Chinese Intellectual Discourse on Democracy

Abstract

Intellectual discourse on democracy has made important impacts on China’s transformation and the Chinese pursuit of democracy. There has been an intense divergence in understanding and interpretation of democracy among the Chinese scholars. In spite of different point of views among scholars in China, there is a growing consensus among them that political reform is the right answer to China’s today’s problems and democracy is a good thing for China. This paper analyzes the on-gong heated debates on democracy. It reviews the main structure, characteristics, and implications of the debates on democracy among three major schools of thought, namely: democracy with Chinese characteristics, liberalism, and New-Leftism.

Full text

RESEARCH ARTICLE
Chinese Intellectual Discourse on Democracy
He Li
Published online: 15 May 2014
#Journal of Chinese Political Science/Association of Chinese Political Studies 2014
Abstract Intellectual discourse on democracy has made important impacts on China’s
transformation and the Chinese pursuit of democracy. There has been an intense
divergence in understanding and interpretation of democracy among the Chinese
scholars. In spite of different point of views among scholars in China, there is a
growing consensus among them that political reform is the right answer to China’s
today’s problems and democracy is a good thing for China. This paper analyzes the on-
gong heated debates on democracy. It reviews the main structure, characteristics, and
implications of the debates on democracy among three major schools of thought,
namely: democracy with Chinese characteristics, liberalism, and New-Leftism.
Keywords China .Democracy .Intellectual discourse .Liberalism .New Leftism
Although Marxism has been retained in the Constitution of the People’sRepublicof
China as the guidance for socialist construction, few in China believe in its relevance in
this increasingly capitalistic country. In contrast to the dominance of one ideology
during the Mao years, by the end of the twentieth century, China’s intellectuals have
opened up a public space and filled it with a variety of new ideas and vigorous debates
[1–3]. Today’s China is buffeted by varied ideological trends, ranging from liberalism,
democratic socialism, New Leftism to neo-Confucianism [4–7]. Yu Keping, the deputy
director of the Central Committee’s Compilation and Translation Bureau, put forward a
theory of “incremental democracy,”which emphasizes the orderly expansion of citizen
participation in politics. His article, “Democracy is a good thing,”published in 2006,
created a huge debate within the Party about the merits of democracy [8]. Meanwhile,
increasing numbers of Chinese scholars have argued for democracy with Chinese
characteristics, which is different from both the Western model of liberal democracy
and Third World authoritarianism [9–11].
Democracy is an important component of the Chinese political discourse since the
concept was introduced from the West to China in the mid-nineteenth century [12–15].
Democracy means different thing to different people. To liberal scholars, open and fair
J OF CHIN POLIT SCI (2014) 19:289–314
DOI 10.1007/s11366-014-9300-8
H. Li (*)
Department of Political Science, Merrimack College, North Andover, MA 01845, USA
e-mail: he.li@merrimack.edu
Author's personal copy

political contests are one of the key features of democracy. In a recent study, Tianjian
Shi and Lu Jie demonstrated with empirical data that in China the popular understand-
ing of the concept of “democracy”does not match the meaning defined in the liberal
democracy discourse; rather, it is based on the guardianship discourse. There is a
widely shared view among ordinary Chinese people that “democracy”means govern-
ment for the people (and by elites), rather than government by the people [16]. They
explain this is the reason why, as long as the Chinese government “serves the people,”
it is deemed “democratic”and legitimate [17].
In the official rhetoric of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the ideal type of
democracy is the socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics. The CCP 18th
National Congress in 2012 proclaimed that people’s democracy is the lifeblood of
socialism. By using the term “people’sdemocracy,”the CCP attempts to conceptualize
socialist democracy and distinguish it from liberal democracy, which is usually
regarded as Western style democracy or capitalist democracy. Party chief Xi Jinping
has repeatedly emphasized the importance of “putting power in the cage of regula-
tions.”Those who advocate for democracy represent a broad ideological spectrum,
from the older generation of Marxist humanist, who still couch their calls for political
reform in Marxist language, to younger intellectuals returned from West, who maintain
that China is still far away from liberal democracy.
1
There is no consensus among Chinese scholars on what is democracy. Likewise,
while there are few concepts more critical to the work of political science than
democracy, there is very little agreement about how it happens. In this paper, I use
Linz and Stepan’s definition for democracy.
“In a nondemocratic setting, liberalization may entail a mix of policy and social
changes, such as less censorship of the media, somewhat greater space for the
organization of autonomous working-class activities, the introduction of some
legal safeguards for individuals such as habeas corpus, the releasing of most
political prisoners, the return of exiles, perhaps measures for improving the
distribution of income, and most important, the toleration of opposition. Democ-
ratization entails liberalization but is a wider and more specifically political
concept. Democratization requires open contestation over the right to win control
of the government, and this in turn requires free competitive elections, the results
of which determine who governs.”[26]
The lack of democracy is a great disappointment of the Chinese intellectuals in the
modern era. In Chinese scholarly discourse, the literature on democracy is vast and is
growing rapidly. A baidu search (search engine equivalent of Google in China) of
“minzhu”(democracy in Chinese) registered more than 100,000,000 hits. There is a
wide spectrum of views in Chinese academic circle on democracy. Although very few
of the establishment intellectuals propose a multi-party system or direct elections of the
political leadership by universal suffrage, a small number advocate the establishment of
other institutions associated with liberal democracy.
2
Some scholars emphasize the rule
1
For comprehensive study of the Chinese intellectuals and democracy, see [18–25].
2
“Establishment intellectual”is a term coinedby Carol Hamrin and Timothy Cheek. For details, see Carol Lee
Hamrin and Timothy Cheek eds. China’s Establishment Intellectuals (Armonk, NY: M E Sharpe, 1986).
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of law, others stressed freedom of expression and association; and still others call for
more competitive elections. Some are concerned with intra-party democracy, others
with grassroots democracy [27]. In spite of their different perspectives on democracy,
they seem all agree that without profound political reform China is on a dead-end road.
The Chinese intellectual discourse on liberal democracy reemerged in 1979, when
market-oriented economic reform began. Wei Jingsheng, for example, advocated
representative democracy as a “fifth modernization,”without which Chinese society
would remain “stagnant.”He called on the Party to add democratization to the list of
“four modernizations”(industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national
defense) that the leadership was then advocating. Although there was an outcry for
political reform and a general atmosphere of theoretical prosperity, systematic reflec-
tions on different political ideas did not begin. Only in the 1990s, with a rapid process
of market reforms stimulated by the state and a loosening of ideological regulation, a
social and economic background appropriate for discussing political ideas established.
China’s reform, which started with the repudiation of egalitarianism and the encour-
agement to “get rich first,”has resulted in spectacular economic growth along with
rampant official corruption, widening income disparity, growing social unrest. Under
such circumstances, democratization is no longer a goal that can be suppressed and
political reform has become much more urgent than ever before. In the words of then
Premier Wen Jiabao, without political reform, such issues as income inequality, loss of
faith in the political system, and corruption could trigger “historical tragedies”like the
Cultural Revolution again [28]. China’s growing interactions with the outside world,
particularly with the West, also promoted a more liberalizing intellectual environment
within China. The market-oriented reform started three decades ago has engendered
intense debates among the Chinese intellectuals and Chinese society is increasingly
diversified. Most China watchers agree that the Chinese intellectuals of the twenty-first
century could be primarily grouped into two camps: liberalism and New-Leftism
[29–31].
Ideas on democracy are rapidly exchanged among netzines as the Internet offers a
major venue for China’s political, ideological, and intellectual debates. In the words of
Kang Liu, “Chinese academic journals of social sciences and humanities, mostly run by
university presses, are under double pressure of censorship and professionalization and
have become largely the venues for professional and career advancement of the
Chinese academics, who usually avoid any political sensitive topics in their writings
for these journals. The Internet thus provides a low-cost, efficient, and relatively
censorship-free forum for intellectual debates”[32]. This paper analyzes the on-gong
heated debates on democracy. It reviews the main structure, characteristics, and impli-
cations of the debates on democracy among three major schools of thought, namely:
democracy with Chinese characteristics, liberalism, and New-Leftism (Table 1).
Democracy with Chinese Characteristics
As China continues to transform itself, many assume that the nation will eventually
move beyond communism and adopt a Western-style democracy. Could China develop
a unique form of government based on its own distinct characteristics (guoqing,
China’s national conditions)? A number of Chinese scholars say yes. Zhang Mingshu,
Chinese Intellectual Discourse on Democracy 291
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a political scientist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences suggests that China’s
political culture is based on ethics, unlike the Western one, which is based on scientism.
That’s the basis of what kind of democracy China wants [33]. Democracy has been on
China’s political reform agenda in recent years although the concept is interpreted “with
Chinese characteristics.”Deng himself drew on Mao’s language of Chinese Marxism in
formulating “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”The concept of democracy with
Chinese characteristics was developed after socialism with Chinese characteristics [34,
35]. Under the influence of the CCP, the theory of democracy with Chinese character-
istics has emerged as a main trend among the Chinese intellectuals as they debate what
kind of democracy China should pursue.
Tab l e 1 Chinese discourse on democracy
Criteria New Leftism Liberalism Democracy with Chinese
characteristics
Cui Zhiyuan, Wang Hui,
Wang Shaoguan,
Li Shenzhi, Liu Junning, Mao
Yu s hi
Li Junru, Yu Keping
Theoretical
roots
Neo-Marxism/Maoism
dependen cy theory
Classical liberalism Deng Xiaoping’sTheory
Checks and
balances
Mass movement
Grand democracy
(Maoist daminzhu,
exercised during the
Cultural Revolution)
Constitutional democracy
Independent judiciary
Competitive and fair election
Freedom of assembly and
speech
Intra-party democracy
Age and term limit for the
top leadership
Deliberative democracy
Rule of law China can and should
establish rule of law
without Western style
democracy
Constitutionalism, the Party
should conduct its
activities within the
bounds of the law and the
Constitution
Rule by law (fazhi)
including democratic
decision making and
protecting the four
democratic rights of
knowledge, participation,
expression, and
supervision
Party system Criticizes the direction of the
Communist Party and
argues that China has
movedawayfromthepath
under Mao
Multi-party competition but
avoid mentioning
opposition parties
One-party democracy
Multi-party cooperation led
by the CCP rather than
multi-party competition
Emphasis Collective interests/national
interests
Individual rights
Freedom of speech
Freedom of assembly
Good Governance
Supremacy of public interest
Incremental political reform
Attitude toward
liberal
democracy
Negative Embrace it as China’s future
political system
Not suitable for China
Representation/
deliberation
Mass participation Representative democracy Democratic centralism
Participation All have an equal say in the
decisions that affect their
lives
Voting and universal suffrage Local election
Indirect election
Source:Compiledbyauthor.
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The Party is pursuing “democracy with Chinese characteristics”primarily to
address the socioeconomic and political challenges that have emerged in the
course of China’s modernization, including a widening income gap, increasing
regional disparities, corruption, environmental degradation, and rising demand for
public goods amid the state’s decreased ability to supply them, as well as the
social unrest these problems have helped spark. These challenges threaten the
realization of China’s development goals upon which the CCP’s legitimacy now
largely rests, and as such, political reforms are ultimately aimed at retaining the
Party’s ruling status [36].
As a result of globalization, China has certainly learned a great deal about the
democratic procedure in the West. According to Ye Zicheng, a professor at Peking
University’s School of International Studies, to “strengthen its international influence
and attractiveness,”its “soft power,”China should “implement Eastern-style socialist
democracy with Chinese characteristics”[37]. This claim is significant because it
reveals Chinese recognition that democracy is a widely respected global norm to which
China must at least adapt if it is to prevail in the great competitions of global politics. In
various speeches, then Premier Wen Jiabao stressed that the universal value of democ-
racy transcends capitalism, socialism, and classes. However, there is no sign indicating
that China is going to import and practice liberal democracy from the West. China has
followed its own way in building a unique political system [38]. Nonetheless, this
doesn’t mean that China will refuse to borrow ideas from the West about political
democracy or even other areas. Current Chinese leaders who are pragmatically orient-
ed, will certainly take in ideas that they think can benefit China in its enterprise of
political reform [39].
The Chinese regime claims to be a Chinese form of democracy on the grounds that it
serves the people and rules in their interest, and a majority of Chinese citizens today
accept that claim [40]. Beijing repeats its own rhetoric of political reform and self-
praises its “Chinese democracy.”Although the basic guideline for building “democracy
with Chinese characteristics”was outlined in the White Paper in 2005 [41], it remains
very much a work in progress and the subject of fierce debate both inside and outside
the CCP [42]. For example, He Zengke suggests a “mixed democracy”composed of
“electoral, consultative, and liberal democracy”as the preferred democratic model for
China [43]. Li Junru divides democracy into three categories: “electoral, deliberative,
and consultative,”and argues that Chinese-style democracy is an organic combination
of the three [44].
The proponents of the China model call for a Chinese model of democracy
basedonChina’s own experiences, which differ significantly from Western coun-
tries. They stress that democracy is the result of progress in human civilization and
that China should become a rich, democratic, civilized, and harmonious nation.
They argue that, although the Western model of liberal democracy based on
political equality is a dominant force, there is no universal model of democracy
and, therefore, it is necessary to develop a model suitable to each individual
nation. In choosing a model of democracy, it is also necessary to take country’s
internal factors into account, such as economic development and historical and
cultural background. They strongly believe this path, rather than the blind pursuit
of electoral democracy, may be more successful in achieving social stability,
economic growth, and even, in the long run, political democratization.
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Beijing recognizes the universal value of democracy, yet it emphasizes that China
should create a Chinese-style model of democracy different from that of the West,
based on China’s own history and current reality. The simultaneous emphasis on both
the universality and peculiarity of democracy is repeated in another White Paper on
Chinese politics, The Chinese Political Party System in 2007. General speaking,
democracy with Chinese characteristics is distinguishable from liberal democracy in
the following respects: intra-party democracy, promoting democracy through good
governance, one-party democracy, rule by law (fazhi), and deliberative democracy.
Intra-Party Democracy
A growing number of pragmatic reformers believe that to enhance the legitimacy of the
regime intra-party democracy and the separation of party and government must be
implemented as the starting point for democratic transition [45]. Yu Keping, one of
China’s most prominent political scholars, states “to rule the country by law we must
first rule the Party by law.”Gao Fang, a professor at the Renmin University, has long
campaigned for the so-called three democracies i.e., intra-party democracy within the
CCP (dangnei minzhu), people’sdemocracy(renmin minzhu), and inter-party democ-
racy among the CCP and the eight satellite parties (dangjian minzhu)[46].
It is understandable that Chinese elites and the public alike are now inclined to
pursue political reforms in a way that is incremental over time and manageable in scale
[47]. Some intellectuals also believe democracy will lead to chaos, or even the
dissolution of the country, they have no immediate incentive to embrace it.
3
Lee Kuan
Yew, the founder of modern Singapore once said that China is not going to become a
liberal democracy; if it did, it would collapse [49]. Many Chinese scholars in this camp
share the same concern. From this perspective, China must develop democracy through
a gradual and orderly process. The greatest intellectual challenge for liberal-minded
Chinese leaders and scholars is to make democracy conceptually and procedurally safe
for China. For many of them, intra-party democracy is the best path to China’s political
transformation [50]. Yu Keping’s article in 2006 offered a vision of gradual, incremen-
tal democratization with Chinese characteristics [51]. Scholars at the Party School of
the Central Committee of the CCP developed this line of thinking further. They
published a book titled “Research Report on Political Reform in China”in October
2007. In the book, they suggest China work toward a low level of democracy by 2020,
a middle level of democratic development between 2020 and 2040, and an advanced
level of democracy between 2041 and 2060.
4
Some scholars call for realizing intra-party democratization and then spreading the
process outside the party, given the obstacles in China to a multi-party democratic
system, intra-party democracy is not likely to translate into a broad political movement,
but remain only a device for the party itself. It should be pointed out that liberal
scholars doubt that intra-party democracy will lead to liberal democracy. The Beijing
leadership has made it clear that Chinese-style democracy should be achieved under the
CCP leadership in a stable and gradual way, with intra-party democratization spreading
gradually to the broader civic society. For intra-party democracy, it is necessary to
3
For a more detailed discussion of this argument, see Cheng Li [48].
4
Quoted in Jung Nam Lee [52].
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democratize and systemize the party’srulingsystembyimprovingthepartyleadership
process, introducing various kinds of democratic systems within the party, and estab-
lishing a system of intra-party supervision. All of these changes involve improving the
party’s governance system.
Promoting Democracy Through Good Governance
Broadly defined, “good governance”is about the “exercise of economic, political and
administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels,”with special
consideration for such good universal norms and practices as participation, rule of
law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity, effectiveness and
efficiency, accountability and strategic vision.
5
There is some consensus among
Chinese scholars that good governance is crucial for the establishment of a functioning
democracy.
Chinese scholars in this camp hold that China should promote democracy through
good governance not via direct national election. With this in mind, an increasing
number of scholars are paying attention to the importance of the rule of law and good
governance rather than focusing electoral democracy. In the words of Yu Keping, “We
must innovate social management and at the same time prioritize the self-governance of
society, mutual governance by the government and the people is the basic path to good
governance”[53].
Over the past two decades, the Chinese government has experimented with democ-
ratization in local governance. Facing rising tensions between citizens and local
government, growing demand for better public services and worsening local corrup-
tion, Beijing hopes that introducing democratic reforms at the local level can improve
the quality of governance and help renew the legitimacy of the Chinese political
system. In addition, the party is paying more attention to what the public thinks of
high-ranking officials. In 2003, it issued rules requiring that polls be used in evaluating
officials for promotion. The Politburo has established informal rules, including term
limits and retirement ages, that govern appointments to top jobs, helping restrain power
struggles among senior leaders. Dictatorship of the proletariat has disappeared from the
official discourse.
While China has carried out direct elections of people’s deputies to county-level
people’s congresses for more than two decades, there is no timetable for the introduc-
tion of popular election at the provincial level. Even if it indeed takes place in the near
future, it may take another two or three decades to perfect it before a popular national
election of the National People’s Congress (NPC) can be put on the agenda. It is still far
from certain that the CCP will be willing to accept the outcome of elections such as
being defeated at the polls. After all, China is still a party-state with a constitutional
guarantee of the ruling party status of the CCP. In his report at the 18th Party Congress,
Hu Jintao called for strengthening “Party’s governance capacity,”he proposes “socialist
democracy”and not “liberal democracy.”Against this political environment, a practical
approach to advance China’s political reform may lie in the promotion of good
governance rather than electoral reform [54].
5
UNDP Report, Governance for Sustainable Human Development (1997).
Chinese Intellectual Discourse on Democracy 295
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Single-Party Democracy
China has never been a multi-party democracy.
6
The CCP has been fine-tuning its rule
to make sure things stay that way. Beijing has been studying the model of governance
of other countries closely so as to avoid the downfall of other great powers, such as the
former Soviet Union. There is little evidence to show that the CCP look at multi-party
democracy as a value. One party-system has been of great interest to the CCP, and
almost every major party in the world has been examined in some depth [56]. Chinese
analysis of Singapore also evince admiration of Singapore’s clean and efficient gov-
ernment, social order, rule of law, moral education, higher education, and high level of
technological development [57].
Zhao Jianying, a scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences contends that
“the liberal tide of thought is in reality just Westcentrism, regarding Western values as
the only reasonable and universal values”[58]. The Chinese government and Party
leaders seek to strategically use methods such as political consultation with selected
non-Party groups and individuals, and institutions such as the Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). These are aimed at addressing mounting
social unrest and popular grievances by creating additional channels for political
participation, but without compromising on core principles of one-Party control. As
Andrew Nathan pointed out recently, “the regime likes to talk about making itself more
democratic, installing the rule of law, and promoting human rights. The apparent goal is
to build a form of one-party rule that people will accept as responsive and legitimate”
[59].
Rule by Law (Fazhi)
The concept of the rule of law originated and developed within the framework of
market-based economic systems. For many, the notion of the rule of law is associated
with liberal democratic political regimes. However, after much debate, and many public
speeches by the Beijing leadership, China enacted in 1999 a Constitutional amendment
making a reference to a concept akin to that of the rule of law. Since 1978, China’s
official discourse on legal development has also evolved in several stages—from a
requirement “to strengthen socialist democracy and the legal system”(jiaqiang
shehuizhuyi minzhu he fazhi) to the need to “administer the state according to law to
build a socialist country based on the rule of law”yifa zhiguo,jianli shehuizhuyi fazhi
guojia). Later, Jiang Zemin’scallfor“combining the rule of law with rule of virtue”
(yifa zhiguo yu yide zhiguo xiang-jiehe) was complemented by Hu Jintao’sideaof
“building a harmonious society”(jianli hexie shehui), emphasizing fairness and justice
through enforcing the rule of law [60,61].
In 2007, Hu Jintao called for the implementation of rule by law, including extending
democratic election, democratic decision making, democratic management, and dem-
ocratic supervision and protecting the four democratic rights of knowledge, participa-
tion, expression, and supervision. However the Party has not embraced liberal idea of
freedom of expression and freedom of speech, instead Hu Jintao formulated so-called
6
For a detailed study on the subject, see Brantly Womack [55].
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“four rights,”namely, the right to know, right to participate, right to express, and right
to monitor.
In the Chinese language, fazhi which can be translated as both “rule of law”and
“rule by law.”In a recent paper by scholars from the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences (CASS), the authors argue that “the rule of law means that the people exercise
their right to administer the affairs of state, economic and cultural affairs and social
affairs through various means under the leadership of the CCP and in accordance with
the Constitution and the law, ensuring that the affairs of state are administered in
accordance with the law and gradually institutionalizing and building the legal frame-
work for socialist democracy. The rule of law is characterized by stability, standardi-
zation and continuity [62]. It is clear that in the official discourse, fazhi is not the same
as the rule of law. As Tony Saich notes, when the CCP uses the phrase “rule of law,”it
does not mean a system that gives primacy to law above political considerations and
Party policy. Instead, it is a way of managing power, regulating the economy, and
disciplining society in the light of rapidly changing circumstances [63]. By emphasiz-
ing “Chinese characteristics”the CCP leadership has repeatedly rejected a Western
liberal democratic concept of rule of law as a bourgeois ideology, contrary to socialism
and a socialist legal system because it requires the separation of major state powers and
the supremacy of the law.
Constitutionalism appeared in China considerably early on, as the banner of the
political reform launched by the late Qing dynasty. However, like other political ideas,
it was banned during the Mao era, but reappeared when the reform-oriented leaders
revised the constitution. In the 1990s, it became a key term used in the liberal discourse
because it not only embodied the liberal political idea, but was also accepted by the
authorities. Thus, constitutionalism was a concept that was acceptable to all major
political forces. For the authorities, constitutionalism meant rule by law, but for the
liberals, it referred to a political system with checks and balances and the Party should
be under the law.
Deliberative Democracy
7
The Chinese debates on democratic theories in general and liberal democracy in
particular concern whether democracy is a good thing for China, and whether China
can find an alternative (such as deliberative democracy) to liberal democracy featured
by electoral politics.
8
In today’s China, various ideas of democracy including deliber-
ative democracy are getting more and more influential compared with liberal democ-
racy. Deliberative democracy has been regarded as a possible model for China’s
democracy by some officials and scholars. The concept of deliberative democracy
was created in the West. Ironically, deliberative democracy spread faster and wider in
China. Instead of plunging itself straight into an instant democracy solution, deliberate
democracy is placing strong emphasis on improving governance and operational
efficiency of its governmental system.
A number of Chinese scholars want to replace conventional competitive democracy
with deliberative democracy. They claim that this is what the Chinese government has
7
Also referred to as participatory democracy and consultative democracy.
8
For detailed study on the subject, see [64,65].
Chinese Intellectual Discourse on Democracy 297
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been doing since 1949, for instance through the institution of the Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Conference, Villager’s Self-Administration in rural China, and so
on [66]. Li Junru, former vice president of the Central Party School, insists that China
can simply strengthen the existing mechanisms of deliberative consultation to serve as a
breakthrough point for China’s political reform, together with the implementation of
intra-party democracy [67]. It is true that the CPPCC shares some elements of
deliberative democracy, but significant changes have to be made in order to qualify
the system as a true form of deliberative democracy [68].
Li Junru’s argument was challenged by the liberal scholars. In the word of Li
Fan, head of the World and China Institute based in Beijing, deliberative democ-
racy has great significance since it helps the public delve deeper into issues to gain
a better understanding and make more informed choices in elections. However,
party leaders are opposed to popular elections, government officials and political
commentators have been advocating the use of deliberative democracy to replace
elections. Moreover, policymakers believe that since deliberative democracy has
long been established in China, elections would be unnecessary [69]. In addition,
the liberal scholars consider China’s deliberative democracy mainly practices in
micro and regional level.
In the words of Hu Wei, “Besides the grassroots democratic autonomy in the rural
and urban communities, some other kinds of direct democracy have also emerged in
recent years. Some leaders and scholars emphasize the importance of citizens’direct
participation in public affairs and policy-making through public hearings, participatory
budgeteering (open discussion on local public budgets), Internet discussions, etc. In
particular, cyberdemocracy has developed quite rapidly and become prevailing com-
pared with other forms of democracy in China, even exceeding its development in
Western democracies to some extent. This is mainly because there are hardly any other
effective channels for citizens to articulate their interests except for the Internet in
China. More and more Chinese people prefer to use the Internet as means to express
their opinions on public affairs, to influence public policy, and to oversee public
officials. With the greatest population of netizens in the world, China’s cyberdemocracy
is developing ahead of representative democracy, welcome by most Chinese people and
regarded as a new form of socialist democracy. Although for most scholars,
cyberdemocracy does not necessarily challenge the prudence of representative democ-
racy, some intellectuals consider it to be an alternative to representative democracy”
[70].
The popularity of deliberative democracy in China is partly attributable to the
Chinese advocacy of political consultations between the ruling party and other political
actors which bears certain resemblance to the idea of Western deliberative democracy.
Although the Chinese practice of political consultation has a different implication from
the Western idea of democratic deliberation, in Chinese language the term “consulta-
tion”(xieshang) shares the same characters as “deliberation.”Consequently, “consul-
tative democracy”in Chinese (xieshang minzhu) becomes an equivalent for “deliber-
ative democracy”in English, thus blurring the nuance between the two key words.
Within this linguistic context, some Chinese scholars further argue that Western style
democracy is traditionally characterized by electoral democracy; whereas Chinese
democracy is traditionally characterized by deliberative democracy (actually consulta-
tive democracy) since China has already established the CPPCC system, which
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symbolizes the characteristics of Chinese democracy or the Chinese model of
democracy.
Other scholars put forward that deliberative democracy and liberal democracy can
support each other. This perspective is endorsed by the White Paper on China’sParty
System issued by the Chinese government in 2007, which recognizes the importance of
both electoral democracy and deliberative democracy. Furthermore, some scholars
consider the two main Chinese political institutions—People’sCongressandPeople’s
Political Consultative Conference—as examples of electoral democracy and delibera-
tive democracy respectively. In addition, there are also eye-catching experiments on the
very sense of “deliberative democracy”in a few Chinese grassroots communities (such
as the democratic discussion meetings in Wenling, Zhejiang Province). Other forms of
community discussion council and public forum have been created as well.
9
It is worthwhile to point out the significant differences between political consultation
in China’s context and deliberative democracy in the Western setting. The discourse on
deliberative democracy was initiated and promoted mainly by the scholars from the
Central Compilation and Translation Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party Central
Committee. Clearly, Beijing remains reluctant to commit itself to democratization. It
just tries to use deliberative democracy and good governance (governing competence
and accountability) to replace electoral democracy. But question remains: will deliber-
ative democracy lead to the government of the people?
The Chinese experience seems to challenge the “democracy is good for develop-
ment”camp [71]. Though market reform launched by Deng in the late 1970s, has
tendency to contradict and weaken communist regime, many analysts see a new model
developing in China: authoritarian state capitalism that delivers rapid growth with
stability.
10
Scholars and reform-oriented policymakers in this camp advocate political
liberalization not liberal democracy. While there is much to dispute about Chinese-style
democracy and it is difficult to predict whether it will succeed over the long term, it is
clear that, for the foreseeable future, the CCP will lead China’s political reform, which
will remain largely instrumental, incremental, and idiosyncratic. If all goes according to
the Party’s plan, in the coming decades the United States is likely to encounter a
“democratic”China that resembles its East Asian neighbor Singapore more closely than
any Western liberal democracy [77]. Unlike their overseas colleagues, mainstream or
establishment scholars are subject to political and ideological constraints in their
debates. They have failed to take note of the dominant role of one-party in an
undemocratic society and it is by no means easy for them to go beyond the official line.
In fact, some of their arguments suit China’s leadership strategies. In the post-Deng
era, both official discourse and policy sustained this conception of democracy with
Chinese characteristics. In sharp contrast, an increasing number of liberal-minded
scholars contend that China is still far from being a rule-of-law society. In his speech
at Harvard University in May 2013, Zhou Zhixin considers that the Party leadership
wants to make cosmetic changes of the existing system to gain time to launch
fundamental transformation in the future.
11
In short, we should not expect democracy
9
For detailed discussion on the Chinese discourse on deliberative democracy, see http://21ccom.net/special/
xieshangminzhu/#top and Hu Wei, “Understanding Democracy in China: An Overview.”
10
Huge volume of literature has accumulated on this subject. For some prominent work, see [72–76].
11
Zhou Zhixin, speech delivered at the Harvard University on May 2, 2013, available at http://www.21ccom.
net/articles/sxwh/shsc/article_2013051583418.html.
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with Chinese characteristics which is mostly concerned about maintenance of the
CCP’s rule, to help democratization in the foreseeable future.
Liberal Discourse on Democracy
Liberalism has had a long history in China. Although poorly understood and inade-
quately diffused before the market reform of the late 1970s, in the past three decades
liberalism has become an important ideology among the Chinese intellectual circles and
a liberal camp was established in China in the late 1990s [78,79]. A recent study of
youth attitudes prepared by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) found
that more than 61 % identified with liberalism and believed it to be a concept of
universal moral significance, despite the fact, as the surveyors put it, that everyone
knows liberalism is a part of Western political thought and constitutes the basis of the
“democratic system”associated with Western capitalism. In like manner, the surveyors
were dismayed to find that close to 36 % of respondents endorsed the concept of
“separation of powers”associated with the Western political and legal systems, while
more than 20 % said that they were “uncertain”as to whether they endorsed it; only
44 % expressed opposition to the concept [80]. China’s liberal school is featured by
publicly active scholars such as Liu Junning, Qin Hui, Zhu Xueqing, and Xu Yuoyu
[81,82]. Unlike “establishment intellectuals”who were mainly state servants under
Mao, today’s liberal scholars are “critical intellectuals.”In Western parlance, they could
be called public intellectuals, intellectuals who speak out publicly on political issues.
The major objectives of the Chinese liberal intellectuals are summarized in Charter
08 (08 xianzhang) which was signed by more than 9,000 Chinese citizens from all
works of life before the party completely shut down the Charter 08 website in mid-
January 2009.
12
Political reform appears most urgent to the Chinese liberals. They hold
that without political reform, equity and social justice are impossible. Proponents of
Chinese liberalism believe that economic reform can only breed crony capitalism if the
liberal democratic system is not adopted. In the past three decades, many books on
Western liberal thought were translated into Chinese. Although scholarly writings on
democracy on liberal democracy are certainly unfamiliar to most Chinese today, they
are familiar to the intellectual elites who in turn often frame the national debate [83].
The following sections will examine the major arguments of the Chinese liberals on
democracy.
Liberal Democracy is the Best Available Form of Government
Democracy is a central concern of the Chinese liberals. The liberal theorists advocate
liberalism as an alternative to the established Marxist ideology. The liberals are
convinced moreover, that liberalism is the only and the best path that Chinese moder-
nity could take and liberal democracy the best available form of government. Li
Shenzhi, a leading thinker of liberalism and former vice-president of the Chinese
12
Liu Xiaobo, a leading liberal scholar and recipient of Nobel Peace Prize, was detained because of his
participation with the Charter 08 manifesto. He was sentenced to eleven years’imprisonment and two years’
deprivation of political rights in December 2009.
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Academy of Social Sciences, wrote his famous statement: “After 300 years of com-
parison and selection in the whole world since the age of industrialization, and
particularly after more than 100 years of Chinese experimentation, the largest in scale
in human history, there is sufficient evidence to prove that liberalism is the best and
universal value”[84].
The scholars from the liberal camp establish their own positions by studying
liberal ideas of the West and by appealing to their considered convictions about
the political and social realities of contemporary China. By studying Western
liberal theories, they are persuaded by the moral desirability of liberal ideals. By
reflecting on reality, they believe that according to liberal criteria there are great
political and social injustices in the present system. They use liberal conceptual
schemes to criticize the existing political and social realities and propose changes
to overcome their faults.
The liberals believe that the CCP already faced a legitimacy crisis advocate
expanding direct elections and widening rights for citizens. As a result, the question
of constitutional democracy occupies more and more of their attention. It was against
this background that they call for constitutional democracy, with all of its standard
features such as general elections, multi-party competition, safeguards of human rights,
and checks and balances of power between legislative, executive and judiciary
branches went out. To them, multi-party democracy is not only the only way out for
China, but also the only way to save and regenerate the CCP. In the minds of liberal
scholars, multi-party competition is a bedrock feature of democracy [85].
Liberal intellectuals share with Western democracy theorists the belief that electoral
democracy provides regime legitimacy [86]. For them, electoral democracy, though not
a sufficient condition for representative democracy, is the necessary condition for
democracy [87]. They argue that legitimate political power derives from the democratic
principle of popular sovereignty, as expressed through free and fair election. For
instance, following the standoff between the authorities and villagers of Wukan in
Guangdong Province, Lin Zuluan, protest leader, was named the new Communist Party
secretary of Wukan. As part of the truce with authorities, Wang Yang, the then Party
Secretary of Guandong Province, acquiesced to a village election in Wukan: the first of
its kind to employ a secret ballot [88].
In December 2012, more than 70 prominent Chinese scholars and lawyers have
urged the country’s Communist Party leaders to undertake moderate political reforms
including separating the party from government, though they avoid any mention of
ending one-party rule. The petition drafted by Peking University law professor Zhang
Qianfan calls on the party to rule according to the constitution, protect freedom of
speech, encourage private enterprise and allow for an independent judicial system. It
also calls for the people to be able to elect their own representatives without interfer-
ence from the Communist Party.
The liberal thinkers become ever more convinced that political reform is truly
indispensable to any successful economic reform. As Li Shenzhi put it, “China’s
implementation of political reform will clearly determine the ultimate success or failure
of its economic reform. A mere open door to the outside world is not enough, or even
genuine without of a domestic opening. Domestically, the door should also be open to
all spheres: the economy, politics, society, culture, media, freedom of speech, freedom
association, etc. Only by doing so can China make true progress”[89].
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China’s liberal thinkers are firmly convinced of intrinsic value of liberal democracy.
Intellectuals with liberal inclinations contend that democracy is a general political
civilization which all countries should embrace. They see concepts such as human
rights not a Western value, but a universal value. They favor a “complete and thorough
globalization and promote the concept of “universal values”(quanqiu jiazhi). Accord-
ing to the liberals, in today’s world, globalization is gaining momentum. Under the
prevailing circumstances, China cannot, and should not, embark on its own road to
modernization. They believe that liberalism, now rejuvenating in the country, will bring
freedom to China and lead a free China into a world of globalization. The liberals think
that the ideal model has already been established by developed countries, and China’s
reform should merely replicate Western development patterns.
Rule of the Law
The 1990s witnessed a robust debate between “rule of law”and “rule by law.”The
liberals argue that China needs the rule of law rather than the arbitrary whims of party
officials. According to the Chinese liberals, the so-called “socialist legality”is at best
“rule by law,”in which the law is used by the party-state as an instrument to control
society, while the Party itself exercises its power above the law and is not subject to the
law. Since then, tremendous efforts have been made by the Chinese liberals to promote
the concept of “rule of law,”in which everyone, the government officials in particular,
is subject to the law, and government power is limited by law, with the result that
individual rights are effectively protected by the law against the abuse of the govern-
ment in particular. It was in the process of this debate that the concept of constitutional
government (xianzheng) was revived and incorporated into the common vocabulary of
formal publications in China”[90]. The liberal scholars believe that democracy is the
best political system, and constitutional government as the initial step. In 2003, when
the Chinese Constitution was undergoing a major revision, participants in both official
and unofficial conferences on constitutional revision called for replacing the concept of
renmin minzhu zhuanzheng (people’s democratic dictatorship) in the Constitution with
the concept of renmin minzhu xianzheng (people’s democratic constitutional rule).
Limited Government
The liberals strongly criticize the political corruption and argue that the main cause for
corruption is the lack of a real market and checks and balances. They do not criticize
the marketization that has been initially stimulated by the state, but they begin to
question the assumption that state-fostered marketization will generate a healthy
market. As a consequence, they propose to expel political power from the market by
deepening economic reform and by initiating political reform. As for political reform,
the liberals are anxious to promote liberal ideas such as the rule of law, the mechanism
of checks and balances, the constitutional protection of private ownership rights and the
establishment of basic individual liberties. In promoting the separation of the state from
the market, fair opportunities for individuals and individual liberties protected by
further political reform, the liberals believe that through the gradual solution of the
problem of corruption, the income gap between the advantaged and disadvantaged will
be narrowed [91].
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Faster and Deeper Political Reform
The liberals claim that the reform in China is a halfway reform, and that the Deng
Xiaoping’s theory, which stresses the importance of strengthening both the spiritual
strength of society and its material growth through socialist principles, has badly
hampered the development of Chinese society [92]. The liberals maintain that Western
democracy is the model to be followed in China. Many liberals associate democracy
with modernity and seek to join the modern world. In the words of Li Shenzhi,
“modernization means Americanization.”
13
It is not surprising that in the cyber world,
the liberals were often bashed as member of dailudang (traitors who betray their
country by providing directions to foreign invaders).
14
On the other hand, the New
Leftists are often called as members of wumaodang or the 50 Cent Party (Internet
commentators hired by the government).
The arguments and positions of the liberals are not uniform. Slightly different and
apparently more radical form of liberalism wishes to make Western democracy and
capitalism a good model. It should be noted, even many reformers are nervous about
granting too much power to rural people, whom they view as backward and pro-
authoritarian. Yao Yang, a well-known economist, holds that the Chinese path of
democratization looks very much like the paths experienced by most mature Western
democracies, that is, it is a process controlled by the elites [93].
The Chinese leadership is facing serve challenges. For instance, the then President
Hu warned the party at his opening speech at the 18th Party Congress that official
corruption had become so serious that, if not tackled, it could “cause the collapse of the
party and the fall of the state.”Alexis de Tocqueville, the nineteenth century French
historian, has enjoyed great popularity among China’s political and economic elites
over the past 20 years. Vice Premier Wang Qishan is a Tocqueville fan and has
recommended the book to his associates. Tocqueville’s ideas of equality and civil
society appeal to the liberals, his ideas are shared by a large number of Chinese
scholars.
At present, the liberal intellectuals are rarely able to go beyond aspirations, inspira-
tion, and persuasion in their programs of political change. According to a recent survey,
some 38.1 % of those surveyed held more conservative values, were more critical of
overall individualism and leaned towards the “left,”atermthatcommonlyrefersto
those more patriotic, according to the study by scholar Zhang Mingshu, a scholar at
Institute of Political Science at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). Only
8 % leaned to the “right,”supporting more individual freedoms and a smaller govern-
ment, and were more critical towards the Communist Party’slegacy.Therestofthose
polled were categorized as centrists, neither left nor right [94].
There is little doubt that most liberal scholars want a Western-style democracy to be
China’s future political system. Generally speaking, although the liberal thinkers played
a very important role during the market oriented reform, their political reform agenda is
not considered viable and usually discredited. In the words of Deng Xiaoping,
13
Huainian Li Shenzhi [In Commemoration of Li Shenzhi], 2 vols. Published unofficially in January 2006,
339.
14
Zhu, Zhixin. Speech delivered at the Harvard University on May 2, 2013. Available at http://www.21ccom.
net/articles/sxwh/shsc/article_2013051583418.html.
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development is the priority. For many in China, at the present time they choose
economic development over democracy. In the minds of establishment intellectuals
and policy makers in Beijing, the liberals merely echo Western ideas or repeating
Western concepts without deep understanding reality of China.
New Left (Xinzuopai)
Though there is no lack of advocates of liberal democracy in the Chinese intellectual
circle, more and more criticisms of liberal democracy have emerged in contemporary
China, conceived even as a wave of antidemocratic ideology in a general sense. It is
worth noting that from the mid-1990s, a New Left position has emerged, calling for
critical rethinking of the revolutionary legacy and democratizing innovation in eco-
nomic and political institutions.
15
The Chinese New Left is a term used to distinguish it
from the Old Left, who are diehard Maoists. Many New Left scholars refused to be
designated as “New Left.”They prefer to be called the “liberal left,”since the left has a
notorious reputation in China because it reminds people of the Left during the Cultural
Revolution.
The New Left is a loose grouping of intellectuals who are capturing the public mood
and setting the tone for political debates through their articles in journals and cyber-
space. Wang Hui, Cui Zhiyuan, Gan Yang, and Wang Shaoguang are among the
leading New Left scholars. A large number of the New Left received their higher
education in the West. Some of them are still based outside mainland China. New Left
scholars are heavily influenced by neo-Marxism and dependency theories [95]. They
criticize the direction of the Communist Party and argue that China has moved away
from the socialist path under Mao. New Leftism appeals much more to workers and
peasants than to professionals and entrepreneurs [96].
Chinese New Leftism is different from its counterpart in the West in style, idea, and
content. It has been much less friendly to liberal democracy and capitalism. Indeed,
some have been sharply critical of market economics and wary of liberal democracy.
They consider the reform in China to be essentially one step away from the socialist
model. They believe that today’s social problems are rooted in the excesses of
capitalism [97]. The liberal critics and Chinese New Leftists have fiercely debated
since the early 1990s.
16
According to Xue Yue, at the heart of their debate is the conflict
between liberal representative democracy, which is favored by the liberals; and con-
ceptions of direct democracy, advocated by the New Left [98]. Politically, the New Left
scholars are skeptical of liberal democracy, favor to use state power to address the
problems that China faces today, and distrust human rights as universal value. New Left
discourse on democracy focuses following major arguments: Liberal democracy does
not suit China, government is a necessary virtue, Marxism not human rights as an
universal value, integration of three traditions (Confucianism, the traditions of Mao
Zedong and Deng Xiaoping).
15
Leftism is used in a different sense from the currently popular usage in the West. In China, New Leftists are
more like conservatists, they oppose the policy of market-oriented reform and liberal democracy.
16
The New Leftists have labeled the liberals as rightists.
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Skeptical View of Liberal Democracy
From the perspective of the liberals, open and fair elections are the bottom line of
democracy, though it may be insufficient or unachievable without the support of other
favorable conditions. Unlike liberals, New Leftists, refuse to invoke the Western liberal
ideas and conceptual schemes to interpret the Chinese experience. From the point of
view of the New Left, electoral democracy is full of deficiencies and flaws and election
is not the solution to China’s problem. In the words of Wang Shaoguang, a well-known
New Left thinker, lottery (or random selection) might be a better option to get people
elected [99].
In an op-ed published in the People’sDailyoverseas edition on July 19, 2013, Hu
Angang, a leading member of the “New Left,”argued that compared with the civil
society in the West, the people’s society is superior and the party’s style of government
was better because it was homegrown and “fits China’s basic national conditions
better.”In an article published on the front page of the People’s Daily,HuAngang
called China’s Politburo Standing Committee a “collective presidential system with
Chinese characteristics,”as opposed to the “Western individual presidential system.”
After elaborating on the merits of the two, he concludes that the former is superior.
China is too big and too complex for the Western “bipartisan system, tripartite system,
presidential system and bicameral system,”which are “too simplistic, too limited and
too defective.”A collective presidential system, with multiple leaders heading different
leading state organs, not only guarantees a wider consensus “through sharing of
decision-making wisdom and expertise,”but also “prevents an individual from making
decisions on major issues and allows timely correction of mistakes”[100].
Pan Wei, Peking University professor, argues that China is currently underdeveloped
politically and he also rejects democracy as the solution. Pan dismisses democracy as
foolishly fashionable and utopian. Thinking things through makes clear that democra-
tization would damage China severely. It certainly has damaged other developing
countries. Pan insists that “The great democratization wave of the past 20 years has
not brought developing countries prosperity and progress.”
17
Wang Shaoguang defines democracy as “a combination of responsibility, respon-
siveness, and accountability”[102]. He claims that only when political reform is no
longer solely equated with competitive elections can the true nature of political change
in China come to light.”
18
Wang asserts that Western style democracy has failed and
become a so-called electocracy (rule by elections). That electocracy reduces the role of
citizens to a series of discrete choice points, often shifting the actual moment of choice
to the politicians. Influenced by the Western mainstream ideology, many people believe
that the sole criterion for classifying political systems is whether competitive election
exists.
Wang suggests that perhaps political systems could also be classified by their
learning/adaptive capacity. Strong learning/adaptive capacity seems to have little to
do with competitive election. Based on this alternative criterion, the Chinese political
system belongs to the category of high adaptive capacity while many boisterous
electocracies can only fall to the category of low adaptive capacity. As Wang put it
17
Quoted in Daniel C. Lynch [101].
18
Ibid.
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frankly, adaptive capacity is perhaps more important than anything else. Without
adaptive capacity, a rich country will become poor and a strong country will become
weak; with adaptive capacity, a poor, backward and unequal country can jump unto a
trajectory of prosperity and happiness. During the past 60 years, China has made its
way through turbulent uncharted waters with reefs and dangers lurking on all sides. In
the future, China will continue to make its way towards socialism through volitional
learning and adapting [103]. Cui Zhiyuan, a New Left scholar, notes that progressive
forces in China should not imitate social democratic practices pursued in Western
Europe. Instead, Cui argues for labor-capital partnerships and social dividends paid
to all citizens according to age and family status [104]. Debate now often centers on
whether Western-style democracy is right for China or whether a “third way”for
political reform can be found [105].
Government is a Necessary Virtue
The New Left is characterized by an emphasis on the state power to redress the
problems of injustice and other negative effects of privatization, marketization, and
globalization. The role and significance of state in social and political life is perhaps the
single most important issue that divides the liberals and New Leftists. The New Leftists
advocates the state capacity theory, arguing for a strong central government to regulate
the market and curb its tendency toward regional protectionism and fragmentation and
toward monopoly and unequal competition. They emphasize that the state played an
important role in the reconstruction of modern China from 1949 to 1966. Hu Angang, a
professor at the Tsinghua University, writes, “If China is to become a modern country,
the first task is to modernize its state structure. That means establishing a socialist
democracy [106]. The “state capacity”theory, formulated by Wang Shaoguang and Hu
Angang, argued for a strong central government to regulate the market and curb its
tendency toward regional protectionism and fragmentation and toward monopoly and
unequal competition [107].
More importantly, Wang and Hu argue that a capable state should maintain a
credible national defense, a socially just distribution of wealth, and the nation’smoral
and political unity [108]. According to Wang Shaoguang, the key to Chinese political
change (he prefers the word change to reform) is not follow the West or to set up
Western competitive electoral institutions, but to promote ordinary people’sinterests.In
order to achieve that goal, China must strengthen the state capacities. Many New
Leftists share the view that Western style democracy is not necessary and even
detrimental to the interests of the vast majority of the Chinese people. What China
really needs is to have a strong state and develop a better and stable livelihood for her
people. For example, Pan Wei remarks that a consultative rule-of-law regime in China,
in which the rule of law is supplemented by democracy rather than democracy being
supplemented by the rule of law, and this is deduced from China’shistory,culture,and
existing social system. He holds that it is the rule of law rather than political democracy
that is the most important means of curing rampant corruption.
19
19
For more discussion of Pan Wei’s criticism of liberal democracy, see [109,110].
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Marxism not Human Rights as an Universal Value
The New Leftists maintain that Marxism has already presented a universally applicable
social model to the world and China should therefore return to the universal values of
communism. They insist that Western style democracy as well as its underlying
commitment and values such as human rights are not those genuinely appreciated by
the Chinese people who have different social, cultural, and political values.
In recent years, the New Left waged fresh attacks on the human rights as “universal
values”that the West has been advocating for years. Chen Kuiyuan, then head of the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), is one of the most prominent. Chen
charged that some people were dancing the tune of the West by championing “universal
values”in China. In Chen’s words “In the past, Christianity promoted its doctrines as
universal values. At present, the West is dominant in discourse, claiming their values
such as “democracy,”“human rights,”andfreemarketeconomictheorytobeuniversal
values. Some people in our country have also danced to their tones, advocating
adopting these ‘universal values’for China.”
20
The New Leftists maintain that social justice cannot be achieved without substantial
political reforms, such as more autonomy for organizations of farmers and workers,
democratic processes that allow for the articulation of interests, and a free press that
would expose official corruption. As Daniel Bell put it rightly, “the New Leftists do not
ask the question of what happens after economic development, when the large majority
of Chinese no longer have to spend their days toiling in fields and factories. The
discourse, both official and unofficial, seems to be confined to debates about how best
to provide benefits for workers and farmers, given current levels of technological
development, and nobody seems to be thinking about how to move toward an abundant
society that frees workers from unwanted labor or about when this ideal is supposed to
be realized”[112].
Integration of Three Traditions
Gan Yang, a New Left scholar, developed an interesting idea of “integration of three
traditions (Confucian one in particular) with the traditions of Mao Zedong and Deng
Xiaoping [113]. According to Gan Yang, the main points of Deng’straditionarethe
market economy and the notions of liberty and rights; Mao’s tradition is based on
equality and social justice, whereas deep-rooted cultural values and ideas form the core
of the Confucian tradition [114]. Gan thereby concurs with the ideas of Daniel Bell, in
that modern society is made up of different and contradictory factors, with no single
factor ever having supremacy over others. Bell said he is economically socialist,
politically liberal, and culturally conservative. Consequently, for a better understanding
of modern society, one should not use only one theory of model, but rather depend on a
variety of different models. Gan follows Bell’s approach and ranks his own values in
order: he is first socialist, second, conservative, and then liberal. In other words, Gan
suggests that only by insisting upon the tradition of socialism and classical culture can
China develop liberalism [115].
20
Quoted in Zhiyue Bo and Chen Gang [111].
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New Leftists, while abandoning the Marxist notion of the state as an instrument of
class dominance or arena of class struggle, envision the state as a permanent feature of
the market economy. Furthermore, they invoke Maoist ideals to criticize the current
trends in China toward capitalism and globalization.
Politically, New Leftists distrust representative democracy, they argue for “da
minzhu”(grand democracy in Chinese which means direct mass democracy). The
New Left advocates that the masses should take part fully in politics as much as
possible and should hold the greatest power. This is their great equality and great
democracy [116]. Bo Xilai, the controversial Party chief in Chongqing and unofficial
head of the New Left within the CCP, attracted attention with his campaign of “Singing
Red and Striking down on the Black”(singing the revolutionary songs and eliminating
crimes). Bo Xilai turned to Maoist spirits and traditional “socialist”practices to cope
with issues such as crimes, the apathy of social morality, and socioeconomic inequality.
A number of New Left scholars became his top advisors in Chongqing. However the
blend of this semi-Maoist campaign, populism, and huge state-sponsored programs did
not win him many friends among the top leadership in Beijing. With the removal of Bo
Xilai, the influence of the New Leftists went down significantly, but their words still
carry a lot of clout. For instance, after the removal of Bo, Wang Hui, the “standard
bearer”of China’s New Left, published a paper arguing that the Chongqing Model
developed under Bo was a genuine socialist reform that threatened the supporters of
neoliberalism in China [117].
The Chongqing model, endorsed by the New Left, was found repeatedly in official,
academic, and popular discourse prior to the downfall of Bo Xilai. Today it still has
tremendous appeal among the poor and low-income people given the prevalence of
inequality and social injustice. Websites with strong New Left inclination have contin-
ued attracting a lot of attention. As Yang Fan, a leading “new left”scholar at China
University of Political Science and Law, observes that the government wants to take
advantage of the heated debates between the ultra-left and ultra-right, but have no
intention to implement democracy [118].
Conclusion
Chinese intellectuals and their debates have exerted tremendous influence over China’s
transformation since the late 1970s. As Dominik Mierzejewski put it correctly that the
central leadership has learnt from the history of the late 1980s that any blockade of
intellectual thoughts may result in internal turbulence as Chinese proverb “water can
carry the boat, as well as overturn it”(shui ke zai zhou,yi ke fu zhou) predicts. To avoid
such a situation, they entered into a discussion and tried to make good use of the
Chinese intellectuals’power [119]. Unlike under the Mao and Deng periods, nowadays,
all major decisions are made collectively through a process of discussion, consultation,
debate, and vote (if necessary) among the ruling elites. That created an environment
that intellectual discourse could influence the decision making indirectly.
There has been an intense divergence in understanding and interpretation of democ-
racy [120–122]. Most of people in China view democracy in more complex ways. The
arguments of democracy of Chinese characteristics, for the most part, are in accord with
the official doctrine for political reform. For the New Leftists, Western-style liberal
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democracy is fatally flawed. They charge that only China’snouveau riche will benefit
from “Western capitalist-style”democracy. Some even called it “democracy trap.”
21
For them, democracy means endless debate and stalemate.
There is a widespread belief that Western style democracy is not appropriate in
China, at least not at China’s current level of economic cultural development. Yao
Yang, a well-known economist, pointed out recently that to use a metaphor of love and
marriage, the Chinese case of democracy is “to marry after falling in love with each
other”and the case of most developing countries is “to learn to love after getting
married.”Neither is superior to the other. After all, many happy love affairs end up in
tragic marriages, and many reluctant marriages evolve into happy families. It takes time
to establish a functioning democracy in both cases [124].
There is a consensus among the Chinese scholars that the development of democ-
racy invariably requires the existence of a variety of social and economic preconditions
such as relatively high levels of economic development and an established middle
class. However, some of them hold that the first task is not election, but increase the
size of middle class. The economic development was the best means to this end. Zheng
Yongnian argues that many believe that democracy contributes to the development of
harmonious society. In fact, under certain circumstance, democracy causes disintegra-
tion of the society. A successful West is due to its large middle class [125].
The liberal scholars believe that China must establish a Western style democratic
political system. Since we cannot find anything better than liberal democracy, we have
to live with it. It should be noted that in the foreseeable future, liberal programs on
political reform have little chance to be carried out. Many Chinese intellectuals used to
take the United States and Western Europe as the best development model to follow, the
global financial crisis since 2008 makes many of them wonder about the value of such
faith. Democratic socialists’arguments hold much promise, but they would need to be
modified somewhat to better suit China’s social and political context.
22
Timothy Cheek found that political ideas do have an influence on the action of
politics and ideas are a primary cause of political behavior [127]. In spite of fact that the
spread of democratic values present a threat to an authoritarian regime’s stability, it is
highly unlikely that China’s discussion will be derailed no matter who will control
Beijing in the future. In fact, Beijing tacitly allows intellectual discourse on democracy
to develop relatively freely, believing that it could promote social harmony amid rapid
social changes.
The Chinese intellectual discourse on democracy marks an important breakthrough
in China’s ideological discourse. Freedom to have private, sometimes even public
discussion of sensitive political issues is far greater than before. This is continuous
debate over whether an independent civil society and later a multi-party democracy will
be able to emerge and take home in the reforming Chinese society. Due to the efforts of
the Chinese liberals and other legal scholars, since 1997 the CCP leadership has also
abandoned the concept of “rule by law”for the concept of “rule of law”[128].
While Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong’s thoughts are still highly regarded in
the Chinese Constitution, pragmatism is encouraged in Beijing’s routine decision-
21
Hu Xiafeng [123]. A baidu search of “民主陷阱”(minzhu xuanjing, democracy trap in Chinese) registered
more than 17,900 hits.
22
For detail study on the topic, see He Li [126].
Chinese Intellectual Discourse on Democracy 309
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making process. Unlike strongmen in other undemocratic regimes, the Chinese Com-
munist Party has enforced a limit of two terms for their top leaders and regularly
invoked democracy in their speeches. The official discourse on democracy has changed
subtly in recent years. The regime has even borrowed some reform ideas such as term
limits, local elections, public hearings, participatory budgeting from Western democ-
racies. Along with the ongoing debates, people’s demand for civil liberties and media
freedom is undeniably on the rise [129].
Intellectual discourse on democracy has made important impacts on China’strans-
formation and the Chinese pursuit of democracy. Policies change when people’svalues
and fundamental values change. In spite of different point of views among scholars in
China, they all agree that China should continue pursuing economic reforms and
political democracy but they differed on how these goals should be realized.
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He Li is a professor of political science at Merrimack College. He would like to express his gratitude to Zheng
Yongnian and Bo Zhiyue providing him the encouragement for writing on the Chinese intellectual discourse in
the past few years; valuable comments from the two anonymous reviewers, generous financial support from
the Henry Luce Foundation and faculty development grant from Merrimack College, and excellent facilities at
the School for Advanced Research in Santa Fe, NM, which made the completion of this paper possible.
314 H. Li
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