Helping those in need: Civil mobilization in Romania in the context of the war in Ukraine

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Introduction
The European security environment was completely reshaped after the Rus-
sia’s extensive military attack on Ukraine in 2022. The longest period of relative
peace experienced by European countries after the World War II, known as Pax
Europaea, ended. The full-scale invasion represented an unwelcomed return of
armed conflict within the continent and an unprecedented humanitarian situation.
Immediately after 24th of February more than 7.4 million refugees crossed borders
into neighbouring countries1 (UN 2022), seeking safety, assistance and protection.
In this context, the receiving countries mobilized human and material resources
in order to provide the needed help. Yet, in some cases, the institutions were
slow or inefficient and civil society became the main provider of humanitarian
aid, overcoming the shortages and blockages generated by bureaucracy or lack of
resources. Moreover, the governmental logistic capacity was exceeded by the large
number of individuals, even in those countries that previously had to tackle with
migration waves from Middle East or Africa. Theoretically, it was an ad hoc civil
mobilization initiative that managed to cover the needs of the refugees in a very
short time. Besides basic goods, other services were provided: linguistic assistance,
short-term accommodation, travel support (using public or private vehicles) or
medical services. So, the logistics behind, the motivation and coordination were
significant, considering the lack of previous planning and existence of formally
built networks.
helping Those in need: civil mobilizaTion in romania
in The conTexT of The war in ukraine
Elena Grad-Rusu–Marius Grad

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Moreover, from a theoretical perspective, in the last decades, the existing bibli-
ography extensively examined matters such as humanitarian aid, social movements
or resources mobilization in various environments. Most of the observed cases
are related to on-going conflict or post-conflict states or to already economically
or politically challenged area (Development Initiatives 2021; Otegui and Yoder-
Bontrager 2021). As such, little attention is paid to how contemporary social move-
ments work and what are the main mechanisms behind resources mobilization.
Overall, there is a gap in the bibliography related to the main drivers of the current
social initiatives, although there are some relevant works on citizen aid and grass-
roots humanitarianism (Fechter–Schwittay 2019).
This article aims to fill that gap and seeks to explain the main drivers of Ro-
manian citizens’ mobilization (both on-line and in the field) immediately after the
war outbreak. It argues and tests the explanatory power of five potential determi-
nants: economic self-interest, deontological motivations, psychological dispositions
and cultural/religious context. Complementary, we take into consideration the so-
cial and cultural environment as a general factor that can shape the willingness to
voluntarily participate in such actions. The analysis uses individual-level data from
a survey conducted in 2022 on a sample of 117 Romanians directly involved in hu-
manitarian work with Ukrainian refugees.
The following section reviews the bibliography on humanitarian aid, resource
mobilization, citizen aid and social movements and formulates several arguments
according to which there are some fundamental drivers of citizen mobilization and
involvement in ad hoc initiatives. The third section presents the research design
and provides details about the case selection. Next, the results of the quantitative
analysis will be presented and interpreted. The conclusion discusses the main find-
ings and present directions for further research.
Theoretical framework
The central goal of this research is to understand the motivations of Romanian
volunteers who assisted refugees in the context of the war in Ukraine. To develop
this analysis, we draw on studies about humanitarianism, which we define as peo-
ple’s efforts to help others in hostile climates. An extend part of the bibliography
has focused on formal humanitarianism, which represents organized efforts fi-
nanced and developed by large, nation or international NGOs. Humanitarian move-
ments represent the positive characteristics of humanity, people doing this reduce
their well-being to assist less-able others. The humanitarian work exponentially
increased after the World War II when civil organisations became more visible and
tented to see themselves outside of politics, as people who will do everything to
save those in need (Barnett 2005). In the last 30 years, the humanitarianism be-
came more professionalised and was institutionalized (Suski 2012) by co-working
with authorities and the governments around the world (Barnett 2005).2

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Such volunteer efforts come in different shapes and structures, from those very
well designed and massively sponsored at a national or international level to those
provided by simple civilians who direct small, spontaneous, but important actions
in a significant moment (Yarris–Millan–Schmidt–Murillo 2020). The last type of
humanitarian aid appears mostly in crises moments and is mostly characterized by
interpersonal relationships and affective sentiments (Shinozaki 2015). Most of the
time, volunteers offering aid in crisis situation do not wait for the authorities to
get involved, they are using the local advantages and their own efforts to instanti-
ate a counter-hegemonic vision of inclusion for refugees (Humphris 2019). Con-
sequently, volunteer efforts towards refugee resettlement thus constitute a huge
argument for civil mobilization and opening spaces of welcome based on affective
ties of solidarity (Yarris–Millan–Schmidt–Murillo 2020).
Theories of civil mobilizations can help us to better understand which are the
main drivers of peoples’ actions to conduct these social phenomena. Previous
studies found the answer in psychology, sociology (Suski 2012), economy, culture,
political science (Donini 2010) or philosophy (Orgad–Seu 2014). Most of the work
developed in this field mainly focused on the causes and mobilization strategies
(Tertytchnaya–Vries 2018) and less on peoples’ reasons to participate in these
events (Segers 2019). Conversely, we would like to pique scientific interest in craft-
ing the main drivers of citizens’ mobilization, especially in the context of a conflict
nearby. And we are especially referring to those people who are not remunerated
for their work and on whose support most of the refugees put their trust. This
support is mostly seen in the form of donations or personal assistance, actions to
define an altruistic behaviour, because the goal is to improve the welfare of the
recipient even though it is costly for the performer in terms of resources, time and
energy (Fehr–Schmidt 1999).
Then comes the big question about what drives someone to engage in hu-
manitarian activities. Previous researchers found out that personal motivation (T.
Miller et al. 2012), compassion (Shepherd–Williams 2014) and empathy (Bacq–Alt
2018) toward those in need are the main drivers of citizens’ mobilization. Regard-
ing the last one, people are often impressed by the possibility that someday might
have to face same similar challenges. A huge civil mobilization is mostly driven by
shared feelings that knit people from diverse categories to come together in the
pursuit of one collective goal (Tilly 2002). It is about the people’s ability to identify
themselves with the framework of a story in which they might be someday and so,
they get involved to reduce the feelings of threat, mercy and to increase the feel-
ings of having control. And by this, we can define civil mobilization as the process
by which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active
participant in public life (Tilly 1978).
In these contexts, a significant number of new civil initiatives were developed
to reduce the suffering of those affected by different crises. People involved in of-
fering humanitarian aid transform themselves in individuals who use non-routine
resources and activities to apply to non-routine domains and tasks, using non-rou-

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tine organizational arrangements (Majchrzak–Jarvenpaa–Hollingshead 2007). This
makes the humanitarian movements to implement professional codes of conduct
for intervention and have a better prepared staff. But still, in a crisis context, it
is all about improvising, taking initiative, sacrificing own resources to help others
(Balliet–Parks–Joireman 2009), proposing new alternatives in order to fulfil rapidly
those in need (E. and A. 2002). Mostly, in critical times, humanitarian aid comes
also from civil society, from people not daily involved in this kind of work, not even
as registered volunteers.
Larissa MacFarquhar examined in one of hers books the concept of human
altruism and explained it as a number of civils’ actions who are oriented towards
helping others as volunteers (MacFarquhar 2015). Her work was inspired by re-
ligious arguments regarding the “good” part in any individual. She defines the
humanitarians as people who prefer social equity, pacifism and to help the others,
even if their powers and actions are limited. In the same way, is functioning the
civil mobilization in a hostile climate.
Other researchers based their work on explaining the concept of refugee aid
using the concept of “vernacular humanitarianism” (Čarna Brković 2017) meaning
local assistance very well organized in different networks from informal solidarity
groups (Rozakou 2017b), controlled through social media, to large associations
which embarrassed a common purpose, outside of formal humanitarian organiza-
tions or state authorities.
Another term used to define the humanitarian work developed by civilians
without a formal framework is “informal humanitarianism” (O’Hagan 2013), by
which we understand that volunteers are developing their efforts outside the
scope of formal humanitarian organizations though grassroots movements and
based on their own initiatives.
In a study regarding the volunteers involved in refugee resettlement in Or-
egon, the authors explain the peoples’ attitude as actions of social belonging in
local communities through connecting emotional ties and empathy (Yarris–Mil-
lan–Schmidt-Murillo 2020). This approach is based on volunteers’ past experiences
as children or grandchildren of migrants and refugees, making easier for them to
identify with similar stories, trying somehow to transpose themselves in that mo-
ment and feeling that they are helping by being involved this time. Relatedly, in-
creased perception of a shared identity (Hellmann–Fiedler–Glöckner 2021) (a com-
mon goal, enemy or stage of economic development) determines a higher degree
to get involved from the civilians.
In this paper, we are analysing the civil mobilization in the context of an armed
conflict nearby the border. In this regard, humanitarian aid offered in or near by
conflict zones, exposes people to dramatic and unpleasant conditions and in-
tensifies their emotional resources and psychological dispositions making their
work more intensive (Tassell–Flett 2011). In this case, why people continue to be
involved in these types of mobilizations? Willing to help in the context of a war
nearby your region can be seen as an expression of empathy-induced altruistic

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motivation(Daniel–David–Eric 2015), as an effort taken not in self-interest, in the
first phase, but still an action to protect yourself on a long term vision. In this
regard, harmful outcomes which are experienced on psychological, physical, legal
and economical levels by the affected people (Koelsch 2017) are also drivers of civil
mobilization for people nearby who put themselves in a similar scenery.
In the recent years, the increased use of the Internet and social media has
spread also to the civil society and enabled their huge mobilization in critical times
by providing the necessary tools for coordination and communication of large
masses of people in large geographical and informational landscapes in very limit-
ed time (Diani 2000) (Reda–Sinanoglu–Abdalla 2021). Civil mobilization was driven
multiple times by events such as natural disasters (Okolloh 2009), political rallies
(Jungherr 2015), desires to protect the trust in different belief (Larson et al. 2019)
or to offer humanitarian aid for conflict refugees as is the case of our study. The
effect of mobilizing people on social media in the context of a conflict was very
well observed during the Arab Spring when a plethora of actions were directed
online (Wolfsfeld–Segev–Sheafer 2013) (Eltantawy–Wiest 2011). Since then, social
media become a key feature of many social movements, especially those organ-
ized in order to offer humanitarian aid (Kidd–McIntosh 2016). Since the online ac-
counts are used by more than half the world population for everyday interactions,
they become a useful tool for any kind of mobilization (Shafiq 2018); this can be
simplified as a simple idea a movement that does not make it into the media is
non-existent (Rucht 2004).
It is also the case of our research, not only the fact that we conducted online
surveys in order to find the main drivers for the civil mobility around Romanian
people, but also the think that the mobilization in this context started and was
conducted almost by using social media. In this case, we can remind support
groups for donations, platforms used for schedules to participate in offering help
at the border or simple online website with information regarding the mobiliza-
tion.
Moreover, all the above-mentioned concepts can be practically found in social
movements, generated by various triggers in different contexts. In the existing
bibliography, four different perspectives on how these collective actions work can
be identified. First, there is the theory of resource mobilization that argues on citi-
zens rationality, which makes the individuals to mobilize and take action (Marshall
1950; McAdam–Tarrow–Tilly 2001; McCarthy–Zald 1977). Secondly, framing theo-
ries show how mobilizations seek to establish and promote specific meanings as
being legitimate (Benford–Snow 2000).
Another approach is related to movement identity and in this case the scholars
discuss about the interaction processes of identification that can be found at dif-
ferent levels and are facilitated by immediate contexts of shared experience (Cas-
tells 2004; Drury–Reicher 2005; Ward 2016). The fourth one is related to explaining
social movements by theories of space, place and network (Edelman 2001; B. A.
Miller 2000). In this case, the communitarian perspective on citizenship – which

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argues on the citizen role as a member of a socially and spatially embedded com-
munity (Sandel 1998) – is used to explain how such initiatives are formed.
Regarding citizen aid practices, the theoretical framework available is poor. Al-
though the concept refers to initiatives started by individuals who are privately
funded and aim to support others in need (Fechter–Schwittay 2019), there is no
solid conceptualization. Moreover, it consists in an unstable category that can in-
clude a set of practices that are dynamic and often temporally limited (Fechter–
Schwittay 2019). The most relevant practical context is considered the migration
crisis from 2015, a relatively similar situation with the humanitarian crisis generated
by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Thus, if associated with “grassroot humanitari-
anism” (Sandri 2018; Schulpen–Huyse 2017) it is worth considering the following
features of citizen aid practices: are characterized by spontaneity (Fechter–Schwit-
tay 2019), mostly implies unexperienced humanitarian workers (Sandri 2018), rep-
resent a form of “solidarity” (Rozakou 2016, 2017a) and are strongly determined
by geographical proximity (Fechter–Schwittay 2019). In addition, the practitioners
base their activity on their own funds, as well as on those belonging to their social
networks (Fechter 2019) and, initially, look for a short term involvement (Fechter–
Schwittay 2019).
In addition, although there is a significant conceptual overlap between the
aforementioned notions and vernacular humanitarianism, we can conclude that, in
most cases, all these practices are ad-hoc, non-professional and non-bureaucra-
tized forms of helping (Brković 2016).
Following these arguments, we hypothesize the following:
H1: Economic self-interest will motivate citizens to involve in helping the refugees.
H2: Stronger deontological values will determine a higher level of involvement in
refugees’ assistance.
H3: The stronger the psychological impact was the more motivated to help the
citizens were.
H4: Citizens closer to borders are likely to participate at humanitarian actions.
The previous hypotheses were designed to be answered without strong data
processing, given that further use of other data collection methods is intended in
order to increase the validity of the analysis.
Research design and case selection
To test these hypotheses, we use original data from a survey conducted be-
tween July and August in 2022 on a sample of 117 Romanians directly involved
in humanitarian work with Ukrainian refugees. The respondents were selected
based on a maximum variation sampling, since there is no official statistics about
the number of those involved in helping the refugees and their profile. As such,
a probability representative sample cannot be drawn. Non-probability sampling is
often used to study populations where formal access to complete lists of mem-

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bers is not possible (Vehovar–Toepoel–Steinmetz 2016). The group of the citizens
that support the displaced population fit in this category, because there were no
restrictions or limitations. Moreover, we considered all the potential forms of en-
gagement – direct or indirect/on-line or on-site, and we did not demand a minimal
time frame. Thus, we also took into account the irregular volunteers or workers.
The maximum variation sampling used for this survey aimed to increase the
variation in terms of experience with refuges or humanitarian work, age, educa-
tion, gender or income. Some of these variables are included in the current analysis
and can be found in the following sections. Since the sample is not representative,
the variation of the variables is relevant for our analysis. To provide an illustration
of this variation, the age of respondents is distributed as follows: 18–30 years
(29%), 31–40 years (38%), 41–50 years (21%) and over 50 years (12%). This age
distribution matches partially the samples used in other researches focused on
volunteering – e.g. (Meijeren–Lubbers–Scheepers 2022). This sampling approach
confines the findings presented in this article to our respondents. However, due to
the different profile of the volunteers included in the analysis and because the sur-
vey was conducted on-line, we should consider a slight influence of the internet
usage in Romania based on age (Statista 2022). The answers were collected after
the survey was distributed through messages on Facebook Groups (created for
helping those in need), so the main disadvantage can be the bias towards those
who have Internet access. Moreover, for this analysis we took into consideration
only the total number of complete answers received to the questionnaire.
The Romanian citizens involved in helping the Ukrainian refugees were selected
as subject of this study due to two reasons. First, Romania was second only to Po-
land in what concerns the number of Ukrainian citizens who have cross its border.
As of July 2022 over 1.94 million entered our country – seeking long term assis-
tance or for transit (UNHCR 2022). In these conditions the impact was significant
and there were no previous preparatory measures. Secondly, the Romanian civil
society has a short experience with civil mobilization (Abăseacă–Pleyers 2019),
there are no formal networks that can facilitate a fast coordination between in-
dividuals and groups in such cases and no similar triggers were recorded before.
Moreover, social cohesion is known to be a factor contributing to civil mobilization
and in Romania it recorder low levels in the past (Commission 2017), although the
COVID–19 pandemic had positive effects in the sense of mobilizing latent but ex-
tensive energies at the local level (Saghin–Lupchian–Lucheș 2022).
How Romanian people effectively mobilize to help Ukrainian refugees?
Since the first day, Romanian citizens mobilized to help Ukrainian citizens to be
well welcomed after passing the border. Multiple news was related to the effec-
tive actions undertaken by the civil society. Headlines as “Romanians are mobiliz-
ing to help refugees from Ukraine” (Lungu 2022), “Unprecedented mobilization of

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Romanians to help refugees from Ukraine. Dozens of hotels, restaurants, doctors,
students and universities offer their services for free” (Vlaicu 2022), “Romanians
mobilize to help refugees from Ukraine: „We cannot remain indifferent”” (Matei
2022), “How Romanians mobilized to help Ukrainian refugees: They offer accom-
modation and free transport or jobs for those fleeing from the Russians” (Spot-
media 2022), “Mobilization on Facebook|The Romanians offer their houses to host
the Ukrainians, the authorities are waiting” (Ofițeru 2022) are just a few of the first
information released regarding civil society implications.
These headlines explain in concrete words how exactly Romanian people get
involved. Basically, from being present with food and clothes at the border, they
offered to accommodate long-term refugees or to employ some of them. Also,
social media was used to create pages or action groups for the same cause. For
example, “United for Ukraine” is a Facebook group which was created in the first
day of the movement. As is written in its description, “the group is intended for
volunteers, donors, everyone who wants to get involved in helping our neighbours
in Ukraine affected by the Russian invasion” (Facebook 2022) and is still function-
ing nowadays (September 2022). In order to see the degree of involvement, over
38,000 people signed up in less than 24 hours on this Facebook group, thousands
of them volunteering their help (Spotmedia 2022). This is just an example, but
multiple other initiatives were developed online. Another very active social media
initiative in this context was “Volunteers in Europe” (Facebook2 2022) which is a
group for Romanian people, but which get involved in this crisis. One remarkable
initiative directed by this platform is an interactive map with available accommoda-
tion places for refugees – “RoOmenia” (GoogleMaps 2022).
Also, the mass media was a good binder in connecting those in need with the
civil society wanting to get involved – numerous of announcements about where,
when and how the help could be used were relieved through media channels –
press, television, radio or online news.
Regarding the kind of help offered, this was not only expressed as an emer-
gency in terms of food and accommodation, we also remarked initiatives to insure
transport from border (to other border for those in transit), food delivery, language
teaching assistance or medical assistance (for people and also for their pets). Us-
ing their own facilities, cars, goods or houses, numerous volunteers get involved in
helping Ukrainian refugees. There were also moments when the number of those
wanting to be involved was bigger than those in need. Since the involvement was
so intense in the first days, the volunteers started to think how to transform this
spontaneous effort into a sustained one. Border associations, as well as local and
border authorities, have started communicating with volunteers to prevent over-
crowding and waste of time or resources (Șancu 2022).
The involved increased daily in the first weeks of the invasions and was dimin-
ished when the number of people needing help was reduced. This is very well
to be observed in the reduction of refugees passing the border. Still, nowadays,
on the social media groups mentioned above, and others also, can be identified

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multiple helping initiatives – people providing accommodation, job offers, medical
assistance, help in school integration or language assistance. The impact of the
refugees’ crisis is still important in the eyes of Romanian civil society and continues
to grab the attention to those willing to offer humanitarian aid and assistance.
Drivers of citizens support and involvement
This section aims to understand the main drivers of citizens support and in-
volvement in the humanitarian crisis generated by the invasion of Ukraine. As
we previously mentioned, the mobilization was significant and unprecedented.
Although, in the last decade, at national level, we had several moments when civil
society managed to actively express a strong position towards political topics
(Abăseacă–Pleyers 2019), there was no previous experience in mobilizing large
material and human resources. Besides this, the profile of those involved in such
initiatives was similar (e.g. protests against corruption), while in this case there
were no identifiable similarities. Moreover, in the past, the general positioning
towards refugees was characterized by reluctance and some sort of discrimination
(Coșciug et al. 2019). Hence, the cultural and political background was not facilitat-
ing nor predicting any of the capabilities that were expressed in a very short time
after the outbreak of war.
Similarly, the tremendous capacity to coordinate and organize within Romania’s
societal structures was not backed up by the existence of formally developed net-
works of collective action. Thus, is worth questioning the main drivers of citizens
support and involvement that was recorded immediately after 24th of February.
Additionally, the motivation in helping and providing assistance could not be sup-
ported by a strong relationship between Romania and Ukraine since, in the last
decade there were divergencies that deepened the gap. Overall, the major topics of
debate were: a large Romanian minority in Ukraine is discriminated (the Romanians
ethnics are not schooled in their native language), the dispute over the ecological
damage from Ukraine’s Bystroye Canal and the territorial limits of the contested
Snake Island. But this subjects that generated dissension in the past were set
aside after the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 (Daborowski–Iwanski
2016). So, we cannot discuss about strong ties between the two communities in
the past and the cultural and social differences are not overcome only by religious
similarities.
However, the Romanians managed to organize informal networks that gathered
hundreds of volunteers and humanitarian workers. These networks emerged out
of nothing, but with the help of social media, small initiatives transformed into
significant civil mobilization operations. In the remainder of this analysis, we will
discuss about the main drivers in accordance with the research hypotheses.

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After observing the on-line activity (especially the FB groups used for mobiliza-
tion and coordination) we found that, in some cases, citizens offered their help in
order to obtain some benefits. For example, some of those providing transporta-
tion with their own private vehicles used to ask for money. Some others, offering
accommodation were charging the refugees, either from the beginning of their
stay or after a predetermined period. As such, in our survey we used three ques-
tions to assess if economic self-interest was one of the drivers.
The results show that only a small number (3%) of those involved in providing
transportation or accommodation ask for payment. In all the cases, they were
low-income citizens that wanted to help so, we assume that, they needed to cover
the basic expenses. Moreover, those providing accommodation asked the refugees
to partially cover the administrative costs – especially during the first month of
their stay.
Besides, on the social groups, the refugees were asking for support and, in all
the cases, either if the request was made by themselves or by other volunteers
(because of the language barrier) it was mentioned if they could cover the costs
or they needed the service for free. Later, the Romanian government fully covered
the transportation costs (by public means), so the ones using private cars were
willing to pay for the service, or they were in a difficult situation – in all the cases,
sooner or later the assistance was provided.
Regarding accommodation, in March 2022 a long-term housing program was
launched and the owners could ask for financial aid – 50 RON/day (10E) for accom-
modation and 20 RON/day (4E) for meals.3 Since then, citizens economically moti-
vated offered their premises for the refugees, in some cases, homes that, on the
market, would be rented for a lower price. So, either in the first days, the economic
self-interest was not a significant driver for those providing help – especially at the
border – later, it could be one of the main factors.
Although the current situation is different, we can assume that immediately
after the outbreak of war, economic self-interest was not one of the main drivers
behind the humanitarian support provided by Romanians, thus, the fist hypotheses
is not confirmed.
Deontological values often play an important role in individuals’ decisions. In
humanitarian actions, people respond to crisis and disaster situations in which
victims are unable to recover on their own and in which their vulnerability puts
them at further risk. Individuals involved in humanitarian work are driven by strong
motivation which source can be identified using an ethics-based approach. Moral
motivation is the basis for the commitment to the moral course of the human
agent’s action (Komenská 2017).
The Romanian society is in a developmental phase, characterized by a rejection
of the individualistic, modern values and the respect for social, communitary and
family values, of (post)traditional lineage. The impact of the religious factor on pub-
lic morality is significant, as the Romanian society is in a post-secular stage of de-
velopment. However, religious values are transmitted indirectly, through education

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received within the family (Sandu–Huidu–Frunză 2020). However, it shares the
similar moral and social values with other European states, although the existing
cleavages are hard to overcome (Mureșan 2017). Even if, the work of civil society
is considered to be limited by low trust capital, citizens’ focus on individual needs
and social alienation (leading to passivity and a lack of mobilisation) according to
a report published by Multimedia Foundation in 2013, the moral values embedded
within each citizen represented a fundamental factor for cohesion and teamwork.
The results of our survey show that most of the volunteers were driven in their
actions by strong moral motivations. 78% of the respondents argued that the
main reason behind their help was “to do good”, while 87% supported the fact
that “I felt the need to involve myself – I couldn’t stay impassive”. Besides this,
60% of the subjects consider themselves “active citizen”, while only 45% support
the idea that they are religious persons. Moreover, 64% claim that someone else
from their family or close friends’ group was involved in providing humanitarian
assistance.
As such, according to the data collected, we can affirm that values as empathy,
justice, responsibility were some of the main drivers that lead to strong and fast
mobilization, cooperation and involvement of the Romanian citizens, thus the sec-
ond hypothesis is confirmed.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine represented an unforeseen event for Roma-
nians, although warnings were sent by media and national authorities. In a study
conducted in 2022, researchers show that: “Regarding the Russian Federation’s in-
vasion of Ukraine, 95.4% of respondents are aware of it. […] Fear of a possible war
caused by the invasion of the Russian Federation in Romania is present in 47.1% of
respondents, while 38.1% of them believe that Romania or another NATO member
state will be invaded by the Russian Federation […]”(Mărcău et al. 2022). Moreover,
previous analysis place Russia as an external threat to Romania’s national security
in public perception (Sarcinschi 2021).
Moreover, humanitarian aid offered in or near by conflict zones, exposes peo-
ple to dramatic and unpleasant conditions and intensifies their emotional resourc-
es and psychological dispositions making their work more intensive (Tassell–Flett
2011). Thus, the immediate vicinity of the Romania-Ukraine border became the
closest area to the on-going battles, and the central point in refugees’ assistance.
According to answers collected, 85% of the volunteers perceived a certain level
of anxiety, while 69% of respondents consider that “Russia is a direct threat to
Romania and European Union”. Moreover, the high rate of refugee’s story sharing
on social media had a strong impact on the citizens. 81% of them considered the
humanitarian situation as being “desperate”, since the stories and experiences
were dramatic. 57% declared that they shared their experience on-line and use
social media to ask for help and to coordinate with others.
Hence, the psychological impact was significant and in association with specific
social and moral values determined a high level of involvement in refugees’ support.

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As such, we determined that the stronger the psychological impact was, the
more motivated to help the citizens were.
Regarding the geographical proximity, data show that only 32% of the respond-
ents were locals or had any connection with the border regions – family / acquit-
tances or other ties. The rest went there from major cities (like Cluj–Napoca, Iași,
Suceava) to better support the humanitarian actions. Besides, the resources mo-
bilized were located in various localities and regions across the country (in major
cities from Transylvania, Moldova and southern Romania were established special-
ized centres for donations collection). Thus, an unofficial support transportation
network was developed in order to deliver food, clothes, drugs and other basic
goods to the borders. As such, the volunteers moved from one area to another
in order to cover all the circumstance. In this regard, the last hypothesis is neither
confirmed, nor invalidated, since there were no data to validate the assumptions
made above.
Conclusions
This article analysed the main drivers of Romanian citizens’ mobilization (both
on-line and in the field) immediately after the war outbreak. It argues and tests
the explanatory power of five potential determinants: economic self-interest, de-
ontological motivations, psychological dispositions and cultural/religious context.
Complementary, we take into consideration the social and cultural environment
as a general factor that can shape the willingness to voluntarily participate in such
actions. The analysis uses individual-level data from a survey conducted in 2022 on
a sample of 117 Romanians directly involved in humanitarian work with Ukrainian
refugees and allows us to draw several conclusions. First, the Romanian citizens in-
volved in humanitarian work with Ukrainian refugees were not drive by economic
self-interest, although the facilities promoted by the government few weeks after
the war outbreak could raise the number of those financially interested – es-
pecially in what concerns long-term accommodation. Secondly, the cultural and
social values embedded within the Romanian society lead to a high level of action,
although there were reduced previous experiences related to civil mobilization,
citizen aid or resource mobilization. The religious factor has no significant impact
on individuals’ decision to support collective actions. Third, the psychological factor
played a salient role, especially for those without previous experience related to
conflict areas or war refugee. Forth, even if geographical proximity is assessed as a
driver of civil mobilization or grassroot humanitarianism, in this specific case it did
not play a significant role.
Thus, we can conclude that the civil mobilization in Romania in the context of
humanitarian crisis generated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 can be
considered an example of grassroot humanitarianism with complex drivers emerg-
ing from the social and cultural background of the citizens.

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Civil Szemle 2023/2. 18 1
Moreover, the tremendous coordination capacity originated from the willing-
ness to help and the awareness that without acting like a team the results will not
be achieved.
The limitations of our analysis are determined by sample validity (there are no
official statistics about the number or profile of those involved in humanitarian
support) and further clarification could be provided in order to deepen the argu-
ments provided until know.
The implications of our analysis reach beyond the case investigated here. It
brings an important contribution to the study of informal and private collective
action networks, that, until now, were localized and very contextualized (e.g. Me-
Too, Occupy Wall Street movement). Considering the magnitude of the effort at
European level and the variety of humanitarian cases, it shows that individuals have
the capacity to rapidly organize and coordinate complex processes that exceed
the governmental capabilities. Moreover, the nature and magnitude of such civil
mobilization initiatives are determined by the nature of the trigger (in this case a
military invasion in close proximity).
Further research could delve deeper into this by looking at other drivers of civil
mobilization or discover other explanations for such fast, efficient and unplanned
collective actions.
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Notes
1 The statistics provided by United Nations reflect cross-border movements and not different
individuals, but the figures can help us understand the humanitarian impact. Moreover, as it
is mentioned on the official website (https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine) more than
100.000 people moved to the Russian Federation from Donetsk and Luhansk regions prior to the
invasion (18–23 February 2022).
2 Although in the last decade, the extensive use of social media and other digital platforms, a
certain level of decentralization can be identified and, in urgent situations or when the citizens
considered that the institution were not using the proper approach, they organized initiatives
aside the official framework.
3 The Romanian Government does not provide any sort of statistics regarding the amplitude of
this program and does not have any sort of control over the quality of the services provided. In
this regard, further analysis should be conducted to assess the efficiency of the program.