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26 The World Financial Review
In this article John Campbell and Ove
Pedersen argue that the way policy
ideas are generated by knowledge
regimes varies considerably across
countries; and the effect on national
politics is significant.
Globalization has created unprec-
edented economic problems
for governments everywhere.
To cope with them, policymakers need
fresh thinking and new ideas. They often
turn to private think tanks, government
research departments, political party ana-
lysts, and other policy research organiza-
tions, which together make up what we
call a knowledge regime. The way knowl-
edge regimes are organized and operate
varies widely across countries and has
significant influence on national politics.
In the United States, private think
tanks often take center stage publicly.
Historically, serious scholarly opera-
tions like the Brookings Institution
and the American Enterprise Institute
played key roles in writing academic
style articles and hefty books. But with
the rise of globalization and consequent
increasing uncertainty about what
policies would be effective in the face
of it, much more aggressive advocacy-
oriented operations like the Heritage
Foundation and the Cato Institute on
the right and the Center for American
Progress (CAP) on the left assumed
leading roles too. Their short policy
briefs, newspaper op-eds, blogs, video
clips, and other media savvy techniques
e National Origins of Policy Ideas
By John L. Campbell and Ove K. Pedersen
Review
were designed to sway public opinion
and influence policymakers faster and
more directly than the old-style scholar-
ly think tanks. And with their entrance,
the tenor of public debate became far
more acrimonious and shrill. Some of
the more aggressive think tanks employ
what one think tank president calls po-
litical “bomb throwers” who relish the
opportunity to foment controversy and
ideological battle. The media, particu-
larly since the assent of smash-mouth
talk radio and cable news shows on
FOX and MSNBC, thrive on this and
stage these ideological food fights on
a daily basis. Within the last few years
Heritage and CAP, which, thanks to
their status under the U.S. tax code, are
prohibited from lobbying politicians,
have taken the fight to a new level by
founding sister organizations that can
cross that line and engage in all sorts
of highly partisan political activity.
This evolution in the American knowl-
edge regime has helped fuel the rising
partisanship and political gridlock that
has made politics and policymaking in
Washington the blood sport it is today.
Backstage, of course, have been
a number of respected govern-
ment research departments like the
Congressional Budget Office and the
Government Accountability Office
(GAO) that quietly perform rigorous
policy analysis of all sorts in a non-
partisan fashion. But the war of ideas
became so extreme and destructive of
sound policymaking that in the early
2000s, a few prominent members of
this knowledge regime launched efforts
to build bridges across the partisan gulf.
One such effort, the Fiscal Wake-Up
The evolution in the American knowledge regime has helped fuel the rising partisanship and politi-
cal gridlock that has made politics and policymaking in Washington the blood sport it is today.
Global Governance
www.worldnancialreview.com 27
July - August 2014
Tour, organized in 2005 by people from Brookings, Heritage,
the American Enterprise Institute, the GAO, and a few
others, worked together to convince policymakers that the
country’s fiscal problems were becoming so severe that ide-
ological differences should be sidelined in the interests of
the country. Washington, they urged, needed to get serious
about addressing the fiscal situation. Unfortunately, their
efforts seem to have fallen on deaf ears as Congress contin-
ues to kick this particular can down the road.
Things are much different in European countries where
the activities of policy research organizations are set up in
ways that often promote consensus-making more than par-
tisan combat. Consider Germany. The powerful Ministry
of Economics and Technology commissions a handful of
the most prominent economic policy research institutes in
the country, often connected with prestigious universities,
to produce a Joint Economic Report (JEP) twice a year that
includes economic forecasts and policy recommendations.
The JEP is supposed to represent a consensus among the
institutes involved. Enhancing consensus-making further,
the Ministry then uses these reports to help guide the prep-
aration of its own forecasts, recommendations and poli-
cies. And it sends a “silent observer” to JEP meetings to
keep it apprised of the technical methods being used there
in an effort to conform to the JEP approach. The system
isn’t perfect. Occasionally JEP members add their dissent-
ing views to the reports. But overall there is far less strident
partisanship in this process than we found in the United
States. The Ministry also convenes an annual closed-door
meeting with the major policy research institutes, repre-
sentatives from various ministries and others to share fore-
casts, policy ideas and discuss how the government might
handle the country’s pressing problems. No official reports
are written and no public statements are issued. The idea
is to confidentially share information and see where ev-
erybody stands on the important issues of the day before
the government moves forward. To the extent that policy-
making is informed by these sorts of deliberations, both
formal and informal, German politics avoids the sort of
cut-throat hyper-partisanship and gridlock that has become
so common in the United States.
The tendency toward consensus among policy analysts
in Germany has been encouraged in others ways too. One
is the Leibniz evaluation, a process launched in 1977 by
which an esteemed scientific professional organization,
the Leibniz Association, reviews each economic policy
research institute every seven years. The Association
judges each institute on the quality of its policy research,
its relevance for national policymakers, and its contribu-
tion to public debate. Institutes that score very high are
admitted to the Leibniz Association, which brings both
monetary reward and a significant boost in status. It is a
coveted honor. A senior official at the Cologne Institute
for Economic Research told us that this process triggered a
“race to the top.” Institutes strive constantly to adopt state-
of-the-art research techniques, which leads to a degree of
consensus in how they conduct their analyses and in turn,
the findings they tend to come up with. It makes reaching
consensus just that much easier for politicians, too, when
the experts are judged to be top-notch and in agreement.
Denmark is even more consensus oriented than
Germany. For example, the Danish Economic Council in-
cludes representatives from the major labour and employer
associations, the central bank, key ministries and other im-
portant economic organizations. It is run by four econo-
mists, commonly known as the Wise Men, whose job is to
conduct forecasts, make policy recommendations, and try
to facilitate consensus within the rest of the Council. The
Danes also rely heavily on a number of ad hoc commis-
sions staffed primarily with experts in the relevant policy
area, such as welfare reform or labour market policy, that
conduct analyses and formulate policy recommendations
for the government. These recommendations are then
transmitted to Parliament where they provide the basis for
legislation. The idea is for each commission to arrive at
consensus after extensive consultation with labour unions,
employer associations and other interested organizations.
Finally, since the 1980s the government has insisted in-
creasingly that ministries, labour organizations, employer
associations, and anyone else seeking to influence policy-
making offer sound empirical analysis rather than ideology
to support their arguments. Otherwise, officials won’t grant
them access to policy deliberations. This has helped gener-
ate a degree of consensus in technical policy analysis and,
as a result, in policy recommendations. Indeed, it is not un-
common now for the major labour and employer associa-
tions to share data, work on joint policy analysis projects,
and even lobby Parliament together whenever they are in
agreement on policy issues. Of course, Denmark is a small
Things are different in European countries
where the activities of policy research organi-
zations are set up in ways that often promote
consensus-making more than partisan combat.
Since the 1980s the Danish government has insisted that anyone seeking to inuence policymak-
ing come with sound empirical analysis rather than ideology to support their arguments. This has
helped generate a degree of consensus in technical policy analysis and in policy recommendations.
28 The World Financial Review
country especially vulnerable to global forces around it.
Since the onset of globalization in the 1970s, most political
parties gradually set aside much of their ideological pos-
turing in favour of more reasoned, data-based arguments.
Not only has this elevated the importance of expert-orient-
ed decision making but it has also infused Danish politics
with an additional shot of moderation in the policymaking
process.
The French have tried to encourage cooperative, if not
always consensus-oriented, policy analysis. In particular,
the Prime Minister’s office directs the government’s Council
of Economic Analysis to conduct studies and make policy
recommendations of all sorts. Once the Council has been
given a task, such as recommending changes in pension
reform, it gathers a variety of experts, often from universi-
ties and from a wide range of perspectives spanning the
intellectual and political spectrum, to work on the report.
Analyses are performed, opinions are expressed, and a
final report is issued that covers the debate that has ensued.
The Council does not always agree on everything. But
the process encourages civil debate. Similarly, the Prime
Minister’s Center for Strategic Analysis helps coordinate the
activities of several policy research organizations inside and
outside the state in order to craft joint forecasts, policy anal-
yses and recommendations with an eye toward consensus.
These organizations, as well as a few others operating
privately but still funded by the state, were created in the
first place by the Prime Minister’s office when it became
clear that fresh thinking was necessary in order for poli-
cymakers to cope effectively with the problems of global-
ization. The state’s formidable in-house technocratic ex-
pertise was no longer viewed as being up to the task. So
the idea was to create independent research units to which
the state could outsource some policy analysis functions
in order to get second opinions. Nevertheless, the French
still depend heavily, as they always have, on the state’s own
expertise, particularly at the national statistical institute
and the Ministry of Finance, for much policy analysis and
advice. A few small advocacy organizations, occasionally
modelled on the Heritage Foundation, have cropped up in
recent years but their influence on policymakers has been
limited (although they do command some attention in the
media). French policymaking remains comparatively insulat-
ed within the state, at least by European and American stan-
dards, as it has been at least since the Second World War. But
these sorts of knowledge regime changes have opened things
up a bit more to new ideas and voices from civil society.
Which knowledge regime is best is in the eye of the be-
holder. In our view, the United States suffers from excessive
partisanship and gridlock but also benefits from a diversity
of viewpoints often missing in these other countries. French
policymakers still rely to a considerable extent on in-house
policy analysis, and so do not seem to have fully overcome
their concerns about the state technocracy’s stale thinking.
Germany benefits from a comparatively high level of exper-
tise across most policy research organizations, but runs the
risk of a modicum of groupthink insofar as consensus-mak-
ing tends to silence opposing views – a concern expressed
publicly by those who criticized German economists for
failing to see the 2008 financial crisis coming. The same
might be said of Denmark, except for the fact that they are
more deliberate in making sure that a wide range of voices,
including those from organized labour, business, state re-
searchers, and a wide variety of independent experts, are
included in the conversation. At minimum, we hope that
each country can learn from the experiences of the others
in ways that can achieve an effective balance. Failing to do
so will make it just that much tougher for policymakers to
cope effectively with the problems of globalization.
The article is adapted from The National Origins
of Policy Ideas: Knowledge Regimes in the United
States, France, Germany, and Denmark (Princeton
University Press, 2014),
About the Authors
John L. Campbell is the Class of 1925 Professor of
Sociology, Dartmouth College, and Professor of Political
Economy, Copenhagen Business School. Ove K. Pedersen
is Professor of Comparative Political Economy, Copenhagen
Business School.
French policymaking remains comparatively
insulated within the state, at least by European
and American standards, as it has been at least
since the Second World War.