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Decolonizing Rather than Decentring ‘Europe’

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Abstract

Some may argue that they might be complementary in that decolonial approaches could ideally create more space for political debates within which decentring approaches could then advance pragmatic improvements and induce gradual evolutions towards systemic change. There is however no guarantee that this would happen, especially if decentring and post/decolonial agendas continue to be conflated. While decentring may lead to a more legitimate and effective EU foreign policy, it may also not diminish or may even reinforce the coloniality of EU power. Thus, rather than ‘decentring Europe’, we ought to move towards decolonial futures that truly prioritize the democratic struggle against colonial continuities.
Editorial
Decolonizing Rather than Decentring Europe
Jan ORBIE
*
, Antonio Salvador M. ALCAZAR III, Anissa BOUGREA,SzilviaNAGY,
Alvaro OLEART,JonalynC.PAZ,RahelW.SEBHATU,TiffanyG.WILLIAMS &Izabella
WÓDZKA
Josep Borrells infamous 13 October 2022 speech, where he described the European
Union (EU) in terms of a gardenversus the jungleoutside, has received an unpre-
cedented amount of scrutiny. Yet the metaphor used by the High Representative of the
EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and European Commission Vice-President
in charge of a stronger Europe in the worldwas not new, nor was its underlying logic a
surprise. Various analysts have pointed out the colonial tropes in European policy-
makersdiscourses over the past decades. In an influential essay that came out in 2000,
Sir Robert Cooper, who would later also become an advisor to the Council of the EU,
the European External Action Service, and the European Commission, pitched the
postmodernEU where the rule of law is reigning versus premodernstates where the
law of the jungleprevails.
1
This illustrates how mainstream EU political discourse has
been, and remains, highly colonial in the way in which relations between the EU and its
presumed othersin world politics are conceived.
More notable is the intensity of the debate and condemnation that Borrells
speech has generated within policy and scholarly circles. This reflects a growing
realization that the EU should be more modest about its so-called civilizational
achievements and acknowledge the long and dark shadow of its colonial past.
Against the background of clear challenges to (western) European dominance in
the world system, critical observers are ardently questioning Europes alleged moral
and sociopolitical superiority. Issues of racism within Europe have been increasingly
discussed in the wake of Black Lives Matterprotests. Recent research has revealed
Orbie, Jan; Alcazar III, Antonio Salvador M.; Bougrea, Anissa; Nagy, Szilvia; Oleart, Alvaro; Paz, Jonalyn C.;
Sebhatu, Rahel W.; Williams, Tiffany G. & Wódzka, Izabella. Decolonizing Rather than Decentring Europe’’.
European Foreign Affairs Review 28, no. 1 (2023): 18.
© 2023 Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands
*
Jan Orbie is member of the Editorial Board of the European Foreign Affairs Review. All authors have
been involved in the activities of the EUROGLOT Research Network (https://www.southsouthmove
ment.org/projects/euroglot-research-network/). We are grateful to the participants of the Migration and
Governance Forum (UNU-CRIS, Bruges, 22 November 2022) and, in particular, to Nora El Qadim
and Laura Luciani for helpful feedback on an earlier draft and to participants of the EUROGLOT
Reading Group (26 October 2022) for sharing their insights. Email: Jan.Orbie@ugent.be.
1
R. Cooper, The Post-Modern State and the World Order (Demos 2000).
the colonial logics behind the creation of the European Economic Community.
2
Equally important, the idea of colonialityforces us to think through the persis-
tence of civilizational, economic, epistemic, gendered and racialized hierarchies
today despite the nominal act of decolonization.
3
These developments have not gone unnoticed in academia. Research agendas have
emerged around decentring,disruptingand decolonizingthe discipline of EU
(foreign policy) studies. For instance, papers, panels and roundtables on these issues
received prominent places in recent conferences of the European Union Studies
Association (Miami, May 2022) and the University Association for Contemporary
European Studies (Lille, September 2022). New handbooks in the discipline also include
chapters on decentring as well as decolonial and postcolonial perspectives.
4
Gurminder
K. Bhambra, a well-recognized professor, working in the field of postcolonial and
decolonial studies, wrote the Annual Lecture Article for the Journal of Common
Market Studies, a leading journal in EU studies.
5
In it, Bhambra articulates a decolonial
project for Europethat necessarily begins with acknowledging the material structures
inherited from colonialism that are still present today and insists on the imperative of
postcolonial reparations. In 2023, the Journal of Contemporary European Research will
publishanentirespecialissueondisruptingEuropeanStudies,
6
with contributions
dedicated to, among others, decolonizing EU trade relations with the Global Souths
and decolonial approaches to curricular thought and praxis in European Studies.
It can only be applauded that such questions are gradually finding a place in
mainstream discussions on European foreign policy. That said, considerable
2
For example, P. Hansen & S. Jonsson, Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and
Colonialism (Bloomsbury Publishing 2014); P. Pasture, The EC/EU Between the Art of Forgetting and
the Palimpsest of Empire, 26(3) Eur. Rev. 545581 (2018); A. Van Weyenberg, Europeon Display: A
Postcolonial Reading of the House of European History, 66(4) Politique Européenne 4471 (2019); G.
Garavini, After Empires (Oxford University Press 2021); M. Brown, The Seventh Member State. Algeria,
France, and the European Community (Harvard University Press 2022).
3
Compare A. Quijano, Coloniality of Power and Eurocentrism in Latin America, 15(2) Intl Soc. 215232
(2000); M. Lugones, Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System, 22(1) Hypatia 186219
(2007); G. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Coloniality of Power in Postcolonial Africa: Myths of Decolonization, Council
for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (2013).
4
For example, C. Kinnvall, Postcolonialism,inThe Routledge Handbook of Critical European Studies 7284
(Routledge 2020); N. Fisher-Onar & K. Nicolaïdis, The Decentring Agenda: A Post-Colonial Approach to
EU External Action,inThe External Action of the European Union: Concepts, Approaches, Theories 288304
(Red Globe Press 2021); S. Keukeleire & S. Lecocq, Decentring European Foreign Policy Analysis,inThe
External Action of the European Union: Concepts, Approaches, Theories 297312 (Red Globe Press 2021); T.
Haastrup, Critical Perspectives on Africas Relationship With the European Union,inThe Routledge Handbook of
Critical European Studies 511522 (Routledge 2020); R. W. Sebhatu, Applying Postcolonial Approaches to
Studies on Africa-EU Relations,inThe Routledge Handbook on EU-Africa Relations (Routledge 2021).
5
G. K. Bhambra, A Decolonial Project for Europe, 60(2) J. Com. Mkt. Stud. 229244 (2022); see also T.
Haastrup, R. Milner & R. G. Whitman, Who Creates the Common Market? The Gendered Practices of
Knowledge Production in a European StudiesJournal, 21 Eur. Pol. Sci. 417429 (2022).
6
M. David, M. Garcia, T. Haastrup & F. Mattheis, Disrupting European Studies?, J. Contemp. Eur. Res.
(forthcoming).
2EUROPEAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW
challenges remain in teasing out the (meta)theoretical, methodological and empiri-
cal implications of decentringand postcolonialor decolonialapproaches to EU
foreign policy. In the field of EU external action, the decentring agenda has been
conceptualized by Fisher-Onar and Nicolaïdis
7
in terms of three analytical dimen-
sions: provincialization (questioning Eurocentrism), engagement (exploring non-
Europeanperspectives), and reconstruction (recalibrating EU policies). Building
on this, Keukeleire and Lecocq have further operationalized these three stages into
a research agenda that considers categories of space, time, polity and norms.
8
In this sense, the decentring agenda pluralizes modes of knowing EU/Europe
within a field grappling with Eurocentrism. However, there is much ambiguity on
how this increasingly popular scholarly enterprise relates to postcolonial perspec-
tives or, more alarmingly, how it subsumes the decolonial option. Although the
decentring project (rightly) claims to be inspiredby postcolonial theories and
indeed borrows from thinkers and concepts within the diverse strand of postcolo-
nial thought, it does not have the same political commitments as the decolonial
project. If anything, it provides the EU with convenient epistemological leeway to
use the coloniality of power to thrive and serve its interests. The ambiguity with
which the decentring agenda navigates postcolonial work, in some cases conflating
the two strands of literature, can be interpreted as a way to recentre Europe in a
veiled way. Arguably, the decentring agenda may appropriate and weaponize
certain elements of postcolonial work against the decolonial project.
Decentring scholarship mostly aims to build bridges between academia and
policy practitioners by presenting legitimate (including post/decolonial) concerns
through less provocative vocabularies. From this perspective, decentring could
contribute to a more self-reflective,adaptedor recalibratedEuropean foreign
policy that is more suited to the increasingly complex and fast-changing world,
which could be realized through training EU civil servants and diplomats in the
Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS).
9
Decentring
scholarship is more concerned about the possibilities of changes within existing
structures through pragmatic policy measures and discussions with those already in
positions of power; decolonial thought would have a more antagonistic approach
towards existing institutions and rather orient the conversation towards and engage
with wider social justice movements and aim for a longer-term paradigm change.
Instead of the changes that come with an increasingly connected, contested and
7
N. Fisher-Onar & K. Nicolaïdis, The Decentring Agenda: Europe as a Post-Colonial Power, 48(2) Coop.
Confl. 283303 (2013); Fisher-Onar & Nicolaïdis, supra n. 4.
8
S. Lecocq & S. Keukeleire, Decentring the Analysis of EU Foreign Policy and External-Internal Legitimacy:
(Re-)introducing Polity, 4(23) Global Aff. 341351 (2016); Keukeleire & Lecocq, supra n. 4; S.
Keukeleire & S. Lecocq, Operationalising the Decentring Agenda: Analysing European Foreign Policy in a
Non-European and Post-Western World, 53(2) Coop. Confl. 277295 (2018).
9
Compare Keukeleire & Lecocq, supra n. 4, at 307, 317.
EDITORIAL 3
complex world
10
or an increasingly non-European and post western order,
11
decolonial thought stresses colonial continuities over the past centuries and the
persistence of coloniality of power in our societies.
Thus, there exist not only significant differences but, in fact, contradictions
between such approaches. By defining the distinctions between decentring and
decolonial approaches in a more discernible way (see table below), we aim to provoke
much-needed dialogues on (the study of) the EU in the world. With this purpose in
mind, we admittedly synthesize the vast diversity of the decentring and decolonial
perspectives with a view to juxtaposing their differences. Our insights on the decen-
tring agenda rely mainly on a number of key publications
12
and on public discussions
with its key proponents.
13
Table Decentring and Decolonial Agendas in EU Foreign Policy Studies?
Stylized Comparison
Decentring Decolonizing
General Key works Fisher-Onar & Nicolaïdis
14
;
Keukeleire & Lecocq
15
Sebhatu
16
; Bhambra
17
;
Rutazibwa
18
; Staeger
19
; Alcazar
III et al
20
; Evans & Ionescu
21
Origins (Mainstream) political science,
EU studies and International
Relations (IR)
Universities
Critical social theory and
sociological approaches
Geopolitically situated
struggles
Approach General Research agenda Political agenda
Posture Constructive
Connecting with policy-
makers
Disruptive and dismantling
Social justice movements
10
Ibid., at 307.
11
Fisher-Onar & Nicolaïdis, supra n. 4, at 297.
12
Fisher-Onar & Nicolaïdis, supra n. 7 and supra n. 4; Keukeleire & Lecocq, supra n. 4 & supra n. 8.
13
UACES Roundtable (Lille 5 Sep. 2022); RELATE Seminar #3, online (26 Oct. 2022).
14
Supra n. 8, supra n. 4.
15
Ibid.
16
Supra n. 4.
17
Supra n. 5.
18
O. Rutazibwa, What If We Took Autonomous Recovery Seriously? A Democratic Critique of Contemporary
Western Ethical Foreign Policy, 20(1) Ethical Persps. 81108 (2013).
19
U. Staeger, Africa-EU Relations and Normative Power Europe: A Decolonial Pan-African Critique, 54(4) J.
Com. Mkt. Stud. 981998 (2016).
20
A. S. M. Alcazar III, C. Nessel & J. Orbie, Disruption as Dialogue: Decolonising EU Trade Relations With
the Global Souths?, J. Contemp. Eur. Res. (forthcoming).
21
A. M. F. Evans & D. P. Ionescu, Unlearning and Relearning Europe: Theoretical and Practical Approaches to
Decolonizing European Studies Curricula, J. Contemp. Eur. Res. (forthcoming).
4EUROPEAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW
Decentring Decolonizing
Process Ticking the box
Framework
Heuristic device
Boxing
Work
Critique
Goals Main goal Pluralize
Effectiveness and legitimacy
Decolonize
Justice and emancipation
For whom EU
(researchers; practitioners)
Subaltern, Postcolonial subjects/
subjecthood, Colonized and
racialized Others, Indigenous
communities
Material Improve power
Adapt and recalibrate policies
Reshuffle power
System change, destroy colo-
nial/modern hierarchies, return
of Indigenous land and life
Epistemic Know more
Knowledge can be neutral
Unknow, re-know, unlearn to
relearn
Knowledge is always embo-
died and political
Firstly, the distinction becomes most visible in the general posture of the presented
writings. The decentring agenda reads like a constructive undertaking, which aims
to ultimately contribute to a more diverse and inclusive world.
22
This becomes
especially clear in the third step of reconstruction. Interestingly, such bridge-
building attempts do not necessarily imply a negation of EU interests. Quite the
contrary, it is suggested that decentring of knowledge can, by being more aware of
other perspectives, contribute to the effectiveness and even to the legitimacy of EU
foreign policy.
23
Eurocentrism is problematic not only because of moral reasons
but because it is self-defeating,
24
counterproductiveand ineffectivefor EU
foreign policy. In turn, these can be illustrated by referring to the EUs failure to
anticipate the Russian war against Ukraine
25
and many abstentions within the UN
on this issue which diminish the EUs power.
26
Decentring here appears as the
22
For example, Fisher-Onar & Nicolaïdis, supra n. 4, at 294; Fisher-Onar & Nicolaïdis, supra n. 7, at 29;
S. Wolff, D. Gazsi, D. Huber & N. Fisher-Onar, How to Reflexively Decentre EU Foreign Policy:
Dissonance and Contrapuntal Reconstruction in Migration, Religious and Neighbourhood Governance, 60(6) J.
Com. Mkt. Stud. 1620 (2022).
23
Keukeleire & Lecocq, supra n. 4, at 317. The authors also point out that decentring can contribute to
the EUs efforts at resilience building.
24
Fisher-Onar & Nicolaïdis, supra n. 4, at 293.
25
Keukeleire & Lecocq, supra n. 4, at 306, 316.
26
Fisher-Onar, supra n. 13.
EDITORIAL 5
academic variant of spying in diplomacy. The logic is the same: by better under-
standing its presumed others, the EU is better equipped to pursue its (geo)political
agendas in world politics. Ironically, the preoccupation with the EUs knowledge
of the Other also serves to recentre Europe in the writings. Rather than mean-
ingfully decolonizing the role of the EU in the world from geopolitically situated
struggles and forms of resistance, in some ways it in fact reinforces it and enables its
continuation.
Instead, the decolonizing agenda is critical of projects of inclusion into the
existing dominant order.
27
It is explicitly and purposely disruptive, even to the
point of inviting the uncomfortable feelings that may arise when the status quo is
challenged. As fiercely and regretfully pronounced in Fanons call for violence and
de-linking from the (former) colonial oppressor,
28
decolonial authors have often
pursued fundamental changes to the existing system. These changes should not
only be of an epistemic nature material dimensions should be stressed too.
Importantly, the decentring agenda pays much attention to the knowledge dimen-
sion and the need to acknowledge different voices. However, it is less outspoken in
terms of material redistributions of power,
29
let alone redress for colonial injuries
and transgenerational injustices. Decolonial thought and praxis have more
unflinchingly advanced the abolishment of existing institutions that inhibit the
coloniality of power. The latter could involve, for instance, calls for the abolition
of Economic Partnership Agreements with the EU,
30
reparations for formerly
colonized peoples,
31
or autonomous recoveryand de-linking from the Western
(aid) system.
32
In contrast, decentring authors emphasize the need for enhanced
partnership, better conversations and engagement, with the EU still holding the
upper-hand.
Secondly, and closely related, we notice the widely varying perspectives on
the role of science. The decentring agenda presents itself as a research programme
27
L. Luciani, Decentring EU Human Rights Promotion. Three Civil Society Struggles and the Geo-politics of the
EUs Interventions in the South Caucasus 158 (2022), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Laura-
Luciani/publication/365508302_Decentring_EU_human_rights_promotion_Three_civil_society_
struggles_and_the_geo-politics_of_the_EUs_interventions_in_the_South_Caucasus/links/
6377b1d237878b3e87bfc7f0/Decentring-EU-human-rights-promotion-Three-civil-society-struggles-
and-the-geo-politics-of-the-EUs-interventions-in-the-South-Caucasus.pdf (accessed 25 Nov. 22).
28
F. Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Grove Press 1961).
29
Fisher-Onar & Nicolaïdis (supra n. 7, at 294) do emphasize the need for a systematic mitigation of
wealth and power asymmetries in international politics, but they do this in the context of the
imperative of mutualitywhich characterizes EU integration and should be translated from a norm
prevailing inside the Union to a basic norm governing relations with the rest of the world.
30
Compare Sebhatu, supra n. 4; M. Langan & S. Price, Migration, Development and EU Free Trade Deals:
The Paradox of Economic Partnership Agreements as a Push Factor for Migration, 7(4) Global Aff. 505521
(2021).
31
Compare Bhambra, supra n. 5.
32
Compare Rutazibwa, supra n. 18.
6EUROPEAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW
that can at least to some extent (specifically, in the first and second phases) be
neutral. As stated by Keukeleire and Lecocq:
a clear distinction should be made between the Decentring Agenda as an analytical or
heuristic tool on the one hand, and as a normative judgment on the other. The aim is to
assist scholars in detecting, labeling and understanding concepts, ideas and practices that do
not fit within the usual frames of reference, without making a priori normative
judgements.
33
Much effort has gone into developing and operationalizing frameworksthat
serve as heuristic devicesand toolsfor academics who want to decentre their
research from Eurocentrism. A key part of the purported problem is indeed the
inadequacy to understand and explain the EUs role and the outcome of its
foreign policyin a complex world.
34
But from a decolonial perspective, its
important to recall that historically objectiveresearch has been used to cement
the existing power relations as natural.
35,36
Therefore, while the decentring agenda seems to entail a practical dimension
that can be credited for enhancing the applicability and comprehensibility for
students and stakeholders, there is a risk of falling into methodic, ticking the
boxexercises that obfuscate the complexities that are inherent to postcolonial
developments and continuing colonialities. It also carries the risk that the latter
becomes depoliticized. Instead, decolonial agendas aim to politicize local space:
37
they are more explicitly normative from the outset, but the decentring agenda is
no less normative in spite of its veil of objectivityand neutrality. Our decolonial
standpoint requires acknowledging the historical epistemological injustices, prior-
itize the voices and narratives about Europeof those communities that have been
historically subjugated,
38
and positioning ourselves politically while also unveiling
33
Keukeleire & Lecocq, supra n. 8, at 280. Similarly, Keuleers, Fonck & Keukeleire clarify that they see
EU-centrism in the narrow sense of research focus on the EU and not in the far more loadedand
normativesense of the West occupying centre stage in world history. F. Keuleers, D. Fonck & S.
Keukeleire, Beyond EU Navel-Gazing: Taking Stock of EU-centrism in the Analysis of EU Foreign Policy,51
(3) Coop. Confl. 361 (2016).
34
Keukeleire & Lecocq, supra n. 4, at 306.
35
See E. A. Kaplan, Looking for the Other: Feminism, Film, and the Imperial Gaze (Routledge 1997); G.
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, The Cognitive Empire, Politics of Knowledge and African Intellectual Productions:
Reflections on Struggles for Epistemic Freedom and Resurgence of Decolonisation in the Twenty-First Century,
42(5) Third World Q. 882901 (2021).
36
This also involves more attention for the international political economy of research and knowledge
production and the international division of labour in research (see e.g., M. Sukarieh & S. Tannock,
Subcontracting Academia: Alienation, Exploitation and Disillusionment in the UK Overseas Syrian Refugee
Research Industry, 51(2) Antipode 664680 (2019)).
37
Compare M. Sabaratnam, IR in Dialogue But Can We Change the Subjects? A Typology of Decolonising
Strategies for the Study of World Politics, 39(3) Millennium 797 (2011).
38
See A. Oleart & A. Van Weyenberg, Narrating Europe: A Contested Imagined Community, 66(4)
Politique Européenne (2019).
EDITORIAL 7
how research agendas that are framed as objectiveare using this legitimacy to
flatten decolonial approaches.
Thirdly, the decentring agenda attempts to raise concerns that could be
resolved through the inclusiveness it purports to achieve. According to
Keukeleire and Lecocq, decentring requires scholars and practitioners to attempt
understanding phenomena which may be considered illegitimate or morally pro-
blematic, as is reflected in the debate on whether beliefs and practices
embedded in different cultures can be analysed without prior ethical judgement.
39
While their concern touches on an important issue, it misses a key point about
how to redress Eurocentrism. Better engaging with scholars from underrepresented
backgrounds is an accessible way to avoid cultural relativism or further pushing
Eurocentric interpretations. Such scholars are uniquely equipped to fill knowledge
gaps and certainly can do so while remaining objective, scientific and under-
standable to a broad audience. Additionally, promoting trans- and inter-discipli-
narity can enable political scientists and other policy scholars to access historical,
cultural, linguistic and anthropological insights where it is lacking and offers the
opportunity for disciplines to work together towards a decolonial future.
Overall, such differences may not be surprising, as they have different theore-
tical roots and correspond to the familiar tensions within all social struggles
between revisionist versus radical strands. In this way, the decentringand deco-
lonizingagendas have conflicting views. It might be envisageable to adapt a
decentringdiscourse and thus avoid references to the jungleand the gar-
den’–without meaningfully changing the underlying colonial ideological para-
digm. Both agendas are driven by a strong desire to better reflect on complicated
issues of diversity. However, decolonial thinking and praxis are addressing the
roots and consequences of colonialism and coloniality in their analysis rather than
decentringEurope.
Some may argue that they might be complementary in that decolonial
approaches could ideally create more space for political debates within which
decentring approaches could then advance pragmatic improvements and induce
gradual evolutions towards systemic change. There is however no guarantee that
this would happen, especially if decentring and post/decolonial agendas continue
to be conflated. While decentring may lead to a more legitimate and effective EU
foreign policy, it may also not diminish or may even reinforce the coloniality of
EU power. Thus, rather than decentring Europe, we ought to move towards
decolonial futures that truly prioritize the democratic struggle against colonial
continuities.
39
Keukeleire & Lecocq, supra n. 4, at 308.
8EUROPEAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW
... Over the life of the project, we saw this most clearly in the discussions about decentring versus decolonisation. In these discussions, the former is seen as facilitating dialogue, the latter forming an obstacle to it, particularly in policymaking circles (see also Orbie et al. 2023). Readers of this special issue may find it useful to juxtapose the arguments of Antonio Salvador M. Alcazar III, Camile Nessel and Jan Orbie with those of Sharon Lecocq and Stephan Keukeleire to gain a broader picture of the debate. ...
... Few working in this area would disagree that a consideration of these impacts and relations from the perspectives of others is essential to decentre the study of Europe, in a colloquial sense, and contextualise it. But as our conversations through the lifetime of the DIMES project clarified, for some, decentering is insufficiently ambitious in view of what needs to be rectified (see also Orbie et al, 2023). Within the study of African-EU relations, some scholars have concentrated on showing how the legacies of colonialism have material negative economic and social impacts Jonsson 2014a, 2014b;Haastrup 2020), and how the European integration project assumed economic contributions from African colonies almost as 'dowries' being brought into the European project (Hansen and Jonsson 2011). ...
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... Dominant discourses and narratives of the European peace and integration project still succumb to similar colonialist logic and imaginaries (cf. Orbie, et al. 2023), exemplified recently in how Josip Borrell, the European Union's 'foreign minister', described Europe as a 'garden' that must be protected from the 'jungle' of 'invaders' surrounding it. 1 Ideologically employing this metaphor upholds the myth of Europe as having progressed historically within a 'closed system' (cf. ...
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The following working paper aims to harness W.E.B. Du Bois’ critical thought to illuminate the ideological characteristics of the modern imaginaries of Europe as manifested in dominant discourses, exemplified recently in how the European Union’s chief diplomat described the EU as a ‘garden’ committed to peace and law and order, as opposed to the ‘jungle’ outside its external borders. Building on contemporary critical-theoretical scholarship and postcolonial interventions, this paper emphasizes the ideological as a conceptual framework undergirded by a certain materiality shaped by societal processes and practices. On this account, the method of the Ideologiekritik necessitates a resuscitation of its normative significance. Key to addressing this issue entails not only unmasking hegemonic structures and epistemic inconsistencies, but also tying such critical analyses to emancipatory agendas aimed at transforming material social relations. This paper considers Du Bois’ historical-sociological works as contributory to such programs of emancipation as a pioneer of the Black Radical Tradition, arguing how his anti-imperial approach pertains to an ideology-critical method of engaging in immanent critique. I underscore that this radical critique is rooted from the inherent antagonisms of an existing racialized social structure, whose dynamic contradictions would stimulate the critical consciousness necessary to trigger practical opportunities for social transformation. In this vein, I hope to contribute to an emerging strand of scholarship of reclaiming Du Bois as a groundbreaking anti-colonial political theorist and Marxist sociologist, which would, in this context, consequently offer us critical European Studies scholars potential tools to revitalize the critique of ideology as an indispensable method of transformative social critique—aimed not only at unmasking but also overcoming the recurring and inevitable augmentation of the contradictions and crises of contemporary European society. ---------- [A summarized version of this paper was subsequently published on the UACES' 'Ideas on Europe' blog: https://uacesoneurope.ideasoneurope.eu/2023/09/25/theorising-europe-from-the-margins-a-reappraisal-of-w-e-b-du-bois-critical-thought/.]
... However, it must, nevertheless, be noted that such post-development and decolonial critique is gradually finding a place in mainstream discussions on European foreign policy as well. Indeed, increasingly, the core assumptions of development and democracy aid have become contested by policy-makers, activists, observers, and researchers inside and outside of Europe (Orbie et al. 2023;Ziai 2017). Will this trend continue? ...
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This article, drawing on Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) and embracing the decentring agenda in European Union (EU) external relations, discusses the substance of human rights promotion in the negotiations of the Samoa Agreement. It documents how the EU has concentrated on civil and political rights, whereas Africa has advanced an innovative approach to economic, social and cultural rights underpinned by the right to development. More importantly, going beyond the ‘heaven–hell binary’, which draws neat lines between the good North and the bad South, and the ‘one‐way traffic paradigm’, which claims that human rights flow from the North to the South, it shows that the human rights corpus may be slowly evolving from its paradigmatic western orientation towards a truly universal project: the EU and Africa have started recognising each other as being holders of diverse yet legitimate perspectives on human rights.
Chapter
This chapter assesses African agency to resist the Global Britain project. The first section recaps the imperial impulses of Brexit. The second section considers material forms of power, and how African officials may utilise new initiatives such as the African Union’s African Continental Free Trade Agreement to counter UK influence. The chapter then turns to ideational sources of African resistance to the Global Britain project. It considers opportunities for African actors to invert the disempowering ‘development’ language of the UK. Finally, the chapter concludes by reflecting on the decolonial approach and the continued relevance of Nkrumah.
Article
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In Western academic spaces, more and more stakeholders are claiming commitments to ‘decolonisation’. Yet in environments shaped by rankings, impact factors, citation numbers and third-party funding figures, what claims to be decolonial scholarship can easily end up being as extractive and violent as the subject it is claiming to confront. In this article, we reflect on attempts to decolonise both the discipline and practice of ‘development’, especially with regard to knowledge ‘production’ in this academic disciplinary space. We are doing this from a particular situatedness that is itself contradictory, as we are both facilitators of an EU-funded network focused on ‘Decolonising Development’ and of Convivial Thinking, a non-institutional, transnational web-based collective. We argue that imperial forms of knowing and making sense of the world are deeply entrenched in the structures of higher education, both shaping and limiting the ways in which what we call ‘development’ is researched, taught and practised. By reflecting on instances of academic activism and institutional pushback in both aforementioned networks, we show how institutional violence limits scholarly imaginations in ways that make sure academic or dominant knowledge structures are not radically challenged, thereby making claims of decolonisation purely performative. Despite this, we also point to concrete openings in both networks where undoing the entanglements of decolonising narratives, ‘development’ and the imperatives of scholarship – and thereby dismantling the master’s house that sustains it – seems within reach.
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The first chapter outlines the Gramscian concept of a ‘passive revolution’ to make sense of present-day EU politics and the shifting legitimacy claims. The chapter develops this concept and relates it to ongoing innovative ‘citizen participation’ mechanisms organised by the EU, including the citizens’ panels within the Conference on the Future of Europe and its follow-up. Next, the chapter describes the politically engaged perspective upon which the book is conceived, and introduces the ‘decolonial multitude’ as an alternative conceptual lens through which to look at the democratic political subject in the EU, in contrast to the traditional ‘demos’ or ‘demoi’. The decolonial multitude facilitates a transnational democracy imaginary. As a better fit for the dominant global capitalist and postcolonial material structures of our society, the decolonial multitude is a possible way forward to decolonise the ‘we’ in democracy in order to challenge the “coloniality of power”. Last, the chapter describes the contribution(s) that the book makes to the literature, the logic of the book’s narrative and the relation that chapters have with each other.
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The concluding chapter begins with the initial parallelism between Gramsci’s conception of a ‘passive revolution’ and ongoing political dynamics, in order to reflect upon how the Conference on the Future of Europe reinforced the conception of democracy ‘without politics’ already dominant at the EU level. The chapter proposes alternative ways to democratise transnational ‘citizen participation’, anchored in the concept of the ‘decolonial multitude’, instead of the traditional notions of ‘the people’ or European ‘demoi’. This entails the reframing of our understanding of democracy from a decolonial perspective. It suggests that the EU is an important terrain of struggle to connect movements, and that democratic innovations should be designed in a way that strengthens collective organisations and fosters a transnational and agonistic public sphere. Next, the chapter outlines the contribution to the literature, the shortcomings of the book, and avenues for future research. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the importance of shifting the ideological borders of European studies academic discourse, and the relationship of academia with politics. For academics in the social sciences, the question is not whether we stay out of ‘politics’ or operate as political activists. Instead, the key question is: to which political purpose are we orienting our work? Accordingly, the book is meant to provide conceptual tools to not only make sense of the EU, but also to contribute in decolonising and democratising it.
Navel-Gazing: Taking Stock of EU-centrism in the Analysis of EU Foreign Policy
  • Beyond Keukeleire
  • Eu
Keukeleire, Beyond EU Navel-Gazing: Taking Stock of EU-centrism in the Analysis of EU Foreign Policy, 51