Securitization, Social Identity, and Democratic Security: Nixon, India, and the Ties That Bind

Abstract

The Democratic Peace stands as one of the most coherent and recognizable programs of study in international relations. Yet despite the pages of research devoted to the subject and claims about its law-like nature, the democratic peace remains a highly contested finding. In large part, this contestation arises out of an enduring question: What exactly keeps democracies from fighting? Drawing on the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School as well as social psychology, this article claims that a critical mechanism of the democratic peace lies at the political junction between policymakers and the public. I argue that the democratic identity of the public, grounded in basic democratic norms essential for the function of any democracy at any time, plays an independent role in the construction of security and foreign policy in the United States. To test the argument, I examine the difficult case of the 1971 Bangladesh War, when President Richard Nixon sent the USS Enterprise carrier group to the Bay of Bengal. Analysis of public statements as well as administration documentation reveals that, while Nixon and national security advisor Henry Kissinger actively saw India as a threat to U.S. interests, they were constrained by their belief that the public would not accept a security argument with respect to a fellow democracy.

Full text

Securitization, Social Identity, and
Democratic Security: Nixon, India,
and the Ties That Bind
Jarrod Hayes
Abstract The Democratic Peace stands as one of the most coherent and recog-
nizable programs of study in international relations+ Yet despite the pages of research
devoted to the subject and claims about its law-like nature, the democratic peace
remains a highly contested finding+ In large part, this contestation arises out of an
enduring question: What exactly keeps democracies from fighting? Drawing on the
securitization theory of the Copenhagen School as well as social psychology, this
article claims that a critical mechanism of the democratic peace lies at the political
junction between policymakers and the public+ I argue that the democratic identity of
the public, grounded in basic democratic norms essential for the function of any
democracy at any time, plays an independent role in the construction of security and
foreign policy in the United States+ To test the argument, I examine the difficult case
of the 1971 Bangladesh War, when President Richard Nixon sent the USS Enterprise
carrier group to the Bay of Bengal+ Analysis of public statements as well as admin-
istration documentation reveals that, while Nixon and national security advisor Henry
Kissinger actively saw India as a threat to U+S+ interests, they were constrained by
their belief that the public would not accept a security argument with respect to a
fellow democracy+
In 1971, the United States threatened India with the use of military force as West
and East Pakistan disintegrated into Pakistan and Bangladesh+ India, caught between
the two combatants, swamped with refugees, and with a sizable Bengali minority,
supported the breakaway Bangladesh against the militarily superior Pakistan+ The
administration of President Richard Nixon viewed the crisis in terms of global
geopolitics: Pakistan, a “friend” of the United States, was being “screwed @by# a
I am grateful for the comments and suggestions of Babak Bahador, Gordon Clark, Robert English,
Peter Gries, Lene Hansen, Ted Hopf, Kavita Hopf, Shashank Joshi, Bill Long, Dan Lynch, Harald
Müller, Matthew Rendall, Erica Resende, Kai Thaler, Wesley Widmaier, and especially Patrick James
and Janelle Knox-Hayes, as well as the editors and reviewers at International Organization+ The usual
caveats apply+ Previous versions of this ar ticle were presented at the 2009 Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association , the 5th European Consortium for Political Research General
Conference, and the 51st Annual Convention of the International Studies Association+
International Organization 66, Winter 2012, pp+ 63–93
© 2012 by The IO Foundation+ doi:10+10170S0020818311000324

friend of Russia’s+”
1
The Nixon administration eventually sent the USS Enterprise
carrier battle group to the Bay of Bengal in an effor t to deter India from what
Nixon and national security advisor Henry Kissinger believed was its ultimate goal:
the destruction of Pakistan+
Although the United States and India never used military force, the threat was
present—making the confrontation a militarized interstate dispute+
2
The events pro-
vide a rare opportunity to explore the mechanisms of security between democra-
cies in the context of the possible use of force+ At the empirical hear t of this article
is an analytical puzzle+ The data demonstrates that Nixon and Kissinger clearly
saw India as a geopolitical threat—to the point that they sent the Enterprise+ Yet,
despite this assessment they sent the carrier battle group completely unannounced+
When questioned about the carrier’s movement, the administration presented a fab-
ricated mission rationale: the evacuation of U+S+ citizens + This article leverages
this puzzle to test a mechanism-based theory of the democratic peace+ In doing so,
I propose conditions under which securitization will— and will not—work+ In
democracies, securitization fails when the object is also generally regarded as a
democracy+ The article also illuminates processes of security in democracies as
part of an effort to understand the relationship between social identity, political
structure, and democratic security+
The 1971 case is also attractive because “mainstream” structural international
relations ~IR! theories are unable to provide a compelling explanation for U+S+
behavior+ Structural realist balance-of-power predictions are indeterminate+
3
It is
not clear that the secession of overwhelmingly poor East Pakistan would mean-
ingfully change the regional or global balance of power+ Even assuming that seces-
sion did change the balance of power, structural realism does not explain the
secretive, milquetoast U+S + response where a more robust response would be
required+ Shifting to balance of threat does not resolve the problem of underdeter-
mination+
4
Reframing the balancing0bandwagoning impetus from power to threat
does not help us understand why India might be construed as a threat, much less
why the United States would choose to oppose India rather than acquiesce to India’s
actions as a means of gaining influence over Indian foreign policymaking+ Admit-
tedly, India had recently signed a friendship treaty with the Soviets, but this on its
own does not mandate a balancing response + Under neorealism, alliances enjoy no
permanence in the anarchic system, so the alliance with Pakistan for its own sake
cannot be explanatory+
Variants of structural liberalism ~neoliberalism! do not fare better+ Emphasizing
economic interdependence and international institutions as moderators of conflict,
neoliberalism has little to say on patterns of behavior in the absence of these fac-
1+ Widmaier 2005, 432+
2+ Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004, Dispute No+ 2943+
3+ Waltz 1979+ Waltz claims that neorealism does not apply to foreign policy, although Elman points
out that Waltz himself uses neorealism in foreign policy analysis ~Elman 1996, 10!+
4+ Walt 1987+
64 International Organization

tors+
5
In 1971, India and the United States shared no appreciable institutional ties
outside the United Nations and negligible economic interdependence+
6
This article takes advantage of structuralist approaches’ failure to explain the
1971 case to present a mechanism-based theory of the democratic peace, integrat-
ing the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory with theorizing regarding pub-
lic democratic identity dynamics+
7
The argument is that we cannot understand the
underlying mechanisms of the democratic peace without examining the domestic
security politics of democracies and the ideational factors that shape them+
Securitization, Identity, and the Democratic Peace
The central problem with the study of the democratic peace lies in underdevelop-
ment of the causal mechanisms that generate the phenomenon+ While the majority
of large-N statistical studies examining the democratic peace support it,
8
the empha-
sis on large-N studies has produced a significant lacuna when it comes to under-
standing the mechanisms of the democratic peace and the dynamics of democratic
security+
9
This is not to say that mechanisms are completely absent from the liter-
ature+ Constructivist, psychological, and rationalist approaches have produced plau-
sible mechanism-based explanations+ The constructivist literature focuses on the
monadic construction of state-level shared norms and identity or on the influence
of democratic identity on the individual decision maker+
10
While these are valu-
able areas of investigation, they neglect the role of domestic political structure in
the norms and identity dynamic; the importance of public social and corporate iden-
tity; and the role of identity and norms in the dyadic context of interstate relations+
Constructivists argue that leaders construct threats based on their identity-informed
interests+ The argument should be extended to the public in democracies because
their construction of threat is an important factor in democratic security policy+
11
Scholars in the rationalist tradition focus on the behavioral implications of
political structures in terms of audience costs ~credible commitments!,
12
transpar-
5+ See Keohane 1984; and Keohane and Martin 1995+
6+ Assuming trade as a proxy for economic interdependence, the UN COMTRADE database ~United
Nations 2010! puts U+S+ annual exports to India at $648 million ~approximately 1+5 percent of total
expor ts! and imports at $329 million ~approximately 0+7 percent of total imports!+
7+ The Copenhagen School principally refers to the collaborative work of Barry Buzan and Ole
Wæver+
8+ See Chan 1984; Danilovic and Clare 2007; Maoz and Russett 1993; Oneal, Russett, and Ber-
baum 2003; and Rousseau et al+ 1996+
9+ Müller and Wolff 2004+
10+ For state-level approaches, see Flynn and Farrell 1999; Harrison 2004; Peceny 1997; Risse-
Kappen 1995; and Williams 2001+ Individual-level approaches include Owen 1997; Schafer and Walker
2006; and Widmaier 2005+
11+ Hayes 2009+
12+ Fearon 1994 +
Securitization, Social Identity, and Democratic Security 65

ency ~enhanced signaling!,
13
and the political effects of winning coalition size ~dis-
tribution of war benefits!+
14
Psychological approaches focus on the role of perception
in political leaders— significantly overlapping with individual-centric constructiv-
ist approaches —or on operational codes shaped by democratic background+
15
The
rationalist and psychological explanations share the constructivist focus on lead-
ers+ The mechanism of the democratic peace lies in the cognitions of democratic
leaders or the anthropomorphized state+ Rationalist explanations ostensibly point
to domestic politics, but in all cases the proposed mechanism is never directly inves-
tigated+ Further, the politics of security are exogenized by the assumption that the
public universally and consistently accepts the security arguments of political lead-
ers+ Finally, most are monadic explanations of a dyadic phenomenon+
16
Securitization Theory and Social Identity
This ar ticle proposes a theoretical approach targeted at addressing these gaps, fus-
ing securitization theory with social identity to produce a model linking domestic
political structure and identity with international security behavior+ The term secu-
ritization refers to the sociopolitical construction of security+
17
Under securitiza-
tion theory, security is the product of a political speech act that recreates an issue
or situation as one of security+ Crucially, the act of securitizing an issue involves
both a securitizing actor—who makes the claim that a particular object of value
~referent object! is facing an existential threat requiring the suspension of normal
politics— and an audience, which must agree both that the referent object is a thing
of value and that it is ~existentially! threatened in the way that the securitizing
agent claims+ The goal of the securitization move is to shift the issue from the
arena of normal politics into the realm of security politics—characterized by
urgency and exceptional measures, including power centralization and marginal-
ized debate+ The Copenhagen School posits three facilitating conditions that shape
the likelihood of successful securitization+
18
The first focuses on whether the speech
act follows the grammar of security ~existential threat, point of no return, possible
solution!+ The second highlights the social capital or authority of the securitizing
actor+ The third identifies the role of external objects that are generally held to be
threatening ~for example, tanks!+
The 2003 invasion of Iraq provides a useful example+ President George W+ Bush
argued that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction ~WMD! could be used directly
against Americans or given to terrorists who would deploy them against Ameri-
13+ Schultz 1999 +
14+ Bueno De Mesquita et al+ 1999+
15+ See Farnham 2003; Haas 2005; Hermann and Kegley 1995; and Schafer and Walker 2006+
16+ Müller and Wolff 2004+
17+ See Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998; Hansen 2000; Huysmans 1998 ; McDonald 2008; Tau-
reck 2006; and Williams 2003+
18+ Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 33+
66 International Organization

cans+ The securitizing actor was Bush and the referent object was the physical
safety of Americans+ The audience, the U+S+ public, agreed with the assessment
and accepted the movement of the issue out of normal politics+ The facilitating
conditions were also present+ The grammar of the securitization move was correct
~emergency action before Iraq reconstitutes weapons program!, the president as
securitizing actor had the requisite social capital, and there were external objects
~WMD, terrorists! held to be threatening+ Implicit in this example is the idea that
securitization is a process rather than a singular event+
19
Additionally, we cannot
understand securitization without accepting that it is a socially and politically
embedded process of argumentation+
20
While securitization theory gives us powerful tools for analyzing the security
process, it is not a complete theory of security+ In particular, securitization theory
only begins to address factors that facilitate or inhibit securitization+ Incorporating
findings from social psychology, specifically the social identity approach ~SIA!,
21
has the potential to produce a more comprehensive framework+ Initially devel-
oped by Tajfel and Turner,
22
SIA focuses on how identity derived from group mem-
bership shapes the social behavior of individuals toward fellow members of the
ingroup as well as toward members of outgroups+
23
Originally, the approach focused
on the role that ingroup-outgroup dynamics play in driving social conflict, and the
most influential use of the approach in IR has been along similar lines+
24
Over
time, as scholarship has expanded to explore the rationale and ramifications of
group membership, SIA has become a primary theoretical vehicle for understand-
ing social cognition+
25
There are three commonly accepted elements that drive group social behavior:
self-categorization, ingroup affect, and ingroup ties+
26
Self-categorization refers to
the process by which individuals partition the world into ingroups and outgroups+
27
Cognitively, these groups are represented by context-specific prototypes+ Once acti-
vated, these prototypes define the group, prescribing the attitudes, norms, feel-
ings, and behaviors of ingroup and intergroup relations: “Social categorization of
the self +++ actually transform@s# self-conception and assimilate@s# all aspects of
one’s attitudes, feelings, and behaviors to the ingroup prototype; it changes what
19+ Stritzel 2007+ The author has also benefited from discussion with Michael C+ Williams on this
point+
20+ See Balzacq 2005; and Stritzel 2007 on the importance of social and political context+
21+ Hogg 2006+ The “social identity approach” incorporates both Social Identity Theory ~Tajfel and
Turner 1979! and Social Categorization Theory ~Turner et al+ 1987!+ While many scholars refer to
“Social Identity Theory” as the generic term encompassing both theories, I agree with Hogg’s conten-
tion that social identity is a general approach for understanding the relationship between groups and
individuals that encompasses several subtheories+
22+ Tajfel and Turner 1979+
23+ For comprehensive reviews, see Brown 2000; and Hogg et al+ 2004+
24+ Mercer 1995 +
25+ Hogg 2006+
26+ See Cameron 2004; and Tajfel 1978, 63+
27+ See Abrams et al+ 1990; Hogg 2003; McGar ty 1999; Oakes 1996; and Tajfel et al+ 1971+
Securitization, Social Identity, and Democratic Security 67

people think, feel, and do+”
28
Hogg and others suggest that self-categorization also
reduces social and behavioral uncertainty+
29
Ingroup affect and ingroup ties provide the glue that holds groups together+
Ingroup affect refers to the emotional attachment group members have to each
other+ Ingroup ties refer to the utility that individuals derive from group member-
ship ~for example, access to resources!+ The fuel for ingroup-outgroup classifica-
tion is positive distinctiveness+
30
Groups offer individuals both a source of identity
~thus locating the self in society! and self-esteem+ The desire for personal self-
esteem requires the ingroup to excel over alternative groups, which drives conflict
as subordinate groups reject the status quo and seek a more positive self-image+
31
Pursuit of a positive self-image brings the subordinate group into conflict with the
dominant group, which maintains positive self-image through its dominant posi-
tion+ This dynamic led Mercer to conclude that SIA supports structural realist pre-
dictions about the inevitability of conflict in the international system+
32
A Mechanism-Based Theory of the Democratic Peace
Building on SIA, I argue that stable democracies require the presence of a demo-
cratic social identity shared across the public+ This is a group identity, specifying
the nature of sociopolitical reality within democracy+ The norms that inform dem-
ocratic identity include nonviolent conflict resolution, rule of law, right of politi-
cal participation, compromise, and transparency+
33
For such an identity to function,
there has to be flexibility in the other delimiters of identity+ Differences in reli-
gion, cultural practices, economic perspective, gender, and race have to be toler-
ated if a democracy is to be successful+ The criteria for recognition and respect in
a democracy must be fairly open+
34
Furthermore, a democracy can operate only if
the population willingly buys into the program+ Thus, if a state is to be demo-
cratic, then democratic identity must be a significant factor in the imagined com-
munity that binds the society under the state together+
35
Democratic governance
fundamentally rests on the democratic identity of its citizenry+
In the securitization process, democratic identity acts on the claim of existential
threat+ Shared democratic identity defines the sociopolitical boundaries of inter-
action, making it very difficult to claim another democratic state poses an existen-
tial threat+ The sociopolitical reality created by democratic categorization and group
28+ Hogg 2001, 187+
29+ See Hogg 2000; and Reid and Hogg 2005+
30+ Crocker and Luhtanen 1990+
31+ Tajfel and Turner 1979+
32+ Mercer 1995+ However, Brewer 1999 and Gries 2005 both show that positive self-image need
not produce conflict+
33+ See Dixon and Senese 2002; Maoz and Russett 1993; Owen 1994; and Russett 1993+
34+ Williams 2001+
35+ On the state as an imagined community, see Anderson 1991+
68 International Organization

membership makes the violent resolution of conflicts of interest unacceptable and
claims that other ingroup members would resor t to force unconvincing+ Con-
versely, categorization of the external state as a nondemocracy empowers securi-
tization by making the existential threat claim plausible+
These dynamics play out in discourses over foreign policy+ Policies involving
negotiation and reconciliation—democratic political behavior—are justified by
appealing to democratic norms and identity+ Leaders emphasize that the external
state warrants these approaches as a trustworthy member of the democratic com-
munity, that these behaviors are expected in return, and that the situation can be
approached without concerns over violence+ Policies involving aggression and
violence —nondemocratic political behavior—are justified by demonstrating that
the target state is beyond reason or trust, and that their behavior could result in
violence against the home state ~an existential threat!+ Political leaders achieve
this aim by emphasizing the undemocratic identity and unwillingness to reliably
operate by democratic norms of the other+ The securitized state poses an existen-
tial threat because it is dissimilar from the democratic self, defined in part by the
exclusion of violence from conflict resolution amongst the ingroup+ In the event
of disputed securitization, political actors are expected to contest the categoriza-
tion of the external state in an effort to garner audience support+
36
Democratic identity occupies a privileged position in threat construction in par t
because it provides the political sphere’s behavioral expectations, including the
resolution of conflicts of interest, in a way that other identities in the political
context do not+ Since the democratic peace highlights the absence of war—and
war is a political act
37
—any effort to understand security relations between democ-
racies must account for factors like political identity that shape domestic politics +
This does not mean democratic identity is all-powerful+ Other identities may come
into play in the securitization move+ The argument here is that democratic identity
plays a particularly central and important role in democratic security construction+
Democratic identity does not dictate that we must like our fellow democrats,
38
or
that democracies should make war against nondemocracies+ In the case of shared
democracy, however, it does make the existential threat element of the securitiza-
tion move extremely difficult+
The securitization dynamic is not unique to democracies+ What is unique is the
primary audience+ In a democracy, the public plays a critical role in major foreign
policy decisions like war+ It is inherent to the nature of democratic governance: lead-
ers are accountable to the public for their policy decisions+ Consequently, it is to
36+ In his work on cascading activation, Robert Entman emphasizes the impor tance of “cultural
congruence”: how well the framing of an event or issue by political leaders and the media matches up
with political culture ~Entman 2004!+ The quality of the match between interpretation and political
culture plays a critical role in the success of framing, and forecloses some framing options altogether+
Thus, arguments in democracies should be over the “democraticness” of the external state rather than
some other categorization+
37+ Clauswitz 1976 +
38+ Exemplified by Widmaier’s 2005 study of U+S+-India relations+
Securitization, Social Identity, and Democratic Security 69

the dominant ~democratic! identity of the public and the attendant set of norms that
leaders in democracies must appeal to securitize an external state+ In democracies,
we would expect contestation over securitization moves to occur within the elite,
but the primary audience ~and adjudicator! of this contestation is the public+ The
role of the public as securitization audience is one of the critically defining ele-
ments of democracy+ Leaders in autocracies face a different audience: the policy-
making elite+ Political structure, identity, and norms are far more personalistic,
indicated by small selectorates and hierarchical political structures+
39
The govern-
ing identity~s! and the interests of the state are grounded in the particulars of the
ruling group+
Applying securitization to the democratic peace creates an analytical avenue for
studying the role of norms and identity in the formation of security policy in dem-
ocratic states+ It positions the locus of action at the domestic level, where decisions
of war and peace are made+ SIA provides a theoretical and empirical basis for the
role of identity in securitization+ The social group plays a critical role in establish-
ing the parameters of social reality+ In order to understand international conflict, we
must account for social groups+ In this context, the social identity approach focuses
on the development of the self and the other through self-categorization, a process
that establishes the boundaries of social behavior and perception+
Combining securitization with SIA gives us a structured way for looking at the
security process, focusing on the communicative action of leaders and their audi-
ences+ Conflict should be preceded by securitization speech acts that seek to estab-
lish the ingroup-outgroup categorization as part of an effor t to claim an existential
threat to a referent object+ Opponents of the securitization should challenge the
categorization as one possible political approach, thus making identity in the secu-
ritization move a site of political contestation+ These same forces would be expected
to preempt or weaken securitization moves against fellow democracies by demo-
cratic leaders conscious of the political cost of such a move+ This approach also
ties norms and structure together in explanation+ To securitize successfully, lead-
ers must use the language of security ; they must appeal to certain norms and iden-
tities to communicate the idea of a threat and that the object threatened is valuable+
The nature of the audience ~general public, small group of oligarchs, military offi-
cers! as well as the norms and identity language the audience responds to are linked
to the political structure+ Securitizers in autocracies face a very different audience,
requiring a very different language of securitization than those in democracies+ I
expect that political leaders use the language of democratic identity and norms to
signal possible threats or the lack thereof to their securitizing audience+ Moreover,
the justifications for securitization acts in democracies are bound to include identity-
related arguments, since questions of war and peace are existential issues in
democracies+
40
39+ diZerega 1995+
40+ Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point+
70 International Organization

Finally, it is worth addressing arguments by Risse and Williams, which bear
similarities to my approach+ Risse argues that the democratic peace is the result of
intersubjective perception arising out of international interactions+
41
My approach
focuses on domestic social identity arising out of the domestic political structures
and norms and how this identity interacts with the international security context
through the securitization process+ Hence, it differs from Risse by disaggregating
the state as an entity as well as alternatively sourcing democratic identity and the
mechanism of security+ Williams approaches the democratic peace from the stand-
point of recognition: democracies recognize each other through “disciplined sub-
jectivity,” a shared commitment to self-restraint+
42
This commitment, along with
the role of history in building a liberal community through shared accomplish-
ment ~victory over the irrational, undisciplined self and others! creates the liberal
identity+ There are important differences between Williams’s argument and that
presented here+ First, like Risse, Williams’s liberal identity arises from shared inter-
national history+ In my argument, identity instead derives from domestic sociopo-
litical dynamics+ Second, Williams’s argument suggests that liberal identity operates
on either the anthropomorphized state or leaders of the state ~Williams is ambig-
uous on this!+ My argument focuses on the role of democratic identity in condi-
tioning the political process of securitization+ Lastly, while it is not clear how the
identity Williams outlines operates to produce the democratic peace outcome , this
paper makes claims for a mechanism-based theory of the democratic peace+
Contributions
In combining securitization theory and SIA, this article makes significant contri-
butions not only to our understanding of the mechanisms behind democratic secu-
rity, but also securitization theory, the social identity approach, and international
relations more generally+ Because the proposed framework redirects analytical and
theoretical focus to the political dynamics within the state, it stands apart from
approaches that focus on the state in the system, individual policymakers, or
abstracted rationalist models of domestic politics+ The theory outlined here also
seeks to account for the role of structure and norms in security outcomes to address
the gaps that arise out of the literature’s tendency to analytically disaggregate them+
I also highlight the relationship between agents and the social and political struc-
tures they operate within, a dynamic largely missing from the literature+ Linking
securitization and social identity gives IR scholars a means to engage empirically
with a subject ~identity! that has presented significant challenges+ Finally, the argu-
ment explicitly focuses on the mechanisms and processes of security within democ-
racies, directly addressing the literature’s most serious weakness+
41+ Risse-Kappen 1995 +
42+ Williams 2001+
Securitization, Social Identity, and Democratic Security 71

With respect to securitization theory, this approach begins to thicken securitiza-
tion’s analytical power by highlighting a set of tools—identity—that political actors
can use to make securitization claims and enhancing the reach of securitization
theory on societal dynamics+ It also contributes to understandings regarding ways
in which social contexts can act as boundary conditions on securitization moves+
In doing so it answers Stritzel’s call for greater effor t to understand the role and
significance of broader social context for the securitization move+
43
While the
Copenhagen School acknowledges that there are constraints on securitization moves,
the approach here adds greater specificity+ It also applies securitization theory in
an empirical context and in the process develops a methodology for the use of
securitization theory+
The framework presents a possible avenue for incorporating the social identity
approach into IR and aids in establishing external validity+ While SIA has been
rigorously tested in experiments, its validity beyond controlled settings remains
an open question+
44
Since social identity does not speak directly to international
relations, applying the approach’s theoretical toolbox faces a number of questions,
notably at what level of analysis should it apply and how it applies outside the
experimental setting, particularly in the context of dynamic, complicated, and cha-
otic social situations like those that characterize IR+
Methods and Case Selection
The Copenhagen School offers little methodological guidance+ However, since secu-
ritization is a speech act, empirics should focus on the discourse of U+S+ leaders
regarding India+ A careful look at the securitization comments made by U+S+ deci-
sion makers should reveal patterns of identification and the relationship between
this identification and U+S+ policy+ Using a content analysis approach similar to
Chilton’s analysis of Powell’s “Rivers of Blood” speech,
45
I focus on the public
security arguments of presidential and congressional political leaders+ In the United
States, the primary political figure in terms of foreign policy formation is the pres-
ident+ Consequently, presidential discourse is a central focus+ Congressional dis-
courses also play a role since Congress serves as a politically important forum for
the contestation of securitization moves+ Finally, securitization is successful only
if the audience accepts the securitization argument+ In democracies, this means
assessing the position of the public on the securitization move+ While acceptance
is difficult to measure, public opinion polling offers important empirical insight+
With respect to case selection, the events of 1971 provide a particularly cru-
cial test of my approach+ India’s relations with the United States were often uneasy
43+ Stritzel 2007 +
44+ Hymans 2002+
45+ Chilton 2004, 111–16+ Chilton focuses on legitimizing communication, paralleling the effort
within the securitization move to legitimate the removal of an issue from normal politics+
72 International Organization

during the Cold War+ India’s socialist economic model and nonalignment policy
were at odds with the Manichean U+S+ worldview+ Just months before the crisis
over Bangladesh, India signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the
Soviet Union+ If there were ever a time when shared democratic identity between
democracies would be weak, it would be in U+S-India relations in 1971+ Thus, if
democratic identity plays an important role in the crisis, the approach in this arti-
cle will have survived a difficult test+ The case is also important because the
primary mechanism in much of the democratic peace literature—the cognitive
processes of foreign policymakers—was at best not operative and at worst reversed+
Both Nixon and Kissinger prided themselves on a foreign policy predicated
on balance-of-power calculations+ In that context, we have no reason to expect
democratic identity would operate in their cognitive and decision-making process-
es+
46
This presents significant problems for many of the democratic peace expla-
nations+ To the extent that the democratic peace is the product of multiple causes,
the U+S +-India case gives us a critical opportunity to probe causal mechanisms
with individual-level causes marginalized+ Finally, the time frame of the case ~1971!
predates the rise of modern democratic peace research+
47
Accordingly, it provides
an opportunity to examine real-world effects without the influence of the aca-
demic discourse+
48
Historical Overview of U.S.-India Case
The partition of British India in 1948 produced two states: secular, predominantly
Hindu India and ethnically oriented, Muslim Pakistan+ The geographic bulk of the
Pakistani state—dominated by the Punjabi ethnic group—lay northwest of India+
East of India lay more populous and mainly Bengali East Pakistan+ In 1970, the
first democratic election in Pakistan’s history gave a parliamentary majority to the
Awami League, an East Pakistan party that favored eastern autonomy+ West Pak-
istani leaders, who controlled the outgoing government, were unhappy with the
election outcome, resulting in a political impasse+ March 1971 demonstrations in
East Pakistan prompted military action+ The Pakistani president, Yahya Khan, out-
lawed the Awami League and ordered the military to arrest Awami leaders and
disarm Bengali military personnel+ The crackdown was brutal, par ticularly for East
Pakistan’s Bengali Hindu population+ The military action pushed millions of ref-
ugees into India+ Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi denounced the Pakistani
action and began covert assistance to Bengali former members of the Pakistani
army+ Indian and East Pakistani political leaders also began a campaign to mobi-
46+ The Watergate crisis further exemplified the absence of democratic identity in Nixon’s worldview+
47+ See Doyle 1986; Rummel 1979; and Small and Singer 1976+
48+ Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama have referred to the democratic peace in justifications of
policy ~see Bush 2003; Clinton 1994; and Obama 2007!+
Securitization, Social Identity, and Democratic Security 73

lize public opinion against Pakistan+ Meanwhile, the Indian military developed
plans for a military response in the winter+
49
By November 1971, the situation in East Pakistan reached a tipping point+ Guer-
rilla fighters were attacking Pakistani military forces in East Pakistan, often with
Indian artillery support+ In the United States, Nixon had chosen to “tilt” U+S+ pol-
icy in favor of Pakistan, and Kissinger was pushing the foreign policy apparatus
hard to implement the tilt+
50
In early December, after attacking Indian airfields,
Pakistan declared war on India+ India moved against Pakistani forces in East Pak-
istan while mounting operations in the west to prevent the arrival of reinforce-
ments+ Within two weeks, the fighting in East Pakistan ended as 93,000 soldiers
surrendered to Indian forces+ While few in government agreed with them, Nixon
and Kissinger grew concerned that India would continue the war effort and attack
West Pakistan+ Despite assurances from both the Indian government and the Sovi-
ets that such an attack was not in the offing, Nixon ordered the Enterprise battle
group to the Bay of Bengal, a display of military force intended to deter India
from expanding the conflict+ Ironically, Indian political and military leaders did
not get the deterrence message, instead assuming the carrier was there to evacuate
West Pakistanis from East Pakistan+
51
The U+S+ approach to the crisis angered Indian
leaders and public+ A member of parliament said India should not hesitate to “blast
it out of the water,” should the Enterprise intervene in the conflict+
52
Reports of
Indian reactions included representations of Nixon burned in effigy and daily pro-
tests outside the U+S+ embassy+ Gandhi wrote to Nixon, reprimanding him for pay-
ing only “lip service” to the need for a political settlement+
53
The events of 1971
set back U+S+-India relations for decades and strengthened the hand of those within
India who wanted to move forward on nuclear testing+
54
Nixon and Kissinger: Private Security Construction
There is no ambiguity regarding Nixon and Kissinger’s position on the events in
East Pakistan+ Both supported the military government of Yahya against the dem-
ocratically elected Awami League and India+ While other major powers con-
demned West Pakistan, Nixon and Kissinger tilted U+S+ policy toward it+
55
Despite
the fact that Yahya’s government was brutally repressing East Pakistan, and that
49+ See Kux 1994, 289–92; Sathasivam 2005, 9–10, 82; and Sisson and Rose 1990+
50+ United States Depar tment of State 1971k+
51+ See New York Times, 16 December 1971, A1; and Kux 1994, 305+
52+ Quoted in New York Times, 16 December 1971, A1+
53+ Ibid+
54+ Kux 1994, 305–7+
55+ CIA analysts noted that, except China, “none of the major powers have shown any suppor t for
the central @West Pakistan# government’s efforts in Bengal” ~United States Central Intelligence Agency
1971!+ On the tilt, Kissinger said: “I’ve been catching unshirted hell every half-hour from the Presi-
dent who says we’re not tough enough++++ He wants to tilt toward Pakistan” ~United States Depart-
ment of State 1971k, 597!+
74 International Organization

India struggled with millions of refugees, Nixon and Kissinger marked India as
the principal threat:
Nixon: The Indians need—what they need really is a—
Kissinger: They’re such bastards+
Nixon: A mass famine+ But they aren’t going to get that +++ But if they’re not
going to have a famine the last thing they need is another war+ Let the god-
damn Indians fight a war @unclear#+
Kissinger: They are the most aggressive goddamn people around there+
56
Remarkably, the threat assessment Nixon and Kissinger made on May 26, 1971,
came at a time when India and Pakistan were not engaged in direct combat and
not long after India had been deluged by refugees+ While India was helping train
Bengali resistance fighters, assistance was limited+
57
By November of that year,
the animosity toward Gandhi and the general perception of threat by Kissinger
and Nixon hardened:
Nixon: This is just the point when she is a bitch+
Kissinger: Well, the Indians are bastards anyway+ They are starting a war
there+ It’s—to them East Pakistan is no longer the issue+ Now, I found it very
interesting how she carried on to you yesterday about West Pakistan +++ I
mean, she will not be able to go home and say that the United States didn’t
give her a warm reception and therefore, in despair, she’s got to go to war+
58
@emphasis added#
In the eyes of Nixon and Kissinger, India posed a two-fold threat+ First, India
indirectly threatened containment: Indian support for an independent Bangladesh
would result in a state vulnerable to communist “infiltration+” Second, Nixon saw
the ultimate Indian aim as the destruction of Pakistan, an ally to the United States
and a component of containment policy+
59
In November, Kissinger warned Nixon
that India had become a Soviet client:
Kissinger: I’d give her @Gandhi# five minutes of the Tito talk because it will
go right back to the Russians as well as to the Vietnamese+
Nixon: Will it?
Kissinger: Oh, yeah+ They have the closest diplomatic ties now with Russia+
They leak everything right back to them+
60
56+ United States Depar tment of State 1971i+
57+ United States Depar tment of State 1971l+
58+ United States Depar tment of State 1971c+
59+ United States Depar tment of State 1971h+
60+ United States Depar tment of State 1971c+
Securitization, Social Identity, and Democratic Security 75

Neither Nixon nor Kissinger had any qualms about Yahya’s efforts to quash
democratic reforms and abuse the citizenry in East Pakistan+ On March 29, after
the repression of East Pakistan had begun in earnest, Nixon and Kissinger showed
no concern:
Kissinger: There’s nothing of any great consequence Mr+ President+ Appar-
ently Yahya has got control of East Pakistan+
Nixon: Good+ There’re sometimes the use of power is +++
Kissinger: The use of power against seeming odds pays off+ Cause all the
experts were saying that 30,000 people can’t get control of 75 million+
Nixon: But hell, when you look over the history of nations, 30,000 well-
disciplined people can take 75 million any time+ Look what the Spanish did
when they came in and took the Incas and all the rest+ Look what the British
did when they took India +++ But anyway I wish him @Yahya# well+
61
The violation of human rights on a massive scale—described in a March 28
cable as “selective genocide”
62
—and the complete disregard for democracy were
irrelevant to Nixon and Kissinger+ In fact, the nondemocratic aspects of Yahya’s
behavior seemed to be what impressed them the most+ As the evidence of military
atrocities mounted in East Pakistan, Nixon and Kissinger remained unmoved+ In a
Senior Review Group meeting, Kissinger commented at news of significant casu-
alties at a university that, “they @the British# didn’t dominate 400 million Indians
all those years by being gentle+”
63
This logic typifies how Nixon and Kissinger
viewed the world+ Democracy never mattered for them in the formulation of for-
eign policy+ Instead, the Cold War and realpolitik balance of power calculations
dominated their worldviews+
64
It was this logic that drew the administration into a
regional conflict, and it makes their restrained securitization efforts all the more
puzzling+ It also lends strength to the democratic peace explanation offered here+
By December, Kissinger became more explicit in linking India to the Soviets in
his threat assessment: “What we may be witnessing is a situation wherein a coun-
try equipped and supported by the Soviets may be turning half of Pakistan into an
impotent state and the other half into a vassal+”
65
At one point, Kissinger went so
far as to call the crisis “our Rhineland” in a reference to Hitler’s militarization of
German Rhineland at the outset of World War II+
66
This kind of powerful imagery
indicates how strongly Kissinger and Nixon came to see India as a threat+
By the time the war started in earnest in December 1971, Nixon and Kissinger
had strongly constructed India as a threat+ Kissinger actively disseminated his belief
61+ United States Depar tment of State 1971m+
62+ Blood 1971+
63+ United States Depar tment of State 1971j+
64+ Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point+
65+ New York Times, 15 January 1972, A6+
66+ United States Depar tment of State 1971f+
76 International Organization

to other government officials that India was aggressing against Pakistan , and that
the Soviet Union was pulling the geopolitical strings+ Kissinger had also begun to
use a heavily security-laden term with respect to the situation: rape+ Before the
war started, Kissinger was concerned that Pakistan would “get raped” if the crisis
was brought before the UN+
67
Kissinger repeated the rape metaphor in a discus-
sion with Secretary of the Treasury John Connally: “The thing that concerns the
President and me is this; here we have Indian-Soviet collusion, raping a friend of
ours +++ Thirdly, if the Soviets get away with this in the Subcontinent, we have
seen the dress rehearsal for a Middle Eastern war+”
68
As for restraining India: “No
matter what we do, we can’t do as much for them @India# as the Soviets have
already done on the thing that interests them which is to rape Pakistan+”
69
By the time India and Pakistan engaged in direct military confrontation, Kiss-
inger and Nixon used the rape metaphor regularly to describe their fears for Pak-
istan+
70
The rape language conveys the impression that innocent, vulnerable Pakistan
was being assaulted by the aggressive, endangering nexus of the Soviet Union and
India+ This posed a threat not only to Pakistan—in the logic of containment, the
destruction of Pakistan would embolden the Soviets to strike at far more geopo-
litically and economically precious territory in the Middle East+ On December 8,
1971, Nixon and Kissinger acted to move U+S+ policy outside the realm of normal
politics+ In a phone conversation with Pakistan Ambassador to the United States
N+A+M+ Raza, Kissinger instructed Raza to invoke Pakistan’s “mutual security
treaty” with the United States+
71
In fact, there was no mutual security treaty, only
the 1959 Agreement of Cooperation—which obligated the United States to take
action only “as may be mutually agreed on” to defend Pakistan+
72
Kissinger would
later argue with Secretary of State William Rogers over the matter as Rogers insisted
that the agreement in no way committed the United States to militarily aid Paki-
stan+
73
Two days later, Nixon deployed the Enterprise+
The Administration’s Securitization Move
Throughout the early months of the crisis, the Nixon administration largely kept
quiet+ In August 1971, despite strong constructions of India as a threat, Kissinger
and Nixon did not securitize India publicly+ During a news conference, Nixon’s
only comments on the East Pakistan crisis were to emphasize U+S+ aid to India
~$70 million! for dealing with the refugees generated by the conflict+ No mention
67+ United States Depar tment of State 1971o+
68+ United States Depar tment of State 1971p+
69+ Ibid+
70+ Three times in the span of an hour-long conversation; see United States Department of State
1971f; and United States Department of State 1971g+
71+ United States Depar tment of State 1971q+
72+ United States Depar tment of State 1971r+
73+ United States Depar tment of State 1971n+
Securitization, Social Identity, and Democratic Security 77

was made of Nixon’s belief that India sought to dismantle Pakistan or that India
posed a threat to U+S+ interests+
74
By the end of September, Nixon and Kissinger were moving to securitize India
while justifying their failure to securitize Pakistan+ In a conversation with British
diplomats, they presaged public arguments, explicitly pointing to India as the pri-
mary reason that the crisis had not been resolved+ Kissinger claimed that India
had “totally thwarted it @meeting between Bengali resistance and Yahya#+ They
made it impossible for these people to deal with us; they’re forcing them to check
everything with them, they are padding demands, which are totally incapable of
fulfillment+”
75
At the same time, Nixon repeatedly defended Yahya, leader of a
government responsible for thousands of deaths and millions of refugees as a
“decent man+”
76
Despite Nixon’s and Kissinger’s growing effort to securitize India within the
halls of government, to the American public, they maintained a façade of neutral-
ity+ In October, in a statement on aid to south Asia, Nixon once again focused on
relief efforts rather than security concerns and specifically mentioned India as a
primary recipient of emergency aid+
77
In greeting Prime Minister Gandhi during
her November 1971 visit to the United States, Nixon immediately brought atten-
tion to India’s democratic system:
Our distinguished guest here today has the unique distinction, through the
parliamentary system of India, that more people have voted for her leader-
ship than for any leader in the whole history of the world+ Madam Prime
Minister, we welcome you because you represent the world’s largest free
nation, the world’s largest democracy+ We welcome you also for another rea-
son +++ India and the United States are bound together by a higher morality
@than treaties#, a more profound morality that does not need a legal document
to make it live+ I speak of the common devotion that the people of India and
the people of the United States have to the cause of freedom, to the cause of
representative government +++ to the cause of peace+
78
Nixon used the language of shared democracy to mask the pro-Pakistan posi-
tion of the U+S+ government+ By appealing to Indian democracy, Nixon was com-
municating that claims that the United States had chosen ~autocratic! Pakistan over
India were false+ The democracy rhetoric also served to mask Nixon’s failure to
74+ See New York Times, 5 August 1971, A16; and Nixon 1971a+ Nixon’s behavior does not appear
grounded in political weakness + Throughout 1970 and 1971, Nixon enjoyed robust approval ratings,
with Gallup polls showing his approval ratings at roughly 50 percent over the span of 1971 ~see Gal-
lup Organization 1971a, 1971b, 1971c, and 1971d !+ Polling also shows a strong general sense—
dropping below 50 percent only during the months of February and March of 1971 and peaking at
more than 60 percent during the crisis— that the administration was doing an excellent or very good
job at progressing world peace ~see Louis Harris and Associates 1971a, 1971b, and 1971c!+
75+ United States Depar tment of State 1971e+
76+ Ibid+
77+ Nixon 1971c+
78+ See Nixon 1971b, 1079–80; and New York Times, 5 November 1971, A10+
78 International Organization

address the ongoing and deepening crisis in East Pakistan and the massive burden
imposed on India by the resulting refugee outflow+ Nixon expected the rhetoric of
democracy to resonate with his primary audience, the American public+ This polit-
ical strategy was double-edged: by publically highlighting India’s democratic cre-
dentials, Nixon constrained his ability to act on his private construction of India
as a threat+
79
The conflict’s intensification in November and December made it increasingly
difficult for the Nixon administration to mask its policy+ The public agenda shifted
from obscuring U+S+ policy to a securitization move+ Nixon and Kissinger, in their
effort to securitize India, attempted to de-emphasize Indian democratic identity
and reframe India as undemocratic+ In a December public-relations strategy ses-
sion, Nixon emphasized that India was defying the will of the United Nations ~deter-
mined through a democratic process!:
The general tone is that in view of India’s refusal to accept the terms of the
General Assembly resolution passed by the overwhelming majority of 104–10
calling for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of armed forces, the United
States has now decided again to take this grave issue to the Security Coun-
cil++++All right+ Add one sentence+ “If India defies,” put it this way, “If India
should defy the overwhelming weight, defies, should continue to defy the
overwhelming weight of world opinion as expressed by a blankety blank vote
in the UN General Assembly+”
80
By focusing on India’s refusal to heed world opinion and the will of the UN,
established through a democratic voting process, Nixon was targeting the core pil-
lar of American public support for India: shared democratic identity+ Nixon also
sought to reframe India’s identity, casting it not as a democracy, but as par t of a
communist system posing an existential threat to the United States:
Nixon: Now, “Pakistan has accepted+ India has refused+ India, supported the
Soviet Union”
+++
Nixon: “India, supported by the Soviet Union, has refused”—now we are
going+
Kissinger: Supported only by the Soviet Union+
Nixon: Supported only by the Soviet Union+ Well, some other Communist
countries+
Kissinger: Supported by the Soviet Union+
79+ Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point+
80+ United States Depar tment of State 1971d+
Securitization, Social Identity, and Democratic Security 79

Nixon: Supported by the Soviet Union+ Can we say other Communist coun-
tries? Use the word Communist for a change+ And, well that throws in the
Chinese and the Romanians+ All right, supported by, at any rate, supported
by the Soviet Union+
81
By linking India with the Soviet Union, Nixon sought to remove India from the
community of democracies+
Despite these indications of a public securitization move, through early Decem-
ber the Nixon administration policy remained remarkably low-key+ For example,
it moved quickly to cut off all military expor t licenses to India+
82
This stands in
stark contrast to the hesitant handling of military export licenses to Pakistan, a
point made by the Indian ambassador to the United States+
83
Charles Bray, the
State Department spokesperson at the time, indicated that the suspension was due
to “continuing Indian incursions into Pakistan,” implying that India, not Pakistan,
bore responsibility for the crisis+ Unidentified U+S+ officials began to suggest that
India was untrustworthy—for example, claiming it was “hard to believe” Indian
reports of Pakistani air strikes against Indian airfields+
84
The administration’s rhetoric attempting to securitize India became more explicit
on December 4, when a State Depar tment official blamed India for the crisis:
India bears the major responsibility for the broader hostilities @between Pak-
istan and India#+ We believe that since the beginning of the crisis Indian pol-
icy, in a systematic way, has led to the perpetuation of the crisis, a deepening
of the crisis, and that India bears the major responsibility for the broader hos-
tilities that have ensued+
85
@emphasis added#
Secretary of State Rogers made the final connections for the American public,
claiming that the crisis “posed a threat to international peace and security+” The
public argument was set: India posed a threat to the United States because the
crisis it had perpetuated and deepened posed a threat to international security+ The
administration also highlighted uncooperative and undemocratic Indian behavior+
The United States had not received even “minimal” cooperation from India+ India
had also refused the good offices of the UN Secretary General and “refused U+ S+
requests to urge the guerrillas not to attack United Nations ships and trucks carry-
ing relief supplies+ ”
86
Less than a week after the Nixon administration initially announced the cutoff
of military aid to India, the New York Times reported the elimination of economic
81+ Ibid+
82+ See New York Times, 2 December 1971, A1; and New York Times, 4 December 1971, A10+
83+ New York Times, 4 December 1971, A10+ It is true that licenses to Pakistan were eliminated
earlier than they were for India, but the Nixon administration did so under strong political pressure,
and waited several months after the start of military operations in East Pakistan to implement it+
84+ New York Times, 4 December 1971, A10+ In fact, the Indian reports were accurate ~Kux 1994!+
85+ New York Times, 5 December 1971, A1+
86+ Ibid+
80 International Organization

aid, a move that Nixon had refused to make against Pakistan+ In announcing the
cut, a dramatic act against a country as poor as India, the State Department now
labeled India as the “main aggressor+”
87
Now India was not just to blame for per-
petuating and deepening the crisis; it became an active threat+
Starting on December 14, in line with the planning sessions between Nixon and
Kissinger, the administration stepped up efforts to recast India’s identity as a “cli-
ent” to the communist USSR+ Unnamed state department officials “expressed puz-
zlement” at the Soviets’ “willingness to forsake possible dramatic improvements
in relations with the United States,” by continuing to back India,
88
implying that
the Soviet Union had deep roots sunk into India+ Otherwise, the Soviets would be
willing to reduce tensions with the United States+ Moreover, the improvement in
relations was described as “dramatic”; by inference, the Soviet stake in India must
be truly significant to forego such a boon+ A day later, the New York Times reported
that the Nixon administration was considering canceling a summit with Soviet lead-
ers if they did not pressure India to cease hostilities, fur ther linking India and the
Soviet Union+
89
In a postbellum attempt to justify Nixon’s policy, well-known syn-
dicated columnist Joseph Alsop—citing Kissinger— again attempted to restruc-
ture Indian identity in terms of its association with the Soviet Union and to highlight
the threat posed by India+ According to Alsop, Kissinger indicated that there was
“a strong possibility” that India would become a “vast new Soviet strategic base
area+”
90
The shift in Nixon’s reference to Indian democracy is remarkable+ While Nixon
and Kissinger maintained a façade of neutrality, they used shared democracy as a
veil to obscure U+S+ policy+ When the administration made a concerned effort to
securitize India, India’s democratic qualities disappeared+
Congressional Counternarratives
During the crisis, the Nixon administration confronted effor ts to defuse its secu-
ritization move, particularly in Congress+ These narratives focused strongly on
the shared democracy of the United States and India+ Senator Edward Kennedy
~D-Mass+! argued that Pakistan, with the “military regime’s brutal repression of
democracy,” and “jail@ing# of a political leader whose only crime was the win-
ning of a free election,” posed the real threat+ Kennedy also desecuritized India,
arguing that the refugees generated by Yahya’s policy threatened the “economic
stability and well-being of the world’s largest democracy+” Kennedy contrasted
Nixon’s efforts to open up China with his apparent willingness to “alienate one-
sixth of mankind in India— a democratic nation with whom we have had years of
87+ New York Times, 7 December 1971, A1+
88+ New York Times, 14 December 1971, A17+
89+ New York Times, 15 December 1971, A1+
90+ Alsop quoted in New York Times, 1 January 1972, A2+
Securitization, Social Identity, and Democratic Security 81

productive relations+”
91
Senator Fred Harris ~D-Okla+! excoriated Nixon’s policy
and argued that, while India could be difficult to deal with at times, it was still
“the largest nation in the world following our notions of political freedom+”
92
Senator Frank Church ~D-Idaho! pointed out that not only had West Pakistan
imposed massive suffering, but it had done so in response to elections+ Church,
citing India as the “only major democracy on the continent of Asia,” quoted one
East Pakistani to exemplify his claim against Pakistan: “We voted for freedom;
we were the majority in the whole country, East and West+ We voted for freedom
and we were killed+”
93
Representative Cornelius Gallagher ~D-N+J+! explicitly cited
Indian democracy in challenging Nixon administration policy:
And we must never forget that India is the largest country in the world with a
democratic tradition+ Prime Minister Gandhi’s electoral victory gave her nation
new hope and new faith in India’s hard-won traditions of democracy++++ For
the sake of our own oft-expressed traditions, should we not be disposed to
consider India’s position with sympathy and understanding?
94
Gallagher’s claim here is representative of the counter-narratives+ Its desecuri-
tization draws on the power of shared democratic identity, tapping into the very
social structure Nixon sought to downplay+
Public Response
Direct evidence of public acceptance or rejection of the Nixon0Kissinger securi-
tization argument is sparse+ Part of the scarcity of data no doubt arises from the
timeframe of the early 1970s, but other factors play a role as well + Nixon and
Kissinger were reticent to discuss the matter in public despite good reasons to
adopt a more public approach to the situation+ Challenging a perceived Soviet proxy
publicly would be in keeping with containment policy as well as the deterrent
goal of the Enterprise deployment+ Pakistan was a long-standing, if neglected,
American ally and the primary conduit for negotiations with China+ As indicated
in some of Nixon and Kissinger’s comments, the administration was keen to
demonstrate to China that it would be a reliable partner against the Soviets —the
raison d’être of the nascent relationship+ In light of these good reasons for a high-
profile response, Nixon and Kissinger’s self-censorship and policy secrecy sug-
gest that they felt strongly that they would be unable to successfully securitize
India+
The administration’s evasiveness had the effect of depressing public focus on
the Bangladesh crisis+ Polling on the matter was limited+ The only public opinion
survey on the crisis occurred after the war’s conclusion+ When questioned about
91+ Senator Kennedy 1971+
92+ Senator Harris 1971+
93+ Senator Church 1971+
94+ Representative Gallagher 1971+
82 International Organization

which country engendered more sympathy, neither India nor Pakistan fared very
well+ Four teen percent of the respondents felt sympathetic toward India while 23
percent felt sympathetic towards Pakistan+ An overwhelming number of respon-
dents ~63 percent! indicated that they had no preference between the two coun-
tries+
95
Given the foreign policy context, these results are not surprising+ The public
simply did not engage deeply on the issue because they were not asked or forced
to do so+ A question on Nixon’s handling of the crisis also indicates a high level of
the public’s disengagement+ Nearly a quarter of the respondents ~24 percent! were
not sure of their opinion on Nixon’s handling of the war+ Similarly, roughly a quar-
ter of respondents held a poor ~23 percent!, only fair ~25 percent!, or pretty good
~23 percent! opinion of Nixon’s efforts+
96
Since the poll gives no indication of
whether the respondents thought Nixon had been too hard on India, the question
only highlights that public engagement on the issue was minimal+ More impor-
tantly, securitization did not take place+
Another poll, positing a hypothetical situation of a communist attack against India,
also presents indirect but supportive evidence+ A plurality of the respondents ~48
percent! indicated they would send troops ~8 percent! or material support ~40 per-
cent!+ A smaller number ~38 percent! indicated they would refuse to get involved+
97
What is striking about this poll is not the “no involvement” rate; that would be
expected to be sizable in light of the popularity problems the war in Vietnam suf-
fered from during its final years+ The poll was, in effect, asking Americans if they
would be willing to venture money and0or manpower for a similar war+ Given that
context, the high willingness to get involved is noteworthy+ Again, while there is
no indication why a near majority of the respondents were willing to engage in
another war while still fighting an unpopular one, shared democratic identity and
the common security construction that attends it may have played a role+
Anecdotal evidence indicates that democratic identity was indeed operative within
the public+ For example, a July 6 letter to the editor of the New York Times high-
lighted the democracy-versus-authoritarianism aspect of the conflict:
By repression of the majority of the population, a mass slaughter of demo-
cratically elected leaders and a systematic decimation of the intellectuals with
aid of a ruthless military machine, the Yahya regime in fact has established a
historical precedent+ Never before in any country of the world has a monstros-
ity of this magnitude been perpetrated, and never before has democracy been
so blatantly violated+
98
In a letter from October 19, a writer expressed concerns that the United States
continued to ship military supplies to Pakistan after the “systematic suppression
of Pakistan’s one democratic election+” After detailing the “cruelty, rape, murder,
95+ Louis Harris and Associates 1972b+
96+ Louis Harris and Associates 1972a+
97+ Gallup Organization 1971e+
98+ New York Times, 11 July 1971, E10+
Securitization, Social Identity, and Democratic Security 83

and massacre of children and civilians” by Pakistan and the challenges forced on
India, the writer laments the fact that “India, Asia’s most populous democracy”
could not look to the United States for support, and was forced to turn instead to
Russia+ The writer’s solution: “Initiating rapprochement with democratic India+”
99
A December 6 letter outlined India’s moral right to intervene in East Pakistan,
warning the Nixon administration that “the attitude of our Government could lead
people the world over to the conclusion that it sides with any autocratic govern-
ment that uses armed force against its own people+”
100
In another letter to the
editor, dated December 8, the writer excoriated the Nixon administration for “com-
forting” Pakistan at the expense of India—”the largest democracy in the world+”
101
While this data is far from systematic, the repeated references to democracy in the
context of critiquing the Nixon administration policy, combined with the congres-
sional narratives, suggests Nixon and Kissinger’s concerns over a public backlash
were grounded in reality+
Explaining the Puzzle
How can we understand the Nixon administration’s erratic security behavior?
Behind closed doors, Nixon and Kissinger were unequivocal in their assessment
of the threat posed by India to the United States and its interests, but in public the
securitization move came late, and was weak when it arrived + The Nixon admin-
istration displayed an acute awareness of the difficulties facing any effor t to con-
vince the public of a security threat posed by India+ In this case, it was Nixon and
Kissinger’s anticipation of—rather than the actual—public backlash to an attempt
to securitize India that produced the foreign policy outcome+
Before the crisis, policymakers were aware that the public would not accept
democracies as threats and would construct nondemocracies as threats+ In 1969,
after the imposition of martial law in Pakistan, Undersecretary of State Elliot Rich-
ardson told a top Pakistani official that experiences with authoritarian regimes in
World War II had left the public with an “unfavorable image+” Richardson believed
that, while U+S+ policymakers understood military regimes to be constructive at
times, communicating that sentiment to the public was “difficult+” Moreover, pub-
lic and congressional opinion ~for example, the Reuss Amendment limiting mili-
tary sales to military dictators! could not be ignored+
102
Echoing these sentiments,
Secretary of State Rogers told Yahya that while the administration was sympa-
thetic, the imposition of martial law “presented problems for some in the U +S+”
103
99+ New York Times, 3 November 1971, 46+
100+ New York Times, 12 December 1971, E10+
101+ New York Times, 18 December 1971, 28+
102+ United States Depar tment of State 1969a+
103+ United States Depar tment of State 1969b+
84 International Organization

Later that year during the Nixon visit to India, Kissinger also acknowledged “the
strong feeling of many Americans for India,” linking this feeling with his opinion
that “American liberals had over-sold Indian democracy+”
104
Nixon, in broaching
the idea that Pakistan might serve as an intermediary between the United States
and China, mentioned “a psychosis in this country @U+S+# about India+”
105
While
Nixon did not explain why such a “psychosis” exists, it seems reasonable to con-
clude that India’s democratic identity played a significant role+
These issues played out in the 1971 crisis+ Nixon complained in November 1971
to the Pakistan foreign minister that public opinion was strongly in favor of India :
Let me say that the President @Yahya# is a good friend to me+ He is a good
friend to Kissinger +++ as the President knows, there’s a huge public relations
campaign here+ Many of our friends in the other party, and including, I must
say, some of the nuts in our own party— soft heads—have jumped on it, have
completely bought the Indian line+ And India has a very great propaganda
line+ And if you read our press, I mean, you get the whole impression that
India’s completely right+
106
Again, while Nixon does not indicate why he believes the public strongly favors
India in the crisis, the fact that Republicans fell in with the consensus seems to
indicate that public suppor t was significant+
In conversation with Kissinger and Attorney General John Mitchell, Nixon high-
lighted the impact of democratic identity on threat construction:
You see this is where The New York Times and the rest are wrong, where they
said that if aggression is engaged in by a democracy it’s all right+ But where
it’s engaged in by a dictatorship, it’s wrong +++ then they say but India is a
democratic country, and Pakistan is a totalitarian country, a dictatorship, and
therefore India—we shouldn’t be on the side of a dictatorship but on the side
of the democratic country+
107
In discussions regarding moving an aircraft carrier into the Bay of Bengal, Kiss-
inger expressed some concern regarding public backlash:
Kissinger: I would be reluctant—you know you should @unclear—consider?#
both courses + From the Chinese angle I’d like to move the carrier+ From the
public opinion angle, what the press and television would do to us if an Amer-
ican carrier showed up there I—
Nixon: What, why—can’t the carrier be there for the purpose of evacuation?
Kissinger: Yeah, but against whom are we going to use the planes++++Are we
going to shoot our way in?
104+ United States Depar tment of State 1969c+
105+ United States Office of the President 1970+
106+ United States Depar tment of State 1971b+
107+ United States Depar tment of State 1971a+
Securitization, Social Identity, and Democratic Security 85

Nixon: So what do we move? Move a little helicopter ship in there? What
good does that do? And why do it?
Kissinger: Well it’s a token that something else will come afterward+ Gets
our presence established there+
108
Clearly, anticipation of public refusal to securitize India was strong enough to cause
Kissinger to harbor concerns about the political backlash should the U+S+ move to
threaten India+
There are indications of opposition within the administration to Nixon and Kiss-
inger’s assessment of the crisis and their policy response+ Columnist Jack Ander-
son, in discussing how he received internal government documents on administration
policy during the crisis, highlighted the internal opposition:
During the India-Pakistan war, one of my sources told me we were bungling+
Here was a conflict between a military dictatorship and the world’s second
@sic# largest democracy, and whose side did we—the largest @sic# democracy—
come out on? The dictatorship+
109
The comment of Anderson’s source suggests that the operative hypothesis of this
article, that democratic identity influences threat perception and construction, which
in turn limits the security options of leaders in democracies, has strong explana-
tory potential+
Conclusion
In 1971, Nixon and Kissinger clearly saw India as a threat to U+S+ interests and
the policy of containment+ Yet , despite the perceived threat, they sought to hide a
policy clearly favoring Pakistan+ Only when events on the ground made it impos-
sible to mask the “tilt” policy did the administration make a half-hearted securiti-
zation move that failed + In the end, Nixon dispatched the Enterprise battle group
in silence, damaging Indo-American relations without achieving policy goals+
Nixon’s and Kissinger’s anticipation of public backlash arising from demo-
cratic identity was a brake on the ability of political leaders to claim that external
democracies pose an existential threat+ As long as leaders are convinced that they
operate in a domestic environment characterized by joint democratic identity, they
will be careful in constructing a fellow democracy as an existential security threat+
The framework advanced in this article makes specific predictions about the nature
of security discourse — actors seeking to make a securitization move against an
external state should emphasize the state’s lack of democracy or nondemocratic
aspects, while those seeking to prevent securitization should emphasize shared
108+ United States Depar tment of State 1971f+
109+ New York Times, 6 January 1972, A17+
86 International Organization

democracy+ The case bears out these predictions+ Indeed, Nixon’s and Kissinger’s
lamenting the public’s affinity for other democracies, which limited their ability to
pursue realpolitik policies, clearly supports the theoretical approach detailed in
this article+ While public engagement on the subject was limited, public demo-
cratic identity played a very strong role in determining security policy, thwarting
securitization by shaping Nixon and Kissinger’s expectations of their ability to
succeed in a securitization move+
This article forwards an explicitly mechanisms-based approach to the demo-
cratic peace, thus addressing a significant weakness in the democratic peace research
program+ In doing so, it suggests that the democratic peace should be viewed as
part of a broader exploration of security dynamics within democracies rather than
an isolated phenomenon+ The article also redirects analytical and theoretical focus
to the political dynamics within the state+ By linking securitization theory and the
social identity approach, this article begins to thicken securitization’s analytical
power by highlighting a set of discourses—identity— that political actors use to
make securitization claims+ It also contributes to understandings regarding ways
in which social contexts can act as boundary conditions on securitization moves+
With respect to the social identity approach, the framework proposed here aids in
establishing external validity+
These findings have implications for today+ Contestations over the democratic
qualities of external states have real ramifications for the foreign and security pol-
icy of democracies+ The presence or absence of democracy plays an important
role in shaping threat constructions + The 1971 case highlights the way democratic
public identity—in the context of metastable identity constructions —can shift the
universe of possible policy options as well as attendant political calculations of
democratic political leaders+ However, these influences are predicated on intersub-
jective constructions of the self and the other, which is where we may observe the
headwaters of future streams of foreign and security policy+ The framework out-
lined in this study also stresses the importance of the public in the security pro-
cess, reinforcing the long-standing admonition to democratic publics to be educated
and politically involved as well as the importance of a vigorous, independent press+
The peace among democracies depends on it+
References
Abrams, Dominic, Margaret Wetherell, Sandra Cochrane, Michael A+ Hogg, and John C+ Turner+ 1990+
Knowing What to Think by Knowing Who You Are: Self-Categorization and the Nature of Norm
Formation, Conformity and Group Polarization+ British Journal of Social Psychology 29 ~2!:97–119+
Anderson, Benedict+ 1991+ Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of National-
ism+ Revised ed+ London: Verso+
Balzacq, Thierry+ 2005+ The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context+
European Journal of International Relations 11 ~2!:171–201+
Blood, Archer K+ 1971+ Selective Genocide+ In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976+
Vo l + E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, edited by Louis J+ Smith+ Washington, D+C+: U+S+
Securitization, Social Identity, and Democratic Security 87

Government Printing Office+ Available at ^http:00 static+history+state+gov0frus0frus1969-76ve070pdf0
d125+pdf&+ Accessed 27 July 2011+
Brewer, Marilynn B+ 1999+ The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love and Outgroup Hate? Journal
of Social Issues 55 ~3!:429– 44+
Brown, Rupert+ 2000+ Social Identity Theory: Past Achievements, Current Problems and Future Chal-
lenges+ European Journal of Social Psychology 30 ~6!:745–78+
Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce, James D+ Morrow, Randolph M+ Siverson, and Alastair Smith+ 1999+
An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace+ American Political Science Review 93
~4!:791–807+
Bush, George W+ 2003+ President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East, Washington
, D+C+,
6 November 2003+ Available at ^http:00 georgewbush-whitehouse+archives+gov0news0releases020030
11020031106-2+html&+ Accessed 27 June 2011+
Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde+ 1998+ Security: A New Framework for Analysis+ Boul-
der, Colo+: Lynne Rienner+
Cameron, James E+ 2004+ A Three-Factor Model of Social Identity+ Self and Identity 3 ~3!:239 – 62+
Chan, Steve+ 1984+ Mirror, Mirror on the Wall +++ Are the Freer Countries More Pacific? Journal of
Conflict Resolution 28 ~4!:617–48+
Chilton, Paul A+ 2004+ Analysing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice+ New York: Routledge+
Clauswitz,
Carl von+ 1976 @1832#+ On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret+
Princeton, N+J+: Princeton University Press +
Clinton, William J+ 1994+ State of the Union Address+ Washington, D+C+, 25 January 1994+ Available at
^http:00www+washingtonpost+com0wp-srv0politics0special0states0docs0sou94+htm&+ Accessed 27 June
2011+
Crocker, Jennifer, and Riia Luhtanen+ 1990+ Collective Self-Esteem and Ingroup Bias+ Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology 58 ~1!:60– 67+
Danilovic, Vesna, and Joe Clare+ 2007+ The Kantian Liberal Peace ~Revisited!+ American Journal of
Political Science 51 ~2!
:397–414+
Dixon, William J+, and Paul D+ Senese+ 2002+ Democracy, Disputes, and Negotiated Settlements+ Jour-
nal of Conflict Resolution 46 ~4!:547–71+
diZerega, Gus+ 1995+ Democracies and Peace: The Self-Organizing Foundation for the Democratic
Peace+ Review of Politics 57 ~2!:279–308+
Doyle, Michael W+ 1986+ Liberalism and World Politics+ American Political Science Review 80
~4!:1151–69+
Elman, Colin+ 1996+ Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy? Security
Studies 6 ~1!:7–53+
Entman, Robert M+ 2004+ Projections of Power : Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign
Policy+ Chicago: University of Chicago Press+
Farnham, Barbara+ 2003
+ The Theory of Democratic Peace and Threat Perception+ International Stud-
ies Quarterly 47 ~3!:395– 415+
Fearon, James D+ 1994+ Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes+
American Political Science Review 88 ~3!:577–92+
Flynn, Gregory, and Henry Farrell+ 1999+ Piecing Together the Democratic Peace: The CSCE, Norms,
and the ‘Construction’ of Security in Post–Cold War Europe+ International Organization 53 ~3!:
505–35+
Gallup Organization+ 1971a+ Gallup Poll; December 10–13: Do You Approve or Disapprove of the
Way Nixon Is Handling His Job as President? The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Uni-
versity of Connecticut, Storrs+
———+ 1971b+ Gallup Poll; July 15–18: Do You Approve or Disapprove of the Way Nixon Is Han-
dling His Job as President? The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connect-
icut, Storrs+
———+ 1971c+ Gallup Poll; May 14–17: Do You Approve or Disapprove of the Way Nixon Is Han-
dling His Job as President? The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connect-
icut, Storrs+
88 International Organization

———+ 1971d+ Gallup Poll; October 8 –11: Do You Approve or Disapprove of the Way Nixon Is Han-
dling His Job as President? The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connect-
icut, Storrs+
———+ 1971e+ Gallup Poll; April 2–5, 1971: In the Event India Is Attacked by Communist Backed
Forces, Tell Me What Action You Would Want to See Us Take? The Roper Center for Public Opin-
ion Research, University of Connecticut, Storrs+
Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer+ 2004+ The MID3 Data Set, 1993 –2001: Procedures,
Coding Rules, and Description+ Conflict Management and Peace Science 21 ~2!:133–54+
Gries, Peter Hays+ 2005+ Social Psychology and the Identity-Conflict Debate: Is a ‘China Threat’ Inev-
itable? European Journal of International Relations 11 ~2!:235– 65+
Haas, Mark L+ 2005+ The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789–1989+ Ithaca, N+Y+: Cor-
nell University Press+
Hansen,
Lene+ 2000+ The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the
Copenhagen School+ Millennium: Journal of International Studies 29 ~2! :285–306+
Harrison, Ewan+ 2004+ State Socialization, International Norm Dynamics and the Liberal Peace+ Inter-
national Politics 41 ~4!:521–42+
Hayes, Jarrod+ 2009+ Identity and Securitization in the Democratic Peace: The United States and the
Divergence of Response to India and Iran’s Nuclear Programs+ International Studies Quarterly 53
~4!:977–99+
Hermann, Margaret G+, and Charles W+ Kegley Jr+ 1995+ Rethinking Democracy and International Peace:
Perspectives from Political Psychology+ International Studies Quarterly 39 ~4!:511–33+
Hogg, Michael A+ 2000+ Subjective Uncertainty Reduction Through Self-Categorization: A Motiva-
tional Theory of Social Identity Processes+ European Review of Social Psychology 11 ~1!:223–55+
———+ 2001+ A Social Identity Theory of Leadership+ Personality and Social Psychology Review
5
~3!:184–200+
———+ 2003+ Social Categorization, Depersonalization, and Group Behavior+ In Blackwell Handbook
of Social Psychology: Group Processes, edited by Michael A+ Hogg and R+ Scott Tindale, 56–85+
Oxford, England: Blackwell+
———+ 2006+ Social Identity Theory+ In Contemporary Social Psychological Theories, edited by Peter
J+ Burke, 111–36+ Stanford, Calif+: Stanford University Press+
Hogg, Michael A+, Dominic Abrams, Sabine Otten, and Steve Hinkle+ 2004+ The Social Identity Per-
spective: Intergroup Relations, Self-Conception, and Small Groups+ Small Group Research 35
~3!:246–76+
Huysmans, Jef+ 1998+ Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, on the Creative Development of a Security Studies
Agenda in Europe+ European Journal of International Relations 4
~4!:479–505+
Hymans, Jacques E+C+ 2002+ Applying Social Identity Theory to the Study of International Politics: A
Caution and an Agenda+ Paper presented at the 43rd Annual Meeting of the International Studies
Association, March, New Orleans, La+
Keohane, Robert O+ 1984+ After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy+
Princeton, N+J+: Princeton University Press +
Keohane, Robert O+, and Lisa L+ Martin+ 1995+ The Promise of Institutionalist Theory+ International
Security 20 ~1!:39 –51+
Kux, Dennis+ 1994+ Estranged Democracies: India and the United States, 1941–1991+ New Delhi,
India: Sage+
Louis Harris and Associates+ 1971a+ Harris Survey, February: How Would You Rate President Nixon
on +++ Working for Peace in the World +++ Excellent , Pretty Good, Only Fair, or Poor? The Roper
Center for Public Opinion Research,
University of Connecticut, Storrs+
———+ 1971b+ Harris Survey, March: How Would You Rate President Nixon on +++Working for Peace
in the World +++ Excellent, Pretty Good, Only Fair, or Poor? The Roper Center for Public Opinion
Research, University of Connecticut, Storrs+
———+ 1971c+ Harris Survey, September: How Would You Rate President Nixon on +++ Working for
Peace in the World +++ Excellent, Pretty Good, Only Fair, or Poor? The Roper Center for Public
Opinion Research, University of Connecticut, Storrs+
Securitization, Social Identity, and Democratic Security 89

———+ 1972a+ Harris Survey, 28 December—4 January 1972: How Would You Rate President Nixon
on His Handling of the War Between India and Pakistan +++ Excellent, Pretty Good, Only Fair, or
Poor? The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut, Storrs+
———+ 1972b+ Harris Survey, 28 December 1971—4 January 1972: In the Recent War Between India
and Pakistan, Did You Feel More in Sympathy with India or with Pakistan? The Roper Center for
Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut, Storrs+
Maoz, Zeev, and Bruce M+ Russett+ 1993+ Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946–
1986+ American Political Science Review 87 ~3!:624–38+
McDonald, Matt+ 2008+ Securitization and the Construction of Security+ European Journal of Inter-
national Relations 14 ~4!:563–87+
McGar ty, Craig+ 1999+ Categorization in Social Psychology+ London: Sage+
Mercer, Jonathan+ 1995+ Anarchy and Identity
+ International Organization 49 ~2!:229–52+
Müller, Harald, and Jonas Wolff+ 2004+ Dyadic Democratic Peace Strikes Back: Reconstructing the
Social Constructivist Approach After the Monadic Renaissance+ Paper presented at the 5th Pan-
European International Relations Conference, September, The Hague, The Netherlands+
Nixon, Richard M+ 1971a+ The President’s News Conference of August 4, 1971+ In Public Papers of
the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1971, 849–50+ Washington, D+C: U+S+ Govern-
ment Printing Office+
———+ 1971b+ Remarks of Welcome to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India , 4 November 1971+ In
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1971, 1079– 80+ Washington,
D+C: U+S+ Government Printing Office+
———+ 1971c+ Statement About Additional Funds for Humanitarian Relief and Refugee Rehabilita-
tion in South Asia, 1 October 1971+ In Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard
Nixon, 1971, 1017–18+ Washington
, D+C: U+S+ Government Printing Office+
Oakes, Penelope+ 1996+ The Categorization Process: Cognition and the Group in the Social Psychol-
ogy of Stereotyping+ In Social Groups and Identities: Developing the Legacy of Henri Tajfel, edited
by W+ Peter Robinson, 95–119+ Oxford, England: Butterworth-Heinemann+
Obama, Barack+ 2007+ Remarks of Senator Obama: The War We Need to Win, Washington, D+C +, 1
August 2007+ Available at ^http:00www+wilsoncenter+org0events0docs0obamasp0807+pdf&+ Accessed
July 9, 2011+
Oneal, John R+, Bruce M+ Russett, and Michael L+ Berbaum+ 2003+ Causes of Peace: Democracy, Inter-
dependence
, and International Organizations, 1885–1992+ International Studies Quarterly 47 ~3!:
371–93+
Owen, John M+ 1994+ How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace+ International Security 19 ~2!:
87–125+
———+ 1997+ Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security+ Ithaca, N+Y+:
Cornell University Press+
Peceny, Mark+ 1997+ A Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Peace: The Ambiguous Case of the
Spanish-American War+ Journal of Peace Research 34 ~4!:415 –30+
Reid, Scott A+, and Michael A+ Hogg+ 2005+ Uncertainty Reduction, Self-Enhancement, and Ingroup Iden-
tification+ Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 31 ~6!:804–17+
Representative Gallagher ~D-N+J+!+ 1971+ The Situation on the Indian Subcontinent+ Congressional
Record
, 92nd Cong+, 1st sess+, 45545+ Washington, D+C+: U+S+ Government Printing Office+
Risse-Kappen, Thomas+ 1995+ Democratic Peace –Warlike Democracies?: A Social Constructivist Inter-
pretation of the Liberal Argument+ European Journal of International Relations 1 ~4!:491–517+
Rousseau, David L+, Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul K+ Huth+ 1996+ Assessing the Dyadic
Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918–88+ American Political Science Review 90 ~ 3!:512–33+
Rummel, Rudolph J+ 1979+ Understanding Conflict and War+ Vo l + 4, War, Power, Peace+ Beverly Hills,
Calif+: Sage+
Russett, Bruce M+ 1993+ Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post–Cold War World+ Prince-
ton, N+J+: Princeton University Press
+
Sathasivam, Kanishkan+ 2005+ Uneasy Neighbors: India, Pakistan and U.S. Foreign Policy+ Burling-
ton, Vt+: Ashgate+
90 International Organization

Schafer, Mark, and Stephen G+ Walker+ 2006+ Democratic Leaders and the Democratic Peace:
The Operational Codes of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton+ International Studies Quarterly 50 ~3!:
561–83+
Schultz, Kenneth A+ 1999+ Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institu-
tional Perspectives on Democracy and War+ International Organization 53 ~2!:233– 66+
Senator Church ~D-Idaho!+ 1971+ War between India and Pakistan and the Ineptitude of U+S+ Policy+
Congressional Record, 92nd Cong+, 1st sess+, 44849 –50+ Washington, D+C+: U+S+ Government Print-
ing Office+
Senator Harris ~D-Okla+!+ 1971+ A New Low in American Diplomacy+ Congressional Record, 92nd
Cong+, 1st sess+, 44834–35+ Washington, D+C+: U+S
+ Government Printing Office+
Senator Kennedy ~D-Mass+!+ 1971+ U+S+ Policy Toward the Crisis in South Asia+ Congressional Record,
92nd Cong+, 1st sess+, 45124–26: Washington, D+C+: U+S+ Government Printing Office+
Sisson, Richard, and Leo E+ Rose+ 1990+ War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of
Bangladesh+ Berkeley: University of California Press+
Small, Melvin, and J+ David Singer+ 1976+ The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816–1965+
Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1 ~1!:50– 69+
Stritzel, Holger+ 2007+ Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond+ European Jour-
nal of International Relations 13 ~3!:357–83+
Tajfel, Henri+ 1978+
Social Categorization, Social Identity and Social Comparison+ In Differentiation
Between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, edited by Henri
Tajfel, 61–76+ London: Academic Press+
Tajfel, Henri, M+G+ Billig, R+ P+ Bundy, and Claude Flament+ 1971+ Social Categorization and Inter-
group Behavior+ European Journal of Social Psychology 1 ~2!:149–78+
Tajfel, Henri, and John Turner+ 1979+ An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict+ In The Social Psy-
chology of Intergroup Relations, edited by William G+ Austin and Stephen Worchel, 33– 47+ Monte-
rey, Calif+: Brooks0Cole+
Taureck, Rita+ 2006+ Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies+ Journal of International Rela-
tions and Development 9 ~1!:53 – 61+
Turner, John C+, Michael A+ Hogg
, Penelope J+ Oakes, Stephen D+ Reicher, and Margaret S+ Wetherell+
1987+ Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory+ New York: Basil Blackwell+
United Nations+ 2010+ United States 1971 Total Commodity Trade SITC as Reported ~Import, Export!+
Available at ^http:00 comtrade+un+org&+ Accessed 2 August 2011+
United States Central Intelligence Agency+ 1971+ SNIE 32-71: Prospects for Pakistan+ In Foreign Rela-
tions of the United States, 1969–1976+ Vo l + E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, edited by
Louis J+ Smith+ Washington, D+C+: U+S+ Government Printing Office+ Available at ^http:00 static+
history+state+gov0frus0frus1969-76ve070pdf0d131+pdf
&+ Accessed 27 July 2011+
United States Department of State+ 1969a+ Admiral Ahsan’s Call on the Under Secretary+ In Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1969–1976+ Vo l + E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, edited
by Louis J+ Smith+ Washington, D+C+: U+S+ Government Printing Office+ Available at ^http:00 static+
history+state+gov0frus0frus1969-76ve070pdf0d15+pdf&+ Accessed 27 July 2011+
———+ 1969b+ Secretary’s Lahore Meeting with President Yahya+ In Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1969–1976+ Vo l + E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, edited by Louis J+ Smith+ Wash-
ington, D+C+: U+S+ Government Printing Office+ Available at ^http:00static+
history+state+gov0frus0
frus1969-76ve070pdf0d23+pdf&+ Accessed 27 July 2011+
———+ 1969c+ Memorandum of Conversation, New Delhi, 1 August 1969+ In Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1969–1976+ Vo l + E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, edited by Louis J+
Smith+ Washington, D+C+: U +S+ Government Printing Office+ Available at ^http:00history+state+gov0
historicaldocuments0frus1969-76ve070d30&+ Accessed 27 July 2011+
———+ 1971a+ Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs ~Kissinger!, and Attorney General Mitchell, Washington, 8 December 1971+ In Foreign Rela-
tions of the United States, 1969–1976+ Vo l + E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972,
edited by
Louis J+ Smith+ Washington, D+C+: U+S+ Government Printing Office+ Available at ^ http:00history+
state+gov0historicaldocuments0frus1969-76ve070d165&+ Accessed 2 August 2011+
Securitization, Social Identity, and Democratic Security 91

———+ 1971b+ Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Secu-
rity Affairs ~Kissinger!, and the Pakistani Foreign Secretary ~Sultan Khan!, 15 November 1971+
In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976+ Vo l + E-7, Documents on South Asia,
1969–1972, edited by Louis J+ Smith+ Washington, D+C+: U+S+ Government Printing Office+ Avail-
able at ^http:00history+state+gov0historicaldocuments0frus1969-76ve070d154&+ Accessed 2 August
2011+
———+ 1971c+ Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs ~Kissinger!, and the President’s Chief of Staff ~Haldeman!, Washington, 5 November 1971+
In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976+ Vo l + E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–
1972, edited by Louis J+ Smith+ Washington
, D+C+: U+S+ Government Printing Office+ Available at
^http:00history+state+gov0historicaldocuments0frus1969-76ve070d150&+ Accessed 27 July 2011+
———+ 1971d+ Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs ~Kissinger!, and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs ~Haig!, Wash-
ington, 12 December 1971+ In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976+ Vo l + E-7, Docu-
ments on South Asia, 1969–1972, edited by Louis J+ Smith+ Washington, D+C+: U+S+ Government
Printing Office+ Available at ^http:00 history+state+gov0historicaldocuments0frus1969-76ve070d177&+
Accessed 27 July 2011+
———+ 1971e
+ Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs ~Kissinger!, the British Foreign Secretary ~Douglas-Home!, and the British Ambassador
~Cromer!, Washington, 30 September 1971+ In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976+
Vo l + E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, edited by Louis J+ Smith+ Washington, D+C+: U+S+
Government Printing Office+ Available at ^http:00history+state+gov0historicaldocuments0frus1969-
76ve070d146&+ Accessed 27 July 2011+
———+ 1971f+ Conversation Between President Nixon and His Assistant for National Security Affairs
~Kissinger!, Washington, 9 December 1971+ In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976+
Vo l + E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, edited by Louis J+ Smith+ Washington, D+C+: U
+S+
Government Printing Office+ Available at ^http:00history+state+gov0historicaldocuments0frus1969-
76ve070d168&+ Accessed 27 July 2011+
———+ 1971g+ Conversation Between President Nixon and His Assistant for National Security Affairs
~Kissinger!, Washington, 10 December 1971+ In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976+
Vo l + E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, edited by Louis J+ Smith+ Washington, D+C+: U+S+
Government Printing Office+ Available at ^http:00history+state+gov0historicaldocuments0frus1969-
76ve070d172&+ Accessed 27 July 2011+
———+ 1971h+ Conversation Between President Nixon and His Assistant for National Security Affairs
~Kissinger!, Washington, 4 June 1971+ In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976+ Vo l +
E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, edited by Louis J+ Smith+ Washington, D+C+: U+S+ Gov-
ernment Printing Office+ Available at ^http:00history+state+gov0historicaldocuments0frus1969-76ve070
d136&+ Accessed 27 July 2011+
———+ 1971i+ Conversation Between President Nixon and His Assistant for National Security Affairs
~Kissinger!, Washington, 26 May 1971+ In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976+ Vo l +
E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, edited by Louis J+ Smith+ Washington, D+C+: U+S+ Gov-
ernment Printing Office+ Available at ^http:00history+state+gov0historicaldocuments0frus1969-76ve070
d135&+ Accessed 27 July 2011+
———+ 1971j
+ Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting+ San Clemente, 31 March 1971+ In Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1969–1976+ Vo l + XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, edited by Louis J+
Smith+ Washington, D+C+: U +S+ Government Printing Office+ Available at ^http:00history+state+gov0
historicaldocuments0frus1969-76v110 d17&+ Accessed July 29, 2011+
———+ 1971k+ Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting+ Washington, 3 December 1971+
In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976+ Vo l + XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, edited by
Louis J+ Smith+ Washington, D+C+: U+S+ Government Printing Office+ Available at ^ http:00history+
state+gov0historicaldocuments
0frus1969-76v110d218&+ Accessed 29 July 2011+
———+ 1971l+ Pakistan-American Relations+ A Reassessment+ In Foreign Relations of the United States,
1969–1976+ Vo l + E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, edited by Louis J+ Smith+ Washington,
92 International Organization

D+C+: U+S+ Government Printing Office+ Available at ^http:00static+history+state+gov0frus0frus1969-
76ve070pdf0d132+pdf&+ Accessed 27 July 2011+
———+ 1971m+ Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and His Assistant for
National Security Affairs ~Kissinger!, San Clemente, 29 March 1971+ In Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1969–1976+ Vo l + XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, edited by Louis J+ Smith, 35 –36+ Wash-
ington, D+C+: U+S+ Government Printing Office+
———+ 1971n+ Transcript of Telephone Conversation between Secretary of State Rogers and the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs ~Kissinger!, Washington, 23 December 1971+ In
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976+ Vo l + E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
,
edited by Louis J+ Smith+ Washington, D+C+: U+S+ Government Printing Office+ Available at ^http:00
static+history+state+gov0frus0frus1969-76ve070pdf 0d195+pdf&+ Accessed 27 July 2011+
———+ 1971o+ Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs ~Kissinger!, Washington, 23 November 1971+ In
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976+ Vo l + E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972,
edited by Louis J+ Smith+ Washington, D+C+: U+S+ Government Printing Office+ Available at ^http:00
static+history+state+gov0frus0frus1969-76ve070pdf 0d155+
pdf&+ Accessed 27 July 2011+
———+ 1971p+ Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of the Treasury Connally
and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs ~Kissinger!, Washington, 5 December
1971+ In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976+ Vo l + E-7, Documents on South Asia,
1969–1972, edited by Louis J+ Smith+ Washington, D+C+: U+S+ Government Printing Office+ Avail-
able at ^ http:00static+history+state+gov0frus0frus1969-76ve070pdf0d159+pdf&+ Accessed 27 July 2011+
———+ 1971q+ Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National
Security Affairs ~Kissinger! and the Pakistani Ambassador ~Raza!, Washington, 8 December 1971+
In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976+ Vo l + E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–
1972, edited by Louis J
+ Smith+ Washington, D+C+: U+S+ Government Printing Office+ Available at
^http:00static+history+state+gov0frus0frus1969-76ve070pdf0d164+pdf&+ Accessed 27 July 2011+
———+ 1971r+ India and Pakistan: Crisis and War, March-December 1971+ In Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1969–1976+ Vo l + E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, edited by Louis J+ Smith,
Docs+ 122–197+ Washington, D+C+: U+S+ Government Printing Office+ Available at ^http:00history+
state+gov0historicaldocuments0frus1969-76ve070ch2&+ Accessed 27 July 2011+
United States Office of the President+
1970+ Memorandum of Conversation: Meeting between Presi-
dent and Pakistan President Yahya, Washington, 25 October 1970+ In Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1969–1976+ Vo l + E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, edited by Louis J+ Smith+ Wash-
ington, D+C+: U+S+ Government Printing Office+ Available at ^http:00history+state+gov0
historicaldocuments0frus1969-76ve070d90&+ Accessed 2 August 2011+
Walt, Stephen M+ 1987+ The Origins of Alliances+ Ithaca, N+Y+: Cornell University Press+
Waltz, Kenneth N+ 1979+ Theory of International Politics+ Reading, Mass+: Addison-Wesley+
Widmaier, Wesley W+ 2005+ The Democratic Peace Is What States Make of It: A Constructivist Analy-
sis of the U+S+-Indian ‘Near-Miss’ in the 1971 South Asian Crisis+
European Journal of Inter-
national Relations 11 ~3!:431–55+
Williams, Michael C+ 2001+ The Discipline of the Democratic Peace: Kant, Liberalism and the Social
Construction of Security Communities+ European Journal of International Relations 7 ~4!:525 –53+
———+ 2003+ Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics+ International Studies
Quarterly 47 ~4!:511–31+
Securitization, Social Identity, and Democratic Security 93