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Emergency powers and the pandemic: Reflecting on state legislative reforms and the future of public health response

Authors:
  • Association of State and Territorial Health Officials

Abstract and Figures

The first 2 years of combatting the COVID-19 pandemic necessitated an unprecedented use of emergency powers. States responded with an equally unprecedented flurry of legislative changes to the legal underpinnings of emergency response and public health authorities. In this article, we provide a brief background on the framework and use of governors and state health officials’ emergency powers. We then analyze several key themes, including both the enhancement and restriction of powers, emerging from emergency management and public health legislation introduced in state and territorial legislatures. During the 2020 and 2021 state and territorial legislative sessions, we tracked legislation related to the emergency powers of governors and state health officials. Legislators introduced hundreds of bills impacting these powers, some enhancing and others restricting emergency powers. Enhancements included increasing vaccine access and expanding the pool of eligible medical professions that could administer vaccinations, strengthening public health investigation and enforcement authority for state agencies, and preclusion of local orders by orders at the state level. Restrictions included establishing oversight mechanisms for executive actions, limits on the duration of the emergency, limiting the scope of emergency powers allowed during a declared emergency, and other restraints. By describing these legislative trends, we hope to inform governors, state health officials, policymakers, and emergency managers about how changes in the law may impact future public health and emergency response capabilities. Understanding this new legal landscape is critical to effectively preparing for future threats.
Content may be subject to copyright.
JEM
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Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 21, No. 7
Special Issue on COVID-19
Emergency powers and the pandemic: Reflecting on state
legislative reforms and the future of public health response
Maggie Davisa, JD, MA, PMP
Lauren Dedona, JD
Stacey Hoffman, MPH
Andy Baker-White, JD, MPH
David Engleman, JD
Gregory Sunshine, JD
ABSTRACT
The first 2 years of combatting the COVID-19 pan-
demic necessitated an unprecedented use of emergency
powers. States responded with an equally unprec-
edented flurry of legislative changes to the legal
underpinnings of emergency response and public
health authorities. In this article, we provide a brief
background on the framework and use of governors
and state health officials’ emergency powers. We
then analyze several key themes, including both the
enhancement and restriction of powers, emerging from
emergency management and public health legislation
introduced in state and territorial legislatures. During
the 2020 and 2021 state and territorial legislative
sessions, we tracked legislation related to the emer-
gency powers of governors and state health officials.
Legislators introduced hundreds of bills impacting
these powers, some enhancing and others restricting
emergency powers. Enhancements included increasing
vaccine access and expanding the pool of eligible medi-
cal professions that could administer vaccinations,
strengthening public health investigation and enforce-
ment authority for state agencies, and preclusion of
local orders by orders at the state level. Restrictions
included establishing oversight mechanisms for execu-
tive actions, limits on the duration of the emergency,
limiting the scope of emergency powers allowed dur-
ing a declared emergency, and other restraints. By
describing these legislative trends, we hope to inform
governors, state health officials, policymakers, and
emergency managers about how changes in the law
may impact future public health and emergency
response capabilities. Understanding this new legal
landscape is critical to effectively preparing for future
threats.
Key words: COVID-19 pandemic, public health
emergency, governor emergency powers, state health
official powers, public health emergency authorities,
emergency powers, COVID-19 legislation, COVID-19
legislative challenges, pandemic preparedness
INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic has necessitated an
unprecedented response from government leaders.
In the United States, governors and state/territorial
health officials are on the front lines of the pandemic
response, leveraging a range of emergency powers
to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 and save lives.
Most states created their original laws pertaining to
emergency powers decades before COVID-19 with the
intent to respond to short-term natural or man-made
disasters. Consequently, the extended use of these
powers during COVID-19 was highly controversial.
Although state and territorial constitutional or
statutory schemes vary, all governors are granted the
authority to declare one or more types of emergencies,
including a disaster, an emergency, or a public health
emergency.1 The COVID-19 response marked the
first time in US history when all 55 governors of the
states and territories issued some type of emergency
DOI: 10.5055/jem.0772
aDavis and Dedon contributed equally to this paper.
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declaration in response to the same incident.1,2b The
appendix catalogs initial gubernatorial declarations
issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Emergency powers, generally activated through
the implementation of a state declaration of emer-
gency or disaster, provide governors, state health offi-
cials, and emergency managers avenues to leverage or
enhance capabilities, coordination, and collaboration
across state and local agencies. They also give states
flexibility to respond to exigent circumstances and
often allow governors or state health officials to tem-
porarily modify their state’s statutory, regulatory, or
legal framework to respond to the changing nature of
an emergency quickly.3 While emergency powers can
activate additional legal tools, these authorities may
only be available for the duration of the emergency
declaration.
In the first 2 years of the pandemic, governors and
state health officials used their emergency powers to
confront a range of COVID-19 pandemic-related chal-
lenges.4 Statewide and geographically targeted disas-
ter and emergency declarations and orders enabled a
robust response by facilitating the flow of people and
resources to where they were needed most. Emergency
powers also allowed states to operate in a regulatory
environment conducive to facilitating a rapid and
responsible answer to evolving crises. Governors and
state health officials mobilized health care workers
by expanding their scopes of practice, granting them
liability protection, ensuring that life-saving medical
resources were directed appropriately, and restricting
price gouging. Research has shown that nonphar-
maceutical interventions implemented by governors
and health officials effectively mitigated the spread
of the pandemic by reducing population movement
and preventing COVID-19 incidence, hospitaliza-
tion, and death.5-8 In addition to these public health
benefits, state policy interventions were shown to
account for a small portion of the observed decreases
in economic activity9,10 particularly when compared
to the “health shock” of the pandemic,11 while some
interventions—such as mask mandates—resulted in
higher rates of consumer spending.12-14 As COVID-19
vaccines became more readily available, state officials
have adopted policies to mitigate the spread of the
coronavirus through vaccination, including vaccina-
tion incentives15 and mandates.16,17
To implement these public health interventions
and mount an effective pandemic response, executive
and legislative branch officials in the states and ter-
ritories were called upon to employ their respective
areas of authority. In some cases, cooperation and
open communication may have enhanced the effec-
tiveness of a state’s whole-of-government approach.18
In others, legislatures sued governors and state
health officials or passed legislation to limit their
emergency powers.19
In the 2020 and 2021 state legislative sessions,
legislatures introduced more than 750 bills, limiting
the emergency powers of governors and state health
officials.c The authors of this article reviewed these
bills and found that at least 70 such bills passed with
at least 25 states enacting laws limiting public health
powers. As states continue to consider changes to
their emergency powers laws, the National Governors
Association (NGA), the Association of State and
Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO), and the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) offer this
analysis, highlighting proposed and enacted changes
in law to inform future public health emergency
responses. By describing trends observed in these
legislative sessions, we hope policymakers, emergency
management agencies, and health departments will
consider this new legal landscape as they prepare for
future threats.
STATE LEGISLATION ON EMERGENCY AND PUBLIC HEALTH
POWERS DURING THE 2020 AND 2021 SESSIONS
Throughout the 2020 and 2021 state legislative
sessions, legislators introduced hundreds of bills on
the emergency powers of governors and state health
bFor the purposes of this article, the term “state” is intended to encap-
sulate officials and legislatures from the 55 states, commonwealths, and
territories of the United States of America, and the District of Columbia.
cThe Association of State and Territorial Health Officials tracked
legislation relating to public health authority and governor authority
throughout the 2020 and 2021 legislative sessions, supported by a grant
from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. A graphical depiction of the
bills identified is published by Temple University’s Policy Surveillance
Program and can be found at http://lawatlas.org/datasets/sentinel-sur
veillance-laws-limiting-public-health-authority. For additional informa-
tion, please contact ASTHO at statehealthpolicy@astho.org.
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officials, with some enhancing and others restrict-
ing these powers.d Many of the 2020 state legislative
sessions were substantially disrupted due to the
COVID-19 pandemic. As such, the pace of legislation
was limited, and though many legislatures in regular
or special sessions introduced proposals to modify
emergency powers, little legislation passed during
this period.e
In 2021, state legislative sessions saw a notable
increase in both the introduction and passage of legis-
lation related to gubernatorial emergency authorities
and public health authorities. Legislators introduced
at least 235 bills on gubernatorial authorities in 47
states during the 2021 state legislative sessions,
with legislation passing in 15 states (Figure 1).16,17
Of these, 24 bills were enacted without a governor’s
veto, and three bills were enacted through an override
of the governor’s veto.f In one state, Pennsylvania,
the legislature also passed a constitutional amend-
ment through joint resolution to limit the governor’s
emergency powers, which was presented on the ballot
and later adopted by Pennsylvania voters on May
18, 2021.g Additionally, state legislatures introduced
at least 221 bills on public health authorities in 47
states during the 2021 state legislative sessions, with
legislation passing in 21 states (Figure 2). Of these,
49 bills were enacted without a governor’s veto, and
four bills were enacted through an override of the
governor’s veto.h
Several key themes have emerged from emer-
gency power and public health legislation both pro-
posed and enacted in the 2020 and 2021 state legisla-
tive sessions. The following describes these themes
and potential implications for public health and emer-
gency response, organized by whether they involved
enhancements or restrictions of authority.
Enhanced government emergency response capability
Though less common than limitations on emer-
gency powers, several states passed laws that enhanced
government public health emergency response capac-
ity, providing governors and state health officials more
emergency and public health response tools. State
executives commonly use emergency authorities to
temporarily waive or modify regulatory and statutory
Figure 1. Restricted governor authority.
dIbid. Please note that not all introduced or enacted legislation related
to executive emergency powers is discussed, and final counts may not
be exhaustive.
eIbid.
fS.B. 1, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2021); S.B. 2, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky.
2021); S.B. 22, 134th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2021).
gS.B. 2, 78th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2021).
hS.B. 1, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2021); S.B. 2, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky.
2021); H.B. 1, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky 2021); S.B. 22, 134th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Ohio 2021).
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requirements that could slow or delay response
activities. During the COVID-19 pandemic, several
states amended or adopted laws to codify aspects of
executive emergency orders, making those changes
last beyond the end of the emergency period. This
legislation fell into three main categories: (1) expand-
ing the pool of eligible medical professions that could
administer COVID-19 vaccinations, (2) strengthening
public health investigation and enforcement author-
ity for state agencies, and (3) preclusion of local orders
by orders at the state level.
Increasing vaccine access and supporting vaccine
administration. In coordination with federal partners,
states swiftly established a COVID-19 vaccination
program aimed at efficiently and equitably distrib-
uting approved COVID-19 vaccines. While state law
governs which medical professionals are authorized
to prescribe or administer vaccinations, all states per-
mitted physicians, nurses, and pharmacists to admin-
ister certain Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-
approved vaccines to adults prior to the COVID-19
pandemic. Also prior to the pandemic, pharmacists
were authorized to administer at least one vaccine
in all 50 states, Puerto Rico, and Washington, DC. In
most jurisdictions, pharmacists were authorized to
administer any vaccine to adults in accordance with
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices/CDC
recommendations.20i Needing to greatly increase the
vaccination workforce, many governors and state
health officials took early steps using executive emer-
gency orders to expand health professionals’ scope of
practice and authorized dentists, emergency medi-
cal technicians (EMTs), pharmacy technicians, and
other health professionals to administer COVID-19
vaccines.21-23j
At least 32 state legislatures considered bills
to expand scopes of practice, and at least 19 states
enacted laws expanding the scope of practice or
enhancing the COVID-19 vaccination workforce
during the 2021 legislative sessions.k Prior to the
Figure 2. Restricted public health authority.
iPharmacists in at least 18 states also had the authority to prescribe
at least one immunization prior to the pandemic. With many states
already granting pharmacists vaccine administration authority, many
bills, like one Iowa is considering, would grant pharmacists authority
to prescribe and administer the COVID-19 and other vaccines broadly.
jHistorically, physicians and nurses administer vaccines within their
scope of practice.
All states and the District of Columbia allowed pharmacists to admin-
ister certain vaccinations prior to the pandemic. Ultimately, the federal
government issued a Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness
(PREP) Act declaration to provide liability protections to a wider range
of healthcare professionals, including EMTs and pharmacy technicians,
expanding scopes of practice, so that they may administer the COVID-
19 vaccine for the duration of the COVID-19 PREP Act declaration.
kH.B. 1134, 93rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2021); H.B. 1135, 93rd Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Ark. 2021); A.B. 1064, 2021-2022, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2021); S.B. 768,
123rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021); S.B. 46, 156th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga.
2021); H.B. 1079, 122nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2021); S.F. 296, 89th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2021); L.D. 1, 130th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me.
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pandemic, pharmacists in 18 states had prescription
authority for at least one vaccine, a trend designed
to increase vaccination rates broadly and improve
access to vaccinations in general.24 Pharmacy profes-
sionals were the most common profession to receive
consideration for an expanded scope of practice, with
at least 10 states enacting laws granting pharmacistsl
greater ability to administer COVID-19 vaccines and
five states expanding the scope of pharmacy techni-
cians to administer vaccines.m In some instances,
states permanently expanded pharmacist vaccina-
tion authority for vaccines other than the COVID-19
vaccine. For example, Arkansas, which previously
only allowed pharmacists to administer vaccines to
persons over the age of 7 under written protocols,
now allows pharmacists to prescribe and administer
pediatric vaccines to persons ages 3 and older.n
Dentists were the second most common profes-
sion legislatures considered for an expanded scope of
practice, and at least two states enacted laws author-
izing dentists to administer COVID-19 vaccines.o
Other professions for which states expanded scope
of practice to administer COVID-19 vaccines during
the COVID-19 emergency declaration include EMTs,
pharmacy technicians, pharmacy interns, and cardio-
vascular technicians.p
While most states that expanded scopes of prac-
tice did so for specific professions, Virginia took a
different approach in enacting HB 2333.q HB 2333
authorized the Virginia Department of Health to
establish a program for any person licensed by the
Virginia Department of Health Professions to admin-
ister drugs to administer the COVID-19 vaccine, if
they were in good standing currently or if they were
in good standing within 20 years of their license laps-
ing. This approach delegated authority to the health
department to identify which professions were best
suited to support vaccination efforts.
Public health investigative authority in group care
and workplace settings. The COVID-19 pandemic
has created a nation-wide need for robust infection
reporting and safety protocol enforcement mecha-
nisms for congregate or group care settings, (eg, nurs-
ing homes and long-term care facilities) and certain
workplaces.25,26 Some states developed new protocols
during the pandemic through emergency orders and
regulations, while other states codified these pro-
cesses in statute.r For example, in Maryland, a new
law establishes planning and reporting requirements
for nursing homes during a governor-declared public
health emergency.s In New York, employers are now
required to create plans to prevent the transmission
of airborne infectious diseases in workplaces.t The
new law also permits the commissioner of labor to
investigate whether an employer has violated the
law and impose fines for noncompliance. New York
also enacted a law granting the department of health
authority to review the policies and practices for
COVID-19 outbreaks in correctional facilities.u
Preclusion of local orders. As was highlighted during
the COVID-19 pandemic, whether and to what extent
governors’ executive orders or state health official
2021); S.B. 67, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2021); S.B. 736, 2021 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Md. 2021); S.F. 475, 92nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2021); S.B. 2221,
67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2021); H.B. 572, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H.
2021); A 5222, 219th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2021); H.B. 6, 134th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Ohio 2021); SB 398, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2021); H 3900,
124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2021); S.B. 777, 112th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Tenn. 2021); H.B. 2079, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. (Va. 2021);
S.B. 13, 2021-2022, Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2021); and H.B. 2962, 85th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (W. Va. 2021).
lH.B. 1134, 93rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2021); A.B. 1064, 2021-2022, Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2021); S.B. 768, 123rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021); S.B. 46,
156th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2021); S.F. 296, 89th Gen. Assemb, Reg. Sess.
(Iowa 2021); S.B. 736, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2021); H.B. 6, 134th
Leg, Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2021); S.B. 398, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2021);
S.B. 777, 112th Gen. Assemb, Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2021); and H.B. 2079,
2021 Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. (Va. 2021).
mH.B. 1135, 93rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2021); H.B. 572, 2021 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (N.H. 2021); S.B. 2279, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2021); H.B. 6,
134th Leg, Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2021); and A.B. 4, 2021-2022 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wis. 2021).
nH.B. 1134, 93rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2021).
oS.F. 475, 92nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2021) and S.B. 13, 2021-2022 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2021).
pSee, eg, S.B. 46, 156th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2021) (expanding the scope
of practice of cardiac technicians and EMTs) and H.B. 572, 2021 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2021) (authorizing pharmacy technicians and interns
administer vaccines).
qH.B. 2333, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2021).
rSee, eg, Maryland Department of Health, No. MDH 2021-05-04-02 (May 4,
2021), https://health.maryland.gov/phpa/Documents/2021.05.04.02%20
MDH%20Order%20-%20Amended%20Nursing%20Homes%20
Matter%20Order.pdf.
sH.B. 1022, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2021).
tS 1034B, 2021-2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021).
uS 877, 2021-2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021) and A 984, 2021-2022
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021).
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orders precluded local public health orders was and
remains a source of conflict and confusion in states.25
Several states have enacted legislation to resolve that
tension by stipulating that state executive orders dur-
ing public health emergencies would preclude local
orders when they conflict or that give state orders
exclusive jurisdiction. In West Virginia, a new law
provides that if the governor declares a statewide
public health emergency, the governor may direct
the state health officer to develop emergency policies
and guidelines with which local health departments
must compl y. v In Ohio, the legislature overrode the
governor’s veto to enact a statute, which provides that
state department of health isolation and quarantine
authority precludes local board of health authority,
among other changes.w While these types of laws
serve as an enhancement in the scope of state powers
and clarify their relationship with conflicting local
measures, they also limit local government emer-
gency response flexibilities.
Limitations on government emergency
response capabilities
Much of the introduced and enacted 2020 and
2021 legislation regarding emergency and public
health powers restricts the authority of governors
and state health officials—both procedurally and
substantively. Some legislatures expanded legislative
oversight of public health emergency response, while
others expressly limited the powers of the governor
and state health officials. Other legislatures limited
the duration of emergency and public health orders,
limited the scope of such orders, set limits for state
action in relation to federal guidance, and established
a process for attorneys general to determine the con-
stitutionality of federal actions and prohibit state
compliance.
Oversight of executive actions. State emergency stat-
utes grant governors broad discretion for issuing
emergency, disaster, and public health emergency
orders.26 Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, at least
41 state/territorial emergency statutes required some
type of legislative involvement—most typically in the
form of legislative authority to terminate the emer-
gency.27 Additionally, prior to the pandemic, at least
eight states and two territories had statutes beyond
granting the legislature authority to terminate the
emergency.27 These statutes required explicit legisla-
tive engagement to further extend an emergency or
other varying mechanisms of legislative oversight.27
Although the COVID-19 pandemic proved to be
highly disruptive for legislative business during the
2020 sessions, by 2021, legislatures had developed
processes to conduct regular business and simultane-
ously participate fully in their states’ responses to the
pandemic. Nevertheless, state legislatures took sev-
eral approaches to increase legislative involvement
and add procedural requirements for the response
to public health emergencies. These reforms include
the establishment of legislative councils or commit-
tees and processes for legislative notification, review,
approval, termination, and recission of executive
emergency actions.
Several states adopted new mechanisms for legis-
lative oversight of public health emergencies, includ-
ing the establishment of special legislative commis-
sions to oversee emergency response activities. A new
law in Arkansas stipulates that during a statewide
public health state of disaster, orders issued by the
state board of health are subject to review by a state
legislative council, which has the authority to termi-
nate the order.x In Kansas, a new law establishes a
Legislative Coordinating Council with the power to
revoke an order issued by the state health official
when the order is pursuant to a governor-declared
disaster.y Utah enacted a law requiring that the state
department of health submits a notice of proposed
action to the legislative emergency response com-
mittee at least 24 hours before issuing orders that
will last longer than 30 days.z The Ohio legislature
overrode a veto from the governor to enact SB 22,aa
creating the Ohio Health Oversight and Advisory
vS.B. 12, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2021).
wS.B. 22, 134th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2021).
xS.B. 379, 93rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2021).
yS.B. 40, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2021).
zS.B. 195, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Utah 2021).
aaS.B. 22, 134th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2021).
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Committee, which has the authority to oversee the
state health department and review the state health
director’s actions to prevent, investigate, and control
the spread of infectious diseases. Florida enacted a
law requiring any agency to submit any order issued
before, during, or after a declared emergency to the
Division of Administrative Hearings within 3 days of
issuance. If the order is not field in a timely manner,
it is considered void.bb
Several states enacted legislation giving the leg-
islature the authority to terminate a state of emer-
gency or rescind orders issued by governors and state
health officials. New York enacted a law empowering
the legislature to terminate an emergency declara-
tion by concurrent resolution.cc Ohio enacted SB 22,
mentioned previously, to empower the legislature to
rescind any state health department order or action
aimed at controlling infectious diseases by concurrent
resolution. If an order is rescinded, the state health
department is prohibited from taking the same or
similar action for 60 days.
Limits on duration of emergencies and orders. Prior
to the COVID-19 pandemic, most states had laws
stipulating the maximum duration of a state of
emergency and requiring a governor or state health
official to renew a state of emergency after a certain
period (usually 30 or 60 days).28 In the case of an
ongoing emergency such as the COVID-19 pandemic,
governors and state health officials in states with
such requirements must repeatedly renew orders
to ensure a consistent and effective emergency
response. In response to COVID-19, legislation was
introduced and enacted in several states impos-
ing new time limits on public health emergencies.
Montana enacted a law imposing a 21-day limit on
a governor’s emergency declaration, unless extended
by a majority of members of both the state house
and senate. To extend the declaration up to 45
days, the secretary of state is authorized to poll
the legislature.dd In Wyoming, a new law limits any
order that restricts freedom of movement or an indi-
vidual’s ability to engage in any activity to 10 days.ee
The governor of Michigan vetoed a bill which would
have imposed a 28-day limit on emergency orders
unless the legislature approved an extension request
from the state health official.ff
Limits on scope of emergency powers and public health
orders. During the COVID-19 pandemic, many gover-
nors and state health officials, seeking to prevent the
spread of disease and save lives, instituted measures
that impacted individuals’ personal lives to protect
the public’s health. In response, several state legisla-
tures enacted laws limiting governor and state health
official authority to respond to the COVID-19 pan-
demic or to curtail their ability to respond to future
emergencies. For example, in Idaho, a new lawgg
prohibits the governor from altering, adjusting, or
creating any provision of the state code, a well-estab-
lished emergency power in many states.3,29 Other
actions fell into two general categories: (1) limiting
or prohibiting emergency orders relating to certain
constitutional rights and (2) limiting executive pow-
ers to establish and enforce mitigation efforts for the
prevention or control of infectious disease outbreaks,
including mask protocols, vaccination requirements,
vaccine verification, and isolation and quarantine
requirements.
Limiting restrictions to first and second amend-
ment rights. State powers to protect the health and
welfare of its residents are well established in consti-
tutional law with all governors empowered to declare
states of emergency,1 and state health officials con-
ferred with powers to identify and contain infectious
diseases, even when doing so may infringe on certain
individual rights.hh During the COVID-19 pandemic,
more than half of state legislatures considered bills
limiting public health actions that may infringe on
bbS.B. 2006, 123rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021).
ccA 5967, 2021-2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021) and New York
S 5357, 2021-2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021).
ddH.B. 230, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2021).
eeH.B. 127, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 2021).
ffS.B. 1, 101st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2021).
ggH.B. 392, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2021).
hhJacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (recognizing that there
are “manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for
the common good.”).
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26 Journal of Emergency Management
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First and Second Amendments rights.ii These bills
exempt activity protected under the First and Second
Amendments, eg, church services, from public health
restrictions that are otherwise applicable to busi-
nesses, public spaces, and other venues, eg, indoor
gathering prohibitions.
At least 26 states introduced, and seven states
enacted,jj laws limiting how governor and state health
official emergency orders can affect religious facilities
and the exercise of religion. For example, Indiana’s new
law prohibits more restrictions on the operations of reli-
gious organizations and religious services than those
imposed on other businesses and organizations that
provide essential services to the public.kk Furthermore,
under the new law, the state may impose health, safety,
or occupancy requirements that may substantially bur-
den religious activities only if the state demonstrates
that the proposed order is the least restrictive means
available to meet a compelling governmental interest,
even if those requirements do not single out religious
organizations. Similarly, Montana’s new law prohibits
direct limitations to religious services by the govern-
ment unless the government demonstrates that the
limitations are applied equally to nonreligious organi-
zations performing essential services and are the least
restrictive means necessary to further a compelling
government interest.ll Montana also enacted a law
which prohibits state, local, and interjurisdictional
bodies, eg, emergency management agencies that cover
more than one jurisdiction, and officials from interfer-
ing with or limiting a person’s ability to physically
attend a religious facility or other place of worship.mm
In Wisconsin, the legislature passed a bill to prohibit
public health measures to restrict gatherings in places
of worship to control outbreaks and epidemics of
COVID-19. This bill was vetoed by the governor and
not passed into law.nn
States also considered constraints to governor and
state health official emergency powers applicable to
the First Amendment right of assembly. Specifically,
some states sought to block social distancing measures
that restricted gatherings in private businesses and
burdened commercial activities. At least 27 states con-
sidered bills related to the operation of private industry
under an emergency declaration or operation during the
COVID-19 pandemic.30 At least four states enacted laws
limiting executive powers to place emergency restric-
tions on commercial activities.oo For example, Texas’s
new law removes any executive emergency authority
for restricting or impairing business operations during
a disaster, and this authority now stands solely as a
legislative power.pp Montana’s new law prohibits local
governments from imposing restrictions on individual
access to private businesses.qq Both Kansasrr and Idahoss
enacted laws that limit the governor from enforcing or
imposing restrictions that would substantially burden
or inhibit freedom of movement for religious and/or com-
mercial activities.
In addition to prohibiting restrictions impacting
First Amendment rights on the free exercise or reli-
gion and assembly, some states considered protections
to the Second Amendment right to bear arms. Prior
to the pandemic, at least 14 states limited the gov-
ernor’s authority to restrict the sale or usage of fire-
arms, explosives, or combustibles during a declared
emergency.tt During the 2021 legislative sessions, at
iiThe Association of State and Territorial Health Officials tracked
legislation relating to public health authority and governor authority
throughout the 2020 and 2021 legislative sessions, supported by a grant
from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. A graphical depiction of the
bills identified is published by Temple University’s Policy Surveillance
Program and can be found at http://lawatlas.org/datasets/sentinel-sur
veillance-laws-limiting-public-health-authority. For additional informa-
tion, please contact ASTHO at statehealthpolicy@astho.org.
jjH.B. 391, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2021); S.B. 263, 122nd Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Ind. 2021); S.B. 40, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2021); S.B. 370,
67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2021); S.B. 172, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont.
2021); H.B. 230, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2021); S.B. 2181, 67th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2021); H.B. 1410, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2021); H.B.
572, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2021); and S.B. 195, 2021 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Utah 2021).
kkS.B. 263, 122nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2021).
llS.B. 172, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2021).
mmH.B. 230, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2021).
nnA.B. 1, 2021-2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2021).
ooH.B. 391, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2021); S.B. 14, 2021 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Kan. 2021); H.B. 257, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2021); and H.B.
3, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021).
ppH.B. 3, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021).
qqH.B. 257, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2021).
rrS.B. 14, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2021).
ssH.B. 391, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2021).
ttSee Ala. Code § 31-9-8 (2016); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 26-303 (2019);
Idaho Code Ann. § 46-1008 (2016); Ind. Code § 10-14-3-12 (2018); Kan.
Code § 48-959 (2009); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 39A.100 (2013); Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 44.101 (2021); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 414.155 (2014); 21 Okl. Stat. § 1321.4
(2020); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 418.014 (2005); Utah Code Ann. § 53-2a-
214 (2018); W. Va. Code § 15-5-19a (2014); Wis. Stat. § 323.24 (2012); and
Wyo. Stat. § 19-13-104 (2011).
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least 13 states considered bills to create or expand
existing limits on officials’ ability to restrict firearm
or ammunition sales during a declared emergency,
two of which were enacted into la w. uu For example,
Kansas’s new law prohibits the governor from seiz-
ing ammunition or restricting firearm sales under
an emergency declaration.vv Montana’s new law spe-
cifically calls on the state to ensure protection of the
Second Amendment rights of its residents during an
emergency or disaster.ww
While many legislatures restricted the use of
public health powers on constitutional rights, gov-
ernors and health officials’ ability to regulate First
Amendment freedoms of assembly, association, and
freedom to worship and the Second Amendment
right to bear arms were highly litigated facets of
state responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. In the
case of religious activity, the United States Supreme
Court issued several orders throughout the pandemic,
indicating that public health restrictions on religious
worship should be no greater than “any comparable
secular activity, xx although a subsequent order from
the Court suggests secular public health restric-
tions could be struck down if they affect religious
gatherings.31yy In addition to legislative changes in
many states, the resulting case law arising out of
these legal challenges may also impact the scope of
health authorities available to governors and health
officials.
Limiting measures for the prevention and con-
trol of infectious diseases. The authority to isolate
and quarantine individuals to mitigate the spread
of communicable diseases is an established power of
governors and state health officials with or without
an emergency declaration. During the COVID-19 pan-
demic, governors and state health officials leveraged
these authorities in a variety of ways to limit the
spread of the coronavirus and save lives, including
broad stay-at-home orders early in the pandemic
response.32 In response to the use of these powers, gov-
ernors and state health officials faced many legislative
and legal challenges to the use of emergency powers to
order and enforce public health mitigation measures,
eg, stay-at-home orders and mask wearing.33
Several states enacted legislation prohibiting
orders that would establish specific public health pro-
tective measures or limit the ability of the governor
to use broad mitigation measures in future pandem-
ics. Specifically, these laws limited state isolation and
quarantine powers and prohibited mask protocols,
COVID-19 vaccination requirements, and the verifi-
cation of COVID-19 vaccination status. Idaho’s new
law limits quarantine authority to a person known
to be exposed to an infectious or communicable dis-
ease, displaying “medically unknown symptoms” or
contaminated from a chemical, nuclear, or biological
agent.zz Under the new law, public health officials
can no longer issue quarantine orders to individuals
suspected of exposure to an infectious disease absent
specific knowledge of an individual’s exposure “under
circumstances likely to result in the spread of the
disease[.]”aaa The law also narrows the definition of
“isolation” to only apply while individuals diagnosed
with a communicable disease are infectious, contami-
nated from a chemical, nuclear, or biological agent, or
displaying medically unknown symptoms.
Beyond restrictions on executive actions aimed
at disease mitigation, states also enacted legislation
to limit the ability to enforce mitigation efforts and
limit the geographic reach of mitigation activities.
Arizona’s new law prevents any state agency from
revoking a license to operate a business unless there
is clear and convincing evidence that the business
was the actual cause of disease transmission.bbb In
Arkansas, the state legislature attempted to pass
uuS.B. 14, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2021) and S.B. 370, 67th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Mont. 2021).
vvS.B. 14, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2021).
wwS.B. 370, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2021).
xxTandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021).
yyGateway City Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1460 (2021); Nelson Tebbe,
The Principle and Politics of Equal Value, 121Colum. L. Rev. 2397,
2400 (2021) (“see also Gateway City Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1460,
1460 (2021) (mem.) (granting injunctive relief without mentioning the
absence of a religious classification).”).
zzS.B. 1139, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2021). The law defines “medi-
cally unknown symptoms” as “symptoms that are or could be suggestive
of an infectious or communicable disease and that do not sufficiently
reveal the structural or other specified pathology of an illness on initial
examination.”
aaaIbid.
bbbH.B. 2570, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2021).
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28 Journal of Emergency Management
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SB 301,ccc which would have required agencies to
return fines collected from certain businesses for
violation of public health orders. SB 301 was ulti-
mately vetoed by the governor. North Dakota’s new
law restricts state health official orders to only the
geographical area affected by the communicable
disease.ddd The law also stipulates that a state health
officer may only issue a statewide order if the gover-
nor has declared a statewide disaster or emergency.
States also considered bills limiting nonphar-
maceutical interventions like requiring face masks
in certain places and situations. At least 11 states
considered bills that would prohibit government
officials from requiring mask wearing or place pro-
cedural limitations to enacting a mask mandate to
control a disease outbreak. Four states enacted laws
prohibiting or ending mask protocols.eee For example,
North Dakota’s new law prohibits the state health
official from mandating the use of a face covering, a
face mask, or a face shield. Arkansas enacted a new
law that ended the statewide mask requirement
executive order and required that any future face
mask requirements must be enacted legislatively.fff
Iowa and Utah limited their prohibitions on mask
mandates to schools, with Iowa’s law preventing
school districts from requiring face coverings,ggg and
Utah’s law prohibiting institutions of higher educa-
tion from requiring face masks going forward.
In anticipation of COVID-19 vaccines, and later
when government leaders were working to increase
vaccination rates, states considered bills regard-
ing governmental, employer, and school vaccina-
tion requirements. At least 35 states considered at
least one bill regarding vaccine mandates, with
nine states enacting laws restricting the ability
to require COVID-19 vaccinations. For example,
Tennesseehhh and Utahiii enacted laws prohibiting
governmental entities from requiring individuals to
receive the COVID-19 vaccine. Arkansasjjj and New
Hampshirekkk enacted laws that prevent the state
from requiring COVID-19 vaccination as a condi-
tion of receiving public benefits or entering a public
facility. Alaska’s new law expressly allows religious,
medical, and personal objections to the COVID-19
vaccine and prohibits any requirement to document
why a person declined vaccination.lll In Wisconsin,
a bill the legislature passed, AB 23,mmm prohibits
vaccine mandates issued by state or local health
officials, but the bill was vetoed by the governor and
not enacted into law.
Several states focused their legislation on
school vaccination requirements, with Ohio enact-
ing a new law to prohibit any school from requiring
a vaccine without full FDA approval.nnn Arizonaooo
and Oklahomappp enacted laws that prohibit certain
educational institutions from creating or enforcing
a COVID-19 vaccine requirement as a condition of
attendance or acceptance. Arkansas’ law prohibits
any COVID-19 vaccine requirement as a condition
of a public benefit, including schools, but provides
state leaders the option to lift the prohibition
against school vaccines if a more virulent strain
of the virus impacting children occurred within 2
years of the law’s enactment.qqq
Incorporation of federal guidance. In general, the
federal government’s authority to impose manda-
tory public health restrictions is limited as com-
pared with the authority of governors, state health
officials, and state legislatures, and federal officials
“[can]not directly order states to implement federal
standards.”2 Nevertheless, many state and local gov-
ernments incorporated CDC recommendations by
reference in their legally enforceable public health
cccS.B. 301, 93rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2021).
dddH.B. 1118, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2021).
eeeS.B. 590, 93rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2021); H.F. 847, 89th Gen.
Assemb, Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2021); H.B. 1007, 2021 Leg., Spec. Sess. (Utah
2021); and H.B. 1323, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2021).
fffS.B. 301, 93rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2021).
gggH.F. 847, 89th Gen. Assemb, Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2021).
hhhS.B. 187, 112th Gen. Assemb, Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2021).
iiiH.B. 308, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Utah 2021).
jjjH.B. 1547, 93rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2021).
kkkH.B. 220, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2021).
lllH.B. 76, 32nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2021).
mmmA.B. 23, 2021-2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2021).
nnnH.B. 244, 134th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2021).
oooS.B. 1825, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2021).
pppS.B. 658, 58th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2021).
qqqH.B. 1547, 93rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2021).
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29
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orders.rrr At least one state went further by enacting
legislation establishing federal guidelines as the ceil-
ing for state emergency orders. New Jersey enacted
a law, requiring that COVID-19 orders be no more
restrictive than CDC recommendations.sss
State attorney general review of federal actions. At
least two states enacted legislation that codified
the process for state attorney general review of
federal public health emergency actions.ttt Under
these laws, if the state attorney general determines
that a federal policy is unconstitutional, the gov-
ernor and state health officials are precluded from
requiring compliance with that policy. Montana
enacted a law stipulating that the legislative
council reviews executive orders issued by the
President of the United States and may recommend
further review by the state attorney general and
the governor.uuu If the attorney general determines
that the order is unconstitutional, the state govern-
ment is prohibited from using public funds to act
pursuant to the executive order in response to a
pandemic or other public health emergency. Utah
enacted a law preventing any state agency from
implementing a federal executive order relating to
a pandemic or other public health emergency that
the state attorney general has determined it is
unconstitutional.vvv
CONCLUSION
Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, state
responses have been bolstered by robust emergency
powers in the hands of governors and state health
officials. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, several
states used these emergency and public health
authorities to respond to natural disasters, such as
hurricanes, and day-to-day public health threats,
such as tuberculosis.34 States also used these emer-
gency authorities to respond to public health threats
that presented unique and exigent circumstances,
including outbreaks of HIV and hepatitis A, as well
as the current opioid epidemic.35 The use of these
powers under these circumstances demonstrates
their utility in protecting communities from a
wide variety of public health threats. Governors,
state health officials, and emergency managers
can benefit from familiarizing themselves with the
contents of their emergency response toolboxes and
incorporating these tools into agency operations and
response strategies.
At the same time, the changing legal landscape
of state emergency powers since the onset of the
COVID-19 pandemic means that leaders and deci-
sionmakers may have different legal authorities and
constraints when responding to future public health
emergencies. In some instances, these changes will
result in new tools for addressing threats and, in oth-
ers, restrict or eliminate mechanisms for garnering
resources and powers to protect the public’s health
and safety.
The COVID-19 pandemic will not be the last time
leaders are called upon to respond to public health
emergencies in their states. In looking toward future
public health threats, governors, state health officials,
policymakers, and emergency managers can examine
these legislative changes, as well as proposed changes
in future legislative sessions, to determine whether
enhancements or limitations on government emer-
gency response capabilities will position them best for
future public health emergencies.
ACkNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors thank Matthew Penn and Dee Dudley (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention), Jeffery Locke and Michelle Woods
(formerly National Governors Association), and countless state
officials and national experts for their guidance and involvement in
this work. Work on this publication by NGA was supported by the
CDC of the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
Cooperative under agreement # NU38OT000301. Legislative track-
ing conducted by ASTHO was supported by a grant from the Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation. The contents are those of the author(s)
and do neither necessarily represent the official views of, nor an
endorsement by, CDC/HHS or the US Government.
rrrSee, eg, Office of Governor J.B. Pritzker, Executive Order 2021-
10 (May 17, 2021), https://www2.illinois.gov/Pages/Executive-Orders/
ExecutiveOrder2021-10.aspx; Office of Governor Phil Murphy, Executive
Order No. 242 (May 24, 2021), https://nj.gov/infobank/eo/056murphy/
pdf/EO-242.pdf; and Office of Governor Tim Walz, Emergency Executive
Order No. 20-20 (March 25, 2020), https://mn.gov/governor/assets/3a.%20
EO%2020-20%20FINAL%20SIGNED%20Filed_tcm1055-425020.pdf.
sssA 5820, 219th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2021).
tttS.B. 277, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2021) and H.B. 415, 2021 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Utah 2021).
uuuS.B. 277, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2021).
vvvH.B. 415, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Utah 2021).
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30 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 21, No. 7
Special Issue on COVID-19
Maggie Davis, JD, MA, PMP, Association of State and Territorial Health
Officials, Arlington, Virginia. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0002-5394-
1704.
Lauren Dedon, JD, Senior Legal Policy Advisor, NGA Center for
Best Practices’ Public Safety and Legal Counsel Program, National
Governors Association, Washington, DC. ORCID: https://orcid.
org/0000-0002-9828-3189.
Stacey Hoffman, MPH, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
Atlanta, Georgia.
Andy Baker-White, JD, MPH, Association of State and Territorial Health
Officials, Arlington, Virginia.
David Engleman, JD, formerly National Governors Association,
Washington, DC.
Gregory Sunshine, JD, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
Atlanta, Georgia. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2154-0159.
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APPENDIx: GUBERNATORIAL EMERGENCY DECLARATIONS IN RESPONSE TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC
The COVID-19 response marked the first time in
US history when all 55 governors of the states and
territories issued some type of emergency declaration
in response to the same incident. Governors began
declaring emergencies on January 29, 2020. By March
15, 2020, every state and territory had declared some
type of emergency.
State and territory emergency declarations made
in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, in chronologi-
cal order, are included below. Please note this list only
contains initial orders from governors and does not
include gubernatorial order renewals or public health
emergencies simultaneously/subsequently declared
by State Health Officials.
nnThe Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands declared a State of
Significant Emergency on January 29,
2020. Office of Governor Ralph DLG
Torres, Executive Order No. 2020-01
(January 29, 2020). https://www.pncguam.
com/coronavirus-prompts-cnmi-to-declare-
an-emergency/.
nnAmerican Samoa declared a Public Health
Emergency on February 27, 2020. Office
of Governor Lolo M. Moliga, Declaration
of Continued Public Health Emergency
(February 27, 2020). https://6fe16cc8-c42f-
411f-9950-4abb1763c703.filesusr.com/ugd
/4bfff9_876de830e2a34d63a4dde79cc7
c5d331.pdf.
nnWashington declared a State of Emergency
on February 29, 2020. Office of Governor
Jay Inslee, Proclamation by the Governor
20-05 (February 29, 2020). https://www.
governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/proc
lamations/20-05%20Coronavirus%20
%28final%29.pdf.
nnCalifornia declared a State of Emergency
on March 4, 2020. Office of Governor
Gavin Newsom, Proclamation of a
State of Emergency (March 4, 2020).
https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2020/03/3.4.20-Coronavirus-
SOE-Proclamation.pdf.
nnHawaii declared a State of Emergency
on March 4, 2020. Office of Governor
David Ige, Proclamation (March 4, 2020).
https://governor.hawaii.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2020/03/2003020-GOV-Emer
gency-Proclamation_COVID-19.pdf.
nnWest Virginia declared a State of
Preparedness on March 4, 2020. Office
of Governor Jim Justice, Proclamation
(March 4, 2020). https://governor.wv.gov/
Documents/SKM_C45820030417010.pdf.
nnMaryland declared a State of Emergency
on March 5, 2020. Office of Governor
Larry Hogan, Declaration of State of
Emergency and Existence of Catastrophic
Health Emergency—COVID-19 (March 5,
2020). https://governor.maryland.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2020/03/Proclamation-
COVID-19.pdf.
nnIndiana declared a Public Health Disaster
Emergency on March 6, 2020. Office of
Governor Eric Holcomb, Executive Order
20-02 Declaration of Public Health
Emergency for Coronavirus Disease 2019
Outbreak (March 5, 2020). https://www.
in.gov/gov/files/20-02ExecutiveOrder(D
eclarationofPublicHealthEmergencyfor
COVID-19)FINAL.pdf.
nnKentucky declared a State of Emergency
on March 6, 2020. Office of Governor
Andy Beshear, Executive Order No. 2020-
215 (March 6, 2020). https://governor.
ky.gov/attachments/20200306_Executive-
Order_2020-215.pdf.
nnPennsylvania declared a Disaster
Emergency on March 6, 2020. Office
SA-Weston-JEM#230005.indd 31 27/02/23 6:56 PM
32 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 21, No. 7
Special Issue on COVID-19
of Governor Tom Wolf, Proclamation of
Disaster Emergency (March 6, 2020).
https://www.governor.pa.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2020/03/20200306-COVID19-Dig
ital-Proclamation.pdf.
nnUtah declared a State of Emergency
on March 6, 2020. Office of Governor
Gary Herbert, Executive Order (March
6, 2020). https://drive.google.com/
file/d/1HQf7KjdTadeQCLWQ38Y6y_
XRwVH4TOnE/view.
nnNew York declared a State Disaster
Emergency on March 7, 2020. Office of
Governor Andrew Cuomo, Executive
Order No. 202 (March 7, 2020). https://
www.governor.ny.gov/sites/default/files/
atoms/files/EO_202.pdf.
nnOregon declared a State of Emergency on
March 8, 2020. Office of Governor Kate
Brown, Executive Order No. 20-03 (March
8, 2020). https://drive.google.com/file/d/1A
cKOePvhmBpuNuaBQq7yZ37E2Sog4tUe/
view.
nnFlorida declared a State of Emergency
on March 9, 2020. Office of Governor Ron
DeSantis, Executive Order No. 20-52
(March 9, 2020). https://www.flgov.com/wp-
content/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-52.pdf.
nnIllinois declared a Disaster on March
9, 2020. Office of Governor JB Pritzker,
Gubernatorial Disaster Proclamation
(March 9, 2020). https://www.illinois.
gov/content/dam/soi/en/web/coronavi
rus/documents/coronavirus-disaster-
proc-03-12-2020.pdf.
nnIowa declared a State of Disaster
Emergency on March 9, 2020. Office of
Governor Kim Reynolds, Proclamation
of Disaster Emergency (March 9, 2020).
https://governor.iowa.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/202003100818.pdf.
nnNew Jersey declared a Public Health
Emergency and a State of Emergency
on March 9, 2020. Office of Governor
Phil Murphy, Executive Order No. 103
(March 9, 2020). https://nj.gov/infobank/
eo/056murphy/pdf/EO-103.pdf.
nnOhio declared a State of Emergency on
March 9, 2020. Office of Governor Mike
DeWine, Executive Order 2020-01D
(March 9, 2020). https://drive.google.com/
file/d/1AcKOePvhmBpuNuaBQq7yZ37E2
Sog4tUe/view.
nnRhode Island declared a State of
Emergency on March 9, 2020. Office of
Governor Gina Raimondo, Executive
Order No 20-02 (March 9, 2020). https://
health.ri.gov/publications/exec-orders/
ExecOrder20-02.pdf.
nnConnecticut declared a Public Health
Emergency and a Civil Preparedness
Emergency on March 10, 2020. Office of
Governor Ned Lamont, Declaration of
Public Health and Civil Preparedness
Emergencies (March 10, 2020). https://
portal.ct.gov/-/media/Office-of-the-
Governor/News/20200310-declaration-
of-civil-preparedness-and-public-health-
emergency.pdf?la=en.
nnMassachusetts declared a State of
Emergency on March 10, 2020. Office
of Governor Charlie Baker, Governor’s
Declaration of Emergency (March 10, 2020).
https://www.mass.gov/doc/governors-decla
ration-of-emergency-march-10-2020-aka-
executive-order-591/download.
nnMichigan declared a State of Emergency
on March 10, 2020. Office of Governor
Gretchen Whitmer, Executive Order
SA-Weston-JEM#230005.indd 32 27/02/23 6:56 PM
33
Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 21, No. 7
Special Issue on COVID-19
2020-04 (March 10, 2020). https://www.
michigan.gov/coronavirus/News/2020/03/
10/michigan-announces-first-presumptive-
positive-cases-of-covid-19-governor-whit
mer-declares-a-state-o.
nnNorth Carolina declared a State of
Emergency on March 10, 2020. Office of
Governor Roy Cooper, Executive Order
No. 116 (March 10, 2020). https://files.
nc.gov/governor/documents/files/EO116-
SOE-COVID-19.pdf.
nnAlaska declared a Public Health Disaster
Emergency on March 11, 2020. Office
of Governor Mike Dunleavy, Declaration
of Public Health Disaster Emergency
(March 11, 2020). https://gov.alaska.gov/
wp-content/uploads/sites/2/COVID-19-
Disaster-Packet.pdf.
nnArizona declared a State of Emergency
on March 11, 2020. Office of Governor
Doug Ducey, Declaration of Emergency
(March 11, 2020). https://azgovernor.gov/
sites/default/files/declaraton_0.pdf.
nnArkansas declared an Emergency on
March 11, 2020. Office of Governor Asa
Hutchinson, Executive Order 20-03
(March 11, 2020). https://governor.arkan
sas.gov/images/uploads/executiveOrders/
EO_20-03._.pdf.
nnColorado declared a State of Disaster
Emergency on March 11, 2020. Office of
Governor Jared Polis, Executive Order
D 2020 003 (March 11, 2020). https://
www.colorado.gov/governor/sites/
default/files/inline-files/D%202020%20
003%20Declaring%20a%20Disaster%20
Emergency_1.pdf.
nnLouisiana declared a Public Health
Emergency on March 11, 2020. Office
of Governor John Bel Edwards,
Proclamation No. 25 JBE 2020 (March
11, 2020). https://gov.louisiana.gov/assets/
ExecutiveOrders/25-JBE-2020-COVID-19.
pdf.
nnNew Mexico declared a Public Health
Emergency on March 11, 2020. Office
of Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham,
Executive Order No. 2020-004 (March 11,
2020). https://www.governor.state.nm.us/
wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Executive-
Order-2020-004.pdf.
nnDelaware declared a State of Emergency
on March 12, 2020. Office of Governor
John Carney, Declaration of a State of
Emergency for the State of Delaware
Due to a Public Health Threat (March 12,
2020). https://governor.delaware.gov/wp-
content/uploads/sites/24/2020/03/State-of-
Emergency_03122020.pdf.
nnKansas declared a State of a Disaster
Emergency on March 12, 2020. Office of
Governor Laura Kelly, State of Disaster
Emergency Proclamation (March 12,
2020). https://governor.kansas.gov/wp-con
tent/uploads/2020/03/2020-03-12-Procla
mation.pdf.
nnMontana declared a State of Emergency
on March 12, 2020. Office of Governor
Steve Bullock, Executive Order No.
2-2020 (March 12, 2020). https://covid19.
mt.gov/_docs/EO-02-2020_COVID-19%20
Emergency%20Declaration.pdf.
nnNevada declared a State of Emergency
on March 12, 2020. Office of Governor
Steve Sisolak, Declaration of Emergency
for COVID-19 (March 12, 2020).
https://gov.nv.gov/News/Emergency_
Orders/2020/2020-03-12_-_COVID-19_
Declaration_of_Emergency/.
nnPuerto Rico declared a State of Emergency
on March 12, 2020. Office of Governor
SA-Weston-JEM#230005.indd 33 27/02/23 6:56 PM
34 Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 21, No. 7
Special Issue on COVID-19
Wanda Vazquez-Garced, Administrative
Bulletin No. OE 2020-020 (March 12,
2020). https://assmca.pr.gov/Documents/
Orden%20Ejecutiva-2020-020.pdf.
nnTennessee declared a State of Emergency
on March 12, 2020. Office of Governor
Bill Lee, Executive Order No. 14 (March
12, 2020). https://publications.tnsosfiles.
com/pub/execorders/exec-orders-lee14.
pdf.
nnVirginia declared a State of Emergency on
March 12, 2020. Office of Governor Ralph
Northam, Executive Order No. 51 (March
12, 2020). https://www.iftach.org/bulletins/
VA%20-%20EO-51-Declaration-of-a-State-
of-Emergency-Due-to-Novel-Coronavirus.
pdf.
nnWisconsin declared a Public Health
Emergency on March 12, 2020. Office
of Governor Tony Evers, Executive
Order No. 72 (March 12, 2020).
https://content.govdelivery.com/attach
ments/WIGOV/2020/03/12/file_attach
ments/1399035/EO072-DeclaringHealthE
mergencyCOVID-19.pdf.
nnAlabama declared a State Public Health
Emergency on March 13, 2020. Office of
Governor Kay Ivey, Proclamation (March
13, 2020). https://governor.alabama.gov/
newsroom/2020/03/state-of-emergency-
coronavirus-covid-19/.
nnIdaho declared a State of Emergency
on March 13, 2020. Office of Governor
Brad Little, Proclamation (March 13,
2020). https://gov.idaho.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2020/03/covid-19-declaration.pdf.
nnMinnesota declared a Peacetime
Emergency on March 13, 2020. Office of
Governor Tim Walz, Emergency Executive
Order No. 20-01 (March 13, 2020). https://
mn.gov/governor/assets/EO%2020-01_
tcm1055-422957.pdf.
nnMissouri declared a State of Emergency
on March 13, 2020. Office of Governor
Michael Parson, Executive Order No.
20-02 (March 13, 2020). https://www.sos.
mo.gov/library/reference/orders/2020/eo2.
nnNebraska declared a State of Emergency
on March 13, 2020. Office of Governor
Pete Ricketts, Proclamation (March
13, 2020). https://www.dropbox.
com/s/64xel8oha2gw22h/2020%20
State%20of%20Emergency%20-%20
Coronavirus%20.pdf?dl=0.
nnNew Hampshire declared a State of
Emergency on March 13, 2020. Office of
Governor Chris Sununu, Executive Order
No. 2020-04 (March 13, 2020). https://www.
governor.nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt336/
files/documents/2020-04.pdf.
nnNorth Dakota declared a State of
Emergency on March 13, 2020. Office of
Governor Doug Burgum, Executive Order
No. 2020-03 (March 13, 2020). https://
www.governor.nd.gov/sites/www/files/doc
uments/EO%202020-03.pdf.
nnSouth Carolina declared a State of
Emergency on March 13, 2020. Office of
Governor Henry McMaster, Executive Order
No. 2020-08 (March 13, 2020). https://gov
ernor.sc.gov/sites/governor/files/Documents/
Executive-Orders/2020-03-13%20
FILED%20Executive%20Order%20
No.%202020-08%20-%20State%20
of%20Emergency%20Due%20to%20
Coronavirus%20(COVID-19).pdf.
nnSouth Dakota declared a State of
Emergency on March 13, 2020. Office of
Governor Kristi Noem, Executive Order
SA-Weston-JEM#230005.indd 34 27/02/23 6:56 PM
35
Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 21, No. 7
Special Issue on COVID-19
No. 2020-04 (March 13, 2020). https://sdsos.
gov/general-information/executive-actions/
executive-orders/assets/2020-04.PDF.
nnTexas declared a State of Disaster on
March 13, 2020. Office of Governor Greg
Abbott, Proclamation (March 13, 2020).
https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/
DISASTER_covid19_disaster_proclama-
tion_IMAGE_03-13-2020.pdf.
nnThe US Virgin Islands declared a State
of Emergency on March 13, 2020. Office
of Governor Albert Bryan, Proclamation
Declaring a State of Emergency (March 13,
2020). https://www.vi.gov/executive-orders/.
nnVermont declared a State of Emergency
on March 13, 2020. Office of Governor
Phil Scott, Executive Order No. 01-20
(March 13, 2020). https://governor.vermont.
gov/sites/scott/files/documents/EO%20
01-20%20Declaration%20of%20State%20
of%20Emergency%20in%20Response%20
to%20COVID-19%20and%20National%20
Guard%20Call-Out.pdf.
nnWyoming declared a State of Emergency
and a Public Health Emergency on
March 13, 2020. Office of Governor
Mark Gordon, Executive Order No.
2020-2 (March 13, 2020). https://drive.
google.com/file/d/19mX3feCje2NKRrKi_
GPiKvwcckGVoVBh/view.
nnGeorgia declared a Public Health State
of Emergency on March 14, 2020. Office
of Governor Brian Kemp, Declaration of
Public Health State of Emergency (March
14, 2020). https://gov.georgia.gov/executive-
action/executive-orders/2020-executive-
orders.
nnMississippi declared a State of Emergency
on March 14, 2020. Office of Governor
Tate Reeves, Proclamation (March 14,
2020). https://mailchi.mp/49732661e240/
governor-tate-reeves-declares-state-of-
emergency-to-protect-public-health?e=
%5bUNIQID%5d.
nnGuam declared a State of Emergency
on March 15, 2020. Office of Governor
Lourdes Leon Guerrero, Executive Order
No. 2020-03 (March 15, 2020). https://
www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/fmcsa.dot.gov/
files/2020-03/Guam%20State%20of%20
Emergency%20Declaration%20Order.
pdf.
nnMaine declared a State of Civil
Emergency on March 15, 2020. Office
of Governor Janet Mills, Proclamation
of State of Civil Emergency to Further
Protect Public Health (March 15, 2020).
https://www.maine.gov/governor/mills/
sites/maine.gov.governor.mills/files/inline-
files/Proclamation%20of%20State%20
of%20Civil%20Emergency%20To%20
Further%20Protect%20Public%20Health.
pdf.
nnOklahoma declared an Emergency on
March 15, 2020. Office of Governor Kevin
Stitt, Executive Order No. 2020-07 (March
15, 2020). https://www.sos.ok.gov/docu
ments/executive/1913.pdf.
SA-Weston-JEM#230005.indd 35 27/02/23 6:56 PM
... An SOE and quasi-SOE allow prefecture governments to take stock of emergency measures to curb the spread of COVID-19, such as refraining from unnecessary and nonurgent going out, reducing the business hours of restaurants and bars, and adopting telework to reduce the movement of the population. However, unlike countries such as Australia [7], the UK [8] and the US [9], a specificity of the Japanese SOE and quasi-SOE is the fact that only recommendations and not mandates can be adopted. A clear example of this difference is the fact that Japan did not adopt lockdown policies and recommended only that businesses close and the population stay at home. ...
... The estimation results based on the random-effects model are summarized in Table 3. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(4) is a dummy that took a value of 1 if all five prevention measures were adopted, while it was a telework dummy in columns (5)- (8). Columns (1)-(4) show that both intervention effects (SOE and quasi-SOE) and information effects (number of deaths and fear of infection) were positive and statistically significant. ...
... Next, columns (5)- (8) show that the declaration of an SOE increased the probability of adopting telework by 7.6 to 8.4%, while the coefficients of the quasi-SOE were not significant. These results indicate that a decision to conduct telework largely depended on an SOE declaration. ...
Article
Full-text available
This paper estimated the impact of intervention effects (state of emergency (SOE) or quasi-SOE requirements) and information effects (publicized increases in the number of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) deaths and fear of infection) on preventive behaviors and telecommuting during the COVID-19 pandemic using the Japan Household Panel Survey. Our results indicated that SOEs and quasi-SOEs had positive effects on the adoption of preventive behaviors among individuals, including handwashing, which indicates that an SOE has a direct effect and an indirect effect. Although SOEs in Japan were less enforceable and more lenient than those in other countries, they still had a certain effect on people’s adoption of preventive behaviors. However, the contribution of information effects was much larger than that of intervention effects, suggesting the importance of how and when information should be communicated to the public to prevent the spread of infection.
Article
Objective The current study presents the legal epidemiological review of State Health Official (SHO) appointment laws, including the evolution of educational and experience requirements of SHOs over time. Findings can inform the discussion about state laws and the substantive, multidisciplinary qualifications essential to successfully leading state public health agencies in the 21st century. Methods Standard policy surveillance methods were used to collect and assess the statutes governing SHO appointment and eligibility from all 50 states and the District of Columbia between 1995 and 2020. Results SHOs are most frequently appointed by their jurisdiction's Health Secretary (n = 17), followed by Governor nominations with legislative approval (n = 15), and 13 states where the Governor is the sole SHO appointing authority. While a large majority of jurisdictions require certain professional and/or educational minimum qualifications to serve as an SHO, 11 states have no professional or experiential minimum qualifications. The most common minimum requirement found was possessing a medical degree, which is required in 22 jurisdictions (including Washington, District of Columbia). Twelve of these states require the physician to have additional education or experience, such as the possession of experience in public health (n = 5), experience in both public health and management (n = 3), or holding an additional health-related degree (n = 2). Four states added a medical degree as a requirement for SHOs over the last 25 years, while 5 states removed their medical degree requirement. Conclusions States should reassess their eligibility requirements for SHO service in light of the advancement and demands of public health leadership in the 21st century, as many states continue to look to those with medical training as the primary source for such leadership.
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Full-text available
Objectives By the end of 2020, 38 states and the District of Columbia had issued requirements that people wear face masks when in public settings to counter SARS-CoV-2 transmission. To examine the role face mask mandates played in economic recovery, we analyzed the interactive effect of having a state face mask mandate in place on county-level consumer spending after state reopening, adjusting for county rates of new COVID-19 cases and deaths, time trends, and county-specific effects. Methods We collected county-specific data from state executive orders, consumer spending data from the Opportunity Insights Economic Tracker, and COVID-19 case and death data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention COVID-19 tracker. Using an event study approach, we compared county-level changes in consumer spending before and after state-issued closure orders were lifted and assessed the interactive effect of state-issued face mask mandates. Results The lifting of state-issued closures was associated with an average increase in consumer spending across all counties studied within 1 month. However, the increase was 1.2-1.7 percentage points higher in counties with a state face mask mandate in place than in counties without a state face mask mandate. Conclusions In addition to their public health benefits, face mask mandates may have assisted economic recovery during the COVID-19 pandemic, suggesting they are a strong public health strategy for policy makers to consider now and for potential future pandemics arising from airborne viruses.
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Context: In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, states across the United States implemented various strategies to mitigate transmission of SARS-CoV-2 (the virus that causes COVID-19). Objective: To examine the effect of COVID-19-related state closures on consumer spending, business revenue, and employment, while controlling for changes in COVID-19 incidence and death. Design: The analysis estimated a difference-in-difference model, utilizing temporal and geographic variation in state closure orders to analyze their impact on the economy, while controlling for COVID-19 incidence and death. Participants: State-level data on economic outcomes from the Opportunity Insights data tracker and COVID-19 cases and death data from usafacts.org. Interventions: The mitigation strategy analyzed within this study was COVID-19-related state closure orders. Data on these orders were obtained from state government Web sites containing executive or administrative orders. Main outcome measures: Outcomes include state-level estimates of consumer spending, business revenue, and employment levels. Results: Analyses showed that although state closures led to a decrease in consumer spending, business revenue, and employment, they accounted for only a small portion of the observed decreases in these outcomes over the first wave of COVID-19. Conclusions: The impact of COVID-19 on economic activity likely reflects a combination of factors, in addition to state closures, such as individuals' perceptions of risk related to COVID-19 incidence, which may play significant roles in impacting economic activity.
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Full-text available
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We examine the impact of government interventions on the spread of COVID-19 and consumer spending. We do this by first estimating models of COVID-19 spread, consumer spending, and social distancing in the United States during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. Social distancing has a large effect on reducing COVID-19 spread and is responsive to national and local case numbers. Nonmask government interventions reduce COVID-19 spread, whereas the effectiveness of mask mandates is much smaller and statistically insignificant. Mask mandates tend to increase social distancing, as do nonmask governmental restrictions as a whole. Social distancing hurts spending in the absence of a mask mandate but has a negligible effect on spending if there is a mask mandate. Mask mandates have a direct effect of increasing spending in counties with high levels of social distancing while reducing spending in counties with low levels of social distancing. We use these three estimated models to calculate the effect of mask mandates and other governmental interventions on COVID-19 cases, deaths, and consumer spending. Implemented mask mandates decreased COVID-19 cases by a statistically insignificant 774,000 cases, saving 28,000 lives, over a four-month period, but led to $76B–$155B of additional consumer spending. Other nonmask governmental interventions that were implemented reduced the number of COVID-19 cases by 34M, saving 1,230,000 lives, while reducing consumer spending by approximately $470B–$703B over our 4-month period of the study. Thus, these restrictions were cost effective as long as one values each saved life at $387,000–$608,000 or more. This paper was accepted by Matt Shum, marketing. Supplemental Material: The data is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4853 .
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This study assesses state-level legal interventions to promote or impede COVID-19 vaccine mandates in the US since the beginning of the pandemic.