Content uploaded by Giovanni Berlucchi
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Giovanni Berlucchi on Aug 05, 2019
Content may be subject to copyright.
Neuropsychology: Theoretical Basis
G Berlucchi, Universita
`di Verona, Verona, Italy
ã2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Birth of Neuropsychology
Broadly conceived as an attempt to understand the
relationships between brain, mind, and behavior, neuro-
psychology has a long history, but it was only in the
1960s that an autonomous field of scientific inquiry
with that name was formally established. Although
there is some evidence for occasional appearances
of the term ‘neuropsychology’ and its derivatives in
medical writings of the nineteenth century and per-
haps even earlier, the term began to acquire some
visibility in the 1940s and 1950s because the influen-
tial North American psychologists Lashley, Hebb,
and Teuber used it in their efforts to advocate the
interaction, if not the coalescence, of neurology and
psychology. (Hebb gave the subtitle A Neuropsycho-
logical Theory to his celebrated book, The Organiza-
tion of Behavior, and Lashley and Teuber mentioned
neuropsychology as part of the classical field of physio-
logical psychology.)
The official birth of neuropsychology as an indep-
endent scientific discipline can be dated to 1963, when
an international specialty journal titled Neuropsycho-
logia started its publication on the initiative of a small
group of neurologists, psychologists, and psychia-
trists partaking in an informal discussion forum called
the International Neuropsychology Symposium. The
scope and aims of neuropsychology were spelled out
in the first issue of the journal in an unsigned manifesto
attributable to the Editor-in-Chief, the French neurolo-
gist Henry He
´caen. According to the manifesto, the
foundation of a new journal and a new distinctive
discipline, neuropsychology, was intended to meet
the needs of a number of investigators in a number
of more traditional fields who had more in common
with one another than with the members of their ori-
ginal specialties. More specifically, the term ‘neuro-
psychology’ was understood to mean a particular area
of neurology of common concern to neurologists, psy-
chiatrists, psychologists, and neurophysiologists, with
an interest focused mainly, but not exclusively, on
the cerebral cortex, and on disorders of language,
perception, and action. It was recognized that although
certain of these disorders could be studied only in
adult humans, information of great value to the under-
standing of basic cerebral mechanisms and to human
pathology was expected to come as well from experi-
ments on animals, from ethological studies of learning
and conditioning, and from analyses of normal devel-
opment in children.
That the field was ripe for more than one
specialized publication was very soon made clear by
the appearance, in the following year, of another
journal devoted to the study of the nervous system
and behavior; this journal was entitled Cortex, and its
frank neuropsychological character was attested by
an opening article by Aleksandr Luria on the role
of neuropsychology in the diagnosis of local brain
damage. The same year, 1964, saw the publication
of a reader, edited by R L Isaacson; this publica-
tion, entitled Basic Readings in Neuropsychology,
collected 16 papers from scientific journals, 14 of
which reported animal experiments, in confirmation
of the perceived importance of this approach for the
new field of neuropsychology.
The Anatomo-Clinical Approach as
a Main Root of Neuropsychology
The concept of neuropsychology explicitly or implic-
itly set forth in the aforementioned publications
extended the boundaries of the discipline well beyond
those of the outgrowth of one of its main roots,
the anatomo-clinical approach applied in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries to the study of
psychological dysfunctions in brain-injured patients.
On the inspiration of phrenology, but with a much
greater scientific respectability, the anatomo-clinical
approach had worked on the belief that mental func-
tions are localizable in the brain and that cerebral
organization is based on an orderly system of func-
tionally specialized centers linked by discrete and
selective anatomical connections. Functional locali-
zation in the brain was assumed to be demonstrated
when an autoptically ascertained lesion in a particular
cerebral region could be shown to stand in a sys-
tematic relation with a particular psychological abil-
ity, insofar as that ability was lost, and others were
preserved, in patients carrying that lesion. Based on
that approach Broca, Wernicke, Liepmann, Lichtheim,
Bianchi, Dejerine, and others had been able to localize
some specific psychological functions, particularly in
the domains of language and voluntary motor control,
in specific regions of the cerebral cortex, strengthening
the view that the brain is made up by a set of centers,
akin in a sense to the cerebral organs of phrenology,
each with its own functional specialization.
The physiological connectionism of the anatomo-
clinical approach assumed that interactions between
functionally allied centers occurred through the discrete
Neuropsychology: Theoretical Basis 1001
fiber pathways linking the appropriate cortical regions,
hence clinical symptoms and syndromes were divided
into those resulting from lesions directly encroaching
upon putative specialized centers, and those caused
by the interruption of fiber pathways and the atten-
dant disconnection of allied centers. This localization–
connectionist view received support not only from
existing knowledge of brain anatomy and human
neuropathology, but also from the study of the effects
of circumscribed brain lesions and electrical stimula-
tions in experimental animals, although such effects
were of course restricted to basic sensory and motor
functions.
Decline of the Anatomo-Clinical Approach
in the First Half of the Twentieth Century
In spite of a number of undisputable achievements,
in the first decades of the twentieth century the loca-
lizationist–connectionist approach came under severe
criticism from different angles, and especially as a result
of detailed clinical examinations of young soldiers
who had suffered from missile wounds of the brain
in World War I. Influential clinical neurologists such
as Monakow, Head, Marie, and Goldstein, dis-
satisfied with the rather crude anatomical and behav-
ioral analyses of their predecessors (caricatured as
brain cartographers and diagram-makers), shared
Hughlings Jackson’s aversion to the attribution of
normal psychological functions to cortical areas based
on behavioral effects of their lesions. They saw any
attempt to localize language and other higher ner-
vous functions in the brain as a futile exercise, and
convinced themselves that disorders of higher ner-
vous functions had better be imputed to diffuse
alterations of brain organization, in contrast with
elementary motor and sensory defects which could
instead be precisely related to specific sites of brain
damage, as in the case of discrete, topographically
organized visual field losses resulting from different
bullet trajectories within the occipital lobes. At the
same time, general theories of cerebral organization
entertained by holistically oriented schools of psychol-
ogy seemed largely incompatible with the localization
of psychological functions in brain centers connected
by select fiber paths. Radical learning theorists tended
to depict the developing nervous system as a random,
unstructured, and essentially equipotential network
to be molded and shaped into a functionally adaptive
system by use, practice, and conditioning.
Based on his lesion experiments in rats, Lashley,
perhaps the most important physiological psycholo-
gist of the time, contrived a general theory of the
brain based on mass action and functional equi-
potentiality of the cortex, whereby the severity of
functional deficits correlated with the amount of
cortex removed, independent of lesion site, and most
perceptual and learning functions could be subserved
by virtually any part of the cortex. In a different
vein, but again in sharp contrast with localization–
connectionist views, the Gestalt doctrine of psycho-
neural isomorphism equated brain activities underlying
psychological functions with diffuse electrical fields
spreading throughout the cortex as a volume conductor
rather than with distinct patterns of nervous impulses
traveling along orthodox neuronal circuits. Finally,
interest in brain–behavior relationships was discour-
aged by behavioristic extremists who advocated the
restriction of behavior analysis to directly observable
input–output relationships of the whole organism, with
total disregard for any independent neurophysiological
evidence.
Return of Localization and Connectionism
These viewpoints against localization and connection-
ism were neither completely illogical nor totally
devoid of some factual evidence. It is true, for exam-
ple, that during development there is an excessive
production of neurons and neuronal connections,
many of which are functionally inappropriate and
must be eliminated by the action of natural environ-
mental influences at later stages of maturation. It is
also true that the brain is not a mosaic of centers and
that functionally specialized populations of neurons
tend to be distributed in the brain rather than being
concentrated in circumscribed centers. But develop-
ments in the neurosciences beginning around the mid-
dle of the twentieth century proved beyond doubt that
anatomical and physiological specificity and selectiv-
ity are the hallmarks of a cerebral organization in
which there is no room for either mass action or
functional equipotentiality. Work in neuroembryol-
ogy and neurophysiology showed that well before
birth the genes and developmental processes deter-
mine highly specific neural connections, which are
then maintained and perfected by environmental
influences.
Cytoarchitectural and myeloarchitectural subdivi-
sions of the cortex, as described by the early neuro-
anatomists, were given specific functional meaning
by the demonstration that most of these subdivisions
contain orderly maps of the sensory or motor periph-
eries, as well as populations of neurons with quite
distinctive physiological properties. An important
distinction surfaced between neuronal systems con-
veying specific sensory or motor information, and
deep-brain systems with diffuse projections to the
thalamus and cortex which can modulate the activity
of the entire nervous system in the sleep–wake cycle
1002 Neuropsychology: Theoretical Basis
as well as in attentional and motivational regulations.
The identification of different synaptic transmitters
subsequently furnished evidence for the existence of
several of these diffusely projecting systems, each
marked by a single transmitter specific for that system
and for its action on its cortical and subcortical tar-
gets. Better controlled lesion experiments in animals
and more accurate and systematic analyses of neuro-
logical patients made it clear that, depending on its
locus, focal brain damage can bring about unique
combinations of impairments and spared psycho-
logical capabilities, allowing reasonable inferences
about the cerebral localization and organization of
normal psychological processes. On the basis of such
a renewed localizationist approach, it became feasible
both to use the pattern of losses and preservations of
functional high-order capabilities for inferring the site
of the causative brain lesion, and in turn to employ
theories about normal psychological functioning in
order to predict the psychological outcome of a par-
ticular cerebral injury. The logic of the interpretation
of the psychological effects of brain lesions benefited
considerably from the distinction between a simple
dissociation (lesion X produces impairment of perfor-
mance on task A but not on task B), which may at
least in part depend on task difficulty rather than
functional specialization, and the more revealing
double dissociation (lesion X produces impairment
of performance on task A but not on task B, while
lesion Y produces impairment of performance on task
B but not on task A), an effective methodological
weapon for strengthening the reliability of inferences
about functional localization.
Technological Progress in the Aid of
Neuropsychology
Starting from the 1960s and 1970s, the advances of
the newly born discipline of neuropsychology were
helped considerably by technological progress. In the
old times neuropsychologists had to wait for post-
mortem examinations or to rely on entry and exit
sites of bullets or other objects in the skull in order
to obtain direct anatomical evidence for the locus of
brain damage. In the case of closed head brain inju-
ries, it was often the neuropsychologist who inferred
the locus of damage on the basis of a specific pattern
of psychological deficits. This situation changed dras-
tically when the invention of X-ray computed tomog-
raphy (CT) scanning in the 1970s allowed one to see
the injured structures of the living brain in a noninva-
sive manner, making it possible to obtain independent
parallel evidence on psychological deficits and brain
pathology, and to follow their evolution over time. In
the following decades, further spectacular advances
in the noninvasive imaging of the normal working
human brain have been obtained with positron emis-
sion tomography (PET) and functional magnetic res-
onance imaging (fMRI), both of which monitor
changes in local blood flow related to metabolism
and chemical and electrical activities of neurons and
glia. These techniques have shown that diverse cogni-
tive operations are associated with rather distinctive
combinations of activated cortical regions inter-
spersed among other cortical regions with unchanged
activity. It has therefore become feasible to match the
deficits in specific cognitive operations resulting from
a localized cortical lesion against the activation of the
same cortical region in the normal brain during the
execution of the same cognitive operations.
Complementary information to the preceding evi-
dence can now be obtained with transcranial mag-
netic simulation (TMS), which allows temporary
functional inactivation of select cortical areas in
normal observers during the execution of cognitive
tasks. Further, the perfection of the classical electro-
encephalographic and evoked-potentials techniques
and the introduction of magnetoencephalography
have furnished the possibility to obtain global or
local brain correlates of behavioral and mental states
with a temporal resolution far superior to that of the
X-ray or PET or fMRI imaging techniques. Digital
computers have enormously facilitated the collec-
tion and analysis of behavioral and brain data, and
computer science and artificial intelligence have con-
tributed to neuropsychological progress both practi-
cally and theoretically. In these sciences, a movement
called connectionism attempts to explain human cog-
nition using artificial neural networks, composed of
large numbers of units linked by connections with
variable strength. The units are the analogs of neu-
rons, and the variable connections mimic synaptic
connections. Although artificial neural networks have
been proved capable to learn typical neuropsycho-
logical tasks (e.g., reading or face recognition) with
stimulation-induced changes in the strength of connec-
tions between the units, the resemblance between the
artificial intelligence connectionism and the anatomo-
physiological connectionism of neuropsychology is
vague. The genes and the forces of development predis-
pose a prenatal, extremely selective pattern of con-
nections between the brain neurons, which artificial
neural networks, with their initially random connec-
tions, cannot simulate in a veridical manner. Finally,
thanks to techniques for recording from single neurons
in experimental animals, particularly in freely behaving
monkeys, an enormous amount of information has
been obtained on the organization of the material sub-
strates of the higher nervous functions in those animals.
In many cases this information has provided a decisive
Neuropsychology: Theoretical Basis 1003
guidance for probing the corresponding substrates of
cognition in man.
Some Major Achievements of
Neuropsychology
As implied in its original program, neuropsychology has
mostly succeeded when progress was made in a conver-
gent fashion on the two fronts – the brain on one front
and the mind or, to use a more fashionable term, cogni-
tion on the other. Since its start in the early 1960s,
neuropsychology experienced profound changes in
the understanding of cerebral organization, especially
as regards the role of long corticocortical connections
in the transfer of sensory, motor, and higher order
information. In support of the validity of the concept
of anatomo-functional connectionism, Geschwind and
others reestablished the reality of aphasic discon-
nection syndromes contingent on lesions of the long
association connections within the cortex of the left
hemisphere, and the split-brain studies of Sperry and
co-workers demolished one of the alleged corner-
stones of Lashley’s view of the long corticocortical
connections as mere ‘skeletal structures,’ devoid of
any demonstrable mental or behavioral function.
Far from being a mere mechanical link between the
two hemispheres, the most developed of these connec-
tions, the corpus callosum, was shown to be the essen-
tial route for the interhemispheric exchange of
information underlying mentation and behavior con-
trol. In addition, the independent cognitive abilities of
the two separate hemispheres proved to be consider-
ably different, in general keeping with much new evi-
dence from the analysis of the deficits caused by right
and left hemispheric lesions. The adoption of appropri-
ate statistical tests in studies of large cohorts of patients
with brain lesions in approximately corresponding
hemispheric locations led to a definitive rejection of
the classical concept of an overall left cerebral domi-
nance in favor of the notion of a complementary func-
tional specializations of the two hemispheres.
The unique specialization of the left hemisphere for
all language functions was confirmed not only in
right-handers but also in most left-handers, and the
right hemisphere was in turn found to be predominant
in various cognitive tasks that cannot be aided by
verbal mediation, such as the exploration and cogni-
tion of space, the discrimination and recognition of
unfamiliar and familiar faces, and the perception and
memory of colors and complex visual shapes. Lesions
of the right hemisphere were attributed a special role
in the unilateral hemineglect syndrome as well as in
emotional and affective disorders such as anosognosia
(e.g., the denial of illness) and the flattening of affect.
Discoveries on hemispheric asymmetry of functions in
brain-injured patients stimulated a multitude of stud-
ies on normal observers tested with different sensory
inputs channeled into single hemispheres while res-
ponses were measured as simple or choice reaction
times, in order to assess various aspects of transfer of
cognitive information between the hemispheres. The
time-honored methodology of mental chronometry
was also applied to the analysis of attentional modu-
lation of cognitive processes, allowing important dis-
tinctions between automatic and voluntary orienting
mechanisms, as well as between the allocation of
attention to spatial locations and that to objects.
The field of memory was revolutionized by the
work of Brenda Milner on the famous patient H.M.,
who had been submitted to a bilateral medial tempo-
ral removal for epilepsy control, with a resulting
extremely severe anterograde amnesia but normal
short-term memory and fair-to-good long-term mem-
ory for preoperatory facts and events. The demon-
stration that this patient could learn at a normal rate
and retain skills of which he was totally unaware
made a definitive case for a fractionation of memory
into components, a case which had been postulated
mainly on theoretical grounds but never revealed
with such compelling evidence. This groundbreaking
discovery started many very successful lines of
investigation which led to a fractionation of both
short-term and long-term memory into multiple com-
ponents. The subdivision of long-term memory into
the declarative and nondeclarative categories, in their
turn subdivided into different subcategories, has been
greatly fruitful for neuropsychology because convinc-
ing evidence is now available that forms of memory
distinguishable at the cognitive level are also asso-
ciated with distinct neural substrates at cortical and
subcortical sites. The discovery of strikingly selective
agnosic disorders which affect the information pro-
cessing of some categories of objects or living beings
or their parts, while sparing the handling of informa-
tion from other categories, has strongly suggested that
different knowledge categories are represented in dif-
ferent regions of the cortex, a suggestion strongly
supported by data from fMRI and TMS studies in
normal observers. Finally, possible approaches to the
neurology of consciousness have been furnished by
the discovery of dissociations between conscious and
unconscious forms of vision, as occur in blindsight and
other situations in both brain-damaged patients
and normal observers, and the proposed distinction of
an occipitotemporal brain system for conscious visual
perception, and an occipitoparietal brain system for
visually guided action not necessarily accompanied
by awareness.
1004 Neuropsychology: Theoretical Basis
Cognitive Neuropsychology: A New
Neuropsychology?
The strong development of neuropsychology in the last
decades of the twentieth century is attested by a strong
increase in the number of publications specializing in
various aspects of the field. In the year 2006 there were
about 20 international scientific journals dealing spe-
cifically with neuropsychology, 12 of which included in
their titles the term ‘neuropsychology’ or related terms
(Tabl e 1) . In most cases the adjectives which accom-
pany the noun ‘neuropsychology’ in the titles of these
journals, as well as in those of neuropsychological
textbooks and other related publications, are merely
indicative of obvious disciplinary subfields and specia-
lizations: experimental, clinical, human, animal, com-
parative, developmental, applied, rehabilitative, and so
forth. Unlike these self-explanatory qualifications, the
adjective ‘cognitive’ deserves special attention, because
in the past two decades the phrase ‘cognitive neuropsy-
chology’ has come to denote a new conception of
neuropsychology and a more restricted agenda for neuro-
psychological research. These have been clearly
explicated in 1984 in an editorial (unsigned, but
attributable to the Editor-in-Chief Max Coltheart) in
the first issue of the journal Cognitive Neuropsychol-
ogy, and reiterated in an editorial by Coltheart and
Alfonso Caramazza in the same journal 22 years later.
Since its inception, neuropsychology had indisputably
been cognitive, insofar as it had amply concerned itself
with cognition and the brain, where the emphasis is on
the ‘and,’ and the word ‘cognition’ applies broadly to
all aspects of mentation and action control. But in the
newly proposed scenario it is argued that cognitive
neuropsychology, as a branch of cognitive psychology,
should primarily aim at understanding how the
human mind works, while considering the question
of how the brain works as a secondary if not irrelevant
problem. Cognitive processes are seen as computa-
tional programs instantiated on a special computer,
the human brain, the physical structure of which
belongs to a level of reality different from that of the
mind and does not necessarily provide insights into
the mind computational programs. The mission
assigned to the newly conceived cognitive neuropsy-
chology is that of testing on brain-damaged patients
theories which assume that cognitive tasks are nor-
mally carried out by sets of discrete, separable, and
relatively autonomous information-processing com-
ponents (sometimes called modules, not to be con-
fused with the cortical neuronal modules known to
neurophysiology). In particularly informative single
cases, the cognitive effects of a local brain lesion are
such as to suggest that a postulated single processing
component of a cognitive system has been selectively
removed, while the remaining parts of the system have
remained largely or totally functional. What is impor-
tant in these data is not the location or nature of the
brain lesion, but rather the demonstration that a mul-
ticomponent cognitive system, a priori represented as
a box-and-arrow diagram, has been selectively
deprived of one of its elements, either a box or an
arrow. While the modularity assumption and the reli-
ance on single cases are common to the classical ana-
tomo-clinical approach, the distinguishing features of
cognitive neuropsychology are the priority of the the-
oretical framework in which the cognitive effects of
brain lesions are interpreted, and the conviction that
explanation of human cognition must take place at
a level of analysis totally separate from the brain
level. Understanding of brain functioning is neither a
foundation nor a goal of the new cognitive neuropsy-
chology, although psychological theories about nor-
mal cognition which are tested against the losses of
Table 1 Titles of scientific journals which contain the noun ‘neuropsychology’ or its derivatives beginning publication date
Neuropsychologia (1963)
Journal of Clinical Neuropsychology (1979); becomes Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, official journal of the
International Neuropsychology Society in 1985
Cognitive Neuropsychology (1984)
Developmental Neuropsychology (1985)
Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology; the official journal of the National Academy of Neuropsychologists (1986)
The Clinical Neuropsychologist (1987)
Neuropsychology Review (1990)
Applied Neuropsychology (1994)
Child Neuropsychology.A Journal on Normal and Abnormal Development in Childhood and Adolescence (1995)
Neurocase:Case Studies in Neuropsychology, Neuropsychiatry and Behavioral Neurology (1995)
Neuropsychology, Development and Cognition. Section B, Aging, Neuropsychology and Cognition (1996)
From the journal database of the PubMed service of the US National Library of Medicine. There are other journals which do not
mention neuropsychology in their titles but are nevertheless neuropsychological in character. These include, for example, Cortex,
Behavioral Neuroscience,Brain and Cognition,Brain and Language, and Cognitive Brain Research.
Neuropsychology: Theoretical Basis 1005
cognitive capabilities following focal brain injuries
may in some cases be inspired and constrained by
existing neurological knowledge. As a result of these
developments, there exists today a wide range of
scientists working in neuropsychology, all of whom
call themselves cognitive neuropsychologists, but who
entertain quite different views of their study subject
and its specific methodologies. At one extreme, closer
to the pristine neuropsychological tradition, there are
those who address such questions as ‘‘what are the
cognitive functions of the prefrontal cortex?’’ ‘‘what
is the role of the hippocampus in memory?’’ etc., and
use a variety of techniques in animals and humans to
obtain proper answers. At the other extreme, radical
cognitive neuropsychologists, dubbed ‘ultracogni-
tive,’ seem to pride themselves on an intentional policy
of eschewing any attempt to correlate the pattern of
cognitive deficits under examination with the causa-
tive changes in cerebral organization. For the latter
group, traditional anatomo-clinical studies of cogni-
tive defects from brain lesions, along with all other
studies of brain–cognition relationships based on
more modern technologies, should be regarded as
belonging to cognitive neuroscience rather than to
cognitive neuropsychology. There is at present some
justified resistance to this rather arbitrary distinction
and to the restriction of the usage of the phrase ‘cog-
nitive neuropsychology’ to research conditions in
which the prefix neuro-is justified solely by the pres-
ence of a per se insignificant brain lesion. Perhaps the
increasingly fashionable term ‘cognitive neuroscience’
will eventually prevail and drive out the term ‘neuro-
psychology’ for good.
The Future of Neuropsychology
The term ‘neuropsychology’ may well be destined to
disappear from the neuroscientific vocabulary, but
the pristine target of neuropsychology – to understand
the relationships between the mind and behavior on
one hand, and the brain on the other – will still remain
the ultimate goal of the neurosciences of the future.
Studies of cognitive alterations from brain damage
will perhaps continue to occupy a central place on the
scene, but progress will inevitably depend on many
other experimental and theoretical approaches and on
combined contributions from all biological sciences,
from molecular biology to paleoanthropology, as
well as from psychology, from cognitive and computer
science, and from philosophy. The as yet poorly
understood neuropsychology of complex cognitive
and emotional derangements as occur in major psy-
choses (e.g., bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, clinical
depression, obsessive–compulsive disorder) will prog-
ress to a point where the already blurred border toward
neuropsychiatry will eventually vanish. There is still a
long, effortful way to go, but the endeavor is worth the
effort. To know how the human brain furnishes the
medium through which all members of our species
cognize, emote, and act would be tantamount to solve
the perennial mind–brain problem, an achievement
which, in William James’ words, would make all previ-
ous achievements pale.
See also: Cognitive Neuroscience: An Overview; History
of Neuroscience: Early Neuroscience; Neurophysiology:
Past and Present; Neuropsychological Testing; Neuro-
psychology of Primate Reward Processes.
Further Reading
Albright TD, Jessell TM, Kandel ER, et al. (2000) Neural science:
A century of progress and the mysteries that remain. Neuron
25(supplement): S1–S55.
Anonymous (1963) Editorial. Neuropsychologia 1: 1–6.
Anonymous (1984) Editorial. Cognitive Neuropsychology 1: 1–8.
Benton AL (1988) Neuropsychology: Past, present and future. In:
Boller F and Grafman J (eds.) Handbook of Neuropsychology,
vol. 1, pp. 1–27. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Boeglin JA and Thomas RK (1996) Where does the term ‘‘neuro-
psychology’’ come from? International Journal of Psychology
21: 163.
Bruce D (1985) On the origin of the term ‘‘neuropsychology.’’
Neuropsychologia 23: 813–814.
Caramazza A and Coltheart M (2006) Cognitive Neuropsychology
twenty years on. Cognitive Neuropsychology 23: 3–12.
Humphreys GW (2002) Cognitive neuroscience. In: Pashler H and
Medin D (eds.) Stevens’ Handbook of Experimental Psychol-
ogy, vol. l.2, pp. 77–112. New York: Wiley.
Isaacson RL (ed.) (1964) Basic Readings in Neuropsychology. New
York: Harper and Row.
Kolb B and Whishaw IQ (1996) Fundamentals of Human Neuro-
psychology. New York: Freeman.
McCarthy RA and Warrington EK (1990) Cognitive Neuropsy-
chology. San Diego: Academic Press.
Milner B, Squire RL, and Kandel ER (1998) Cognitive neuroscience
and the study of memory. Neuron 20: 445–468.
Shallice T (1988) From Neuropsychology to Mental Structure.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vallar G (2000) The methodological foundations of human neuro-
psychology: Studies in brain-damaged patients. In: Boller F and
Grafman J (eds.) Handbook of Neuropsychology, 2nd edn.,
vol. 1, pp. 305–344. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
1006 Neuropsychology: Theoretical Basis
