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ОЦЕНКА РЕАЛИЗАЦИИ ЗАКАЗЧИКОМ ПРИНЦИПА ОБЕСПЕЧЕНИЯ РЕЗУЛЬТАТИВНОСТИ И ЭФФЕКТИВНОСТИ В КОНТРАКТНОЙ СИСТЕМЕ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫХ И МУНИЦИПАЛЬНЫХ ЗАКУПОК
Abstract
Ранее действовавшее законодательство о размещении заказов на поставки товаров для государственных нужд не содержало каких-либо специальных норм, устанавливающих принципы функционирования системы закупок. Закон о контрактной системе, вступивший в силу с 2014 г., напротив, четко определяет перечень и суть принципов, которыми должны руководствоваться заказчики при осуществлении государственных и муниципальных закупок. Ключевым из них является принцип ответственности за результативность и эффективность закупок. В статье раскрываются подходы к возможности оценки реализации принципа результативности и эффективности закупок, а также оценивается выполнение государственным заказчиком Республики Татарстан данного принципа с использованием различных методов анализа.
Оценка проводилась по трем направлениям. Анализ результативности закупок с точки зрения экономии показал, что использование ее в качестве ключевого критерия эффективности не всегда оправдано, поскольку вынуждает как заказчика, так и поставщика завышать начальную цену контракта. Анализ на основе интегральной оценки свидетельствует о том, что использование этой методики позволяет определить слабые места в закупочной деятельности и определить направления повышения эффективности закупок учреждения.
Оценка на основе построения эконометрической модели, отражающей зависимость между числом участников аукциона и экономии, достигнутой по результатам его проведения, позволила сформулировать выводы о целесообразности расширения использования электронных аукционов при проведении закупок, которое будет способствовать увеличению числа участников и, как следствие, росту эффективности закупок в целом.
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Red flags are widely used to minimize the risk of various forms of economic misconduct, among which corruption in public procurement. Drawing on criminal investigations, the literature has developed several indicators of corruption in public procurements and has put them forward as viable risk indicators. But are they genuinely viable, if only corrupt procurements are analysed? Using a dataset of 192 public procurements — with 96 cases where corruption was detected and 96 cases where corruption was not detected — this paper addresses the identification of significant risk indicators of corruption. We find that only some indicators significantly relate to corruption and that eight of them (e.g. large tenders, lack of transparency and collusion of bidders) can best predict the occurrence of corruption in public procurements. With this paper we successfully tap into one of the most vulnerable areas of criminological research — selecting the right sample — and consequently, our results can help increase the detection of corruption, increase investigation effectiveness and minimize corruption opportunities.
Many scholarly articles on corruption give the impression that the world is populated by two types of people: the 'sanders' and the 'greasers'. The 'sanders' believe that corruption is an obstacle to development, while the 'greasers' believe that corruption can (in some cases) foster development. This paper takes a critical look at these positions. It concludes that the evidence supporting the 'greasing the wheels hypothesis' is very weak and shows that there is no correlation between a new measure of managers' actual experience with corruption and GDP growth. Instead, the paper uncovers a strong negative correlation between growth in genuine wealth per capita --a direct measure of sustainable development--and corruption. While corruption may have little average effect on the growth rate of GDP per capita , it is a likely source of unsustainable development. Copyright 2009, Oxford University Press.
There is a low risk of detection for white-collar criminals in most nations. White-collar criminals in public procurement corruption are probably no exception. Public procurement appears particularly vulnerable to corruption despite the multitude of policies and procedures that most public organisations have in place to ensure proper stewardship of public funds. While these mechanisms are designed to control and make transparent the procurement process, corruption has been inherent in public procurement since governments first began buying goods and services. This article presents the topics of white-collar crime, public procurement corruption, and detection by whistleblowers. Based on a sample of 390 convicted white-collar criminals in Norway from 2009 to 2014, this article explores sources of detection with an emphasis on whistleblowing. It seems that whistleblowers are the single most important source of detection. Based on conflict theory, there is a need to strengthen the role of whistleblowers and prevent them from revenge and retaliation.
The paper presents a model of public procurement in which the contracting officer is corrupt and extracts bribes from the bidding firms. The firms submit multidimensional bids, which consist of the quality and the price of the project that they propose to realize. The firms differ in their costs of realizing the project at a given quality, and these costs are private information. The contracting official, in exchange for a bribe, abuses the power of his or her public office by distorting the quality ranking of the bids and by giving the favoured firm an opportunity to readjust its bid to undercut its rivals. Our analysis suggests that when the firms serve only the internal market, the public project is realized at low quality and inflated prices. However, when the firms are also allowed to sell the product they develop for the internal market in a foreign market, the auction is ex post efficient.
Purpose
This paper investigates the technique of benchmarking to improve the quality of the public procurement process and discusses the importance of benchmarking to overcome perceived weaknesses with these processes. This is followed by a case study of Sri‐Lanka, exploring the difficulties faced by public sector employees in separating the daily business of government from the political influences of its elected leaders.
Design/methodology/approach
Initially the literature review was used to examine the key principles of government procurement and how they could be benchmarked. This formed the theoretical base for the discussion. The case study of Sri‐Lanka has been used very effectively to discuss the experiences of developing countries.
Findings
It is revealed that reform solutions within government procurement systems must include measures that address issues of accountability, transparency, value for money, a professional work force and ethics.
Research limitations/implications
The major limitation of this study is that it relies solely only on the experience of Sri‐Lanka. Perhaps including the experiences of other developing countries such as India, Bangladesh and Indonesia could increase the transference of findings of Sri‐Lanka to these countries as well.
Practical implications
Poor procurement practices hinder sustainable development and negatively impact upon economic growth. Therefore, developing countries need to recognise the importance of the technique of benchmarking to improve the public procurement process.
Originality/value
Provides an effective framework to public sector employees in developing countries to benchmark and overcome weaknesses in the public procurement process.
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