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Intercultural Methodology in Researching Chinese Philosophy
Con la convicción de que la identidad de la filosofía china parece necesitar una revisión que junto a metodologías innovadoras multidisciplinares augura unos resultados heterogéneos pero concluyentes, el presente texto pretende examinar el análisis chino de estos cambios notoriamente paradigmáticos. Por un lado, más general, se apela a la particularidad china y por otro, se fundamenta en tres propósitos: 1. Alcanzar el análisis actualizado desde la sinología occidental más actual; 2. Delimitar los fundamentos diferenciales de esta tradición, pero también; 3. Destacar los progresos en metodología y paradigma filosófico contrastivo.
Fang Dongmei (1899–1977) is among the most influential Chinese philosophers who lived and worked in Taiwan during the second half of the 20th century. The present article aims to clarify his view on the basic nature of the human Self. This assessment is more multifaceted than it seems at a first glimpse, for Fang’s philosophy is also more complex than it seems. As a member of the so-called neo-conservative streams of thought, he criticized the Western-type modernization and aimed to revive the holistic onto-epistemology of classical Confucianism. On the other hand, he highlighted the importance of its basic paradigm which underlay the Confucian discourses from their very beginning, i.e. since the Book of Changes, namely the principle of creative creativity (shengshengbuxi 生生不息). The alleged contradiction between his advocating of holism and creativity, has been reflected in the apparent dichotomy between the social and relational essence of the Confucian Moral Self on the one side, and individual uniqueness on the other. The paper aims to show that both seeming contradictions are actually parts of the same theoretical principle defining the complementary interactions of binary oppositions.
Contemporary theoretical streams in sinology and modern Chinese philosophy have devoted increasing attention to investigating and comparing the substantial and methodological assumptions of the so-called 'Eastern' and 'Western' traditions. In spite of the complexity of these problems, the most important methodological condition for arriving at some reasonably valid conclusions will undoubtedly be satisfied if we consciously endeavor to preserve the characteristic structural blocks and observe the specific categorical laws of the cultural contexts being discussed. Whenever sinologists speak of Chinese philosophy, they must inevitably consider the appropriateness of this term. Due to the fact, that the general theory and genuine philosophical aspects of Chinese thought have only rarely been treated by Western scholars, they namely continue to remain quite obscure for the majority of them. Therefore, we must examine the fundamental question (or dilemma) of whether it is possible to speak of traditional Chinese thought as philosophy at all.
The study of Chinese thought in the United States has taken a "philosophical turn." Whereas a scholar of the previous generation such as Benjamin Schwartz could take his broad humanistic learning to the study of Chinese thought, the present generation of scholars are specialists, and some of them claim--often with some fanfare--that philosophical expertise is necessary to explain Chinese thought. Recen@ the word "philosophy" seems to pop up everywhere in the study of Chinese thought. Where we used to have interpretations of various Chinese thinkers, we now have philosophical interpretations; where we used to have translations of Chinese texts we now have philosophical translations, and so on. What does the word "philosophy" really mean in this context? The American philosophy that is introduced into the study of Chinese thought is predominantly analytic and pragmatic. In the following, I consider paradigmatic examples of these two styles of philosophy. I show that the notion of philosophy that is introduced into the study of Chinese thought is too narrow to do justice to the wide range of styles and concerns of Chinese thinkers. Therefore, this philosophy cannot claim any special status in the study of Chinese thought in fact it hampers productive research in this area. In particular, the style of philosophy introduced into the study of Chinese thought is not concerned with reading but with ana~sis, and therefore it reduces unique thought to arguments and subsumes the specific under abstract categories. I suggest that in the study of Chinese thought this philosophy must be rejected and indicate another, an anti-philosophical
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- Ming-Huei Lee
- 李明輝
Lee, Ming-Huei 李明輝. Dangdai ruxuede ziwo zhuanhua 當代儒學的自我轉化.
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- Yaoming Feng
- 冯耀明
Feng, Yaoming 冯耀明. Zhongguo zhexuede fangfa lun wenti 中國哲學的方法論問題.
Taibei: Yunchen wenhua shiye, 1989.
Accessible at: Chinese Text Project
- 老子 Laozi
- 道德经 Dao De Jing
Laozi 老子. Dao de jing 道德经. Accessible at: Chinese Text Project. Pre-Qin and Han.
http://ctext.org/dao-de-jing (quoted: January 12 th 2015)