Why Do Contractors Contract? The Experience of Highly Skilled Technical Professionals in a Contingent Labor Market

Abstract

This study examines 52 highly skilled technical contractors' explanations, in 1998, of why they entered the contingent labor force and how their subsequent experiences altered their viewpoint. The authors report three general implications of their examination of the little-studied high-skill side of contingent labor. First, current depictions of contingent work are inaccurate. For example, contrary to the pessimistic 'employment relations' perspective, most of these interviewees found contracting better-paying than permanent employment; and contrary to optimistic 'free agent' views, many reported feeling anxiety and estrangement. Second, occupational networks arose to satisfy needs (such as training and wage-setting) that employing organizations satisfy for non-contingent workers. Third, regarding their place in the labor market, high-skilled and well-paid technical contractors cannot be called--as contingent workers usually are--'secondary sector' workers; and their market is not dyadic, with individuals selling labor and firms buying it, but triadic, involving intermediaries such as staffing firms. (Author's abstract.)

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Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 55, No. 2 (January 2002). © by Cornell University.
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WHY DO CONTRACTORS CONTRACT?
THE EXPERIENCE OF HIGHLY SKILLED TECHNICAL
PROFESSIONALS IN A CONTINGENT LABOR MARKET
GIDEON KUNDA, STEPHEN R. BARLEY, and JAMES EVANS*
This study examines 52 highly skilled technical contractors’ explanations, in
1998, of why they entered the contingent labor force and how their subsequent
experiences altered their viewpoint. The authors report three general implica-
tions of their examination of the little-studied high-skill side of contingent
labor. First, current depictions of contingent work are inaccurate. For example,
contrary to the pessimistic “employment relations” perspective, most of these
interviewees found contracting better-paying than permanent employment; and
contrary to optimistic “free agent” views, many reported feeling anxiety and
estrangement. Second, occupational networks arose to satisfy needs (such as
training and wage-setting) that employing organizations satisfy for non-contin-
gent workers. Third, regarding their place in the labor market, high-skilled and
well-paid technical contractors cannot be called—as contingent workers usually
are—“secondary sector” workers; and their market is not dyadic, with individu-
als selling labor and firms buying it, but triadic, involving intermediaries such
as staffing firms.
*Gideon Kunda is Chair, Department of Labor
Studies, Tel Aviv University; Stephen R. Barley is
Director, Center for Work Technology and Organiza-
tion, Department of Management, Science, and Engi-
neering, Stanford University; and James Evans is a
Doctoral Student in the Department of Sociology,
Stanford University.
The authors deeply appreciate the comments and
suggestions that Diane Bailey, Rosemary Batt, Yinon
Cohen, and Pamela Hinds made on earlier drafts of
this paper.
or most of the twentieth century, insti-
tutions of bureaucratic employment
dominated the social organization of work.
Bureaucratic employment was built on a
simple bargain: as long as firms remained
profitable, they would provide employees
with secure jobs in return for effort and
loyalty. Although there were notable ex-
ceptions on the economy’s periphery
(Doeringer and Piore 1971; Baron and
Bielby 1984; Piore 1979; Friedland 1975),
until the 1980s most middle-class Ameri-
cans believed that working for a reputable
company would guarantee life-long employ-
ment, as long as they performed conscien-
tiously and the economy remained strong.
In recent years, three developments have
shaken this belief. First, in the name of
efficiency, firms in the economy’s core have
repeatedly laid off large numbers of em-
ployees independent of economic cycles.
For the first time in history, layoffs have

WHY DO CONTRACTORS CONTRACT? 235
targeted significant numbers of managers
and professionals (Heckscher 1994;
Osterman 1996; Cappelli 1999). Second,
despite inconclusive data (Diebold,
Neumark, and Polsky 1997; Bureau of La-
bor Statistics 1997), many people believe
that job tenure has become shorter and
labor markets more volatile. Finally, per-
haps the most radical break with the system
of bureaucratic employment has been the
expansion of the so-called “contingent la-
bor force” (Barker and Christensen 1998).
The term contingent labor has been ap-
plied to a wide range of short-term employ-
ment arrangements, including part-time
work, temporary employment, self-employ-
ment, contracting, outsourcing, and home-
based work. Estimates of the size of the
contingent labor force vary widely. The
most conservative data come from the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics. Under the most
liberal of its restricted definitions, the BLS
estimates that 13.3% of Americans were
contingently employed in 1995 (Polivka
1996a, 1996b; Cohany 1996; Cohany et al.
1998).
1
Estimates for 1997 were nearly
identical.
2
More liberal estimates suggest
that the number may be as high as 30%
(Dillon 1987; Belous 1989; Kalleberg et al.
1997).
Estimates of the spread of contingent
work are hampered by the absence of longi-
tudinal data. However, data on the tempo-
rary service industry suggest two significant
trends (U.S. Department of Commerce
1997). First, between 1986 and 1996 there
was spectacular growth in the relative size
of the temporary service industry: in those
years, employment in temporary services
grew 10.3% while total employment in the
United States grew by only 1.7%. Second,
there has been a change in the distribution
of contingent jobs. Between 1991 and 1996,
the percentage of the temporary service
industry’s payroll represented by office,
clerical, and medical work declined, while
the industrial, technical, and professional
segments (which include managers) be-
came more important (Staffing Industry
Report 1997).
Thus, three conclusions seem reason-
able on the basis of available data: a signifi-
cant proportion of Americans are contin-
gently employed; this proportion has in-
creased over the past decade; and techni-
cians, professionals, and managers repre-
sent a larger portion of the contingent
labor force than in the past.
Although researchers have begun to at-
tend to contingent work, they have yet to
explore all of its facets fully. The largest
body of research, conducted primarily by
social scientists and management scholars,
addresses the issue of how firms use con-
tractors to respond flexibly to increasingly
competitive environments (Handy 1989;
Mangum, Mayall, and Nelson 1985;
Abraham 1988; Abraham and Taylor 1996;
Pfeffer and Baron 1988; Harrison and Kelley
1993; Davis-Blake and Uzzi 1993; Matusik
and Hill 1998). Because this literature
takes the firm’s perspective, it focuses more
or less exclusively on the demand for con-
tractors and ignores both the contractors’
experience and the significance of con-
tracting as an employment relationship.
Scholars who have studied contingent la-
bor from the worker’s perspective have usu-
ally focused their attention on relatively
low-skilled occupations long associated with
1
Under its most liberal, restricted definition, the
BLS defines the contingent work force as the sum of
(a) all wage and salary workers who “do not expect
their employment to last,” except for those who
planned to leave their jobs for personal reasons, (b)
all “self employed (both the incorporated and the
unincorporated) and independent contractors who
expect to be and had been in their present assign-
ment for less than 1 year,” and (c) temporary help
and contract workers who “expected to work for the
customers to whom they were assigned for one year or
less” (Cohany et al. 1998:43–44).
2
The BLS repeated its assessment of the contin-
gent work force in the February 1997 supplement to
the CPS. The number of workers in the BLS’s broad-
est definition of contingent labor declined by .5%,
while the percentage of Americans in each of the four
alternative employment relations remained constant.
Since two data points do not make a trend, it is
difficult to determine whether the decline represents
random variation or an actual shift away from contin-
gent labor. The BLS’s data also cannot tell us whether
contingent labor increased prior to 1995, as most
commentators contend.

236 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
temporary labor. Although traditional tem-
porary work remains an important aspect
of contemporary labor markets, unless re-
searchers also take highly skilled contin-
gent work into account, they risk develop-
ing theories of contingent employment that
are of limited scope.
This paper takes a step toward broaden-
ing our image of contingent work by ex-
ploring the experiences of highly skilled
technical contractors. By documenting how
technical contractors view their world, we
hope to facilitate comparisons with tradi-
tional contingent work and to illustrate
how theories of contingent employment
can be profitably developed. We begin by
reviewing two literatures that speak to the
significance and experience of contract-
ing. After highlighting their limitations,
we turn away from received notions of what
contingent work means and ask: how do
highly skilled, technical contractors make
sense of their situation? We develop our
answer by turning to what contractors say
about why they became contractors and
how their subsequent experiences altered
their perspective. We conclude by explor-
ing the implications of our study for exist-
ing theories of contingent work.
Perspectives on the
Implications of Contingent Labor
Journalists, consultants, lawyers, and so-
cial scientists have interpreted contingent
work from two points of view, what we shall
call the “employment relations” and the
“free agent” perspectives. Each offers a
distinct account of contingent work and its
implications.
The Employment Relations Perspective
Analysts who adopt an employment rela-
tions perspective situate contingent em-
ployment in its institutional context. They
are concerned with the experience of em-
ployment, the collective welfare of employ-
ees, and, by extension, the welfare of soci-
ety as a whole (Osterman 1988; Cappelli et
al. 1997; Parker 1994; Smith 1998; Cappelli
1999). In this view, bureaucratic employ-
ment is not only a prescription for stable
employment; it is the foundation for
America’s unique system of social welfare,
which hinges, to some degree, on employ-
ers fulfilling legally prescribed obligations
to a permanent work force.
Employment relations researchers view
the expansion of the contingent labor force
as a threat to the stability of the system and
have historically framed the threat from
the perspective of dual labor market theory.
This theory holds that industrial econo-
mies are composed of two sectors: “pri-
mary” and “secondary” (Piore and Sable
1984; Osterman 1984; Baron and Bielby
1984). Primary labor markets provide stable
employment, career ladders, job security,
high wages, and attractive benefit plans.
Secondary labor markets are, by compari-
son, less stable and marked by lower wages.
Participants are more likely to be members
of minority groups and to work for employ-
ers who provide few benefits. Because schol-
ars have viewed secondary labor markets as
peripheral, they have treated them as a
social problem to be controlled within the
framework of existing institutions (for ex-
ample, minimum wage laws), rather than as
a threat to bureaucratic employment.
Scholars in this tradition, however, fear
that the growth of contingent work repre-
sents the spread of secondary labor market
dynamics into the economy’s core. More-
over, it appears that permanent jobs are
themselves no longer secure (Osterman
1996; Cappelli 1999). Many fear that these
developments are undermining the well-
being of workers and their families (Hipple
and Stewart 1996a, 1996b; Osterman 1988;
Christensen 1998). Others have argued
that contingent work’s spread may result in
growing demand for government assistance
(Dillon 1987) and suggest that contingent
employment facilitates the oppression of
marginal groups (Martella 1991; Polivka
1996b; Spalter-Roth and Hartmann 1998;
Banegin 1998). Finally, some critics charge
that the shift to contingent labor is part of
an attempt to undermine unions (Aronowitz
and Defazio 1994; Rifkin 1995). In short,
the employment relations scholars view
contingent labor as an unraveling of the

WHY DO CONTRACTORS CONTRACT? 237
system of employment established by the
New Deal and a return to laissez-faire capi-
talism. Consequently, they argue for either
strengthening New Deal institutions or
searching for new institutions that will pro-
vide enhanced security (Benner 1997; Carre
and Joshi 1997).
The employment relations view of con-
tingent work as exploitative is most vividly
articulated by ethnographies of temporary
work in clerical or industrial settings
(McAlester 1998; Parker 1994; Henson
1996; Rogers 1995; Smith 1996, 1998). In-
formants in these studies report being
forced into temporary employment by cir-
cumstances that make it difficult to find
full-time jobs. They subsequently experi-
ence a continuing sense of insecurity and
uncertainty.
3
Poor working conditions are
often described: low wages and high work-
related expenses; disputes between clients,
agencies, and workers over payment and
hours; antagonism from permanent em-
ployees and a sense of isolation, exclusion,
estrangement, and dissatisfaction with work.
In comparison to these disadvantages, in-
formants report few advantages. Some claim
to enjoy the flexibility of scheduling their
work and the freedom of being able to
reject jobs that are particularly unpleasant.
Others say they prefer to receive their com-
pensation as “fast cash” rather than wait for
a monthly paycheck. Still others report
obtaining satisfaction from knowing that
their services are “really needed” by compa-
nies in crisis. Overall, however, the disad-
vantages of contingent work clearly out-
weigh its advantages.
Although the exploitation and social
problems that concern employment rela-
tions researchers deserve close attention,
one can question whether their view validly
describes all contingent work. With few
exceptions (Barker and Christensen 1998;
Jurik 1998), the employment relations im-
age of contingent work relies on studies of
low-skilled occupations. Even labor econo-
mists and industrial relations researchers,
who acknowledge the changing composi-
tion of the contingent work force, quickly
lose sight of the highly skilled sector in
their analysis because they rely on aggre-
gate data, which is weighted toward the
responses of traditional temporary employ-
ees (Cappelli 1999; Kalleberg et al. 1997;
Spalter-Roth et al. 1997). Yet, students of
work have long understood that there are
substantial differences in social organiza-
tion between low- and high-skilled work.
Permanent professional, technical, and
managerial jobs are usually more secure,
more remunerative, more varied, and more
intrinsically involving than lower-skilled
service and industrial jobs. It stands to
reason that low- and high-skilled contin-
gent work should vary in similar ways. By
overlooking highly skilled contingent work,
the employment relations perspective risks
confounding the effects of contracting with
the correlates of low-skill occupations.
Free Agent Perspective
In sharp contrast, the free agent per-
spective focuses almost entirely on the ex-
perience of highly skilled contractors. Most
advocates of free agency are futurists, hu-
man resource consultants, or staffing in-
dustry experts who write books aimed at the
general public or publish articles in popu-
lar magazines. Nevertheless, their point of
view is consistent with more academic ver-
sions of “agency theory” in that both stress
the advantages of free labor markets.
Advocates of free agency agree that bu-
reaucratic employment and its supporting
institutions are unraveling, but, unlike those
who adopt the employment relations per-
spective, they endorse this development.
They portray organizational employment
as constraining and unjust and view “jobs”
and “careers” as outmoded inventions of
the industrial revolution that were designed
to meet the needs of large organizations
(Bridges 1994; Pink 1998; Beck 1992;
Caulkin 1997; Darby 1997). In the unravel-
ing of bureaucratic employment they see a
3
Jurik (1998) is a notable exception in that only
20% of her self-employed, home workers felt forced
into their home businesses. Nevertheless, Jurik fixed
on the perceptions of that 20% in assessing how home
workers felt about their work arrangements.

238 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
return to craft-based models of employ-
ment centered on marketable skills that
release people from the confines of bu-
reaucracy.
Advocates of free agency promote a post-
industrial vision of economic individual-
ism in which entrepreneurial workers re-
gain independence and recapture from
employers a deserved portion of their sur-
plus value. The free agent literature is
replete with stories of contractors who va-
cation when and where they choose, who
live in exotic places because they can
telecommute, and who successfully inte-
grate the demands of their work with the
needs of their family. Although profes-
sional and technical workers typically popu-
late such stories, proponents contend that
people in all socio-economic strata could
benefit by adopting a similar attitude to
work (Bridges 1994). In short, free agency’s
emphasis on self-reliance and individual-
ism echoes the rhetoric of Social Darwin-
ism popular at the turn of the twentieth
century (Bendix 1956).
The free agent perspective paints an
optimistic picture of contingent labor that
contrasts sharply with the employment re-
lations literature point by point. Advocates
of free agency argue that contingent status
is a choice rather than a necessity; that it
represents liberation rather than isolation
from the workplace; that uncertainty about
employment is actually minimized and that
flexibility enhances personal control; that
contractors receive more money than per-
manent employees because they are paid
for every hour that they work at rates that
reflect a premium for skills; and that full
use of their skills results in a sense of self-
actualization rather than estrangement.
Although it is plausible that some of free
agency’s claims are consistent with the ex-
periences of contractors in professional and
technical labor markets, at present there is
no way to know, because there have been
no studies of high-end contracting.
Limitations of Existing Perspectives
Although the employment relations and
free agent perspectives attempt to posit
credible views of contingent labor, their
depictions are too neat and narrow to cap-
ture the full diversity of the phenomena.
Three limitations are particularly signifi-
cant. First, both perspectives lack ground-
ing in the experiences of a sufficiently broad
range of contingent workers to facilitate
comparisons. The free agent literature is
largely non-empirical. Its proponents rely
exclusively on anecdotes purposefully se-
lected to support their views (see Bridges
1994; Davis and Meyer 1998). In contrast,
proponents of the employment relations
perspective rely on careful research, but
their concern with exploitation has led them
to study low-skilled temporary workers.
Thus, both literatures lack empirical stud-
ies of highly skilled contractors.
Second, both perspectives overlook di-
versity and contradictions even within oc-
cupational sectors. Advocates of free agency
generally ignore the risks and costs of con-
tracting. Although employment relations
researchers acknowledge that contingent
work may have benefits, the positive aspects
are typically downplayed. Nevertheless,
there is evidence that even lower-skilled
contractors have a wider range of experi-
ences than most commentators imply and
that the variation may depend on situational
and organizational factors (Lautsch 1998;
Benson 1998; Pearce 1993; Cohen and
Haberfeld 1993; Smith 1998).
Finally, both perspectives imply that con-
tractors use limited conceptual frames to
make sense of themselves and their work.
Employment relations scholars assume that
people construct the meaning of work
against a backdrop of involvement in an
organization. Advocates of the free agency
view suggest that people define themselves
by their skills and by the role they play in an
entrepreneurial labor market. This di-
chotomy of hierarchies and markets artifi-
cially limits and simplifies the social con-
texts in which contingent workers operate
and develop a sense of self. Specifically, the
literature on contingent work largely over-
looks occupation—long known to serve as a
source of worker identity (Van Maanen and
Barley 1984)—as a locus for organizing and
sense-making.

WHY DO CONTRACTORS CONTRACT? 239
Developing a more accurate image of
contingent work will require collecting
grounded data on various forms of contin-
gent work and on the contingent workers’
perspective. This will enable researchers to
develop better typologies of contingent
employment and explain distinctions that
currently appear to be contradictory. It was
in order to develop a more grounded im-
age of contingent employment in skilled
labor markets that we set out to study why
engineers, software developers, and infor-
mation technology professionals become
contractors and how they ultimately come
to interpret the advantages and disadvan-
tages of contracting. As we shall show, our
data indicate that neither an employment
relations nor a free agent perspective ad-
equately captures the themes that run
through the contractors’ discourse. In-
stead, our analysis suggests that the experi-
ence of high-end contracting is more varie-
gated than currently imagined and that
notions of occupation are important for
understanding how contractors make sense
of their situation.
Data and Methods
Because there is at present no represen-
tative enumeration of individuals who work
as technical contractors, researchers have
several equally troublesome options for
choosing respondents and informants. One
could convince a staffing firm to make avail-
able the names of the people in their data-
bases, sample from one of several résumé
databanks found on the Internet, or seek
subscription records from magazines tar-
geted at contractors. All of these sources,
however, are biased in different ways. Our
approach was to select informants from a
list of nearly 500 contractors who regis-
tered for a seminar on contracting lifestyles
broadcast live over the World Wide Web in
December 1997.
The seminar was sponsored by a staffing
firm that specializes in recruiting and plac-
ing technical professionals and was widely
advertised in contracting circles through-
out the nation via a number of channels,
including magazines written for technical
contractors. During the spring and sum-
mer of 1998, we interviewed 42 contractors
who had registered for the Web Seminar, as
well as 10 others whom we encountered in
the course of the larger project of which
this study was a part or who were recom-
mended to us by contractors whom we had
already interviewed. We actively sought
contractors from outside Silicon Valley to
ensure that our conclusions were not re-
gionally biased, and we made a particular
effort to interview women. Although our
informants are not representative in a sta-
tistical sense, they span numerous regions,
occupations, and age cohorts, as well as
both genders. For this reason, we are rea-
sonably confident that our data identify key
issues and dilemmas that are of widespread
concern to technical contractors.
4
All informants worked in engineering or
information technology–oriented occupa-
tions. Table 1 reports the distribution of
informants across occupations as well as
their age, their marital status, and the length
of time they had worked as contractors.
Although the contractors ranged from 26
to 68 years old, most were over 40. Forty-
five percent had been contracting for five
years or less, 33% for six to ten years, and
22% for over a decade. Sixty-nine percent
of the informants were married. These
demographic patterns parallel those re-
ported in Black and Andreini’s (1997) sur-
vey of IT contractors in the Silicon Valley.
Fifteen of the contractors in our study were
women. Fifty-eight percent worked in the
Silicon Valley, and the remainder worked
in Austin, Houston, Baltimore, Seattle,
Toronto, Los Angeles, Atlanta, Billings, and
Norwalk (Connecticut).
Five of our informants either were inde-
pendent contractors or were incorporated
as a business.
5
The rest worked as employ-
4
It is important to recognize that substantive cov-
erage does not imply distributional coverage. For this
reason we make no population inferences, and we
urge readers to exercise the same restraint.
5
The distinctions between an independent con-
tractor, a contractor who works as an employee of a
staffing firm, and a contractor who is incorporated as

240 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
ees of staffing firms that specialized in find-
ing contractors’ jobs and served as the con-
tractors’ employer of record while they
worked at a client firm.
6
Most informants
had worked with numerous staffing firms
over their career, and 37% had at some
time secured a contract through the firm
that sponsored the Web seminar.
Doctoral students trained in ethno-
graphic interviewing conducted most of
the interviews, which were structured
around a common set of open-ended ques-
tions developed to ensure that each inter-
view covered the same topics. These in-
cluded the contractors’ reasons for becom-
ing a contractor, their career history, their
perceptions of contracting, their business
practices, and their personal and family
life. Twenty-four interviews were conducted
over the telephone and 28 were conducted
face-to-face. The decision to use a tele-
phone or face-to-face interview depended
on the informants’ preferences and geo-
graphical location. All interviews were re-
corded and transcribed.
In the course of each interview, we asked
informants to reconstruct the sequence of
events that led them to leave full-time em-
ployment for their first contracting job. To
determine how subsequent experiences had
affected their perception of contracting,
we asked them to tell us later in the inter-
view what they saw as the costs and benefits
of contracting and what they would tell
someone who was thinking about becom-
ing a contractor. Our intent was to discover
if and how the contractor’s interpretations
of contracting had changed. Although the
informants’ reconstruction of the past may
have been colored by their situation at the
time of the interview, there is evidence that
they were able to distinguish between the
two time periods: informants tended to
answer the first set of questions using the
past tense and the second with the present
tense. More important, their answers were
substantively different. We used answers to
the first question to develop our analysis of
informants’ “reasons for becoming a con-
tractor” and the second set for our analysis
of how they interpreted the “realities of
contracting.”
7
Reasons for Becoming a Contractor
The stories that our informants told about
how and why they became contractors
evinced three broad themes that, when ar-
rayed sequentially, reveal an underlying
narrative of transformation. The narrative
begins with the lament of an expert for
whom the tension between the ideal of
technical rationality and the political real-
ity of organizational life has become a source
of simmering discontent. Then, an
employer’s action or an unanticipated event
that undermines job security leads the ex-
pert to act on his or her discontent. Aided
by serendipitous encounters with the world
a business concern the contractors’ tax status, not
whether they use staffing firms to find jobs. Indepen-
dent contractors are individuals who satisfy a number
of criteria set by the IRS, who receive wages, but who
pay taxes and social security on a quarterly basis.
Contractors who are incorporated have registered
themselves as a business and bill for their services via
an invoice from their corporation. All other contrac-
tors are “W2’s,” working as employees of a staffing
firm that withholds taxes and social security. Like
W2’s, independent and incorporated contractors
sometimes use staffing firms to find jobs, but unlike
W2’s they are not obligated to do so.
6
We use the term “client firm” to refer to the
organization for which a contractor performs work.
Many firms recruit their own contractors, but then
demand that they register with a staffing firm for the
duration of the contract. The staffing firm becomes
the contractor’s employer of record and takes on the
legal responsibilities of an employer, including the
withholding of taxes and social security payments.
The client firm pays the staffing firm a fee that in-
cludes the contractors’ wages as well as the staffing
firm’s “mark-up.”
7
One limitation of our data is that we cannot say
how people who had entered and then left contract-
ing would have responded to our questions. There is
no systematic way to identify individuals who leave
contracting. Nevertheless, several informants said
they intended to return to permanent employment.
Several others had moved back and forth between
contracting and permanent employment over the
course of their careers.

WHY DO CONTRACTORS CONTRACT? 241
of contracting, the expert finally chooses to
escape the world of full-time employment
into the world of contingent work, which
promises a way of life more consistent with
the expert’s worldview.
Expertise and Discontent
Informants wove their tales of discon-
tent with permanent employment around
three motifs: politics, incompetence, and
inequity. Together, these motifs depicted
organizations as irrational and capricious.
“Politics” was the term informants most
frequently used to refer to the endless ways
in which the machinations and manipula-
tions of self-interested others undermined
technical rationality as a criterion for orga-
nizational action. Often subsumed under
the label of politics were managers’ per-
sonal agendas and collective interests. The
view that managers acted to further their
own interests was so widespread that infor-
mants frequently portrayed technical pro-
fessionals and projects as pawns in
management’s political games. A board
designer recounted: “I used to have written
on my grease board, ‘Politics Is Our Most
Important Project.’ The boss came around
and saw that and it went away real quick.
But it’s true: we’re just tools in their project”
(Board designer, M, C50).
8
A verification
engineer offered a similar, albeit less hu-
morous view:
I worked a lot of long hours. It was for politics.
It wasn’t for getting the project done. It was like
I was doing this for somebody else’s ego, or
somebody else’s personal or career goals. They
could check off, they got this or that done based
on my work. I was getting the project done not
for the goals of the project but for the goals of
the people above. (Verification engineer, M, C19)
Politics was not confined to hierarchical
relationships and interactions: peers were
said to be as political as management. Or-
ganizational life was, therefore, rife with
conflicting agendas, which informants per-
ceived as a waste of time and a source of
tension.
You have to listen to a lot of people’s agendas,
spend time in a lot of unnecessary meetings,
trying to keep everybody happy, trying to play
their game. It’s not strictly work-related, it’s
very unproductive, and it can be very tense… .
But I’ve seen people in meetings who don’t talk
to each other there’s so much tension going on.
(Mechanical design engineer, M, C44)
Incompetence was the second source of
discontent that informants routinely men-
tioned. Whereas they portrayed politics as
an aspect of social life, they saw incompe-
tence as an attribute of specific individuals.
Organizational leaders were sometimes a
target of criticism. For example, a software
designer with over 15 years’ experience
8
To assist readers, we provide information on the
informant’s occupation and gender as well as a unique
identifier for each excerpt cited in the text. We use
the format “(occupation, gender, identifier)”, which
appears at the end of each quotation.
Table 1. Informant Characteristics:
Occupation, Age, Marital Status,
and Tenure as a Contractor.
Dimension Percentage
Occupation
Software Developers 40%
Hardware Engineers 12
Technical Writers 13
Quality Assurance 12
Information Technology 17
Project Managers 4
Marketing 2
Age
60s 4%
50–59 19
40–49 38
30–39 29
20–29 10
Marital Status
Married 69%
Single or Divorced 31
Years as a Contractor
1–5 45%
6–10 33
11–15 12
16–20 4
21–25 4
over 25 2

242 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
offered a scathing indictment of entrepre-
neurial management in Silicon Valley,
which he claimed was full of “ego-maniacs
who just happened to stumble into a bunch
of money.” He continued: “There’s plenty
of people out there who’ve made money in
spite of themselves. It’s the Beverly Hill-
billy story. They were shootin’ at a rabbit,
struck oil, and now they think they’re a
genius” (Software developer, M, C39). An-
other software designer said he had turned
to contracting after encountering a series
of senior managers whose incompetence
shaded into dishonesty:
I was at the naval shipyard for a couple of years,
and they were going nowhere. I theoretically
reported to the chief financial officer and they
brought in a couple, how do we say, “yo-yos.”
We caught one of the CFO’s funneling stuff into
his condo in Florida. We had a series of CFO’s
and each one had a different idea of what needed
to be done and how to do it, and I’m going, “No,
I’m not playing anymore.” You know? There
was no real strategy or anything. (Software de-
signer, M, C12)
However, it was middle management—
and project managers, in particular—for
whom contractors reserved their most sus-
tained and detailed accusations of incom-
petence. The comic strip “Dilbert,” which
depicts the travails of technical profession-
als who work for managers who lack requi-
site skills, was a popular source of imagery.
A software support technician made the
connection: “I don’t know if you read
‘Dilbert,’ but it’s almost prophetic. I mean,
they hire people to be managers that you’d
say, ‘Why in the world is this person lead-
ing?’ They just don’t have the skills” (Soft-
ware support, M, C18). Often accompanying
such complaints was the belief that infor-
mants were more rational and capable than
the managers for whom they had worked. A
database administrator’s comments illus-
trate this perspective:
I think I am a little bit smarter than a lot of
people out there. If there were really good
project managers out there, there would not be
any contractors. The reason contractors are
hired is because they [organizations] are in
deep shit. And the reason they are in so deep is
because they have been poorly managed or
poorly planned. Like when I was working at
[Astrotech]. The project manager there was
bordering on schizophrenic; things changed
every day: the project plan, the features of the
software product. They changed every day!
When that happens, people cannot get any work
done. And then I—and the rest of the team—
would be berated for not getting enough work
done. They hire people as project managers
without having worked up through the ranks.
They have not done the work that the people
they are managing are doing. They have no clue
as to what is required to get things done. They
don’t know what is reasonable and what is not.
(Database administrator, M, C34).
Informants felt that managerial incom-
petence bred trouble for individuals as well
as organizations. For individuals, living
with incompetence produced a sense of
indignity and injustice. A quality assurance
technician who had been laid off by a man-
ager whom he perceived as incompetent
explained, “To have a person like that say,
‘You have been tagged and you don’t have
a job any more,’ was just too much. This
bozo is telling me I don’t have a job any
more and he’s still working?” (Quality assur-
ance, F, C13). Incompetent management,
usually combined with other associated fac-
tors, also made experts feel they had little
voice, a situation that informants viewed as
detrimental to organizational performance.
An informant who specialized in project
management underscored the costs of sup-
pressing an expert’s voice:
In the corporate world you may have an opin-
ion, but you are not allowed to say it. When I
worked on the project in Missouri, I said: “We
are going to lose our rear ends on this project!”
They recognize that now. But then they said:
“You are not a team player. You are giving up
before the battle starts.” No, this is reality!
Fifteen million dollars later, they will come
back and say: “Why didn’t you tell us?” (Project
manager, M, C14)
The informants’ third source of discon-
tent was their perception that permanent
employment was inequitable. Many claimed
that employers exploited technical experts
by requiring long hours without commen-
surate pay:
There’s no compensation for engineers. I had

WHY DO CONTRACTORS CONTRACT? 243
to take a lower salary, I didn’t get to take any
vacation, and I worked a lot longer hours. When
I worked at Motorola the last time as a perma-
nent employee, I was required to work 12-hour
shifts with no extra pay. And it just went on like
that for months and months and months. (Veri-
fication engineer, M, C19)
I don’t work for free anymore. As an employee
I did that a lot, because I was exempt and didn’t
get paid for overtime. I have observed that the
guy who will work for free—they will just give
him more work for free. And I have noticed that
no good deed goes unpunished when it comes
to working for free and volunteering to do so.
(Software developer, M, C48)
Inequity, however, was not simply a fi-
nancial matter. Contractors claimed that
the growing tendency for firms to demand
loyalty without offering security was funda-
mentally unfair:
As time went on I saw that companies want
loyalty, but they will not—and in some sense
cannot—give loyalty to their employees. You
know, if the company is falling apart, if it’s
going bankrupt—they’re going to lay off em-
ployees. They’re going to try and remain a
viable entity. But, they want loyalty from me as
an employee. Now, why should I do that? What
do I get out of this relationship? I have to
subject myself to reviews, to whatever the latest
reviewing technique is out there. Peer reviews
this week, something else next week. I have to
subject myself to all of this stuff, company poli-
tics, for what? What is it that I’m going to get out
of that? (Software developer, M, C48)
Informants claimed that inequitable
employment relationships created an un-
pleasant work environment. A program-
mer spoke of the pettiness and competitive-
ness she had observed among full-time
employees who felt they were improperly
compensated:
I was working a contract at TRW just around
Christmas. People were very upset because the
bonus was a thousand dollars and to get your
thousand dollar bonus you had to walk on wa-
ter. Bonuses were graded, and they were argu-
ing and complaining and yelling in the halls.
And I’m thinking, “What is the matter with you
people. Why are you doing this for a thousand-
dollar bonus? You’re highly paid people. Why
are you standing here screaming about a mere
thousand dollars? It’s nothing in the grand
scheme of things!” But everybody’s involved in
all the politics of stuff—who should be getting
what, and why. (Programmer, F, C27)
Ultimately, politics, incompetence, and
inequity exacerbated insecurity and under-
mined a climate of trust. A technical writer
described the fear of layoffs she had ob-
served among full-time employees in firms
in the Silicon Valley: “You can smell the
fear in the halls when you walk into some of
those buildings. People are so tense, so
afraid that they are going to screw up. They
wonder about the next layoff” (Technical
writer, F, C8).
Panel A of Table 2, which displays the
number (and percentage) of informants
who spontaneously mentioned politics
(31%), incompetence (33%), and inequity
(21%) as sources of dissatisfaction with
permanent employment, indicates how
widespread themes of expertise and dis-
content were among the technical contrac-
tors we interviewed. Since other infor-
mants may have failed to voice similar dis-
contentment, one can only interpret these
percentages as a lower bound. Neverthe-
less it is instructive to note that without
prompting, over half of the informants
mentioned at least one of these themes
when explaining why they became contrac-
tors.
Triggers for Change
Although discontent with the exigencies
of permanent employment was widespread,
it was insufficient to motivate most of our
interviewees to turn to contracting. Infor-
mants did not generally decide to become
contractors until they encountered layoffs,
acquisitions, financially troubled employ-
ers, deteriorating work conditions, and
other events that made changing jobs sud-
denly seem inevitable or desirable. These
were events that informants could neither
anticipate nor control. For at least 50%
(see panel B of Table 2), such events trig-
gered a choice between seeking another
full-time position, becoming a contractor,
or becoming unemployed.
By far the most common triggers were
downsizing and other situations that sug-

244 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
gested job loss was imminent. Eleven (21%;
see Table 2, panel B) of the contractors
were actually laid off from their last perma-
nent job. Most went directly into contract-
ing:
In March of ’97 Apple had a huge layoff, 40% of
my department was cut, and I was one of the
people laid off. This was a long, drawn-out
process, and there already were rumors that
Apple was speculating about layoffs, so many of
us had begun thinking what we would do in that
case. I had been toying with the idea of becom-
ing a contractor before and so I decided that if
I were to be laid off, I would become a contrac-
tor. So that’s how I got into it. I knew that
becoming a contractor would require some cour-
age and a leap of faith of sorts because contract-
ing is, you know, unstable by its nature, and I
knew I would need to have something to live on
while getting myself going. And yet I knew that
it was something that I ultimately wanted to do
and it was just a question of when I’d get up the
courage to take this step. And the layoff seemed
like the perfect opportunity because we all got
severance packages that softened the fall. (Tech-
nical writer, F, C24)
Others (3 informants) initially looked for
permanent work after being laid off, but
could not find it.
I didn’t realize at the time, when I quit DEC,
that it was changing my life forever. I went to
Table 2. Themes in Contractors’ Accounts of Entering Contracting.
Theme Number Percentage
A. Expertise and Discontent
Organizational Politics 16 31
Incompetent Management 17 33
Inequity 11 21
Number of Contractors Who Mentioned at Least One Theme 28 54
B. Triggers
Laid Off 11 21
Unable to Find Full-Time Work 3 6
Probable Loss of Job 11 21
Deteriorating Work Conditions 4 8
Boring or Routine Work 3 6
Prospect of Undesired Relocation or Travel 3 6
Number of Contractors Who Mentioned at Least One Theme 26 50
C. Factors Encouraging Escape into Contracting
Encounter with Contractors 11 21
Encounter with Staffing Firms 11 21
Desire to Work for a Specific Company 6 12
Encounter with Friends/Prior Customers Who Said They Could
Use Someone with Informant’s Skills 2 4
Number of Contractors Who Mentioned at Least One Theme 27 52
D. Anticipated Rewards
Money 23 44
Autonomy at Work 7 14
Development of Marketable New Skills 8 15
Control over Time 6 12
Entrepreneurialism 3 6
Job Variety 4 8
Number of Contractors Who Mentioned at Least One Theme 32 61
Notes:
The themes are listed in the order in which they appear in the paper.
The total number of informants in each panel is the sum of all informants mentioning at least one thematic
item mentioned in the panel and hence cannot be computed by summing the number of informants who
mentioned each item.

WHY DO CONTRACTORS CONTRACT? 245
Apollo; four months later I got caught in the
first layoff wave at Apollo, and it decimated the
entire tech writing department. Four months
after that, another 20 to 30 percent were laid
off. Shortly after that, Apollo was bought by
Hewlett-Packard. Apollo went right down, it
was absolutely amazing. When I got laid off at
Apollo, that was it. I could not find a permanent
job anywhere in Massachusetts. So I started to
go contract instead. (Technical writer, M, C9)
A number of contractors (11, or 21%)
did not wait for the pink slip. Observing
that their employer was having financial
difficulties, they decided to leave the firm
before it collapsed around them:
Hayes filed for Chapter 11 protection. They
successfully reorganized, but in the midst of all
this, I said, “Look, they’re not being very inno-
vative technology-wise. And they’re not putting
any money into new products like I think they
should. I just don’t see it being viable.” People
were bailing out left and right. My former boss,
who had already quit, said, “Look, call up this
company, MRJ, Inc. [a staffing firm]. They
need somebody like you and they’re paying
really good money.” MRJ made me an offer. I
said, “Man, this is just too good to turn down.”
So I left Hayes.” (Embedded systems engineer, M,
C41)
For another set of contractors (4, or
8%), deteriorating working conditions were
sufficient to trigger the shift to contracting,
even though these events did not explicitly
threaten their job security. For example, a
multimedia developer had been demoted,
felt unappreciated, and saw the acquisition
of his company as a sign that it was time to
move on:
I was in computer support for seven years, and
at one point I was a manager but I got demoted
and I ended up being in field service. There was
a period of about two years there, where about
every single day I hated my job and I wanted to
get out of it. When the company I was working
with got sold to a bigger company, I said, “I am
not doing this again,” and I left. So that is what
I mean by push. If a company keeps rejecting
and does not take advantage of the skills I have,
there is no sense of fulfillment. That is enough
of a push. It was sort of like, the universe is
giving me a hint, maybe you should move on.
(Multimedia developer, M, C3)
Others indicated that they turned to con-
tracting because they were bored (3 infor-
mants) or because their employer had asked
them to relocate and they did not want to
move (3 informants).
Escape into Contracting
Triggering events were crucial for decid-
ing to move from permanent to contingent
employment, because they led informants
to consider their options. However, even
the experience of being laid off was, by
itself, insufficient to tip the balance in favor
of becoming a contractor. As 52% of our
informants spontaneously reported (see
Table 2, panel C), the decision to enter
contracting often required exposure to
people or opportunities that made con-
tracting seem more viable than taking an-
other full-time job. Exposure to contract-
ing could occur through encounters with
contractors, staffing firms, and potential
clients.
Most informants had worked beside con-
tractors in previous jobs where they had
opportunities to observe the practicalities
of contingent employment. Informants
were particularly taken with the idea that
contractors made more money for doing
the same work. Twenty-one percent of our
informants noted that when they finally
made their decision, other contractors
served as role models:
There were several contractors also working at
General Electric and I found out that they were
making a lot more money than I was even though
they didn’t have the benefits I did. So at one
point I had a disagreement with the people I was
working for and I said, “The heck with you,” and
I quit General Electric and I went to the job
shop that was employing the guys that were
working at GE and I said, “Do you guys have a
call for anybody?” And they said, “Oh yeah we
do, and we will even give you your job back.” So
they gave me my job [at GE] back at about a
third increase in salary. (Quality assurance, M,
C7)
Encounters with staffing firms were a
second, common stimulus that led infor-
mants to consider contracting as an option.
Technical professionals, especially those in
managerial roles, routinely encounter rep-

246 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
resentatives of staffing firms seeking new
recruits and job openings. Eleven of our
informants (21%; see Table 2, panel C)
reported being lured into contracting after
encountering agents of staffing firms at the
very time when they were ready to consider
change:
How did I get into contracting? The company
that I worked for hired contractors. And at one
point they finished up the portion of the project
for the contractors and they let them go. The
company that they worked for, the Registry,
called up a few weeks later and said, “Hey, do
you need anybody else?” I said “No.” They said,
“How would you like to go to work as a contrac-
tor?” And I said: “Sure!” (Database administra-
tor, M, C34)
Another 12% of our informants said they
entered contracting because they wanted
to work for a specific firm, but found that
the firm would only hire them on a contin-
gent basis. In fact, some firms appeared to
have an explicit policy of hiring people as
contractors to assess whether to offer a full-
time job:
I was working horrendous hours and I got fed
up with it after a while. My neighbor said: “I see
your light on at 3:30 every morning. What’s
going on?” And I said, “Well I’m working on this
RISC chip.” She said her husband was at IBM,
and suggested I try there. So I talked to IBM and
they gave me this six-page folder and said they
didn’t hire anybody who had experience. They
hired everybody right out of school. I said,
“How do you gain experience? How do you hire
people from outside?” And they said, “Well you
have to come in as a contractor.” So I did that.
I got a one-year contract, and then I got a six
month extension. (Verification engineer, M, C19)
A final type of encounter that pulled
informants to contracting was a direct offer
of contingent employment from a poten-
tial client. In some cases, offers came from
personal friends and acquaintances:
A friend of mine, a diving buddy actually, who
was the Assistant Dean of UCLA needed some-
one with my skill set to do a major project. She
said: “Gee it would be great if you were avail-
able!” and I was like, “Well, yeah, maybe I could
be available.” So I decided that it was time to get
out of the corporation, go off on my own and
start making some money for myself and being
my own boss. All of a sudden I had a one-year
contract full-time with UCLA to do this project.
(Software developer, M, C28)
Opportunities also came from customers of
former employers who believed that an in-
formant had valuable skills for which they
were willing to pay high rates on a contin-
gent basis. A software developer explained
how he was hired to develop and maintain
software sold by his former employer:
The customers were just very easy to find. They
wanted custom development. They were exist-
ing customers of the software house that I was
working for. The company did not offer custom
development services. In the last two years, in
fact, it became obvious that the president didn’t
really want to take the company anywhere and
was actually looking to sell it. More and more
customers were getting antsy. They still wanted
modifications. So that’s when I went into con-
tracting. And it was by word of mouth. I had to
turn down work, there was so much work. (Soft-
ware developer, F, C11)
Anticipated Rewards
Encounters with contractors were cru-
cial for informants because they modeled a
way to escape discontent while gaining ben-
efits that seemed more attractive than those
associated with full-time work. Of the vari-
ous advantages of contracting, the most
frequently and compellingly expressed was
the belief that contractors made more
money. Forty-four percent of our infor-
mants volunteered that they were drawn to
contracting primarily because they thought
they would make more money. A numeri-
cal control programmer captured the gen-
eral tenor of contracting’s economic lure:
A little less than a year ago, my family and I were
living in Seattle and we were getting a little tight
on money—getting behind, getting in debt too—
because Boeing did not pay enough for me to
support my family without my wife working. She
doesn’t work and I don’t believe she should
have to. We have four children. I actually
worked two or three jobs at one time for
about a year. I was even delivering newspa-
pers and doing other odd jobs. At Boeing I
was making about $40,000 to $44,000 a year
plus overtime which maybe averaged out to
be another $5,000 a year. Here, in eight

WHY DO CONTRACTORS CONTRACT? 247
months I’ve made about $115,000. (N.C.
programmer, M, C47)
In fact, the lure of money was so persuasive
that contractors were willing to forgo what
they saw as the benefits of a more tradi-
tional career:
It was a big move, from permanent to contract.
I gave up the chance to climb the corporate
ladder, the security, benefits. I mean, you lose
everything. As a permanent employee you can
climb up the ladder in the company and get
more responsibility, more opportunities. But
you lose everything as a contractor. [Interviewer:
So why did you move?] The money! They paid a
lot more! (Systems administrator, M, C42)
Enhanced income, however, was not the
only attractive feature of contracting. A
number of informants (14%) anticipated
more autonomy in their work.
I really wanted to have a little more freedom
and choice about what I was involved with. I had
been doing software support for network fax
products and I ended up doing some support
for some development work for a company build-
ing network interface cards and I really wanted
to gravitate more toward networking on a full-
time basis. (Systems administrator, M, C6)
Others (15%) anticipated developing new
skills: “I thought, I’ve been doing this
firmware stuff and systems bit for quite a
while. Maybe I need to branch out and
learn some of this IT stuff, like client server
and networks and GUI’s and all this” (Em-
bedded systems engineer, M, C41). Still others
(12%) sought more control over their time.
A marketer described how she quit a per-
manent position and came back as a con-
tractor to gain the flexibility to pursue
multiple jobs:
The company did not allow part-time employ-
ees, so I had to be a temp. I was outsourced
through a regular temp placement agency, work-
ing for him half day versus being a full-time
employee. Then I was free to work at the
lectures and video company for half of the day.
And it was flexible hours. I just had to tell them
the day before what time I would be expected.
The flexible hours really helped, being able to
juggle these things. (Marketer, F, C15)
A few of our informants were drawn to
contracting not because they wanted money,
flexibility, or control, but because they liked
the entrepreneurial excitement of string-
ing together a series of temporary contracts
(6%) or because they sought the variety
that contracting inevitably brought (8%).
Our informants’ stories of how they be-
came contractors suggest that explanations
for the rise of high-end contingent work
that consider only a one-sided set of causal
factors cannot adequately explain why tech-
nical professionals become contractors. As
scholars of employment relations would
anticipate, downsizing, outsourcing, and
related practices triggered movement into
contracting for a significant minority of
informants (Cappelli 1999; Barker and
Christensen 1998). But the individualistic
and financial motives that figure so promi-
nently in free agency’s rhetoric of employ-
ability were also integral to many contrac-
tors’ accounts. Moreover, serendipitous
encounters with the world of contracting
were critical for making contracting seem a
realistic option at a crucial point in time.
The complexity of “pushes” and “pulls”
that led informants into contracting make
it difficult to distinguish contingent work-
ers who entered temporary labor markets
voluntarily from those who did so involun-
tarily (for example, Tilly 1991). At least
among our informants, most of whom could
have easily found a permanent job, the
decision to enter contracting usually
evinced attributes of both.
In short, the decision to become a con-
tractor seems to reflect a mix of structural
and economic factors as well as a set of
motives rooted in a professional ideology
of work. Most informants viewed them-
selves as experts and subscribed to the no-
tion that decisions about work should be
governed primarily by an ethic of technical
rationality based on logic, reason, and prac-
ticality. But they had discovered, to their
chagrin, not only that organizational life
deviated from the way they believed organi-
zations should operate, but also that, as
experts, they were not always given the
respect they thought they deserved. In this
sense, the contractor’s discontent is remi-
niscent of the difficulties sociologists of
work have repeatedly discovered among

248 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
professionals in bureaucratic settings
(Marcson 1960; Ritti 1971; Raelin 1985).
Although some contractors found their
discontent a sufficient motive for entering
contracting, most required a push from
their environment before they took action.
At this point, an encounter with a contrac-
tor, staffing firm, or potential client made
contingent employment seem like an op-
tion that would allow informants to align
their work life with their professional ideol-
ogy. Contractors not only hoped to make
more money, they wanted to be treated as
knowledgeable and enjoy the autonomy,
flexibility, and influence they believed they
deserved. Our informants, therefore, ini-
tially saw contracting as a way to escape the
burdens of organizational life, while secur-
ing the benefits and respect befitting a
professional. The practical realities of con-
tracting, however, soon proved to be more
complicated and ambiguous than most
newly minted contractors anticipated.
Realities of Contracting
When asked to evaluate their experience
as contractors and offer advice for those
who might follow in their footsteps, infor-
mants articulated a more complex and dif-
ferentiated view of contracting than when
they spoke about why they had become
contractors. Experience as a contractor
cast new light on their original concerns
and posed a new set of problems. A few
contractors even expressed belated recog-
nition that they had lost some of the advan-
tages of full-time employment. Most had
come to perceive two sides to contracting, a
matched set of pros and cons that sug-
gested underlying tensions. The infor-
mants’ discourse on the realities of con-
tracting centered on four themes, each
marked by an opposition: independence
versus being an outsider, security versus
uncertainty, enhanced income versus hid-
den costs, and skills as expertise versus
skills as a commodity.
Table 3 documents the number of infor-
mants who spontaneously voiced each
theme during their interviews. As with
Table 2, these percentages must be read as
clues about the relative importance of the
themes among technical contractors: they
are, at best, lower bounds of a sample esti-
mate, because informants were not respond-
ing to structured questions.
Independence versus
Being an Outsider
As previously discussed, informants ini-
tially perceived contracting as a way of gain-
ing independence and distance from the
irrationalities of organizational life. As
panel A of Table 3 indicates, even after
years of experience, at least 69% of our
informants continued to view indepen-
dence as one of contracting’s advantages.
Like many contractors (37%), a quality as-
surance specialist felt that contracting had
delivered the promised escape from orga-
nizational politics:
As a contractor, many times you can be removed
from corporate politics—not removed com-
pletely, but at enough of a distance so that you
don’t have to take a position—you can be as
involved as you want to be. Whereas as an
employee, I found that you are involved whether
you want to be or not. Contractors can step back
a bit, because people let them do that. They say,
“Oh this person isn’t here forever like the rest of
us.” (Quality assurance technician, F, C13)
Contracting also granted informants the
freedom to express professional opinions
and offered at least the illusion of more
control over their own time, in part be-
cause they were less invested in the organi-
zation and less enmeshed in social relation-
ships at work (31%). Because contractors
were exposed to many work environments,
21% also mentioned that they experienced
more challenge and variety in their work:
The thing I like with consulting is I get to do
different things. And I know there’s an end to
it and I can do another project. I was offered a
full-time job; I did consider it, but when I thought
about it, I realized I would still be doing the
same thing. So I opted not to take it. (Multime-
dia developer, F, C26)
In other words, contractors apparently
found that moving from job to job re-
lieved them of the burdens they associ-
ated with full membership in an organi-

WHY DO CONTRACTORS CONTRACT? 249
zation. But, once they experienced the
realities of contracting, they also discov-
ered that independence had a price: they
were now outsiders who developed only
short-term relationships with employers.
Their status as outsiders manifested it-
self in a variety of ways. For example, a
design engineer lamented that he was no
longer granted the right to speak for the
company:
Table 3. Themes in Informants’ Accounts of Their Experience as Contractors.
Number of Percentage of
Theme Informants Informants
A. Independence Versus Being an Outsider
Independence
Escape from Organizational Politics 19 37
Freedom to Express Opinions 16 31
Job Variety 11 21
Total Mentioning at Least One Independence Theme 36 69
Being an Outsider
Unable to Speak for Client Company 3 6
Clients Bar Access to Information/Technology 7 13
Treated as an Outsider 10 19
Repeating Cycles—Adapt to New Firms 6 12
Total Mentioning at Least One Outsider Theme 18 35
B. Job Security Versus Uncertainty
Greater Security
a
10 19
Uncertainty
Uncertainty/Lack of Security 17 33
Must Repeatedly Look for Work 6 12
Must Endure Periods without Money to Pay Bills 4 8
Total Mentioning at Least One Uncertainty Theme 21 42
C. Enhanced Income Versus Hidden Costs
Enhanced Income
a
26 50
Hidden Costs
No Benefits 15 29
Skills Training Costs 13 21
Responsibility for Taxes and Fear of IRS 4 8
Downtime Costs 11 21
Lack of Stock Options 2 4
Total Mentioning at Least One Hidden Cost 29 56
D. Skill as Professional Expertise Versus Commodity
Professional Expertise
Developing Marketable New Skills/Learning 15 29
Gaining Influence and Respect 10 19
Total Mentioning at Least One Expertise Theme 21 40
Commodity
Having to Keep Skills Current 9 17
Finding Specialized Niche 3 6
Total Mentioning at Least One Commodity Theme 11 21
Notes:
The themes are listed in the order in which they appear in the paper.
The total is the sum of all informants mentioning at least one theme in this category and so cannot be
computed by adding the number of informants mentioning each theme.
a
Because this theme had no significant variants, item and theme total are equivalent.

250 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
When it comes to representing the company, I
can make recommendations and all that. But
when it comes down to it, I can’t speak for the
company. I don’t have the authority to do
things in their name even though I have a job
description that says, “OK, this contract em-
ployee is the one who will recommend go-no-go
on this kind of thing.” So it’s just … it’s a minor
little point, but it’s a point nevertheless. (Design
engineer, M, C5)
More crucially, and less symbolically, some
(13%) discovered that being an outsider
could limit their access to more interesting
work, thereby undercutting one of
contracting’s perceived advantages:
There’s one big difference. I can’t do some
things I could do as a permanent employee. I’m
working on a joint venture project on non-
volatile memory. But there’re some aspects of it
I can’t get involved in because I’m a contract
person, not a permanent employee. I’m not
permanent, so I might walk away from it and
leave a hole in their group. Also, they don’t
want to give out that sort of technical informa-
tion to just anybody. It’s sort of like the
company’s jewels: process information and stuff
like that. (Verification engineer, M, C19)
Contractors also found that they were
not always treated well by permanent em-
ployees, precisely because they were per-
ceived as outsiders. A programmer ex-
pressed the perception well: “Some com-
panies don’t treat contractors as good as
their employees. In a lot of places, employ-
ees are a little unfriendly because they’re
really cautious about what information to
share with you” (Programmer, M, C22). In-
formants were conscious of the day-to-day
consequences of lacking full membership
in an organization, such as being excluded
from company parties or being given an
undesirable workspace. Most considered
these consequences to be an acceptable
price for contracting’s advantages, but a
significant minority (19%) found them
troublesome and spoke openly of their dis-
satisfaction with being a person without a
community:
The one thing I’ve actually never really talked
about is the lack of belonging. As a contractor,
you often go from group to group. You don’t
really feel tied to the goals and vision of any one
community of writers. In contrast to the expe-
rience I had at Apple where I was part of a large
well-respected documentation group that was
doing a lot of interesting things and had some-
what of a vision for the future. There were
opportunities for individuals to feel part of
something greater and more important. As a
contractor, I’m temporarily tied to the goals of
all these different groups. I have my own per-
sonal goals, but less of a sense of, you know,
belonging and community. (Technical writer, F,
C24)
Others (12%) mentioned the frustration
of becoming acclimated to a new setting
only to leave and start over somewhere
else. A mechanical engineer described
the experience of being a professional
stranger:
You go to a new company, they look on you as
outsider. They don’t tell you much, and you’re
a stranger in the beginning, and it takes a while
to get to know them. You have to prove yourself
all over again. It takes a while to establish
yourself. By the time you establish yourself,
you’re out of the company. Your work is done
and you’re gone. So that’s the downside. (Me-
chanical design engineer, M, C44)
When informants began contracting, be-
ing a perpetual newcomer was not entirely
negative. It offered diversity and opportu-
nities to learn. Over time, however, the
positive aspects of being an outsider could
fade and the negative aspects predominate.
As a programmer, who had been a contrac-
tor nearly all his career, put it: “You’re
having to figure out a new culture every
time you change jobs. It’s tough. At the
beginning that was one of the benefits, but
now it’s getting to be one of the drags”
(Programmer, M, C21).
In short, the majority of informants felt
that contracting had liberated them from
the costs of membership in an organiza-
tional community. Many had entered con-
tracting, at least in part, to escape such
costs, and most remained disdainful of or-
ganizations’ social demands. After work-
ing a number of contracts, however, infor-
mants discovered that freeing oneself from
organizational life entailed accepting a new
burden: the existential status of a per-
petual stranger.

WHY DO CONTRACTORS CONTRACT? 251
To manage isolation, some contractors
developed affiliations along occupational
and professional lines. For instance, some
participated in—and one even founded—a
users’ group where software developers
gathered to exchange information about
technical and career issues. Others worked
through staffing firms whose business model
approached that of an occupational collec-
tive, and one technical writer actually affili-
ated with an occupational union. Still oth-
ers turned to virtual communities on the
World Wide Web for technical and profes-
sional support as well as for finding work.
Almost all informants recognized the im-
portance of cultivating informal networks
composed of professional peers and, in
fact, the majority had such networks. For
veteran contractors, in particular, these
networks provided a substitute for the com-
munity they had renounced, but the infor-
mal networks that most contractors main-
tained had not developed into an extended
professional community. These networks,
nevertheless, helped contractors address
another key difficulty: the problem of job
security.
Job Security versus Uncertainty
Perhaps the key benefit of permanent
employment is the sense of social and eco-
nomic security it affords. On the face of it,
contractors traded this security for the un-
certainty of the market, a calculated risk
that seemed worthwhile or unavoidable at
the time contractors made their decision.
With the benefit of hindsight, informants
now viewed security from two conflicting
perspectives. Nearly a fifth (19%) of our
informants claimed without prompting that
contracting had actually enhanced their sense
of security (see Table 3, panel B). Those
who articulated this view portrayed the se-
curity of permanent employment as an illu-
sion. Security was not about keeping a job,
they claimed, but about how easily one
could find another job when one’s current
job ended. These contractors believed they
had developed networks and skills that en-
abled them to manage job loss as a matter
of course. The result was an optimism that
belied popular perceptions of contingent
employment’s uncertainty:
Job security is the ability to get a job. Staff
people don’t have job security; you can be fired
whenever the company likes. And they don’t
have the networks. They can’t call someone and
get a job tomorrow morning. They think they
have job security but it’s on paper. People don’t
realize that real job security is when you have a
network of managers and recruiters where you
simply call them and say, “OK my contract fin-
ished,” and they say, “Great, I can place you
somewhere tomorrow morning.” The social
reality is, the staff person has no connections to
a next job. They don’t have social relationships.
They’re isolated. A contractor has these rela-
tionships. That’s real job security. That’s the
real game. (Technical writer, M, C32)
People always said, “Oh, contracting, you make
a lot of money but your future is not secure. No
job security.” I have never ever been fired from
a job. There’ve been a number of times I was at
places where they had layoffs. Big tearful scene
out in the parking lot after the big company-
wide meeting. “Oh I’m going to miss you.” “Oh
I don’t know what I am going to do.” I’m
watching these people—you know, hip flasks of
vodka, tearful goodbye scenes. I’m a contrac-
tor. I’ve got a job. I’ve got a job as long as I want
one. That’s happened a lot, and I don’t know
why. It may be that employees end up costing
the company a lot more. It seems like whenever
there’s a downturn, whenever there’s a layoff,
management has an opportunity to get rid of
the corporate deadwood with plausible
deniability. Whereas, it’s not an issue with a
contractor because they can make them go away
anytime they want. That’s always how it’s panned
out for me. Stay as long as you want. You got to
quit because they won’t kick you out. (Software
developer, M, C36)
Our informants’ depiction of contract-
ing as secure had experiential confirma-
tion: most had yet to experience signifi-
cant “downtime,” their term for periods
between contacts. Nevertheless, at least 17
(Table 3, panel B) were still concerned
with long-term security and believed that at
some point they would face a prolonged
period of downtime and its accompanying
financial difficulties. Although most
thought they could survive, and proved so
by repeatedly choosing to remain in con-

252 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
tracting, uncertainty lurked in the back-
ground. Contractors countered their
doubts with the argument, again grounded
in their own experience, that risk dimin-
ished with experience: “There is more risk.
A contract can be over today. But the more
you stay in contracting the less scary it
becomes. Those in it for 20 years would
never be an employee” (Quality assurance,
F, C13). Nevertheless, a third of the infor-
mants considered latent uncertainty to be a
downside of contracting, and half of these
found it stressful:
Well, initially it was very stressful. Right now,
I’m kind of relaxed because I’m in the middle of
a contract that’s rather long and they want to
renew. But, many times during the year you
have to think about finding work. You’re always
looking for work. They say it gets easier with
time. Once you’ve developed, if your clients are
happy with you, they’ll come back and refer
work. But there’s that constant stress. (Techni-
cal writer, F, C24)
Moreover, contractors discovered that
the activities necessary for minimizing un-
certainty were themselves a disadvantage.
As 12% of our informants mentioned,
searching for jobs, maintaining a network,
and keeping records took time and energy:
You are looking for a job every couple of months.
That is probably no different than a salesman
who is out of a job every morning—he has got to
go create business every morning. But, still, you
have to devote some of your time and some of
your energy to finding work, instead of working
your work. So that is a disadvantage. (Program-
mer, M, C48)
A surprisingly small number (8%) of our
informants, however, feared that failing to
find a job would drain their savings, mak-
ing it difficult to pay bills and make ends
meet.
Commentary on the nature and mean-
ing of security and uncertainty was nearly
ubiquitous in our informants’ evaluations
of contracting. All were aware of the risks
associated with contracting, and those who
worried about uncertainty were more preva-
lent than those who did not (40% versus
19%). For the most part, however, contrac-
tors had discovered ways of redefining or
minimizing the lack of security. The most
common view was that the economic re-
wards of contracting, at least for the mo-
ment, outweighed the risk.
Enhanced Income versus Hidden Costs
Contractors readily agreed that money
was contracting’s primary advantage. With-
out prompting, 50% of the informants
mentioned that contracting had enhanced
their income (see Table 3, panel C). Most
estimated that they made 30–300% more
than they had as permanent employees.
Even those who were initially concerned
about making ends meet believed that con-
tracting had made them wealthier. Few
envisioned returning to permanent employ-
ment, and many had already turned down
one or more offers. A story told by an
embedded systems engineer was typical:
[My manager] said to me, “Everybody loves your
work, we like working with you. So, we’re going
to offer you $80,000 a year and a $5,000 signing
bonus and we might talk about stock options.”
And I go, “Well, Mark, gee that’s great.” After a
weekend I come back and he says, “Have you
thought about it?” And I say, “Yeah, Mark, that’s
a great offer but, you know, by the time I take
care of all my benefits, vacation and everything
else, there’s still a twenty thousand dollar differ-
ence between what I can make as a contractor
and what you’re offering me. I’d love to take it
if I could, but it just doesn’t make economic
sense.” (Embedded systems engineer, M, C41)
Even contractors who factored downtime
into their calculations concurred that the
economics of employment favored contract-
ing. In fact, no informants said they were
economically worse off than they had been
as full-time employees. One reason for this
was that they had experienced less down-
time than they originally expected. An-
other was that unlike permanent employ-
ees, contractors were paid for every hour
they worked, usually at a rate higher than
permanent employees performing compa-
rable work. An outspoken programmer
put it bluntly:
They’re asking me to work seventy hours a week.
And, you know what? They’re going to pay me
for seventy hours a week. When they ask a full-

WHY DO CONTRACTORS CONTRACT? 253
time person to work seventy hours a week they’re
going to pay them whatever their salary is. The
full-time person is sitting there going, “Ugh.”
I’m going, “Ching, ching, ching, ching.” (Pro-
grammer, F, C27)
Yet, despite their insistence that they
were economically better off as contrac-
tors, informants had come to realize that
contracting entailed hidden costs. One
cost, widely recognized in the literature
and mentioned by 29% of our informants,
was the burden of providing one’s own
benefits, especially pension funds and
health insurance. Less widely appreciated
outside contracting circles was the burden
of maintaining one’s expertise (mentioned
by 21% of our informants). The direct
costs of remaining up-to-date included fees
for courses as well as the price of equip-
ment, books, and software:
You make a lot of mistakes, and you have to go,
“You just blew five thousand dollars on a piece
of software that you’re throwing away. Whoa!”
Especially when you’re starting out, that’s hard
to do. God! (Software developer, M, C12)
Other costs were indirect, as when contrac-
tors lowered their rates to secure contracts
from which they hoped to learn new skills:
When I moved from the old—not that old, but
legacy—skills to the newer, more popular skills,
I had to lower my rate because obviously I was
coming as a neophyte as opposed to someone
who has several years of project experience.
Mostly, customers want references for real
projects as opposed to something that I did at
home. So the learning of new skills as a contrac-
tor is a challenge. (Software developer, F, C11)
Some contractors (8%) said that higher
taxes and different tax schedules were an-
other hidden cost that reduced the mon-
etary advantage of contracting: “I earn a
little bit more than an employee. But let’s
get it straight: It may appear that I earn
twice as much because I take home these
huge checks, but half of it goes to the
government. I have to pay my own taxes”
(Technical writer, M, C17). Especially those
contractors who worked as independents
(or 1099er’s, as they are known in contract-
ing circles) feared a tax audit and its subse-
quent penalties, since the IRS was thought
to scrutinize independent contractors
closely.
Another hidden cost was the price of
uncertainty itself (21%). The potential
irregularity of a contractor’s income in the
face of fixed expenses meant that contrac-
tors had to think explicitly about financial
strategies for ameliorating uncertainty’s
impact:
Say something turns bad, and my contract at
Cisco is terminated. Now I have my $860-a-
month mortgage, my $300-a-month car pay-
ment. $300-a-month food bill, I don’t know,
whatever else, you know, utilities, electric, gas,
water…. You learn to think differently as a
contractor. (Technical writer, M, C9)
At least one informant managed the cost of
uncertainty by maintaining a buffer account
in the bank, and several others implied that
they had done the same. As this engineer
(M, C19) put it, “The difference between
being contract and being permanent is the
amount of money I have in my savings
account.” Other contractors spoke of de-
laying major purchases until they had saved
enough to pay for the item in cash. Married
contractors usually said they could get by
on their spouses’ income, at least for a
short period of time.
Finally, technical contractors perceived
the lack of stock options as a hidden cost.
Although contractors typically made more
money than permanent employees, espe-
cially in the entrepreneurial climate of the
Silicon Valley, permanent employees could
become wealthy overnight if their firm went
public and did well on the stock market. At
least two of our informants were still
troubled by memories of lost opportunities
to become wealthy:
I turned down a job at Netscape because I
wanted to contract. I mean I turned down a job
offer from Netscape the month before they
went public! I decided not to apply when
Grayson moved to Mountain View even though
I was doing Web development at the time. That’s
the one that hurts. Of course I had no idea at
the time that Netscape was going to do that. I
keep reminding myself of that when I start
feeling really stupid. (Software developer, M,
C21)
Economic considerations were central

254 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
to the informants’ initial decisions to con-
tract, and most felt that they had reaped
the economic benefits they sought, but they
also understood that contracting’s mon-
etary advantage was reduced by costs they
had not anticipated. As a result, infor-
mants gradually began to realize the full
implications of having directly entered a
labor market. Like actors in any other
market, they confronted the necessity of
estimating, pricing, and managing uncer-
tainty. To this reality they brought one
crucial resource: their professional exper-
tise. The meaning of expertise in a market
was the final theme that marked our infor-
mants’ discourse on contracting.
Professional Expertise
as Skill versus Commodity
Informants originally hoped contracting
would allow them to focus more intently on
technical work and on developing new skills,
and 29% (see panel D of Table 3) volun-
teered that they had achieved their objec-
tive:
I am really glad I became a contractor, because
it has given me a chance to go all around the
Valley and work for all kinds of companies.
When you stay in the same field, you only see
that world; you don’t get to see other kinds of
things. I did a contract testing encryption soft-
ware for a bank. I would have never done that.
I mean I would not have gone to a bank and said,
“Can I test your encryption software?” I didn’t
even know it existed. So I got lots of opportuni-
ties by doing that. (Quality assurance, F, C13)
Furthermore, nearly a fifth of the contrac-
tors (19%) claimed that their skills had
brought them considerable influence and
respect in the client companies where they
worked.
The realities of developing and main-
taining expertise, however, were sometimes
sobering. Contracting did not guarantee
interesting or challenging work. Once in-
formants began contracting, they quickly
discovered that exercising skill was no
longer simply a matter of being knowledge-
able; skill and reputation for skill were the
coinage by which others measured their
value in the marketplace. Failing to keep
current and demonstrate skills that were in
demand undercut a contractor’s market-
ability:
It is possible, as a contractor, to wind up doing
small things. You know, the same pigeon-hol-
ing can happen to you as a contractor. If you fail
to educate yourself, you not only have all of the
entrepreneurial risks, but you have the same
drawbacks as an employee and none of the
benefits. (Software developer, M, C39)
Once contractors recognized that re-
maining on the “cutting-edge” was crucial
for maintaining employability, learning
became an issue of survival and not simply
a means of getting a job done or a route to
personal satisfaction and growth. At least
17% of our informants portrayed the con-
tinual need to retool as a cost of contract-
ing. Furthermore, contractors discovered
that it was ultimately customers who de-
fined what they needed to learn. The need
to stay abreast of technology could become
tedious and might even lead contractors to
consider returning to full-time employ-
ment:
The competition is getting a little stiffer be-
cause the application packages that a writer
needs to know are getting more complicated,
more complex, more work intensive. And so,
you have to keep up with it. At 45, I’m getting
a little tired of playing that rat race, which is why
I’m at Cisco, because Cisco wants to bring me on
board direct. I would just as soon focus on the
network engineering side of technology and on
working my way into a management position
than continue this. (Technical writer, M, C9)
In time, contractors realized that the
meaning of expertise had been trans-
formed. To be an expert was no longer
simply to possess sophisticated skills and
knowledge. One had to possess skills that
were marketable. A few contractors (6%)
even lamented that one result of selling
expertise was doing highly skilled but mo-
notonous work within a specialized niche.
In short, experienced contractors came to
understand expertise as a commodity whose
maintenance could be costly. Ironically,
many had become contractors precisely
because they wanted to distance their pro-
fessional selves from the irrationalities of
organizational life, yet most eventually dis-

WHY DO CONTRACTORS CONTRACT? 255
covered that their professionalism was now
subject to market forces, which could be no
less corrosive.
Discussion and Implications
As ethnographers, our objective has been
to document technical contractors’ ac-
counts of their experiences with contract-
ing and to use these as a lens for evaluating
conceptions of contingent work and for
building more valid theories of contingent
labor markets. Our data are informative on
three counts. First, they help us under-
stand why current images of the experience
of contingent work are oversimplified. Sec-
ond, they point to the previously overlooked
role that occupational communities and
communities of practice may play in con-
tingent labor markets. Finally, they raise
questions about our notions of how contin-
gent labor markets are structured. Con-
sider each implication in turn.
Adequacy of Current
Images of Contingent Work
Most research on contingent work be-
gins by positing a contrast between employ-
ment in bureaucracies and employment in
markets and then, at least implicitly, cham-
pions one system over the other. Employ-
ment relations scholars highlight the ad-
vantages of bureaucratic employment and
the disadvantages of contract labor. They
warn that contingent employment exacer-
bates economic insecurity by lowering
wages, abetting discrimination, eliminat-
ing access to benefits, undermining oppor-
tunities for collective action, and, ulti-
mately, exposing people more directly to
the whims of employers and the ravages of
economic cycles. Advocates of free agency,
on the other hand, enumerate the con-
straints and injustices of organizational
employment and extol the virtues of selling
one’s skills on the open market. Free agents,
they claim, have more autonomy, accumu-
late more wealth, and enjoy a more holistic
lifestyle than employees who are trapped in
the webs of bureaucracy. Our data, how-
ever, suggest that both interpretations are
inadequate.
For those who live it, a life of technical
contracting appears neither as grim as the
proponents of the employment relations’
perspective fear nor as rosy as the advocates
of free agency promise. Viewing the tech-
nical contractors’ world through their own
eyes suggests how inadvisable it may be for
employment relations scholars to assume
that contingent work always exacts the so-
cial and economic costs associated with
low-skilled, temporary labor. The contrac-
tors we encountered were not forced into
lower-paying, less secure jobs than they
desired. In fact, most found contracting to
be more lucrative than permanent employ-
ment, and a sizable minority saw it as more
secure. Our informants generally preferred
contracting and consciously accepted its
risks in hope of making more money while
escaping the constraints of organizational
life.
This is not to say that the economic
pressures that worry employment relations
proponents are irrelevant for highly skilled
contractors. A significant number of tech-
nical contractors turned to contracting af-
ter having been laid off or because they
anticipated losing their job. Yet, even in
these cases, because demand for their skills
was so great, most could have pursued per-
manent employment had they so desired.
That they did not attests not only to techni-
cal contracting’s economic potential but to
important social-cultural considerations.
The contractors with whom we spoke viewed
organizational employment through the
lens of a professional identity and found it
wanting. They aspired to obtain work that
would enable and reward their efforts to
develop and exercise expertise. Many
sought independence and greater control
over their environment. The majority
claimed to have found it.
It is important to note, however, that our
study took place during one of the tightest
labor markets in recent American history.
Whether technical contractors would re-
port similar experiences at another time
remains an open question. Furthermore,
because we have no data on technical ex-
perts who left contracting, it may be that
some technical contractors have experi-

256 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
ences more like those anticipated by the
employment relations perspective.
Even with these caveats, our informants’
experiences might, at first glance, appear
to be more consistent with the free agent
perspective. On closer inspection, how-
ever, the free agent perspective seems as
partial as the employment relations view.
Independence, security, income, and ex-
pertise had their dark side: a sense of
estrangement and insecurity, the burden
of being financially responsible for oneself,
and, most important, the realization that
expertise was a commodity whose value was
determined by market dynamics. Free
agency’s notion that contractors partici-
pate in a market unencumbered by organi-
zations is also misleading. Not only did all
contractors have to meet the needs of their
clients, but most were forced by their cir-
cumstances or by their clients to work
through staffing agencies that became their
legal employers for the duration of a con-
tract.
Thus, it appears that common images of
contingent employment are simplistic in
two ways. First, contractors seem to experi-
ence their situation more complexly than
most research acknowledges. To capture
this complexity, scholars of contingent work
must set their assumptions aside and turn
to data on the perspectives and behaviors
of contingent workers. They should at-
tempt to understand both the advantages
and disadvantages of contingent work and
how these are grounded in the specific
conditions that workers face.
Second, because technical contractors’
tales of work contradict prevailing images
of temporary employment, they underscore
the danger of building a theory of contin-
gent labor by generalizing from data on
one type of occupation to all others. A
comparison of our findings with existing
accounts suggests that the experience of
contracting in low- and high-skilled jobs
differs significantly. Specifically, the no-
tions that contracting is more lucrative than
permanent employment and that employ-
ability is a form of security appear to have
no parallel in the experience of low-skilled
temporary workers. Moreover, while both
low- and high-skilled contractors experi-
ence being an outsider, their experiences
may have somewhat different flavors: the
former are often ignored or disdained, while
the latter frequently experience admira-
tion and respect.
This is not to say that there are no simi-
larities in contingent employment across
occupational strata. Like other temporary
workers, technical contractors worry about
downtime, experience uncertainty, and lack
a sense of community. Although differ-
ences between occupational groups remain
a matter for further research, this study
suggests that these differences shape the
way people experience contingent employ-
ment and that it is unrealistic to assume
that contingent employment in itself could
level such differences.
The Importance of
Occupational Communities
Our ability to offer a full theoretical
account of contingent employment may be
hampered by confining our conceptua-
lization of its social context to organiza-
tions and markets. Organizations and free
markets are but two ways of structuring
employment relations. As has long been
understood in the case of the professions
and crafts, occupational communities are a
third (Van Maanen and Barley 1984). In
their most developed form, occupational
communities certify expertise, broker em-
ployment, set wages, and create barriers to
entry.
Occupational identities were extremely
important for the technical contractors we
studied. They viewed themselves as profes-
sionals and introduced themselves to oth-
ers using occupational terms. Many spoke
of how difficult it was to be a professional in
a bureaucratic setting. But just as profes-
sional expertise co-existed uneasily in orga-
nizational milieus, so professionalism was
not entirely consistent with a free market.
The informants’ stories of contracting were,
in part, tales of how they discovered the
difficulty of being professionals in an open
market.
Although the market for technical ex-

WHY DO CONTRACTORS CONTRACT? 257
pertise apparently satisfied the contractors’
desire to be recognized and paid for their
skill, it undermined other aspects of profes-
sional life that were more easily addressed
when they were permanent employees.
Organizations often employ numerous
members of the same technical specialty.
For this reason, they offer technical special-
ists a local community of practice (Lave
and Wenger 1990), support membership in
professional associations, and subsidize
professional training and development.
Because permanent employment is more
stable than contingent employment, even
in an age of downsizing it shields technical
professionals from experiencing the full
brunt of the market for expertise, thereby
moderating the threat of obsolescence.
As technical contractors, our informants
rapidly learned that their expertise was a
commodity whose utility was defined by the
clients’ willingness to pay for their services.
The responsibility for and costs of remain-
ing marketable and technically up-to-date
now rested on the contractors’ shoulders.
To enhance their skills, contractors re-
quired access to the technical communities
where technical knowledge resides. To
find appropriate jobs, they had to interact
with people who were aware of potential
clients and who appreciated the details of
technology and technical work. To coun-
teract the sense of being outsiders, they
needed a community independent of the
organizations in which they worked. For
these purposes, the market was no substi-
tute for an employing organization.
Technical contractors attempted to meet
these professional needs through a variety
of mechanisms, the most ubiquitous of
which was the cultivation of personal net-
works comprised of friends, colleagues, and
acquaintances who could provide techni-
cal information and information on jobs.
Although the contractors’ networks in-
cluded recruiters, permanent employees,
and managers, a significant proportion of
their contacts were other contractors in the
same technical specialty with whom they
exchanged technical information. In short,
many contractors had begun to construct
networks that resembled occupationally
oriented communities of practice to handle
their professional needs.
Some sought to augment and strengthen
such networks by affiliating with more for-
mally structured communities. Some con-
tractors belong to professional associations
and, even more commonly, to “users’
groups” that offered technical training,
socializing, and information on job oppor-
tunities. Several contractors allied them-
selves with staffing firms that were occupa-
tionally homogeneous. One was structured
as a collective that provided its members
with training, business services, and ben-
efits. Another specialized in outsourcing
Unix systems administrators. The firm sup-
ported the community it had organized by
providing bulletin boards, online chat-
rooms, and Web-based reference materials
that systems administrators could access
when they needed technical assistance.
These developments represent the emer-
gence of occupation affiliations and proto-
occupational communities in the midst of a
contract labor market. They served to shield
contractors from the isolation, insecuri-
ties, and costs of participating as lone indi-
viduals in a market for expertise. They
enabled technical contractors not only to
address professional issues but also to share
experiences, concerns, and interpretations
of contingent employment. To put this
another way, among technical contractors
there was evidence that occupational aware-
ness had begun to bridge the gulf between
bureaucracy and market.
The Structure of
Contingent Labor Markets
Our data suggest two other modifica-
tions of how we should envision the struc-
ture of contingent labor markets. Histori-
cally, the employment relations literature
has conflated the distinction between pri-
mary and secondary labor markets with the
distinction between the stable core and
unstable peripheral sectors of the economy.
Because of the impermanent nature of con-
tingent work, contingent labor markets have
been viewed as secondary. Yet, technical
contractors apparently experience few of

258 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
the vicissitudes of a secondary labor mar-
ket: for instance, they are not poorly trained
or rewarded, nor do they appear to lead a
hand-to-mouth existence. Consequently,
the image of contingent employment as a
form of secondary employment seems un-
warranted. If we accept the view that less
skilled contingent workers often do experi-
ence the tribulations of secondary employ-
ment, then it might be more accurate to
argue that like bureaucratic employment,
contingent employment seems to have its
own primary and secondary sectors, and
the differences in dynamics between them
are as pronounced and socially significant
as the differences between permanent and
contingent employment itself.
Furthermore, it may be even more mis-
leading to employ simple market images of
how contingent employment is structured.
Discourse on contingent employment of-
ten envisions a simple, dyadic relationship
between the individual who sells and the
firm that buys labor. Except in the special
case of independent contractors, this is
inaccurate. At minimum, most contingent
labor markets are triadic in structure. Be-
tween the buyer and the seller lies a third
party, usually a staffing firm that brokers
market information and matches workers
to clients in return for a significant cut of
the contractor’s hourly rate. Yet, most
discussions of contingent labor markets
ignore or underplay the role of the staffing
firms, and there are almost no studies of
how they operate (but see Peck and
Theodore 1998). Moreover, at least in the
world of technical contracting, a number
of other social entities contribute to and
participate in the structural dynamics of
contingent employment. Internet-based
job banks and résumé services (such as
DICE) are particularly important. Con-
tractors post their résumés to these services
and consult them for job announcements,
and staffing firms often rely on them to
identify job candidates. Users’ groups, pro-
fessional associations, and, in some cases
(technical writers), even unions also influ-
ence the dynamics of contingent employ-
ment in technical fields. Sorely needed to
leaven the discourse on free agency are
studies that take seriously the triadic struc-
ture of labor markets and that examine the
role of other actors in making them oper-
ate. If for no other reason, the notion of a
dyadic contingent labor market is a fiction
because information on jobs and job seek-
ers is neither free nor evenly distributed.
Whether or not the economy will be
marked by greater use of contingent labor,
we still have much to learn about contract-
ing as a social phenomenon and an eco-
nomic phenomenon. By describing the
point of view of highly skilled contractors,
we have tried to show not only where exist-
ing theories of contingent work are lim-
ited, but that contingent employment is
more diverse than is often thought. Con-
tingent work is an area where new employ-
ment practices and ideologies are being
forged. If policy-makers are to adequately
address these developments, they will re-
quire more nuanced images of how people
experience contingent work and how con-
tingent labor markets are actually struc-
tured. We offer this study as but a step in
this direction.

WHY DO CONTRACTORS CONTRACT? 259
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