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Chimpanzees: Self-Recognition
Abstract
After prolonged exposure to their reflected images in mirrors, chimpanzees marked with red dye showed evidence of being able
to recognize their own reflections. Monkeys did not appear to have this capacity.
... Can the Alter3+LLM possess a minimal self, as described by Gallagher? This paper introduces the mirror self-recognition test (Gallup, 1970) for Alter3, which applies the motion generation and image recognition capabilities of GPT-4. Furthermore, we analyzes the "sense of ownership" based on the framework of the rubber hand illusion (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). ...
... We used the framework of the mirror test which is a behavioral experiment used to assess self-awareness and sense of agency. The test was first developed by Gordon Gallup in the 1970s (Gallup, 1970). Previous research on robot mirror cognition, such as Gold's work with the robot named Nico, has involved comparing a learned self-model with a mirror image to judge self-recognition. ...
This paper introduces Alter3, a humanoid robot that demonstrates spontaneous motion generation through the integration of GPT-4, Large Language Model (LLM). This overcomes challenges in applying language models to direct robot control. By translating linguistic descriptions into actions, Alter3 can autonomously perform various tasks. The key aspect of humanoid robots is their ability to mimic human movement and emotions, allowing them to leverage human knowledge from language models. This raises the question of whether Alter3+GPT-4 can develop a "minimal self" with a sense of agency and ownership. This paper introduces mirror self-recognition and rubber hand illusion tests to assess Alter3's potential for a sense of self. The research suggests that even disembodied language models can develop agency when coupled with a physical robotic platform.
... On the individual level, not all chickens passed the mirror-mediated spatial location task successfully and those who did, needed different amounts of time (numbers of sessions). These findings contribute to the research focus of personality and capabilities at the individual level within a species' behaviour in mirror-image processing tests in detail, as well as animal behaviour studies in general 1,13,34,[37][38][39] . ...
The increasing demand on adapting modern livestock farming to higher animal welfare standards requires a thorough understanding of a species’ cognitive abilities to determine their adaptability. With the chicken being the world’s most numerous birds in animal production, it is mandatory to identify its cognitive abilities and limitations in order to meet its needs. We investigated if chickens are able to use and understand the reflective properties of a mirror that is the correlation of reflections of food rewards and their real location. In total, 18 female chickens of two different breeds were tested in a mirror-mediated spatial location task. Eleven out of eighteen hens solved the task successfully and thus, possibly exploited the correlation between the reflection in the mirror and the real food reward. We found differences on a breed and on the individual level, with different amounts of time needed learning the association of reward and mirror image. The results imply sophisticated cognitive abilities in chickens, assuming they may be able to understand how mirror images represent objects in the real environment, and to make use of it during foraging. The chicken’s cognitive ability might lead to a new understanding and provision of animal welfare-compliant production environments.
... This is demonstrated by the fact that one responds faster to one's own face than to the faces of others, a phenomenon known as the 'self-face advantage' (see [2] for a review). Interestingly, people generally hold a self-enhancement bias whereby they perceive their own face as more attractive than it might be [3][4][5]. The underlying mechanism of this phenomenon is not fully understood, but one possibility could be the identification with attractive others through blurring of self-other boundaries [6]. ...
People naturally exhibit a self-serving bias which can be observed in their tendency to judge their own physical attractiveness more favourably than that of others. Despite this positive self-perception, minimally invasive cosmetic injectable procedures for facial rejuvenation and enhancement are becoming increasingly common. It remains unclear, however, whether recognizing an altered version of one’s own face, enhanced cosmetically, correlates with a positive view of cosmetic surgery and excessive preoccupations about physical characteristics perceived as defects (body dysmorphic concerns). In this study, 30 healthy female participants, aged 18–24 years (Mage = 21.1 years, SD = 1.6), engaged in a face recognition task during which their faces were digitally morphed with that of gender-matched unfamiliar women who had undergone cosmetic enhancements, specifically lip and cheek fillers. The duration of exposure to these modified faces varied with short (500 msec) and long (2000 msec) viewing periods. Participants were asked to identify whether the digital morphs represented themselves or the other woman. Self-reports regarding acceptance of cosmetic surgery and dysmorphic concerns were collected. Participants PSE indicated a tendency towards self-bias under short presentation times, shifting towards the other as presentation times lengthened. Interestingly, this effect was associated with greater acceptance of cosmetic surgery and higher body dysmorphic concerns. This study underscores the importance of understanding how perceptions of others’ physical appearances can influence self-recognition and attitudes towards cosmetic surgery, which may have both positive and potentially harmful implications.
... Por isso, os animais sociais estão expostos a mais oportunidades de desenvolvimento cognitivo do que os solitários, que interagem mais frequentemente com desafios físicos menos desafiadores. À medida que uma espécie se torna cognitivamente mais avançada, devido ao seu ambiente 3 Sobre as origens (ontogenia e filogenia) da consciência, v., e.g.,Mashour & Alkire (2013); para um estudo pioneiro envolvendo o teste do espelho,Gallup (1970), e, para uma revisão recente, Lei (2023). Este último assim descreveu o teste (Lei 2023, p. 1; tradução livre): "No estágio final [do teste], [...] uma marca inodora é colocada em uma parte do corpo que normalmente não pode ser vista. ...
Diferentemente do que imaginam alguns, a autoconsciência não é uma exclusividade humana. Chimpanzés e orangotangos passam no teste do espelho, por exemplo, uma evidência de que esses animais reconhecem a si mesmos como objetos dignos de atenção. Para os nossos propósitos, o mais importante a registrar aqui seria o seguinte: até onde sabemos, todos os animais dotados de autoconsciência são também animais de hábitos sociais. Sim, todos eles vivem (temporária ou permanentemente) em grupos. E isso não parece ser um mero capricho da Mãe Natureza.
... If our hypothesis is accurate, animals with a sense of self should also typically be good decisionmakers. To test which animals possess self-awareness, researchers have employed methods such as the mirror test [14], where an animal is marked in a spot only visible through a mirror. Animals that recognize and attempt to investigate or remove the mark demonstrate self-awareness. ...
We demonstrate how Darwinian evolution enhances decision-making via experiential learning and game-theoretical strategies. To an external observer, the resultant moderate intra-individual variability is indistinguishable from free will. We conclude that this evolutionary outcome is the simplest explanation for decision-making, thus being preferable according to Occam's razor, and implying that free will is an illusion. Furthermore , we argue that the perception of free will exists due to evolutionary benefits.
Purpose
The aim of this paper is twofold: to explore the significance and implications of the rise of AI technology for the field of tertiary education in general and, in particular, to answer the question of whether teachers can be replaced by intelligent AI systems such as androids, what that requires in terms of human capabilities and what that might mean for teaching and learning in higher education.
Design/methodology/approach
Given the interdisciplinary nature of this conceptual paper, a literature review serves as a methodological tool to access data pertaining to the research question posed in the paper.
Findings
This exploratory paper gathers a range of evidence from the philosophy of mind (the mind-body problem), Kahneman’s (2011) System 1 and System 2 models of the mind, Gödel’s (1951) Two Incompleteness Theorems, Polanyi’s (1958, 1966) theory of tacit knowing and Searle’s (1980) Chinese Room thought experiment to the effect that no AI system can ever fully replace a human being because no machine can replicate the human mind and its capacity for intelligence, consciousness and highly developed social skills such as empathy and cooperation.
Practical implications
AI is rising, but there are inherent limits to what machines can achieve when compared to human capabilities. An android can at most attain “weak AI”, that is, it can be smart but lack awareness or empathy. Therefore, an analysis of good teaching at the tertiary level shows that learning, knowledge and understanding go far beyond any quantitative processing that an AI machine does so well, helping us to appreciate the qualitative dimension of education and knowledge acquisition. ChatGPT is robotic, being AI-generated, but human beings thrive on the human-to-human interface – that is, human relationships and meaningful connections – and that is where the true qualitative value of educational attainment will be gauged.
Social implications
This paper has provided evidence that human beings are irreplaceable due to our unique strengths as meaning-makers and relationship-builders, our capacity for morality and empathy, our creativity, our expertise and adaptability and our capacity to build unity and cooperate in building social structures and civilization for the benefit of all. Furthermore, as society is radically automated, the purpose of human life and its reevaluation will also come into question. For instance, as more and more occupations are replaced by ChatGPT services, more and more people will be freed up to do other things with their time, such as caring for relatives, undertaking creative projects, studying further and having children.
Originality/value
The investigation of the scope and limitations of AI is significant for two reasons. First, the question of the nature and functions of a mind becomes critical to the possibility of replication because if the human mind is like a super-sophisticated computer, then the relationship between a brain and mind is similar (if not identical) to the relationship between a computer as machine hardware and its programme or software (Dreyfus, 1979). [ ] If so, it should be theoretically possible to understand its mechanism and reproduce it, and then it is just a matter of time before AI research and development can replicate the human mind and eventually replace a human teacher, especially if an AI machine can teach just as intelligently yet more efficiently and economically. But if AI has inherent limitations that preclude the possibility of ever having a human-like mind and thought processes, then our investigation can at least clarify in what ways AI/AGI – such as ChatGPT – could support teaching and learning at universities.
The Gaia hypothesis is often used as the basis for demonstrating environmental integrity in current arguments within the field of ecological philosophy. However, when citing the Gaia hypothesis, people are often vague when defining its connotations and extensions. By analysing the controversies surrounding the Gaia hypothesis, we can achieve an appropriate conception of its ontology, including the blindness of the strong theoretical approach and the rationality of the weak one. Gaia's naturalistic epistemology, holistic methodology and systematic values can thus be discriminated. Gaia has strong significance for allowing human beings to understand the Earth's ecological environment and is an effective ecological holistic theory.
Forty years ago, Gallup proposed that theory of mind presupposes self‐awareness. Following Humphrey, his hypothesis was that individuals can infer the mental states of others thanks to the ability to monitor their own mental states in similar circumstances. Since then, advances in several disciplines, such as comparative and developmental psychology, have provided empirical evidence to test Gallup's hypothesis. Herein, we review and discuss this evidence.
This volume provides the most comprehensive and up-to-date compendium of theory and research in the field of human intelligence. Each of the 42 chapters is written by world-renowned experts in their respective fields, and collectively, they cover the full range of topics of contemporary interest in the study of intelligence. The handbook is divided into nine parts: Part I covers intelligence and its measurement; Part II deals with the development of intelligence; Part III discusses intelligence and group differences; Part IV concerns the biology of intelligence; Part V is about intelligence and information processing; Part VI discusses different kinds of intelligence; Part VII covers intelligence and society; Part VIII concerns intelligence in relation to allied constructs; and Part IX is the concluding chapter, which reflects on where the field is currently and where it still needs to go.
This volume provides the most comprehensive and up-to-date compendium of theory and research in the field of human intelligence. Each of the 42 chapters is written by world-renowned experts in their respective fields, and collectively, they cover the full range of topics of contemporary interest in the study of intelligence. The handbook is divided into nine parts: Part I covers intelligence and its measurement; Part II deals with the development of intelligence; Part III discusses intelligence and group differences; Part IV concerns the biology of intelligence; Part V is about intelligence and information processing; Part VI discusses different kinds of intelligence; Part VII covers intelligence and society; Part VIII concerns intelligence in relation to allied constructs; and Part IX is the concluding chapter, which reflects on where the field is currently and where it still needs to go.
Analyzes the psychological properties of an organism's own reflection in a mirror, and discusses methodological problems associated with mirror research. Many organisms are responsive to mirrors, and reflected images are examined in terms of motivational and social stimulus properties which have been found to extend across a wide variety of species. Reinforcing properties of mirrors are interpreted in terms of novel stimulation with social stimulus overtones. Stimulus change and mimicry are 2 of the most prominent characteristics of an organism's mirror image. An animal in front of a mirror is instrumental in producing changes in the behavior of the reflected image, yet most organisms respond to mirrors as if their image represented another animal. In an attempt to conceptualize both the human and animal data, responses to mirrors and dimensionalized into other- and self-directed behaviors. Implications of mirrors for abnormal behavior and psychotherapy are considered. (63 ref.)
This chapter reviews some experimental data regarding learning by primate and non-primate species. It presents some problems on which both primates and representatives of some other vertebrate taxon have been tested. It presents the ways in which learning in primates does not differ from learning in other taxa. The qualitative differences in learning between mammals and nonmammals are much greater and more significant than what learning theorists have recognized. The substantial qualitative similarities in learning by mammals indicate that the differences in learning between primates and other mammals are not so great as they seemed to many primatologists a few years ago.
