based (action repertoires) and sensory-based
(visual, auditory); (5) intersubjectivity—to imagine acting in a social setting, simulations are
about or involve other persons; (6) language, symbolic expression, and abstraction36 —to
imagine (abstract) concepts and meanings, simulations are schematic, structural, and involve
both linguistic processing capacities and areas of the brain “responsible for understanding and
reasoning about nonphysical or abstract objects or processes” (Johnson 2012, 105). Not only
do we need to see whether simulation can do this, but also that in simulation this actually
happens.
First the notion of embodied simulation (ES) is discussed. Then I treat the interactionist,
multimodal, simulation theory of meaning and thought (Gallese and Lakoff 2005). From this
interactional, or enactive (Varela et al., 1991), perspective I appropriate and explain the claim
that the sensorimotor system is mainly multimodal (i.e. involving neural substrates used for
both action and perception), a claim supported by empirical evidence from studies of
perception and action in monkeys and humans. Third, I argue ES makes possible the
simulation of goal-directed action without actually carrying it out. Next, I supplement ES with
affective qualities in simulations using Damasio’s as-if body loop. I conclude by showing my
supplemented ES allows imagination to play the role within Deweyan moral deliberation.
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36 This is mainly treated in the next chapter.

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4.3.2 What is embodied simulation?
The idea of ES, as proposal for a mechanism how embodiment of cognition and meaning
could be realized, is simply this: “Maybe we understand … by simulating in our minds what it
would be like to experience the things” (ibid.). Simulating is done all the time. For example,
when we imagine our beloved one’s faces, or replay that disastrous presentation we gave. We
also simulate sounds when we “imagine sounds in [our] head without any sound waves hitting
[our] ears,” for example the organ melody starting the Dire Strait’s The Walk of Life or the
characteristic whooshing sound that Michael Knight’s car sidekick K.I.T.T. produced in
Knightrider (ibid., 14).37 The same goes for other sensor modalities like taste and smell. Next
to sensory simulation, we also simulate action. When we think about brushing our teeth, we
not only visually simulate moving our hand, but we also ‘feel’ what this is like to grasp the
toothbrush (the amount of force applied) and what motions we customarily make with our
hand.
Simulation treated so far is consciously and intentionally undertaken. It is mental
imagery. The idea of ES goes further and deeper. According to Bergen, “simulation is an
iceberg” of which mental imagery is “the tip” (Bergen 2012, 14). Of interest then are
simulations both automatic and consciously inaccessible in character. ES and direct
interaction with the environment engage the same parts of the organism’s brain (cf. Bergen
2012, 45). This hypothesis can be tested by measurement of brain activity. When people
imagine seeing or acting, the areas involved in seeing and acting should light up in brain
imaging scans.38 When people imagine seeing or acting, the areas involved in seeing and
acting should light up. Johnson argues concepts are neural activation patterns. They can be
“turned on” due to actual perceiving or moving, or when we think or imagine something. As
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37 Having grown up in the eighties these are some of my trademark examples. If you don’t know or appreciate
David Hasselhoff’s acting skills, no worries, I am sentimentally biased.
38 Evidence for embodied simulation is not restricted to brain imaging studies. I discuss other ways too.

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simulation (of a concept, or meanings) is built upon other systems that evolved for more
direct Πinteraction, it is informative to discuss the multimodal character of what is involved
in perception, performance, and understanding of grasping acts.
4.3.3 Multimodality of sensorimotor experience and embodied simulation
Multimodality is explained through elaborating what is involved in an act of grasping an
object. When we grasp, there is coordination of perception and motor activity. There is a
sequencing of a variety of motor synergies, like our ability to first open our hand flat, move it
toward the object, and then fold our fingers around it. Depending on the object, and our
visuomotor capabilities, there are multiple types of grasping actions, each with its own so
called action parameters (cf. Johnson 2012, 96). The neural clusters instantiating such
parameters model the action performed (grasping little object), the direction (movement
towards), the amplitude (‘size’ of motion), the force (strength of motion), et cetera. Naturally,
since grasping does not involve motor coordination of our hands alone, more parameters are
involved for our upper-body position, arm motion, and the necessary hand-eye coordination
guiding our grasping. Reflecting upon a simple action of grasping seems to show a lot is
involved. Neural clusters mostly get parameterized automatically and without much conscious
awareness, but sometimes we do feel a parameter (force in a vice grip, proprioceptive
awareness of our arm in space). An action, such as grasping our phone, is multimodal, when
(1) “it is neurally enacted using neural substrates used for both action and perception,” and (2)
“the modalities of action and perception are integrated at the level of the sensory-motor
system itself and not via higher association areas” (Gallese and Lakoff 2005, 459).
Multimodality as neural structural principle differs from supramodality. If grasping was
supramodal, our brains would have to contain an association area integrating sensory and
motor neural signals. That multimodal structures realize most sensorimotor activity does not

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imply there is no supramodality. However, there is simply too much evidence the brain is not
massively modular (Edelman and Tononi 2000; Tucker 2007; Anderson 2014).
Most research comes from monkeys (Gallese et al. 1996; Rizzolatti et al. 1996; Fogassi
et al. 2005; Bonini et al. 2010), but newer studies show similar processes and neural structures
in humans (Glenberg 2011; Gallese 2016).39 Sensorimotor processes are carried out via
functional clusters of neurons. A functional cluster carries out a particular function for an
organism and is made up from a certain cortical network organized for this purpose. Three
such functional clusters, networked between premotor and parietal areas, are:
(1) Spatial position locators.40 The F4-VIP neural cluster enables awareness of and interacting
purposefully with objects in peripersonal space, the area of space reachable by our body parts
(head, hands, arms, and feet) (Matelli et al. 1985; Rizzolatti and Luppino 2001). Perceiving an
object within reachable location appears to execute an action simulation for object interaction
(Fogassi et al. 1996; Rizzolatti et al. 1997; Gallese 2005).
(2) Canonical neurons. The F5ab-AIP cluster enables actual and simulated interaction with
objects. When we see the cup of coffee we want to grasp, pick up, and drink from, we
automatically and non-consciously get ready with the needed motor program for enacting our
purpose (Rizzolatti et al. 2000; Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004). Activation happens both when
we grasp, and when we only see an object we might grasp (Jeannerod et al. 1995; Murata et
al. 1997; Rizzolatti and Fadiga, 1998; Raos et al. 2006; Umilta et al. 2007, 2008).
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 See Rizzolatti and Craighero (2004) for a review; Molenberghs et al. (2012) for a meta-analysis; Cook et al.
(2014) for a critical study of function.
40 For human results see Bremmer et al. (2001) and Serino et al. (2011).

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(3) Mirror neurons.41 The F5c-PF cluster contains neurons that activate both when we perform
a goal-directed action, and when we see another person perform the same type of motor action
involving arm, hand, or mouth (Gallese et al. 1996; Rizzolatti et al. 1996; Fogassi et al. 2001;
Buccino et al. 2001; Umilta et al. 2001; Ferrari et al. 2003). Mirror neurons contain a degree
of specificity and do not fire when just observing tool usage; only actual hand movement
performing an act (like grasping) causes activation. Also, experiments show only small parts
of total motor movement need to be perceived to complete the whole motor plan
‘understanding’ (Umilta et al. 2001). Perceiving action or dynamic expression links up with
“the intrasubjective, proprioceptive sense of one’s own capabilities” (Gallagher 2005, 77).
For my account of ES these clusters are relevant, as “all three of these systems make possible
the simulation of a purposive action without actually carrying that action out” (Johnson 2012,
99). The first cluster binds perception of location to possible action. The second cluster is
evidently multimodal, firing both when we interact with an object and when we see the object
that we can possibly interact with. The third cluster shows perceptual and motor
multimodality as well, and importantly, simulation. When we see someone reaching out and
grasping an object, we automatically understand the action by simulation, through mirror
neurons, of undertaking the action ourselves. Similar results have been found for imagined
situations and actions (Decety and Grezes 2006; Aziz-Zadeh et al. 2006). Much of our brains
is organized in terms of goal-directed motor acts, what Gallese calls “motor cognition”
(Gallese et al. 2009). As Gallagher notes, “it is likely [at the neurophysiological level] that
numerous intermodal mechanisms allow for the [preconscious] communication between
proprioception and vision, or more generally, between movement, proprioceptive awareness,
and perception” (2005, 77).
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41 For human homologues see Gallese et al. (2004) and Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2010).

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What this means is that “within the operation logic of such neural networks, a series of
physical entities … are identified, differentiated and conceptualized, not in relation to their
mere physical appearance, but in relation to the effect of the interaction with an acting agent”
(Gallese 2003, 1236). Simulations by the three functional clusters support action
understanding and forms of primary intersubjectivity (Rizzolatti and Gallese 1997; Gallese
2006, 2007). We are able to interpret observed, and imagined, actions in terms of motor goals,
and also able to better distinguish details of observed, and imagined, actions in terms of motor
plans (Fogassi 2014, 199; Gallese and Sinigaglia 2014, 200). We can anticipate what can
happen next by observing complex actions, and react to, “the agency of others just as [we]
would anticipate the agency of [ourselves]” (Kaag 2009, 11; cf. Umilta et al. 2001).
I now elaborate ES with the structural understanding action schemas provide.
4.3.4 Action structure in embodied simulation
So far we have an idea how concepts and meaning can be considered embodied, in that “the
job done by what have been called ‘concepts’ can be accomplished by schemas characterized
by parameters and their values. Such a schema, from a neural perspective, consists of a
network of functional clusters” (Gallese and Lakoff 2005, 466).42 An illustration of the
notions of schemas, functional clusters, and parameters was discussed previous paragraph
with the concrete example of the concept of grasp (cf. Johnson 2007, 162-164).
All concrete concepts (of physical objects and actions) can be described through
schemas, and what the concepts-as-schemas idea provides is a dynamic flexibility of how we
understand concepts. Since the underlying functional clusters can be active in degrees, instead
of just on/off, the result is that various parts or phases could be left out. When we grasp our
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42 This embodiment of concepts can be grounded in sensorimotor networks and is congruent with evolutionary
ideas of neural reuse (Anderson 2010, 2014; Gallese and Sinigaglia 2011; Gallese 2016, 303-306 for discussion)
and exaptation (Gallese 2000; Gould and Lewontin 1979; Gould and Vrba 1982).

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cup of coffee the schema is activated with specific parameters and values. The schema is also
activated when we think about grasping, or when we hear or read the word grasp, with partly
inhibitions of the complete schema (cf. Gallese and Lakoff 2005, 467-68). The grasp concept
contains schematic structure and the accompanying inferential structure. Abstract concepts
and thoughts of society, morality, or values, also need to be explained as embodied. I discuss
three minimally needed components: image schemas, COGs, and conceptual metaphors.
Image schemas build upon topological neural maps of various sensorimotor areas, and are
patterns characterizing invariant structures within them (Johnson 2005). Image schemas
always exist only due to the functional coupling of brain-body-environment.43 Our ongoing
bodily interaction with environments builds up the capacity to experience and enact many
different image-schematic patterns, providing a host of simple “corporeal and spatial logics”
enabling us in applicable situations to make inferences (Johnson 2012, 102). One example is
the image schema SOURCE-PATH-GOAL (Johnson 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1999) that
structures the motion of an object along a path from a starting point to an end point.44
Inferences we can make include: two objects starting from a source point and moving at the
same speed along the same path will reach the goal simultaneously; if an object has moved
along a path to the halfway point toward the goal, then is has covered the intermediate points
along the path up to that point. And even though this logic might seem simple, such
inferences are used in reasoning about sensorimotor experiences commonly.
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43 Possible neural substrates of image schemas are neuro-computationally studied in structured connectionist
models (Dodge and Lakoff 2005; Regier 1996), and linguists explored structure and logic in diverse cultures
(Hampe 2005). There is also neuroimaging evidence (Rohrer 2005).
44 Other examples are VERTICALITY, BALANCE, RIGHT-LEFT, CENTER-PERIPHERY, COMPULSIVE
FORCE, CONTAINMENT, DEGREE OF INTENSITY (SCALARITY), et cetera (Gibbs 2006a; Johnson 1987,
2012).

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Cogs are a neuro-computational construct (Narayanan 1997a), modeling premotor and motor
cortex and premotor-motor interfaces where the premotor system both coordinates and
sequences certain motor synergies. The model specifies different possible phases or stages of
motor actions: (1) initial state, (2) starting phase transition, (3) precentral state, (4) central
phase transition (instantaneous, prolonged, or ongoing), (5) postcentral state, (6) ending phase
transition, and (7) final state. The model includes structures for assessing progress to goal,
reiterating action sequences, and deciding to terminate action. Most interestingly, the model
can depict the linguistic “aspect” of action, i.e. in what manner the action is done (once,
reiterated, prolonged in time) (Narayanan 1997b, c). For example, progressive aspect (John is
writing the thesis) means action is ongoing. With perfect aspect (John has written the thesis)
the model is in the final state of action. Spatial motions, state changes, or even abstract mental
processes can be represented in the model, using patterns, structure and inferential logic from
the sensorimotor domain. The premotor cortex brain structure is supramodal in a sense,
because it provides structure to information going to sensors and effectors, although it is not
directly connected to sensorimotor areas itself. Simulations can be run ‘abstractly’ by
inhibition of connections to primary areas, so without any action resulting. The resulting
abstract concept of action structure is the cog (Narayanan 1997a, Feldman 2006, Lakoff
2008).45
Conceptual metaphor combines with previous components of embodied meaning discussed so
far: multimodal sensorimotor concepts, image schemas, executing schemas for action
structures, and cogs providing structure of grammatical constructions. Central to metaphor is
inference (Lakoff and Johnson 1980/2003, 244). Conceptual metaphor is a cross-domain
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45 Cogs hypothesized as such can explain specific abstract structures encountered and needed in natural language
(Feldman and Narayanan 2004; Feldman 2006; Loenneker-Rodman and Narayanan 2012; Lakoff 2014), or
action structures and inferences of means and ends-in-view I defined as components for ES realizing Deweyan
moral imagination.

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39
conceptual mapping; it permits inferences in (typically) sensorimotor source domains (e.g.,
domains of motion, objects, physical space) to be utilized to make inferences about
nonphysical or abstract domains (like domains of purposeful action, justice, society, et cetera)
(ibid.; cf. Johnson 2007, 165-167). The mapping is asymmetrical46 and directional (Lakoff
2008). Importantly, conceptual metaphor is not just about ways we talk, but also about
conceptualization and reasoning.
An example will illustrate and facilitate elaboration of conceptual metaphor. Reflect on
your understanding of the expression “John has a long way to go before his thesis is finished.”
We talk about the completion of a multistep ‘mental’ project (composing a thesis) in terms of
distance and motion through space (in a long way to go). What is significant is that in the
former there is no literal motion whatsoever involved. The explanation comes from how
conceptual metaphors are made up of a mapping of entities and relations in the source domain
(physical spatial motion) onto the target domain (purposive action, of physical and abstract
kinds).
The actual metaphor is the underlying conceptual mapping that is realized by a complex
neural binding. One consequence of the ubiquity of basic sensorimotor cognition for language
is that conceptual mappings can give rise to what is known as polysemous linguistic
expressions that have meanings both for the physical experience and to abstract notions.
When complementing the previous example with the polysemous term “arrived,” the
expression “John has finally arrived” can be understood both in spatial meaning (“John has
finally arrived at his destination for his thesis defense after a long bicycle trip”) or in
metaphorical meaning (“John has finally arrived at his goal of submitting a final version of
his thesis to his professors”). Many related expressions can be found in natural languages:
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 Neurons that fire more have greater capacity. Because those involved in bodily functioning fire more often,
metaphorical mappings are developed asymmetrically and typically have sensorimotor source domains (Lakoff
2008, 28). That some metaphorical mappings have social source domains should not come as a surprise given
the neural and sociocultural exposition of cognitive development thus far.

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“John started out to get his masters degree,” “John wandered off the track along the way,”
“John stood in the way of his own progress,” “John’s friends helped him get moving again
along the right path,” “He finally reached his original destination—he got his MA.”
Our knowledge from a source domain, often structured by image schemas (here
SOURCE-PATH-GOAL at least, but more basic schemas like walk—a variant of grasp—can
be involved), gets used in reasoning about and understanding of the target. So image
schematic structure and inferences are preserved by conceptual metaphors.47
For abstract reasoning and conceptualization to be based on these structures there must
be neural connections between sensorimotor areas of the brain and parts involved in ‘higher’
cognition (see Schomers and Pulvermüller 2016). Edelman’s account of reentrant mapping for
neuronal groups provides a neural basis for the existence and operation of schemas and cross-
domain mappings, with reentry described as: “the ongoing, recursive interchange of parallel
signals between reciprocally connected areas of the brain, an interchange that continually
coordinates the activities of these areas’ maps to each other in space and time. This
interchange, unlike feedback, involves many parallel paths and has no specific instructive
error function associated with it. Instead, it alters selective events and correlations of signals
among areas and is essential for the synchronization and coordination of the areas’ mutual
functions” (Edelman and Tononi 2000, 48).48
Neurobiological structures underlying language (such as speech perception,
comprehension, and production) are explored through brain imaging studies and neuro-
computation, and recent work underscores and expands upon Edelman (Pulvermüller 2005,
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47 For example with the image schema CONTAINMENT, a structure acquired through our regular experiences
of putting objects into and taking them out of a bounded area (cf. Johnson 1987, 29-32): source domain container
(physical cup of coffee) gets mapped to container (metaphorical cups of coffee), with interior mapped to interior
and exterior mapped to exterior (Lakoff and Johnson 1980/2003, 253). Possible metaphorical expressions then
become: “John got lost in his cup of coffee,” “We got the most out of our cup of coffee.”
48 These sensory and motor maps allow intermodal connection and correlation of structures in topological neural
maps, as with vision and touch having both a CONTAINER schema where the intermodal connection enables us
to grasp the cup of coffee we see in front of us.

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41
2013). The arcuate fasciculus (AF; see Catani et al. 2005; Rilling et al. 2008; Poeppel et al.
2012), and other such white-matter fiber tracts, provides strong links between language areas
in the frontal and temporal cortex (including the ‘classic’ Broca and Wernicke areas, but
importantly also interconnecting with Geschwind’s territory in the parietal lobe). Important
(evolved) capacities include expressive language functioning, higher-order language functions
and providing shorter connections between important language regions (Pulvermüller et al.
2014, Schomers et al. 2017; Skipper et al. 2017; Tomasello et al. 2017).49 Of import is the
interconnection of premotor, motor, visual and auditory regions involved in language; this
makes a functional role for cogs, image schemas, and metaphorical mappings possible and
shows how abstract conceptualization and reasoning could be realized. As of the writing of
this thesis, however, no empirical studies have explored this exciting new possibility. I now
elaborate ES with the evaluative capacity affect provides.
4.3.5 Affect and valuation in embodied simulation
The multimodal functional architecture of the sensorimotor system allows many cognitive
functions to be scaffolded upon “motor potentialities expressed by our situated body” (Gallese
2016, 299). The motor system, through its intermodal linking, can functionally shape a
pragmatic Umwelt, dynamically surrounding our bodies in ongoing interaction with the
environment. The effect is the ongoing mapping of distances, locations and objects in the
environment, providing us with actual and possible ways of enacting goal-directed actions by
what our interactions afford (cf. Gallese 2016, 300-301; Chemero 2003, 2009). We also noted
basic empathic and intrasubjective capacities through mirror mechanisms. But for simulation
to help deciding which possible course of action presents the better way forward for future
experience we have to feel “a twinge of affect in connection with the idea of acting in a
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49 See Rutten (2017) The Broca-Wernicke Doctrine for a historical study of language localization in the brain.

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certain way” (Seligman et al. 2016, 212). An affective response toward entertained actions is
an evaluative capacity within imagination as ES. Memories of previous emotional experiences
in the past get activated as traces in present similar situations. The activated memory trace
now acts as signal of what emotion we will have in the future if we enact this possibility (cf.
Seligman et al. 2016, 211-213). When we imagine a chain of possible events unfolding,
including our own role or action, the consequences, and other’s actions or (dis)approvals, we
feel better or worse now towards these future circumstances.
Feelings in imagination can play this functional evaluative and prospective role due to
ES of “certain body states, as if they were occurring” (Damasio 2010, 102). Damasio’s “as-if
body loop” provides the missing link in my ES account so far: simulation occurring “within
somatosensing regions” (ibid.; see Damasio 1994, 155-160). Since “our perception of any
body state is rooted in the body maps of the somatosensing regions,” Damasio claims, through
simulations “we perceive the body state as actually occurring even if it is not” (ibid., cf.
Damasio 1994, 184; 2003, 115-118). Habits and memories are (neurally) dependent on
experience-driven learning within Œ couplings where “certain categories of entity or event”
get connected “with the enactment of a body state, pleasant or unpleasant” (Damasio 1994,
180). When we get re-exposed to such options, or think or imagine about them or their
outcomes, the “as-if body loop” now has “the power to reenact the painful body state” and
can serve as a “reminder of bad consequences to come” (ibid.). Our deliberation gets “biased
toward selecting the action most likely to lead to the best possible outcome, given prior
experience” (Damasio 2003, 148; emphasis mine). So the immediate character of our
affective appraisals here serves to illuminate the bodily basis for “the person’s quest for an

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anticipated better state” (Seligman et al. 2016, 217). In the end, what ES provides is a felt way
forward for Πreintegration, resolution of a problematic situation.50
4.3.6 From Experience to Discourse
Imagination, and imaginative projection specifically, as realized by the supplemented ES
thesis I argue for, can play the role Dewey describes by allowing one to extend the actual
environment into the possible, thereby shining new light on the “affordances” (Gibson 1979)
the environment presents for continued action in present and future engagements.51 Through
imagination, by simulation, we can try out alternative courses of action and feel what
available course of action would best resolve the indeterminacy we face in the situation.
Motor structures are pre-activated for offline enaction of sensorimotor potentialities including
all accompanying body states “we would assume were we ourselves moving” (Damasio 2010,
104). The functions required for Deweyan moral imagination that I elaborated with evidence
from neuroscience so far include: action structures, inferences and corporeal logic of schemas,
affective qualities for appraisal, sensorimotor multimodality, intersubjectivity, and
conceptualization and semantic content. Having a concept of grasp, or a cup of coffee for that
matter, comes down to having “the ability to simulate neurally certain specific kinds of
experiences associated” with cups of coffee (Johnson 2016, 147). Over and above relatively
concrete sensorimotor concepts language and conceptualization become increasingly abstract.
As Gallese notes, here we are confronted with the need to “connect the common pre-linguistic
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50 Evaluation by feeling is often described as appraisal. Important is that I hold, with Colombetti (and Dewey),
that appraisal is not a separate process, as “evaluating the world and responding emotionally to it are not distinct
processes” (Colombetti 2014, 111-112). Appraising is part and parcel of our ongoing behavior, and reappraisal is
a way to regulate emotional responses by influencing what we think about something to change its affective
impact. Appraising and reappraising can both happen through ES. Modulation of emotional responses can be
interpreted as changes of significance and meaning of emotional stimuli. An example is someone seeing the
body of a victim of a violent crime may tell himself, “that is just ketchup,” (cf. Buhle et al. 2014, 2982) thereby
influencing the felt quality. See the related meta-analysis by Brooks et al. (2017) for language on emotion.
51 Remember that in truly problematic situations the ends themselves are in question. A big part of any moral
deliberation is “working toward an emergent end that becomes clarified as the process of inquiry develops”
(Johnson 2014, 107).

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sphere to the linguistic one” (Gallese 2016, 307; see Glenberg and Gallese 2012). Taking
embodiment of language and the ES hypothesis seriously, this need “consists in showing that
language, when it refers to the body in action, brings into play the neural resources normally
used to move that very same body” (ibid.). Dewey noted, “a universe of experience is the
precondition of a universe of discourse” (LTI, LW 12:74); extending him entails showing the
universe of abstract conceptual discourse is scaffolded upon the universe of concrete
conceptual experience.
4.4 Chapter Four - Conclusion
In the end, I fleshed out what the role of our body and brain in conceptualization and
simulation play, by using neural mechanisms underlying and enabling the (cognitive) actions
I described earlier, like moral deliberation. Projection of the horizon of possibility by
imagination gives to the process of dramatic rehearsal those possible meanings that the
qualitative situation in all its aspects and relations has available considering our current Œ
coupling.52 Imagination thus presents the sensed affordances within the context of the
situation as relations, and thus, according to pragmatic naturalism, as possible meanings (cf.
Chemero 2003, 185-186; 2009, 150ff.). ES of the projected possible action and foreseen
consequences make us imaginatively experience a feeling of understanding the meaning
afforded by this or that alternative, including an evaluative component of “Oh,” or “Good”
(QT, LW 5:250) characterizing ambiguity or reestablishment of stability in situations (cf.
Johnson 2007, 78).
The vast amount of simulation taking place unconsciously and automatically (ibid.) is
possibly problematic in a sense that we can be relatively unaware of how our values and
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52 Remember habits, communal tacit horizon, and situational constraints limit imaginative projection.

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meaning are constrained and influenced by the situations and contexts we experience.53
“What [something] means depends on merging together independent experiences,” especially
when we have never experienced anything in the real world that corresponds to an abstract
term or non-existent object (ibid., 19). Discourse and language, including metaphors, provide
such ubiquitous ways we experience and simulate that they require more attention now.
5. Chapter Five – Metaphors in Moral Imagination
“Classification and conception are purely teleological weapons of the mind. The essence of a
thing is that of its properties so important for my interests that in comparison with it I may
neglect the rest” (James, PP II, 335).
5.1 Chapter Five - Overview
In the previous chapter I provided an overview of the psychological process and function of
imagination required for Deweyan moral deliberation and argued ES is the neurobiological
mechanism that realizes it. In the following pages I treat our moral experience as shaped
through language use, specifically metaphors in moral deliberation.
Elaborating the function of metaphor in moral imagination, I focus on two aspects. First
is how language influences understanding, importantly in which possible ways metaphors
prime, frame, obscure, and steer moral imagination. Second is several traditional ways our
moral experiences are structured metaphorically, including a case study analyzed with the
framework and process of moral imagination as argued for. The outcome indicates metaphors
impact moral imagination (ways we deliberate and evaluate possible action); metaphors both
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53 Given the above, extending ES to language no longer seems far-fetched. Language is embodied, just like other
cognitive functions, and depends on ES (cf. Bergen 2012, 15). When we listen to someone, or read, we simulate
seeing and acting what is described, appropriating our sensorimotor system and somatosensory regions, like
those involved in emotion.

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hinder and facilitate moral imagination, but importantly, play a functional role regardless
whether we are consciously aware of them.
5.2 Linguistic Influence on Embodied Simulation
Any inquiry involves both facts found and ideas entertained. Especially when ideas become
more abstract space arises for misunderstanding and misconceiving of both situation and
possibilities entertained for reestablishing ongoing effective action. I first shortly summarize
abstract concepts and metaphor. Then I treat how language relates to ES, showing several
ways language influences ES. I end with how metaphors are simulated.
5.2.1 Abstract Concepts and Metaphors
There is a level of physical interaction in the world at which we evolved to function
successfully, and an important part of our conceptual system is attuned to such functioning
(Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 90). Out of our embodied and sociocultural experiences
conceptual schemas and structures have arisen, the neurophysiological aspect of which was
discussed last chapter. The basis of our conceptual lives begins in sensorimotor behavior and
derives meaning from this bodily experience. We noted metaphors are based upon image
schemas, themselves realized through more basic neural maps. Our concepts of front and back
are based on the “peculiar nature of our bodies” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 19). This counts
for up-down, pushing, pulling, etc. Our conceptual thought is shaped through abstraction and
metaphor based on these underlying schemas, including our moral concepts. So, justice is
conceived in terms of balance, virtue is conceived in terms of being upright, and so on. We
also noted conceptual inference is, importantly, sensorimotor inference (ibid., 20; Johnson
2005, 21; 2006, 52-3).

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The idea that ES underlies cognitive processes like imagination and language processing is an
important hypothesis for a pragmatic naturalist theory of meaning (cf. Johnson 2010b, 139).
The understanding we have of a concept of a particular object, event, or relation is constituted
by the cognitive capacity for simulating “a series of perceptions, body movements, feelings,
emotions, and appraisals,” all incorporated in the physical and sociocultural interactions we
have with such objects or events (Johnson 2016, 147-148; cf. Johnson 2010b, 136ff.). I now
consider empirical evidence on ES of language.
5.2.2 Embodied Simulation of Language
Language being the “tool of tools,” (EN, LW 1:134) it acts as proxy for more overt action in
our environments (cf. Glenberg 1997). Language itself recruits brain regions typically
activated in sensorimotor experience, as empirical evidence shows (see Bergen 2005; Gibbs
2003; Pecher and Zwaan 2005), and language comprehension involves ES (Borreggine and
Kaschak 2006; Glenberg and Kaschak 2002; Glenberg et al. 2008; Stanfield and Zwaan 2001;
Taylor and Zwaan 2008; Zwaan 2004; Zwaan and Taylor 2006; see Bergen 2012 for a
systematic review).54 As I consider behavioral and neuroimaging studies on motor,
perceptual, emotion, and abstract language simulation, I am mainly concerned to show that
ES plays a functional role in language comprehension. A growing body of evidence shows
linguistic meaning arising from ES (reviews Fischer and Zwaan 2008; Willems and Casasanto
2011; Bergen 2012).
Motor simulation by processing of verbs and nouns is undertaken online and persists,
becoming part of full sentence interpretation (e.g. Glenberg and Kaschak 2002). Behavioral
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54 Again, ES is understood here to mean the activation of sensorimotor areas previously involved in experiences
of objects, events, or actions that words and concepts refer to that we now hear or read (Gallese 2008; Gallese
and Sinigaglia 2011). So “people simulate in response to language,” Bergen affirms, but importantly “their
simulations appear to vary substantially” (Bergen 2012, 19). The variety of things we take concepts to refer to is
a clue that “we all have different experiences, expectations, and interests” that enter into our “mental resources
to construct meaning … for the language we hear” (ibid.).

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studies’ results are complemented by neuroimaging studies (fMRI/EEG) seeing motor activity
during language comprehension (see Kemmerer and Gonzalez-Castillo 2010; Martin 2007;
Pulvermüller and Fadiga 2010). Somatotopic activation along the motor cortex was found
when processing words like pick, kick, and lick in respectively hand, foot, and mouth areas
(Hauk et al. 2004; Hauk and Pulvermüller 2004; Buccino et al. 2005; Tettamanti et al. 2005).
Research on perceptual simulation from Zwaan (Stanfield and Zwaan 2001; Zwaan et
al. 2002, 2004) had participants read sentences specifying visual content (e.g. Reading “The
eagle is in the sky” should trigger a simulation of an eagle in flight). After reading
participants were shown pictures that either matched the sentence or not (e.g. a picture of an
eagle with wings folded in) and had to indicate whether this was mentioned in the sentence.
Responses to matching picture contents were faster indicating a compatibility effect.
Experiments with processing of sentences about visual motion show interference effects
(Kaschak et al. 2005). Here participants process a sentence (e.g. “The squirrel ran away from
you” describing visual motion away from the body) and also view stimuli that depicts motion.
Participants responded faster to sentences when the simultaneously viewed visual stimulus
depicted motion in an opposite direction. This interference effect, a conflict taken as evidence
that visual motion comprehension involves the same neural substrate underlying perception of
motion, causes slower reaction. A host of other studies show evidence of this interdependence
and reciprocal interference effect in processing language about motion and visual stimuli of
motion (e.g. Matlock 2004; Bergen et al. 2007; Richardson and Matlock 2007; Meteyard et al.
2007). Here behavioral studies are also complemented by neuroimaging studies (Martin 2007,
Binder et al. 2009 for a review).
More recently ES of emotion concepts has received attention by Glenberg and others
(Havas et al. 2007, 2010), showing participants first receiving a Botox injection in muscles
involved in frowning and then showing difficulty in comprehending sentences with negative

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emotion concepts. Seemingly obstruction of physical expression of emotion interferes with
comprehending emotion sentences.
Taken together, the foregoing studies indubitably show language and meaning to be
facilitated by ES. The skeptical question one could ask is whether performance of ES actually
contributes to language understanding (Bergen 2012, 223). Or is neural resonance in
sensorimotor areas merely epiphenomenal to language processing? That would mean our best
theory would still be the one advanced by traditional cognitive science and philosophy of
mind (Fodor 1975; Pinker 1994; Searle 1999). Bergen therefore argues we should reformulate
the hypothesis: ES “is responsible for some aspects of normal language understanding, at least
sometimes necessary and at least partially sufficient” (Bergen 2012, 226). We can distinguish
ES from the traditional view in the testable predictions made. If we interfere with ES during
comprehension this should cause shortcomings in comprehension, and, according to Bergen,
lead to noticeable effects like people taking longer to understand sentences, understanding in
less detail or with less accuracy. It could even interfere with making inferences or
remembering specific aspects.
Several behavioral studies tried interfering with simulation, taxing cognitive capacity by
other tasks (Lindsay 2003; Glenberg et al. 2008; Kaschak et al. 2005; Meteyard et al. 2008;
see Bergen 2012, 227-232). These show ES playing a functional part for constructing
meaning. Direct physical interference with processing capacity comes from studies
investigating temporary or permanent inability of brain areas to function (Damasio and Trenel
1993; Damasio et al. 1996, 2001; Kemmerer 2005; Shapiro et al. 2001, 2005; again see
Bergen 2012, 232-237). These show impairment of understanding language about objects,
actions, and relations when unable simulating specific sensorimotor events.
With functional relevance of ES in meaning construction established, Bergen suggests
comparing language comprehension to similar cognitive functions like vision to gain insight

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into what aspects of the function different parts contribute to (Bergen 2012, 241). For
example, if we lose the part to recognize faces, we do not lose the capacity of vision. Several
aspects of language use involve ES and are therefore subject to influences from language
experienced. To this I now turn.
5.2.3 Priming, Framing, Obscuring, and Steering
Language comprehension through ES is not merely word-content based. Grammar functions
as imparting structural guidance about not what, but how we simulate (Liu and Bergen 2016,
183).55 Grammatical person provides the perspective adopted in ES (Brunyé et al. 2009). The
structure of an argument contains signs how to construct described events in ES (Goldberg
1995). Grammar of natural languages consists of “the highly structured neural connections
linking the conceptual and expressive (phonological) aspects of the brain” (Lakoff and
Johnson 1999, 498; see Langacker 2013).
Also, a concept is not independent of metaphor(s) we use. Metaphors for ‘love’ are
constitutive for the concept of ‘love.’ Try to excise from the concept ideas around physical
force, like attraction and electricity, or ideas around union, or nurture, closeness, heat, or
giving of oneself. What we are left with is skeletal structure only: “a lover, a beloved, feelings
of love, and a relationship, which has an onset and an end point” (ibid., 72). To have only
literal language at one’s disposal to talk and reason about love, without all (conventional or
novel) metaphors, I daresay Shakespeare or the Romantics would not be as popular as they
still are today. Metaphor, as grammar, shows the importance of how to comprehend signified
events and objects.
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55 The role of grammar in language-driven mental simulation is of considerable concern. Liu and Bergen note
that first off, it implies a role for grammar in meaning, contra Chomsky (1957, 1965). Secondly, it is taken as
evidence against (at least strong) modularity of syntax or language (Fodor 1983; Pinker 1994). Furthermore,
grammar provides unique insights, per the cognitive linguistics paradigm, into human cognition and experience
(Liu and Bergen 2016, 183).

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Outside of structural guidance, and hence natural—or at least possible to describe as neutral—
influence on ES, there are more overt exploitative ways influencing ES (cf. Cuccio 2016, 56).
Speaker’s intention may not be involved and as such will not be further upon.56 Of note
however are Austin’s perlocutionary speech acts, indicating a certain operative force, such as
an order, warning, promise, and assurance, at least expressing what is termed intention.
Ordinarily “certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts or actions of the
audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons” follow (Austin 1962, 101). Relevant is that
Austin presages the contestation that language influences affect, cognition and behavior, of
both listener and speaker.
Framing is one such manner of overt influence, traditionally defined as “select[ing]
some aspects of a perceived reality and mak[ing] them more salient in a communicating text,
in such a way as [a] to promote a particular problem definition, [b] causal interpretation, [c]
moral evaluation, and/or [d] treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman
1993, 53; cited in Burgers et al. 2016, 410-411).57
Given the presumed influence metaphors have on moral imagination, further analysis
employs these functional distinctions of the four ways language influences ES.
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56 Speaker’s intention is an important analytical notion in philosophy of language and the study of linguistic
pragmatics however, and future work can benefit from applying it to such analyses as undertaken here (see Grice
1989; Strawson 1964; Searle 1969, 1979; Sperber and Wilson 1986; Levinson 2000).
Still, much modern work in pragmatics or philosophy of language is undertaken in a paradigm of cognitivism
and first generation cognitive sciences. For example, Levinson notes that standard notions of meaning (i.e.
Gricean for him) must be supplemented with a type that is not based “on direct computations on speaker-
intentions but rather on general expectations about how language is normally used” (2000, 22; emphasis mine).
A comparative study of this classic approach to one understood through the lens of pragmatic naturalism and 4E
cognitive sciences would benefit the fields involved.
57 I added the [ ] in the quotation to make apparent there are actually four different functions indicated in what
Entman terms framing. I do this so as to help further discussion.
Traditional framing theory also distinguishes between linguistic structure and conceptual content, a distinction,
which, with a pragmatic naturalist understanding of language and concepts, is only functionally useful in
reflective practices. As argued, metaphors operate as both structure and content.

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Priming
The literature provides different characterizations of what constitutes priming (cf. Bargh
2006; Wood et al. 2014). Importantly, priming effects “are ubiquitous and pervasive across
the major forms of psychological phenomena: appraisal and evaluation, motivation and goal
pursuit, social perception and judgment, and social behavior” (Bargh 2006, 148). Priming
research demonstrates the widespread automaticity and unconscious character of much of our
cognitive processing.
I redefine priming as an influence on behavior (including cognition) with a focus on
evaluation, or appraisal, of an aspect of experience, characterized by a concept or goal, so we
are more likely to behave toward or treat an object or event according to the schematic logic
and inferences of the concept it is primed with.58 Primes essentially indicate your experience
is of this kind, staging suggested means of coping, often bypassing attentive problem
definition.
Liu and Bergen note compatibility effects by language on consequent motor response as
a type of priming (2016, 195). Activation of functional neural clusters (when hearing or
reading) speeds up subsequent similar action. Another effect is observed in activation of
sensory (Vermeulen et al. 2008) or action-related priming (Kiefer et al. 2011; Helbig et al.
2006; Myung et al. 2006). ES of subsequent conceptual task performances is hereby
modulated, clearly noticeable when the primed modality is relevant to the concept (Witt et al.
2010). One study primes participants with an action movie showing a hand hammering;
promoting access to later presented utilizable objects when associated with similar action as
the prime. An axe has this effect, whilst a saw does not (Helbig et al. 2010).
Most noteworthy is linguistic priming of perspective taking in ES (Bergen 2012, 69,
112ff). When an implied perspective (internal or external) matches an object’s location,
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58 This operational definition locks in with parts [c] and [d] of Entman’s definition of framing

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participants respond faster to tasks (Borghi et al. 2004). Grammatical person (especially you)
also cues this modulation effect on ES; who is described as engaging in action affects what
perspective is simulated. This primes ES of a situation description in either an “immersed
experiencer” or “observing bystander” viewpoint (Bergen 2012, 109). Difference in the
imagery implicates different neural structures and connections (Ruby and Decety 2001;
Vogeley and Fink 2003). Behaviorally different compatibility effects arise (Zwaan et al. 2004;
Brunyé et al. 2009). Other perspective modulation effects concern perceived angle, ease of
visibility of objects or events in experiences (Yaxley and Zwaan 2007; Horton and Rapp
2003), and experiencer-event distance (Winter and Bergen 2012). Grammatical person pushes
us around regarding what perspective we are more likely to adopt and primes our action
potentiality; linguistic description of events is a lot like being there ourselves (cf. Bergen
2012, 92).
Framing
Framing of ES through language happens because descriptions are grammatically structured.
The problem is how we construct meaning from contributions various words make to ES in a
sensible way (ibid., 94). Sentences contain not just separate words. To know who’s lost and
who’s producing axe sounds in a forest we need the glue grammar provides. An utterance’s
exact form largely informs its meaning (ibid., 95). Grammar’s contribution to ES is providing
the right arrangement of all different pieces; the order of words indicates what qualities go
with what objects and which relations obtain between them (cf. Bergen 2012, 97-98).
Grammar also provides its own meaning (see Langacker 2013). Argument structure
construction has effects on ES, so verbs normally not indicating transfer of possession (like
crutched, a noun forced into verb-service) can, given the right pattern (Goldberg 1995;

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Kaschak and Glenberg 2000). Meaning of transfer-of-possession comes from grammar, not
the verb, which does not have it (itself derived from a noun).
I redefine framing as an influence on behavior (including cognition) with a focus on
conceptualisation, or definition of a subject-matter, of an aspect of experience, characterized
by a concept or goal (including argument structure construction), so we are more likely to
reason or causally make inferences about an object or event according to the schematic logic
and inferences of the concept or grammatical structure it is framed in.59 Frames essentially
indicate your experience has these relations, staging suggested causal inferences, often
limiting possible felt engagement.
Frames make certain utterances jarring or unapt. Thinking and talking about the subject-
matter then requires another frame. Language always underdetermines experience, seen in
grammatical person modulated viewpoints in ES. Dewey noted: “Language fails not because
thought fails, but because no verbal symbols can do justice to the fullness and richness of
thought” (QT, LW 5:250). We should not slip into cognitivism again though, as language
does not express what is thought of already. Language “presents or rather it is the subject’s
taking up of a position in the world of his meanings” (Merleau-Ponty 1962:193).
Here the focus is on conceptualization from the language user’s position. It concerns
“the way in which the problem is conceived [that] decides what specific suggestions are
entertained and which are dismissed; what data are selected and which rejected; it is the
criterion for relevancy and irrelevancy of hypotheses and conceptual structures” (LTI, LW
12:112). Language is literally a frame, not concretely tangible as with artworks, but as
conceptual framework for thinking; metaphor and grammar provide structure and limit what
is allowed within that frame.
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59 This operational definition locks in with parts [a] and [b] of Entman’s definition of framing.

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Obscuring
Action structure of simulations or their end state is influenced by grammatical aspect (Brunyé
et al. 2009; Bergen 2012, 115-16). Perfect aspect makes us passive by obscuring action
potentiality (cf. Madden and Zwaan 2003; Bergen and Wheeler 2010). Whether a situation
affords meaningful interactions or interventions is structurally obscured (cf. Bergen and
Chang 2005; Chang et al. 1998; see Magliano and Schleich 2000; Carreiras et al. 1997).
Metaphor also selectively abstracts by nature. Treating love in terms of economic
exchange—she invested a lot in that relationship— or a collaborative work of art—they
sculpted their bond, giving form to the relationship together— partly obscures concrete
phenomena we point to in our shared experiences (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980/2003, 139).
Here culture is an influence. If art is just a commodity then love as art might not be the best
metaphorization (ibid., 143). Inherent to obscuring is not defining concrete phenomena in
particular ways, but that the operation of obscuring can lead to a washing out effect of
conceptualizing concrete phenomena in other ways. “Selective emphasis, choice, is inevitable
whenever reflection occurs,” Dewey observes, but “deception comes only when the presence
and operation of choice is concealed, disguised, denied” (EN, LW 1:34). The notion of idiom
(or dead metaphor) indicates this eventual sociocultural obscurement effect. What we do not
notice as metaphor anymore is most automatic and active in habitual ways of treating objects
and events (Kövecses 2010, xi).60 Conventionality of expression and effortlessness in
reasoning can thus mean obscurement of possible other conceptualizations of actual
experiences due to acculturation of social conventional knowledge.
Obscuring is a conventionalized and more or less automatic and unconscious string of
steps in Entman’s framing definition: this is the problem, these are its causes, feel about it this
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60 Here a profitable comparison can be drawn between metaphor and habit. Rote habit runs ever deeper into its
grooves as does metaphoric treatment of concomitant sensorimotor experiences through plasticity and
degeneration of neural connections (cf. HNC, MW 14:121). Remember Dewey’s injunction: capacity for repeat
performance is the effect of usage not a preexisting condition for efficacy (LTI, LW 12:39).

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way, and deal with it that way. No second thought, nor, quite literally, first thought is given.
In Dewey’s terminology, it is what we take as the essence of something (cf. EN, LW 1:143-
144). Obscurement happens when thinking and feeling the essentials are covered. For
example, the essence of a policeman’s whistle is not something inherent in the matter or
found in a transcendent realm, but is “the rule, comprehensive and persisting, the standardized
habit, of social interaction, and for the sake of which the whistle is used” (EN, LW 1:149).
Steering
Both figurative language and ES’ multiphase nature induce steering. Perceptual details accrue
while incrementally coming to understanding. Simulation leads us down a winding garden
path (Bergen 2012, 135). Steering is an inherent effect of any language processing taking
more than a few milliseconds to process. Aside incremental simulation we engage a wrap up
simulation. We first cobble together incremental meaning from what we hear or read as it
becomes available. A second processing stage induces a resimulating given new information
(Townsend and Bever 2001; Zwaan and Taylor 2006).61 Another hypothesized function of
incremental and wrap-up simulation is providing a readiness potential for action and last
inhibitory pop-cap for overt response (ibid., 140). Incremental sentence simulation of “there is
a bomb in my office …” provides readiness to act, but the sentence wrap-up due “…clip-art
collection” literally diffuses our response (ibid.).
Another mechanism is ES of factual-counterfactual language (ibid., 147). Simulating
“the umbrella isn’t open” or “the umbrella is closed” provide us with the same (wrap-up)
factual simulation, but the paths toward this end state differ. In counterfactual language we
first simulate and then reject a described object or event (Giora et al. 2004; Kaup et al. 2006,
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61 This hypothesis is supported by neurocomputational research (Narayanan 1997a, b) showing neural structures
allowing belief updating through wrap-up simulation (Bergen 2012, 139). See §4.3.4 for premotor action
structuring allowing for loops, nesting, and recursion.

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2007) and this contributes to the feeling of understanding negation Bergen hypothesizes
(ibid.; compare James, P I:245-246).62 Here ES of language emphasizes the process of
understanding itself as an important contribution to eventual meaning over just total outcome.
Not just negation, but other linguistic or speech indicators play this role, like emphasis,
intonation, and hyperbole (Bergen 2012, 147-48). Taken out of the context of a discursive
situation, notational formal sentences lose these indicators. Comprehending language and
speech is dynamic. Incremental simulations provide best guesses until wrap-up can instantiate
more definite conceptions. Differing language makes ES traverse differing series of steps
contributing to meaning.
Steering concerns the characteristic evolving dynamic nature of the event or situation by
unique combinations of this metaphor in that situation. In Entman’s framing definition, it is
the unique sequence and interval distance of steps in a temporal spread. If obscuring is the
lateral limit of focus, then steering is the longitudinal dynamic shaping the pulsing change of
what is focal or not any given instant.63 I now consider empirical evidence on ES of metaphor.
5.2.4 Embodied Simulation of Metaphors
Abstract concepts have been one of the more problematic issues for embodied cognition
approaches (Barsalou 1999; Gibbs 2011). Conceptual metaphor theory is an influential
account how abstract concepts are grounded in concrete concepts of sensorimotor experience
(Johnson 2005, 2008, 2010a; Kövecses 2010; Lakoff and Johnson 1980/2003, 1999). Studies
of metaphorical comprehension include how we think about time (Boroditsky and Ramscar
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62 For the pragmatic naturalist this function of language provides no mystery. Large parts of language provides
no “definite sensorial image,” but the “bare … logical movement” of relations and grammatical constructs are
“signs of direction in thought,” whose function is to “lead from one set of images to another” (James, P I:252-
253).
63 As said above, the four-way classification is not a sharp demarcation. I take the evidence as proof that “to say
that language moves my body is already to say that other people move me” (Gallagher 2005, 129). Language
always entails adjustments when taking Πtransaction seriously. Whether adjustment is towards more particular
and private life-adjustments (accommodation), or the more environmental and public adjustments we can effect
(adaptation) depend on the above ways language allowing humans to manipulate this social medium of meaning.

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2002; Casasanto and Boroditsky 2008; Gentner et al. 2002; Sell and Kaschak 2011; Ulrich et
al. 2012).
Temporal change is conceived of in two different conceptual metaphors (Boroditsky
and Ramscar 2002; Casasanto and Boroditsky 2008). The MOVING TIMES metaphor
presents times as objects moving with varying speed toward and then past (behind) stationary
observers, expressed like “The day is fast approaching that my thesis is finished,” “The time
for action has arrived,” or “That gruesome event is past us now.” The MOVING OBSERVER
metaphor presents times as locations on a landscape and observers moving toward and
beyond various time-locations, verbalized as “We’re fast approaching Halloween,” “We’re
coming up on Christmas,” “It’s a long way to my birthday,” or “What’s up ahead for us.”
Boroditsky predicts preferred metaphorical interpretation based on primed source domain. For
example, “Let’s move the meeting ahead two days” can be interpreted via both metaphors.
Say the original meeting was scheduled Wednesday, then with the MOVING TIMES
metaphor it is moved ahead (earlier) to Monday, while the MOVING OBSERVER metaphor
makes it move ahead (later) to Friday. Experiments show subjects video of a person seated in
a chair pulling a second chair toward them with rope. This primed subjects to more likely
MOVING TIMES interpretation of subsequent sentences. When the person seated in the chair
pulled herself across the room by a rope tied to a fixed object, it resulted in primed subjects
more likely to interpret moving ahead according to MOVING OBSERVER. Boroditsky’s
results are extended with studies of posture influencing consequent metaphoric time
comprehension (Miles et al. 2010). Leaning forward or backward during experiments
depended upon being presented with imagery inducing revisiting the past or anticipating the
future, indicating temporal information processing has an effect on posture according to the
FUTURE TIME IS IN FRONT, PAST TIME IS BEHIND construct.

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Other studies show similar findings. With AFFECTION IS WARMTH, compare your warm
smile to my icy stare. Williams and Bargh (2008) manipulated participants’ social judgments
through felt physical warmth, by holding cups of warm or cold coffee before making
judgments about others. Warm coffee led to judgments of more generous, happy, and
sociable, but not other traits like honest, unrelated to the concept of warmth. Another study
used LONELINESS IS COLDNESS, having participants think about times feeling socially
included or excluded, and then, after telling participants about problems with the central air in
the building, ask them about the temperate in the room. Participants thinking of feeling social
exclusion gave significantly colder estimates (Zhong and Leonardelli 2008; see also Hong and
Sun 2012).64 All these studies indicate experience-based embodied valence associations
related to purity, upright posture, and others.
Neuroscientific evidence is mainly from fMRI with a “motor” focus (cf. Bergen 2012,
203ff.). One study used metaphorical idioms like kick the bucket and bite the bullet presenting
sentences to participants visually one word at a time, reading words but in a manner
consistent with listening to spoken language (Boulenger et al. 2009). Areas in the motor
cortex lit up when people read about metaphorical action, and somatotopic regional activity
was observed when metaphorical action was about action using those body parts (hand, feet,
mouth). Other earlier studies do not show these effects (Aziz-Zadeh and Damasio 2008;
Raposo et al. 2009), leading to doubts about a robust finding. Bergen (2012, 205) argues this
might be due to the use of less expressions and more conventional expressions in both earlier
studies, whereas metaphorical language simulation might just be less pronounced than it is for
literal language, so more data is needed in studies for noticeable effects. A recent study (Desai
et al. 2011; see also Guan et al. 2013; Boulenger et al. 2012) took this same cue and
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64 Other examples include: GOOD IS CLEAN, BAD IS DIRTY (Schnall et al. 2008; Zhong and Liljenquist
2006); GOOD IS UP, BAD IS DOWN (Meier and Robinson 2004; Schubert 2005; Casasanto and Dijkstra
2010).

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investigated whether idiomatic expressions led to less motor activation than novel
expressions. They also used incremental sentence feeding, first presenting the subject (the
public) and then the predicate (grasped the idea), avoiding an effect whereby participants
could be misled by the verb. Activation in the motor system was found for both types of
metaphorical expression, but the more familiar it was the less they drove metaphorical
simulation. Such findings at least indicate that metaphorical ES does not always take place
and depends on familiarity and temporal dynamics of processing, as with incremental
presentation of sentences (cf. Bergen 2012, 206).65
It is time to sum up. We noted evidence that supports claims the current body state influences
words people use. We also saw evidence supporting claims language use influences bodily
states. Overall, metaphorical language studies show influence but are also in some sense
inconclusive whereas studies focusing on non-linguistic metaphorical concepts provide
insight into the pervasive influence conceptual metaphor has on ES, mostly automatically and
unconsciously (what Dewey terms immediately had experience, but recall my comment on
immediacy always being mediated immediacy), an important fact to note going forward.
Priming effects include source domain activation leading to metaphor simulation using source
domain structure and inferences (Gibbs 2006a, b; Gibbs and Matlock 2008).
Such influences on ES constitute risks for morality as well and again emphasize
morality’s social nature. Merely accepting experience as had is not to be on the lookout for
something better (E 1932, LW 7:271ff.).66 We should reflect on experience whenever it
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65 Bergen further hypothesizes that some abstract and metaphorical language elicits less detailed simulations
because physical concrete things are not included (Bergen 2012, 208), which is again fully consonant with cogs
discussed before (Narayanan 1997a). Even so, this does not indicate that metaphorical ES is in any way not of
sensorimotor character.
66 As Dewey rightly notes, the difference between immediate sensitiveness and conscientiousness as reflective
inquiry, is not between faculties or brain regions, but between character (E 1932, LW7:273, 285ff). Here again,
habits, development, learning, and growth come together. The pragmatic naturalist values sensitivity to context,
to uniqueness of situations, to intelligence, to empathy, and a tragic notion of fallibilism because these

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becomes indeterminate or problematic, especially given the radical underdetermination of
language. Daily life is rife with “relatively unproblematic partitioning of kinds of experience”
which, through linguistic influence and metaphor, “can become problematic if it leads us to
oversimplify a situation and thus ignore its complexity” (Johnson 2014, 40). We are in error
when conceiving of experience containing “some pre-established ontological, epistemic, or
phenomenological absoluteness” formulable in “our preferred distinctions” (ibid.).
Experiential reduction makes us overlook other aspects potentially available for selective
emphasis and discursive formulation.
5.3 Metaphors in Moral Imagination
So far, I treated ES of concrete and abstract language. Next, I discuss prototypical notions of
how moral deliberations are metaphorically structured. To diversify treatment beyond
metaphoric elucidation of the big three constructs of virtue ethics, deontology, and
consequentialism, 67 I also present a case study analyzed with my developed framework,
including the fourfold characterization of framing. I then present the conclusion of my
argument regarding the function of metaphor in moral imagination.
5.3.1 Metaphors of Morality
Dewey described three factors in experience that are the traditional basis for morality:
demands of communal life, individual ends, and social approbation. These were handily in
accordance with deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics. Dewey’s argument can be
summarized in one sentence: “Whatever may be the differences which separate moral
theories, all postulate one single principle as an explanation of moral life” (TIF, LW 5:280). I
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dispositions and traits of character have brought, and will continue to bring, the best results for further worthy
experiences and well-being and flourishing of life.
67 Again, see ‘Three Independent Factors in Morals’ (TIF, LW 5:279-288) on pluralism and context in ethics.

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take his argument not be about defining a precise number of primary factors of moral life, but
about philosophers having generally abstracted one of these aspects of moral experience, put
it central by hypostatization, and then treating it as the independent self-contained starting
point of moral experience, deliberation, judgment, and justification.68
Pragmatic naturalists take these hypostatized factors of moral theory to be a
constellation of abstract principles and metaphoric concepts able to inform our primary
experiences and morally problematic situations, the former through habitual meaning by
customary morality, the latter through the function of a principle as intelligent tool or guide
pointing to aspects of experience we should take into account in inquiry.69 The principle as
concept or idea allows for inferential reasoning according to metaphorical structuring.
They also see the grounding of moral metaphors in experiences of well-being, typically
physical, and informed by what “people over history and across cultures have seen as
contributing to their well-being” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 290). We are rather healty than
sick; we like our food, water, and air pure rather than contaminated; we covet strength, not
weakness; we prefer to be in control rather than not; we want freedom, not slavery; it is better
to be wealthy than poor; we need nurturance and care and avoid isolation or neglect; we like
it better in the light than in the fearful dark; we function better upright and in balance than
prone or unstable (ibid., 291). Counterexamples obviously exist, but one of these contrasting
pairs is taken to contribute to our well-being, the other not or less so, and taken together such
valuations form a folk theory of well-being (ibid.). Since morals are at root about the
improvement and promoting of well-being, mainly that of our conspecifics, these folk theory
ideas provide the terra firma for arrangements of moral metaphors. For example, since having
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68 A moral theory conceived of in this way is a paradigmatic instance of an obscuring effect (see previous
section). Of course, such theories provide ample hooks for conceptual and linguistic primes too.
69 I thank Roberta Dreon and Italo Testa for comments upon my presented paper at the April 2017 Parma
conference. Their comments made me realize how to connect Dewey’s notion of customary morality with a
reflective account, as related to my discussions of habit and intuition in morals (Machielsen 2017).

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enough wealth is seen as beneficiary for comfortable living, well-being is conceptualized as
wealth too. An increase of well-being is a gain, a decrease is a loss. The notion of healthy or
sick constitution finds immoral behavior conceptualized as a disease, or contagion. An ethics
of empathy and care grows out of the basic condition of human maturation through
intersubjective nurturance. Our strength permits us to reach locations and best obstacles, so
moral strength, or will, is what enables confrontation and defeat of evil.
Lakoff and Johnson note that each of these metaphors have their own internal logic for
reasoning about moral experiences structured by the source domains of human well-being:
health, wealth, strength, balance, protection, nurturance, et cetera (ibid., 292). Well-being is
wealth leads to the formation of the MORAL ACCOUNTING complex metaphor, also
involving other metaphors and accounting and effect schemas, allowing the essential
transaction to be conceptualized. Moral actions are financial transactions (ibid.).70 Other
moral metaphors involved in the complex are: reciprocation, retribution and revenge,
restitution, altruism, turning the other cheek, karma as moral accounting with the universe,
fairness, and the idea of rights as moral I-owe-you’s.
The above moral metaphors are not a complete list nor exhaustively treated but suffice
to make the point moral theories are metaphorically constituted and structured. We noted such
structuring takes place through experiential correlations and neural co-activations. The same
mechanism applies here, informed by intersubjective and social experience. We should
jettison we possess univocal moral concepts. Morality is given meaning through multiple, not
always consistent, metaphors. Realistic and scientifically supported moral reasoning and
judgment follows from a pragmatic naturalist framework, not from transcendent or
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70 To increase someone’s well-being, when doing something good, is to metaphorically increase their wealth, to
give them something of value. Doing so increases one’s moral credit. When we do something bad, we take value
away by harming them, and incur a moral debt to them. We owe them. Justice is conceived of as the balancing of
the (moral) books. Keeping the books is of import for the economy, just like moral bookkeeping is for social
functioning. Lakoff and Johnson note that the source domain of finance already has a morality, which gets
ferried over to morality in general. We need to not only pay our debts, but also our moral debts (Lakoff
andJohnson 1999, 293).

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fundamentalist moral views. A morality for humans is one taking metaphor, imagination, and
framing seriously. I want to discuss a case study to provide further evidence of the affective
valuing and metaphoric structuring of discourse on moral matters.
5.3.2 Case study: A Tsunami of Islamisation
The case study allows deconstruction of a political metaphor. I first present the case, i.e. the
linguistic expression and the situational context in which it was used.71 I then give a brief
schematic analysis using the notational format used in cognitive linguistics. Next I analyze the
metaphor with the four communicative framing effects to illustrate its cognitive-affective
effects. I first focus on the priming and framing effects since these reciprocally co-determine
each other—since how we conceptualize something influences how we appraise possible
ways of action, and how we feel about something influences the possible interpretations we
accept. I then note possible obscurement effects, and present some steering effects of the
metaphor’s usage.
The case study is the ‘Tsunami of Islamisation’ metaphor in political debates on immigration.
Dutch politician Geert Wilders used it in 2006 (Elsevier 2006; Trouw 2007). He expresses
trepidations about increasing numbers of muslims in the Netherlands, fearing a tsunami of
Islamisation hitting us straight to the heart, threatening identity and culture (Volkskrant 2006).
Statistical evidence for the causal relation between Islam and crime is cited, as he comments,
“one in five Moroccan youth is registered as suspect with law enforcement. Their behavior
follows from their religion and culture” (ibid.). Wilders believes no moderate version of Islam
exists, as the religion is inherently violent. Wilders received widespread critique and threats
regarding his statements.
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71 This includes related sentences that have inferences, connected metaphors, or other conceptual entailments.

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Islamisation is “the greatest problem” for the nation, the frontman of the Freedom Party
(PVV) declares, one that “if we do not defend ourselves against it, will prove all other points
from my program to be in vain” (Volkskrant 2006). Wilders challenges the undue Dutch
reasononableness-syndrome, pleading for a hard-line approach. He argues for the closing of
borders for all non-Western immigrants. The immigrants already present in the Netherlands
commit to an “assimilation contract,” thereby promising to accommodate to “the dominant
Dutch culture” and it’s accompanying norms and values (ibid.). Those violating the covenant
must leave the country, but not many will have to, Wilders thinks, because this law will have
a fearsome and forbidding operation. One of the things driving him crazy is the sight of so
many mosques dotting the countryside; he wants to forbid the building of new mosques.
Muslims will engulf Dutch society and cause crime and nuisance all the way to rural areas
(ibid.).
Logical inconsistencies are apparent in the network of metaphors and their relations, which I
will come back to when treating obscurement. I now elaborate on the central metaphor of this
political rhetoric on immigration. It sketches a natural phenomenon, a tsunami as a giant tidal
wave, and compares it with a wave of immigrants from muslim countries. Just like the natural
force is unstoppable and highly lethal, so is the wave of immigrants unstoppable (or so it
seems) and dangerous to us. The Dutch have a history with combatting water, and even
invented the term water management. Floods from both sea and overspilling rivers threatened
farmlands and towns before man-made water works were put in place for protection and
regulation of water flow. Where concrete waves or high tides could be controlled in this way
through Dutch hard work, so can the metaphorical wave of immigration be dammed in or kept
out. And the water that has already passed the new storm surge barriers, should either be
pliant and accommodating enough through water management (by signing an assimilation

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contract), or it will be carried back to open sea and set adrift.72 The metaphorical notation for
Tsunami of Islamisation is IMMIGRATION AS FORCE OF NATURE.73 Schematically it
can be presented as follows:
The IMMIGRATION AS FORCE OF NATURE Metaphor
Source Domain Target Domain
—————————————————————————————————
[Force of Nature] [Immigration]
Natural Phenomena >>> Human Agents (in Motion)
Natural Causes >>> Force Exerted By Agents
Natural Events >>> Effects Of Force Exerted By Agents
—————————————————————————————————
Extensions to the central metaphor:
Natural Disaster >>> Destruction Caused By Agents
Inexhaustible Source >>> Unrelenting Number Of Agents
Obstacles To Nature >>> Impediments To Human Agents (in Motion)
—————————————————————————————————
Important to note about NATURE AS A HUMAN AGENT (Lakoff and Johnson 1999,
212ff.) is that it allows conceptualizing of natural processes as an agent exerting force, and
thus as a cause of certain consequences. Immigration as sudden and unrelenting waves is a
natural phenomenon; it exerts force, and causes all sorts of societal problems. So we can say,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 Of course, here I take some poetical leeway and extend upon the metaphor as used in the case above to sketch
its basic structure more clearly.
73 This complex metaphor is built up from other simpler ones, including NATURE AS HUMAN AGENT
providing extension from one human agent to groups of people (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 212ff.), and
UNCONTROLLABLE EXTERNAL EVENTS ARE LARGE MOVING OBJECTS (Kövecses 2010, 46).

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“Immigration threatens our culture” or “Immigration is the cause of crime.” Furthermore, this
allows for personification of the immigration phenomenon as agent, like in “Immigration took
our prosperity away.” So here natural processes are causes and natural events are effects of
them, conceptualized metaphorically as the force exerted by migratory patterns of humans
and the effects of this force on societies and nations.
I now indicate framing effects of the IMMIGRATION AS FORCE OF NATURE metaphor.74
Priming involves an indeterminate, threatening, external force moving towards us; something
an individual can do little, if anything, about. This situation is appraised as dangerous; one of
rejection, of retreating or escaping. The suggested evasion is fleeing towards higher altitudes
and dry terrain, both metaphorical. The threat is evaluated as being on (and of) a lower moral
level; one places oneself and one’s social group above it.75 Priming allows for acceptance of
suggested (political and social) treatments recommended for immigration and Islam given the
metaphorical natural disaster frame. Remember priming is always reciprocally co-determined
with the frame used. Any measures enabling one to put distance between the dangerous
situation and oneself are appraised favorably. Any measures curtailing crime and violence of
the invasive force, and tainting of one’s own cultural identity, are understood as in our best
interests.
Framing involves how a certain problem is defined; immigration as an unstoppable
incessant wave. Furthermore, this problem definition allows specific suggestions from the
causal connections made through the metaphorical structuring of experience. There are only
so many ways one can treat the problem of high water given the nature of the phenomenon.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 Recall the definition of framing as “select[ing] some aspects of a perceived reality and mak[ing] them more
salient in [communication], in such a way as [a] to promote a particular problem definition, [b] causal
interpretation, [c] moral evaluation, and/or [d] treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman 1993,
53). I divided these four functions between priming (latter two) and framing (first two).
75 Evidence from priming and metaphor studies support this analysis of spatiality and experiential factors in
reasoning and social judgment concerning morality (Thibodeau and Boroditsky 2011, 2013; Yu 2015, 2016). My
discussion of metaphors of morality also coheres with this analysis.

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Certain instrumentalities and means for a purpose or end-in-view (fed, or co-determined by
the priming effect) present themselves as options, foreclosing others as disconfirmations of
the metaphoric frame. Moreover, the frame makes us select certain data from experience
(essential behavior of immigrants, certain problems as caused exclusively by forces of
immigrating agents), highly determining what constitutes relevance. Here the prime again co-
determines how we appraise what options as admissible for evidence.
What the metaphor obscures is the complex nature of the phenomenon. Tidal waves can
certainly have a determinable source like an ocean floor tremor, but this again has other
causes or influences leading up to the displacement of water. Furthermore, such a natural
dynamic complexity of events belies the metaphor’s supposed agentive and belligerent
character. Tsunamis have no real (or highly uncontrollable) ‘source’. But portraying
immigration as a disastrous natural force, we now focus on symptom treatment instead of the
origin, which is far more opaque and confounding. Definition using disparate metaphorical
terms allows other suggested treatments and solution appraisals. The obscurement of the
metaphor is characterized by a social conceptual bias, reflected in habits of speech and
reasoning concerning certain situations. We live by a conventional and sociocultural norm or
standard, a more or less automatic and unconscious chain of defining, interpreting, evaluating,
and treating particular problematic situations. What is actual is only seen in that many
possible projected horizons; to the rest we are (non-metaphorically) blind.
Concrete steering effects are seen in how the sociocultural sedimentation of the
metaphor has developed. The expression was picked up, rebroadcast, and part of many
analyses and discourses, both in academia and popular media.76 Immigration as a wave has
certainly become a dead metaphor in political debates and as such determines to an extent the
dynamic shaping of focus on and attention to aspects of experience as problematic terms in
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76 I do not have room to discuss the typical aspects our historical and technological circumstances bring to the
table concerning how novel expressions become sociocultural lingo, or idiom.

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discourse (cf. Kalmoe 2014). Where in 2006 the metaphor’s novelty had a certain unique
sequence and interval distance of definition, interpretation, evaluation, and treatment, in ten
years the temporal spread of this sequence and interval has certainly changed toward a sharper
steering of whatever is focal in any given instant of problematic situations concerning
immigration (Lecheler et al. 2015).
I close with a short take-away message. Metaphors indubitably enhance communicative
persuasion. The four effects are not all necessarily constitutive here, as persuasion always
happens in particular and unique situations, depending on the character of the agent and the
functional couplings to the environment. Persuasion is emergent and dynamically constituted.
Under optimal conditions, when a single, non-extended metaphor is novel and has a familiar
target and is used early in a communicative situation, such an effect is most prominent (cf.
Sopory and Dillard 2002). Studies on potential persuasiveness of metaphor indicate the
superior experiential organization afforded as most important factor, bringing unity, balance,
or wholeness to situations. This resonates with Dewey’s notion, that, after inquiry, the
situation is again determinate, a unified whole, both in felt quality but also in the conceptual
organization of material means as experiential subject-matter.
5.3.3 The Actual and the Possible
As perception intertwines with motor capacity for cognition, so language intertwines with
both sensorimotor contingencies and social intersubjective horizons of meaning for social
cognition and coordination of purposeful experiences of meaning and value. Bergen notes
“it’s not surprising that language, as such a high-level, heterogenous, and recently evolved
cognitive function would piggyback off of other cognitive functions, like ES, or that these
components would play functional roles” (2012, 245).

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Feelings of doubt arising in precarious existence lead to inquiry toward reinstatement of
effective coordination. Here lies the main avenue for the unsettling of ideas, convictions, and
importantly, the ways we conceptualize and treat situations through and with language. As
Dewey said, “possible doubts inevitably troop with actual beliefs” (BAE, MW 3:97). Actual
beliefs influence what we deem possible. I hold that metaphors as actual conceptual
constructs (and linguistic expressions) project a horizon of possibility in situations. The
metaphor affords possible action (which includes cognition). So it is that “all serious thinking
combines in some proportion and perspective the actual and the possible” (TPA, LW 3:147).
What is actual is what “supplies contact and solidity”, what is possible “furnishes the ideal
upon which criticism rests and from which creative effort springs” (ibid.).
For Dewey propositions are discursive and symbolic, intermediate instrumentalities
used to reach a final settlement of a particular case. He defines two distinct but correlative
types. Existential propositions deal with “actual conditions as determined by experimental
observation,” and ideational or conceptual propositions deal with “interrelated meanings,
which are non-existential in content in direct reference but which are applicable to existence
through the operations they represent as possibilities” (LTI, LW 12:284). These propositions
consist of a “division of labor” within inquiry but cannot be conceived without each other
(ibid.). This indicates the place and use Dewey accords abstraction, through conceptual
metaphor, in the pattern of inquiry. Living relations between abstract and concrete are upheld
through means of experimentation (cf. Hickman 1998, 174). Abstraction allows for
development of new meanings to be brought back to concrete experience. Since however
abstract we may become, inquiry is always engaged in transforming existential situations, and
the test of abstraction is determined in concreto (HWT, LW 8:198). Propositional
understanding therefore is performative, there is an operational sense of propositions as
proposals for action; these can be either helpful or unhelpful (cf. Fesmire 2015, 55).

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Correlative propositions in inquiry are always shaped and influenced by the sociocultural
environment and our physical natures and bodily processes involved with survival and well-
being. The emergence of language, a totally new adaptive tool, brings another co-determinant
of experienced situations.77
The value and meaning of language itself is in new possibilities afforded for
sociocultural experiences. Metaphors as mediation allow for continuing reconstruction of
experience in a melioristic way (cf. Johnson 2007, 206). Language, however, always
underdetermines experience. Dewey emphasized “words can only hint, point; the indication
succeeding when it evokes an actual experience of the thing in question” (EN, LW 1:230).
And “in so far as we know how to assign meanings to facts and objects,” we are mistaken
when we presume “we will be able to secure also those values or meanings that we want and
to avoid those which we do not want” (HME, LW 17:353). Being able to have an intelligible
conversation about the value of growth is not the same as securing growth for all those we
wish to experience it. If there is any baseline to measure with in Dewey, it would be the norm
for any practice, including the use of certain linguistic expressions, to contribute to further
enrichment of future experiences we might have. So, a metaphor and its entailments of
structural relations in the conceptual propositions and the existential connections involved in
experienced situations can be of value to us. This counts for immediacy of meaning and
appraisal as well. Both immediate and reflective experience answer to the growth of well-
being as standard for a valuational judgment of the metaphor. For the pragmatic naturalist
language (including metaphors) is not a postmodernist construct where “things are as they are
said to be” (Schneider 1970, 12). Language is always primarily about communication, about
manipulation of things for social purposes.
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77 Cognitive development after birth is to a large extent scaffolded upon the social, cultural, and linguistic
practices and institutions present. This is reflected in repertoires of meanings and values we come to possess and
express. Meaning as a function of dynamical coupling is imbued with greater complexity as the architecture
itself becomes more differentiated, leading to possibility for finer discrimination of experiences.

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We can interpret Dewey’s remark “no word can describe or convey a quality” in two ways
(IIS, LW 15:40). The inadequacy of language as gulf between the universe of experience and
the universe of discourse is, given all the above, an unconvincing interpretation. We have a
lexicon of meaningful expressions, with many “words which are always used by everyone …
without seeing all that is understood in them” (HME, LW 17:354). This should not lead us to
relativism or skepticism about meaning. Instead it points to the fact that obscurement is “a
refusal [of signification] due as a rule to habits previously formed” (IIS, LW 15:40). What I
argued for is language can at best serve to produce in the hearer or reader an experience in
which the quality mentioned is directly had. In this sense language can be seen as an
invitation for imaginative experiences of meaning.78
5.4 Chapter Five - Conclusion
In the previous pages I argued metaphors play a functional role in moral imagination. I argued
ES processes involved in construction of meaning and understanding of our lived experiences
are also engaged in processing language. Projection takes place both in the universe of
experience and in the universe of discourse. Language itself has an immediate quality,
allowing metaphor to have persuasive and influencing effects of priming, framing, obscuring,
and steering. Metaphoric moral deliberation is subject to such effects like any cognitive-
affective process. Like any valuing act, an appraisal of a moral experience through metaphor,
is subject to a performance-resource function of attention and awareness that situationally
determines whether more control or more efficiency of operation takes place (Pessoa 2013,
2015). I now close with final remarks and present the notion of metaphordances.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78 As James noted, “There is not a conjunction or a preposition, and hardly an adverbial phrase, syntactic form,
or inflection of voice, in human speech, that does not express some shading or other of relations which we at
some moment actually feel to exist between the larger objects of our thought” (PP, I, 245).

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6. Chapter Six – Where No Metaphor Has Gone Before
“Nature is the intertwining of the actual and the possible; intelligence is seeing the possible in
the actual; wisdom is discerning life-worthy possibilities in present situations” (Alexander
2017, 7).
6.1 Conclusions and Summary Findings
The three main conclusion, or positive theses, of my argument are: 1) moral deliberation, or
moral imagination as Dewey would have it, can be understood as cognitive-conative-affective
simulation (cf. Johnson 2014, 2016); 2) metaphors are proposals for inquiry and judgments;
3) metaphors unconsciously influence moral deliberation.
In the case study we saw metaphor in moral imagination. When we are as yet undecided
toward a subject-matter, like immigration, our moral deliberations and judgments are
automatically and unconsciously maneuvered due to certain metaphors encountered in
sociocultural environments. Summary conclusion is that the most devious of such metaphoric
frames, being so ingrained in our discursive and conceptual habits, are those we no longer
recognize as metaphors; the effects are none the lesser.
The reader, having arrived at the conclusion of my argument may feel confounded. The
conclusion might sounds simple, but recall the amount of preparatory groundwork that was
needed to arrive here; that is why it now sounds so familiar and common-sensical. It means
you have accepted it. If the conclusion sounds vague or obscure, I ask the reader to retrace the
steps of the journey and come back again. I would like to end with my own contribution.

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6.2 Provocation: Metaphordances
A certain metaphor allows us to conceptualize and reason about a complex abstract topic in
terms of concrete sensorimotor experiential terms. A certain metaphor affords us certain
insights and inferences. A certain metaphor projects the horizon of our actual sensorimotor
experience into possible consequences of acting on a certain conception through embodied
simulation. A certain metaphor used in moral imagination opens up and closes off certain
ways forward that concern what to do in the problematic situations we encounter in our lives.
Language is intertwined with our affective, cognitive, perceptual, sensory and motor
capacities. As we have seen, language can mediate and impact our experiences in many ways.
Language seen as cultural artifact, or systematic fund of meanings, provides insight into rich
polysemous expressions and can be considered proof of language as a sort of virus, one that
certainly exploits the multimodality of the brain’s sensorimotor region. “Communication is
not only a means to common ends,” Dewey observed, “but is the sense of community,
communion actualized” (EN, LW 1:66). For a pragmatic naturalist this concerns what sort of
community, and the manner of communion that gets actualized, through linguistic practice.
Moreover, which possibilities of behavior, meaning, and value we entertain, is connected with
sociocultural affordances shaped by language, too.
I thus return to the notion of affordances. Anthony Chemero’s treatment of affordances (2003,
2009) as ecological follows Gibson (1979). Affordances are “possibilities for experience
constituted by the interaction of our perceptual and motor capacities with the features of our
surrounding environment” (Johnson 2014, 95). Mark Johnson extended Chemero’s
affordances to cover the sociocultural environment “to include possibilities for social
interactions in a cultural context” (ibid.). My contribution is to extend Johnson’s extension, to
include possibilities for experience constituted by interaction of our linguistic capacities,

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shaped by sensorimotor structures through conceptual metaphors, with the features of our
surrounding environment in its physical, social and cultural contexts.
My extension I term metaphordances, a neologism, affirming its status as philosophical
tool.79 I am, however, still in good company as the idea can be found in Dewey as a germ:
“meanings are rules for using and interpreting things; interpretation being always an
imputation of potentiality for some consequences” (EN, LW 1:147).
Metaphordances can be understood as propositions for inquiry and invites for
experience. The context of a situation is a scene of action, a pragmatic landscape of
affordances, that metaphor as linguistic tool uniquely provide access to. More complex
functional couplings between organism and environment reveal us more about nature, and
provide a greater capacity for ways of sense making through experience (cf. EN, LW 1:201).
Metaphordances allow for more meaningful and value rich experiences, due to our now finer
discriminations through habitual capacities of conceptualizing situations, to mark more
differences, similarities, changes, and relations. Metaphordances allow the carrying over of
meaning as relations from situation to situation.
All experience shows both the precarious and the stable, is both actual and possible.
I close with Dewey: “The visible is set in the invisible; and in the end what is unseen decides
what happens in the seen; the tangible rests precariously upon the untouched and ungrasped.
The contrast and the potential maladjustment of the immediate, the conspicuous and focal
phase of things, with those indirect and hidden factors which determine the origin and career
of what is present, are indestructible features of any and every experience“ (EN, LW 1:44).
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79 Its status is really more a philosophical bastard child between ecological psychology and cognitive linguistics,
weaned and reared on a steady diet of radical embodied cognition (see what I did there?).

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Abbreviations
Citation of Charles Sanders Peirce’s works are to the Essential Peirce collected volumes published
by Indiana University Press under the editorship of Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel. Citations
give volume abbreviation, followed by page number.
ABBREVIATIONS FOR THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE
EP1 The Essential Peirce, Volume 1, Selected Philosophical Writings (1867-1893)
Citation of William James’s works are to the two-volume Dover edition of The Principles of
Psychology, the two-volume Library of America collected volumes of the William James Writings,
and John McDermott’s the Writings of William James for the essays. Citations give volume
abbreviation, followed by page number.
ABBREVIATIONS FOR SELECTED TEXTS
PP I The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1, 1950 (1890)
PP II The Principles of Psychology, Volume 2, 1950 (1890)
WWJ The Writings of William James, ed. John J. McDermott, 1977
Citations of John Dewey’s works are to the thirty-seven-volume critical edition published by
Southern Illinois University Press under the editorship of Jo Ann Boydston. Citations give text
abbreviation, series abbreviation, followed by volume number and page number.
SERIES ABBREVIATIONS FOR THE COLLECTED WORKS
EW The Early Works (1882-1898)
MW The Middle Works (1899-1924)
LW The Later Works (1925-1953)
ABBREVIATIONS FOR SELECTED TEXTS
P Psychology, 1967 (1887), EW 2
RACP “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology”, 1972 (1896), EW 5
RTS “The Relationship of Thought and Its Subject-Matter”, from Essays in Experimental
Logic, 1977 (1916), MW 2
BAE “Beliefs and Existences [Beliefs and Realities]”, from Essays in Experimental Logic,
1977 (1916), MW 3
PIE “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism”, 1977 (1905), MW 3
IDP “The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy”, 1977 (1909), MW 4
LJP “The Logic of Judgments of Practice”, 1979 (1915), MW 8
DE Democracy and Education, 1980 (1916), MW 9
EEL Introduction to Essays in Experimental Logic, 1985 (1916), MW 10
RP Reconstruction in Philosophy, 1982 (1920), MW 12
HNC Human Nature and Conduct, 1983 (1922), MW 14
EN Experience and Nature, 1981 (1925), LW 1
AT “Affective Thought”, 1984 (1926), LW 2
PP The Public and Its Problems, 1984 (1927), LW 2
TPA “The Pragmatic Acquiescence”, 1984 (1927), LW 3
QC Quest for Certainty, 1984 (1929), LW 4
WIB “What I Believe”, 1984 (1930), LW 5
QT “Qualitative Thought”, 1984 (1930), LW 5
TIF “Three Independent Factors in Morals”, 1984 (1930), LW 5

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CaT Context and Thought, 1985 (1931), LW 6
SAS “Science and Society”, from Philosophy and Civilization, 1985 (1931), LW 6
SSSC “Social Science and Social Control”, 1985 (1931), LW 6
E 1932 Ethics, 1985 (1932), LW 7
HWT How We Think, Revised Edition, 1986 (1933), LW 8
ACF A Common Faith, 1986 (1933), LW 9
AE Arts as Experience, 1987 (1934), LW 10
LTI Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, 1986 (1938), LW 12
EE Experience and Education, 1988 (1938), LW 13
EKVaR “Experience, Knowledge, and Value: a Rejoinder”, 1988 (1939), LW 14
IIS “Inquiry and Indeterminateness of Situations”, 1989 (1942), LW 15
KK Knowing and the Known, 1989 (1948), LW 16
ISM “Importance, Significance, and Meaning”, unpublished ms., 1989 (1950), LW 16
HME “The Historical Method in Ethics”, unpublished ms., 1990 (1901) LW 17
LOE Lectures on Ethics, 1900-1901, ed. Donald F. Koch, 1991

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