In February of 1997 approximately 125 representatives of government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, academic institutions, community forestry associations, and others met for four days to discuss the complex challenges facing the forestry sector in Quintana Roo, Mexico. The Agenda Forestal de Quintana Roo was organized by state agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) with support from the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID). In addition to topics such as industrialization, marketing, technical services, and public support, participants examined what they perceived to be worrisome trends regarding the capacity of land grant communities (ejidos) to consolidate community forest enterprises (CFEs). One of the main concerns centered on the apparent breakdown of CFEs into multiple independent producer groups. Several analysts suggested that such internal divisions might lead to a free-for-all in which individual groups would claim tracts of forest commons and abandon collective management and harvesting (DFID et al. 1998; Zabin and Taylor 1997). The move toward internal division within ejidos appeared to stem from broad legal reforms instituted by the Mexican government in 1992. In line with the actions of states across Latin America and other regions during this period, the Mexican government transformed the legal structure of the agrarian sector, promulgating constitutional and statutory reforms designed to promote economic liberalization and political decentralization. These institutional reforms included shifts in economic policy that lowered trade barriers and allowed for the privatization of state-owned industries. They also produced revisions to the federal Constitution that ended agrarian reform and altered the legal underpinning of the ejido system. Whereas collective lands were inalienable prior to 1992, the legal changes made it possible for community assemblies to dissolve their communal landholdings and obtain private property titles to the individual plots of land that had been governed collectively since the 1930s. Changes to the Constitution also allowed foreign corporations to own land in Mexico and enter into commercial partnerships with ejidos, both of which were illegal before 1992 (Cornelius and Myhre 1998; Key et al. 1998). As with all agricultural policies, the national forest law was rewritten to fall in line with liberal designs (see Merino-Pérez and Segura-Warnholtz, this volume). Beyond the legal changes regarding land tenure and foreign partnerships, revisions to the agrarian code permitted ejidatarios to form internal groups for commercial production. This subtle but important legal change allowed registered producer groups within ejidos to operate as independent commercial entities separate from the executive committee (comisariado ejidal), which had previously administered communal enterprises (see Taylor, this volume). This chapter explores how the formation of independent subgroups-known locally as work groups (grupos de trabajo)-has affected forest management, local economies, and community governance in two of Quintana Roo's most prominent forestry ejidos: Caoba and Petcacab. In the majority of large forestry ejidos in southern Quintana Roo, work groups have replaced ejido executive committees in the administration of most forest management responsibilities. This organizational shift constitutes a de facto dissolution of the CFE as originally conceived in the early 1980s under a program known as the Plan Piloto Forestal. Each work group administers timber profits from a percentage of the ejido's authorized annual harvest volume. While the work groups in both communities coordinate their forest management activities, they each decide how to use timber-based income. Since work group formation is not unique to Quintana Roo (see Taylor, this volume, for a discussion of the same phenomenon in Durango), it is worth exploring implications of these groups not just for communal forest management but also for collective governance under the ejido structure. What impact do work groups have on forest management and, by extension, forest protection? How do they affect the local economy, generally, and the distribution of timber profits, specifically? Finally, what impacts have work groups had on local governance? Do they represent the de facto breakdown of forestry ejidos in Quintana Roo? The chapter's first section provides a descriptive overview of Caoba and Petcacab. While the two ejidos are similar in many ways, they differ in terms of forestry production potential. Interestingly, Petcacab, the ejido with the higher production potential, and thus presumably greater economic incentives to cooperate, faced stiffer governance challenges compared to its less endowed counterpart, Caoba. The second section presents a comparative analysis of work group formation in Caoba and Petcacab. Caoba had seven groups in 2000, although two of these commanded a significant majority in local decision making. In contrast, Petcacab subdivided at two levels between 1996 and 2000, including 11 groups and another 18 group "sections." In the third and fourth sections, I examine the evolving collective rule systems that govern multigroup forest management in the two communities. While groups in Caoba mostly adhered to new rules, their counterparts in Petcacab frequently deviated from norms. The fifth section explores how work groups have affected local forest management and politics by focusing on changes in governance practices, participation, and informal economies. The final section of the chapter summarizes what work groups might mean for the future of community forestry in Quintana Roo.