The Effect of Linkedin on Deception in Resumes

Abstract

This study explores how Linkedin shapes patterns of deception in resumes. The general self-presentation goal to appear favorably to others motivates deception when one's true characteristics are inconsistent with their desired impression. Because Linkedin makes resume claims public, deception patterns should be altered relative to traditional resumes. Participants (n=119) in a between-subjects experiment created resumes in one of three resume settings: a traditional (offline) resume, private Linkedin profiles, or publicly available Linkedin profiles. Findings suggest that the public nature of Linkedin resume claims affected the kinds of deception used to create positive impressions, but did not affect the overall frequency of deception. Compared with traditional resumes, Linkedin resumes were less deceptive about the kinds of information that count most to employers, namely an applicant's prior work experience and responsibilities, but more deceptive about interests and hobbies. The results stand in contrast to assumptions that Internet-based communication is more deceptive than traditional formats, and suggests that a framework that considers deception as a resource for self-presentation can account for the findings.

Full text

The Effect of Linkedin on Deception in Resumes
Jamie Guillory, M.S.,
1
and Jeffrey T. Hancock, Ph.D.
1,2
Abstract
This study explores how Linkedin shapes patterns of deception in resumes. The general self-presentation goal to
appear favorably to others motivates deception when one’s true characteristics are inconsistent with their
desired impression. Because Linkedin makes resume claims public, deception patterns should be altered relative
to traditional resumes. Participants (n = 119) in a between-subjects experiment created resumes in one of three
resume settings: a traditional (offline) resume, private Linkedin profiles, or publicly available Linkedin profiles.
Findings suggest that the public nature of Linkedin resume claims affected the kinds of deception used to create
positive impressions, but did not affect the overall frequency of deception. Compared with traditional resumes,
Linkedin resumes were less deceptive about the kinds of information that count most to employers, namely an
applicant’s prior work experience and responsibilities, but more deceptive about interests and hobbies. The
results stand in contrast to assumptions that Internet-based communication is more deceptive than traditional
formats, and suggests that a framework that considers deception as a resource for self-presentation can account
for the findings.
Introduction
P
eople rarely lie for the sake of lying. Deception is used
to accomplish goals (e.g., appearing attractive or compe-
tent).
1
Self-enhancing deceptions are common, and typically
driven by the desire for positive self-presentation. In the self-
presentational framework of deception,
2
self-enhancing lies
are part of an effort to manage how we convey ourselves to
the world.
In professional contexts, resume padding is an example
that seems to occur frequently. One resume consulting service
suggested that 43 percent of resumes evaluated contained
significant inaccuracies.
3
Though many of these lies seem like
mere exaggerations, consequences for deception in resumes
can be devastating. Take Janet Cooke, who lost the Pulitzer
Prize in 1981 after being caught lying about her educational
background.
4
Cooke’s case is extreme, but demonstrates the
costliness of deception in organizations. Getting caught in a
self-enhancing lie damages one’s reputation, leading to social
or material punishment. People also prefer to view them-
selves as honest, which is evident in research demonstrating
that even with no chance of being caught, people tend to lie or
cheat in small amounts.
5
Factors encouraging or discouraging deception have been
raised anew in the age of online profiles, in which individuals
construct virtual self-presentations. These profiles have be-
come surprisingly common with social networking Web sites
linking profiles between friends, acquaintances, and col-
leagues. These services include professionally oriented sites,
such as Linkedin, in which people upload online resumes
and form connections with colleagues and friends. Because
social networking profiles are virtual self-presentations and
are not physically connected to the self, these profiles offer
novel opportunities for deception not possible in Face-to-
Face (FtF) settings. Walther
6,7
argues that people can take
advantage of affordances of computer-mediated communi-
cation (CMC) (e.g., reduced cues and editability) to enhance
self-presentations.
Though the online environment may facilitate deception,
several factors should constrain deception and foster honesty.
Social network profiles make self-presentations publicly
available and link individuals to the profile (e.g., colleagues
and supervisors) who can verify whether profile claims are
deceptive or not. Researchers both on and offline have dem-
onstrated the importance of social relationships in fostering
honesty between individuals.
8–10
For example, recommender
systems on Web sites like eBay help ensure that transactions
in these environments remain honest by providing users,
who have no previous seller history, with information about
sellers’ trustworthiness. Affordances that establish links be-
tween the on and offline self should improve the likelihood of
honesty online.
In the case of resumes, how might Linkedin, which allows
people to post resumes and link with others online, affect
deception? More specifically, how will Linkedin affect the
tension between the self-presentational motivation to be
Departments of
1
Communication and
2
Information Science, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.
C
YBERPSYCHOLOGY,BEHAVIOR, AND SOCIAL NETWORKING
Volume 15, Number 3, 2012
ª Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.
DOI: 10.1089/cyber.2011.0389
135

deceptive and the motivation to be honest, given that dis-
covery of deception is reputation damaging? The current
study explored how Linkedin resumes affect the frequency
and type of deception produced in resumes.
Self-presentation and deception
in social networking Web sites
Popular opinion holds that deception is prevalent online,
with one study finding that 73 percent of individuals believe
deception is widespread online.
11
These are concerns about
digital deception, or the deliberate control of a technologically
mediated message to create false belief.
12–14
Specifically, we
are concerned with identity-based deception related to per-
sonal identity.
15
Research suggests that identity-based de-
ception occurs more in CMC than FtF.
16
The major reason
digital deception may be more frequent in online communi-
cation is because ‘‘text-based interaction or virtual represen-
tations of self’’ (p. 291)
15
are not physically connected to an
individual.
Self-presentational goals, however, are a common and
important motivator for deception
2
regardless of medium.
Online these goals range as widely as they do FtF and often
involve eliciting positive impressions.
17–19
Research dem-
onstrates that wanting to appear competent motivates
deception.
20,21
One study
20
found that 90 percent of indi-
viduals admitted to lying on a resume-like scholarship ap-
plication. When trying to appear competent, motivation to
lie flows from the need to impress an audience, such as
a potential employer. Social networking profiles are de-
signed to convey impressions to an audience, whether it is
the unknown general audience online or specific network
connections.
22
Self-presentational goals should drive decep-
tion in social networking profiles, especially in the case of
Linkedin profiles, which are designed to convey competence
for employment.
While individuals are motivated to provide positive self-
presentations, the publicness of resumes makes people ac-
countable for information shared online. When a person
creates a Linkedin profile, the site provides default settings
making the profile public, creating a potential audience to
which the communication partner must explain deceptions
(profiles can be made private upon request). Public settings
should increase the possibility that an employer might dis-
cover deceptions. Traditional resumes, on the other hand, are
confidential and are not widely shared outside organiza-
tions.
23
Though it is common for employers to contact refer-
ences to review truthfulness of resumes, traditional resumes
are limited in their ease of accessibility to others, with far
fewer potential viewers to verify veracity.
The likelihood of being caught in a lie about previous
employment should be higher for publicly available Linkedin
profiles than for traditional resumes. Though profile public-
ness does not guarantee that relevant audiences will view
profiles (e.g., supervisors), profile creators should alter de-
ceptive behavior to be consistent with information known by
potential audiences. For example, online dating profiles had
fewer deceptive photographs when more friends knew about
the profile.
24
In another study, the more links a person had on
a social networking site the fewer lies they reported in pro-
files.
25
Socially connected displays of information on these
sites should constrain deception, as being detected has seri-
ous consequences (e.g., exposure of deceptions by network
members).
How exactly should Linkedin affect deception then? On one
hand, the perception that deception is widespread online is
pervasive. This perception is partially fueled by the affor-
dances of text-based communication, which allow for in-
creased opportunities to edit self-presentations, and the
reduction of the nonverbal cues, which are stereotypically used
to detect lies.
11,26
In the absence of these cues, which may
provide ‘‘leakage’’ indicating deceptiveness, deception maybe
perceived as less difficult.
27,28
Recent research, however, has
shown that the content of deception (rather than nonverbal
cues) improves accuracy in detecting deception.
29
Thus, con-
cerns about being caught lying should be more important
when making resume claims publicly available. Since both
traditional resumes and Linkedin profiles are created without
nonverbal cues and provide similar opportunities to craft
self-presentations—but only Linkedin profiles are publicly
available—lying should occur less frequently in Linkedin
resumes:
H1: Deception will occur less frequently in public
social networking profiles than in private profiles or
traditional resumes.
Not all lies are created equally, however. A more subtle
response to the pressure of making a resume public on Lin-
kedin should also affect the types of lies people tell to ac-
complish self-presentational goals. For instance, deception
should be affected by the verifiability of resume claims. The
falsifiability heuristic suggests that when a person shares self-
relevant information that is more objectively verifiable (e.g.,
observable behaviors), it is viewed as less credible and people
are more likely to classify it as deceptive.
30
Deceptions about
verifiable claims, such as educational background or experi-
ence, pose significant risks if made public and are more likely
to be classified as lies. In contrast, when the veracity of re-
sume information is difficult to assess objectively, such as
hobbies or interests, not only is there less risk of being caught
lying, but information is less likely to be classified as decep-
tive.
30,31
Thus, individuals should practice deception strate-
gically, lying about different types of information depending
on the publicness of the claims. Specifically, public resume
creators should lie less about former employment, such as job
responsibilities, because this information can be indepen-
dently verified as deceptive.
31
Indeed, cases involving discovery of deceptions about ver-
ifiable claims entailed consequences including loss of jobs and
awards, and damage to reputation.
32
To avoid consequences,
people creating public resumes should lie about information
that is not widely known to network members and therefore
less job relevant. For example, when applying to a job in-
volving travel, lies about interests in travel or learning new
languages accomplish this goal without being verifiable by
network members. Though unverifiable information is less
directly relevant to obtaining a job, it can be used to accom-
plish self-presentational goals. Thus, deception should occur
strategically based on a resume’s potential audience:
H2: Public profiles will contain less deception about
verifiable information, but more deception about un-
verifiable information than traditional resumes or
private profiles.
136 GUILLORY AND HANCOCK

Methods
Participants
Participants were 119 undergraduates between 18- and 22-
years old in the Northeast United States (29.4 percent men).
Four participants were excluded for failing to follow in-
structions.
Resume conditions
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three
resume-creating conditions: offline as a Word

document
(traditional, n = 37), or online as a Linkedin profile that was
either private (n = 41), or public (n = 41). Linkedin profiles and
traditional resumes required the same information categories:
education, experience, skills, and interests.
Participants in the public Linkedin condition were in-
formed that profiles would be available online. Participants in
the private Linkedin condition created profiles that only the
participant and researchers could access. This condition was a
control to ensure that differences between the traditional re-
sume and public profiles were not due to the public profile’s
presence on Linkedin. Participants created new Linkedin
profiles and had no site experience.
Procedure
Following previous procedures,
20
participants created a
resume for an advertised position. They spent 30 minutes
creating a resume for a consultant position with a lucrative
salary and international office locations. Requirements were
enhanced to ensure that participants would have difficulty
meeting the qualifications. Participants were instructed to
tailor resumes using their own information to be the most
qualified candidate, with a $100 incentive for the ‘‘best-
fitting’’ resume. Participants spent 15 minutes answering
questions related to creating the resume and demographics.
The researcher then revealed the study’s true purpose:
assessing deception in resumes. Participants spent 15 minutes
revealing and describing their deceptions using the retro-
spective deception identification technique from previous re-
search,
21
which requires participants to review statements
and identify deceptions. Participants were told that any in-
formation that could create false belief counted as a lie. Par-
ticipants were assured that we made no judgments about
deception’s valence and deception in resumes is common.
20
In a worksheet participants reported the deception and pro-
vided a more truthful version of the deception. Participants
were debriefed and dismissed.
Dependent variables
Deception coding. Self-reported deceptions were coded
on how verifiable information was. Verifiable information
related to aspects of the self-presentation that could be con-
ceivably confirmed by others online. Lies in this category
were related to responsibilities, information describing re-
sponsibilities at a job or activity; abilities, information indi-
cating ability to use software, language, or anything
involving expertise; and involvement, information indicating
level of participation in an activity or job.
Unverifiable information made up a smaller subset of the
data and included information typically unknown to col-
leagues. These lies related to interests, and indicated an in-
terest, motivation, or concentration in some aspect of life.
These lies included information about interests or hobbies.
These types of deception make up our original resume lie
taxonomy (see Table 1 for examples of each deception type).
Two coders rated all lies individually, reviewed codes to-
gether, and resolved discrepancies. Intercoder reliability was
acceptable (j = 0.76).
Manipulation checks. A manipulation check ensured that
participants in the public condition felt that their profiles
were more public than those creating nonpublic profiles (e.g.,
‘‘My profile in this experiment is publicly identifiable.’’).
A second manipulation check ensured that differences in
deception were due to publicness of resumes, rather than
differential motivation to create a self-presentation that
publicness of different communication environments may
have elicited. Participants responded to the 10-item, semantic
Table 1. Resume-Related Lie Taxonomy
Definition Deception Truth
Responsibility Lies that discuss implicit and/
or explicit job or activity-
specific duties.
Nine students work for my
company
Six students work for my company
Organize museum’s spring
benefit
Helped staff who organized
Abilities Deceptions indicating ability
to use specific software,
language, etc.; lies related to
recognition (i.e., honors,
awards) for skills or
abilities.
Familiarity with Adobe Suite Not familiar with Adobe Illustrator
Poststandard ‘‘Voices Award’’
winner
Only a contributing writer
Involvement Lies indicating a greater or
lesser degree of
participation in some
specific activity, job, etc.
National society of collegiate
scholars 8/2007—present
Member, but only attended 1 meeting
Interests Deception indicating interest,
motivation, or
concentration that is in
some way false.
Major concentration in media
studies
Not sure what my major concentration is
Marketing is my best fit I’m not interested in marketing at all, just
in high salary
LINKEDIN, DECEPTION, & RESUMES 137

differential state motivation scale.
33,34
Participants assessed
the resume task (i.e., ‘‘Please indicate the number toward ei-
ther word which best represents your feelings about creating
a resume for the described job.’’) using polarized adjectives
anchoring each end of a seven-point scale (e.g., motivated vs.
unmotivated, excited vs. bored, etc.). The scale measured
how motivated participants were in creating a positive self-
presentation with high item reliability (Chronbach’s a = 0.86).
Data analysis
Contrast analyses explored the effect of publicness on
manipulation check items and dependent variables (i.e., de-
ception frequency and type). Contrast analyses assigned
weights of - 1, - 1, and 2 to traditional resumes, private
profiles, and public profiles respectively,
35
to compare pri-
vate conditions (i.e., traditional resumes and private profiles)
to the public condition. Though a Bayesian analysis would
provide a more appropriate test of the probability of decep-
tion, insufficient data exist from prior studies to factor in the
probability of deception in this context.
Results
Manipulation checks
Public Linkedin resumes (M = 5.30, SE = 0.27) were con-
sidered more publicly available than the two types of private
resumes (M = 4.18, SE = 0.19), t(115) = 3.42, p < 0.01, r
effect size
=
0.30.
36
This confirms that the publicness manipulation was
successful (see Table 2 for individual means of traditional,
private, and public Linkedin resumes).
The second manipulation check ensured equal motivation
among all participants in creating a positive self-presentation.
Analysis assessing the effect of publicness on self-presentational
motivation revealed no differences in motivation between
private (traditional: M = 3.26, SD = 0.94; private Linkedin:
M = 3.73, SD = 1.17) and public resumes (M = 3.69, SD = 0.96),
t(116) = 0.94, p = 0.35. As deception is a function of motivation,
this check allowed us to focus on publicness as the mecha-
nism driving deception differences.
Deception patterns
On average, participants lied 2.87 (median = 3.00, SD = 1.79)
times in their profile with a total of 341 lies. The frequency of
deception was normally distributed. One hundred and six
participants (92.4 percent) reported at least one deception; the
greatest number of lies was 8. There were no gender differ-
ences in deception frequency, t(117) = 0.53, p = 0.60.
The first hypothesis predicted that deception would be
more frequent in traditional and private Linkedin resumes
relative to public Linkedin resumes. This was not the case.
Participants in the public condition (M = 3.02, SE = 0.27) pro-
duced a similar number of lies as participants in private
conditions (M = 2.78, SE = 0.21), t(116) = 0.94, p = 0.49 (see
Table 3 for individual means of traditional, private, and
public Linkedin resumes).
Our next hypothesis concerned whether the publicness of
Linkedin resumes affected the types of deceptions told. Lies
related to responsibilities, abilities, and involvement were
considered verifiable lies. Lies related to interests were con-
sidered unverifiable lies. We predicted that more verifiable
lies would be present in traditional and private Linkedin re-
sumes compared with public Linkedin resumes and that
more unverifiable lies would be present in the public condi-
tion compared with private conditions (H2). As predicted,
participants in the public condition lied less about responsi-
bilities (M = 0.39; SE = 0.09) relative to participants in private
conditions (M = 0.64; SE = 0.10; t(116) = 1.66, p
< 0.05, one-
tailed, r
effect size
=0.15).
36
In contrast, participants in the public
condition lied more about interests (M = 0.37; SE = 0.10) rela-
tive to participants in private conditions (M = 0.10; SE = 0.04;
t(116) = 2.88, p < 0.01, r
effect size
= 0.26).
36
Comparisons for abil-
ities and involvement were not significant (see Table 3 for
individual means of traditional, private, and public Linkedin
resumes). Note that data for responsibilities and interests
were positively skewed; however, data transformations did
not change effects reported earlier.
Discussion
The public nature of Linkedin shaped deception in our
participants’ resumes. Although overall rates of deception
did not differ across the two types of resumes, participants
lied differently depending on whether their self-presentation
was a traditional or Linkedin resume. Participants creating
public Linkedin profiles lied less about verifiable information,
specifically responsibilities, and maximized their resume’s
attractiveness with minimal consequences by lying more
about unverifiable information, specifically interests. Partici-
pants creating traditional resumes lied more about verifiable
information that was central to the job, presumably because
there is less threat of being caught. Traditional resume crea-
tors accomplished self-presentational goals via deceptions
about verifiable information, and lied less about unverifiable
information. While the effect sizes were small, these findings
were consistent with the hypotheses, and have important
theoretical and practical implications.
First, these data are consistent with the idea that self-
presentational motivations drive deception.
1,37
Given that
Table 2. Means (Standard Errors) for Publicness
and Motivation by Condition
Traditional
resume
(n = 37)
Private Linkedin
profile
(n = 41)
Public Linkedin
profile
(n = 41)
Publicness 4.54 (0.23) 3.85 (0.29) 5.30 (0.27)
Motivation 3.26 (0.15) 3.74 (0.18) 3.69 (0.15)
Table 3. Mean (Standard Error) Frequency
of Deception Overall and by Resume Information
Type Across Presentation Condition
Traditional
resume
(n = 37)
Private Linkedin
profile
(n = 41)
Public
Linkedin
profile (n = 41)
Responsibilities 0.68 (0.15) 0.61 (0.13) 0.39 (0.09)
Abilities 1.24 (0.18) 1.07 (0.17) 1.32 (0.21)
Involvement 0.76 (0.13) 0.95 (0.15) 0.76 (0.12)
Interests 0.05 (0.04) 0.15 (0.07) 0.37 (0.10)
Total frequency 2.81 (0.27) 2.76 (0.31) 3.02 (0.27)
Note: Total frequency may not indicate exact total of all four types
because some lies could not be coded into these four categories.
138 GUILLORY AND HANCOCK

self-presentational motivations were equivalent across con-
ditions, as indicated by our manipulation check, our expec-
tation that Linkedin would uniformly reduce deception was
overly simplistic. Instead participants accomplished identical
self-presentational goals (as indicated by the motivation
manipulation check) using different forms of deception that
matched the public nature of the claims. It is important to
note that the effect size of the difference in the frequency of
responsibility deceptions was relatively small. Given the
grave consequences associated with deception in organiza-
tions, for both employers and employees,
4
we argue that this
small difference is nonetheless important.
Second, our findings suggest that the assumption that the
Internet is rife with deception
11
is not necessarily correct. Our
data from Linkedin resumes reflect lower levels of deception
compared with previous work exploring enhancement in pa-
per-based resumes.
20
The results suggest that the public nature
of online resume information, rather than the distinction be-
tween on and offline deception, determines how lying takes
place. Further, our data speak to the recent debate on the
prevalence of deception in everyday communication, with some
research suggesting most people lie a little each day
38
and other
research suggesting that only a few people lie a lot.
39
In the
current study, over 90 percent of participants lied at least once
on their resume. This distribution of deception is more consis-
tent with previous observations that most people lie a little.
Conclusion
Although counterintuitive, our data suggest that Web sites
such as Linkedin, which make resume information public
and linked to one’s network, can foster greater honesty for
resume claims that are most important to employers, such as
claims about experience and responsibility. Similar effects have
been demonstrated in the context of recommender systems.
8,10
Our research suggests that the public availability of informa-
tion to social ties affects honesty in a more complex manner
than previously assumed. Participants considered publicness
strategically, adapting their lies based on whether information
could be verified as deceptive by others online, suggesting that
public availability of information does not guarantee honesty.
Instead, the public nature of online self-presentations shapes
how we use deception to achieve our goals.
Acknowledgment
This research was supported by funding from the National
Science Foundation HSD#0624267.
Disclosure Statement
No competing financial interests exist.
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Address correspondence to:
Jamie Guillory
Department of Communication
Cornell University
331 Kennedy Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853-4203
E-mail: jeg258@cornell.edu
140 GUILLORY AND HANCOCK