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Policy Implications for Congestion Pricing in the City of Belgrade
1
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR CONGESTION PRICING IN THE CITY OF
BELGRADE
Miloš N. Mladenović1, Dušan Jolović2, Draženko Glavić3
1 Department of Built Environment, Aalto University, Finland
2 Department of Civil Engineering, New Mexico State University, USA
3 Faculty of Traffic and Transportation Engineering, University of Belgrade, Serbia
Abstract: Congestion pricing is an emerging trend in the urban environments across the world, with a primary objective
of transport demand management. Stemming from the transport economics theory, congestion pricing is an example of a
Pigouvian tax. The assumption is that the user is paying an additional ‘tax’ amount equal to the marginal external costs.
The economic perspective is that when a road user decides to travel additional kilometers or additional trips, she
imposes costs on herself, other road users, infrastructure, and the rest of the society. Consequently, introducing a pricing
mechanism is considered as a good approach to ensure that a limited good is made accessible to those who value it the
most. As a result, those with the highest willingness to pay receive the good. However, despite its economic roots,
congestion pricing has a strong socio-political dimension. A range of issues arise since congestion pricing affect the
distribution of benefits and disadvantages in society, thus raising the questions of public and political acceptance. As a
result, despite several successful implementations across the world, congestion pricing has often been rejected in many
cities. Drawing on the policy lessons from abroad, this research investigates a potential for congestion pricing in the City
of Belgrade. Taking into account crucial socio-political aspects and their importance for a country in transition, as well as
emerging development of road pricing technology, this research investigates a potential for mobility credit scheme.
Moreover, the policy implications draw on the common European transport planning framework – Sustainable Urban
Mobility Plan.
Keywords: road pricing, transport economics, public acceptance, policy learning, demand management.
1. INTRODUCTION
Congestion pricing, as one implementation of road pricing theory, and enabled by the advent of Intelligent
Transport Systems technology, offers significant promises for managing demand and transport externalities
in urban environments. Considering the level of service on the Belgrade network, congestion pricing can be
considered as one policy-level alternative for tackling ongoing demand management issues. In addition to
the benefits from demand management, congestion pricing can be an effective policy in financing transport
infrastructure. However, despite the attractiveness of some immediate benefits, congestion pricing is very
complex policy measure. At the core of this complexity are often contradicting institutional and user criteria. A
discussion on institutional and user perspectives in road pricing has been an open question since the
seminal Pigou and Knight papers [1]. These two perspectives still persist, with several dimensions, such as
economic, political, or technological. For example, an institutional perspective might need to take into
consideration total revenue from road pricing, investment costs, and maintenance and operations costs,
adaptability of tolling technology, tolling system interoperability, access control, vulnerability issues,
organizational resources, or level of potential user abuse [2]. Contrary to the institutional perspective, one
important element of the user perspective is acceptability of road pricing scheme [3-11]. User acceptance is
important since lack of public acceptance can be crucial for successful implementation of a road pricing
scheme [7]. For example, extreme cases of lacking public acceptance of road pricing have resulted in
boycott and demonstrations [12]. On the other hand, other issues relate to the economic dimension of user
perspective. For example, it is a fact that users cannot precisely calculate direct and indirect costs during
travel [13]. With this in mind, economic literature often hypothesizes about a monetary borderline value
where an individual would be willing to pay to secure the use of the goods or service, i.e., willingness to pay
[14]. In addition to willingness to pay, economists often discuss willingness to accept, as the minimum
amount an individual would be willing to accept to give up using the goods or service. Taking into account
institutional and user perspectives, there is an evident need for a balance between the two. Moreover,
previous research informs us that we cannot underestimate the importance of case specific implementation
factors [15]. This research will build from the fundamentals of road pricing theory, to draw policy lessons for
considering congestion pricing in the City of Belgrade. Having the benefit of existing international
1 Corresponding author: milos.mladenovic@aalto.fi
Miloš N. Mladenović, Dušan Jolović, Draženko Glavić
2
experiences from congestion pricing, City of Belgrade can engage in policy learning, to avoid pitfalls and
enable benefits.
2. ROAD PRICING FUNDAMENTALS
Until the 19th century, road pricing charges have been integrally related to financing the road construction
and maintenance [16, 17]. Prior to this period, the building and maintenance of roads was usually the
responsibility of local residents and towns that benefited from this infrastructure. In addition, publicly financed
roads have been perceived as unfair since very small percentage of population owned a vehicle [18]. In the
previous decades, several European countries have considered road pricing systems, using mostly time-
based vignette or kilometer-based system [16, 19, 20]. The infrastructure pricing policy at the EU level
primarily concerns freight traffic, while the question of pricing for passenger vehicles was left to individual
member states. For example, Directive 2004/52/EC of the European Parliament focuses on the conditions for
interoperability of electronic road toll systems in Europe, with the intention to ensure straightforward car
travel across national borders. Furthermore, Directive 2006/38/EC and 2011/76/EU of the European
Parliament focus on recommendations for internalizing external costs of road transport. In practice, only a
limited number of road pricing proposals has actually been implemented for passenger vehicles [15, 19, 21],
with most of the EU countries having road pricing schemes primarily for heavy vehicles [16]. The actual road
pricing schemes differ between European countries, with different road prices and charge methods [22].
Complementary to the institutional perspective, road pricing has strong origins in the economic theory.
Transport economists have argued that the search for maximum efficiency in the provision of scarce
resource is achieved by application of marginal cost pricing [23-26]. Road user charging is therefore a classic
application of a Pigovian tax (Figure 1), where the user is paying additional ‘tax’ amount equal to the
marginal external costs [24, 27]. The argument is that when a road user decides to travel additional
kilometers or additional trips, she imposes costs on herself, other road users, infrastructure, and the rest of
the society [17]. These costs to oneself are referred to as private costs. Other costs are referred to as
external costs. Consequently, there is a need for the price to reflect these additional external costs, and act
as signal to the traveler’s decision-making. Marginal signal to an efficient car use links to the cost of making
a particular trip, in order to influence individuals’ decisions on whether, how, when, and what route to travel
[19, 28]. In addition to the signaling effect, the price mechanism is considered a good approach to ensure
that a limited good is made accessible to those who value it the most. As a result, by raising price by certain
amount of the Pigovian tax until the total demand is equal to the available quantity, those with the highest
willingness to pay receive the good. This way, the price shifting from marginal private costs (MPC) to
marginal social costs (MSC), effectively reducing the demand.
Figure 1. Pigovian tax representation
Source: Authors
Policy Implications for Congestion Pricing in the City of Belgrade
3
Despite the potential benefits stemming from the Pigovian tax idea, there are several practical reasons why
this theoretical consideration of marginal cost pricing might not be optimal in road transport [29]. Some of the
reasons include complexity of measuring short-run MSC, questions of equity, investment decisions and
technology choice, financing and institutional issues, and price distortions elsewhere in the economy.
Nevertheless, while some of these concerns might lead to a need to depart from pure marginal cost pricing,
the measurement of MSC remains an essential starting point in any efficient pricing policy [17].
Consequently, the theory on user value of time and willingness to pay lies in the center of road pricing
questions.
After decades of research, value of travel time is not completely understood, and it depends on very specific
factors [30]. This often leads to an approximation and estimation of value of time (e.g., 50% of gross wage
rate [31]). In relation to road pricing, value of time is often estimated as a price the user is willing to pay for
travel time savings. Resulting relationship was often analyzed in view of users’ income [32]. For example,
[32] conclude that with 1% increase in income, willingness to pay for travel time savings increases by 0.45%
for business trips, 0.65% for commuting trips, and 0.35% for other trips. Similarly, other studies conclude that
with the increase of income there is an increase in value of travel time savings [33-36]. However, these
values are often difficult to estimate, as people often underestimate their willingness to pay for actual time
savings [30]. A range of studies has specifically focused on willingness to pay for road use, indicating a
range of values [37]. For example, a 1998 study indicates that users are willing to pay from $3.50 to $5.00
per one hour of travel time savings, or 15 to 25% of hourly wage [38]. Similarly, another study indicates that
the mean value of travel time savings was $7.95 [39]. Contrary to these values, several other studies indicate
higher values of users’ willingness to pay from travel time savings, including mean values such as $22.0 [40],
$22.87 [41], and $30 [42]. In addition, previous studies have determined willingness to pay per distance as
well, resulting in a value of 0.60 $/km [43].
Previous studies have also concluded that willingness to pay depends on a range of other variables. One
example is dependency based on the road type, with users valuing travel time savings on rural roads higher
than those on urban roads [40]. Additionally, previous research informs us that users distinguish between
values based on trip distance and based on days in the week [44]. Moreover, previous studies also conclude
that willingness to pay depends on travel time [38, 45]. Another example is willingness to pay as a function of
motorway use frequency, with more frequent users being less willing to pay [46]. However, it is important to
note that most of the previous studies of willingness to pay have identified a relationship to users’ income,
similar to the previous studies of travel time valuation. Finally, several previous studies have also identified a
relationship between willingness to pay and risk of traffic accidents [40, 47, 48]. These studies conclude that
users value higher preventing risk of traffic accidents with casualties as compared to those with injuries.
In addition to the previous studies focusing on willingness to pay, a range of studies have concluded that
there is often a high percentage of users not willing to pay road pricing. For example, [43] conclude that
13.67% of users are not willing to pay road pricing, mentioning reasons such as traveling out of peak time or
rarely using the motorway. Similarly in EU, the public often does not accept road pricing, with acceptability
varying intra-personally, inter-personally, and chronologically [7]. A range of literature describes different
variables affecting acceptability, including problem perception and awareness, attribution of responsibility,
subjective knowledge, the attitude towards car driving, mobility-related social norms, and perceived
effectiveness and fairness of road pricing [3, 6, 9, 10, 49]. Most of this research states that psychological
factors have a significant effect on acceptance of road pricing, as opposed to willingness to pay. For
example, previous studies point to environmentally conscious users [5], or users convinced about the
introduction of road pricing [8]. Contrary to the attitudinal factors, some studies often found smaller influence
of socio-economic factors, such as income [5]. In addition to psychological factors, an important element is
the relation between road pricing and social justice, especially through perceived infringement of freedom of
movement [6, 49]. Finally, a very crucial factor for influencing the user acceptability of road pricing is the use
of revenue from tolls [49, 50].
Miloš N. Mladenović, Dušan Jolović, Draženko Glavić
4
3. POLICY TRANSFER FRAMEWORK
Considering the multidimensionality of road pricing theory and practice, this research observes the question
of congestion pricing in the City of Belgrade from the perspective of policy transfer theory. Policy transfer
theory originates from the fields of political science and public policy [51-53]. Thus far, the work by Dolowitz
and Marsh (2000) has been one of the most comprehensive attempts to study and understand the policy
transfer process. This work draws attention to the applied terminology in which the term ‘policy transfer’ is
preferred to ‘lesson drawing’ since it covers both the volunteer and coercive transfer processes [1].
Moreover, Dolowitz and Marsh define policy transfer as a “process in which knowledge about policies,
administrative arrangements, institutions, etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies,
administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place [54]. The framework provided by
Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) answers to a series of fundamental questions underlying the policy transfer
process, and has been widely applied to the policy transfer studies across different policy arenas.
Transport planning has been one of the significant areas influenced by policy transfer and the similar
concepts including policy learning, best practices, and lesson-drawing. It is a common practice that national
and city governments look for solutions from other locations to tackle transport policy problems. This can be
partly explained by the fact that the awareness of transportation’s implications on social and environmental
problems has increased [8]. Despite the commonality of policy transfer in transport planning practice, there is
a limited amount of literature studying transport policy transfer processes [55]. Moreover, much of the
research on transport policy transfer has focused on the context of developed world [56-58]. However,
contrary to the cities in the developed countries, the cities in developing countries experience different types
of urban transport problems [59, 60], and are consequently more vulnerable to transfer of policies from other
locations. In case of transport planning, few cities in the developing world have already started to tackle their
transport problems through policy innovations [61-63]. The change in the nature of policy transfer in the
transport arena originates from the opportunity of global policy transfer. Moreover, the changes arises due to
the emergence of sustainable transport concept accompanied by the growth in global communication. As a
state-of-the-art in sustainable transport planning, this research will draw parallels from the common
European transport planning framework, named Sustainable Urban Mobility Plan [64].
4. INTERNATIONAL CONGESTION PRICING LESSONS
4.1. Successful Examples
Taking a practical perspective, a range of lessons can be derived from existing successful examples of
congestion pricing (CP) across the world. The City-state of Singapore was one of the first to introduce
manual road pricing in 1975, with the electronic road pricing started in 1998 [65]. Since its inception, road
pricing in Singapore was effective, reducing traffic volumes by 10-15%. Still, there is a concern on users
privacy but the operator keeps improving the security of the system to minimize the issue [66]. The second
famous example is London, UK, where CP was introduced in 2003. In London’s CP scheme, all vehicles
entering downtown area have to pay a congestion fee. The London Congestion Charge is an £11.50
daily charge for driving a vehicle within the charging zone between 07:00 and 18:00, Monday to Friday. The
easiest way to pay the charge is by registering for Congestion Charge Auto Pay. There are a range of
exemptions and discounts available to certain vehicles and individuals [67]. CP excludes motorcycles, taxis,
vehicles for disabled, passenger vans, government and fuel-efficient vehicles, buses, and some emergency
vehicles. Residents in the area of CP are eligible for up to 90% fee discount. During the first few weeks of
operation, the violation rate was high due to the confusion and errors on both drivers and operators sides
(e.g., optical recognition was not properly calibrated; the users took time to get used to payment system,
etc.). The CP was heavily criticized in the beginning but was generally accepted afterwards. The benefits of
the system can be summarized as follows: bus ridership increased by 14%, average speeds increased by
37%, peak congestion declined 30%, bus travel time declined by 50%, taxi travel cost were reduced by 30%
on average, and it is observed increase in moped and bicycle travels. However, there is still concern of
program fairness to the lower income and people who must drive, privacy issues, cost of the system
operation and the non-variable fee during heavy congested time periods [68]. The transit service has to be
Policy Implications for Congestion Pricing in the City of Belgrade
5
reliable to make people switch the mode of transport. The total gain in travel time for all paying vehicles is
estimated to be £135 million per year [69].
Another successful example of CP is Stockholm, Sweden, where CP was introduced in 2006. The charging
system is defined by two cordon lines: the first encircles the inner city of Stockholm, the second divides the
encircled area in a northern and a southern part along the water connection between lake Malaren and the
sea (see Figure 1). The charged area of inner city of Stockholm has a diameter of approximately 5–6 km.
Hourly price of CP in Stockholm varies throughout the day (Table 1). CP in Stockholm went from very
negative to considerable public and political support [70]. Stockholm example shows reduced congestion,
emissions of greenhouse gasses decline of almost 3% on a country level and 10-14% in a city center. The
traffic crashes decreased by 3.6%. Reduction in emissions is mostly attributed to the higher sales of
alternative fuel vehicles, which were exempt of the congestion charge until the end of 2008. Overall system
yielded to a large surplus, covering both operating and investment costs. All the costs were recovered in
about 4 years and the lifetime of the system is estimated to be 20 years [71, 72]. The Stockholm case
suggests that the crucial factors in successful implementation of CP are political acceptance, which includes
influence over the use of revenues and the design of the system, and the efficient and reliable public transit
alternatives [Borjesson 2012]. Similarly, first results from the City of Gothenburg, where the CP is introduced
in 2013, shows positive effects of CP as well [73, 74].
Figure 2. Cordon lines of the congestion-charging system in Stockholm
Source: Eliasson and Mattsson [72]
Table 1. Hourly congestion price in Stockholm
Time of Day
Price (€)
00:00-06:29
0.00
06:30-06:59
1.62
07:00-07:29
2.70
07:30-08:29
3.77
08:30-08:59
2.70
09:00-09:29
1.62
09:30-14:59
1.19
15:00-15:29
1.62
15:30-15:59
2.70
16:00-17:29
3.77
17:30-17:59
2.70
18:00-18:29
1.62
18:30-23:59
0.00
Source: Wikipedia [75]
Miloš N. Mladenović, Dušan Jolović, Draženko Glavić
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In Milan, Italy, CP named Ecopass was introduced in 2008 with the primary goal of reducing air pollution. CP
area in Milan is shown in the Figure 3. In addition, details of the CP scheme are presented in Table 2.
Besides these prices, entry in the CP area is free for hybrid and electric vehicles, as well as scooters.
Moreover, discounts were introduced to the base 5€ toll to make the toll more acceptable to some
categories. Commercial activities can be associated to ‘Service vehicles’ which benefit from a reduced fare
of €3 per day. Residents inside the cordon enjoy a package of 40 free entrances per year, and pay a
discounted €2 per day for any extra entrance. All tolls can be prepaid or paid within a day after entering. A
‘mini-fine’ of €15 has been introduced for later payments made within seven days [76]. Findings from Milan’s
example show reduction in air pollution, congestion and an increase in utilization of buses and trams. In
tolled area, the crashes were reduced by 18%, with no reduction in number of deaths due to traffic collisions.
Milan’s example points out the importance of the test phase setup (the pilot project) before public
referendum, existence of infrastructure for alternative traffic modes (e.g., bikes, pedestrians, public
transport), definition of specific discounts, and estimation of number of trips in the area which are mainly for
leisure [76, 77].
Figure 3. Milan’s Ecopass area and the entry points
Source: Rotaris et al. [76]
Table 2. Congestion pricing scheme in Milan
Gasoline
Diesel
Euro Level 1 to 6 0 4 to 6 0 to 3
non-resident 5 euros
banned
5 euros
banned
resident 2 euros 2 euros
commercial 3 euros 3 euros
public service free free
Source: Wikipedia [78]
Due to the heavy congestion issues and enormous pollution, Beijing plans to develop the congestion pricing
scheme as well. On a case study in Beijing, Linn et. al. showed that well planned congestion pricing can be
just to the poor and affect mostly the wealthier population [79]. The authors emphasize that, if CP is set
properly, on specific roads around the city where wealthier population live, CP can be politically acceptable
and help alleviate the congestion issues. Other successful examples of CP pricing include three Swedish
cities – the City of Bergen (1986), the City of Oslo (1990), and the City of Trondheim (1991), and also the
City of Rome, Italy (2001), Durham, UK (2002), and Valletta, Malta (2007).
Policy Implications for Congestion Pricing in the City of Belgrade
7
4.2. Unsuccessful Examples
Besides the range of successful example, there is a range of cities with failed attempts to introduce CP.
Examples include Edinburgh, Manchester, New York City, and the Netherlands [80-84], with individual
factors for failure. For example, the failure of the New York City CP proposal provided valuable lessons for
the other cities. New York example revealed several key factors in building support for the CP program,
including leadership with a vision, understanding of broader goals by the public (e.g., climate change, land
use opportunities), outreach to community groups, cooperation with non-government groups in discussions,
and funding availability. In the case of Manchester, UK the citizens turned down the CP proposal in the
referendum. Additionally, there was no political will to push the idea of CP toward implementation level. The
City of Edinburgh, Scotland also failed to gain public acceptance for road charging scheme, which was under
development for almost a decade. The main reasons of failure were the opposition of car owners, weak
support of proposal from the non-vehicle owners and public transportation users, very complicated charging
scheme misunderstood by public, and the lack of political will. In the Netherlands, out of two road pricing
schemes, neither one was introduced.
4.3. Advanced Pricing Mechanisms
Lessons from practical CP schemes have pointed out to the importance of multidimensional thinking about
introducing CP in an urban area. Similar to general road pricing theory, that developed its roots in the
economics, CP theory has to take into account a range of other socio-technical and socio-political questions.
At the core of the CP acceptance issues is the question of distributive impacts, i.e., the distribution of
burdens and benefits. As an alternative to conventional area based CP, theory of tradable mobility credits
(TMC) is undergoing development. The theory of tradable mobility credits derives its roots from the theory
and practice of personal carbon trading [85-87], with similar efforts to introduce personal carbon trading in
road transport for reducing emissions [88]. Compared to CP, TMC theory underlies the fact that simple
command and control restrictions do not alter the incentive structure surrounding the vehicle use restriction
[89]. However, contrary to direct relationship with emissions, TMC theory recognizes that besides carbon
emissions, transport involves other externalities, such as noise, safety, and congestion [90]. These
externalities depend on such mobility factors as vehicle miles traveled, time of driving, area of driving, and
vehicle used. As a result, common to TMC instrument are the following features [90-92]:
• Predetermined total quota of TMP in an area;
• Initial endowment for allocating permits to specific receivers;
• Permit holders have the right to use the permits to access roadways or to exchange with other
holders;
• Roadway usage consumes the permits, differing by time, place, and vehicle characteristics;
• Necessary enforcement to validate use and trade;
In addition to the context of CP, non-monetary mobility credit scheme is proposed in the context of self-
driving vehicles for the purpose of demand management [93-99]. TMC are suitable for controlling time-
dependent and place-dependent externalities [90]. Moreover, an important effect on acceptability can be
made through free initial credit allocation [91]. Technological capabilities, such as the advent of smart card
and smart phone technology allow for protecting anonymity in TMC schemes. Furthermore, TMC schemes
can account for efficiency and equity elements of CP, especially through deeper connection to user
psychology [100]. However, a range of other questions remains open with respect to TMC. Some examples
include initial setup and trading rules [89], cost of transactions [91], interactions with other taxes, parking
charges, public transport instruments, physical restrictions [100], or determining if credits are assigned to the
vehicle or the user [101].
5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CITY OF BELGRADE
The need for clarity, simplicity, and pragmatism in congestion pricing, requires policy learning both from
international lessons and pricing theory. Despite the advent of road pricing technology, City of Belgrade has
to evaluate a range of contextual factors. However, one important aspect is the lack of localized congestion
Miloš N. Mladenović, Dušan Jolović, Draženko Glavić
8
area. Rather, congestion points are spread around the city network. Moreover, the centers of activity are
spread on both sides of the Sava River. This is one of the critical points that might require consideration of
TMC scheme, instead of a conventional, area-based, CP scheme.
Figure 4. Examples of congestion areas across City of Belgrade
Source: Authors
Considering an additional complexity stemming from the properties of congestion on Belgrade’s network,
developing and implementing CP will have to account for a set of factors. Drawing upon the lessons from
practice and theory, as well as following the principles and the process of Sustainable Urban Mobility Plan
paradigm [64], City of Belgrade will have to consider the following points:
• CP scheme design. As previous experience informs us, CP scheme can include several
components pertaining price, time, geographical area, and discounts. In addition, mobility credits
schemes relate to a range of factors pertained to allocation, transfer, and spending. In the case of
Belgrade, a relationship to parking charging scheme needs to be clarified.
• Strong leadership and clear political will. An important aspect for generating political will is the
cost-effectiveness of the CP scheme, which has to be evaluated. In the case of Belgrade, a critical
component might be providing resources for investment costs. Leadership consisting of both
transport planners and politicians needs to have clear objectives why CP in Belgrade is
implemented, which can range from demand management, through environment impact mitigation,
up to transport infrastructure financing.
• Public engagement in the process of developing and evaluating CP scheme. In order for the
public to be engaged, planning process will have to account for including public throughout the
planning process, not just at the stage of evaluation. The interaction with public will also depend on
informing and educating the public. An important aspect of public support is transparency, especially
in the distribution of the revenue from CP scheme. Another aspect will be communicating the
distribution of burdens and benefits for several alternative CP schemes, as opposition from losers
might be often a greater obstacle for CP implementation.
• Small scale piloting during the planning process. Piloting is an excellent way for testing and
increasing public acceptance for CP scheme. Moreover, implementation in stages will avoid ‘big-
bang’ effect, and allow for the users to adjust their travel behavior.
• Evaluating the alternative transport infrastructure. Public transport alternative is very important
to the users who would be affected by the pricing scheme. Public transport service has to be reliable,
efficient and accessible from all parts of the city. Earmarking CP revenue for investments in public
Policy Implications for Congestion Pricing in the City of Belgrade
9
transport can be an important factor in gaining public support, and proving cost-effectiveness of the
CP scheme.
• Pricing and enforcement technology. When implementing CP, attention should be on choosing
between low-tech (e.g., satellite) and high-tech options (e.g., license plate recognition) for toll
collection. Moreover, installing the technology can relate to additional functions and interoperability
with the traffic management center. Special attention related to technology has to be paid to privacy
concerns, as these can relate to public acceptability. Moreover, an important aspect is the vehicle
fleet age, as older vehicles are not equipped with on-board units for distance based tolls.
6. CONCLUSION
Considering the advent of Intelligent Transport Systems technology for CP, technology cannot be considered
a crucial obstacle for implementation of CP schemes in the City of Belgrade. However, if City of Belgrade is
to tackle its congestion issues on a strategic level, multidimensionality of CP has to be accounted for. Going
beyond the economic origins of road pricing theory, implementation of urban CP depends on a range of
socio-technical and socio-political questions. Drawing on theoretical understanding and international lessons,
this paper presents a set of policy recommendations for initiating planning process of a CP scheme in the
City of Belgrade.
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