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SINATRAWARMING TREND
The “Warming Trend” in Conceptual Change
Research: The Legacy of Paul R. Pintrich
Gale M. Sinatra
Department of Educational Psychology
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This article explores the legacy of Paul Pintrich in regard to theory and research in conceptual
change. Specifically, this article reviews his vision for a view of conceptual change—a vision
that integrated motivation and affect within a broader view of cognition in the classroom
(Pintrich, 1999; Pintrich & Sinatra, 2003). This article describes 2 models inspired by his 1993
article, Beyond Cold Conceptual Change (Pintrich, Marx, & Boyle, 1993): Dole and Sinatra’s
(1998) Cognitive Reconstruction of Knowledge Model and the Cognitive-Affective Model of
Conceptual Change (Gregoire, 2003), as well as our own personal view of intentional concep-
tual change (Sinatra & Pintrich, 2003). This article argues that the field may be changed inexo-
rably by Pintrich’s vision. Finally, this article describes Paul’s ideas for future research in con-
ceptual change.
Conceptual change was by no means Paul Pintrich’s main
area of research. And yet, his 1993 article “Beyond Cold
Conceptual Change: The Role of Motivational Beliefs and
Classroom Contextual Factors in the Process of Conceptual
Change,” co-authored with Ron Marx and Robert Boyle, ar-
guably changed the field as much as any single contribution
to conceptual change research. Prior to the “hot cognition”
article, accounts of conceptual change mainly focused on
students’ existing knowledge, developmental changes, and
conceptual change pedagogy. With few exceptions, these ac-
counts gave little recognition to the affective, situational, and
motivational factors that influence, and sometimes deter-
mine, whether change occurs.
This article explores the new focus in conceptual change
research inspired by the work of Paul Pintrich. Specifically, I
examine how the hot cognition article led to new models that
emphasize motivation as a determining factor of conceptual
change. I describe the Cognitive Reconstruction of Knowl-
edge Model (CRKM; Dole & Sinatra, 1998) and the Cogni-
tive-Affective Model of Conceptual Change (CAMCC)
(Gregoire, 2003) as two examples of the warming trend in
conceptual change models inspired by Paul Pintrich’s work.
Both models prominently feature motivational, affective, and
contextual components.
In addition to examining how these models are a direct re-
sponse to Pintrich’s views expressed in the 1993 article, I also
explore his view of conceptual change—a view that integrates
motivation and affect within a broader viewof cognition in t he
classroom. Specifically,I discuss his views outlined in a recent
chapter in Schnotz, Vosniadou, and Carretero’s volume New
Perspectives on Conceptual Change (Pintrich, 1999) and in
our collaboration on the construct and volume of the same
name, Intentional Conceptual Change (Sinatra & Pintrich,
2003), to show how the fieldm aybe changed inexorably by his
vision. Finally, I describe where I believe Paul wanted us to go
in future research in conceptual change.
“COLD” CONCEPTUAL CHANGE
For decades, researchers studying knowledge acquisition
have recognized that students come to the learning situation
with preconceived notions about the way the world works
(e.g., Anderson, Reynolds, Schallert, & Goetz, 1977; Piaget,
1952). This pre-existing knowledge serves as a platform
from which learners interpret their world. Often this knowl-
edge, developed through everyday experiences with the psy-
chological, social, and physical world, conflicts with infor-
mation taught in school. As an example, many young
children believe the earth is flat, as their experience suggests,
and thus have considerable difficulty developing the concep-
tion of a spherical earth (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992).
Learning under these circumstances often involves not only
EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGIST, 40(2), 107–115
Copyright © 2005, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Gale M. Sinatra, Department of
Educational Psychology, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 4505 Maryland
Parkway, Box 451017, Las Vegas, NV 89154–1017. E-mail:
sinatra@unlv.nevada.edu
the integration of new information into memory but also the
restructuring of existing knowledge representations. This re-
structuring is known as conceptual change or conceptual
change learning (Vosniadou, 1999).
Prior to Pintrich, Marx, and Boyle’s (1993) influential ar-
ticle, there was little attempt to link motivation and cognition
in the study of conceptual change learning. Research in con-
ceptual change in the 1980s and early 1990s focused primar-
ily on three areas of investigation: (a) the influence of cogni-
tive factors such as students’ existing knowledge or
misconceptions on change, (b) developmental changes in
young learners’ knowledge representations, and (c) the de-
sign of instructional methods to foster change. With one no-
table exception (Strike & Posner, 1992), these accounts gave
little recognition to the affective, situational, and motiva-
tional factors that influence and sometimes determine
whether change occurs. Pintrich et al. (1993) labeled these
prevailing perspectives cold conceptual change due to their
focus on rational, cognitive factors to the exclusion of
extrarational or “hot” constructs.
The first of the three traditional areas of conceptual
change research, cognitive factors in conceptual change, is
exemplified by the early work of researchers such as
Vosniadou and Brewer (1987; 1992), Chi (1992), and
Thagard (1992). These researchers described structural
changes in the cognitive architecture of learners’ knowledge
representations. In their views of conceptual change as “radi-
cal restructuring,” “radical conceptual change,” and “concep-
tual revolutions,” respectively, these researchers mapped the
change in the organization of learners’ conceptual under-
standings that occurs with dramatic knowledge restructuring.
These perspectives contributed tremendously to understand-
ing the breadth and depth of the changes in students’ knowl-
edge representations when they come to accept that two ob-
jects of different weight fall at the same rate (Hynd, 1998) or
when they learn that heat is not a substance but a process
(Chi, 1992). This research also established the difficulty of
creating such profound reorganizations of thought. However,
early on, these views did not explain why change often oc-
curs for some students and not for others who have similar
background knowledge.
One main interest of cognitive psychologists, educational
psychologists, and science educators in this line of research,
has been describing learners’ num erous misconceptions, pre-
conceptions, alternative conceptions, or naïve theories in an
attempt to catalog the litany of students’ notions bedeviling
educators. These existing conceptions were described as bar-
riers to knowledge restructuring in that misconceptions
proved resistant to change and had to be overcome (Clough
& Driver, 1985; Eaton, Anderson, & Smith, 1984; Posner,
Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982; West & Pines, 1985; see
also Guzzetti, Snyder, Glass, & Gamas, 1993, for a
meta-analysis of this research). The notion of resistance to
change, central to this research, clearly ignited a motivational
spark; yet these researchers did not explicitly describe how
motivational constructs were implicated in creating or main-
taining students’ reluctance to adopt new ideas.
The second approach to conceptual change research of-
fered a developmental perspective of knowledge restructur-
ing. Researchers from this theoretical orientation helped ex-
plain how young children’s conceptions were often based on
their everyday experience and were fundamentally different
from those of adults or scientists (Carey 1985; 1992;
Vosniadou & Brewer, 1987). Vosniadou and Brewer’s (1992)
classic study illustrated how children’s conceptions of the
earth’s shape developed from a flat earth notion to round like
a pancake before adopting the scientific view of a spherical
globe. The cognitive developmental literature provided an
excellent description of the change in young children’s
knowledge representations and how the development of in-
ternal cognitive processes mediated that conceptual growth.
These descriptions contributed to conceptual change re-
searchers’ understanding that change is essentially a develop-
mental process. However, this view could still be considered
a “cold” description of change in that it focused on cognitive
structures alone and typically did not account for affective,
motivational, or contextual factors.
The third area of conceptual change research, the design
of instruction to foster change, is exemplified by Posner et
al.’s (1982) model. Science educators studying conceptual
change sought to understand why students’ knowledge
seemed so resistant to change even in the face of instruction
designed to alter those ideas. Posner et al.’s conceptual
change model was developed in part to explain the challenges
of teaching for conceptual change. Their view was based on
the idea of an inherent similarity between the process of sci-
entific revolutions in the scientific community and the
knowledge restructuring process experienced by science
learners. The model described the nature of students’ resis-
tance to new ideas as well as the conditions necessary to cre-
ate knowledge change.
According to Posner et al. (1982) individuals must be-
come dissatisfied with their existing conceptions as explana-
tions for scientific phenomena. Next, individuals must find
the new conceptions to be both intelligible and plausible;that
is, the new ideas must be comprehensible and believable to
learners. Finally, students must find the new conceptions
fruitful for explaining other conceptions or related phenom-
ena. Dissatisfaction clearly provides students with an affec-
tive reason to change their existing knowledge. However, it
took a decade before Posner and his colleagues expressly
noted “motives and goals and the institutional and social
sources of them need to be considered” in conceptual change
models (Strike & Posner, 1992, p.162).
THE VISION: “HOT” CONCEPTUAL CHANGE
As illustrated, prior to the Pintrich et al. (1993) hot concep-
tual change article, the issue of motivation was either ignored
108 SINATRA
or merely foreshadowed in conceptual change research.
Pintrich and colleagues brought a broader view of the learner,
one in which cognitive and motivational constructs operate in
interaction, to the study of knowledge restructuring. It took
the expertise of a motivation scholar and his colleagues to ex-
plicate how motivational constructs might play a role in fos-
tering knowledge change. Why? Motivation is a complex,
multidimensional construct that interacts in dynamic ways
with cognitive constructs such as background knowledge and
metacognition. Thus, it was not until Pintrich et al. brought
their expertise to the task of analyzing the role of motiva-
tional constructs in facilitating or inhibiting conceptual
change that researchers began to appreciate the current view
as a cold depiction of the change process. Equally important,
was Pintrich et al.’s, recognition of the need to examine the
classroom context to fully appreciate how these constructs
play out in actual learning situations. The notion of examin-
ing the classroom context as a facet of the change process
was arguably as influential as the focus on motivational con-
structs. Prior to the 1993 article, most research on conceptual
change was conducted in laboratory settings using clinical
interviews with contrived tasks and situations. After Pintrich
and colleagues argued “the actual classroom context may in-
fluence students’ motivation and cognition and most impor-
tantly, interaction between these two constructs” (p. 168), the
context for conceptual change became a more central focus
for researchers.
Pintrich et al. (1993) began their argument by questioning
the position of the day—that the process of change in the sci-
entific community (the model for individual conceptual
change) was ultimately “determined by empirical and logical
factors” (p. 170). In contrast to this view, Pintrich et al.
reframed the conceptual landscape by asserting, “We take the
constructivist position that the process of conceptual change
is influenced by personal, motivational, social, and historical
processes, thereby advocating a hot model of individual con-
ceptual change” (p. 170). They further asserted, “The class-
room community does not generally operate in the same
fashionasthescientificcommunity...[rather]theactual
content of students’ theories and models is influenced by per-
sonal, motivational, social, and historical factors” (p. 170).
With the theoretical terrain established, Pintrich et al.
(1993) went on to explain one of the most vexing issues in
conceptual change research: the apparent paradox that back-
ground knowledge—well established in the psychological
literature as a facilitator of learning—often served as a bar-
rier to knowledge change. The problem, they explained, is
that Posner et al.’s (1982) metaphor for conceptual under-
standing, “conceptual ecology,” was based on a biological
view that the “fittest” ideas survived. Posner et al. explained
that as ideas compete for the same conceptual niche, the idea
that best resolves anomalies and fits within the learners’ con-
ceptual ecosystem will survive, whereas other ideas will go
“extinct.” Although a useful metaphor in many respects,
Pintrich et al. explained their objection: “Ecosystems are not
purposeful, but individuals learners and communities of
scholars can and do have goals, purposes, and intentions,
thereby suggesting a role for an individual’s motivational be-
liefs” (p. 172).
It is these individual goals, purposes, and intentional—hot
constructs—that resolve the apparent paradox. Although stu-
dents may have similar background knowledge, they may not
have the goal of making sense of the to-be-learned content or
the motivation to resolve discrepancies between their knowl-
edge and the new conceptions. Indeed, Pintrich et al. (1993)
argued that learners’ epistemic goals, defined as “their moti-
vations towards knowledge as an object” (p. 172) have a me-
diating effect on the processing of information and ulti-
mately, the likelihood of conceptual change.
Next, Pintrich et al. (1993) explained how a host of spe-
cific motivational constructs could affect the process of
knowledge change (to which I return later). The constructs
addressed included mastery goals, epistemological beliefs,
personal interest, values, importance, self-efficacy, and con-
trol beliefs. This laid the groundwork for the role of these and
other motivational constructs to be explored in future con-
ceptual change models.
THE “WARMING” TREND
The 1993 article had a tremendous impact on views of con-
ceptual change. The article was the first to articulate how mo-
tivation and cognition interact in complex ways to produce a
learning outcome such as knowledge change. As such, it had
a profound influence not only on conceptual change research
but also on cognitive views of learning in general. Models of
conceptual change proposed after 1993 portrayed a
“warmer” view of conceptual change by acknowledging and
incorporating motivational constructs. Two such conceptual
models strongly influenced by Pintrich et al. (1993) are the
Cognitive Reconstruction of Knowledge Model (CRKM) by
Dole and Sinatra (1998) and Gregoire’s Cognitive-Affective
Model of Conceptual Change (CAMCC) (Gregoire, 2003).
In developing the CRKM, we were influenced by views
from social psychology, cognitive psychology, and science
education. The CRKM borrows liberally from views of atti-
tude change and persuasion from social psychology, in par-
ticular the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) of Petty and
Cacioppo (1986). The ELM is a dual process model of atti-
tude change. Dual process models describe a central and a
peripheral route to change. The central route involves sys-
tematic or deep processing and is more likely to lead to
change. The influence of the ELM on our thinking represents
an awareness of the importance of affective constructs in
conceptual change because the ELM describes motivational
influences on attitude and belief change.
We also incorporated aspects of Posner et al.’s (1982) influ-
ential model. The work of cognitive and developmental psy-
chologists describing structural changes in knowledge repre-
WARMING TREND 109
sentation was also central to our thinking (Carey 1985, 1992;
Chi, 1992; Thagard, 1992; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1987). Of
course, we were also strongly influenced by the work in moti-
vationingeneral and the work ofPintrich et al. in particular.
The CRKM describes how learner and message character-
istics interact, leading to a degree of engagement with the new
concept (see Figure 1). It is a depth of cognitive engagement
that ultimately determines the likelihood of change. Message
characteristics refer to the features of the instructional content
or persuasive discourse designed to promote change. These
features describe the extent to which the learner finds the mes-
sage comprehensible, coherent, plausible, and rhetorically
compelling. Specifically, if the message lacks even one of
these characteristics, change is unlikely to occur.
Next, the CRKM describes learner characteristics impli-
cated in the change process. Specifically, we emphasized
background knowledge and motivational factors. In terms of
background knowledge, we posited three key aspects of a
learner’s existing knowledge—strength, coherence, and
commitment—that influence the likelihood of change.
Strength refers to the conceptual development of the
learner’s existing idea. Strong ideas are richly represented
and well connected to other ideas and, therefore, are less
likely to change. Coherence refers to the conceptual coher-
ence of ideas as described by Thagard (1992) and is similar to
Posner et al.’s (1982) idea of a stable conceptual ecosystem.
Less coherent ideas (or unstable ecologies) are more suscep-
tible to change. Finally, an individual’s commitment to an
idea may be strong or weak, thus influencing the likelihood
of change. Ideas to which an individual is strongly commit-
ted are less likely to change.
It is important to note that all three facets of background
knowledge identified in the CRKM have a motivational bent.
The learner is more resistant to the notion of change when
ideas are conceptually strong. Coherent conceptual ecologies
become unstable when anomalous data (Chinn & Brewer,
1993) create a situation of disequilibrium, which the learner
is motivated to resolve. Degree of commitment to ideas is re-
lated to one’s epistemological beliefs as to whether knowl-
edge is stable and fixed or changing and in constant flux. A
belief in the constancy of knowledge creates resistance to
knowledge change (see Sinatra, Southerland, McConaughy,
& Demastes, 2003).
Next, the CRKM identifies specific motivational factors
influencing the likelihood of change. Like Posner et al.
(1982), we viewed dissatisfaction as a motivator. Unlike the
Posner et al. model, dissatisfaction is only one of several fac-
ets of motivation posited in the CRKM. We used the term
personal relevance to capture motivation stemming from in-
terest, emotional involvement, self-efficacy, and having a
stake in the outcome. Similarly, Pintrich et al. (1998) had
specifically identified interest, self-efficacy, and importance
(related to having a stake in the outcome) as motivational fac-
tors likely to influence change. Next the CRKM describes the
social context as a motivator. For example, students disinter-
ested in a message may engage if their peers show an interest.
The notion that the social context could support or undermine
students’ motivation to engage is analogous to Pintrich et al.’s
argument that “classroom contextual factors … can influence
students’ motivation and cognition and can either facilitate or
hinder the potential for conceptual change” (p. 178).
Motivation is described in the CRKM as a learner charac-
teristic but the aspects described thus far are viewed as play-
ing out in interaction with the context; thus, they are not
viewed as personal traits. However, the CRKM also identi-
fied “need for cognition” (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) as more
of a personal characteristic of a learner that serves as a moti-
vation to engage with the message. Not unlike students who
are intrinsically motivated, individuals with a high need for
cognition enjoy the challenge of weighing issues and argu-
ments and are willing to engage deeply with content—both
key facilitators of conceptual change. The identification of a
personal trait-like motivator in the CRKM differs to some ex-
tent with Pintrich et al.’s (1993) perspective. Whereas they
explained that control beliefs can be somewhat of a personal
trait, they emphasized the situational aspect of those beliefs
in contrast to the way Petty and Cacioppo described need for
cognition as a stable personality trait.
The CRKM next describes how these learner characteris-
tics (background knowledge and motivation) interact with
message characteristics. Specifically, the message would
have to be comprehensible, plausible, coherent and rhetori-
cally compelling to individuals to facilitate change. These
features, emphasized by researchers in areas of conceptual
change and attitude change and persuasion, relate to the cog-
nitive processing of a message in that a student cannot be per-
suaded by a message he or she cannot comprehend. We de-
scribed these features in the CRKM as interacting with
motivational constructs in dynamic ways. That is, if a mes-
sage lacks these characteristics for a learner, he or she will
lack the motivation to process the message.
Finally, we posited that, based on the outcome of the inter-
action between learner and message characteristics, an indi-
110 SINATRA
FIGURE 1 Dole and Sinatra’s (1998) Cognitive Reconstruction of
Knowledge Model.
vidual will engage with the information to some extent. Wehy-
pothesized that a continuum of engagement ranges from low
cognitive engagement to high metacognitive engagement
(Dole & Sinatra, 1998). Low cognitive engagement describes
superficial, surface-level processing with little reflection. In
contrast, high metacognitive engagement involves “deep pro-
cessing, elaborative strategy use and significant
metacognitive reflection” (p. 121). The CRKM posited that
significant and long-lasting conceptual change was likelyonly
if individuals engaged in high metacognitive processing.
The CRKM is not a linear model describing a specific se-
quence of conditions for change. Rather, it describes change
as an iterative process, whereby learner and message charac-
teristics interact producing a degree of engagement. The
model assumes the nature of this interaction would change as
a learner revisits the information over repeated exposures to
the content in class discussions, activities or through reading
or listening to content. It recognizes the dynamic nature of
these constructs as they play out in classroom contexts. Moti-
vational constructs are expressly identified in the model and
are inherently present in the description of learners’ back-
ground knowledge and the engagement continuum. There-
fore, the model reflects a warmer view of conceptual change
as called for by Pintrich et al. (1993).
More recently, Gregoire (2003) proposed the Cogni-
tive-Affective Model of Conceptual Change or CAMCC.
The CAMCC was designed to offer an explanation of why
practicing teachers’ resist the adoption of reform-oriented
curricula that conflict with their existing beliefs about in-
struction. Not unlike the CRKM, Gregoire’s model was in-
spired by views of conceptual change and attitude and belief
change. Gregoire explained that the CAMCC was developed
in response to models such as Dole and Sinatra’s (1998) be-
cause, in her view, extant models had not gone far enough in
addressing Pintrich et al.’s (1993) concerns. In comparing the
two models, she asserts, “The CRKM is considered a warm
model of conceptual change. I propose, however, that the
new model advanced in this article is truly a hot model of
conceptual change” (p. 163; see Figure 2).
Gregoire’s assertion regarding the relative “temperature”
of the two models not withstanding, there is a great deal of
similarity between the CRKM and the CAMCC. Both mod-
els describe how cognitive and motivational factors (such as
background knowledge, ability to process a message, and
self-efficacy) interact with characteristics of a message in a
particular context designed to persuade individuals to change
their views. A point-by-point comparison between the two
models is beyond the scope of this article, and readers should
refer to the original source for a fuller description of the
CAMCC (Gregoire, 2003). However, even a casual compari-
son reveals a good deal of correspondence between the two
models’ depictions of the role of affective or hot constructs
promoting change. For example, the CAMCC describes a
scenario whereby a teacher, hearing a message about a cur-
riculum reform effort, evaluates whether this information
“implicates self,” a key branch point in the model for whether
individuals will engage deeply with the message. Teachers
who view their concept of self as at stake are more likely to
go on to systematically process the message. This notion is
not unlike Dole and Sinatra’s (1998) description of personal
relevance leading to engagement or Pintrich’s (1993) view of
the students’ perception of the importance of the topic to
their future careers mediating their message processing.
More to the point for this argument than a comparison of
the two models, it would be fair to say that the CAMCC
“raises the temperature” over the CRKM in that it posits a
greater role for affective constructs in conceptual change.
Specifically, the CAMCC includes more emotional influ-
ences on message engagement such as stress and threat ap-
praisals. Gregoire (2003) explained how anxiety, fear, and
coping mechanisms all influence how a teacher experiences a
message about the latest reform effort: Affective states, “as
part of the appraisal process, serve as additional information
for individuals as they interact with a complex, stressful mes-
WARMING TREND 111
FIGURE 2 Gregoire’s Cognitive-Affective Model of Conceptual
Change. From “Is It a Challenge or a Threat? A Dual-Process Model
of Teachers’ Cognition and Appraisal Process During Conceptual
Change,” by M. Gregoire, 2003, Educational Psychology Review,
15, p. 165. Copyright 2003 by Springer Science and Business Media
Reprinted with kind permission of Springer Science and Business
Media.
sage” (p. 168). The inclusion of these affective constructs
clearly “turns up the heat” compared to the CRKM.
Another extension beyond the CRKM involves goals—a
motivational construct at the heart of Pintrich’s research in-
terests. Goals have a much more specific role in the CAMCC
than in the CRKM. Teachers formulate approach or avoid-
ance goals in regards to their intentions to engage with the re-
form message. If teachers perceive the reform effort as
threatening, they may adopt the avoidance goal of evading
that threat. If they view the reforms as a challenge, rather than
a threat, they may adopt an approach goal that could lead to
more systematic processing of the message and a greater
likelihood of change.
Another distinguishing feature of the CAMCC is
Gregoire’s (2003) description of the appraisals teachers
make prior to message processing and the affective responses
resulting from those appraisals. As Gregoire describes it:
A chief difference between the CAMCC model I propose and
the one proposed by Dole and Sinatra (1998) is that I am
claiming that appraisals happen automatically before charac-
teristics of the message are seriously considered and that the
message characteristic may never be fully processed. (p.
168–169)
This difference may not be as dramatic as Gregoire de-
scribes in that Dole and Sinatra (1998) do not claim that ev-
ery message is fully processed. Indeed, the engagement con-
tinuum in the CRKM describes low engagement as
“superficial processing of the message,” which leads to either
no change or weak or short-lived change. However, because
automatic, heuristic processing of a message generally is a
dead end for conceptual change, understanding how affective
appraisals occur automatically may lead to better design of
conceptual change pedagogy. As Gregoire explains, “the ap-
praisals teachers make when confronted with reforms and
their affective responses to those appraisals [offer] a potential
new target of intervention” (p. 173). That is, if teachers can
be made aware of this tendency to dismiss a message before
fully analyzing it, it may be possible for them to override
their initial reaction and thus process the message more
deeply. This is consistent with Sinatra and Pintrich’s (2003)
view that intentional rather than automatic processing of con-
tent is a more productive path to conceptual change.
Pintrich et al. (1993) called for conceptual change re-
searchers to view change as a process whereby cognitive, af-
fective, andm otivational constructs interact in ways that either
facilitate or inhibit change. The CRKM and CAMCC are ex-
amples of models that have expressly tried to meet that chal-
lenge for knowledge and belief change, respectively. The
warming trend, however, is clearly not restricted to conceptual
models alone. Over the last decade, empirical research has also
moved beyond cold conceptual change to investigate the role
of affective constructs in knowledge restructuring. Several re-
searchers have examined the role of epistemological beliefs in
knowledge change (e.g., Andre & Windschitl, 2003; Gill,
Ashton, & Algina, 2004; Mason & Boscolo, 2004; Sinatra et
al., 2003; Stathopoulou & Vosniadou, 2004). Research has
been initiated on the role of interest in conceptual change (An-
dre & Windschitl, 2003; Mason & Boscolo, 2004). Finally, the
empirical investigation of achievement goals on conceptual
change has been begun as well (Linnenbrink & Pintrich, 2002;
2003). Now not solelytheoretical conjecture, the em pirical ev-
idence provides support for Pintrich et al.’s claim that hot con-
structs play a mediating and sometime determining role in
conceptual change.
THE VISION ARTICULATED
Fortunately, we do not have to conjecture about Pintrich’s
more recent views on conceptual change. In a recent chapter
(Pintrich, 1999), he outlined the specifics of his vision by ar-
ticulating how motivational beliefs facilitate or constrain
change. These views are described in a series of five proposi-
tions. He also maintained his earlier perspective that motiva-
tional constructs are embedded within specific classroom
contexts.
As Pintrich and others have demonstrated in a large body
of research, students who adopt a goal of mastering content
have been shown to use more elaborate metacognitive and
self-regulatory strategies that lead to deeper processing of the
information (Pintrich & Schrauben, 1992). In contrast, those
who adopt a performance goal orientation focus on getting
the grade or outperforming peers and tend to use more super-
ficial strategies, resulting in shallower processing. This led to
the first proposition, the “adoption of a mastery goal orienta-
tion should facilitate conceptual change” (Pintrich, 1999, p.
35). More specifically, students who adopt mastery goals are
more likely to engage in the deep processing necessary for
knowledge change.
Recently, Linnenbrink and Pintrich (2002) provided em-
pirical support for this proposition. They predicted that stu-
dents with different achievement goals would approach
knowledge change differently. Conceptual change requires
students to examine their own ideas and question whether a
change in their thinking is needed. Linnenbrink and Pintrich
(2002) suggested that students with performance goals might
be “less likely to acknowledge that their prior beliefs are in-
correct” (p. 117) for fear of appearing wrong in front of oth-
ers. Mastery goal oriented students, however, are focused on
learning the material and therefore “should be more inclined
to disregard prior beliefs in order to reach their goal of under-
standing” (p. 119).
In a series of two studies involving students’ comprehen-
sion of Newtonian physics texts, Linnenbrink and Pintrich
(2002) demonstrated that, as predicted, mastery goals related
to change in physics understanding, whereas performance
goals did not. They were also able to illustrate how goals are
likely implicated in fostering conceptual change. Spe-
112 SINATRA
cifically, mastery goals were related to the use of more elabo-
rative strategies that “enhanced the change in physics under-
standing” (p. 130). This is consistent with conceptual change
theories that suggest that deeper processing is more likely to
lead to change (i.e., Dole & Sinatra, 1998). In addition,
Linnenbrink and Pintrich (2002) provided evidence that mas-
tery goals related to decreased negative affect (such as feel-
ings of anxiousness, frustration, and annoyance) surrounding
the learning experience. Other theory and research has also
supported the idea that negative affect is related to resistance
to new conceptions (i.e., Gregoire, 2003).
In addition to goals, Pintrich (1999) argued that
epistemological beliefs should also be related to knowledge
change. In their influential article, Hofer and Pintrich
(1997) described epistemological beliefs as “individual’s
beliefs about the nature of knowledge and the process of
knowing” (p. 117). They argued that these beliefs, best de-
scribed as “theories,” guide students’ approach to thinking.
More specifically, Pintrich’s second proposition asserted
that a belief in simple and certain knowledge places con-
straints on the potential for conceptual change by prompt-
ing students to foreclose their thinking prematurely and
thus to not fully consider alternative views. In contrast, stu-
dents who recognize that scientists (as well as students)
construct knowledge are more likely to do the cognitive
“heavy lifting” necessary to promote change. The research
on epistemological beliefs and change has begun to support
this contention (Mason & Boscolo, 2004).
Pintrich’s (1999) third proposition seeks to describe the
aspects of personal and affective characteristics of individu-
als (specifically interest, values, and importance), as opposed
to situational influences, that effect change. These character-
istics create a “self-generated context” that may “increase at-
tention, persistence and the activation of appropriate knowl-
edge and strategies” (p. 41) thus creating a context conducive
to change. As noted, some research on interest does support
this proposition (Andre & Windschitl, 2003), but importance
and values have yet to be empirically studied as to their role
in the change process.
The topic of the fourth proposition, self-efficacy, is a
complex notion when it comes to considering its role in
conceptual change. High self-efficacy for learning may cre-
ate confidence in one’s ability to engage in change-promot-
ing activities such as argumentation and experimentation.
High self-efficacy, however, could translate into confidence
in one’s current conception, thus creating intolerance for
change (Pintrich, 1999). Research has yet to demonstrate
whether self-efficacy operates in a positive or negative
manner regarding change. Research suggests, however, that
a tendency to hold on to one’s point of view impedes the
likelihood of change (Sinatra, Southerland, & Demastes,
2004). This suggests that conceptual change pedagogies
that promote cognitive conflict should be designed to assist
students in resolving that conflict (Pintrich, 1999;
Southerland & Sinatra, 2003).
Pintrich’s (1999) fifth proposition is based on research
demonstrating that students who believe they have control
over their performance ultimately perform well compared to
those who feel circumstances are beyond their control
(Connell, 1985). This last proposition foreshadows the no-
tion of intentional conceptual change (Sinatra & Pintrich,
2003). Pintrich argued that students who have a sense of con-
trol over their experience (those who could be described as
intentional learners) would be more willing to work toward
resolving knowledge conflicts.
THE LEGACY
It is hard to imagine how influential Paul Pintrich’sbody of re-
search will ultimately be to the field of conceptual change. Be-
yond his direct writing on the topic, his research on many moti-
vation constructs had a profound effect on how researchers
view the nature of learning in general. No longer do we think of
research on learning as occurring in the cold setting of the lab-
oratory, examining the cold constructs of cognitive informa-
tion processing. The integration of motivational constructs
into conceptual change research is an illustration of the new
view of learning he helped formulate, one that is more contex-
tual, cultural, social, and affective, as well as cognitive.
In our volume Intentional Conceptual Change (Sinatra &
Pintrich, 2003), we assembled an international group of
scholars, many of whom were directly influenced by Paul’s
research, to move the research agenda toward an examination
of the learner’s role in the change process. These researchers
empirically investigated manyof the issues he raised such as,
the role of epistemological beliefs (Mason, 2003), interest,
(Andre & Windschitl, 2003), domain differences (Limón,
2003), classroom contexts (Hennessey, 2003), and the social
and cultural contexts (Hatano & Inagaki, 2003) in learner-di-
rected change.
We defined intentional conceptual change as “goal-di-
rected and conscious initiation and regulation of cognitive,
metacognitive, and motivational processes to bring about a
change in knowledge” (Sinatra & Pintrich, 2003, p. 6). This
definition shows his mark. Specifically, and not surprisingly,
he added “goal-directed” as a defining characteristic of inten-
tional conceptual change. This new view depicts conceptual
change as a complex and dynamic interaction of affective,
motivational, and contextual factors, just as the 1993 article
had described.
Much work is needed to explicate this new view and ex-
tend the research agenda for conceptual change in general.
Paul was clear about the path for future work on conceptual
change (Pintrich, 1999; Pintrich & Sinatra, 2003). These two
chapters provide a primer for researchers interested in mov-
ing the field toward his vision of conceptual change.
First, Paul called for greater definitional clarity in our con-
structs, an issue facing the field of motivation in general and
conceptual change in particular. If the perspective of inten-
WARMING TREND 113
tional conceptual change is to be fruitful, many definitional
issues need attention. Paul pointed out the lack of agreement
about the definition of conceptual change among research-
ers, and intentionality has a number of instantiations as well
(Pintrich & Sinatra, 2003). Which constructs will be critical
in defining intentional conceptual change is an area in need
of investigation.
Next, he called for directional clarity in understanding the
role motivational constructs play in knowledge restructuring.
Motivational constructs often present a double-edged sword
in that the valence of the construct can have a positive or neg-
ative effect on the learning outcome. It is especially impor-
tant in conceptual change research to determine whether a
construct acts as a facilitator or an inhibitor of change.
Self-efficacy, epistemological beliefs, and achievement
goals, as well as many of the other motivational constructs
mentioned previously, must be understood both in terms of
whether they impact change and of whether that impact is to-
ward adopting a new idea or toward resisting it.
Paul also wrote of the need for greater understanding of the
specific mechanisms or processes of change and in particular
how motivational constructs trigger change (Pintrich 1999;
Pintrich & Sinatra, 2003). More evidence is needed regarding
whether motivational constructs play a direct or mediation
role in knowledge change. For example, do epistemological
beliefs set tendencies for how learners interact with informa-
tion, thereby constraining or supporting change? Or do moti-
vational constructs play more of an indirect role by affecting
the type and level of engagement with the information, which
in turn affects the likelihood of change?
Another area in which Paul looked toward broadening our
research approach was the content domain. He called for re-
search in conceptual change to move beyond science learning
to compare knowledge restructuring in other domains, such as
history and mathematics (Pintrich & Sinatra, 2003). He was
concerned that models of motivation were domain-general
views of learning, whereas investigations of conceptual
change usually occurred within a specific domain. This re-
quires further investigation because, “beyond the possibility
of general domain differences due to the nature of the content
… there may be personal or individual differences in how
knowledge, goals and regulation interact to facilitate or con-
strain conceptual change” (p. 435).
As he had in much of his research in other areas, Paul
called for more research examining classroom contextual
factors in conceptual change (Pintrich, 1999). These studies
should examine how patterns of classroom interactions and
instructional contexts promote or restrict opportunities for
change. For example, he suggested researchers might exam-
ine how specific instructional changes, such as the introduc-
tion of a greater degree of student choice, might affect the use
of learning strategies and, subsequently, the likelihood of
knowledge change.
Finally, Paul called for the development of design princi-
ples for instruction to promote conceptual change (Pintrich
& Sinatra, 2003). He noted that promoting a mastery orienta-
tion, heightening students’ awareness of their goals and
beliefs, and teaching self-regulatory strategies should all
have a concomitant effect on the change process. Ultimately,
he suggested that researchers need to develop a conceptual
change pedagogy that recognizes the emotional aspects of
knowledge commitment and that promotes a greater willing-
ness to examine ones’ ideas and an openness to change
(Pintrich & Sinatra, 2003).
In addition to these areas in need of research, a variety of
methodological issues plague conceptual change research.
Too often our measures are self-reported and our designs are
correlational. Paul called for greater methodological rigor.
He argued we lack experimental studies, reliable behavioral
measures, and longitudinal and developmental research
(Pintrich, 1999; Pintrich & Sinatra, 2003). Much work is left
to do, and I am sure he would expect us to continue on the
path he so clearly defined.
As in many areas of his research, Paul left an indelible
mark on the field of conceptual change. It is unlikely that mo-
tivation will ever be ignored in future conceptual change
models. Research on the role of motivational constructs in
conceptual change is bourgeoning. The field is beginning to
tackle the research agenda Paul envisioned and answer the
questions he posed. It also is unlikely that conceptual change
researchers will ever forget Paul Pintrich’s profound influ-
ence on our thinking. Paul made us all think differently. What
a wonderful legacy for a conceptual change researcher.
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