3 Researching entrepreneurship as lived experience

Full text

3 Researching entrepreneurship as lived
experience
Henrik Berglund
Introduction
The basis of a science of conduct must be fixed principles of action, endur-
ing and stable motives. It is doubtful, however, whether this is fundamentally
the character of human life. What men want is not so much to get things that
they want as it is to have interesting experiences. And the fact seems to be that
an important condition of our interest in things is an element of the unan-
ticipated, of novelty, of surprise. We must beware of the temptation to judge
the nature of our conduct by the way in which we think about it.
(Knight 1921: 53–4)
It is often recognized that entrepreneurship is to a great extent a form of
art, a practice-oriented endeavour that requires a sensitive and committed
engagement with a range of phenomena in the surrounding world. Still,
much of the research and theory development favours large studies and
positivist epistemology (Chandler and Lyon 2001), where the liveliness of
entrepreneurship tends to be suspended in favour of ‘scientific rigour’.
There is, however, a growing interest among entrepreneurship researchers
to expand the methodological toolbox and widen the scope of inquiry. In
introducing a special issue on entrepreneurship theory development, Phan
(2004: 619) emphasized the need for diverse and dynamic methods, claim-
ing that ‘to develop a catechism founded on positivist empiricism may hide
the very grail we seek’. Instead Phan and many others (e.g. Busenitz et al.
2003; Steyaert 2003) urge researchers to complement research focused on
individual and decontextualized factors with investigations of emergence,
interpretation and intersections of various kinds. Sarasvathy (2004) thus
invokes Simon (1996) to encourage a focus on the artificial, i.e. the inter-
face between inner and outer environments, and proposes the rubric of
design as a useful metaphor for entrepreneurship. Similarly Gartner et al.
(2003) see enactment (Weick 1979) as a constructive way to comprehend
opportunities in the context of entrepreneurial action.
This emphasis on enactive design and interpretation is congenial to philo-
sophical phenomenology and phenomenologically inspired methodologies.
At the core of phenomenology is an emphasis on ‘returning to the things
themselves’, i.e. to the meaningful ways in which things are experienced,
75
M609 NEERGAARD TEXT M/UP.qxd 8/9/06 2:39 PM Page 75 Ray's G4 Ray's G4:Users:ray:Public:Ray

madesenseof andenactedineverydaylife.Athinginthephenomenological
sense does not exist primarily in and of itself, but rather in the meaning that
individuals attach to it. Such a conception of phenomena is fundamentally
differentfrom‘things’asnormallyconceived,i.e.inthe senseof objectiveand
a priori meaningful entities or institutions. This is not to suggest that there is
no ‘material world’out there, but rather that the world as we experience it is
alwaysmeaningfulto us.Inthe wordsof MauriceMerleau-Ponty(2002:xxii)
we are ‘condemned to meaning’. It is consequently the meanings things have
for us, not the things in themselves, that affect our thoughts and behaviours
and therefore these become a relevant focus of investigations.
The goal of phenomenological methods is to study the meanings of phe-
nomena and human experiences in specific situations, and to try to capture
and communicate these meanings in empathetic and lucid ways. As the entre-
preneurship field is still young and grapples with fundamental issues such as
the nature and role of entrepreneurial opportunities (Gartner et al. 2003),
phenomenology could prove helpful in many ways. Phenomenological
methods, as described below, can serve as a powerful tool for exploring and
enriching received theoretical constructs such as risks and opportunities, by
investigating how entrepreneurs actually interpret and enact them (e.g.
Berglund and Hellström 2002). Phenomenology can also be used more
directly to explore what meaningful experiences and strategies are associated
with different situations such as deciding to start a venture or seeking finan-
cial assistance.
The ambition of this chapter is to introduce briefly some relevant aspects
of philosophical phenomenology and to exemplify how phenomenological
methods can be used to investigate entrepreneurship. To accomplish this,
the chapter is structured as follows. First there is a brief review of the phe-
nomenological tradition through the writings of Edmund Husserl and
Martin Heidegger. This review is followed by a discussion of how the
insights of philosophical phenomenology can be formalized and translated
into practical guidelines for entrepreneurship research. Thereafter phe-
nomenological method is illustrated through a worked example of entre-
preneurial risk enactment. After that the potential contribution of
phenomenological methods to entrepreneurship is elaborated in some
detail, especially in relation to cognitive psychological and discursive
approaches.
Phenomenological philosophy
Phenomenology deals with a fundamental philosophical question: What is
real? In our everyday lives, the realness of the things we encounter is seldom
questioned. In modern philosophical discussions, however, the question
is often central, and many contemporary social theories such as social
76 Choosing a vehicle
M609 NEERGAARD TEXT M/UP.qxd 8/9/06 2:39 PM Page 76 Ray's G4 Ray's G4:Users:ray:Public:Ray

constructionism (Berger and Luckmann 1966) and structuration theory
(Giddens 1984) draw explicitly on the phenomenological tradition in
addressing it.1
In the Cartesian tradition the human mind is seen as a passive interpreter
of sense data. Phenomenologists object to this description and instead see
humans as intentional beings, meaning that each person always actively
configures meaning by imposing order on the world (von Eckartsberg
1986). Phenomenologists thus argue that the world and the objects we per-
ceive exist to us through the meanings we give to them, through an act of
interpretation. This does not necessarily deny the existence of an external
physical world independent of our perceptions, but it does imply that the
only way things exist to us is through the way we interpret and give meaning
to them. Things such as books, business partners or risks may in this sense
exist as more or less independent entities, bombarding us with sense data
of different kinds. However, this is not how we know and experience them.
Instead, we live in a world filled with books, business partners and risks
because we stretch forth into the world and interpret it in terms of those
familiar objects. This interpretative way of relating to the world should,
according to phenomenology, form the basis for statements about reality
(Karlsson 1993).
The contemporary development of phenomenological methodology is
rather diverse and has taken place mainly in pedagogy (van Manen 1990),
nursing (Benner 1994), and as a general methodology in psychology (van
Eckartsberg 1986; Giorgi 1985; Smith 1996). These methods are also influ-
enced by related and more contemporary developments in philosophy and
social science such as symbolic interactionism and social phenomenology,
and by other phenomenologists and hermeneuticists such as Maurice
Merleau-Ponty and Hans-Georg Gadamer. However, phenomenological
methods tend to draw mainly on ideas originally developed by Edmund
Husserl and Martin Heidegger (Koch 1995; Crotty 1996; Paley 1998).
Therefore the following section introduces Husserl’s and Heidegger’s ideas
regarding the nature and basis of human knowledge before discussing phe-
nomenological methods.
Husserl and transcendental phenomenology
Edmund Husserl is commonly recognized as the father of modern phe-
nomenology. He started his career as a mathematician but then turned to
philosophy, where he found that the prevailing scientific method was failing
to provide true knowledge. Measuring only empirically available properties
of reality, unconditional truth was always going to be beyond the reach of
scientific inquiry. In Husserl’s view the problem was that psychologists and
others who tested hypotheses and used specific measurement methods were
Researching entrepreneurship as lived experience 77
M609 NEERGAARD TEXT M/UP.qxd 8/9/06 2:39 PM Page 77 Ray's G4 Ray's G4:Users:ray:Public:Ray

epistemologically flawed because they focused too much on operational
definitions and contingent measures, and too little on actual human experi-
ence (Colaizzi 1978).
Husserl, who aspired to establish philosophy and science on ‘a basis of
unimpeachable reality’ (Lauer 1965: 4), was certain that true knowledge
could not be reached by observation of empirical manifestations. To Husserl
knowledge had to be grounded in individuals’ experiences and his alternative
was therefore to return to ‘the things themselves’(zu den Sachen selbst), i.e.
to focus on how individuals truly experience and understand phenomena in
their everyday lives. This meant a radical empiricism grounded in an intuitive
and unbiased understanding of phenomena as they present themselves to
consciousness.2In focusing on consciousness and not the empirical world,
Husserl wanted appreciation to be holistic and comprise all conceivable
aspects of an experienced phenomenon. Therefore he gave no priority to that
which was deemed scientific or a priori real. The basis for true knowledge of
a phenomenon or thing was to be found in the whole range of experiences
we have of it as we experience it in everyday life. Phenomena should there-
fore be analysed for what they are, intuitively and directly, not as what they
mean, theoretically and from a particular standpoint.
Husserl wanted to establish a solid and universally valid ground for
knowledge about phenomena. To accomplish this, he developed a process
consisting of a number of steps aiming to eliminate all preconceptions and
reduce experienced phenomena to their essences (Husserl 1982). To Husserl
it is because our experiences are grounded on such essences that we are able
to find order in our experiences and recognize a meaningful world of things
(ibid.: 105). In short, this process entails two steps. First, when meditating
on a phenomenon one should bracket or disregard one’s natural attitude to
things. All the socialized and learned prejudices we have should be sus-
pended so that the phenomenon being contemplated emerges as pure phe-
nomenon. Second, the essential nature of the phenomenon is reached by
elaborating it in our minds. By freely and imaginatively varying and the-
matizing different aspects of the phenomenon, we are able to understand
the limits of its identity, which are its transcendental essences and which are
its conditional features. Take for example a book: the number of pages and
colour of the cover may be seen as conditional features, whereas the exist-
ence of pages and a cover may be considered essential.
The goal is thus to focus on the phenomenon as experienced in the every-
day life world, then completely bracket its contingent aspects and elaborate
the meaning of the pure phenomenon in order to understand its essence.
This may seem paradoxical, drawing on a holistic appreciation of life-world
experiences and then suspending these in order to reach transcendental
essences. It is important, however, to remember that Husserl was strongly
78 Choosing a vehicle
M609 NEERGAARD TEXT M/UP.qxd 8/9/06 2:39 PM Page 78 Ray's G4 Ray's G4:Users:ray:Public:Ray

influenced by Cartesianism, with its rational ambitions and division of the
world into consciousness and matter. From that perspective there could be
no other true basis for knowledge than consciousness.
Heidegger and hermeneutic phenomenology
Heidegger was a student of Husserl’s but reacted to his teacher’s
Cartesianism. In fact ever since Plato philosophers had appealed to some
form of higher ground to validate worldly experiences. Plato had the ideal
world, Dark Age philosophers had God and Descartes had the subject’s
experience of being. Husserl, while emphasizing the importance of a holis-
tic understanding of experiences, saw no other option but to retreat to tran-
scendental essences when explaining how we can truly know the world.
Heidegger endorsed Husserl’s focus on a holistic appreciation of the
world and of phenomena, but fundamentally opposed the idea of bracket-
ing as a means of reaching true knowledge (Heidegger 1962; Dreyfus 1991).
To Heidegger we always already exist in-the-world and it is therefore in our
ever ongoing and situated activities that the source of meaning is ultimately
located.
3
As for Husserl, physical objects or sensory data have no meaning
in themselves, but as opposed to Husserl, Heidegger did not believe that our
experiences rely on transcendental essences to make sense. Meaning instead
resides in what Heidegger called a referential totality: the historically
learned practices and background understandings we have of the world as
a holistic web of interrelated things. Meaning is thus not some stable essence
that is mediated by interpretations and that can be reached by bracketing or
digging through our holistic web of experiences and practices. Meaning
resides in that web. As an example, consider the following description of
coming to a home and being greeted by the smell of freshly baked cookies:
The pleasant associations we have with the smell of freshly baked cookies are
not created by us exclusively, and certainly not at the moment of walking in the
door. They are memories of our own previous pleasurable experiences with
cookie baking, and they tap into social memories of the meaning of home
cooking and a caregiver welcoming us, and deeper human memories of being
fed and protected by caregivers. Those memories swirl around us. They are not
confined to some dusty file cabinet in the mind, waiting to be called up so we can
interpret that lovely smell. They come to light because the fragrance has directed
our attention to them. The fragrance is part of a holistic matrix of things and
relations that say homely pleasures, care and love. (Steiner 2002)
The meaning of a phenomenon is consequently a result of the historical
and holistic ways in which a person has come to makes sense of a certain
aspect of the world. Similarly, the world becomes better known to us as
individuals when we look at more and more aspects of the world and our
lives, and try to relate these to each other in an ever more comprehensive
Researching entrepreneurship as lived experience 79
M609 NEERGAARD TEXT M/UP.qxd 8/9/06 2:39 PM Page 79 Ray's G4 Ray's G4:Users:ray:Public:Ray

structure (Dreyfus 1991: 32). Heidegger’s phenomenology thus rests on a
truly holistic understanding of the world where understanding any aspect
requires knowledge of the greater context of which it is a part.
Phenomenological methods
It is clear that Husserl and Heidegger differ in some of their basic assump-
tions. These differences are briefly summed up in Table 3.1. Despite these
differences, Husserl, Heidegger and other phenomenologists all reject
‘natural science’approaches and propose a ‘human science’ model of under-
standing human experiences. In doing so they acknowledge that as
researchers our privileged access to meaning lies not in measures and
numbers but in our capacity to understand and find meaning in other
people’s stories and experiences (von Eckartsberg 1986). They also share a
radical bottom–up approach to understanding reality which emphasizes the
role of ‘the things themselves’ as they present themselves as meaningful to
individuals in everyday experiences. In so far as behaviour and thinking are
truly influenced by the meanings phenomena and situations have for us, this
is a significant point with methodological consequences. It suggests that an
important goal of entrepreneurial research should be to capture and com-
municate the meaning of entrepreneurs’ experiences in everyday life.
4
When moving from philosophy to methodology it is common to distin-
guish between reflexive and empirical methods, where reflexive researchers
use their own experience as data (Colaizzi 1978). It is of course possible to
conduct reflexive phenomenological research in entrepreneurship, but this
would require the researcher to be in a suitable position to do so, something
that is not very common (see, however, Johannisson 2002). There are also
differences among empirical methods, some of which lean toward Husserl’s
80 Choosing a vehicle
Table 3.1 Summary of differences between Husserlian and Heideggerian
phenomenology
Husserl Heidegger
Metaphysical focus Epistemological Ontological
Description of Person living in Person exists as being
the individual a world of objects in and of the world
Knowledge Ahistorical Historical
Enabling the social Essences are shared Culture, practices and
history are shared
Method for Bracketing affords access Cultural interpretation
gaining knowledge to true knowledge ‘grounds’any knowing
M609 NEERGAARD TEXT M/UP.qxd 8/9/06 2:39 PM Page 80 Ray's G4 Ray's G4:Users:ray:Public:Ray

pure descriptions and some of which emphasize the hermeneutic elements of
Heidegger’s phenomenology (e.g. Karlsson 1993; Colaizzi 1978; Moustakas
1994). As seen above, Husserl sought transcendental knowledge and devel-
oped an intricate method for suspending conditional features in order to
reach transcendental essences of consciousness. Heidegger on the other hand
saw human beings as part and parcel of the world, and therefore saw engaged
coping and being immersed in the historically developed web of practices
and background knowledge as the fundamental basis for knowing. To illus-
trate the variety of phenomenological methods available I will briefly present
two approaches that can be said to represent polar positions in this respect.
Objectively describing the essential structure of a lived experience
Amadeo Giorgi (1985) represents a Husserlian tradition that seeks to trans-
fer Husserl’s philosophical method of reducing lived experiences to their
pure essences to a similarly rigorous empirical methodology. The ambition
is to collect respondents’ lived experiences of a phenomenon, and from
those idiosyncratic experiences approach the universal and general aspects
of the phenomenon. After a verbatim transcription of the interview proto-
cols, the data analysis consists of four steps:
1. Read and re-read the protocols in order to gain a sense of the whole of
the phenomenon as described. This holistic understanding is import-
ant for determining how the parts are constituted.
2. Divide the protocol into isolated ‘meaning units’. A meaning unit is a
purely descriptive term that contains a specific meaning relevant for the
study. The division should be based on the researcher’s general discip-
linary perspective while maintaining a strict focus on the phenomenon
being researched. Here it is important not to let one’s disciplinary pre-
knowledge dominate the research but allow unexpected meanings to
emerge.
3. Translate the protocols from the language of the respondent to the dis-
ciplinary language of the researcher. This step corresponds to Husserl’s
free imaginative variation. The researcher uses his or her ‘disciplinary
intuition’ to translate the subject’s everyday language into the
researcher’s more narrow disciplinary language. Giorgi emphasizes
that this step does not entail any interpretation but is purely a matter
of describing the essence of the meaning unit in disciplinary language.
4. Synthesize the transformed meaning units to a consistent statement of
the structure of the phenomenon. This step is similar to the previous
one but here it is the transformed meaning units that are subjected to
free imaginative variation. The result is a description of the essential
structure of the lived experience from the perspective of the discipline.
Researching entrepreneurship as lived experience 81
M609 NEERGAARD TEXT M/UP.qxd 8/9/06 2:39 PM Page 81 Ray's G4 Ray's G4:Users:ray:Public:Ray

By following this procedure, Giorgi claims to develop objective know-
ledge of the subject’s experiences and not necessarily of what actually took
place. The result is an objective description of the transcendental structure
of the phenomenon as it is experienced.
Poetically re-creating the feeling of a lived experience
Max van Manen’s (1990) main interest is not pure phenomenological intu-
itions. His method instead tries empathetically to capture and transmit the
sense and feeling of living through different experiences. Van Manen’s
approach is explicitly hermeneutic and recognizes the role of the researcher
as an interpreter and even inventor of meaning. The goal is to try to
describe a lived experience in a way that retains and communicates the
essential meaning of that experience. To accomplish this van Manen pro-
poses that researchers first engage themselves thoroughly in the phenome-
non to be investigated. The researcher should then reflect on what the
essential elements or themes of the interview subjects’experience are. Such
themes ‘are not objects or generalizations; metaphorically speaking they
are more like knots in the webs of our experiences, around which certain
lived experiences are spun and thus lived through as meaningful wholes’
(van Manen 1990: 90). These themes are then used to craft a composite nar-
rative account which resonates with the original experiences of the partic-
ipants. This is a fairly extensive process where the researcher engages in a
prolonged process of reflective writing and re-writing. Re-writing in this
sense does not mean mere editing, but entails new readings of the text that
each time reveal novel insights. The end product is a narrative description
that is said to capture the essence of an experience if it ‘reawakens or shows
us the lived quality and significance in a fuller or deeper manner’(ibid.: 10).
To capture the essence of a phenomenon is thus to re-create an experience
in a way that resonates with the reader, something that requires a poetic or
aesthetic quality in the text.
There are benefits and drawbacks with both approaches. Researchers
such as Giorgi are criticized for underestimating the interpretative role of
the researcher (Karlsson 1993) as well as for writing in an academic prose
which loses the liveliness of the phenomenon and in doing so fails to
capture the essential experience of the phenomenon (Todres 1998).
Similarly, researchers in van Manen’s tradition are criticized for drifting too
far from the phenomena in themselves and instead focusing on individuals’
subjective experiences of phenomena (Crotty 1996). Many phenomenolog-
ical methods seek a middle ground between outlining the general structure
of an experienced phenomenon (what is it?) and re-creating a local experi-
ence of encountering a phenomenon (what is it like?) (e.g. Smith 1996;
Smith and Osborn 2003). In the following section such a middle-ground
82 Choosing a vehicle
M609 NEERGAARD TEXT M/UP.qxd 8/9/06 2:39 PM Page 82 Ray's G4 Ray's G4:Users:ray:Public:Ray

approach is illustrated with a worked example of entrepreneurial risk
enactment.
A worked example of phenomenological methodology
In a recent project (Berglund and Hellström 2002), a phenomenological
method was used to investigate risk among a number of high-tech entre-
preneurs in Sweden. This study sought to elucidate the variety of ways in
which risk is experienced and enacted by entrepreneurial high-tech innova-
tors as they develop their ventures, and the example illustrates how phe-
nomenological methodology may be used in terms of sampling, data
collection, analysis and how the results can be written up and presented.
Sampling
Since statistics are of no concern to phenomenological methods, sampling
was purposive, focusing on getting a manageable and relevant group of indi-
viduals with whom the investigated phenomenon was relatively salient. The
purpose was not to present intrinsically interesting cases nor to represent a
general population, but rather to gain a more detailed picture of the
phenomenon (Smith et al. 1995). In our case we identified 12 high-tech
entrepreneurs distributed across Sweden, who had been active in their
technology-based ventures for at least one year, or until such time as the
venture had started to stabilize. They had all taken a key role in driving the
process of inventing, producing and marketing a technological innovation,
whetherin thefield of informationtechnologies,biotech oradvancedservices.
Collecting data
When gathering data it is important to be flexible enough to accommodate
the richness inherent in the experiences of the participants while staying
focused on the research question and the phenomenon explored. To accom-
plish this we used semi- to non-structured interviews which gave respond-
ents room to speak and allowed us to follow respondents’leads into novel
and unexpected areas. The interviews were conducted in the firms and
lasted, on average, two hours each. The initial discussions concerned the
venture and innovation in general but gradually moved towards the issue
of risk, which was discussed very broadly as related to the firm and the
innovation, and with regard to the participant, the company and the busi-
ness environment. The method does not demand detailed content or textual
analysis, so taking notes was seen as a viable alternative to taping. In this
case we were between two and four interviewers who took turns to inter-
view and document the discussions in detailed notes. The notes were later
used to identify specific quotes that were used to distinguish between
researcher and interviewee in the results presentation.
Researching entrepreneurship as lived experience 83
M609 NEERGAARD TEXT M/UP.qxd 8/9/06 2:39 PM Page 83 Ray's G4 Ray's G4:Users:ray:Public:Ray

Analysis
All interview protocols were read by all the interviewers in order to estab-
lish interpretative flexibility and common meaning. In this way the inter-
pretation of the general narratives, as well as of specific quotations, was
agreed upon. The individual protocols were then re-read line by line and
broken down into discrete parts, not according to syntactic rules such as
sentences but with respect to visible changes in meaning, i.e. meaning units
(MUs) (e.g. Karlsson 1993; Giorgi 1985). To illustrate how the interview
texts were divided into MUs, an excerpt from the original (translated) pro-
tocol is included in Table 3.2. As shown in the table, each MU was associ-
ated with a tentative descriptive concept and broken out of the text together
with its corresponding statements. When the whole text had been broken
down in this way, the resulting list of MUs was re-read and discussed within
the research group. As the researchers worked their way through the list,
MUs with similar meanings were cut out of the original document and
pasted into a new document with a tentative category heading. Each new
MU on the list was similarly either put in an existing category or given its
own new category heading. This process generated a great number of cat-
egories, and during the process some categories that were found to be
similar were merged and others split up until all MUs had been clustered
into categories that were agreed to capture specific homogeneous qualities
84 Choosing a vehicle
Table 3.2 Extraction of meaning units and descriptive concepts from the
interview protocol
Standard NN says he has not thought of risks all that explicitly, but that
treatment there is a SWOT analysis in the business plan. These risk analyses
of risk are of a fairly general character and you just copy them from
a textbook or another business plan.
External NN thought the idea was strong. ‘I had an idea, a logical trick,
validation concerning how such industrial logical problems could be solved.’
He tried to validate the basic idea many times by testing it
against colleagues. ‘I tried to get my academic colleagues to shoot
down the idea on several occasions, but it withstood their attempts.
That way I figured the technological risk was accounted for.’
In terms of markets NN had seen many problems around in the
world, i.e. the Arianne rocket and JAS fighter jets had problems.
He therefore judged the potential upside to be big.
Generic Another reason the firm was started was that the idea was broad.
idea ‘The idea is like a shotgun; it’s so versatile that it can be adapted
to new applications, if the initially chosen ones for some reason
wouldn’t work. These additional exits help minimizing the risks.’
M609 NEERGAARD TEXT M/UP.qxd 8/9/06 2:39 PM Page 84 Ray's G4 Ray's G4:Users:ray:Public:Ray

of what was said by the participants. The three MUs above were finally
included in the categories ‘Risk administration’, ‘External innovation
audits’ and ‘Technological prowess’respectively (see Table 3.3). The cate-
gories and their interrelationships were then focused on in more detail and
similar themes were clustered into factors and overarching super-factors, as
shown in Table 3.3.
During the analysis procedure, interpretations are continuously made
by the researchers as categories and factors are developed. By re-reading
the original protocol and questioning the bases of categorizations, the
researchers actively sought to minimize the use of pre-existing theoretical
categories and be true to the participants’original expressions. If the MUs
Researching entrepreneurship as lived experience 85
Table 3.3 Super-factors, factors and categories of risk and innovation
Super-factors Factors Categories
Innovation risk Human capital Human capital risk
encountered Abundance of slack and lack
of coordination
Pace and priority Missing the time slot
Lack of time to evaluate decisions
First-mover risk
The world moves Force majeure
Perception of venture capitalists
Product competition
Market response
Innovation risk Activating social Managing risks through
affected networks partnerships
Matching partnerships to
venture pace
Network activation
Risk learning Internalizing routines
Affecting perceptions of risk
Risk incrementalism Risk administration
Venture incrementalism
Opportunistic adaptation
Maintaining The venture as a test-case
venture agility Opportunity scanning/market pull
Creating and External innovation audits
sustaining Technological prowess
autonomy Piggybacking
Creation of momentum
Source: Berglund and Hellström (2002).
M609 NEERGAARD TEXT M/UP.qxd 8/9/06 2:39 PM Page 85 Ray's G4 Ray's G4:Users:ray:Public:Ray

clearly coincide with existing theoretical categories, such categories may
however be used (cf. Smith and Osborn 2003).
Results
The results section is a natural extension of the analysis process and con-
tains further interpretative elements. To accomplish a clear distinction
between the participants and the researchers, the participants’ accounts
were presented using direct quotes. The style of such a results presentation
is shown with an excerpt from the original article in Box 3.1. This results
86 Choosing a vehicle
BOX 3.1 CREATING AND SUSTAINING
AUTONOMY
Several of the interviewed innovators found it useful to utilize differ-
ent kinds of external innovation audits in order to ensure innovative
integrity of the venture. One way in which an interviewee achieved
this is given in the following quote: ‘I tried to get my academic
colleagues to shoot down the idea on several occasions, but it with-
stood their attempts. That way I figured the technological risk was
accounted for.’ Another, more externally oriented version was that
‘The most important thing is not to get the product out on the market
in a certain space of time, but rather to get an external actor to vali-
datetheconcept byshowing aninterestin thatparticulartechnology.’
Technological prowess is a version of the previous category, where
the innovator uses the strength of the technology to achieve auton-
omy. One example of this was:‘The idea is like a shotgun; it’s so ver-
satilethatit can be adaptedtonewapplications,iftheinitially chosen
onesfor somereasonwouldn’twork.These additionalexitshelp min-
imizing the risks.’ On the administrative/financial side we have found
piggybacking to be the rule rather than the exception.Piggybacking
is clearly a commonplace informal strategy for furthering the auton-
omyoftheventure,e.g.:‘Toolittleandtoodedicatedmoneyisanother
risk. We took money budgeted by S [public utility] for machine pur-
chases and used part of it for developing the innovation . . . . It’s
easier to obtain forgiveness than permission.’ The last category
underthisgeneral factorrelates tothecreationof momentumforpur-
posesofgettingintoandstayingintheraceasanautonomousplayer.
One innovator addressed this phenomenon directly and stated that:
‘In a short period of time we have met numerous VC, recruited per-
sonnel, made 350 presentations and presented at eight trade-fairs.
Thishaskeptthe wheels spinning . . .one keepsupthemomentum.’
M609 NEERGAARD TEXT M/UP.qxd 8/9/06 2:39 PM Page 86 Ray's G4 Ray's G4:Users:ray:Public:Ray

section shows how the factor ‘Creating and sustaining autonomy’ is
described using the categories ‘External innovation audits’, ‘Technological
prowess’, ‘Piggybacking’ and ‘Creation of momentum’.
Summary of methodological procedure
As with much qualitative research, the results are not generalizable in the
statistical sense. Instead the hierarchy of risk-related factors and categories,
plus their elaboration and discussion, helps produce a relatively compre-
hensive and varied account of how risk is experienced and enacted by a
sample of high-tech entrepreneurs in Sweden. The ambition was to increase
understanding of how entrepreneurs perceive and deal with the phenome-
non of risk in the course of developing their ventures, but also to explore
specific strategies that may be employed by practitioners and used by
researchers for further theorizing. In the original paper we used the results
to discuss and elaborate on previous research on entrepreneurship and risk
(see Berglund and Hellström 2002), but as suggested by Giorgi and van
Manen, phenomenological results can be used in many different ways. The
next section touches more generally on the potential advantages and draw-
backs of a phenomenological approach.
Relevance and potential contributions to entrepreneurship
Phenomenology in a methodological context
The theoretical potential and methodological position of applied phenom-
enology can be illustrated more clearly be positioning it in relation to cog-
nitive psychology and discursive approaches to entrepreneurship (cf. Smith
1996). In the realm of cognition, research on the use of biases, heuristics and
cognitive schemata (Baron 1998; Busenitz and Barney 1997; Mitchell et al.
2002) is rather common. While not all cognitive research on entrepreneur-
ship draws on ‘cold cognitions’,
5
research tends to focus on cognitive
processes (i.e. neglecting specific content or context) where the entrepre-
neurs’ expressions, usually captured using questionnaires and scales, are
taken to reflect relatively stable cognitive mechanisms. On the other side
there is a growing interest in narrative and discursive approaches to the phe-
nomenon of entrepreneurship. Here researchers (e.g. Hjort and Steyaert
2004) investigate and interpret entrepreneurial expressions and events in
relation to emerging and pre-existing discourses. Researchers in the narra-
tive tradition tend to focus on the stories through which entrepreneurial
actions and events receive their meaning. They are therefore somewhat
reluctant to connect these situated narratives to underlying cognitions.
Cognitive researchers thus seek to isolate entrepreneurs’ cognitive
processes whereas discursively oriented writers investigate local stories.
Phenomenological methods can be seen as occupying a niche in between,
Researching entrepreneurship as lived experience 87
M609 NEERGAARD TEXT M/UP.qxd 8/9/06 2:39 PM Page 87 Ray's G4 Ray's G4:Users:ray:Public:Ray

by focusing on the way lived experiences are interpreted, what meanings
phenomena have for individuals and the strategies by which these phe-
nomena are engaged. A phenomenological analysis may thus enrich find-
ings from areas dominated by quantitative cognition studies by providing
‘thicker’elaborations of how things such as entrepreneurial risk-taking are
enacted and given meaning by specific entrepreneurs. Such investigations
could both develop new theoretical constructs and enhance the potency of
existing ones. Phenomenological methods can also contribute to the dis-
cursive tradition by providing detailed illustrations of how prevailing dis-
courses are interpreted and made sense of, or by constructing novel
narratives based on how individuals think about and deal with specific
issues (cf. van Manen 1990).
Limits and criticism of phenomenological methods
Phenomenological methods are often criticized for reasons common to
most qualitative methodology. Here I will mention two specific criticisms
that are especially relevant to phenomenology, namely its reliance on inter-
pretation and its focus on the individual.
Since findings are grounded in participants’life-world experiences, one
main objection is the methods’ reliance on interpretation. There is admit-
tedly a fair amount of interpretation in most phenomenological studies.
The interpretation is also inevitably double as entrepreneurs first interpret
and express their own experiences, after which the researcher interprets
these interpretations. One may, however, persuasively argue that most
quantitative methods involve at least as much interpretation: in defining
the phenomenon to be investigated, in the reduction of variables to be
studied, in the choice of indicators to be used, by the respondent who
interprets the questions (e.g. in a questionnaire) and by the researcher
interpretating the numerical results. The review of philosophical phenom-
enology also made clear that interpretation is not so much a problem as a
basic condition for understanding meaningful experiences. Such under-
standing is always grounded in individual experiences and framed in a
social and cultural context, so while interpretations may seem more or less
plausible, the interpretative element is unavoidable in the human sciences
(cf. Taylor 1971).
Another criticism is the methodological emphasis on the individual. The
method emphasizes individuals’ experiences, and the meanings of phe-
nomena are seen primarily in terms of how specific individuals interpret
them. Applied phenomenological methods may therefore be accused of
reifying the primacy of individuals in entrepreneurship (cf. Ogbor 2000).
However, with Heidegger, the basis for intelligibility shifted from the indi-
vidual consciousness to the historical and social embeddedness of people.
88 Choosing a vehicle
M609 NEERGAARD TEXT M/UP.qxd 8/9/06 2:39 PM Page 88 Ray's G4 Ray's G4:Users:ray:Public:Ray

The results of phenomenological studies therefore include the greater
context as a vital source of individual interpretations. It is, however, true
that the method favours individual accounts.
However, the issue of methods is not primarily one of right or wrong but
rather a matter of ‘fit’, where the phenomenon and the knowledge interest
of the researcher should guide the choice of method. As the entrepreneur-
ship field is relatively young and tries to come to terms with fundamental
issues regarding what its object is, what questions are relevant, and if it can
be studied at all (e.g. Davidsson 2003; Gartner 2001), phenomenology pro-
vides a constructive and accessible methodology for deeply exploring and
revisiting different topics from the perspective of the entrepreneurs’ mean-
ingful lived experiences. More such descriptions and perspectives should
help increase awareness and understanding about how entrepreneurs are
motivated to act as well as what cognitive and practical strategies they
employ. Such investigations do not allow for causal prediction and control
of behaviours, but can complement more quantitatively oriented findings
and thereby permit more thoughtful actions among entrepreneurs as well
as policy-makers, researchers, teachers, venture capitalists and incubator
managers. Phenomenological knowledge in this sense does not inform so
much as enlighten practice.
Conclusion
As indicated in the introduction, positivist investigations of entrepreneur-
ship run the risk of missing ‘the very grail we seek’(Phan 2004). The reason
proposed here is that entrepreneurs as well as the commonly conceptual-
ized and measured attributes of entrepreneurship are lifted out of the con-
texts and life worlds in which they receive their meaning. The view of
entrepreneurship as difficult to describe in terms of stable and objectively
existing entities is also reflected in recent theories which give local sense-
making and emergence priority over stable plans and isolated decisions
(e.g. Sarasvathy 2001; Gartner et al. 2003). In this light, phenomenological
methods can be seen as a structured way of investigating how popular con-
cepts and common events in entrepreneurship (e.g. opportunity discovery,
risk-taking, business planning) as well as less explored aspects (e.g. involve-
ment of self, view of time) are experienced, given meaning and translated
into action by entrepreneurs. Phenomenological methods are especially
well suited for investigating the gaps between real-life occurrences and the-
oretical concepts on the one hand and individuals’interpretations of these
occurrences or concepts on the other (Smith 1996). As shown in the case of
risk, phenomenological investigations can enrich concepts theoretically
and give them fuller and broader meaning by exemplifying how they are
manifested in entrepreneurs’lived experiences.
Researching entrepreneurship as lived experience 89
M609 NEERGAARD TEXT M/UP.qxd 8/9/06 2:39 PM Page 89 Ray's G4 Ray's G4:Users:ray:Public:Ray

In addition to the methodological contribution, the philosophical
underpinnings of phenomenology have been used more directly to theo-
rize entrepreneurship. Much entrepreneurship research seeks to under-
stand the relationship between entrepreneurs and their life worlds via
entrepreneurial cognitions (e.g. Krueger 2003), Scott Shane’s person–
opportunity nexus program (2003), and Saras Sarasvathy’s (2001) notion
of effectuation. These theories all entertain a view of entrepreneurs as
contextually embedded human beings trying to make sense of their local
and extended life worlds. Some writers have used phenomenology and
hermeneutics to explicitly theorize entrepreneurial action. One example is
Israel Kirzner’s student Don Lavoie (1991), who sees entrepreneurs as cul-
tural interpreters. Lavoie rejects the notion that entrepreneurial discovery
is either systematic search or arbitrary alertness: ‘profit opportunities are
not independent atoms but connected parts of a whole perspective on the
world. And the perspective is in turn part of a continuing cultural tradi-
tion’(Lavoie 1991: 45–6).
Phenomenological theory and methods thus seem to suit the needs of
entrepreneurship researchers since the field is young, struggles with con-
ceptual definitions and faces questions regarding its proper focus and iden-
tity, and since entrepreneurship is increasingly becoming theoretically
infused with personal meaning and interpretations via terms such as emer-
gence, enactment and effectuation.
Notes
1. The modern use of the term phenomenology is rooted in Immanuel Kant’s distinction
between ‘that which shows itself’ (phaenomenon) and ‘the thing in itself’ (noumenon).
2. Phenomenology is therefore not a simple critique of positivism. Husserl rather claimed
that: ‘If “Positivism” is tantamount to an absolutely unprejudiced grounding of all sci-
ences on the “positive”, that is to say, on what can be seized upon originaliter, then we
are the genuine positivists’(Husserl 1982: 39).
3. Heidegger completely rejects the dualism of mind and world. The meaning of ‘in’ in the
phrase in-the-world should therefore not be seen as describing objects in spatial relation
to one and other such as ‘I live in Gothenburg’, but in its involved and existential
meaning such as ‘I am in love’ or ‘he is in business’. Since we as humans have always
already lived in-the-world, the world has always already had natural meaning for us
(Dreyfus 1991: 40–45).
4. It is of course very difficult, perhaps even impossible, to fully capture and communicate
lived experience. It is therefore important to remember that phenomenological research
‘is always in conflict with its material, which is beyond language and concept’(Schütz
1982: 70).
5. Cold cognitions usually refer to reasoned and deliberate cognitions. These are often con-
trasted with warm or hot cognitions, which rely more on affect and emotions.
Recommended further reading
Benner, P. (ed.) (1994) Interpretive Phenomenology: Embodiment, caring and ethics in health
and illness. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.This edited book discusses the implications of
Heideggerian phenomenology with special emphasis on the nursing profession. The first
90 Choosing a vehicle
M609 NEERGAARD TEXT M/UP.qxd 8/9/06 2:39 PM Page 90 Ray's G4 Ray's G4:Users:ray:Public:Ray

half of the book introduces the philosophical background and the other half describes a
number of studies.
Giorgi, A. (1985) Phenomenology and Psychological Research. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne
University Press.Giorgi is an authority in the Husserlian tradition of phenomenological
psychology. This book describes his research programme, including a detailed description
of his method.
Packer, M. (1985) Hermeneutic inquiry in the study of human conduct. American Psychologist,
40: 1081–93. Oft-cited paper that compares hermeneutics to the empirical and rational trad-
itions in psychology. Emphasis is placed on knowledge claims and explanations of human
action.
Smith, J.A. (ed.) (2003) Qualitative Psychology: A practical guide to research methods.London:
Sage. Practical handbook of qualitative methods that includes detailed guidelines for con-
ducting research using most of the major approaches. Includes chapters on phenomenol-
ogy by Amadeo Giorgi and Jonathan Smith.
Smith, J., Harré, R. and van Langenhove, L. (1995) Idiography and the case study. In
Rethinking Psychology, ed. Smith, J., Harré, R. and van Langenhove, L. London: Sage,
pp. 59–69.This book provides an exposé of the developments of psychological research
from empirical and cognitive towards more discursive approaches. The specific chapter con-
tains an interesting discussion of the tradeoffs inherent in different methodological
approaches, viz. view of individual, sample size and time frame.
Spinosa, C., Flores, F. and Dreyfus, H. (2001) Disclosing New Worlds: Entrepreneurship, demo-
cratic action, and the cultivation of solidarity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.This brief
volume discusses how concepts and approaches from Heideggerian phenomenology can be
used to comprehend entrepreneurship as a practical skill involving a heightened sensitivity
to everyday anomalies.
References
Baron, R. (1998) Cognitive mechanisms in entrepreneurship: Why and when entrepreneurs
think differently than other people. Journal of Business Venturing,13(4): 275–94.
Benner, P. (ed.) (1994) Interpretive Phenomenology: Embodiment, caring and ethics in health
and illness. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Berger, P. and Luckmann, T. (1966) The Social Construction of Reality: A treatise in the soci-
ology of knowledge. New York: Doubleday.
Berglund, H. and Hellström, T. (2002) Enacting risk in independent technological innovation.
International Journal of Risk Assessment and Management,3(2/3/4): 205–21.
Busenitz, L.G., West, G.P., Shepherd, D., Nelson, T., Chandler, G.N. and Zacharakis, A.
(2003) Entrepreneurship research in emergence: Past trends and future directions. Journal
of Management,29(3): 285–308.
Busenitz, L.W. and Barney, J.B. (1997) Differences between entrepreneurs and managers in
large organizations: Biases and heuristics in strategic decision-making. Journal of Business
Venturing,12(1): 9–30.
Chandler, G. and Lyon, D. (2001) Issues of research design and construct measurement in
entrepreneurship research: The past decade. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,25(4):
101–14.
Colaizzi, P. (1978) Psychological research as the phenomenologist views it. In R. Valle and M.
King, (eds), Existential Phenomenological Alternative for Psychology. New York: Oxford
University Press, pp. 48–71.
Crotty, M. (1996) Phenomenology and Nursing Research. Melbourne: Churchill Livingstone.
Davidsson, P. (2003) The domain of entrepreneurship research: Some suggestions. In J. Katz
and S. Shepherd (eds), Advances in Entrepreneurship, Firm Emergence and Growth. Oxford,
UK: Elseveir/JAI Press, 6: 315–72.
Dreyfus, H. (1991) Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger’s being and time, division I.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gartner, W.B. (2001) Is there an elephant in entrepreneurship? Blind assumptions in theory
development. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,25(4): 27–39.
Researching entrepreneurship as lived experience 91
M609 NEERGAARD TEXT M/UP.qxd 8/9/06 2:39 PM Page 91 Ray's G4 Ray's G4:Users:ray:Public:Ray

Gartner, W.B., Carter, N.M. and Hills, G.E. (2003) The Language of Opportunity. In
C. Steyaert and D. Hjort (eds), New Movements in Entrepreneurship. Cheltenham, UK and
Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.
Giddens, A. (1984) The Constitution of Society: Outline of the theory of structuration.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Giorgi, A. (1985) Phenomenology and Psychological Research. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne
University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1962) Being and Time. New York: Harper and Row.
Hjort, D. and Steyaert, C. (eds) (2004) Narrative and Discursive Approaches in Entrepreneurship.
Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.
Husserl, E. (1982) Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological
Philosophy. 1st book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, trans. by F. Kersten. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Johannisson, B. (2002) Enacting Entrepreneurship Using Auto-Ethnography to Study
Organization Creation. Conference on Ethnographic Organizational Studies. University of
St Gallen, Switzerland.
Karlsson, G. (1993) Psychological Qualitative Research from a Phenomenological Perspective.
Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell International.
Knight, F. (1921) Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. Boston, MA and New York: Houghton
Mifflin.
Koch, T. (1995) Interpretive approaches in nursing research: The influence of Husserl and
Heidegger. Journal of Advanced Nursing,21: 827–36.
Krueger, N.F., Jr (2003) The cognitive psychology of entrepreneurship. In Z. Acs and D.B.
Audtresch (eds), Handbook of Entrepreneurial Research. London: Kluwer Law
International.
Lauer, Q. (1965). Introduction. In E. Husserl (ed.), Phenomenology and the Crisis of
Philosophy, trans. and ed. Q. Lauer. New York: Harper and Row.
Lavoie, D. (1991) The discovery and interpretation of profit opportunities: Culture and the
Kirznerian entrepreneur. In B. Berger (ed.), The Culture of Entrepreneurship. San Francisco:
ICS Press.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (2002) Phenomenology of Perception. London: Routledge.
Mitchell, R.K., Smith, J.B., Morse, E.A., Seawright, K.W., Peredo, A.-M. and McKenzie, B.
(2002) Are entrepreneurial cognitions universal? Assessing entrepreneurial cognitions
across cultures. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,26(4): 9–32.
Moustakas, C. (1994) Phenomenological Research Methods. London: Sage.
Ogbor, J.O. (2000) Mythicizing and reification in entrepreneurial discourse: Ideology-critique
of entrepreneurial studies. Journal of Management Studies,37(5): 605–35.
Paley, J. (1998) Misinterpretive phenomenology: Heidegger, ontology, and nursing research.
Journal of Advanced Nursing,27: 817–24.
Phan, P. (2004) Entrepreneurship theory: Possibilities and future directions. Journal of
Business Venturing,19(5): 617–20.
Sarasvathy, S. (2001) Causation and effectuation: Toward a theoretical shift from economic
inevitability to entrepreneurial contingency. Academy of Management Review,26(2):
243–88.
Sarasvathy, S. (2004) The questions we ask and the questions we care about: Reformulating
some problems in entrepreneurship research. Journal of Business Venturing,19(5): 707–17.
Schütz, A. (1982) Life Forms and Meaning Structure. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Shane, S. (2003) A General Theory of Entrepreneurship: The Individual-Opportunity Nexus,
Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.
Simon, H.A. (1996) Sciences of the Artificial. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Smith, J. Harré, R. and van Langenhove, L. (1995) Idiography and the case study. In J. Smith,
R. Harré and L. van Langenhove (eds) Rethinking Psychology, London: Sage, pp. 59–69.
Smith, J. and Osborn, M. (2003) Interpretative phenomenological analysis. In J. Smith (ed.),
Qualitative Psychology: A practical guide to methods, London: Sage, pp. 55–80.
Smith, J.A. (1996) Beyond the divide between cognition and discourse: Using interpretative
phenomenological analysis in health psychology. Psychology & Health,11: 261–71.
92 Choosing a vehicle
M609 NEERGAARD TEXT M/UP.qxd 8/9/06 2:39 PM Page 92 Ray's G4 Ray's G4:Users:ray:Public:Ray

Steiner, C. (2002) The technicity paradigm and scientism in qualitative research. The
Qualitative Report,7(2). [http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR7-2/steiner.html]
Steyaert, C. (2003) Entrepreneurship: In Between What? – On the ‘Frontier’ as a Discourse of
Entrepreneurship Research. Best Paper Proceedings of the Academy of Management.
Taylor, C. (1971) Interpretation and the sciences of man. Review of Metaphysics,25: 3–51.
Todres, L. (1998) Pearls, pith and provocation: The qualitative description of human experi-
ence: The aesthetic dimension. Qualitative Health Research,8: 121–7.
van Manen, M. (1990) Researching Lived Experience: human science for an action sensitive ped-
agogy. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
von Eckartsberg, R. (1986) Life-world Experience: existential–phenomenological research
approaches in psychology. Washington, DC: Center for Advanced Research in
Phenomenology, University Press of America.
Weick, K. (1979) Social Psychology of Organizing. Rev. edn. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Researching entrepreneurship as lived experience 93
M609 NEERGAARD TEXT M/UP.qxd 8/9/06 2:39 PM Page 93 Ray's G4 Ray's G4:Users:ray:Public:Ray

M609 NEERGAARD TEXT M/UP.qxd 8/9/06 2:39 PM Page 94 Ray's G4 Ray's G4:Users:ray:Public:Ray