China’s foreign and security policy institutions and decision-making under Xi Jinping

Abstract

Power concentration in the hands of Xi Jinping, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary, can be interpreted not only as a reaction to the power fragmentation and the intra-party factionalism that developed under his predecessor, but also as a way to strengthen and stabilise China’s authoritarian polity. In the realm of foreign and security policy, it can also be understood as the result of China’s awareness of both the growing transnational security risks that it is facing and the need to better address the new international tasks and responsibilities it needs to fulfil as a great power. Since 2012, Xi has embarked on sweeping institutional reforms that have contributed to centralising and better coordinating foreign and security decision-making. Yet, although more integrated, China’s authoritarian system has remained fragmented, including in the realm of foreign and security policy, an area where decision-making processes are still highly opaque.

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https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148120974881
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
2021, Vol. 23(2) 319 –336
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DOI: 10.1177/1369148120974881
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China’s foreign and security
policy institutions and decision-
making under Xi Jinping
Jean-Pierre Cabestan
Abstract
Power concentration in the hands of Xi Jinping, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary, can
be interpreted not only as a reaction to the power fragmentation and the intra-party factionalism
that developed under his predecessor, but also as a way to strengthen and stabilise China’s
authoritarian polity. In the realm of foreign and security policy, it can also be understood as the
result of China’s awareness of both the growing transnational security risks that it is facing and the
need to better address the new international tasks and responsibilities it needs to fulfil as a great
power. Since 2012, Xi has embarked on sweeping institutional reforms that have contributed to
centralising and better coordinating foreign and security decision-making. Yet, although more
integrated, China’s authoritarian system has remained fragmented, including in the realm of foreign
and security policy, an area where decision-making processes are still highly opaque.
Keywords
authoritarian polity, China, Chinese Communist Party, decision-making, foreign policy, integrated
fragmentation, leading small groups, security policy, Xi Jinping
Introduction
Xi Jinping’s arrival to power in 2012 has resulted in a greater concentration of power at
the top of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership (Heilmann and Stepan, 2016).
Xi has also created new institutions that have taken away responsibilities from existing
ones, moving more decision-making processes from the government to the Party appara-
tus or to his own hands. These changes have also significantly affected agencies dealing
with foreign and security policy.
Kenneth Lieberthal famously coined the term ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ to
describe the competition and, as a resulting lack of coordination, among bureaucracies
which all report to and are controlled by the CCP leadership (Lieberthal, 1992). Andrew
Nathan (1973) and Lowell Dittmer (1995) among others have explored how factionalism
and patron-client relations can affect decision-making. In other words, although it is
Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon, Hong Kong
Corresponding author:
Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Kowloon, Hong Kong.
Email: cabestan@hkbu.edu.hk
974881BPI0010.1177/1369148120974881The British Journal of Politics and International RelationsCabestan
research-article2020
Special Issue Article

320 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 23(2)
obsessed with speaking with one voice and covering up its own divisions, the CCP has
never been a monolith.
In order to keep under control the risks of fragmentation, the CCP has set up under the
Central Committee (CC) leading small groups (LSGs, Zhonggong zhongyang lingdao
xiaozu). These LSGs are designed to better coordinate and regulate the actions of all the
bureaucracies which are represented in them, usually by their top leader (Tsai and Zhou,
2019). Although under Mao Zedong Party LSGs already existed, since the late 1970s
their number and their role have increased (Miller, 2008; Zhou, 2010). Xi’s institutional
reforms have consolidated this trend.
To better comprehend the rationale of Xi’s reforms in the realm of foreign and security,
this article operationalises the concept of ‘integrated fragmentation’ developed by Kjeld
Erik Brødsgaard and applied to the relationship between China’s large state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs) and the Party (2012, 2017). For him, the CCP Nomenklatura (or leaders’
appointment) system and the establishment of the State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission (SASAC) have contributed to mitigating, up to a point, the
risks of fragmentation between the Party and the SOEs. There are obvious differences
with Brødsgaard’s case study since in the area of foreign and security policy, nearly all
institutions involved are part of what I will call the ‘Party-state apparatus’, including the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Nonetheless, this concept helps better understanding
the instruments of, as well as the obstacles to, organisational integration in China’s
authoritarian polity.
It is today rather easy to identify the Party and state institutions involved in foreign and
security decision-making. The difficulty in the Chinese case is to evaluate the respective
weight of these various power loci and their leading officials as well as the nature of the
debates that they hold and the relationship that they entertain among each other. Do they
follow the same objectives and policies? Are there tensions among them and even contra-
dictions between their respective actions? Do personal relations among leaders matter?
The very opacity of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) political system forbids any
researcher to apply the methods developed for example by Graham Allison (1999) to
comprehend the ‘essence of decision’ in the United States government at the time of the
Cuban missile crisis. Yet, as in democracies and open societies, in authoritarian and rather
closed political systems, it remains possible, on the basis of a careful reading of primary
sources, leaked information, and interviews, to identify bureaucratic interests and ten-
sions and, as a result, propose an institutional analysis of decision-making processes
(Barnett, 1985; Goldgeier, 2018).
While remaining modest about what we know, particularly regarding the role of LSGs
and personal relations among leaders, this task can help open the Party-state’s ‘black box’
and better comprehend China’s foreign and security policy decision-making processes
(Halperin, 2006). It can also help with evaluating the influence of fragmentation and even
factionalism on these processes. In other words, in order to understand Xi’s reforms in the
context of authoritarian politics, this article combines institutional analysis and evalua-
tion of leaders’ behaviours and inter-personal relations. More specifically, it articulates
the changes that have occurred among Party, state and military institutions to leading
personnel’s reshuffles and promotions.
In this article, I attempt to assess the major changes introduced by Xi Jinping. I will
first explain the rationale behind the power concentration that has taken place since 2012.
Then, for clarity, I will present the major institutional and personnel changes affecting the
various agencies involved in foreign and security decision-making. While this article

Cabestan 321
focuses on China’s outside security, it also includes the domestic security institutions that
have international responsibilities. In spite of Xi’s power concentration, I will also high-
light the tensions and contradictions that have persisted in foreign and security policy-
making since 2012 as well as the elements of continuity with the previous eras.
The rationale of Xi’s power concentration
Xi’s power concentration has been rightly presented as a reaction to Chinese leadership’s
growing fragmentation and even factionalism under the reign of his predecessor, Hu
Jintao, CCP General Secretary from 2002 to 2012, and an effort to better coordinate
decision-making. Although, as far as we know, fragmentation and factionalism did not
directly influence foreign and security policy, it did weaken the Chinese state’s ability to
act. The purge of Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai, Politburo Standing Committee
(PBSC) member Zhou Yongkang, and Politburo member PLA General Guo Boxiong,
highlighted a serious degree not only of corruption but also of political divisions and
rivalry within the Party leadership (Li, 2016a: 53).
In the realm of foreign and security policy decision-making, Xi’s institutional reforms
can also be understood as the result of China’s awareness of both the growing security
risks that it is facing and the need to better address the new international tasks and respon-
sibilities it needs to fulfil as a great power. On one hand, it is well-known how much Xi
has been obsessed with the demise of the Soviet Union (Gao, 2013). Better managing all
the risks to the regime’s security, be they domestic or transnational, has become a clear
priority since Xi came to power. On the other hand, as China was becoming a world
power competing in a new bipolar game with the United States, there has been a need to
introduce more rapid and efficient decision-making processes and better coordinate pol-
icy implementation.
Xi Jinping’s more pre-eminent role
The role of the Party supremo in foreign and security policy decision-making has always
been pre-eminent and even decisive. This was true of Mao, Deng and Jiang Zemin, less
so of Hu Jintao because of an obvious lack of charisma and legitimacy in the eyes of
many in the Party leadership, particularly of Jiang’s allies. In concentrating foreign and
security policy power in his own hands, Xi has in many ways restored the status quo ante.
Like Jiang and Hu, as CCP General Secretary, Xi chairs the Party and state Central
Military Commission (CMC) and is President of the People’s Republic. He also chairs the
CCP Finance and Economy LSG (Zhongyang caijing lingdao xiaozu), Foreign Affairs
LSG (thereafter FALSG, Zhongyang waishi gongzuo lingdao xiaozu), and Taiwan Affairs
LSG (Zhongyang duiTai gongzuo lingdao xiaozu).
But Xi has also gone further than his two immediate predecessors, both in becoming
more active on the international stage and in creating new institutions involved in foreign
and security decision-making that he directly controls.
For one thing, since November 2012, Xi has been a much more hands-on CCP General
Secretary, with the willingness to make a difference: he has adopted a more assertive
foreign policy, burying for good Deng Xiaoping’s low-profile diplomacy. He has launched
multiple new international projects, including the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in
October 2013; and he has travelled abroad more frequently than Hu Jintao (Economy,
2018). More importantly, Xi made some crucial institutional changes. In October 2013,

322 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 23(2)
he established within the Party system a National (or ‘State’ as indicated in official trans-
lations) Security Commission (NSC, Zhongyang guojia anquan weiyuanhui) that he has
since then chaired. Although mainly dealing with domestic security issues, the NSC has
also developed some international responsibilities, as for example in the area of border
control and counterterrorism (see below). Around the same time, he created two new CCP
central LSGs that he decided to chair as well: The Comprehensively Deepening Reform
Leading Small Group (Zhongyang quanmian shenhua gaige lingdao xiaozu) and in
December 2013, the Cybersecurity and Informatisation LSG (Zhongyang wangluo
anquan he xinxihua lingdao xiaozu).
Two years later, in December 2015, Xi embarked upon a major restructuring of the
PLA and streamlining of the CMC, strengthening his own control of the military and the
country’s defence policy. A few months later, in April 2016, Xi appointed himself ‘com-
mander-in-chief of the CMC Joint Operations Centre’ (Zhongyang junwei lianhe zuozhan
zhihui zhongxin zongzhihui). Then, in October 2016, at the 6th plenum of the 18th CC, Xi
was elevated to the status of ‘core’ (hexin) of the leadership.
In March 2018, Xi made another unprecedented decision when he turned four of the
five LSGs mentioned earlier – namely foreign affairs, finance and economy, deepening
reform and cybersecurity – into full-fledged CCP CC commissions (weiyuanhui). The
objective of this reform was clear: tighten Party control in these areas in empowering its
major coordinating bodies with larger although ill-defined policy-making and implemen-
tation responsibilities. Only Taiwan affairs have remained managed by an LSG, probably
because of its similarities, in the eyes of the CCP, to Hong Kong and Macau affairs, also
run by an LSG. While dealing mainly with domestic affairs, the Finance and Economy
Commission (FEC) also oversees foreign economic relations and as a result important
trade negotiation (Cabestan, 2019).
Finally, at the same time, the powers of the newly created Foreign Affairs Commission
(FAC) were expanded; it took over the responsibilities of the CCP Maritime Rights and
Interest Protection LSG (Zhongyang weihu haiyang quanyi gongzuo lingdao xiaozu), cre-
ated in mid-2012 and also chaired by Xi since its inception. This latter LSG was at the
same time dismantled.
As a result, Xi is no more primus inter pares (first among equals) but both the ‘chair-
man of the board’ and the ‘CEO’ of the CCP and the PRC as Roderick MacFarquhar
(2016) suggested, particularly as far as foreign and security policy is concerned (Lampton,
2015). Xi is of course facing the risk of being responsible of too many levers of power –
five commissions and one LSG (NSC, deepening reforms, cybersecurity, finance and
economy, foreign policy, Taiwan LSG), in addition to his three key official titles – to be
efficient. But, as we will see, these power loci meet very rarely; as a result, decision-
making power is concentrated in their office’s permanent leading staff.
The changing role of the major party-state institutions
under Xi
The PBSC
Including the seven most powerful leaders of the Party and the country, the PBSC has
under Xi officially remained China’s supreme decision-making body. Meeting probably
every week, it continues to formally endorse all important decisions, including regarding
foreign and security policy (Choi, 2017). Nonetheless, Xi is known for having gradually

Cabestan 323
questioned the principle of collective leadership, making more decisions himself or rely-
ing on LSGs or commissions that he better controls (Li, 2016a).
After Xi came to power in 2012, he had to operate with a seven-member PBSC (against
nine between 2002 and 2012). Then the PBSC was still dominated by Jiang Zemin (as
Zhang Dejiang and Yu Zhengsheng) or Hu Jintao clients (as Li Keqiang and Liu Yunshan).
In contrast, since the 19th Party Congress in November 2017, Xi has enjoyed a clear
majority in the PBSC. Although its second member is Li Keqiang, Premier since 2013,
Hu Jintao’s only other ally is Wang Yang, Chairman of rather weak China’s People’s
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). The four other members are either close to
him, as National People’s Congress (NPC) Chairperson Li Zhanshu and the secretary of
the Party Central Discipline Inspection Commission Zhao Leji, or have made allegiance
to him, as Party theorist and head of the CCP Central Secretariat Wang Huning and first
(executive) Vice-Premier Han Zheng, even if the latter had initially been promoted by
Jiang Zemin (Guo, 2019).
To some extent, Xi has stuck to PBSC past operation procedures. As his predecessors,
he is in charge of preparing the agenda of each meeting and has kept the same level of
opacity; although decisions are officially made collectively, decision-making procedures
are secret and probably rather informal. Decisions are usually endorsed by consensus
rather than by vote, although some observers claim that ballots can take place and, in such
cases, each PBSC member has one vote. For instance, in May 2019, it was reported that
the PBSC had refused to accept the conditions imposed by the US government on the
conclusion of a trade deal but it remains unclear how each member voted and whether
only the PBSC or the whole 25-member Politburo (PB) was involved (Nakazawa, 2019).
Moreover, since 1997, the PBSC has not included any military leader. Consequently, it is
forced to delegate to the General Secretary and the CMC all decisions that have a defence
dimension.
Yet, under Xi, the PBSC’s weight in foreign and security policy has been harder to
evaluate. For one thing, according to several reports, Vice President of the Republic Wang
Qishan, although not any more a PB or even a CC member, is regularly invited to sit in
PBSC meetings (SCMP Reporters, 2017). Wang’s presence provides Xi with additional
support, particularly on foreign affairs, with Wang having some responsibilities in this
area (see below). For another thing, the PBSC formally endorses foreign policy and secu-
rity decisions that are prepared and actually made elsewhere, for example by the FAC or
the NSC (see below). In any event, since 2017, Xi has been in a stronger position to
impose his decisions on the PBSC and even more so on the PB, and as a result reigns in
risks of fragmentation.
The PB
Under Xi, the role of CCP PB in foreign and security policy-making has not really
changed; it has always been rather weak except in times of crisis when enlarged PB meet-
ings, to which military leaders can be associated, are convened by the Party General
Secretary (Cabestan, 2009: 72; Lampton, 2001). Although PB meetings are far from
being systematically reported in the Chinese media, such enlarged PB meetings have
apparently not taken place since 2012. The growing role of the Party LSGs and commis-
sions mentioned earlier have also contributed to shifting decision-making.
The PB on average meets once every month. PB meetings generally deal with domes-
tic affairs. The PB may debate foreign or security matters but it is usually invited to listen

324 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 23(2)
to reports made by the General Secretary or to attend study sessions to which well-known
scholars are asked to make presentations on a particular issue. This is because under Xi as
before, most of the PB’s 18 ordinary (or non-PBSC) members are not versed in foreign or
security affairs, except general Xu Qiliang and Zhang Youxia as well as Yang Jiechi, FAC
Office director, and Ding Xuexiang, director of the powerful CC General Office
(Zhongyang bangongting) since 2017.
The FAC of the CCP Central Committee
It is difficult to define the role of the FAC in foreign policy decision-making processes
because it is nearly as secretive as the LSG that it replaced in 2018. The FAC’s first and,
to date, only meeting made public took place on 15 May 2018. It has given us sketchy
information about its membership and mission (Xi, 2018b; Yue, 2018). We then learnt
that Li Keqiang was the FAC’s Vice-Chairman and that Wang Qishan, one of its mem-
bers. The rest of the membership has remained officially unknown, although it was indi-
cated that Wang Huning and Han Zheng, in charge of the BRI and Hong Kong and Macau
LSG chair, as well as ‘responsible comrades of concerned organs’ (youguan bumen fuze
tongzhi) took part in the meeting.
Usually presented (and listed) as the eighth leader of the Party-state top hierarchy,
behind the PBSC members but ahead of other PB members, including Yang Jiechi, Wang
Qishan regularly travels abroad (until COVID-19) or receives foreign dignitaries.
However, his influence may have diminished since 2019 when his relations with Xi
reportedly started to deteriorate.
The detailed membership of the FAC has not been made public. If it has remained the
same as the now defunct FALSG (Miller, 2008), one can assume that other ex-officio
FAC members include the heads of the following agencies: the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MOFA), the CCP International Liaison Department (CCP-ILD), the CCP CC
Propaganda Department, the Ministry of National Defence (MND), the Ministry of Public
Security (MPS), the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the Ministry of Commerce
(MOFCOM), the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office
(HKMAO), the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office and the State Council Information
Office.
The FAC may meet secretly. But from a practical viewpoint, it is uneasy to regularly
bring together so many important officials. As a result, FAC meetings are probably irreg-
ular, and only convened when very important decisions need to be made. Consequently,
the FAC is a body that can be used to gather and synthesise the view of the various
bureaucracies involved in foreign affairs. It can also serve to disseminate among them the
latest foreign-policy decisions made by its chair, Xi Jinping. It may also help with over-
coming differences or disputes among agencies and containing fragmentation. But it is
doubtful that its meetings are the locus where most foreign-policy decisions are made.
The FAC powers, therefore, are probably concentrated in its office, and more specifically
Yang Jiechi’s hands.
The Central Committee Foreign Affairs Office (CCFAO)
Established in 1958, the CCFAO (Zhongyang waishi bangongshi) became in 1998, the
office of the CCP FALSG and since 2018, of the FAC. Headed since 2012 by Yang Jiechi,
the main architect of China’s foreign policy (Lam, 2015: 207–208), the CCFAO or FAC

Cabestan 325
Office reports directly to Xi, contrary to the MOFA which reports to the CCFAO. Yet, the
FAC Office deputy-director was Le Yucheng from November 2016 to 2018. Now
Executive Vice-Foreign Minister, Le has been replaced in this position by another diplo-
mat, Liu Jianchao. The FAC’s deputy-director is clearly in charge of guaranteeing coor-
dination with the MOFA.
It is not known how many officials work in the CCFAO but CC LSG, and now com-
mission offices typically include 200–300 officials and sometimes more. Interacting very
little with the outside world, the CCFAO has been widely used by Xi when he needs
information on major foreign-policy issues (Glaser, 2015). A CCP organisation, the
CCFAO is not only of higher ranking than the MOFA but reports directly to Xi who is also
FAC Chair. Moreover, the CCFAO prepares the agenda of every FAC meeting under Xi’s
only supervision. We therefore can assume that its role in decision-making is crucial.
The NSC
On this front, Xi has succeeded where his predecessors failed. Nonetheless, it remains to
be seen whether China’s NSC can really operate and be as reliable as any other NSC,
particularly the ones designed on the American model.
It took a long time for China to create an NSC. The National Security LSG (NSLSG)
set up by Jiang Zemin in the early 2000s to better address international crises and coordi-
nate with the PLA was too much an ad hoc structure meeting only when required by the
General Secretary and largely overlapping with the FALSG. It was also ill-equipped to
share information and make recommendations to the PBSC (Cabestan, 2009: 75–78;
Wuthnow, 2017: 893). After dismantling the NSLSG, Xi decided to establish a fully
fledged NSC which would include PLA representatives on a permanent basis, and as a
result improve information-sharing between the CCP military and civilian leaders
(Lampton, 2015; Saunders and Wuthnow, 2019: 532).
At the NSC’s first meeting in April 2014, this new body’s mission was defined; intro-
ducing an ‘overall approach to national security’, better coordinating agencies in charge
of national security and better prepare the country to crisis management, both inside and
outside of China (Hu, 2016). Up until now, the NSC seems to have dealt more with
domestic (60% of its time according to some experts’ rough estimation) rather than for-
eign security (40%) (Finkelstein, 2014). It has also focused less on foreign and security
affairs as such than it has on cross-border security issues, including terrorist and separatist
activities affecting Xinjiang or Tibet, as well as the surveillance of all political, economic,
social or religious organised forces that, inside or outside of China (or in Hong Kong), can
potentially threaten the CCP’s grip on the state and the country (Cabestan, 2017: 116–
118; You, 2016).
Yet, for the first time, a civilian-dominated body has been able to involve on a perma-
nent basis as many as four PLA generals and make, in a shorter period of time, situational
and policy option assessments, and consequently, recommendations to the Party top lead-
ership, including on foreign and outside security issues (Erickson and Liff, 2016;
Wuthnow, 2017: 895). For example, situation reports from the PLA’s East China Sea joint
operations command centre have started to be forwarded to senior Party officials (Swaine,
2015: 146).
In April 2018, in the NSC’s first meeting after the 19th Party Congress, Xi insisted on
the need to preserve the CCP’s ‘absolute leadership’ (Xi, 2018a). Reflecting the leader-
ship changes that took place at this congress, the NSC’s membership has since late-2017

326 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 23(2)
evolved: its two vice-chairmen are Li Keqiang and NPC Chair Li Zhanshu. More impor-
tantly, its Office Director is now Ding Xuexiang, Li Zhanshu’s successor both in this
position and as Director of the CCP CC General Office, a key job in terms of direct access
to Xi as well as circulation of information within the Party and the state apparatuses.
The rest of the NSC’s new full membership has not been made public, but it is pre-
sumed that the same bureaucracies are represented, each of them by their top leader, as in
February 2017, when its standing membership, 21 officials in total, was revealed
(Zhongyang, 2017): Propaganda Department, Legal and Political Commission, PLA,
CCFAO, Foreign Ministry, Central Bank and major cities. The PLA was then represented
by four CMC members, the chief of the general staff (Fang Fenghui), the director of the
General Political Department (Zhang Yang), the Director of the Logistics Department
(Zhao Keshi) and the Director of the Department of Armament (Zhang Youxia). It is
likely that the first two position holders, today Li Zuocheng and Miao Hua, still sit in the
NSC (see below).
Interestingly, today the NSC Office’s two deputy-directors are Liu Haixing (since
March 2018) and Chen Wenqing (since May 2018), the latter then also becoming its
executive vice-director (Chen, 2018). Liu (2018) was assistant Foreign Minister between
2015 and 2017 and has been elected in March 2018 Standing Committee member of the
NPC, representing Xinjiang. Chen is the Minister of State Security (in charge of espio-
nage and counter-espionage) and a close political ally of Xi (Mattis, 2015). While PLA
representatives probably sit in the NSC Office, to date, their presence has not been made
public.
Again, in view of its sheer membership, the NSC is unlikely to meet very frequently,
even if some of its meetings are not reported. For example, it has secretly met three times
since April 2018, with the latest meeting held in March or early April 2020 being devoted
to the security implications of the COVID-19 health crisis (Ho et al., 2020). Consequently,
the NSC probably relies on its office as well as the triumvir that leads it to make most
security-related decisions. As Wuthnow (2017) has rightly argued, China’s NSC is still
largely a ‘black box’.
In any event, although its office contributes to a better coordination among agencies in
charge of external security (MOFA, MSS, PLA), it appears as a good illustration of ‘inte-
grated fragmentation’ model. As a result, the Chinese NSC is likely to remain quite dif-
ferent from, and probably less influential as a body than the American NSC.
The CMC
For these reasons, the CMC has remained a key decision-making locus regarding not only
peace and war, but also the management of the military dimension of any international
crisis in which China may be involved.
Introduced in December 2015, the PLA’s reorganisation has included many facets.
Two of them have been crucial: recentralise power within the CMC and better prepare the
PLA for war, particularly in developing coordination and joint exercises among its vari-
ous branches as well as in replacing the seven and army-dominated military region with
five ‘war theatre’ (zhanqu) commands.
Only the former reform is of interest here. Xi has not only strengthened but also
streamlined the CMC (7 against 11 members before) excluding from it two of the tradi-
tional four central PLA departments, namely the General Logistics Department and the
General Armament Department as well as the commanders of the Army, the Navy, the Air

Cabestan 327
Force and the Second Artillery, renamed Rocket Forces. Only the Defence Minister
(General Wei Fenghe since 2018), the chief of the general staff (General Li Zuocheng
since 2017) and the Director of the Political Work Department (Admiral Miao Hua) sit in
the CMC, in addition to the two CMC vice-chairmen (Xu Qiliang and Zhang Youxia, both
PB members) and the secretary of the PLA Discipline Inspection Commission (Zhang
Shengmin). The implication of this streamlining is the possibility to make swifter
decisions.
How much the CMC is involved in foreign policy and security decision-making is a
question that remains difficult to answer. Top PLA generals still have influence on foreign
policy, either through their participation in the leading bodies in which they are repre-
sented as the FAC, the NSC and even the PB or in being invited to enlarged ad hoc meet-
ings of the PBSC (Swaine, 2015). On security matters, and not only in times of crisis or
war, because of its control of military information and intelligence, the CMC is in a posi-
tion to prepare and to some extent impose decisions on the NSC, and even the PBSC. For
example, in the South China Sea or East China Sea, the CMC holds the power to lead and
coordinate the actions of the PLA Navy, the Coast Guards and the Maritime Militia, the
latter being often on the frontline to harass incoming ships (Erickson, 2017). Even if since
March 2018, the FAC has been in charge of Maritime Rights and Interest Protection, the
control and security of China’s claimed maritime domain remains primarily the responsi-
bility of the three major sea forces reporting directly or indirectly to the CMC (through
the People’s Armed Police for the Coast Guards; Erickson and Martinson, 2019).
Consequently, risks of fragmentation are far from over.
This issue boils down to assessing Xi’s control over the PLA and the CMC. Xi is the
CMC’s only civilian leader (until his successor is chosen and promoted to the CMC vice-
chairmanship). As ‘commander-in-chief’ of the joint battle command centre, he has
acquired some direct leadership on combat and relevant strategies, particularly in war-
time. But is he as powerful and well-informed as the US president (Chan, 2016)? While
the establishment of the NSC has contributed to reducing the PLA’s autonomy, the CCP
top leadership’s actual control over the PLA remains thin and overly dependent upon Xi
Jinping alone (You, 2020). In other words, in spite of Xi’s reforms, the PLA’s autonomy
in the decision-making process has remained an unresolved issue.
The role of the ministry of foreign affairs
The role of the MOFA has not really changed under Xi. It is responsible for day-to-day
foreign policy. It makes many diplomatic decisions and is a unique source of analyses and
information about the outside world, with the help of its Policy Planning Department and
the two think tanks that report to it, the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and
the China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU) (Li, 2016b: 26). It is also a major source of
policy proposals and a privileged channel of foreign-policy implementation. Since March
2018, promoted State Councillor, Foreign Minister Wang Yi has been the foreign-policy
coordinator within the State Council. He also sits in the FAC.
Under Xi, an important development affecting the MOFA has taken place: the estab-
lishment in March 2018 of the China International Development Cooperation
Administration (CIDCA, Guojia guoji fazhan hezuo shu), a vice-ministerial agency that
reports directly to the Premier, and actually to Yang Jiechi’s CCFAO and Wang Yi’s
Foreign Ministry (Rudyak, 2019). Headed by Wang Xiaotao, a former vice-chairman of
the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), this agency has taken over

328 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 23(2)
the competences of both the MOFCOM’s Department of Foreign Aid and the MOFA’s
responsibility for aligning foreign aid objectives with foreign-policy goals. In the turf of
war between both ministries, it seems that since the CIDCA’s creation the latter has man-
aged to regain some influence in this area. Yet, both in Beijing and on the ground the situ-
ation will take some time to change. The CIDCA staff is very small (around 100) and does
not include so far representatives in Chinese embassies where aid projects remain super-
vised by MOFCOM personnel (Sun, 2019). It is unclear either how much in Beijing the
Ministry of Finance (MOF) has stopped coordinating the aid budget and the MOFCOM
has refrained from managing it.
All in all, the MOFA’s input in decision-making (knowledge, assessments and profes-
sional experience) should not be underestimated. However, the Ministry is only one of the
bureaucracies influencing major foreign-policy decisions. For instance, the Ministry of
Ecology and Environment plays a crucial role in international climate change negotia-
tions. And decisions in which commercial interests are at stake need to involve the
MOFCOM. As many realities contributing to fragmenting decisions.
The growing role of the ministry of commerce and its limits
The MOFCOM’s growing influence precedes Xi’s era. Since 2013, in view of the increas-
ing importance of trade negotiations with other countries, its role has kept expanding in
foreign-policy decision-making processes. The Minister of Commerce sits in the Party
FAC. Together with the MOF, the MOFCOM is also on the forefront when trade disputes
arise, for instance, with the United States since April 2018. Since February 2017, the
MOFCOM has been headed by Zhong Shan, a close ally of Xi Jinping (Mai, 2017).
Nevertheless, the international activities of the MOFCOM have encountered a number
of obstacles. In spite of the gradual weakening of the NDRC since Xi’s arrival to power,
the division of labour between the MOFCOM and this commission is far from well delin-
eated. For example, often, the minister in charge of the NDRC, today He Lifeng, rather
than the Minister of Commerce, travels with the President abroad (Xinhua, 2019).
National enterprises – in particular, the big oil and gas companies – have developed their
own strategies, and their interests may not always coincide with the MOFCOM’s policy
priorities. The same can be said of the major policy banks funding projects, particularly
infrastructures, overseas, namely the Exim Bank and China Development Bank.
Moreover, in charge of investing abroad part of China’s hard currency reserves, the China
Investment Corporation (CIC) does not report to this ministry, but to the Party FEC. The
establishment of the CIDCA in 2018 has taken away from the MOFCOM its competence
in foreign aid. And although tensions with the MOF are less pronounced, they emerge
from time to time, particularly during negotiations with other countries.
Various unresolved bureaucratic rivalries therefore have hindered the MOFCOM’s
growing role, lending the Party LSGs – and now commissions – and their office even
more importance in containing as much fragmentation as possible.
The more visible complementary role of the CCP International Liaison
Department
For a long time, the CCP International Liaison Department (Zhonggong zhongyang dui-
wai lianluobu) played a discreet but complementary role in China’s foreign-policy deci-
sion-making and implementation. Under Xi, its role has become more visible and active

Cabestan 329
in promoting China’s new initiatives, such as the BRI, and propagating its ‘solutions’
(fang’an) around the world.
Concentrating since its creation in 1951 on developing and managing relations with
other communist parties and third-world liberation movements, the CCP-ILD has since
the beginning of the reform era established links with a very diverse array of political
parties worldwide. This catch-all policy has allowed the CCP-ILD to entertain today rela-
tions with more than 600 parties in 160 countries against 400 and 140, respectively in
2008 (Zhonglianbu, 2020). It has also developed contacts with foreign non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), and deepened its investigation and analyses regarding the outside
world. It cooperates closely with other CCP organs to propagate China’s ‘success story’
and foreign-policy discourse. Although, traditionally, it has been headed by a CC member
(Song Tao, since November 2015), it plays an important role in dealing with ‘delicate’
countries (e.g. North Korea), and issues (e.g. the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) (Hackenesch,
2020). At least since 2008, the CCP-ILD director has a seat in the FALSG and now FAC.
Under Xi, the CCP-ILD’s portfolio has continued to expand. For example, in April
2015, it created a cooperative alliance of think tanks researching on the BRI aimed at
organising inside China as well as events abroad promoting this initiative. Simultaneously,
it has intensified its relations with foreign political parties, multiplying exchanges of vis-
its and organising training sessions in China for an increasing number of politicians,
particularly from the global South. This task is part of a larger strategy aimed at better
exporting China’s own narrative.
Today led mainly by former diplomats, the CCP-ILD closely coordinates with the
MOFA. In 2018, it was reported that it would merge with the FAC Office in order to
‘streamline the structure of the agencies and reduce overlaps’ (Ng, 2018). However, since
then both structures have remained distinct. Only the office headed by Yang Jiechi can
overcome possible duplication or fragmentation between the CCP-ILD and the MOFA.
The growing importance of foreign propaganda organs
Much more than before, under Xi, the CCP wants to control the global narrative about
China. In order to better fulfil this ambitious objective, Xi has strengthened all the agen-
cies in charge of foreign propaganda (Joske, 2020). He has also asked them to better
coordinate with the international activities of the CCP United Front Department, a power-
ful bureaucracy in charge of reaching out to ‘friendly forces’ around the world.
On 31 December 2016, under Xi’s personal instruction, CCTV, the Chinese Central
Television Company, set up a new international media organisation, the China Global
Television Network, or CGTN (Zhongguo guoji dianshetai or Zhongguo huanqiu diansh-
ewang). Headquartered in Beijing, CGTN’s objective is ‘to integrate resources and to
adapt to the trend of media convergence’. It broadcast news and programmes in six lan-
guages: Chinese, English, French, Spanish, Arabic and Russian. It has production centres
in Washington DC and Nairobi, Kenya, where Xinhua has also established its Africa
regional office (CCTV, 2016).
This initiative has directly contributed to enhancing the influence of the leaders and
agencies in charge of outside propaganda on foreign-policy decision-making. Publicly
presented as the State Council Information Office (Guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi), the
CCP bureau in charge of foreign propaganda (duiwai xuanchuan) has been directed since
August 2018 by Xu Lin who also sits in the FAC. Interestingly, Xu Lin was previously in
charge of the Office of the CCP LSG and now Commission in charge of Cybersecurity

330 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 23(2)
and Informatisation. This appointment highlights the importance given by China to con-
trolling the narrative in the cyberspace.
The input of other stakeholders
The role of think tanks
The role of think tanks, or international relations and strategic studies research institutes,
has always been hard to evaluate (Abb, 2015; Zhu, 2013). Under Xi, Chinese foreign and
security policy think tanks’ diversification and professionalisation have become a strate-
gic priority. Nonetheless, two major changes have occurred: many of the think tanks have
been imposed stricter financial and political controls; at the same time, the most political
of them are more actively involved in track-two diplomacy and used by the government
as ‘soft power agents’ (Menegazzi, 2015: 11, 100–101).
The consequence of this activism has been to involve, to a larger extend, experts in
Xi’s diplomatic offensives as the BRI. This growing involvement has contributed to bet-
ter informing the CCP leadership. For instance, scholars’ research work has more often
served a ‘feedback function for policy-makers’ and their ‘cautious voice’ can help adjust
Chinese diplomacy (Pu and Wang, 2018). However, experts’ increasing input has not yet
resulted in any significant softening of Xi’s aggressive foreign policy (Reuters, 2020).
More generally, we do need to remain cautious about the true extent of think tanks’ influ-
ence on foreign- and security-policy decision-making.
Do local governments play a role in foreign and security policy decision-
making?
Xi’s policy towards local governments has been somewhat contradictory. On one hand,
he has tried to reduce their autonomy particularly in the area of foreign and security pol-
icy, mainly to enhance the country’s external security. On the other hand, he has been
willing to give them a bigger role in the Chinese economy’s globalisation, especially after
he launched the BRI, perpetuating the risks of fragmentation that he wished to mitigate.
Since Xi came to power, the central government’s main agencies dealing with foreign
countries represented locally (MOFA, MOFCOM, CCP-ILD, MPS, MSS, TAO, etc.) have
more actively ensured that official policies are uniformly implemented. In addition, every
provincial-level government has been required to set up an NSC-modelled security com-
mission, underscoring Xi’s and the current CCP leadership’s obsession with security.
This centralisation and securitisation have particularly affected Xinjiang, whose
Uighur community (around 44% of the local population) is perceived by the CCP as a
source of instability, terrorism and even secession. This Western autonomous region’s
economic relations with Central Asia and Pakistan have carried on but under a much
closer central security oversight. Likewise, because of the tensions between the Tibetan
majority (91% of the population) and the Han minority, Tibet’s relations with Nepal and
India have remained tightly managed by Beijing.
Yet, within this more security-oriented bureaucratic environment, local governments
have continued to enjoy a lot of leeway in their relations with the outside world. Since 2013,
all provinces and major municipalities have taken an active part in the BRI, trying by the
same token to get additional resources from the centre. This has particularly been the case
in border provinces and regions as Yunnan and Guangxi (Li, 2014) whose ‘gateway’ roles

Cabestan 331
to Southeast Asia have been strengthened. While superficially toeing the line, localities
involved in the BRI’s various transnational corridors have clearly moved away from the
master plan to fulfil their own economic interests (Hillman, 2018; Jones and Zeng, 2019).
In the same period of time, Hainan has acquired a say in Beijing’s strategy in the South
China Sea (Wong, 2018). As a result, provincial authorities do continue to influence foreign
and security-policy making and to a larger extent policy implementation.
Tensions and contradictions in decision-making
Under Xi, it is clear that the whole political system has been centralised, giving more power
to the secretary-president-commander-in-chief himself and the key leaders of the Party
commissions, especially the ones dealing with foreign (FAC), security (NSC) or military
(CMC) affairs, Yang Jiechi, Ding Xuexiang and Xu Qiliang, respectively. To these four
leaders, one can add Vice President Wang Qishan, NPC Chair Li Zhanshu, CCP Secretary
Wang Huning, CPPCC Chair Wang Yang (as top leader in charge of united front work and
vice-chair of the Taiwan LSG), Han Zheng, CMC second Vice-Chair Zhang Youxia, as well
as Foreign Minister Wang Yi. By and large, the organisational changes introduced by Xi
have contributed to better coordinating decision-making among agencies and speeding up
processes. They have more efficiently served Xi and China’s more assertive foreign-policy
objectives and mitigated the security risks that the CCP regime is facing.
However, this centralisation and coordination effort has not been able to put an end to
‘bureaucratic politics’ (Lai and Kang, 2014) and more generally, the fragmentation ten-
dencies of the Chinese authoritarian polity. For one thing, even if he is inclined to make
decisions together with the three other leaders mentioned earlier, Xi cannot totally ignore
the Party’s PBSC or the PB. For another, the CCP’s central commissions and LSGs are far
from having become final decision-making loci able to impose their decisions upon all
the agencies concerned. Above all, they are coordination bodies in which the major
bureaucracies represented defend various and sometimes conflicting interests. Since they
do not meet frequently, they need to largely rely on their office leaders to resolve these
tensions. The office leaders continue themselves to be heavily dependent upon the profes-
sional institutions specialised in foreign and security matters, namely, the MOFA,
MOFCOM, MPS and MSS as well as the CCP-ILD and the various branches of the PLA.
They also need to take into account the interests of other agencies, as the Propaganda and
the United Front Departments. Put differently, China’s tensions and contradictions in for-
eign and security policy decision-making do not stem from the lack of institutions in this
area but rather from their excessive number. In such an institutional environment frag-
mentation can be better integrated but not totally overcome.
More generally, in Xi’s China, three types of tensions have continued to dominate the
institutional landscape: diplomatic versus commercial, diplomatic versus military, and
commercial versus military. A fourth one has also become more visible, triggered by the
empowerment of the ideologues.
Tensions between ‘diplomats’ and ‘merchants’, the representatives of commercial
interests, have remained frequent, in spite of the MOFCOM’s participation in the FAC.
For example, although the MOFA is involved, trade negotiations are generally conducted
by the Vice-Premier in charge this matter, today PB member Liu He, with the participa-
tion of MOFCOM and sometimes MOF officials. The increasing international vested
interests of China’s large state-owned and to a lesser extend private conglomerates also
complicate the role of the diplomats, compelling the coordination bodies or the top CCP
leadership to arbitrate when the former’s objectives clash with the government’s policy.

332 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 23(2)
Because of the PLA’s persistent autonomy and isolation, contradictions between dip-
lomats and soldiers, and merchants and soldiers are probably deeper. While the CMC is
represented in the FAC, the NSC and the Taiwan LSG, apart from Xi, civilian leaders are
absent from the CMC and do not have much say, for instance, in the way the PLA Navy,
the Coast Guards of the Maritime Militia behave in the South and the East China Seas or
in the Taiwan Strait or the PLA ground forces operate on the Sino-Indian border. Since the
FAC has taken over the protection of China’s rights and interests in the South China Sea,
coordination between soldiers and diplomats has improved. Nonetheless, this unclear
division of labour has been the source of lingering inter-agencies frictions (Martinson,
2019). Moreover, it is far from certain that the PLA accepts to share with the NSC all the
intelligence and data about military capabilities and operations that it would need to make
informed decision (Saunders and Wuthnow, 2019: 532).
A final source of tension has emerged, directly caused by Xi’s effort to restore the
Party’s ideological purity: the CCP ideologues and their various agencies have acquired
much more influence in China’s foreign and security policy-making, forcing diplomats,
but also merchants and soldiers to more forcefully disseminate the CCP’s global narrative
around the world. What has been called China’s ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’ has also been a
source of tensions within this country’s governmental system.
Conclusion
Since he came to power, Xi has concentrated in his own hands more foreign and security
policy power than any of his predecessors, except perhaps Mao. While more coordination
bodies and agencies have a say in this area, a smaller number of officials are able to deci-
sively influence policy-making. As a result, the Chinese government can make better-
informed decisions in this area faster and more efficiently. In other words, under Xi,
China is better equipped to defend its security interests and to promote its great power’s
international role and status. Its authoritarian polity has demonstrated its capacity not
only to adapt but also to apparently deliver more coordinated foreign and security policies
than many democracies.
Yet, as in other single-party systems, the leader’s link to the Party is of ‘utmost impor-
tance’ (Kinne, 2005). While better integrated, China’s foreign policy and security deci-
sion-making processes have remained partly stove-piped and Xi is the only leader who
can really overcome this compartmentalisation. As a result, Xi is both the strong and the
weak link of the Party-state’s chain of command. This weak link underscores the institu-
tional fragility of authoritarian regimes. While still strong politically, because of the
changes he has introduced and his willingness to perpetuate his reign, Xi has made many
enemies within the CCP, raising questions about the stability of the patron-clients rela-
tions, he has forged and the true level of institutionalisation of his organisational reforms.
In China, as in any one-party regime, informal politics is condemned to continue to
play a role and to remain a source of bureaucratic fragmentation and even political fac-
tionalism. These vulnerabilities are likely to hinder China’s international ambitions.
Moreover, for the sake of their long-term stability, authoritarian polities need to tolerate
and even protect entrenched bureaucratic interests. Said differently, ‘integrated fragmen-
tation’ has been unable to yield seamless coordination of all foreign and security decision-
making processes.
Finally, there is still a lot that we do not know about China’s foreign and security
policy decision-making processes. Under Xi as before opacity has been used as a weapon

Cabestan 333
aimed at giving an impression of unanimity and strength to the outside world. But it can
be argued that, on the contrary, it nurtures distrust and fear, making more countries suspi-
cious and feeding the ‘China threat’ syndrome.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
ORCID iD
Jean-Pierre Cabestan https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5933-8901
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