Content uploaded by Callum Blades
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Callum Blades on Oct 05, 2023
Content may be subject to copyright.
1
2
Neoliberalism in the 21st Century Politics: Klein, Lacan and the Working Class
Callum Blades
3
© Callum Blades 2023
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this
publication may be made without written permission.
No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted
save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence
permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency,
Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.
Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication
may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.
The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author of this work
in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published 2023 by Pioneer Creative Marketing company number 12707200,
of Ramsgate, Kent CT12 6AY.
This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully
managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing
processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the
country of origin.
4
Contents
Acknowledgements
1 How Do Working Class Millennials Use Social Media 4
For Political Engagement?
2 Jeremy Corbyn and the Mobilisation of British Youth: Neoliberal Alienation? 46
3 Streamline Politics: Challenging the Inequalities 60
and Exploitations of Neoliberalism
4 Trump, the Symptom, Lack and the Fantasy 94
5 Nationalism: Division or Unification? 118
6 Are We Living In A Paranoid-Schizoid Society? 137
Applying Kleinian Theory In Relation To The Covid-19 Pandemic
7 Paranoid-Schizoid, Manic Defensive Society: 155
Kleinian Psychodynamics in Contemporary Political Culture
How Do Working Class Millennials Use Social Media For Political
Engagement? A Look Into Neoliberalism, Alienation and the Working Class
Callum Blades
5
Abstract
In neoliberal political culture, one can observe mistrust, post-truth attitudes
and alienation. Thus, it is important to investigate the political engagement of
working-class Millennials through social media, amidst the backdrop of
neoliberalism and political alienation. It addresses the decline in political
participation in the UK, particularly among youth and the working class,
juxtaposed with the rising influence of social media as a platform for political
discourse. The research explores how these Millennials employ social media
for political engagement, uncovering their motivations and the extent to
which it translates into tangible offline political actions. The study reveals
three key themes: the presence of social media echo chambers shaping
political beliefs, pervasive feelings of hopelessness and apathy towards UK
politics, and a disconnect between online activism and formal voting,
highlighting the complex dynamics between digital engagement and
traditional political participation in contemporary society.
6
Since 1997, the decline in general engagement with politics has been
widely documented (Kimberlee 2002), with turnout declining 27% from 76%
(with variation of 4%) to 59% in 2001 (UK Parliament 2016). Youth engagement
followed suit, with 25-34 year old voter participation declining from 68.6% in
1997 to 55.1% in 2001. In addition to this, working-class engagement has also
declined. According to Heath (2016 p1061), while voter turnout has increased
in all other socioeconomic demographics since 2001, it has been on a
consistent decline within the working class since the early 1990s (see Figure 1).
This is developed by Pattie et al. (2018 p101) who state that “at each
subsequent General Election it recovered somewhat, but at 69% in 2017 it is
still some way below even the lowest turnout of the late twentieth century”. In
addition, social media engagement has been increasing amongst all
generations, with a link being identified between political participation online
and offline political engagement (Levya 2017). Owing to this fact, it is clear
that the mobilisation of young people is vital to cause real change. As such,
one must attempt to understand the means in which youth demographics
are engaging with politics in order to cause genuine political progress. Taking
this into consideration, how do working class Millennials use social media for
political engagement?
7
Fig. 1. Reported turnout by class, 1964–2010
In order to answer this question, the literature surrounding it shall be
discussed with two approaches. Firstly, there will be an approach that focuses
on working-class engagement in politics, followed by an approach oriented
around youth engagement with politics and social media.
Working-Class Engagement in Politics
Whilst much discussion has taken place in relation to this
phenomenon, one can look at the work of Owen Jones and the book “Chavs:
The Demonization of the Working Class” as an efficient starting point. Within
this, the discussion of working class political alienation is established.
Effectively, when Margeret Thatcher’s Conservative party introduced
neoliberal policy to the United Kingdom in 1973, the Labour party found itself
in disarray, failing to gain support for any “of the left-driven transformations of
8
the party structure” (Philips & Wannell 2013). Fraser (2017 p49) elaborates,
stating that the Left combined a lack of a “critique of financialization, on the
one hand, and with an anti-racist, anti-sexist and anti-hierarchical vision of
emancipation, on the other”. As such, in order to create the possibility for
general election victory, Tony Blair injected neoliberal policy into the New
Labour manifesto, something that was seen as a victory for the Conservative
party, with Thatcher being quoted as saying her greatest victory was “Tony
Blair and New Labour.” as “we forced our opponents to change their minds.”
(Stacey 2013).
As such, in shifting the Labour party toward more centre politics, the
party that ordinarily represented working-class ideology instead began
representing market-based, neoliberal ideology. Jones (2011 p100) states that
“working-class voters were taken for granted as the ‘core vote’ who had
nowhere else to go, allowing New Labour politicians to tailor their policies to
privileged voters”. In actuality, the focus on more middle-class voters resulted
in the working class becoming increasingly alienated politically, and
ultimately created a sense of hopelessness in terms of political engagement.
This could be exacerbated further, as Inglehart (1988) identifies that
post-materialism is heavily associated with areas of low economic growth,
potentially leading to further alienation of working-class voters. Evans & Tilley
(2017 p200) develop this, stating that “top down party change has resulted in
9
increasing non-participation in the democratic process by working class and
low educated voters”, hence the decrease in working class voter turnout.
It should be acknowledged that alienation of the working class could
potentially lead to social media echo chambers. Defined by as Garimella et. al
(2018 p913) as “situations where one is exposed only to opinions that agree
with their own”, the existence of social media echo chambers was developed
by Bakshy et al. (2015) who found that, in a study of 10.1 million Facebook users
that while they “were exposed to opposing views on social media, their social
media network was mainly composed of like-minded people” (Lilleker &
Ozgul 2021). Combining this with the notion of political alienation, one can
understand the means in which working-class alienated populations could
potentially be seduced by populist parties and candidates via social media
echo chambers (Goodhart 2017).
Youth Engagement In Politics and Social Media
It has been well documented that engagement, interest and overall
voter turnout has been historically low for younger demographics (Sloam
2007), with the Power Inquiry publishing a report entitled ‘Power to the
10
People’, to study the phenomenon further. Within which, the conclusion was
drawn that “the level of alienation felt towards politicians, the main political
parties and the key institutions of the political system is extremely high and
widespread” (The Power Inquiry 2006). Effectively, the British people do not
connect in any level to politicians, rather the only people that do are the
people that happen to agree with the economic neoliberal policy or
thoroughly reject it.
As such, there is more informal politics taking place. Banaji (2008 p545)
writes that “the trend was for young people to be more suspicious of and
unlikely to trust government and formal politics”, the Power Inquiry drew a
similar conclusion, which stated that “there is also clear evidence that
involvement in pressure politics…has been growing significantly for many
years” (2006 p16), this indicates that engagement with politics isn’t that which
is in decline, rather there is a specific decline in engagement with formal
politics.
One of the primary methods that can be observed is via social media, it
has been strongly argued that social media usage leads to the possibility that
users might “organise…mobilise and to debate” (Cammaerts, 2012), and that
“the increasing popularity of social media has led to increased social activism
happening throughout social media sites”. (Li et.al, 2021), with McDowell (2014
11
p44) writing that “[young people’s] engagements through…new forms of
participation enabled by the electronic media are seen as seeds for a new
sophisticated and more inclusive political Arena.” As such, one could identify a
juxtaposition here; in that the increase in activism via social media, yet
decrease in working class voting act contrastingly to one another.
In analysing Millennial voting habits, one of the most vital readings
would be Seelig’s 2018 paper ‘Social activism: engaging millennials in social
causes’ discussing social media and politics in regards to young adults.
Within which, the study suggested that “millennials are open to using social
media for social causes”. However, it has been noted by Dookhoo (p39 2015)
that “millennial engagement in online activism does not naturally translate to
offline activism which is a key concept as activists try to obtain support from
this growing demographic”. This suggests that Millennial activism exists
within online spheres, and yet, translates very poorly over to electoral politics.
Altogether, these studies provide an important framework to discuss
voter apathy within working class Millennials, however leave an important
question. At present there has been no specific research conducted in order
to identify whether Millennials who engage with social media, also find
themselves disenfranchised in relation to formal politics.
12
Research Questions
In establishing whether political engagement on social media increases
voter turnout in working class millennials, one must via qualitative research,
understand the motivations within those who conform to both working class
and Millennials demographics and the means in which they engage with
politics.
With this in mind, a post on social media specifically addressed to
Millennials was created, with interviews aiming to begin around the 4th to
the 7th of December, each lasting around 45 minutes each. Afterwards, I was
contacted by two participants “Jake” and “Hannah”, who agreed to be
interviewed. Due to the nature of their location, Zoom interviews would take
place. With this information in mind, it would be best to understand the
thematic elements existent in Millennials' use of social media as a means of
political participation and the subsequent effects this has on offline spaces.
As such, the research question devised shall be the following:
How Do Working Class Millennials Use Social Media For Political
Engagement?
13
Methodology
In establishing this question, the means in which to pursue an answer
will be qualitative. According to Bryman and Bell (2018, p16) qualitative
research “takes a predominantly inductive approach to the relationship
between theory and research, in which the generation of theories and
interpretations is the main goal”, due to the linguistic and thematic
understanding within which one’s discussion and attitude surrounding
politics takes place, utilising inductive reasoning to draw elements of theory
from conversations in order to establish the disposition of the interviewee. In
this instance, the theory and interpretation that needs to be established is the
attitude within the participants of the interview, how they utilise social media
and how they believe social media affects their attitude towards voting.
In addition to this, Bryman and Bell (ibid.), established that qualitative
research “embodies a view of social reality as a constantly shifting and
emergent property of individuals’ creations”. Owing to the nature of politics as
constantly shifting in accordance with various political and economic trends,
one would be better positioned to identify the key elements of public attitude
towards politics within contemporary, fluctuating schema of the present
mindset.
14
Whilst critiques of qualitative analysis exist in this capacity, primarily in
the form of its subjectivity, as stated by Siedman (p415 1977) “qualitative
analysis has been dismissed as too difficult, too intangible, and too
subjective”, with Bryman and Bell developing this, stating that “quantitative
researchers sometimes criticise qualitative research for being too
impressionistic and subjective” (Bryman and Bell 2018), these arguments can
be acknowledged in a formal sense, however dismissed when one turns to
the thematic analysis that shall be taking place.
Method
In order to allow room for the interviewees to think freely, with little
pressure, an unstructured interview will take place; within which, a clear set of
questions and topics will be discussed, “with a fairly clear rather than a
general focus… so that they can address more specific issues” (Bryman and
Bell 2018). According to Lofland (1995, p. 78 as quoted in Bryman and Bell
2018) researchers ask themselves “Just what about this thing is puzzling me?”.
As such, certain questions shall be asked in order to understand better the
topics that the interviewees are discussing, as well as relating back to
previous topics in order to understand better the themes utilised by the
interviewee. This benefits the understanding of the means in which political
communication and engagement exists within Millennials as it allows space
15
for them to better convey ideas, ideologies and political dispositions within a
free-flowing environment.
Analysis
In discussing the findings of the interviews taking place, thematic
analysis will be conducted in regards to themes identified within the
literature review as well as themes that arise as a result of the interviews. For
example, in incidents where there is an emotional response to certain
questions, there will be more in-depth questions surrounding that topic
whilst ensuring that the discussion remains on-topic. Additionally, this will
help identify the emotional connections to specific topics.
As such, the manner in which the information shall be presented is via
key themes and headings, backed up by relevant theoretical, political context.
Results and discussions
Having held the discussions on the aforementioned dates, key themes
were immediately apparent from both parties, and as such, have been broken
down into smaller headings. These are ‘Echo Chambers’, ‘Apathy- for the UK’,
and ‘Millennials Attitudes towards Voting’.
16
Echo Chambers
One of the main findings during the interviews was discussion that
pertained to the concept of “echo chambers”. In regards to the means in
which social media is utilised by its users, a common theme arose in this
form. Hannah, mentioned the concept in relation to working class attitudes
towards topics such as the presidency of Donald Trump and Brexit, stating
that
“Cambridge Analytica and things, who made millions of
Facebook ads to make people believe that Brexit was a good idea
and stuff and fair enough if you want to vote for Brexit, but a lot of
it was lies and Facebook didn’t factcheck any of it.” Q7
This theme was backed up by a similar aspect of the interview with Jake, who
shared, quite impassionately, the sentiment that people don’t care about
politics as a result of utilising social media echo chambers, and that,
“they just don’t, then they all look at the same sh*t, get angry and
more racist and if you bring it up they call you a snowflake
because they don’t know what it’s like to be challenged about
sh*t” Q7
17
Both these interpretations of attitudes towards social media are vital as
they highlight the fact that these social media echo chambers exist in
working-class circles and divide people into political polarisation. As such,
there bears similarity to the work of Lilleker & Ozgul and Bakshy et al., who
found that users will utilise social media echo chambers to propagate their
own biases without deliberate reference to fact.
An interesting thing to note at this juncture would be the interviewees
overlooking their own existence within echo chambers. Hannah states that,
“when I see other people online in my circles saying “yeah we’re going
to vote for the Labour party” or something like that, I’ll believe it and be
more hopeful about it all and think there will be change”
Whilst Jake acknowledges that,
“So it’s useful, yeah. And it’s good to see, like other people who
share the same views, so I don’t feel alone. I know there are at
least other people who have to deal with this.”
18
Jake and Hannah, who possess similar political grounding, both utilise
social media echo chambers to a certain extent, and in doing so, one can
identify the theme that echo chambers are spread across a whole range of
political ideologies, Lilleker & Ozgul (2021 p42) support this, stating that “this
phenomenon can prove powerful for the propagation of any form of content,
from those promoting democratic participation, championing
environmentalist campaigns, combatting xenophobia or spreading
conspiracy theories”.
One can conclude then that the existence of social media echo
chambers within these interviews is relevant for both the interviewees, and
one can identify social media echo chambers as a key element of social
media usage by those who engage politically online, regardless of political
persuasion.
Hopelessness for the United Kingdom politics.
Another key finding from the interviews were the means in which
apathy and hopelessness that exists within both the schema of the
interviewee, as well as their stance on the politics of the United Kingdom.
Effectively, there is complete disenfranchisement with regards to any
economic certainty or security within the Millennial generation. McDowell
19
(2014) identifies the trend for youth apathy within politics, with considerable
other scholarly sources backing this up (see Farthing 2010, Pilkington and
Pollock 2015, Koppell 2022). As such, Hannah stated that,
“There’s just a sort of feeling of hopelessness when it comes to politics…
I don’t know many people who care about owning a house, or cars, or
believe they’ll get a job they care about, or ever have enough money for
anything, so there isn’t much hope for the future there really.” Q13
In relation to this, one can identify not just something in the political
sense, rather people have become disenfranchised with various elements of
the economy. This notion expands the ideas of post-materialist values as
discussed by Inglehart (1988) & Evans & Tilley (2017), to that which covers
various elements of economic factors. Moving forward with this notion of
apathy, Jake backs this notion of hopelessness up, but identifying “Gammons”
as responsible, saying that,
“There’s too many gammons about. The world is laughing at us. We’re a
tiny island full of f***ing racists and always will be. Clinging to the
past…This place is a trainwreck and it’s only gonna get worse.” Q8
20
Effectively, Jake believes that “Gammons”, defined as “gay-hating,
immigrant-bashing, left-reviling affluent white men” (Jones 2018), to be the
source of this political hopelessness.. He understands there to be no point in
voting. Hannah expresses similar sentiments,
“I worry that there are more racist old people than young people.” Q8
Thus, one can understand that, as a result of these interactions with social
media, a politician reflecting post-materialist values, presenting a direct
representation of younger people in the political realm would be necessary in
order to mobilise British youth (Henn et al. 2018).
Millennials Attitude towards Voting
Perhaps one of the most vital components of these interviews is
attitude towards voting. As The Power Inquiry (2006) documented, younger
people are disenfranchised with political systems and formal politics as a
whole, however Li et al. (2021) found that more social activism is taking place
as a result of the existence of social media. Would those who engage with
politics online be more inclined to engage formally? The research found that
both participants presented the same view, with Hannah stating that social
media activity is
21
“a way of feeling like you’re doing something when you know voting
won’t affect anything?” Q12
This sentiment is reflected by Jake, who says
“Your vote ain’t gonna do sh*t.” Q12
This indicates that both participants identify that they have no faith in
electoral politics, and as such utilise social media to act against what they
perceive to be incorrect. However, they also engage with it and go out and
vote, despite their belief that nothing will change. This further supports
McDowell’s (2014) claim that online spaces are seen as means in which those
engaged with politics can exist in conjunction with voting in electoral politics.
However, as Jake points out,
“nothing is going to change. That’s why loads of them don’t care at all
about any of it. They know nothing will change.” Q12
These findings indicate that young working class millennials who are
disinterested in politics won’t go out and vote, whereas those who have an
interest in it, will vote out of principle, but don’t believe there is much purpose
22
to it. This backs up the findings of Jones (2011) in relation to Neoliberal politics
as leading to the alienation of the working class, as well as the work of Banaji
(2008), who documented the notion that young people are disinterested in
engaging with formal politics.
Having analysed the findings of this research, various results can be
established. It is clear that working-class Millennials utilise social media to
inform, understand and educate themselves, as well as presenting challenges
to those they disagree with, as well as fact-checking. However, it is apparent
that they still fall victim to echo chambers. Additionally, one can observe the
use of social media for political engagement has led towards resentment for
older generations, who both participants agreed had caused a lot of the
issues that they are both facing today. A possible solution to rectifying both of
these issues is for the presence of postmaterialist politicians, who actively aim
to attract and support younger generations, acting in their interest.
Both opposed Brexit and the presidency of Donald Trump, both utilised
social media in similar capacities, and both of them, vitally, had no faith in
formal politics as it stands. As such, quantitative research could take place
between the voting habits of general working-class demographics in relation
to social media echo chambers, as well as quantitative research to
understand the necessity for post-materialist politicians amongst Millennials.
Additionally, mixed methods research could take place to identify voting
23
trends among those who wouldn’t see themselves as politically active and
their voting habits. This would assist in better understanding the need for
political change in the United Kingdom, as well as the urgency and form it
would take, in order to create a stronger, more politically aware youth.
REFERENCE LIST
Bakshy, E., Messing, S., and Adamic, L. A., 2015. Exposure to ideologically
diverse news and opinion on Facebook. Science, 348 (6239), 1130–1132.
Banaji, S., 2008. The trouble with civic: a snapshot of young people’s civic and
political engagements in twenty-first-century democracies. Journal of
Youth Studies, 11 (5), 545–560.
Bryman, E., 2022. Social Research Methods. 6th ed. S.L.: Oxford Univ Press.
Dookhoo, S., 2015. How Millennials Engage in Social Media Activism: A Uses
and Gratifications Approach. [online], 39. Available from:
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2363&context=et
d [Accessed 30 Dec 2021].
Farthing, R., 2010. The politics of youthful antipolitics: representing the “issue”
of youth participation in politics. Journal of Youth Studies, 13 (2), 181–195.
24
Fraser, N., 2019. The old is dying and the new cannot be born : from
progressive neoliberalism to Trump and beyond. London ; New York:
Verso.
Garimella, K., De Francisci Morales, G., Gionis, A., and Mathioudakis, M., 2018.
Political Discourse on Social Media: Echo Chambers, Gatekeepers, and
the Price of Bipartisanship. In:Association of Computer Machinery.
Presented at the WWW ’18: Proceedings of the 2018 World Wide Web
Conference, ACM Digital Library, 913–922.
Goodhart, D., 2019. Road To Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future
of Politics. S.L.: C Hurst.
Heath, O., 2016. Policy Alienation, Social Alienation and Working-Class
Abstention in Britain, 1964–2010. British Journal of Political Science, 48
(4), 1061.
Henn, M., Oldfield, B., and Hart, J., 2018. Postmaterialism and young people’s
political participation in a time of austerity. The British Journal of
Sociology, 69 (3), 712–737.
Inglehart, R., 1988. The Renaissance of Political Culture. American Political
Science Review, 82 (4), 1203–1230.
Jones, O., 2018. No, “Gammon” Is Not a Racial Slur. Now Let’s Change the
Conversation [online]. The Guardian. Available from:
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/14/gammon-no
t-racial-slur-change-conversation [Accessed 7 Jan 2022].
Jones, O., 2020. Chavs : the demonization of the working class. S.L.: Verso
Books.
Kimberlee, R. H., 2002. Why Don’t British Young People Vote at General
Elections? Journal of Youth Studies, 5 (1), 85–98.
Koppell, C., 2022. UNTAPPED POWER : leveraging diversity and inclusion for
conflict and development. S.L.: Oxford Univ Press Us.
25
Leyva, R., 2016. Exploring UK Millennials’ Social Media Consumption Patterns
and Participation in Elections, Activism, and “Slacktivism.” Social
Science Computer Review, 35 (4), 462–479.
Li, M., Turki, N., Izaguirre, C. R., DeMahy, C., Thibodeaux, B. L., and Gage, T.,
2020. Twitter as a tool for social movement: An analysis of feminist
activism on social media communities. Journal of Community
Psychology.
Lilleker, D. G. and Aslan Ozgul, B., 2022. The psychology of democracy.
Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, Ny: Routledge.
McDowell, L., Rootham, E., and Hardgrove, A., 2013. Politics, anti-politics,
quiescence and radical unpolitics: young men’s political participation in
an “ordinary” English town. Journal of Youth Studies, 17 (1), 44.
Pattie, C., Hartman, T., and Johnston, R., 2018. A Close-run Thing? Accounting
for Changing Overall Turnout in UK General Elections. Representation,
55 (1), 101.
Phelps, E., 2005. Young Voters at the 2005 British General Election. The
Political Quarterly, 76 (4), 482–487.
Philips, D. and Whannel, G., 2014. Deborah Philips and Gary Whannel, The
Trojan Horse: The Growth of Commercial Sponsorship. European
Journal of Communication, 29 (5), 648–649.
Pilkington, H. and Pollock, G., 2015. “Politics are Bollocks”: Youth, Politics and
Activism in Contemporary Europe. The Sociological Review, 63
(2_suppl), 1–35.
Power Inquiry (Great Britain) and Rowntree, J., 2006. Power to the people : the
report of Power : an independent inquiry into Britain’s democracy : the
centenary project of the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust and the
Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust. 1st ed. London, Uk: Power Inquiry.
Seelig, M. I., 2018. Social activism: Engaging millennials in social causes. First
Monday, 23 (2).
26
Siedman, E., 1977. Why Not Qualitative Analysis? Public Administration
Review, 37 (4), 415.
Sloam, J., 2007. Rebooting Democracy: Youth Participation in Politics in the
UK. Parliamentary Affairs, 60 (4), 548–567.
Stacey, K., 2013. Opposition moves to damp down triumphalism. Financial
Times [online], April 9, 2013. Available from:
https://www.ft.com/content/853babe6-a12c-11e2-bae1-00144feabdc0
[Accessed 25 Dec 2021].
UK Parliament, 2016. General election turnout [online]. UK Parliament.
Available from:
https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/el
ectionsvoting/chartists/contemporarycontext/electionturnout/
[Accessed 4 Jan 2021].
Appendix
27
1. Interview guide
28
29
2. Interview Transcript
Interviewer:
Hi, how’s it going? Are you well?
Jake:
Yeah, alright, you?
I:
All good. So I was just going to ask you a few questions if that’s OK? It
shouldn’t take longer than an hour.
J:
Yeah, no worries.
I:
OK, so I wanted to ask first about social media. Do you use any social media?
J:
Yeah I do, yeah. I’ve got Facebook, Instagram and Snapchat. I have Twitter, but
I’m not really use… Don’t really use social… Twitter too much. Only when I’m
30
looking at like specific things, like politicians and that, or some memes and
that. But only a few times a year probably, well rare, but I’m on it.
I:
Sweet. No that’s great. So you use Twitter a few times a year, what about the
others?
J:
Well, I’m on Instagram all the time, like, I’ll find myself like flicking through it
when I’m bored, so I usually open it a few times an hour. Slightly less with
Facebook, but I’m on it, I’m on Facebook for longer at a time. I’ll go on it and
I’ll end up looking at comments and watching videos and stuff, so usually I’ll
be on one of them for a few hours a day in total.
I:
What about Snapchat?
J:
Oh yeah, no, I don’t really… I use it, but not like, not for… only for like chatting
with people, like so I don’t really look at the news stuff on there, because it’s…
stupid. Like, stuff about Love Island and all that, cringy.
31
I:
So if you use Snapchat for mainly chatting with people, what about the
others? What sort of stuff do you get up to on Instagram and Facebook?
J:
Yeah, well, as I say, on Instagram I’ll be looking at stories a lot, then I’ll be
flicking through, see what stuff people have put up, then go to the explore
page and see if there’s anything there I need to look at. Usually, I’ll put stuff up
of work I’ve done, if I’m proud of it. I follow a few pages with like similar stuff;
drone footage and stuff. It’s normally just looking at like Grime and that too,
Aitch and Songer and that. But Facebook is different really. I’ll always be
looking at arguments and that on there, like anti-vaxxers and them idiots,
Brexit, like loads of the people where I’m from are proper gammons, so I’ll
laugh react their stupid sh*t, ‘cause they all just sit on Facebook and look at
lies and tell each other more lies and no one tells them to shut up, so I do it.
[Laugh]
I:
Ah ok, so do you think social media has been a good thing or a bad thing on
the whole?
J:
32
Oh bad, it’s f***ing sh*t. Like, before all them idiots couldn’t talk to each other,
but now they all can and they all see something online and believe it without
questioning it. Before, they’d say something like that and get angry and the
only people who would listen would be people in the pub, but now they’re all
online, they just don’t, then they all look a the same sh*t, get angry and more
racist and if you bring it up they call you a snowflake because they don’t know
what it’s like to be challenged about sh*t.
I:
So would you say you have an interest in politics then?
J:
Yeah, definitely. I didn’t use to. But when Brexit and that happened I kind of
thought “I’m either gonna be on the side of the Gammons, or I’ve got to be
against them”. So, like I try and be as clued up as I can about stuff.
I:
What form does that take would you say?
J:
A few things, I’m in like a load of fact-checking groups on social media, and I
try and read the Guardian and that. I’ll listen to people like James o’Brien on
33
LBC, who will, like, ask people why they think a certain way and try and show
them that they don’t actually know, they’re just angry. Like then I do the same
thing at the pub and that. If I’m seeing anything I’ll question it and read a few
sources.
I:
So do you vote?
J:
Yeah, definitely vote. But I don’t tell everyone about it all the time. Like in the
last election, when everyone in [home town] was hanging up UKIP flags and
saying about how great Boris Johnson is, like I weren’t going round saying
how I was gonna vote Labour, because they’d’ve shouted at me [Laugh].
Thing is, like, there ain’t any point voting, ‘cause, if I vote for Labour down
here, they aren’t gonna get in, and no one is even close, so what’s the point? I
still do it, just in case. But it won’t do anything.
I:
Ah ok, so what influences your decisions when you vote?
J:
34
Like, I’ll look at the manifestoes and weigh it up. Which the gammons never
do, they just go for whoever they think is going to be more racist. But the
Labour one is just always better I think. Like the Tory one is just Brexit and
that, which is a sh*t idea anyway and the gammons will all fall for it. Like, I find
it useful looking at loads of stuff. And listening to LBC, as I say, helps a bit and
all.
I:
Do you feel represented by the political system as it stands today?
J:
[Laugh] No!
I:
Why not?
J:
Because I don’t have a problem with brown people.
I:
How do you mean?
35
J:
Well, like our government is full of rich old racists who know how to get a load
of other racists to vote for them. Like, I ain’t a racist, I ain’t rich. I try and treat
people kindly and sh*t. That’s not what politics in the UK is all about.
I:
Do you think many people share your view?
J:
Yeah, loads, yeah. Like, I think no one my age thinks the politicians give a sh*t,
they know voting ain’t going to matter, but what else can we do? There are
more f***ing racists in the UK then there are clever people, so nothing is going
to change. That’s why loads of them don’t care at all about any of it. They
know nothing will change. So would would they give a f***? It’s like going out
for a meal with, like a load of vegans or something and someone says “where
shall we go?” and the options are the steak house, or the vegan place. Your
vote ain’t gonna do sh*t. And you can’t even get out of this country now
because they all voted leave so that’s f***ed and all.
I:
How do you see the future of the UK politics going?
36
J:
Nah, it’s not gonna get better. There’s too many gammons about. The world is
laughing at us. We’re a tiny island full of f***ing racists and always will be.
Clinging to the past…This place is a trainwreck and it’s only gonna get worse.
I:
Why do you think that?
J:
Because of all the f***ing gammons! They’re everywhere mate. You’ve got the
Daily Mail and The Sun and the Daily Express filling their heads with racist
b****cks, the same with Facebook, the same with Sky News and that…And the
BBC are all “oh, here’s someone with a PhD in economics talking about why
Brexit is a sh*t idea, and here’s John from the pub who is a f***ing bricklayer or
some shit, in the interest of “fairness”, let’s see them debate it”. Like we ain’t
got a chance. No one cares if they’re f***ing hurting anyone, or the impact it’s
having on people, they just want money and viewing figures and clicks. It’s
f****ed.
I:
You say about Facebook. Do you ever see political content on social media?
37
J:
Yeah, all the time. If you can call it that. It’s just old people sharing lies that
ain’t even spelled right.
I:
Do you ever see things you agree with?
J:
Yeah, all the time, yeah. Like, I’m in a few groups, like one called
“Gammon-watching”, where you share the stupid racist sh*t you see online.
Then there’s like, Jeremy Corbyn and that, I follow, and some Remainer
groups and that. Like, it’s quite good, because if I don’t know what to make of
something, often people will say whether or not something is good or not in
those groups. Like, say I can’t figure out if an article about Brexit is in favour or
against, I’ll ask the groups and they’ll say. So it’s useful, yeah. And it’s good to
see, like other people who share the same views, so I don’t feel alone. I know
there are at least other people who have to deal with this sh*t all the time.
I:
How do you think other working class millennials engage with politics?
J:
38
Well, they either don’t or they do it like me. Like, looking at groups and that,
reading articles, fact-checking and sh*t. Thing is, it ain’t gonna do much. I was
reading about these young kids, Gen Z, on TikTok, who were reserving seats at
Trump rallies and then not showing up, so then the rallies were all empty. I
think that’s good. Like, I reckon that’s the sort of thing we should do. Voting
ain’t gonna do sh*t. There needs to be some online attacks and that to show
them up. They don’t know how the internet works [Laugh].
I:
What sort of thing would you have in mind?
J:
Like, overloading servers. Like, during the General Election, if everyone
overloaded the Tory website, no-one would be able to download their
manifesto, so they can’t read it. Or like, locating people like Nigel Farage and
then chucking milkshake at him. Like, they’ll call us all snowflakes no matter
what, so we might as well do something, because voting is f***ing pointless.
I:
Thank you Jake!
J:
39
Cheers, yeah, I need a lie down. [Laugh].
3. Coding frame
Interviewe
e
Attitude
Towards
Voting
Activism
Social
Media
Working
Class
Attitudes
Towards
Voting
Millennial
Attitudes
Towards
Voting
Hannah
I think
maybe
that’s why
actually.
Like it’s a
way of
feeling like
you’re
doing
something
when you
know
voting
won’t
Yeah.
Basically.
[Laugh]. I
kind of
think, like, I
don’t feel
like it’ll do
much, but
I know
that I can
at least try.
At least I
know I did
something
Facebook
is kind of
similar, I’m,
uh, I mean,
like, uh, I
don’t trust
a lot of the
things on
it, like I
take most
news
things
I know
loads of
people
who will
post stuff
about how
they hate
the
conservati
ve party
and their
policies
and all
that stuff,
There’s
just a sort
of feeling
of
hopelessn
ess when it
comes to
politics.
No-one
trusts any
politicians,
I think also
that there
is sort of a
40
affect
anything?
-
I worry
that there
are more
racist old
people
than
young
people.
you know?
with a
pinch of
salt, but uh
I’m
probably a
hypocrite
because
I’ve
probably
shared
stuff from
like,
political
groups
and that
before that
weren’t
true. Like, I
think I’ll
often find
something
that I really
agree with
and it’s
like, only
later that
I’ll like
properly
think “oh
hang on,
maybe I
should
have
fact-check
ed that”
[Laugh].
But I think
but then
won’t go
out and
vote!
lack of
hope in a
lot of
things
though, I
don’t know
many
people
who care
about
owning a
house, or
cars, or
believe
they’ll get
a job they
care about,
or ever
have
enough
money for
anything,
so there
isn’t much
hope for
the future
there
really.
41
I’m a lot
better
than other
people for
it. Some of
the things
I see, I
really bite
my
tongue,
‘cause, like,
I know it’s
obviously a
lie, but
people are
sharing it
anyway.
-
so I feel
like it has
probably
been a bad
thing. It’s
good for
me to see
the stuff
everyone is
up to and
keep in
touch, but
then I
don’t think
you’d have
had Trump
or Brexit if
42
social
media
wasn’t a
thing. Like,
uh, all
those
political
groups
that
people get
angry in
and stuff. I
think
Facebook
ads are a
scary thing
too.
-
I don’t
think
Facebook
cares
about the
effect it
has on
people,
just about
getting
the
money, so
you had all
that with
those, uh,
people
that like,
Cambridg
43
e Analytica
and things,
who made
millions of
Facebook
ads to
make
people
believe
that Brexit
was a
good idea
and stuff
and fair
enough if
you want
to vote for
Brexit, but
a lot of it
was lies
and
Facebook
didn’t
factcheck
any of it.
Q7
-
There’s
just a sort
of feeling
of
hopelessn
ess when it
comes to
politics.
No-one
trusts any
politicians,
I think also
44
that there
is sort of a
lack of
hope in a
lot of
things
though, I
don’t know
many
people
who care
about
owning a
house, or
cars, or
believe
they’ll get
a job they
care about,
or ever
have
enough
money for
anything,
so there
isn’t much
hope for
the future
there really
Q13
Jake
Everyone
seems so
uninterest
ed in it all
now. They
just want
whoever is
going to
say the
nastiest
things
A few
things, I’m
in like a
load of
fact-checki
ng groups
on social
media, and
I try and
read the
Guardian
and that.
Like, it’s
quite
good,
because if
I don’t
know what
to make of
something
, often
people will
say
J:
Because I
don’t have
a problem
with
brown
people.
I:
How do
you mean?
Yeah,
loads,
yeah. Like,
I think no
one my
age thinks
the
politicians
give a sh*t,
they know
voting ain’t
going to
45
about
immigrant
s. I know
that I’m in
a minority,
like,
wanting
more
left-wing
stuff when
I’m in
England,
so I just
stay quiet.
It makes
you feel
like there’s
no point
voting
really,
because if
Labour did
get in,
which I
doubt, I
don’t see
much
changing.
I’ll listen to
people like
James
o’Brien on
LBC, who
will, like,
ask people
why they
think a
certain
way and
try and
show
them that
they don’t
actually
know,
they’re just
angry. Like
then I do
the same
thing at
the pub
and that. If
I’m seeing
anything
I’ll
question it
and read a
few
sources.
-
they’ll call
us all
snowflakes
no matter
what, so
we might
as well do
something
whether or
not
something
is good or
not in
those
groups.
Like, say I
can’t
figure out
if an article
about
Brexit is in
favour or
against, I’ll
ask the
groups
and they’ll
say. So it’s
useful,
yeah. And
it’s good to
see, like
other
people
who share
the same
views, so I
don’t feel
alone. I
know
there are
at least
other
people
who have
to deal
with this
sh*t all the
time.
-
J:
Well, like
our
governme
nt is full of
rich old
racists who
know how
to get a
load of
other
racists to
vote for
them. Like,
I ain’t a
racist, I
ain’t rich. I
try and
treat
people
kindly and
sh*t. That’s
not what
politics in
the UK is
all about.
matter,
but what
else can
we do?
There are
more
f***ing
racists in
the UK
then there
are clever
people, so
nothing is
going to
change.
That’s why
loads of
them don’t
care at all
about any
of it. They
know
nothing
will
change.
They
expect
nothing to
change. So
would
would they
give a f***?
It’s like
going out
for a meal
with, like a
load of
vegans or
something
and
someone
says
“where
46
, because
voting is
f***ing
pointless.
they just
don’t, then
they all
look a the
same sh*t,
get angry
and more
racist and
if you
bring it up
they call
you a
snowflake
because
they don’t
know what
it’s like to
be
challenged
about sh*t.
Q7
-
shall we
go?” and
the
options are
the steak
house, or
the vegan
place.
You’re vote
ain’t
gonna do
sh*t. And
you can’t
even get
out of this
country
now
because
they all
voted
leave so
that’s
f***ed and
all.
47
Jeremy Corbyn and the Mobilisation of British Youth: Neoliberal
Alienation?
Callum Blades
I saw some sick picture of him from back in the day when he was
campaigning about anti-apartheid and I thought, “Yeah, I like your energy”
(Stormzy cited in Wolfson 2016)
Whilst it is a historically acknowledged trend for younger demographics to
display lower levels of knowledge, interest and engagement in electoral politics
(Mardle & Taylor 1987), it is important to recognise the extreme form this took
following the 1997 general election. After Labour’s general election victory, the mean
voter turnout declined from an average of 76% (with a variation of 4%) to 59% in 2001
(UK Parliament 2016), making the turnout the “lowest for any postwar UK general
election” (Livingstone and Markham 2008). The turnout of youth voters also followed
this trend, with turnout from the 18-24 demographic falling from 60% to 39%
between the 1997 and 2001 general elections, with that number declining further to
reach 37% in 2005 (Pickard 2005). Inglehart & Norris (2016) argue that demographics
that display both a lack of knowledge around politics as well as a lack of interest in
engaging with it are more likely to identify with populist candidates. An example of
this can be seen in the support for Jeremy Corbyn. After the election of Corbyn as
Labour Party leader, support for the party rose from 198,000 in 2015 to 552,000 in
2018 (Audickas et al. 2018), with 60% of the youngest cohort of voters supporting the
48
Labour Party in 2017 (Henn and Sloam 2019). But in the run-up to the 2017 general
election, how did Corbyn manage to construct an image that appealed to youth
voters as well as engage them? This essay will explore the effect Corbyn’s campaign
strategy had on the political mobilisation of young people in relation to
postmaterialism, proximity, populism and social identity theory, with specific
reference to the Grime scene, examining key texts and relevant psychological theses
where appropriate.
Since the 1960s, the philosophy of postmaterialism has become more
widespread around Western culture, and postmaterialist notions of autonomy,
positive quality-of-life and self-expression have often been embraced and
encapsulated by young people who “strive for self-actualization, stress the aesthetic
and the intellectual, and cherish belonging and esteem” (Held et al 2009). According
to Inglehart’s thesis (1977), young people who grew up in times of strong economic
and physical stability, with greater educational prospects, are more likely to value
postmaterialist ideals and engage with non-institutionalised forms of politics.
Following this thesis, one would expect that against the backdrop of damaging
austerity measures, high levels of unemployment and the economic insecurity,
materialist ideals would become more prevalent in younger people. However, Grasso
(2014) found that the tendency for young people to lean towards more
postmaterialist ideals bases itself more around the cohort they are socialised with
and the degree of political uncertainty they encounter as opposed to the amount of
economic security they experience. Henn et al. (2018 p.716) agree, stating that
“contemporary austerity, therefore, may inspire young people to engage with
49
postmaterialist values, rather than prioritising material concerns as Inglehart’s thesis
would suggest.”. Applying these expansions to Inglehart’s thesis, one can see the
relevance of a political figure that simultaneously acknowledges and reciprocates
the postmaterialist values of the youth demographic and establishes trust and
meaningful engagement with that demographic whilst presenting a viable
alternative to the existent structures of government. Acknowledging this, Corbyn
utilised populist rhetoric to create a sense of proximity with those voters and
communicate to those with postmaterialist ideals.
It can be argued that in order to engage a voter with a political candidate, a
sense of proximity must be established. Lilleker (2014 p.100) states,
“If an individual feels close to an organisation or individual, that they represent
them in some way, or that they espouse similar values, then that individual
would logically be also more likely to offer them electoral support.”
Populist strategy is reliant on portraying a candidate as having a sense of proximity
with ordinary people and representing them in the political sphere to challenge an
elite group. Laclau (2005 p.117) agrees, stating that populist strategies rely on “the
construction of internal frontiers and the identification of an institutionalized 'other'”.
In this instance, strengthened by anti-austerity protests that had taken place before
his election as leader, Corbyn’s rhetoric took an anti-austerity, socialist stance. During
his first speech as elected Leader, Corbyn spoke of creating “a kinder politics, a more
caring society” leading “local and national campaigns against injustice and the
50
dreadful impact of Tory austerity”, and opposing “an economy that works for the few,
not for the many” (Corbyn 2015). Corbyn continued to espouse these values and
elaborate on them during nationwide rallies and speeches, utilising his platform to
discuss how “Trident must go. Quantitative Easing will fund a job creation scheme.
Industries will be renationalised.” (Richards 2016), and in so doing created a sense of
proximity with youth voters. Effectively, Corbyn linked the postmaterialist values,
beliefs and attitudes of the disengaged youth demographic with his own ideals and
aligned them with the political goal of beating the Conservative party in the general
election. In analysing youth participation and engagement with Corbyn’s politics in
relation to Inglehart’s thesis, it can be asserted that the attendance of
postmaterialist-leaning young people at Corbyn’s rallies and gatherings
predominantly relates to their likelihood to support non-governmental,
non-institutional forms of political action. Another example of which can be seen in
the grassroots organisation Momentum, which effectively targeted young people on
social media platforms and encouraged them to get involved with political activism
by utilising humour and simple language to convey easily digestible information,
and as such managed to organise
“citizens to undertake tasks typically associated with party political
campaigning, such as canvasing voters with a phone banking tool, supporting
voter registration efforts on social media, and distributing activists to marginal
constituencies.” (Dennis 2019)
51
Utilising postmaterialist language in speech is only effective if there is a
receptive audience however, and ingratiating oneself in that audience is key to
achieving that goal. In analysing how Corbyn achieved popularity with young,
disengaged demographics, it is important to analyse Social Identity theory in relation
to the Grime scene. Tajfel and Turner (2004) put forward the concept, positing that
the group one identifies with is a vital source of positivity, unity, pride and
self-esteem. Elaborating on this concept, Tajfel (1981 p.255) defines social identity as,
“that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his
knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the
value and emotional significance attached to that membership.”
Fundamentally, the theory lends itself to the notion that a group of people existing
as a collective, with a shared identifying trait (e.g, race, class, gender identification,
music taste or political allegiance) are able to relate to and engage with the social
sphere. A key element of social identity theory is the ability to distinguish between
in-groups and out-groups, with group-members drawing divisions between
themselves as a collective entity and the collective identity of out-groups. This
division introduces binary oppositions within the schemata of the collective and thus
the individual (e.g ‘us’ vs ‘them’,) Sen (2007 p. 21) agrees, stating “a strong—and
exclusive—sense of belonging to one group can in many cases carry with it the
perception of distance and divergence from other groups.”. Employing this definition
of social identity in relation to populism, if a populist candidate were to integrate
themselves as part of an in-group and build up a collective schema based around an
52
oppressive out-group, they can mobilise that in-group into taking political action. An
example of which can be seen in Jeremy Corbyn’s mobilisation of the Grime scene
and the working class subculture it represented.
In 1997, under the leadership of Tony Blair, the Labour party made a shift
towards the centre, introducing more neoliberal policies into its manifesto. Under
New Labour, a substantial portion of the working class were marginalised, with little
to no political representation and a sense of powerlessness, alienation and apathy
towards politics. Boswell et al. (2020 p.5) elaborate on this, stating “the alienation that
residents feel towards business and political elites, and their cosmopolitan values, is
seen as primarily a product of these economic circumstances.”. The Grime music
scene developed in the early 2000’s, shortly after Blair’s election, creating a sense of
social identity for those working-class subcultures; being created, enjoyed and
engaged with by those in-groups that had been the worst affected by the
exploitation and inequality caused by New Labour’s move towards neoliberalism, as
well as by the later austerity measures put in place by the Conservative government.
This was the group that Corbyn began to affiliate himself with, associating with
Grime artists such as Stormzy, Akala, JME, Novelist and AJ Tracey. By utilising social
media effectively, Corbyn was able to ingratiate himself as part of the Grime
‘in-group’. An example of this can be seen in the moments following rapper
Stormzy’s criticism of Conservative MP and London Mayor candidate Zac Goldsmith
in 2016, in which he tweeted “Beg no one vote for this Zac Goldsmith bruddah he
seems like a proper pussyhole”. Minutes later, Stormzy was followed on Twitter by
Jeremy Corbyn’s official account (Stormzy as cited by Wolfson 2016). Stormzy went on
to become an advocate for Corbyn’s politics, saying in an interview with the Guardian
53
“I feel like he gets what the ethnic minorities are going through and the homeless
and the working class.” (ibid.). Corbyn later presented Stormzy with the award for
best solo artist at the GQ Awards further cementing that connection. According to
NME (2016), during Owen Smith’s 2016 challenge to Corbyn’s leadership, artist
Novelist tweeted a screenshot of his newly obtained Labour Party membership,
writing “Been supporting but now it’s official”, later tweeting Corbyn himself, writing
“Do not resign. The mandem need you,” (Novelist, as cited ibid.), with rapper Akala
also pledging his support
“He isn’t all glitz and glamour – he’s willing to be different and we like that
about him. So what if he goes to his allotment and doesn’t dress like the other
politicians? We want someone who doesn’t pursue the traditional route!”
(Duggins 2017)
Building on this support, Corbyn was interviewed by rapper JME in May 2017,
in which he talked about the housing crisis, eradicating social cleansing, and
providing equality of opportunity (i-D 2017). The wave of support for Corbyn from the
Grime community was so great that on the day of the Labour Party manifesto
release, hashtag #Grime4Corbyn outperformed the official #labourmanifesto
hashtag (Maughan 2017). The backing of Corbyn by the Grime scene is relayed
succinctly by Charles (2018 p46) who writes that,
“The grime endorsement is led by those who are themselves marginalised, not
those who have had a degree of privilege and are now speaking out against
54
injustice on others’ behalf. As a result, those involved have a sense of political
agency that involves much more than the provision of a musical backdrop to
an election campaign.”
On the day of the 2017 general election, the Labour Party increased its
vote-share to 40%, gaining 30 seats (BBC 2017). Comparing Ipsos MORI data from
2015 and 2017, one can see an increase of voter support for the Labour Party in the
18-24, 25-34 and 35-44 demographics, increasing 19% from 43% to 62%, 20% from 36%
to 56% and 14% from 35% to 49% respectively, with an increase in all BME voter
turnout from 65% to 73% (Ipsos MORI 2015 and Ipsos MORI 2017). It is clear from these
election results that Corbyn successfully managed to integrate himself within the
Grime scene, communicating effectively with younger demographics who
developed mental networks of association that linked elements of their social
identity with his politics. It is evident that the Grime in-group saw Corbyn as
someone who simultaneously acknowledged and reciprocated their values, beliefs
and attitudes, established both trust and engagement, and appeared to present a
viable alternative to the government at the time. This populist approach combined
with his addressing of the issues these subcultures were facing as well as his calm,
empathetic manner of speech created an air of authenticity and understanding
about him that mobilised that demographic.
In analysing both Corbyn’s relationship with the Grime scene, as well as his
engagement with young voters as a wider entity, it is clear his affiliation with Grime
artists allowed him to integrate with the in-group of the Grime scene as a whole. This
55
integration allowed him to engage more with the surrounding subculture, who had
been more strongly affected by Labour’s move to the centre and the subsequent
austerity measures that took place. Corbyn created a sense of proximity with those
voters and mobilised them to partake in political discourse, to evident success. With
young apathetic voters as a broader group, Corbyn espoused postmaterialist values,
establishing himself as a relatable and understanding figure within the schema of
the younger, postmaterialist demographics as well as those subcultures. The Labour
campaign gave the underrepresented, disenfranchised youth a sense of hope and
excitement in the political system that they had never encountered and never
expected to encounter. Corbyn stood down as Labour leader on the 12th of
December 2019 after losing the election to the Conservative Party.
56
Bibliography
Boswell, J., Denham, J., Furlong, J., Killick, A., Ndugga, P., Rek, B., Ryan, M., and Shipp,
J., 2020. Place-based Politics and Nested Deprivation in the U.K.: Beyond
Cities-towns, “Two Englands” and the “Left Behind.” Representation [online], NA (NA),
5. Available from:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/00344893.2020.1751258? [Accessed
13 May 2021].
Charles, M., 2018. Grime Labour. Soundings [online], 68 (68), 40–52. Available from:
https://lwbooks.co.uk/product/grime-labour-soundings-68-spring-2018.
Corbyn, J., 2015. Leader’s Speech [online]. [online]. Transcript. Available from:
http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=359 [Accessed 5
May 2021].
Dennis, J., 2019. A party within a party posing as a movement? Momentum as a
movement faction. Journal of Information Technology & Politics [online], 17 (2), 100.
Available from:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/19331681.2019.1702608?needAccess=true
[Accessed 10 May 2021].
Duggins, A., 2017. #grime4Corbyn – why British MCs are uniting behind the Labour
leader. The Guardian [online], May 17, 2017. Available from:
57
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/may/17/grime4corbyn-why-british-mcs-ar
e-uniting-behind-the-labour-leader [Accessed 13 May 2021].
Grasso, M. T., 2014. Age, period and cohort analysis in a comparative context: Political
generations and political participation repertoires in Western Europe. Electoral
Studies, 33 (NA), 63–76.
Held, M., Müller, J., and University, J., 2009. Value Structure and Dimensions Empirical
Evidence from the German World Values Survey. World Values Research [online], 2
(3), 57. Available from: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2393891
[Accessed 12 May 2021].
Henn, M., Oldfield, B., and Hart, J., 2018. Postmaterialism and young people’s political
participation in a time of austerity. The British Journal of Sociology, 69 (3), 716.
Henn, M. and Sloam, J., 2019. Young cosmopolitans and the deepening of the
intergenerational divide following the 2019 general election [online]. British Politics
and Policy at LSE. Available from:
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/young-cosmopolitans-and-ge2019/ [Accessed
6 May 2021].
i-D, 2017. When JME Met Jeremy Corbyn. YouTube [online]. YouTube Video. Available
from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A-rxp_QwjmQ [Accessed 13 May 2021].
Inglehart, R., 1977. The silent revolution : changing values and political styles among
western publics. 1st ed. Princeton (N.J.): Princeton University Press.
58
Inglehart, R. and Norris, P., 2016. Trump, brexit, and the rise of populism: Economic
have-nots and cultural backlash. SSRN Electronic Journal [online], 15 (2), 1–52.
Available from: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2818659
Ipsos MORI, 2015. How Britain voted in 2015 [online]. Ipsos MORI. Available from:
https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/how-britain-voted-2015 [Accessed 13 May
2021].
Ipsos MORI, 2017. How Britain voted in the 2017 election [online]. Ipsos MORI.
Available from:
https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/how-britain-voted-2017-election [Accessed
13 May 2021].
Laclau, E., 2005. On populist reason. 1st ed. London ; New York: Verso.
Lilleker, D. G., 2014. Political communication and cognition. 1st ed. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Livingstone, S. and Markham, T., 2008. The contribution of media consumption to
civic participation. The British Journal of Sociology, 59 (2), 352.
Mardle, G. and Taylor, M., 1987. Political Knowledge and Political Ignorance: a
re-examination. The Political Quarterly, 58 (2), 208–216.
59
Maughan, P., 2017. How grime music fell in love with Jeremy Corbyn [online].
www.newstatesman.com. Available from:
https://www.newstatesman.com/culture/music-theatre/2017/08/how-grime-music-fel
l-love-jeremy-corbyn [Accessed 13 May 2021].
NME News Desk, 2016. Novelist joins Labour Party, backs Jeremy Corbyn [online].
NME. Available from: https://www.nme.com/news/music/novelist-1195229 [Accessed 12
May 2021].
Pickard, S., 2005. What’s the Point? The Youth Vote in the 2005 General Election.
Essay. N [online]. Université de la Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris 3. Available from:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/284030459_What’s_the_Point_The_Youth_
Vote_in_the_2005_General_Election [Accessed 14 May 2021].
Richards, S., 2016. Leadership, Loyalty and the Rise of Jeremy Corbyn. The Political
Quarterly, 87 (1), 15.
Roberts, H. and Darshan Sachdev, 1996. Young people’s social attitudes : having their
say : the views of 12-19 year olds. Ilford, Essex: Barnardos.
Sen, K. 2007. Identity and violence : the illusion of destiny. 1st ed. London: Penguin.
BBC, 2017. Results of the 2017 General Election [online]. BBC News. Available from:
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2017/results [Accessed 12 May 2021].
60
Sloam, J. and Henn, M., 2019. Youthquake 2017 : the rise of young cosmopolitans in
Britain. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
Tajfel, H., 1981. Human groups and social categories : studies in social psychology.
Studies in Social Psychology, NA (NA), 255.
Tajfel, H. and Turner, J., 2004. An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict. In: Hatch,
M. J. and Schultz, M., eds. Organizational Identity: A Reader [online]. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 56–65. Available from:
https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=l2R7DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA56&o
ts=AA-s7LmUKH&sig=Pp3OrkZB81Tmzp19F4hFKAXnzlY&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f
=false [Accessed 12 May 2021].
UK Parliament, 2016. General election turnout [online]. UK Parliament. Available from:
https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/electionsvoting
/chartists/contemporarycontext/electionturnout/ [Accessed 5 May 2021].
Wolfson, S., 2016. Stormzy: “My man Jeremy Corbyn! I dig what he says.” The Guardian
[online], May 21, 2016. Available from:
https://www.theguardian.com/music/2016/may/21/stormzy-grime-skepta-kanye-drake
.
61
Streamline Politics: Challenging the Inequalities and Exploitations of
Neoliberalism
Callum Blades
62
1.0: Introduction
Neoliberalism as a capitalist structure bases itself upon a self-regulating
free market that relates “all facets of human life to capitalist cost-benefit
analysis as a mechanism for creating social wellbeing.” (Barrios, 2017, p. 8).
Attempts to limit or control the market are considered inimical to civil
liberties. As such, those who support neoliberalism conventionally disagree
with government regulation and higher taxes, as well as anything that
imposes restrictions on the free market. As such, the ideology has been the
subject of considerable scrutiny, with criticism being directed towards the rise
of exploitation and inequality, with a case being presented that it has
assigned non-negotiable limits to representative democracy. (Dardot & Laval,
2019).
Neoliberal ideology was introduced into British politics in 1979, and
became the dominant economic framework within the United Kingdom.
Fraser (2017) states that upon its introduction, the left narrative failed to
demonstrate “a fulsome critique of financialization, on the one hand, and with
an anti-racist, anti-sexist and anti-hierarchical vision of emancipation, on the
other.”. In coming to power in 1997, New Labour policies embraced the
63
principles of neoliberalism now firmly established in British political discourse.
In so doing, the conventionally left-wing party moved its policies nearer to the
centre, leaving a sizable amount of the working class feeling as if they lacked
political representation, or ‘left-behind’.
It may be logical at this point to expect those on the left to have a
stronger inclination toward anti-neoliberal ideology, with the inverse being
true of the right, however, one can look at the 2016 referendum on European
Union membership to challenge this notion. With a 48%-52% split between
remaining in the largest global neoliberal bloc and departing from it, the vote
surpassed traditional party lines, resulting in the simple left-right boundaries
growing increasingly blurred. Subsequently, the United Kingdom saw
working-class support for the Conservative party increase based largely on
after their “Get Brexit Done” campaign, a distinctly anti-neoliberal action that
would conventionally not be expected of a party on the right. This increase in
political divergence has led to conflict based less on the relationships
between capital and labour and more on that of culture and identity
(Wheatley, 2019), with less trust being placed in institutions of authority, such
as those of political, academic or scientific specialisms. Bearing these factors
in mind, it is clear that amendments to the current neoliberal structure are
necessary in order to accommodate those ‘left behind’ members of the
64
working class as well as represent those of scientific and academic
backgrounds, creating a sense of unity between these social groups.
2.0: Background, Context and Theory
2.1: The Background and Context of Streamline Politics
A commonly accepted definition of the ‘left behind’ is that of “older,
working-class, white voters who lack the educational qualifications, incomes
and skills that are needed to adapt and thrive amid a modern post-industrial
economy.” (Ford and Goodwin, 2014.) However, critiques of this definition
acknowledge key voices being silenced in Black, Asian and Middle Eastern
communities, with Rhodes et al. (2019, p.56) stating that,
“What these erasures often overlook is the way in which Black and
minority ethnic communities have been disproportionately impacted
by the loss of work, rising inequalities, and the persistence of racism and
exclusionary visions of place, community and nation.”
Going forward, the “left-behind” will be defined as voters of working-class
backgrounds without the necessary education, income or skills required to
thrive within the current framework of neoliberal globalisation. When utilising
65
this definition, it becomes clear that relevant representation of this portion of
the British public is key in creating a functional society that serves to benefit
its population.
Due to the plurality of social groups within modern society, aiming to
mobilise solely the socioeconomic working class to achieve change is likely to
fail, whereas movements that unify multiple social groups do so by
constructing a common story that unites these groups and sets goals for
them to achieve, that does justice to and respects their internal diversity
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). Hence the aim to represent those subjected to the
inequalities and exploitation involved in the neoliberal framework, as well as
those of scientific backgrounds by creating and maintaining a unifying space
for productive communication and community-building between social
groups that respects the beliefs and attitudes of each group contained within
the movement, creating unity without uniformity.
2.2: The Relevance of Streamline Politics
Streamline Politics is a new political movement that aims at addressing
and challenging the exploitative and unequal elements of neoliberal
globalisation via simple communication, education, and representation of
cognitive misers, with a basis on creating unified social movements that
integrate various social groups with a joint objective.
66
The means in which the movement aims to achieve this objective is by
breaking it down into smaller, more manageable campaigns, designed to
communicate political, economic and scientific ideas in order to guide
potential supporters down the marketing funnel, from brand awareness
through to conversion, with the goal of advocacy. (see Fig. 1)
Figure 1: “Marketing Funnel” (Pioneer Creative Marketing, 2020)
With the movement in its infancy, the most efficient use of time and
resources would be to create and strategise a campaign aiming to raise brand
awareness of Streamline Politics and its ambitions, with the objective of this
campaign being to highlight the necessity of a need for a system of
government aligned with the principles outlined, that more accurately
represents the needs and interests of the ‘left-behind’, hence the introduction
of the ‘Fresh Politics’ campaign.
67
3.0: The Campaign: Fresh Politics
3.1: Brand Equity
As marketing develops, evolves and fluctuates, as does the definition of
a brand, and an up-to-date, accurate definition can often be hard to pinpoint.
However Duffy (2021, p.xxiv) defines a brand as “a trademark – a name and/or
symbol (typically presented with a specific design treatment, phrase or
combination of these) in which an organization invests to differentiate its
products or organization from others in the same category”.
By utilising Sinek’s model of the ‘Golden Circle’ (Sinek, 2013) (Fig. 2), the
Fresh Politics campaign can be examined in further depth in relation to the
“Why”, “How”, and “What” of the brand, placing the “Why” at the core and
working outwards.
68
Figure 2: “Sinek’s Golden Circle”
3.2: Branding
Branding is defined by Healey as the “attributes of a product that make
a lasting impression in a customer’s mind” (2010, p.6). Allen, (2021) agrees,
stating that a brand is a “combination of physical attributes that deliberately
creates a certain image of the company within a customer’s mind”. Ergo, the
attributes that make up the branding of Streamline Politics have been
designed with heavy consideration lent to the values acknowledged in
section 2.2 (see Fig. 3), with varying slogans depending on the targeted
audience (see Section 4.2). As such, the branding of the Fresh Politics
campaign has been designed utilising light grey and white to demonstrate
intellect,compromise and diplomacy (Smith, 2021) as well as avoid
connotations with any specific political party. This branding is reinforced with
minimalist imagery and adapted to accommodate for the dimensions and
capacities of other online spaces.
69
Figure 3: Streamline Politics Logo
4.0: Objectives & Goals of Streamline Politics’ “Fresh Politics Campaign”
4.1: Specific Objectives & Goals of the Fresh Politics Campaign
70
The primary objective of the Fresh Politics campaign is rooted around
the notion of the effective, concise communication of political ideas about the
means in which government should be managed, and the steps that can be
taken by the public to push for this to happen. Owing to the fact that
“speaking to low involvement citizens necessitates reliance upon visual and
textual rhetoric, symbolism and simple messages.” (Lilleker, 2014), peripheral
cues will be utilised to target the politically apathetic cognitive misers by
appealing to the peripheral processing that will be taking place within their
schema. As such, the campaign will base itself at the top of the marketing
funnel at brand awareness level. The campaign strategy will be weighted
heavily in digital marketing as opposed to more physical procedures, and will
be planned for launch in June 2021. Outlined below are micro and macro
objectives for the campaign:
Micro-objectives:
Successfully communicate with cognitive misers both organically
and inorganically.
Create a community based around the notions of representation
of the ‘left-behind’ in politics.
Create a community based around the notions of representation
of the scientific community in politics.
Establish links between different online spaces and mediums.
71
Macro-objectives:
Create a community based around the notions of accountability,
clarity and representation in politics.
Engage cognitive misers in political discussion and consideration.
Push targeted audiences down the marketing funnel - from
Awareness to Conversion.
In relation to the above micro and macro objectives, the means in which
success will be gauged will be in line with the Key Performance Indicators
outlined in section 6.0.
4.2: Target Audiences
When acknowledging the specific context of the Fresh Politics
campaign and its goal of engaging and representing politically apathetic
cognitive misers in political activity, the targeted political advertising for the
Fresh Politics campaign will be aimed more specifically on the education,
employment, interests, jobs, and recent life events of both our target
audience and a lookalike audience. It will simultaneously ensure relevance to
the objective of brand awareness at all times. Slogans for each targeted
audience will vary based on that audience. In targeting the ‘left behind’
72
groups, the slogan “Want politicians that actually care?” will be used to
convey a direct challenge to the current system of government. In targeting
those from academic and scientific backgrounds, the slogan “Want
evidence-based politics?” will be used to convey a form of governing that
utilises hard facts and proper scientific approaches. As a general slogan that
captures both social groups “The Power of People” will be used to convey a
sense of unity, this is elaborated on in Section 5.1.1. That being the case,
examples of two ads from the Facebook campaign are laid out in Appendix 1.
5.0: Communication
5.1: Social media strategy
A global village, defined as world interconnectivity brought about by
electronic communications (McLuhan, 1964), will be required in order to
create a unifying long term collective group of engaged supporters, and as
such, the social strategy has been developed with this notion taking
precedence. This strategy will aim to raise awareness of the inclusive,
educational aspects of the Fresh Politics campaign and the benefits that can
be provided. Acknowledging the strengths and limitations of each social
platform (See Fig. 4) the strategy for each platform will balance
self-promotional content and value-adding content (content that doesn’t
73
directly promote a product or company, rather a topic of entertaining
relevance that aligns with the brand values) at a ratio of 70/30 in favour of
self-promotional content. When crafting this content, specific attention will
be paid to communicating the ideas laid out previously by Sinek, as well as
the below three points of focus:
1) Who Streamline Politics are.
2) What Streamline Politics do.
3) Why Streamline Politics matters.
This content will be scheduled in the morning, lunchtime and evenings
initially, but with amendments made in accordance with the analyses of
relevant Key Performance Indicators.
74
Figure 4: Social media capabilities.
5.1.1: Facebook strategy
Facebook will be utilised to market both organically and inorganically
towards cognitive misers, with a mix of humorous and educational content
targeted at politically apathetic cognitive misers, as well as ‘lookalike’
audiences based upon these users, aiming for between 1,000 to 50,000
people, with A-B testing assessing the most efficient advertising methods.
Taking this 70/30 split into consideration, a month-long organic content plan
has been devised with humorous, educational and informative content being
75
posted three times a week (see Appendix 2) Additionally, attention will be
paid to the Facebook page itself, which has been designed specifically to
reinforce the brand values by utilising the cover art, profile photo, and
description to provide clarity,tone and necessary information (see Appendix
3).
The success of this organic content will be analysed by measuring
Growth Rate,Engagement,Post Interaction and Reach, whilst the
effectiveness of the ad campaigns will be analysed by observing the
ad-specific objectives (a web-traffic ad would be measured by the
click-through-rate, and an impressions ad via the cost-per-click.)
5.1.2: Twitter strategy
The Fresh Politics Twitter strategy will bear semblance to the strategy
for Facebook in terms of the nature of content being shared, however, it will
not feature inorganic advertising. Due to the ‘immediate’ nature of Twitter,
the frequency of posts will be substantially greater than the frequency of
posts on Facebook, with Twitter aiming for three posts a day compared to
Facebook’s three a week, whilst maintaining the same 70/30 split. In addition
to this, Twitter allows for easier interaction between pages and thus better
organic business-to-customer reach, due to the lack of differentiation
76
between a business page and a personal page. As such, engagement,
commentary, and insight into political events can be provided and
conversations and discussions generated as a result. While it is more difficult
to convert these engagements into meaningful follows or repeat interactions,
provided the ideas expressed in these engagements relate directly back to
the brand values, this method of organic interaction would be beneficial for
establishing the movement as a hub of discussion, an insightful source of
credible information and a means in which to increase engagement with
cognitive misers.
An effective means in which to do this would be to utilise Tweetdeck to
locate keywords that fit the outline established in section 4.2, as well as filter
by location (see Appendix 4.) As such, the Twitter page design will follow a
brand tone consistent with other social media channels (see Appendix 5), as
will the colour and tone used within the content plan (see Appendix 6).
5.1.3: Instagram strategy
The Instagram strategy will follow a blend of the former two strategies -
employing the inorganic ad strategy utilised on Facebook, as well as the
engagement-based strategy used on Twitter. Due to the prevalence of
hashtags on Instagram, there is opportunity for interaction between relevant
77
accounts, posting high-quality content three times a week (see Appendix 7),
utilising Stories, as well as undertaking hashtag research.
In terms of content posted, whilst website links cannot be added to
Instagram posts, utilising Linktree, the campaign will link to the Streamline
Politics website, other social media, and relevant blog posts. Additionally, blog
content will be uploaded to the Instagram page in a carousel format, with
further detail in the description of the post. The content will conform to a grid
aesthetic based on the colour scheme of the Streamline Politics brand, with
content alternating between light grey graphic, photo/meme and a graphic in
line.
The inorganic ad strategy will utilise still images, video and carousel ads
that address political cognitive misers utilising humour, information and soft
calls-to-action as a means of relating and engaging with the peripheral
processing taking place within the schema of the targeted audience, with the
ultimate goal of encouraging page visits, page follows, post likes and
engagement as well as website traffic.
5.2: Website
The website will act as a keystone that the social media channels link
back to and as such, must be constructed in a way that reflects brand values
78
and tone as well as the ‘straight-forward’ nature of the movement, conveying
information in a less formal tone. As an example, the ‘About’ page will be
titled ‘What we’re all about’, and the ‘Policies’ page will be titled ‘What we
stand for’. The colour scheme and style of the website will be in-keeping with
the outline of the style guide (See Appendix 8) Additionally, a Facebook pixel
will be utilised on the Streamline politics website. Defined by Facebook (2021)
as,
“A few lines of code from Facebook that you copy into the header
section of your website. This code allows the pixel to receive information
about the actions taken on your site to make your Facebook ads more
relevant to your audience.”
This code will allow the Fresh Politics campaign to share content from the
Streamline Politics website on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram, and then
retarget those who accessed that content with Facebook and Instagram ads,
creating a strong link between all three social media sites.
6.0: Gauging Success
In order to gauge the success of the campaign objectives and the
efficiency of the social media campaigns, Key Performance Indicators (KPI’s)
79
need to be established. KPI’s can vary based on what is deemed most
appropriate by the campaign manager, with some opting to note the digital
impact of the brand in relation to impressions, engagements and
click-through-rates, while “other authors examine the outcomes of
communication on social media on consumers’ offline behavior, sales, or
returns on investment” (Gräve, 2019). Despite this, one can assert that within
the realm of peripheral processing, the former is more pertinent, as the goal
of the campaign is to increase knowledge of the Fresh Politics campaign and
the Streamline Politics movement. With these ideas taken into consideration,
the KPI’s to be measured are:
Twitter:
-Impressions
-Engagement
-Website clicks
-Follower count
Facebook:
-Growth Rate,
-Engagement,
-Post Interaction
-Reach
Facebook and Instagram Ads:
-Traffic gained to website (via Facebook Pixel)
-Return on Investment (ROI)
-Quantity of desired outcome (Likes, engagement, views
etc.)
Instagram:
-Likes
-Profile visits
-Page followers
80
-Website clicks
An important element to acknowledge within this context is the fluid
nature of KPI’s. Social media marketing is an evolving process, and with that
comes the evolution of social media strategy and content. If one aspect fails
to produce the desired results, it must be rectified, re-imagined or removed
entirely, and ones KPI’s should reflect that. Schatzki (2005, pp.475-476) agrees,
stating KPI’s must “evolve as circumstances change, opportunities and
problems arise, personnel change, new ideas arise, and so on”. As such, the
re-evaluation of KPI’s needs to take place periodically, in order to maintain the
effectiveness of the campaign.
7.0: Conclusion
Utilising the above strategies and techniques, the campaign would
significantly increase the online awareness of the Streamline Politics
movement. Additionally, this campaign would contribute greatly to the
bolstering of the organisation's SEO, creating as it would a substantial
increase in online presence due to the constant, engaging activity taking
place on social media, this connectivity combined with the high quality
content being distributed, as well as the ‘global village’ built around
Streamline Politics, utilising targeted advertising and multi-platform sharing,
81
will create a strong, tightly knitted community of people desiring social
change in relation to the principles outlined.
It is clear that by utilising social media to raise awareness of the
limitations and exploitations of neoliberalism, as well as to convey information
to political cognitive misers as to how politics can work to their advantage,
one can put forward a strong case for a movement aimed at amending the
existing neoliberal framework. As time progresses and the Streamline Politics
movement looks to the future, it would be valuable to expand the social
media strategy to incorporate consideration and conversion in addition to
continuing the awareness strategy. After these KPI’s are met, a valuable
progression would be develop explanatory video essays for YouTube,
promotional videos, photography of real people for use on social media,
collaborating with relevant YouTube commentators (incorporating elements
of thought-leadership into the movement), marketing business-to-business
via LinkedIn, developing podcast material, and writing articles. Effectively
Streamline Politics would start to cement itself as not just a movement for
change, but a movement with credible, clear, insight into the political
landscape with specific achievable goals designed to amend the neoliberal
framework by unifying and mobilising different social groups that have been
affected by neoliberalism with the goal of real, powerful change.
82
Reference List
Allen, E., 2021. The Psychology of Design. Zoom conference.
Barrios, R. E., 2017. Governing affect : neoliberalism and disaster
reconstruction. 1st ed. Lincoln: University Of Nebraska Press.
Dardot, P. and Laval, C., 2019. Never ending nightmare : the neoliberal assault
on democracy. London ; New York Verso.
Duffy, S., 2021. INTERNATIONAL BRAND STRATEGY : a guide to achieving
global brand growth. S.L.: Kogan Page.
Facebook, 2021. Facebook Pixel Overview: Understanding How It Works &
What It Can Do [online]. Facebook for Business. Available from:
https://www.facebook.com/business/learn/lessons/overview-of-how-face
book-pixels-work [Accessed 20 Apr 2021].
Ford, R. and Goodwin, M., 2014. Understanding UKIP: Identity, Social Change
and the Left Behind. The Political Quarterly [online], 85 (3), 278.
Available from:
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-923X.12099 [Accessed
30 Apr 2021].
83
Fraser, N., 2017. Progressive neoliberalism versus reactionary populism: a
Hobson’s choice. Downloaded The Great Regression, 1 (1), 49.
Gräve, J.-F., 2019. What KPIs Are Key? Evaluating Performance Metrics for
Social Media Influencers. Social Media + Society [online], 5 (3),
205630511986547. Available from:
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2056305119865475
[Accessed 11 May 2021].
Healey, M., 2010. What is branding? . Mies ; Hove: Rotovision.
Kevin Lane Keller, 2001. Building customer-based brand equity : a blueprint
for creating strong brands. 1st ed. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MSI.
Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C., 1985. Hegemony and socialist strategy : towards a
radical democratic politics. London: Verso.
Lilleker, D. G., 2014. Political communication and cognition. 1st ed.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mcluhan, M., 1989. The global village : transformations in world life and media
in the 21st century. New York: Oxford University Press.
Pioneer Creative Marketing, 2020. Marketing Funnel [online].
pioneercreativemarketing.com. Available from:
https://pioneercreativemarketing.com/2020/12/14/5-really-useful-social-
media-tools/ [Accessed 29 Mar 2021].
84
Rhodes, J., Ashe, S., and Valluvan, S., 2019. Reframing the “Left Behind”: Race
and Class in Post-Brexit Oldham. Manchester: University of Manchester.
Schatzki, T. R., 2005. Peripheral Vision. Organization Studies [online], 26 (3),
475–476. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0170840605050876
[Accessed 26 Apr 2021].
Sinek, S., 2013. Start with Why: How Great Leaders Inspire Everyone to Take
Action. 2nd ed. London: Portfolio/Penguin.
Smith, K., 2021. Meaning Of Gray: Color Psychology And Symbolism [online].
https://www.sensationalcolor.com/. Available from:
https://www.sensationalcolor.com/meaning-of-gray/#:~:text=Symbolism
%20And%20Meaning%20Of%20Gray [Accessed 26 Apr 2021].
Wheatley, J., 2019. The changing shape of politics : rethinking left and right in
a new Britain. Oxford, UK: Cham, Switzerland Palgrave Macmillan.
85
Appendix 1: Facebook Ad Examples.
86
Appendix 2: Facebook content plan
87
Appendix 3: Facebook Page Design
88
Appendix 4: Tweetdeck search example
89
Appendix 5: Twitter Page Design
90
Appendix 6: Twitter Content Plan
91
92
Appendix 7: Instagram Content Plan
93
Appendix 8: Website Layout
94
95
Trump, the symptom, lack and the fantasy
Callum Blades
Donald Trump’s election to the United States presidency has been no doubt
one of the most defining moments in recent political history, and has been
the subject of considerable scrutiny and analysis from a plethora of political
and academic sources. Described as “the most shocking election upset in
American history” (Ferguson et al. 2018, p1) and an “American Tragedy”
(Remnick, 2016). The aggressive, polarising and often offensive means in
which Trump used his platform to express the sentiment that America was in
a state of disrepair evidently resonated with a considerable portion of the
American population. But how did Trump’s nationalist rhetoric manage to
propel him to the office of the White House? What was his appeal to the
American population? In order to understand this, one must make a return to
Jacques Lacan. In understanding Lacanian psychoanalytic theory in relation
to fantasmatic narratives, the notion of the symptom and the concept of Lack,
one can explain succinctly the nature of Trump’s appeal to the American
schema. As such, Lacan’s work shall be analysed, as well as developments
made by Yannis Stavrakakis and Slavoj Zizek in relation to Donald Trump,
alongside an analysis of Trump’s inauguration speech on January 20th 2017, a
speech described as “pure populist” (Reston 2017) and “a victory for
96
right-wing populism” (Pei 2017, p598) . A full transcript of which is attached in
Appendix 1. In understanding this, one can better assess the appeal of
right-wing populism with greater depth, as well as be cognizant of the mood
of the American right wing. With this, one can answer the vital question of
Donald Trump’s appeal to the American population and the means in which
it manifested in the American psyche.
The first element of Lacanian psychoanalysis to be discussed is the concept of
lack. Within humanity, there is a constant search for meaning and identity; a
desire for meaning. Lacan discusses this desire in terms of lack. Defined by
Ruti (2008, p487) as “the relentless sense of incompleteness that
characterizes human existence—as the melancholy underside of social
subjectivity”, lack is a core part of the formation of human identity. Effectively,
this desire causes constant identificatory processes to take place in relation to
that which exists in the symbolic order, attempting to find meaning and
identity in life, whether that is in the context of consumerism, politics, music
and so on. Lacan described the manifestation of the necessity to fulfil lack as
being characterised by the objet petit a; the object-cause of desire. One of the
key elements of the objet petit a lies in the fact that it exists as an expression
of lack, the incompleteness of human existence and desire for meaning in
early humans creates a need for fulfilment in later life. McGowan (2016, p21)
ties this to capitalism, stating that “the producer must produce more in order
97
to earn more money, the distributor must distribute more in order to
maximize profit, and the consumer must consume more in order to find the
truly satisfying object.”
In understanding this in relation to Trump’s political terminology, one can
analyse his catchphrases “Lock her up!” in regards to Hillary Clinton as
emblematic of this. The assumption being that in Hillary Clinton’s arrest,
America will return to an imagined sense of fullness and everything will be
fine once more. However, when this doesn’t take place, a further objet petit a
is pursued. One can analyse Trump’s other catchphrases “Drain the swamp!”
and “Build that wall!” in this light; if these desires are accomplished,
individuals will move to the next one and the next one, because they don’t
wish to face the reality that the fantasy is never fulfilled (Zizek, 1989). As such,
a further object cause of desire must be diagnosed in order to sustain the
fantasmatic narrative. Owing to the fact that lack is conducive to the
maintenance of fantasy, a further examination of fantasy itself must take
place. How does it manifest and how can this be observed in society?
Fantasy, in Lacanian terms (1991) was seen as a reworking of one’s perception
of events to suit the desires of the ego. Characterised by the aforementioned
lack, the fantasy enables the ego to attempt to reconstitute its identity,
serving as an underlying component of public perceptions of social and
98
political reality, that is seen as simultaneously unacknowledged yet serves as
“a screen protecting against the intrusion of the real” (Zizek 2009, p81),
McGowan (2016, p64) agress, stating,
“Our desire moves metonymically from object to object without ever
successfully obtaining satisfaction in the object that it seeks. Each time that I
obtain an object of desire, I quickly find this object dissatisfying and move on
to another object”.
These fantasmatic elements are pivotal to understanding the schema of the
American population in relation to their perceived perception of political
reality. Trump was able to convey American exceptionalism to the population
via the utilisation of terms such as “Make America Great Again”, creating the
image within the schema of the population that the American fantasmatic
narrative is compromised and America is in a state of disrepair, conveying the
notion that whatever is responsible for this (the objet petit a) shall be
overcome by his election to the presidency, thus restoring the fantasy of
America. Hence why fantasy is vital, as it provides a sense of resolution to lack.
Stavrakakis (2007, p197) agrees, writing that “fantasy promises a harmonious
resolution of social antagonism, a covering over of lack”.
99
The notion of the fantasy is incomplete however, as the nature and role of the
fantasmatic narrative is exactly that; a construction designed to avoid
confronting the real. Owing to this, the fantasy can never be perfect, the objet
petit a can never be enough. One moves from one object of desire to another.
From “Lock Her Up!” to “Drain the Swamp!”. This is summarised succinctly by
Homer (2005, p87), who states that
“We are always searching for fulfilment, for knowledge, for possessions, for
love, and whenever we achieve these goals there is always something more
we desire; we cannot quite pinpoint it but we know that it is there.”
Due to this, a symptom must be located. The function of which is to exist as
the receptacle for the negative elements of the fantasy to be projected in
order to sustain it. Owing to this, the symptom exists as an object petit a of
the fantasy; as something that cannot be overcome, rather upon the point of
its overcoming, it is manifested in another form. As such, “the symptom is not
a coincidental appearance but a constitutive element of the universal
socio-political order, as it points to the element which enables the existence
of the order”. (Zevnik 2017, p218).
In a political sense, within the rhetoric of a fascistic leader, the symptom
responsible for one's lack of enjoyment is conventionally characterised by the
100
projection of the failures of capitalism onto the Other. Zizek (1990, p60) uses
the example of the Jew, stating that
“since the excess was introduced from outside—the work of an alien
intruder—its elimination would enable us to obtain once again a stable social
organism whose parts form a harmonious corporate body, where, in contrast
to capitalism’s constant social displacement, everybody would again occupy
their own place”.
One can observe the relevance of all of these principles when analysing the
rhetoric of Donald Trump and its appeal to the American working-class
population. One can identify the allure of the phrase “Make America Great
Again” as it pertains to the simultaneous existence of lack; ‘America is not
great’, the objet petit a; ‘vote for me and it will be’. and the fantasy ‘and your
fantasy of America will be complete and your identity restored’. As such, one
can understand these concepts further by analysing Trump’s inaugural
speech made on the 20th of January 2017 and explore these notions in a
more in-depth and comprehensive manner.
In analysing Trump’s inauguration speech, see Appendix 1, one can notice
these concepts in action within political reality. In the initial instance, the
fantasmatic narrative becomes clear. In stating that Americans “are now
101
joined in a great national effort to rebuild our country and restore its
promise”, Trump invokes the fantasy of American exceptionalism, the promise
in this instance that America is currently existing in a state of decay and not
living up to the American dream. Trump sparks the notion that there is a lack
of power and democratic control within America, and as such, begins to
reference factories as a signifier, with the signified being the notion that
manufacturing in America has fallen by the wayside, he states that
“politicians prospered, but the jobs left and the factories closed.” Owing to
this, Trump points to politicians as responsible, causing the subject to believe
Trump’s election will reacquire power from them and restore lack, leading to a
fantasmatic narrative of fullness. This is supported by Laclau (1996, p54) as
quoted in Stavrakakis (2007, pp75) “Politics comprise all our attempts to fill in
this lack in the Other: ‘although the fullness and universality of society is
unachievable, its need does not disappear: it will always show itself through
the presence of its absence”.
Subsequently, Trump paints the fantasy of America as an apocalyptic
wasteland, lending further support to his idea that one should “Make America
Great Again”. He describes America as having,
“Mothers and children trapped in poverty in our inner cities, rusted out
factories, scattered like tombstones across the landscape of our nation, an
102
education system flush with cash, but which leaves our young and beautiful
students deprived of all knowledge, and the crime, and the gangs, and the
drugs that have stolen too many lives and robbed our country of so much
unrealized potential.”
Within this, all three elements of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory are drawn
upon. Trump, having established this fantasy of a broken America, identifies a
handful of symptoms, suggesting that mothers are poor, manufacturing is
dead, academia is corrupt, younger generations aren’t intelligent and there is
an increase of crime. The justice he perceives, and the American population
perceive in their fantasy of America is not being met; these elements are
lacking and, upon his election, the perceived symptoms will be abolished and
the fullness of the fantasy of America will be restored. Within Trump’s rhetoric,
these causes are not seen to be capitalism (Zizek 1990), rather the failures of
the Other, conventionally viewed to be people of Black, Asian and minority
ethnic backgrounds, according to Inwood (2019, p592) at one of his rallies,
Trump stated that “this was going to be the last election when (white) voters
would genuinely be able to decide the outcome because so many minority
groups were coming across to the United States”. As such, this rhetoric in the
inauguration speech, may seem acceptable in tone, but alludes to fascistic
rhetoric and thus encourages the fascistic prejudices of his supporters. This is
developed by Vadolas (2009, p190) who relates to Nazism, stating that,
103
“Nazism emerged as a violent challenge to the Other…The victorious
ascendance of Nazism to power was an indication that the fascist fantasy
seized the desire of the German people, whether voluntarily or against their
will.”
This bleak picture is reinforced further, as Trump identifies lack in more
nationalistic rhetoric, stating that,
“We've defended other nation's borders while refusing to defend our own.
And spent trillions and trillions of dollars overseas, while America's
infrastructure has fallen into disrepair and decay.”
This rhetoric allows more and more room for desire in the mindsets of those
who believe it. In understanding that their fantasy of America as the greatest
country in the world is being contradicted by being described as something
that juxtaposes that fantasy, the fear of the symptom is increased, and the
faith in the leader is stronger (Glynos & Stavrakakis 2008, p258). Upon
establishing this current fantasmatic narrative, Trump reminds the viewer
that he will start afresh, he will rebuild and reconstruct the issues he has
described via further nationalist rhetoric, stating that,
104
“We assembled here today our issuing a new decree to be heard in every city,
in every foreign capital, and in every hall of power, from this day forward: a
new vision will govern our land, from this day forward, it's going to be only
America first. America first.”
Trump’s solution to the aforementioned issues, in order to rebuild the fantasy
of American exceptionalism is nationalism. He causes anxiety by identifying
symptoms that then can be solved by “putting America first” (Trump 2020).
McMillan (2017, p210) agrees, stating “Trump’s idiosyncratic hijacking of the
fantasmatic logic of American exceptionalism underpinned his
populist–nationalist campaign”. This notion is built on by Hirvonen (2017, p21)
who states that
“The only thing we have to do is to take enjoyment back from those who have
stolen it from us. Therefore, we invent those others as the objects of fear at
the fantasy level. The object that provokes nervousness or anxiety cannot be
located, but one eagerly seeks some object to reach the order of fear.”
In order to reinforce his view of nationalistic solutions to the symptom, Trump
continues to identify various nationalist solutions to problems inflicted by
capitalism and target them at the Other.. For example, “America will start
winning again, winning like never before”, “We will bring back our borders”,
105
“rebuilding our country with American hands and American labor”, and “buy
American, and hire American”. These nationalist tendencies provide a solution
to the perceived issue of the broken American fantasy and set Donald Trump
up as the arbiter, resolving these issues by promoting nationalism. This
tendency to exacerbate faults of capitalism via Othering is discussed further
by Zizek (1990, p57) who elaborates that,
“The fascinating image of the Other personifies our own innermost
split—what is already ‘in us more than ourselves’—and thus prevents us from
achieving full identity with ourselves. The hatred of the Other is the hatred of
our own excess of enjoyment.”
Trump proceeds to reinforce the fantasmatic narrative of America, the
America he envisions will be whole and full once these symptoms are cured.
He states,
“In America, we understand that a nation is only living as long as it is
striving…we all bleed the same red blood of patriots. We all enjoy the same
glorious freedoms, and we all salute the same, great American flag…We are
protected, and we will always be protected. We will be protected by the great
men and women of our military and law enforcement.”
106
For those invested in Trump’s fantasy of America, this is seen as a message of
protection. For those communities who have been persecuted by police,
however, this message can be seen more as a threat (Giroux 2017). It can be
seen to be excluding those who are repeatedly victimised by the nature of the
police system within the USA, and as such, can be read to mean that those
communities committing persecutory acts based upon race will be protected
against those who protest the racial inequality it poses (Bean 2017).
Trump ends his speech by reaffirming the notion that his presidency and his
vision of the American fantasy will be the cure to the symptoms the American
population are experiencing. His notion of a nationalist fantasy becomes that
which is signified, with his slogan “Make America Great Again” as the signifier,
leading to paranoid conspiracism. In relation to this fantasy, as well as the
Other, (Blanuša 2021, p314)
“Such interpretations and fantasies produce and reinforce specular
relationships, as well as paranoid mirror imaging, with the aim to prevent
theft of a precious object a.”
Effectively, when one hears the slogan, regardless of political orientation, they
know that it reflects Trump’s nationalist view of his ideal America.
107
Bracher (1994, p.5) discusses how Lacanian psychoanalysis aids in recognising
the “psychological and social effects of particular texts and discourses''. This
can be observed clearly in terms of the appeal of Donald Trump to the
American psyche. It is clear that the role of the symptom, lack and the fantasy
are all prevalent when discussing Trump’s appeal to the American psyche,
both in a general sense in terms of phrases such as “Lock Her Up!” and “Drain
The Swamp!”, but additionally in terms of specific patterns within speech. It is
apparent that the fantasy of America must be sustained by diagnosing
symptoms created by lack within capitalism, and via Othering people and
communities seen to represent this. Utilising this, Trump’s primary means of
communicating with the public is one of continual, on-edge anxiety, based
around notions of a crumbling America, represented with post-apocalyptic
imagery. Trump identifies symptoms for his supporters and utilises small
catchphrases to deliver these symptoms, he promises that these symptoms,
like the objet petit a can be overcome, and that his election as president shall
be the primary means in which the overcoming of these symptoms can be
achieved and the fantasmatic narrative of America shall be restored. Further
examination into this topic can take place, analysing Trump’s career as
president from grassroot campaigns to rallies to the presidency, as well as his
defeat and subsequent insurrection against the United States government,
analysing Lacanian psychoanalytic trends within this period of time.
Additionally, one could also conduct qualitative thematic analysis with groups
108
of Trump supporters, identifying the symptoms they believe America
possesses that can be overcome in order to restore America to its fantasmatic
fullness.
REFERENCE LIST
Bean, B., 2017. United states: The reason Trump cheered cop violence. Green
Left Weekly, (1148).
Blanuša, N. and Jerbić, V., 2021. Enjoying an Empty Edifice. Anali Hrvatskog
politološkog društva, 18 (1), 314.
109
Bracher, M., 1994. Lacanian theory of discourse : subject, structure, and society.
New York, Ny New York Univ. Press.
Ferguson, T., Jorgensen, P., and Chen, J., 2018. Industrial Structure and Party
Competition in an Age of Hunger Games: Donald Trump and the 2016
Presidential Election. SSRN Electronic Journal, 1.
Giroux, H. A., 2017. White nationalism, armed culture and state violence in the
age of Donald Trump. Philosophy & Social Criticism, 43 (9), 887–910.
Glynos, J. and Stavrakakis, Y., 2008. Lacan and Political Subjectivity: Fantasy
and Enjoyment in Psychoanalysis and Political Theory. Subjectivity, 24 (1), 258.
Hirvonen, A., 2017. Fear and Anxiety: The Nationalist and Racist Politics of
Fantasy. Law and Critique, 28 (3), 21.
Homer, S., 2004. Jacques Lacan. 1st ed. London ; New York: Routledge.
Inwood, J., 2018. White supremacy, white counter-revolutionary politics, and
the rise of Donald Trump. Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space, 37
(4), 592.
Kirshner, L. A., 2005. Rethinking Desire: The Objet Petit A in Lacanian Theory.
Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 53 (1), 101.
Lacan, J., 1991. Le séminaire de Jacques Lacan / Livre 8, Le transfert, 1960-1961.
3rd ed. Paris: Seuil, Cop.
Mcgowan, T., 2016. Capitalism and desire : the psychic cost of free markets.
New York: Columbia University Press.
110
Pei, S., 2017. White Supremacism and Racial Conflict in the Trump Era.
International Critical Thought, 7 (4), 598.
Remnick, D., 2016. An American Tragedy [online]. The New Yorker. Available
from: https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/an-american-tragedy-2
[Accessed 12 Jan 2022].
Reston, M., 2017. Trump brings campaign populism to Washington [online].
CNN. Available from:
https://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/20/politics/2017-inauguration-trump/index.ht
ml [Accessed 27 Jan 2022].
Ruti, M., 2010. The Singularity of Being: Lacan and the Immortal Within.
Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 58 (6), 1113.
Stavrakakis, Y., 2007. The Lacanian left : psychoanalysis, theory, politics. 1st ed.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
The White House, 2020. A collection of speeches laying out the most
significant United States foreign policy shift in a generation [online].
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Trump-on
-China-Putting-America-First.pdf. Washington: The White House. Available
from:
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Trump-on
-China-Putting-America-First.pdf [Accessed 1 Jan 2022].
Vadolas, A., 2019. Perversions Of Fascism. London: Karnac.
111
Zevnik, A., 2017. A return of the repressed: Symptom, fantasy and campaigns
for justice for Guantánamo detainees post-2010. The British Journal of Politics
and International Relations, 20 (1), 218.
Žižek, S., 1990. Eastern Europe’s Republics of Gilead. New Left Review, 183 (1),
57, 60.
Žižek, S., 2008. The sublime object of ideology. 12th ed. London: Verso.
Žižek, S., 2009. The plague of fantasies. London: Verso
112
Appendix 1:
Chief Justice Roberts, President Carter, President Clinton, President Bush,
President Obama, fellow Americans, and people of the world, thank you. We
the citizens of America are now joined in a great national effort to rebuild our
country and restore its promise for all of our people. Together we will
determine the course of America, and the world, for many, many years to
come. We will face challenges. We will confront hardships, but we will get the
job done.
Every four years, we gather on these steps to carry out the orderly and
peaceful transfer of power, and we are grateful to President Obama and First
Lady Michelle Obama for their gracious aid throughout this transition. They
have been magnificent. Thank you.
Today's ceremony, however, has very special meaning, because today we are
not merely transferring power from one administration to another, or from
113
one party to another, but we are transferring power from Washington, D.C.,
and giving it back to you, the people.
For too long, a small group in our nation's capital has reaped the rewards of
government, while the people have borne the cost. Washington flourished,
but the people did not share in its wealth. Politicians prospered, but the jobs
left and the factories closed. The establishment protected itself, but not the
citizens of our country. Their victories have not been your victories. Their
triumphs have not been your triumphs, and while they celebrated in our
nation's capital, there was little to celebrate for struggling families all across
our land. That all changes, starting right here and right now, because this
moment is your moment --- it belongs to you. It belongs to everyone
gathered here today, and everyone watching, all across America. This is your
day. This is your celebration, and this, the United States of America, is your
country.
What truly matters is not which party controls our government, but whether
our government is controlled by the people. January 20th, 2017 will be
remembered as the day the people became the rulers of this nation again.
The forgotten men and women of our country, will be forgotten no longer.
Everyone is listening to you now. You came by the tens of millions to become
114
part of a historic movement, the likes of which the world has never seen
before. At the center of this movement is a crucial conviction, that a nation
exists to serve its citizens. Americans want great schools for their children,
safe neighborhoods for their families, and good jobs for themselves. These are
just and reasonable demands of righteous people and a righteous public, but
for too many of our citizens a different reality exists. Mothers and children
trapped in poverty in our inner cities, rusted out factories, scattered like
tombstones across the across the landscape of our nation, an education
system flush with cash, but which leaves our young and beautiful students
deprived of all knowledge, and the crime, and the gangs, and the drugs that
have stolen too many lives and robbed our country of so much unrealized
potential. This American carnage stops right here and stops right now.
We are one nation and their pain is our pain. Their dreams are our dreams
and their success will be our success. We share one heart, one home, and one
glorious destiny. The oath of office, I take today, is an oath of allegiance to all
Americans. For many decades, we've enriched foreign industry at the expense
of American industry, subsidized the armies of other countries, while allowing
for the very sad depletion of our military. We've defended other nation's
borders while refusing to defend our own. And spent trillions and trillions of
dollars overseas, while America's infrastructure has fallen into disrepair and
decay. We've made other countries rich while the wealth, strength and
115
confidence of our country has dissipated over the horizon. One by one, the
factories shuddered and left our shores, with not even a thought about the
millions and millions of American workers that were left behind. The wealth of
our middle class has been ripped from their homes and then redistributed all
across the world.
But that is the past, and now we are looking only to the future. We assembled
here today our issuing a new decree to be heard in every city, in every foreign
capital, and in every hall of power, from this day forward: a new vision will
govern our land, from this day forward, it's going to be only America first.
America first.
Every decision on trade, on taxes, on immigration, on foreign affairs will be
made to benefit American workers and American families. We must protect
our borders from the ravages of other countries making our products, stealing
our companies and destroying our jobs. Protection will lead to great
prosperity and strength. I will fight for you with every breath in my body, and I
will never, ever let you down. America will start winning again, winning like
never before. We will bring back our jobs. We will bring back our borders. We
will bring back our wealth, and we will bring back our dreams. We will build
new roads and highways and bridges and airports and tunnels, and railways,
116
all across our wonderful nation. We will get our people off of welfare and back
to work, rebuilding our country with American hands and American labor.
We will follow two simple rules: buy American, and hire American. We will
seek friendship and goodwill with the nations of the world, but we do so with
the understanding that it is the right of all nations to put their own interests
first. We do not seek to impose our way of life on anyone, but rather to let it
shine as an example. We will shine for everyone to follow. We will reinforce old
alliances and form new ones, and you unite the civilized world against radical
Islamic terrorism, which we will eradicate completely from the face of the
Earth.
U.S. President-elect Donald Trump and his wife Melania leave St. John's
Episcopal Church before Trump's inauguration.
Live from Donald Trump’s inauguration
At the bedrock of our politics will be a total allegiance to the United States of
America, and through our loyalty to our country, we will rediscover our loyalty
to each other. When you open your heart to patriotism, there is no room for
prejudice. The Bible tells us, how good and pleasant it is when God's people
live together in unity. We must speak our minds openly, debate our
disagreements, but always pursue solidarity. When America is united,
America is totally unstoppable. There should be no fear. We are protected,
117
and we will always be protected. We will be protected by the great men and
women of our military and law enforcement. And most importantly, we will
be protected by God.
Finally, we must think big and dream even bigger. In America, we understand
that a nation is only living as long as it is striving. We will no longer accept
politicians who are all talk and no action, constantly complaining but never
doing anything about it. The time for empty talk is over. Now arrives the hour
of action. Do not allow anyone to tell you that it cannot be done. No challenge
can match the heart and fight and spirit of America. We will not fail. Our
country will thrive and prosper again.
We stand at the birth of a new millennium, ready to unlock the mysteries of
space, to free the Earth from the miseries of disease and to harness the
industries and technologies of tomorrow. A new national pride will stir our
souls, lift our sights and heal our divisions. It's time to remember that old
wisdom our soldiers will never forget, that whether we are black, or brown, or
white, we all bleed the same red blood of patriots. We all enjoy the same
glorious freedoms, and we all salute the same, great American flag. And
whether a child is born in the urban sprawl of Detroit or the windswept plains
of Nebraska, they look up at the at the same night sky, they fill their heart with
118
the same dreams and they are infused with the breath of life by the same
almighty creator.
So to all Americans, in every city near and far, small and large, from mountain
to mountain, from ocean to ocean, hear these words. You will never be
ignored again. Your voice, your hopes, and your dreams will define our
American destiny. And your courage and goodness and love, will forever
guide us along the way. Together, we will make America strong again. We will
make America wealthy again. We will make America proud again We will
make America safe again, And yes, together, we will make we will make
America great again. Thank you. God bless you. And god bless America. Thank
you. God bless America.
119
Nationalism: Division or Unification?
Callum Blades
“It is not what is, but what people believe is that has behavioral
consequences.”
(Connor 1994 p. 75)
Has nationalism been a uniting or a dividing force? Due to the various
perspectives offered by authors and scholars, the exact answer is difficult to
pinpoint, with British historian Hugh Seton-Watson being “driven to the
conclusion that no "scientific definition" of the nation can be devised; yet the
phenomenon has existed and exists” (1977 p.5). Despite Seton-Watson’s
frustration, a functional definition of the nation can be established, with
Anderson (2006 p.6) perhaps putting it best, writing that “it is an imagined
political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and
sovereign”. Utilising this definition going forward, one must first discern
between the two distinctive nationalist models that have been established in
political discourse. These models were first noted by German scholar Friedrich
Meinecke (1907) who outlined the origins of nationalism, identifying a
distinction between political and cultural nations. This concept was built
upon and solidified in the form of the Kohn dichotomy, which labelled the
former camp ‘Western (civic) nationalism’ and the latter Eastern (ethnic)
nationalism’ (Kohn 1944). Jasjulowski (2010 p.293) provides further definition,
120
summarising the civic model as a “politically oriented nationalism focusing on
policy-making and government”, and the ethnic model as a “culturally
oriented nationalism concentrating on education, propaganda and the
cultivation of native values”. The dichotomy highlights a distinction between
viewing ones belonging to a nation as being rooted around the principles and
laws of that nation, and viewing ones belonging to a nation as tied to
bloodline. Bearing the Kohn dichotomy in mind, this essay will set out to
compare and contrast both the positive and negative elements of the civic
and ethnic models of nationalism with the goal of understanding whether it
has been a uniting or dividing force as a whole. In analysing the role that
these models have played, specific reference will be made to social identity
theory, a 2018 case study undertaken by Emir Yazici examining forty-nine
countries between 1981 and 2011 in relation to a global rise of nationalism
around the world (Yazici 2018).
Expanding on the earlier definition of civic nationalism provided, ones
belonging to a country is based upon their adherence to the social values of
and respect for the nation. Ignatieff (2013 p.3) concurs, stating “this
nationalism is called civic because it envisages the nation as a community of
equal, rights bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of
political practices and values”. It was established that the nation as an entity
originated in Northwestern Europe and the North Atlantic in the seventeenth
121
and eighteenth centuries “in the context of the age of enlightenment, of
liberalism and tolerance” (Kohn 1956). More recently, Tamir (2019 p.425) has
delineated that civic nationalism is “a rational and liberal way of thinking
founded on respect for human rights and personal freedoms”. It could be
argued then, that the implementation of a civic nationalist model within a
nation would be a uniting force due to it’s congruence with these
aforementioned notions of liberalism. Yazici (2018 p.148) agrees, stating that
“civic nationalism, which is not based on an ethnic identity, is compatible with
universal liberal values”. As such, it bears semblance to social identity theory.
Reliant on the identification of in-groups and out-groups, social identity
theory argues that the social group with which one identifies is a key source
of pride and self-esteem (Tajfel and Turner 2004). Bearing this in mind, a
strong example of civic nationalism as a uniting force can be observed in the
context of the French revolution.
With an emerging sense of shared social identity, the French people
discerned their in-group as an egalitarian collective of ordinary people, and
their out-group as their aristocratic rulers, causing massive social upheaval
that resulted in the overthrowing of the monarchy, transition of considerable
power from the church to the state and resulting most crucially, in a unified
nation. One of the more intriguing means in which this revolution provided a
sense of national unity can be observed in the introduction of the word
122
‘citizen’ into French politics. After the revolution, and in opposition to the
more provincial, regional laws that existed prior to the revolution, The
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen provided a set of rules and
laws around property and speech to be overseen by a central government.
The shift from ‘subject’ to ‘citizen’ in the declaration is not merely a matter of
semantics as it represents the egalitarian nature of the revolution as a whole;
the people are no longer subordinate to the rulers, they are the rulers. As
Shusterman (2021 p.47) writes,
“The revolutionaries’ emphasis on the importance of citizenship was not only
meant to expand the rights that the men of France enjoyed; it was intended
to reshape the relationship between the government and the population”.
A further example of this unifying force can be observed in decrees passed
that ruled all official texts were to be read in French, the French language
would be the sole language spoken in schools and all children would learn
the language (Bell 2000). According to Djité (1992 p165),
“The belief was that, in view of the egalitarian ideal of the Revolution, all
French citizens should speak the same language in order to facilitate
communication and have equal opportunities in the running of the public
affairs of their nation.”
123
This notion of unity via common language is backed up by Barère in 1794
(cited in Ziller 2006) who states that in democracy, “the supervision of the
government is entrusted to each citizen; to watch it you have to know it,
above all you have to know its language.” The French revolution unified
citizens with a belief in a common national identity, extinguishing feudalism
and lessening the power of the Catholic Church, resulting in the formation of
a democratically elected system of government, represented by the French
tricolour flag. It is evident then that this civic nationalist uprising brought
about legal equality and a patriotic adherence to collective rules, unity and
political principles that shaped France into the powerful nation it is today.
As is perhaps becoming more apparent, the quest for unity that civic
nationalism sets out to achieve frequently creates a weakened sense of
individuality, and as such it has received considerable criticism from a
plethora of different perspectives. These criticisms base themselves around
the notion that whilst in theory, civic nationalism seems to be a positive and
unifying force, the goal of nationwide collective unity has resulted in
exclusionary outcomes for individual cultures. Kymlicka (2001 p.6) puts
forward this argument, stating,
124
“there is a gulf between the real world of liberal democracies, which exhibit
these complex combinations of state nation-building and minority rights, and
the world of liberal political theory, which has largely ignored the way that
liberal states are actively implicated in issues of nationhood and minority
rights.”
A specific example of these flaws and oversights can be found in the
assimilation of ethnic minorities within civic nationalist frameworks. Being
lenient, one can surmise that civic nationalism allows a self-contradictory
representation of ethnic minorities due to the simultaneous effort to reject
the notions of heritage and bloodline, whilst also attempting to celebrate the
ethnically diverse elements of society. A more damnatory case could be put
forward however, to describe civic nationalism as directly oppressive to ethnic
minorities. In his case study, Yazici (2018 p.149) identifies this problem, finding
that “constant pursuit of national unity leads governments to repress
minorities and violate empowerment rights such as freedom of assembly and
association, freedom of speech, and electoral self-determination”. He uses the
example of Hong Kong and Xinjiang, examining that the right of
self-determination has been taken away from these areas in the pursuit of
unity, stating that Chinese nationalism considers these regions and their
residents to be a part of the “united” China (ibid.) Brown (2000 p.43) concurs,
writing that
125
“Ethnic minorities within modern states are now regularly depicted as being
permanently marginalised, because their eventual full integration into the
civic nation is vitiated by the barriers to their effective ethnocultural
assimilation.”
Effectively, this failure of ethnocultural assimilation leads to a sense of
marginalisation within ethnic minority communities and cultures, as well as a
sense of repression and resultantly, the human rights to free speech and
self-determination are crushed. Yazici also finds that in prioritising the
interests of the nation over the interests of the individual, such practices as
“extrajudicial killing, disappearance, torture, and political imprisonment” (2018
p.149) become more commonplace, with the frequency of the application of
these practices being dependent on the nation’s perception of what is in the
national interest. Yazici (2018) describes Turkey’s treatment of Kurds as initially
basing itself around democratic ideals, however the nationalist narrative of
the incumbent Justice and Development Party (AKP) has grown more
aggressive. According to Shaheen’s 2018 study (cited in Yazici 2018) “Last year,
the government arrested the leaders of the pro-Kurdish political party
(People’s Democratic Party), claiming that they are directly linked to the
pro-Kurdish terrorist organization PKK. Effectively, the political imprisonment
of these people is viewed by the AKP as being “a part of counter-terrorist
126
strategy… human rights can be suspended for the sake of national security”
(ibid.).
In analysing civic nationalism in relation to the idea of national unity,
one can concur that it there are clear positives to the model; the French
revolution would not have had the same outcome if the revolutionaries did
not believe in the unifying, egalitarian tenets that the civic nationalist model
espouses, however, in opposition to that, the pursuit of unification and
equality leads to the discouragement of free speech and self-determination; a
clear irony if one considers this in the context of the French revolution. In
comparing the civic model with the ethnic, Yazici (2018 p.148) finds that “civic
nationalist governments are not, in practice, any different from ethnic
nationalist governments given the prioritization of the majority’s interests at
the expense of those of the individual”. And as such, the ethnic nationalist
model shall receive similar scrutiny.
Expounding on Eriksen’s (2001 p.41) definition of ethnic nationalism as “a
notion of shared ancestry (a kind of fictive kinship)”, one can gain a solid grasp
of the sense of familiarity and common ancestry inherent within the model,
with these convictions being based upon a collective history of cultural ties
(such as traditions, religions and languages). A key element of the ethnic
nationalist model is the right to self-determination. Defined by Cingranelli et
127
al. (2014 cited in Yazici 2018), as a governments’ respect for the right to “freely
determine their own political system and leadership”, self-determination
presents itself as a key advocate for ethnic nationalist unification. Therefore,
that concept shall be examined closely.
Giuliano (2015 p.513) explains self-determination in greater depth, stating that
those seeking it “may desire, among other goals, escape from discrimination
and oppression; increased control over economic policy; or the right of their
community to cultural and political expression”. This process of
self-determination occurs when a sense of national identity is developed,
expressed and sufficient unity is established amongst the people, an example
of which can be observed by analysing the act of self-determination
undertaken by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples of Australia.
The indigeneous people fought for “a shift from an emphasis on the
modernizing fantasy of ‘assimilation’ and the eradication of Aboriginal culture,
towards one of land rights, and ‘self-determination'” (Ginsburg and Myers
2006) leading to policy changes in Australian government, and the
subsequent creation of the National Aboriginal Consultative Committee,
representing the indigeneous people on a national scale, as well as the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission. In 1992, the landmark Mabo
vs Queensland case led to the recognition of ‘native title’ to land,
acknowledging native rights to their own land. Additionally, the Aboriginal
128
Provisional Government was established in 1990, campaigning for aboriginal
sovereignty. In referring back to earlier definitions of ethnic nationalism, it is
clear that the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples campaign for
self-determination is exemplary of the unificatory aspects of ethnic
nationalism, campaigning as it does for the rights of indigenenous people to
self-govern independently of the Australian government.
Whilst this attitude towards bloodline and heritage can lead to a positive
outcome for ethinic groups, in identifying whether nationalism has been
either a uniting or dividing force, one must look to the negative, divisive
elements of ethic nationalism. Perhaps one of the most potent negative
effects of ethnic nationalism is the ethnic division and race-based
discrimination it can entail. In looking again to social identity theory, a clear
insight can be made into this ethnic conflict. In the circumstances in which
one defines their in-group in relation to their heritage, race and bloodline,
then chooses to assert dominance over their out-groups on the grounds of
ethnic superiority, conflict will invariably occur. When these differences are
highlighted and exacerbated by nationalist leaders, the extent of the violence
of these conflicts is demonstrably worse. Freeman (2000 cited by Yazici 2018
p148) expands on this in relation to the increase of unity amongst in-group
members, identifying that “leaders of ethnic groups, who know that conflict
increases the solidarity among members, may instigate ethnic conflicts.”
129
Yazici (2018) finds a strong example of this division when analysing the desire
for ethnic nationalist self-determination expressed by the Muslim community
in Sandžak, Serbia. He argues that Serbian nationalism inflamed by
then-leader Slobodan Milošević, lead to the ethnic cleansing of the
Muslim-Bosniak community. Yazici builds on the work of Lyon (2008) who
found that upon 98.9% of the Muslim-Bosniak community voting for political
autonomy, an era of state terror began,
“marked by ethnic cleansing, human rights abuses, and discrimination that
left them questioning their ability to survive as a people. By all accounts, they
were disorganized, virtually unarmed, surrounded, and closely monitored by
the Serb-dominated army” (p.79).
Resultantly, Ramet (1996 p.353) notes that “some 69,000 Muslims from the
Sandzak between 1991 and summer 1993” were driven from their homes by
the Serb-dominated nationalist army, as well as 139 Muslims kidnapped and
100 Muslim homes destroyed (United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees 2021). Due to the perception of these Muslim communites as an
ethnic out-group by the Serbian nationalist government, and as a result of
the encouragement of these beliefs by Milošević, the movement for
self-determination on the grounds of a collective shared history was
suppressed by an ethnic nationalist movement based on shared heritage.
130
Yazici (2018 p.148) concludes that “ethnic nationalism, therefore, is associated
with the most violent forms of human rights violations.”
It is evident from the Sandzak conflict that a strong sense of attachment to
one’s heritage can lead to the violation of human rights. Both directly, via the
assertion of ethnic superiority and heritage of a particular group over another,
and also indirectly via the provocation of that belief to incite violence. It acts
as the inverse of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander case, as one can
glean that the success of the Aboriginal tribes campaign for
self-determination hinged on the fact that they had a birth claim to the land
they were on. Therefore, if those Aboriginal tribes didn’t have that birth claim
to their land, yet were still attempting to work towards self-determination
within Australia, a very different outcome would likely have emerged.
Upon analysis of both civic and ethnic models of nationalism, a theme can be
observed within both; attempting to achieve national unity whilst
incongruously prioritising the national interest over that of the individual
leads to oppressive systems of government that violate human rights. This
aligns with Yazici’s (2018 p.158) finding that “nationalist governments violate
human rights more than others given the inherent incompatibility between
the two main elements of nationalism”. This is proved in Yazici’s (ibid.) case
study. In analysing the relationship between nationalism and human rights in
131
Turkey, it was identified that “significant increases/decreases in the
nationalism level and the level of respect for human rights are correlated” (see
Fig. 1). Whilst this doesn’t necessarily indicate direct causation, Yazici (ibid.
p.157) notes that “major violations of the rights (especially freedom of
assembly and association, freedom of electoral self-determination, and
freedom of speech) are mostly related to nationalist policies of the
government”. However, with proper non-governmental institutions in place,
the Turkish nationalist government would be held accountable for these
human rights violations. For this reason, the argument for nationalism as a
uniting force has not necessarily been defeated, as the case can be put
forward that the violation of human rights nationalist governments cause are
greatly reduced within a fully-fledged democracy. In creating systems and
institutions that actively work to prevent governments from violating human
rights, oppressing minorities and preventing self-determination, a unifying
model of nationalism can be developed. Yazici (ibid. p.158) identifies this in his
conclusion, stating,
“In partial democracies, nationalist governments have access to means to
violate human rights for the sake of national unity and security with less costs
given unconsolidated democratic institutions. Yet, in full democracies,
consolidated democratic institutions. . .prevent nationalist governments from
sacrificing human rights for ambiguously defined “national interests””.
132
While further research should be conducted to understand the link between
social identity theory and ethnic and civic models of nationalism, one can
conclude utilising the data obtained in Yazici’s (2018) case study, it is
observable that nationalism has simultaneously proved to be both a uniting
and a dividing force. In drawing a sense of pride and esteem from an in-group
with collective goals, rules and ambitions, it can be observed that in its civic
form, when a clear set of moral principles are recognised and implemented,
genuine positive change can be achieved in the form of equality, diplomacy,
and national unity. Likewise, in its ethnic form, cultures and communities can
identify a sense of affinity with their in-group based on a shared history and
campaign to self-determine. Yet both these models fall down when
implemented in democracies that haven’t been fully established, with
governments creating nationalist policies that result in the violation of human
rights. As such, it can then be argued that nationalism as a true unifying force
is dependent on existing within a full democracy; being challenged and held
accountable by strong democratic institutions. With this considered, the
conclusion comes in the form of a question - if a nationalist government is
dependent on institutions to hold them accountable, is that nationalist
government a uniting force, or simply a dividing force being held back from
causing real damage? The answer is a matter of perception.
133
REFERENCE LIST
Anderson, B., 2006. Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and
spread of nationalism. 3rd ed. London: London Verso.
Bell, D., 2000. Tearing Down the Tower of Babel: Grégoire and French
Multilingualism. Archives Internationales D’Histoire des Idées [online], 169,
109–128. Available from:
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-94-011-4070-6_6 [Accessed 21
May 2021].
Brown, D., 2000. Contemporary nationalism : civic, ethnocultural and
multicultural politics. London: Routledge.
Connor, W., 1994. Ethnonationalism : the quest for understanding. 2nd ed.
Princeton, Nj: Princeton University Press.
134
Djité, P. G., 1992. The French Revolution and the French Language: A Paradox?
Language Problems and Language Planning, 16 (2), 165.
Eriksen, T., 2001. Ethnic Identity, National Identity, and Intergroup Conflict. In:
Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Reduction. Oxford England
New York, N.Y. Usa: Oxford University Press, 41.
Ginsburg, F. and Myers, F., 2006. A History of Aboriginal Futures. Critique of
Anthropology [online], 26 (1), 34. Available from:
doi/pdf/10.1177/0308275X06061482 [Accessed 8 Apr 2021].
Giuliano, E., 2015. The Social Bases of Support for Self-determination in East
Ukraine. Ethnopolitics [online], 14 (5), 513. Available from:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17449057.2015.1051813?needAcce
ss=true [Accessed 25 Apr 2020].
Ignatieff, M., 2013. Blood and belonging : journeys into the new nationalism.
1st ed. London: Vintage.
Jaskulowski, K., 2010. Western (civic) “versus” Eastern (ethnic) Nationalism. The
Origins and Critique of the Dichotomy. Polish Sociological Review, (171), 293.
135
Kohn, H., 1956. A New Look At Nationalism. The Virginia Quarterly Review
[online], 32 (3), 324. Available from:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26442102.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aa3e902e3
73eefcac1b88a08046332da7 [Accessed 18 May 2021].
Kymlicka, 2001. Politics in the Vernacular. Oxford University Press: Oxford
University Press.
Lyon, J., 2008. Serbia’s Sandžak Under Milošević: Identity, Nationalism and
Survival. Human Rights Review [online], 9 (1), 79. Available from:
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12142-007-0030-6.pdf [Accessed
21 May 2021].
Meinecke, F., 1970. Cosmopolitanism and the national state. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Ramet, S., 1996. The Albanians of Kosovo: The Potential for Destabilization. The
Brown Journal of World Affairs [online], 3 (1), 353. Available from:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/24590429.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A9c58992
6b62318e39212cdded9e1e6f7 [Accessed 21 May 2021].
136
Seton-Watson, H., 1977. NATIONS AND STATES : an enquiry into the origins of
nations and the politics of nationalism. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge.
Shusterman, N., 2021. The French Revolution : faith, desire, and politics. 2nd ed.
Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, Ny: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
Tajfel, H. and Turner, J., 2004. An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict. In:
Hatch, M. J. and Schultz, M., eds. Organizational Identity: A Reader [online].
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 56–65. Available from:
https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=l2R7DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=
PA56&ots=AA-s7LmUKH&sig=Pp3OrkZB81Tmzp19F4hFKAXnzlY&redir_esc=y#v
=onepage&q&f=false [Accessed 12 May 2021].
Tamir, Y. (Yuli), 2019. Not So Civic: Is There a Difference Between Ethnic and
Civic Nationalism? Annual Review of Political Science, 22 (1), 425.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2021. Refworld | Chronology
for Sandzak Muslims in Yugoslavia [online]. Refworld. Available from:
https://www.refworld.org/docid/469f38f61e.html [Accessed 21 May 2021].
Yazici, E., 2018. Nationalism and Human Rights. Political Research Quarterly,
72 (1), 147.
137
Ziller, J., 2006. French Law on the Use of Language, Between the Myth of a
Protectionist Tradition and the Reality of New Concerns (Le droit français de la
langue, entre les mythes d’une tradition interventionniste et la réalité de
nouvelles angoisses). SSRN Electronic Journal [online], 6. Available from:
https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/4293/?sequence=1 [Accessed 20
May 2021].
Are We Living In A Paranoid-Schizoid Society? Applying Kleinian Theory In
Relation To The Covid-19 Pandemic
Callum Blades
“I cannot trust Obama, I have read about him and … he’s an Arab, and…”
Gayle Quinnell told Republican presidential hopeful John McCain on October
10th 2008.
“No ma’am. He’s a decent family man, citizen, that I just happen to have
disagreements with on fundamental issues,” McCain responded in regards to
his opponent (Davich 2018). 8 years later, Republican presidential hopeful
Donald Trump spoke about his opponent Hillary Clinton as “an unbelievably
nasty, mean enabler” (Jaffe 2016), referred to her as “Crooked
Hillary”(Jamieson 2016), and led chants of “Lock her up!” (Stevenson 2016)
138
With the contrast in professionalism and attitude between the two men
being this stark, the rationalist would hope that the former would be the one
to win over the electorate. However, this was not the case. It is well observed
that in modern political discourse, the respect and civility presented by
Senator McCain has seemingly vanished, being replaced with an abusive,
polarising lack of empathy (Bomey 2021). Whilst being the most heavily
documented and scrutinised instance of this shift in attitude, the support for
Donald Trump isn’t isolated in what it represents. One can look at the
polarising, xenophobic attitudes of, and public support for, political figures
such as Nigel Farage in the United Kingdom and Marine Le Pen in France, as
indicative of a similar public mood existent across modern Western politics.
What is responsible for this shift in public mood? What is the nature of the
appeal of these polarising attitudes? In order to better understand the
current political situation, it is essential to analyse these events not as isolated
incidents, rather as symptomatic of a greater public mood; a mood one can
find rooted in Kleinian psychoanalytic theory. Specifically, the concept of the
paranoid-schizoid position. As such, are we living in a paranoid-schizoid
political culture and what are the implications?
In order to understand whether one is living in a paranoid-schizoid
political culture, it must first be clarified what this term means. In one of the
earliest works documenting Melaine Klein entitled “Introduction to the work
139
of Melanie Klein”, Segal (1964 p.36) defines the paranoid-schizoid position as a
situation in which,
“the infant divides his perception of his experiences into two categories,
in such a way as to minimize his anxieties. He divides his world into
'good' which he attempts to possess and to be, and 'bad' which he tries
to get rid of and locate outside himself, in his object. 'Good' for the
infant thus equals 'Me', and it is made up of good object/good me. 'Bad'
equals 'Not me', and it is made up of bad object/bad me.”
Effectively, the paranoid-schizoid position is characterised chiefly by the
paranoid splitting of objects into binary ‘good’ vs ‘bad’ oppositions, denial, as
well as “projection and projective identification (expelling unwanted anxieties
onto the other and then responding to those projections)” (Yates 2019). From
this, the infant will move to the depressive position, marked by the
overcoming of splitting and acceptance of the possibility of nuance and thus
creating a more integrated experience and understanding of the self.
If this is expanded outwards and applied to the general public mood,
one can see examples of the paranoid-schizoid position throughout current
political discourse. For example, in relation to Farage’s anti-immigrationary,
nationalist campaign to leave the European Union and “Take Back Control”
140
(de Geus & Ralph-Morrow 2021). In this, the notions of splitting into ‘good’ vs
‘bad’ (The English vs the “EUSSR”), denial (Project Fear!) and projective
identification towards the immigrant (We’re at breaking point!) can be
observed. This indicates the existence of paranoid-schizoid mood in politics,
however, it should be examined in further depth, and as such, Klein’s
psychoanalytic theories shall be investigated in relation to the political realm
as well as public mood.
It is vital at this juncture to raise the point that the paranoid-schizoid
position is precisely that; a position and not a developmental stage. The key
difference being that, whereas a developmental stage is worked through, a
position is not fixed. As such, one can fluctuate between positions throughout
life, and
“in times of extreme stress or threat, we shouldn’t be surprised to find
people regressing to the Paranoid Schizoid Position. This is exactly what
has happened because of the Coronavirus. Aided by the Internet, it’s
allowed Dis- and Misinformation about who and what is responsible for
the Virus to spread around the globe at virtually the speed of light.”
(Mitroff and Kilmann 2021, p. 2)
141
As such, in taking this notion into consideration, one must align it with
appropriate historical and socio-economic context, thus avoiding the
possibility of pathologisation of various political and social beliefs.
Extensive research into the nature of conspiracy theories finds that they
“tend to prosper in times of crisis as people look for ways to cope with difficult
and uncertain circumstances” (Douglas 2021). One can see this conclusion
mirrored in the general understanding of the paranoid-schizoid position, in
that “under times of stress or trauma we will revert to the more primitive
modes of functioning of the paranoid-schizoid position and our paranoid
anxieties will come to the fore again.” (Watts et al. 2009, p84). In applying
Kleinian theory to COVID-19 conspiracies, one must first recognise the
pertinence of anxiety and denial within the paranoid-schizoid position. Klein
(1949, p99) wrote that the paranoid-schizoid position originates from a point
of anxiety, the likes of which is “predominantly experienced as fear of
persecution and that this contributes to certain mechanisms and defenses
which characterize the paranoid and schizoid positions” .
The relevance of denial in this position cannot be understated. There
are a plethora of potential points in the pandemic in which one can observe
denial. There is denial of the existence of the COVID-19 pandemic entirely (see
Figure 1), denial of the authenticity of government guidelines, and denial of
142
the efficacy of the vaccine, among others. As such, one can argue that denial
is conducive to the existence of the COVID-19 conspiracy theories. Klein (1940,
p141) links this to the paranoid-schizoid mindset, stating that “without partial
and temporary denial of psychic reality the ego cannot bear the disaster by
which it feels itself threatened”. In the case of the existential threat of the
COVID-19 pandemic, the denial of its existence leads to splitting it into these
paranoid-schizoid ‘good’ vs ‘bad’ dynamics. Developing on this, Mollon (1986,
p162) states that, “in an effort to deal with overwhelming instinctual forces of
life and death, good and bad aspects and experiences of the object are in
phantasy kept apart. An idealised object is sought to protect against a
persecutory one”.
Figure 1: “They” control you
143
In the instance of conspiracy theories, one can perceive idealisation to
be the presence of absolute power; if there is omnipotent control, there is
predictability, and in acknowledging the phantasy of this power, it can
provide a sense of security, a sense that meaning has been identified. Marasco
(2016, p238) concurs, stating that “conspiracy theory is a love affair with power
that poses as its critique. Like so many love affairs, it is premised on a fantasy
about its beloved”. Expanding on this, the Othering of unseen, nefarious
governmental forces enables the paranoid-schizoid mind to deny and
disavow the insecurity and uncertainty of the reality of the situation it exists
within. This can be observed within Figure 1, one can see clear examples of
this taking place. Assuming denial as the progenitor of this split, the
subsequent ‘us’ vs ‘them’ binary opposition can be observed, in the utilisation
of terms such as “they control you”, “their agenda”, “they are imposing more
measures”. This split enables the fantasy of the other to emerge, within which
anxieties and insecurity can be projected. In this case, the means in which
these insecurities are characterised is via the idealisation of the other. ‘They’
are in charge, ‘they’ are all-powerful’, ‘they have their own plans’. In so doing,
the paranoid-schizoid mind creates itself an omniscient Other, that can be
demonised accordingly. It is key to understanding the nature of the
conspiracy theories surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic; as if a
paranoid-schizoid mindset is capable of creating an Other characterised by a
144
malevolent force in charge, controlling everything surrounding the pandemic
with a greater, unseen master-plan, it can feel a sense of security and
placation in demonising it.
Figure 2:
“The Media is the Real Virus”
In analysing Figure 2, further observations can be made. Firstly, one can
identify the presence of paranoid-schizoid thinking embedded within the
statement “the media is the real virus”. As opposed to creating a
well-balanced argument taking a nuanced perspective, incorporating several
valid criticisms and presenting them accordingly, the poster of this sees
themselves as the idealised ‘good’, and ‘the media’ as the, persecutory ‘bad’,
and as such seeks to protect itself from that by demonising it. Furthermore,
within the lower third of the graphic, the statement instructs the reader to
‘turn off the TV and think for yourself”, the implication of which being that if
one were to stop watching television, they would stop receiving information
145
about the virus and thus will stop believing in the existence of it. This
statement takes the concept of attacking the demonised Other one step
further, and attacks those it perceives to be complicit in its perceived
persecution, demanding they stop. According to Johanssen (2021, p638), this
behaviour is indicative of the paranoid-schizoid position, he states that “it
named something … as bad for some people and subsequently asked
everybody else to banish this bad practice”.
A commonality can be observed within the context of these pieces of
content, the split mind, idealising itself and incapable of perceiving itself with
nuance, assumes itself to be in possession of total knowledge about the
nature and role of the pandemic. One can summarise then that the binary
‘us’ vs ‘them’ split, indicative of the paranoid-schizoid position can be
observed within the language of conspiracy theories surrounding COVID-19.
This split is exemplified by the fantasy of an idealised other; an omnipotent,
nefarious power secretly in control. Owing to the fact that the fantasy of this
idealised power is conceptual, there is room to shift narratives as the
paranoid-schizoid mind so chooses, even if these narratives contradict one
another.
After Freud hypothesised the existence of projection as a defence
(Quinodoz 2010, p24) mechanism (Quinodoz , it was elaborated on by Klein,
who stated that “identification by projection implies a combination of
146
splitting off parts of the self and projecting them on to (or rather into) another
person” (Klein 1988, p. 21). Effectively, projective identification exists as a
means in which the mind can deny that which it considers threatening or has
deemed intimidating by attributing those traits onto others. As such, these
traits are perceived in others as dangerous and a threat and subsequently
attacked and demonised. Thereupon, the concept has been developed to
incorporate notions of the social, in the sense that it has been deemed to exist
as a means in which to make judgements about one's environment without
dependency on trustworthy or objective information around the topic (Ames
2004). Ogden (1970 p357) agrees, stating that “the projector fantasies ridding
himself of an aspect of himself and putting that aspect into another person in
a controlling way”. These definitions go some way to describing the
paranoid-schizoid mindset in further detail, as well as the projective
identification that one can observe within the conspiracy theories
surrounding COVID-19. In Figure 2, one can observe ‘the media’ being
criticised as the primary means in which the public are being deceived,
specifying ‘the TV’ as the mainstream source of this media. However, if one
were to observe the average viewing figures for BBC news shows in
comparison to the social media platform Facebook, the discrepancy between
4.3 million viewers in October 2021 (BARB 2021) vs 2.91 billion active users in
the same period (Statista 2021) invites scepticism of the claim of ‘the TV is the
virus’. As is widely researched and documented, the spread of conspiracy
147
theories has been exacerbated by the existence of Facebook echo chambers
(Klimiuk et al. 2021), and as such, one would have to assume that this is not
mere oversight by those that hold the view expressed by the sticker, but an
inability of those who placed it to view themselves with the nuance and
complexity indicative of the depressive position and instead exist within a
paranoid-schizoid position where this level of complexity and ability to,
ironically, ‘think for yourself’ is not possible, rather projecting this thought
process into others who follow guidelines. Further examples of this can be
seen in Appendix 1. The first statement instructs the reader not to trust any
information from government sources, and the next statement quotes
government numbers as support for their case. This fragmentary and
incoherent lack of a cohesive narrative allows for the projective identification
of whatever negative traits one desires onto the Other, Fundamentally, one
can observe the opinion that people aren’t thinking for themselves as
projective identification in this regard; the paranoid-schizoid mind has
identified these traits in others, but has failed to do so in its idealised self.
When looking at projective identification in relation to COVID-19, there
are a myriad of examples existent within Appendix 2 that the concept can be
observed within. In thematically analysing specific examples, one can identify
quite quickly a commonality. There is a sticker stating “Live in fear”, a sticker
depicting a television set declaring “remain terrified, question nothing, stay
148
home”, or the sticker claiming “staying human is more important than living
in fear”, all these examples have the same unifying theme of fear. Fear is
utilised as a weapon in the mindset of the paranoid-schizoid and is used to
accuse the reader of living in fear, terrified of reality. Effectively, instead of
acknowledging the anxieties, fears and uncertainties that naturally surround
an event such as a pandemic, the paranoid-schizoid mind has instead denied
this reality, split into idealising the self as the embodiment of all that is ‘good’,
unafraid, bold and heroic, and projected the anxiety, fear and uncertainty
onto a perceived ‘bad’, who it claims is scared, living in fear and doesn’t
possess the same courage and freedom they do (Klein 1955)
This concept of projective identification embedded within this example can
be analysed in greater depth when related to the other examples provided in
Appendix 2. The commonality these stickers share with one another does not
limit itself simply to the sentiments they express collectively, but the means
in which they are expressed. As McLuhan (1964, p7) famously wrote “the
medium is the message”. Conspiratorial reasoning in this instance is reliant on
the group pushing their political agenda onto the public with no
consideration of those whom their actions have an impact on, in an intrusive
and inconvenient manner; a manner that directly parallels the sentiments
these conspiracy theorists express in regards to the guidelines, quarantines
and lockdowns put in place by the governments they are criticising.
149
With this definition and development of projective identification now
established, a return to Figure 2 can be made; specifically the statement ‘turn
off your TV and think for yourself’. The crucial point is that this statement can
be seen as a clear form of projective identification; the distributor perhaps
feels shame or guilt due to of their own fear, their own need to cling to a
narrative and their own lack of critical thought, ergo the projection of these
ideas from the idealised ‘good’ self onto the reader. Marcinko et al. (2021, p699)
agree, stating that shame “may not only impact but also underlie key
manifestations of this position.” Again, this instance directly points at the
paranoid-schizoid mindset, in that the ironic and hypocritical nature of this is
not acknowledged, due to the inability of the paranoid-schizoid mind to
engage with this, primarily because it involves introspective, critical thinking
that requires the nuance and complexity afforded by the depressive position
(Klein 1955).
In analysing both the paranoid-schizoid position in relation to the
COVID-19 pandemic, one can see clear and evident trends that unify both
aspects. Thus proving Klein’s relevance to contemporary political discourse,
with explicit ‘good’ vs ‘bad’ binary oppositions, projective identification, and
idealisation taking place. Whilst the COVID-19 pandemic acted primarily as
the focus of this essay, one can also observe other examples vis-a-vis Donald
150
Trump and Nigel Farage as indicative of this situation as an example of a
public mood. Owing to this, further analysis and research could be
conducted. It would be worth understanding the means in which current
political discourse can be moved away from the paranoid-schizoid position
and into the depressive position, as well as conducting mixed-methods
research to understand the nature of the mistrust in medical institutions
more generally. Only in understanding how to progress from this position can
political discourse evolve, allowing for newer, nuanced and more innovative
political discussion.
Reference list
151
BARB, 2022. Top programmes report [online]. thinkbox. Available from:
https://www.thinkbox.tv/research/barb-data/top-programmes-report/
[Accessed 21 Oct 2021].
Bomey, N., 2021. Bridge builders : bringing people together in a polarized age.
Cambridge, Uk ; Medford, Ma: Polity.
Davich, J., 2018. “No, ma’am”: McCain wasn’t merely a politician, but a true
patriot [online]. chicagotribune.com. Available from:
https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/post-tribune/opinion/ct-ptb-d
avich-john-mccain-no-maam-moment-st-0831-story.html [Accessed 12
Jan 2022].
de Geus, R. and Ralph-Morrow, E., 2021. An every man, not for every woman:
Nigel Farage and the radical right gender gap. Journal of Elections,
Public Opinion and Parties, 1–18.
Douglas, K. M., 2021. COVID-19 conspiracy theories. Group Processes &
Intergroup Relations, 24 (2), 271.
Jaffe, A., 2016. Trump Ramps Up Attacks On Clinton Over Husband’s Affairs
[online]. NBC News. Available from:
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/trump-slams-hillary-cli
nton-nasty-mean-enabler-husband-s-affairs-n569791 [Accessed 1 Feb
2022].
Jamieson, A., 2016. Trump calls Clinton “Crooked Hillary” – should she ignore it
or fight back? [online]. The Guardian. Available from:
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/may/25/donald-trump-croo
ked-hillary-clinton-nickname-ignore-fight [Accessed 13 Jan 2022].
Jean-Michel Quinodoz and Alcorn, D., 2010. Reading Freud : a chronological
exploration of Freud’s writings. 2nd ed. London ; New York: Routledge, ,
Cop.
Johanssen, J., 2020. Social Media and Coronavirus: Paranoid-Schizoid
Technology and Pandemic? Human Arenas, (4), 638.
152
Klein, M., 1940. Mourning and its Relation to Manic-Depressive States.
International Journal of Pyschoanalysis, 21, 141.
Klein, M., 1949. Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms. Melanie Klein. Int. J. Psa.,
XXVII, 1946, pp. 99–110. The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 18 (1), 99.
Klein, M., 1988. Envy and gratitude, and other works, 1946-1963. 1st ed. London:
Vintage.
Klimiuk, K., Czoska, A., Biernacka, K., and Balwicki, Ł., 2021. Vaccine
misinformation on social media – topic-based content and sentiment
analysis of Polish vaccine-deniers’ comments on Facebook. Human
Vaccines & Immunotherapeutics, 17 (7), 1–10.
Marasco, R., 2016. Toward A Critique of Conspiratorial Reason. Constellations,
23 (2), 238.
Marcinko, D., Bilic, V., and Eterovic, M., 2021. Shame and COVID-19 Pandemic.
In:Psychiatria Danubina. Presented at the NA, Zagreb.
Mcluhan, M., 1964. Understanding Media : the Extensions of Man. 1st ed.
London: Abacus.
Mitroff, I. I. and Kilmann, R. H., 2021. The psychodynamics of enlightened
leadership : coping with chaos. 1st ed. Cham: Springer.
Mollon, P., 1986. A Note on Kohut and Klein Idealisation, Splitting and
Projective Identification. British Journal of Psychotherapy, 3 (2), 162.
Ogden, T., 1979. On Projective Identification. International Journal of
Psychoanalysis [online], 60, 357. Available from:
https://icpla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Ogden-T.H.-On-Projective
-Identification-IJP.pdf [Accessed 1 Jan 2022].
Segal, H., 1964. Introduction to the work of Melanie Klain. 1st ed. London:
Karnac.
Statista Research Department, 2021. Facebook users worldwide 2020 |
Statista [online]. Statista. Available from:
153
https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-fa
cebook-users-worldwide/ [Accessed 2 Nov 2021].
Stevenson, P., 2016. A brief history of the “Lock her up!” chant by Trump
supporters against Clinton. Washington Post [online], November 22,
2016. Available from:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/22/a-brief-hist
ory-of-the-lock-her-up-chant-as-it-looks-like-trump-might-not-even-try
/ [Accessed 12 Dec 2021].
Watts, J., Cockcroft, K., and Duncan, N., 2013. Developmental psychology. Cape
Town: Juta.
Yates, C., 2019. Emotion, Affect and Contemporary Politics. Routledge
Handbook of Psychoanalytic Political Theory [online], 1, 22. Available
from:
https://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/30770/3/Yates-Emotion-Affect%20M
ay%202018.pdf [Accessed 1 Jan 2022].
154
Appendix 1- Contradictions Within Conspiracy Theories
Appendix 2- Stickers
155
156
Paranoid-Schizoid, Manic Defensive Society: Kleinian Psychodynamics in
Contemporary Political Culture
Callum Blades
In the current landscape of political discussion, a prevailing sentiment
of scepticism is evident, encompassing doubt directed at major institutions,
brands, media outlets, and governmental bodies, as indicated by the
Edelman Trust report in 2021. The origins of which are contested, however one
can observe the election of Tony Blair to be pivotal in this. In 1997, the Labour
party shifted towards the centre in order to embrace Thatcherite neoliberal
policies under the rebranded “New Labour” party (Quiggin 2022), effectively
alienating the working class. As has been documented, alienation leads to
mistrust in the alienating institution (Boulding et al. 2021) as well as
influencing the values, beliefs and attitudes built up in one’s schema in
regards to associated institutions (Lilleker and Aslan Ozgul 2022). Owing to
this, one can understand the potential for mistrust within these institutions
from a working class socio-political context, however, these can be seen as a
symptom of this trend, as opposed to the root cause. One can look at news
narratives and capitalist press as playing a role within this mistrust too, with
increasing competition for sales, website clicks, and viewing figures
encouraging news outlets to produce more sensationalist content. As a result
of this, Gardner (2009 p16) claims that “the media are in the business of
profit… Inevitably and increasingly, the media turn to fear to protect shrinking
157
market shares because a warning of mortal peril - ‘A story you can’t afford to
miss!’ - is an excellent way to get someone’s attention”. As such, one can
argue that news media corporations' desire for profit can lead to divergent
thinking, with different corporations tailoring the same content to suit the
attitudes and beliefs of the consumer. This can exacerbate the strength of
these attitudes in viewers and can lead to them utilising these platforms
more, leading to the news outlets tailoring their content to these attitudes,
and so on.
In recent years, a trend has emerged towards increasing polarisation
and binary “us vs them” narratives in both news reporting, as well as language
within the public sphere. For example, a headline in a recent Daily Express
article reads “EU plots to PUNISH Britain: Bloc happy to see UK disintegrate as
they 'don’t give a stuff'” (McGrath 2022), enforcing an ‘us’ (the United
Kingdom) versus ‘them’ (the European Union) binary opposition. This causes
polarising nuance-free opinions to emerge, painting the EU as the enemy to
the United Kingdom. This has a clear, direct effect on the readers, with the top
comment on this article stating “As I've said since 2016 the eu are not our
friends they're our enemies” (2022). This trend can be observed within a
plethora of instances within current contemporary political discourse. One
can look at the “us” vs “them” narratives of Donald Trump's criticism of
158
Muslims, Mexicans, the Democrats and Hillary Clinton, as well as in the
language of Brexit, and within COVID-19 conspiracy theories.
Additionally, post-truth attitudes are rife, with discussion about opinions of
facts being just as prevalent as facts themselves. One can see the rise of
emotive far-right populist candidates and causes as exemplary of this. This
affect-based language can be observed specifically in the support for Donald
Trump, the support for Brexit and the rise in conspiracy theories, all
promoting the notion that one’s stance on a subject is the most important
thing. UK minister Michael Gove summed this up succinctly when he claimed
that the UK “had had enough of experts” (Sky News 2016). This attitude was
not assisted by the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused the
public to depend on experts and their advice. Both these irreconcilable
stances increase a one-sided “all-good”, “all-bad” thinking. This perspective
has been described by journalist James O’Brien as “footballification” (2018)
This process involves effectively picking a side as if one were to support a
football team, denouncing the achievements of one's rival, and ignoring the
failings of one’s own belief system. Within this, there has been an increased
amount of binary thinking, with sides being picked, facts being ignored and
selfishness increased. Within this, denial can take place. There has been a rise
of conspiracy theories in relation to COVID-19; with denial of the pandemic
taking place, denial of lockdown measures, and denial of the efficacy of the
159
vaccine. Effectively, one could argue that contemporary public mood is
characterised by split, binary oppositional thinking, self-aggrandising
attitudes, and a distinct lack of nuance. How can one identify these traits
specifically, what is the psychology behind them, and how does a society
progress from them to a more nuanced, reasonable form of politics? To
understand this public mood, this paper shall focus on the psychodynamic
theory of Melanie Klein, and her constellation of work focusing on
understanding the human mind. Focusing specific attention on her concepts
of the paranoid-schizoid position, the depressive position, and manic
defences. This shall be examined alongside the work of Hanna Segal and her
developments on Klein’s work, as well as Thomas Ogden and Christopher
Bollas, whose more contemporary developments aid in understanding
Kleinian theory in the modern day. This literature review will then be applied
to contemporary politics, exploring the work of of more contemporary writers,
such as Noelle McAfee, Dr Amy Allen and papers that surround the topic in
regards to Donald Trump and consumerist capitalism. After which, a
qualitative, critical discourse analysis shall be conducted to identify these
traits more clearly within modern politics. This will identify just how these
traits are manifested and how they can be worked through. After which, an
exploration of the findings of this case study shall take place in order to better
understand and recognise the potential for future research that could take
place via quantitative and qualitative methods.
160
With this in mind, it is vital to analyse an instance that highlights all of Klein’s
work and brings its relevance to the modern day. As such, the case study in
question shall be oriented around news media reporting of political advisor
Dominic Cummings’ journey to Durham on the 22nd of May to the 27th of
May 2020, in the midst of UK lockdowns. There shall be analysis of the style of
reporting in the news media, as well as the psychosocial, cultural implications
of this, utilising qualitative critical discourse analysis. The motivation behind
this case study in particular rests in the fact that it serves as a combination of
all elements of modern political contention as outlined above. There is a
perceived “expert” who has disobeyed the guidelines that his government set
out. Owing to this, this story acts as a high-priority news event that news
media believe will generate considerable opinion on the matter. Owing to
this, this case study shall explore and analyse the language of news media
reporting in relation to both paranoid-schizoid and manic defensive
language, before progressing to analyse the responses made by the British
public on Twitter, with the express intention of identifying whether there are
a paranoid-schizoid positions and manic-defences existent in contemporary
political discourse. After which, there will be a discussion of these findings,
analysis of potential solutions, and addressing further research that can take
place in order to understand this situation more succinctly and establish if
there is a direct cause of action one can take to work through this. Primarily,
161
however, a literary review shall take place in order to understand in greater
depth the work of Melanie Klein, as well as those who have developed her
theories and applied them to various elements of contemporary society, with
focus being paid to Hanna Segal, Thomas Ogden, Christopher Bollas, as well
as more contemporary writers, such as Noelle McAfee and Dr Amy Allen.
Literature Review
Whilst a plethora of developments have been made within the context of
Kleinian psychodynamics, with evolution of Klein’s theory taking place, there
has been little written and developed in relation to the contemporary political
landscape as well as the language utilised by news media corporations. As
such, this literature review will focus on the psychoanalytic work of Melanie
Klein, exploring her theory on the paranoid-schizoid position, depressive
position, and the notions of manic defence, incorporating developments from
Hanna Segal, Thomas Ogden and Christopher Bollas, before focusing on
contemporary research conducted in relation to modern political discourse
from Noelle McAfee, Dr Amy Allen, and Rudan et al. Kleinian psychoanalytic
theory provides a fundamental backdrop to understanding in greater depth
present-day politics, Klein’s understanding and development of the
paranoid-schizoid position enables one to gain a strong comprehension of
the public mood during the COVID-19 pandemic and her theory of manic
162
defence provides greater understanding as to the nature of public mood
during this period. As such, Klein’s work shall be broken down into key
concepts; splitting, denial, idealisation and the manic defences. Subsequently,
developments of Kleinian theory shall be identified, analysed and critiqued. In
doing so, theoretical underpinning of Kleinian psychodynamics will be
established in order to inform the understanding of current political mood
and the effects of news media reporting during COVID-19.
Building on the distinction between schizophrenia and paranoia as outlined
in Freud’s The Schreber Case (1911), Melanie Klein, in her 1952 article The
Emotional Life of the Infant, incorporates the notions of anxiety within these
theories. She argues that the experience of birth, as well as the inner workings
of the death drive contribute to the sense of persecutory anxiety experienced
by the infant. She writes that,
“It would appear that the pain and discomfort he has suffered, as well as the
loss of the intra-uterine state, are felt by him as an attack by hostile forces, i.e.
as persecution. Persecutory anxiety, therefore, enters from the beginning into
his relation to objects in so far as he is exposed to privations.” (1952, p.52)
Prior to this however, the perception of persecutory anxiety was recognised as
an event that led to splitting. First observed by Ronald Fairbairn as a means of
163
“splitting the figure of his mother into two objects, a good and a bad. by
internalizing the bad object in an endeavour to control it…” (1942, p.114), Klein
developed this notion to acknowledge the binary oppositionary nature of the
split mind. She understood that the split mind internalises the all-good
aspects and refutes the all-bad, observing only these elements, without
ground for nuance. This is elaborated on by Klein in her 1946 essay “Notes on
Some Schizoid Mechanisms”, writing that “anxiety is predominantly
experienced as fear of persecution and that this contributes to certain
mechanisms and defences which characterize the paranoid and schizoid
positions” (1946, p110). In entering that split mindset, the paranoid-schizoid
position is established.
The paranoid-schizoid position is perhaps the most seminal and influential of
all of Klein’s works. Since “Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms”, it has been
elaborated on and developed by Klein as well as other notable scholars.
According to Klein (1948, p30) “hatred and persecutory anxiety become
attached to the frustrating (bad) breast, and love and reassurance to the
gratifying (good) breast”. Developing this, in her book “Introduction to the
Work of Melanie Klein”, Segal (1988, p26) writes that “the leading anxiety is
paranoid, and the state of the ego and its objects is characterized by the
splitting, which is schizoid.” Essentially, Klein posits that the infant views its
mother as either an all-good breast or an all-bad breast, incapable of
164
observing the existence of both as belonging to one entity. Owing to this, it is
“bound up with the splitting of the object, for the good aspects of the breast
are exaggerated as a safeguard against the fear of the persecuting breast”
(Klein 1946, p96). In instances when high-persecutory anxiety is experienced,
one can shift into the paranoid-schizoid position and seek a ‘good’ object to
protect them from that which is causing distress. One can recognise the
paranoid-schizoid mindset with regard to contemporary political culture,
referring to the aforementioned example of the European Union “punishing”
Britain, with the direct response being that “they” are “our enemies”. Within
this context, one can observe clearly the lack of nuanced, critical thinking
when faced with the potential of a high-persecutory anxiety (the European
Union’s “punishment” of the United Kingdom) and the emergence of the
paranoid-schizoid position and paranoid-schizoid language. This splitting is
only one element of the paranoid-schizoid mindset however, Klein also noted
the existence of denial.
Klein understood that when the source of high-persecutory anxiety is
too great, absolute denial can take place. She writes that “denial in its most
extreme form—as we find it in hallucinatory gratification—amounts to an
annihilation of any frustrating object or situation, and is thus bound up with
the strong feeling of omnipotence which obtains in the early stages of life”
(1952, p.65). That which is perceived to be a threat, whether it is an object, or
165
whether it is something greater and more existential, is simply annihilated
from one’s existence, “by these means gratification and relief from
persecutory anxiety are obtained” (ibid). Within this framework, one can
observe denial from extreme high-persecutory anxiety consistently
throughout modern politics as well as the pandemic. Throughout the
pandemic, this annihilation of extreme high-persecutory anxiety has been
prevalent; one can look at the denial of the existence of the COVID-19
pandemic, the denial of the efficacy of the vaccine, denial of the effectiveness
of lockdown measures, of face masks, of lateral flow tests and so on. When the
reality of political culture contradicts the assumed narrative in one’s schema,
it can “launch a complex set of psychological reactions, including denial,
enraged revenge and a deep sense of loss that can last for hundreds of years
in the form of an unconscious transgenerational bereavement” (Bollas 2018, p.
xxv). It is owing to this that not only is the analysis of language surrounding
COVID-19 pertinent to understanding contemporary effects on public mood,
but also to understanding the potential future cultural implications on
Western democracy and political attitudes. This denial can exist alongside
split mindsets and in so doing, one idealises themself, their own perspective
and their own opinions over anything that surrounds them.
In understanding this idealisation, one can see its pertinence in relation to the
nature of denial. Klein understood this, stating in regards to denial that “in
166
some measure these processes are operative in idealization as well” (1952,
p.65). By this, one can understand that the absolute refutation, annihilation
and denial of an object requires the mind to view itself as all-good. If it
allowed room for potential error, it would not be able to deny outright the
anxiety in its entirety, and thus idealisation cannot take place. Summing up
the nature of idealisation, Ogden (1984, p512), writes that,
“idealization of the good breast is the strength of the infant's persecutory fear,
which creates the need to be protected from persecutors and therefore goes
to increase the power of an all-gratifying object. The idealized breast forms
the corollary of the persecuting breast; and in so far as idealization is derived
from the need to be protected from persecuting objects, it is a method of
defence against anxiety”
This idealisation does exist, however, in good object-relationships too. To a
certain extent one places illogical emotional attachments to various idealised
elements of their lives, such as “falling in love, appreciating beauty, forming
social or political ideals, emotions which, though they may not be strictly
rational, add to the richness and variety of our lives” (Segal 1988, p.36). This
element of positive idealisation in regards to object-relations goes some way
to explaining the nature of one’s attachment to political, social and economic
beliefs. Extending outwards, this can explain the means in which one can
167
argue in favour of a social or political cause that has been disproven or proved
demonstrably false. If one bears this in mind, with specific regards to
COVID-19, one can understand the role the paranoid-schizoid position,
splitting and idealisation play in the discussion of conspiracy theory, the
nature of which shall be explored in further depth later. In regards to anxiety,
splitting, denial and the paranoid-schizoid position, these positions are
worked through and resolved, resulting in what Klein calls the depressive
position.
The depressive position is one of Klein’s most prominent theories of the mind.
Klein emphasises the fact that if an infant experiences too much envy, it
negatively impacts on their ability to develop sound gratitude and happiness.
A lack of envy allows for the possibility of a sufficient ability to respect others
feelings and accomplishments (Klein 1957). Succeeding from the
paranoid-schizoid position, the depressive position is first mentioned in her
1935 essay entitled “A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive
States” (1935), and in her essay “Mourning and its Relation to Manic Depressive
States” (1940). Within which, Klein establishes a differentiation between
anxieties within paranoid and depressive states. Klein posits that as the child
develops, it views its mother, not as either all-good or all-bad object, rather as
a whole object, capable of containing the nuance and complexity of both
simultaneously. She viewed the consolidation of the love-hate binary
168
oppositions for the object to cause anxiety in regards to potentially harming
oneself, creating the notion of depressive guilt. The infant realises that in the
destruction of the all-bad breast, the all-good breast would also be destroyed.
Understanding this, she writes that “not until the object is loved as a whole
can its loss be felt as a whole” (1935, p. 147). As such, the ongoing internal
battle between love and hate provides a key area of difference for the
paranoid-schizoid and the depressive positions. Segal agrees that “there is a
constant fluctuation between the persecutory anxiety, when hatred is
stronger, and the depressive anxiety, when love comes more to the fore” (1979,
p. 80). Essentially, Klein provides a post-paranoid-schizoid mental framework
and clear goal to strive towards in regards to one’s own personal
development. In relating this position to contemporary political culture, one
can understand the necessity for the public mood to shift towards this more
nuanced, balanced way of consuming media and politics and engaging in the
public and political sphere. In her book “Fear of Breakdown: Politics and
Psychoanalysis” (2019), Noelle McAfee concurs with this, stating that the
current political climate “calls for growing up, moving beyond the black and
white of adolescence and toward a more mature understanding of the
complexities and ambiguities in politics, and learning to live with
ambivalence and uncertainty” (2019, p. 149), however she fails to mention any
practical ways in which this can be implemented. This depressive position,
169
whilst on the outset provides a key transitional point and wholesome outlook,
is not without its own defences.
During the paranoid-schizoid position, defences such as splitting, denial and
idealisation are utilised to keep the mind from high-persecutory anxiety,
however, upon the transition to the more depressive state, these defences are
replaced with what Klein referred to as “manic defences”. In her essay,
“Mourning and its Relation to Manic Depressive States” (1940) Klein outlines
these more significant understandings in regards to psychodynamics. She
recognises these manic-defences to be an integral part of entering the
depressive position, as they “enable the individual to escape from the
sufferings connected with the depressive position” (p. 150). Segal expands
slightly on this, writing that the main characteristic of manic-defence is
effectively a denial of reality (1979, p. 81). When in this state, the ego will turn
to its manic-defences in order to shield itself from both the anxieties
surrounding the object, as well as the self, protecting itself as it does so, from
its own superego. Upon reading Klein’s essays on this topic, there are three
main categorisations of manic defence that can be identified; triumph,
control and contempt.
As Klein understands, manic-defences originate first from a position of denial;
if the mind refutes its own internal, psychic reality, then the ego may
170
additionally continue to deny the nature of external reality as well (Klein 1935,
p. 161). This is the conflict of the depressive position. It continues to experience
splitting and persecutory anxiety but at a different strength and in a different
form. These paranoid-schizoid defences are utilised within the depressive
position to ward off high-persecutory anxiety, but with a slight difference;
paranoid notions still exist, however they take into consideration concern for
the object (Klein 1960). Within this position, the ego can either outright deny
reality, or it can deny the significance of reality; henceforth described as
‘significance-repudiation’. In doing so, the ego can omnipotently control
reality, treating it with either a sense of triumph or contempt. Segal concurs,
stating that it can thus be “omnipotently controlled and treated with triumph
and contempt so that the loss of the object shall not give rise to pain or guilt”
(Segal 1979, p. 81). At the same time, the ego “endeavours ceaselessly to
master and control all its objects and the evidence of this effort is its
hyperactivity.” (Klein 1935, p. 162). When the ego encounters this loss, it
encounters the loss of the reassurance it provided, and develops a sense of
hate towards the object for having left. The ego is then confronted with the
fact that it is at risk of losing its “good” internal objects. Segal (1979, p. 82)
demonstrates this with a clear example,
“Mourners who seek to blame in a paranoid way doctors or nurses, say, for the
death of the loved one, or who experience self reproaches and
171
self-devaluation in a truly melancholic way. Manic defences are also mobilized
by mourning. As a defence against the pain of loss, unconscious contempt
and triumph can be mobilized. This, in turn, increases the guilt, making it
harder to restore in one's mind the lost person as a good internal object, and
it adds to the pain and length of the work of mourning.”
One can understand then, when examining the COVID-19 pandemic, why
such visceral reactions and criticism were aimed at medical professionals. In
accepting that these professionals performed to the best of their ability, and
the loved one succumbed to the disease, one would have to accept the
nature of the pandemic and in turn, recognise the harsh reality of what has
befallen them. In addition to this, the pandemic increased manic defences in
other ways. Due to the nature of lockdowns, a great deal of the population
were told to stay at home, unoccupied with nothing to distract them from
persecutory anxiety, and no loved object to placate them, struggling to
communicate their anxiety towards their current situation. This can lead to an
inability to distinguish psychic reality from consensual reality (Ogden 1984, p.
188). This form of behaviour can lead to “an excessive weakening of the ego, a
feeling that there is nothing to sustain it, and a corresponding feeling of
loneliness” (Klein 1946, p. 113). Owing to this, one can observe the nature of the
role of the manic defences as another key facet to understanding the
relevance of Kleinian theory within contemporary public mood. One can
172
identify notions of the paranoid-schizoid position, both in media reporting
and within public attitudes, as well as manic defences within the context of
lockdowns during COVID-19.
Having read and understood Klein’s wealth of research and theory, it would
be useful at this stage to recognise the primary criticism of Kleinian
psychodynamics. Klein’s demonisation of the paranoid-schizoid position and
her idealisation of the depressive position is something to be addressed.
Ogden (2019, p29) highlights Klein’s own pathologisation of the notion,
stating that Klein has a tendency to “valorize the depressive mode and
villainize the paranoid-schizoid mode”. This attitude is natural to assume, as
the paranoid-schizoid position pertains directly to denial, binary oppositions
and idealised versions of the self. However, on the first hand, the depressive
position is not without its own defences, and on the other, the
paranoid-schizoid position is a vital element of the human condition. As such,
the concept of the paranoid-schizoid should be treated as a position as
opposed to a point of regression. Transitioning into this position can take
place at various points throughout one’s life, before being worked through
and entering the depressive position, within which, it faces its own challenges
and defences. An additional point to note in regards to Klein’s work is that it is
very much conformant to early 20th century ideals, owing to the reliance on
the mother being all-present and breastfeeding. In the 21st century,
173
breastfeeding is not a necessary option. In addition to this, Kleinian theory
does not take into consideration other cultures, focusing primarily on Western
civilisation. However, this could point to Kleinian theory being more
appropriate to the analysis of political culture and society and act as a
strength in understanding political culture as a whole as opposed to
individual study of infants. The analysis and discussion within this dissertation
shall be conducted taking this into consideration, treating the notions of the
paranoid-schizoid position and manic defences with care and respect,
avoiding the pitfalls of idealisation and demonisation that Klein occasionally
falls into.
Klein’s development on the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions reflect
the primary psychoanalytic stance of this dissertation, in that Klein highlights
split binary oppositions, idealised forms of the self and denial. Expanding on
this stance, one can observe societal factors as a key component in the
production of a paranoid-schizoid public mood. Owing to contemporary
political and economic conditions, as well as the means in which this is
reported and conveyed to the public via news media, paranoid-schizoid
language and thought processes occur within the mindsets of the public that
consume this media. Klein’s work does not directly pertain to societal factors,
instead focusing on the individual, and as such, one must apply Kleinian
theory to contemporary political and socio-economic discourse. Bringing this
174
notion into more modern political contexts, there are key developments
being made by several scholars and authors in the field of psychoanalysis and
critical theory. As such, key texts by Dr Amy Allen and Noelle McAfee shall also
be explored, as well as papers discussing the topic. These works are most
prominent due to their discussion of politics in the 21st century and the
Kleinian context that surrounds it.
McAfee's 2019 book “Fear of Breakdown: Politics and Psychoanalysis”
explains in detail the current trend of nationalism within western society and
relates to Kleinian psychodynamics. One of the key points within her analysis
is her exploration of Donald Trump’s rise to the U.S presidency, focusing on
nationalism. McAfee explores the appeal of nationalism to the US population,
and the means in which it was utilised by Trump to get to that point. McAfee
explores the paranoid-schizoid position in relation to this topic. She clarifies
her position foremost by stating that,
“Trying to fathom these kinds of motivations does not mean authorizing
them as reasonable or warranted; rather, it opens the door to putting them
into words so that they can be thought through and worked through”
(McAfee 2019, p. 187)
175
McAfee explores the notion that Trump’s appeal allowed for regressions to the
paranoid-schizoid position within the US population and allowed them to act
on their phantasies. Those who despised immigrants were effectively given
“permission” to split their negative elements onto others, project their hate
onto others and then act on them in the political sphere. She acknowledges
that the lack of ambiguity “can easily lead to nativism and it helps explain the
lure of authoritarian regimes’ promises to solve all problems” (McAfee 2019, p.
58). She states that the current political sphere is less of a “shared enterprise
of making difficult choices and recognizing that each choice incurs loss”, she
instead views the political sphere as a means in which individuals “champion
our own causes and candidates and demonize others” (ibid.). As a direct result
of this, groups and echo chambers form, full of people with identical
ideologies that can slowly radicalise each other over time. Owing to this,
McAfee highlights the need to move to a more depressive position within
society.
In order to progress to this more depressive public mood, McAfee proposes
creating environments reminiscent of Ancient Greek agoras. She suggests
that this will “offer more opportunities for moving from a paranoid- schizoid
politics to a politics of mourning lost idealizations” and “of coming to terms
with ambiguity to the reality that there are no ideals, utopias, or even
banisters to tell us which way to go”. (ibid.). This concept is understandable,
176
and is one of the primary means in which the public mood could work
through the paranoid-schizoid and into the depressive position. However, the
primary concern would be with the application of this practically. When
understanding the nature of late capitalism, one can understand the
necessity for businesses, politicians, governments, social media platforms and
news media outlets to promote this paranoid-schizoid way of thinking in
order to illicit personal and financial gain, and as such, this change will be
difficult to pursue without restructuring contemporary neoliberal hegemony.
McAfee concedes this point, stating that “the media industry has splintered
along ideological lines, readers and viewers can sequester themselves into
isolated camps”, highlighting that “facts are easily disregarded for whatever
“truth” seems more convenient” (McAfee 2019, pp. 146-147). However, she
indicates social media to be the primary means of communication that can
rebuild these divisions, despite the evidence to suggest increasing political
polarisation since its creation (Lilleker & Aslan Ozgul 2022, p. 42). As such,
whilst McAfee provides a clear link between Kleinian theory and
contemporary politics in regards to the Trump administration, it is clear that
Trump is perhaps more of a symptom of this public mood as opposed to
solely responsible. As such, exploration of a wider polarised public mood is
necessary, as well as exploring the direct implications of the impact of media
publications on public mood.
177
Another key reading is “Critique on the Couch: Why Critical Theory Needs
Psychoanalysis” by Dr Amy Allen. Allen argues against contemporary
rationalist viewpoints on critical theory and puts forward Kleinian
psychoanalysis as a lens in which to analyse the political realm. Effectively, her
argument addresses the Trump administration as well, however, she expands
outwards to cover other elements of society that are subject to this
paranoid-schizoid public mood. She highlights conspiracy theories as a part of
this public mood, stating that “gaining strength from and in turn fueling
increased political polarization, right-wing conspiracy theories exemplify
clearly the demonization of opponents and the distorted orientation to reality
that marks the paranoid-schizoid mode” (Allen 2021, p. 194). Essentially, she
points to right-wing political parties and news media to be responsible for
exacerbation, polarisation and paranoid-schizoid thinking.
This notion of conspiracy is of particular relevance when exploring the
COVID-19 pandemic, as this paranoid-schizoid public mood, combined with
the mundanity of lockdowns, mistrust in government and high-persecutory
anxiety provides perfect breeding ground for conspiracy theories surrounding
COVID-19. However, Allen then moves to address the nature of
paranoid-schizoid society and potential causes of this position. She discusses
the role neoliberalism has to play within the formation of the public
paranoid-schizoid mood, describing the roots of this position to be “neoliberal
178
economic restructuring and global financialized capitalism, brought to a head
by the financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath, and that is already deeply
split by racist structures of mass incarceration and the criminalization of
immigration” (Allen 2021, p. 193). Effectively, one can view the introduction of
neoliberal economic policy into mainstream political culture to be at least
partly to blame for this. Allen doesn’t delve too deeply into this notion,
however one could put forward an argument that, outside of the competitive
nature of neoliberal economics encouraging click-bait headlines and social
media echo chambers, there is encouragement of a sense of entitlement and
selfishness that is characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position as well as
neoliberal economics.
In Allen’s conclusion to to her book, she argues in a similar vein to McAfee, in
that paranoid-schizoid public mood is one that can be overcome by creating
a “utopia of a fully rationalized democracy” that while “may be a dangerous
fantasy, but democracy can enable us to negotiate ambivalence without
resorting to hatred and demonization, cope with loss, and even productively
channel aggression” (Allen 2021, p. 199). It seems that this is the means in
which the depressive position can be achieved again in both Allen and
McAfee’s view, creating spaces for citizens to engage in politics of which they
may disagree and understand that these people are not all-good or all-bad
objects, rather beings containing both elements of perceived good and bad
179
within them. This bears strong relevance to the study of Kleinian
psychodynamic theory in relation to COVID-19. Whilst Allen’s book fails to
mention the pandemic, its principles can be applied to news media reporting
of the pandemic. However, it would perhaps best be fitting to understand the
role of manic defences in modern politics in addition to this wealth of
information. Consequently, one final paper shall be examined entitled Manic
Defences in Contemporary Society.
Within this paper, Rudan et al. (2016) document very specifically the role
manic defences play within a modern socioeconomic, consumerist context,
drawing on Kleinian psychodynamics. The article examines the effects of
contemporary political culture on the individual. Similarly to Allen, Rudan et
al., pinpoint the root cause of manic defences to be neoliberal economics,
stating that
“In neoliberal culture, self-realization takes place mainly in economic and
consumerist spheres, which promotes a hypercompetitive narcissistic and
manic self that does not address the needs and suffering of others” (Rudan et
al. 2016, p. 335)
Within this capacity, the authors address the notions of selfishness and
entitlement that have cultivated as a result of this neoliberal hegemony,
180
however recognising a narcissistic element to social reality in addition. They
understand the current socio-economic framework to be one that punishes
inadequacy and yet encourages it at the same time, promoting feelings of
guilt within individuals for not living up to the increasingly more difficult
standards set by society.
Within the paper, Rudan et al. argue that this framework leads to manic
activity as businesses and financial institutions take bigger risks, governments
take bigger risks and individuals take bigger risks. They write that instead of
“applying careful examination which should logically come from the
responsible leaders, people start denying reality and engaging in
over-activity” (2016, p. 337). In essence, they recognise a transition to a more
paranoid-schizoid style of thinking when the depressive mind cannot contain
the loss and high-persecutory anxiety it is facing, characterised by manic
defences, such as denial, omnipotent control, and attempts to triumph over
the persecutory object, stating that “the signifiers of a depressive position
decrease, while the signifiers of a paranoid-schizoid position increase” (Rudan
et al. 2016, p. 335).
An additional aspect of manic defence viewed as prevalent in
contemporary consumer society is that of omnipotence, as it upholds “the
cardboard figure of an “all-good” world where everything was possible and
181
where one did not have to depend upon others for love and support” (Rudan
et al. 2016, p. 339). In this “all-good” world, one can exist within its own internal
phantasies, denying reality and controlling the world it perceives itself to exist
within. The authors recognise that the beliefs that lead to this manic
defensive position are those beliefs founded on unstable grounding,
providing the example that the pursual of work exists as a form of security
that protects the ego from persecutory anxiety and forces individuals to
invest further into consumerist society, stating that “people work more and
more in order to maintain the ability to pay with money, credit cards or other
means of payment.” (ibid.), concluding that “manic defences ensure a
“guiltless state”. In harsh, or even ruthless social conditions, they become the
only way out for many people” (ibid. p. 340). When looking at this in relation to
news media, as well as within the context of COVID-19, then one can
recognise just how “diverging narratives across programs can lead different
segments of the population to hold dramatically different views of reality.”
(Bursztyn et al. 2020). Evidence of these aforementioned manic defences can
be seen in several instances during the context of the COVID-19 pandemic;
banging pots and pans to say thank you to the NHS, hoarding toilet paper,
making banana bread, themed evenings, virtual taverns, and growing
tomatoes all contributed to an attempt to omnipotently control the
pandemic through one's own inner psychic reality.
182
Klein’s focus on the paranoid-schizoid position, depressive position and
manic defences provide a vital foundation for which the case study shall base
itself. These notions are clearly relevant in the 21st century. In terms of the
research endeavoured by McAfee, Allen and Rudan et al., there is a clear
reason for psychodynamic theory to be explored in relation to consumerist
capitalism, as well as the surge in support for right-wing political parties.
However, there is even greater capacity for Kleinian theory to be analysed
within the context of COVID-19 specifically, and can provide an exceptional
basis in which to understand the nature of the language surrounding
Dominic Cummings trip to Durham in this time and the subsequent
psychosocial mood that followed. Owing to this, one can further the research
of these vital scholars, as there is still a significant amount of detail that can
be examined in relation to COVID-19. One can apply Klein’s work to the realm
of the political, analysing the presence of paranoid-schizoid, depressive and
manic defensive language and thinking in relation to both news media and
public mood. Similarly, Allen, Rudan et al., and McAfee’s work can be
understood and developed within the context of COVID-19, recognising and
taking into consideration both the relevance of conspiracy theories, as well as
consumerism in relation to the pandemic, and as such, the basis for research
is clear.
Methodology
183
In order to understand the paranoid-schizoid language of news media and its
effect on public mood, qualitative analyses of news articles shall take place in
relation to Dominic Cummings’ trip to Durham during the height of the
COVID-19 pandemic. This shall take the form of a critical discourse analysis,
focusing on the direct reporting of the event and the stories that followed.
This will search tweets between May 22nd 2020 and May 27th 2020, in order
to analyse public mood during that period. This five-day period is the most
relevant period to examine, as after that point, discussion and criticism
around the topic seems to dwindle, with less interest being paid to it, and
more being paid to other breaking news stories. As such, the research aims
devised shall be to understand:
Does the British public currently exist in a paranoid-schizoid and manic
defensive public mood?
Is public mood exacerbated by the news media?
Owing to this, the research question devised is as follows:
“How Does News Media Influence Public Mood?”
184
In understanding the nature of contemporary public mood, one must
investigate specifically an instance in which this is best exemplified. The
incident of Dominic Cummings’ trip to Durham during the height of the
COVID-19 pandemic shall be explored. This case study is perhaps the most
relevant to explore due to the nationwide coverage of the event by every
major news source in the UK, as well as the fact that this event took place
during the first UK lockdown, in which more users were actively using social
media (Statista Research Department 2021).
Method
Having identified the research question and aims, one must next identify the
method of research for the topic. Within this instance, it is clear that
qualitative research is the best means through which to answer this question,
using critical discourse analysis. In his seminal 2010 work, Critical Discourse
Analysis: The Critical Study of Language, Norman Fairclough analyses in
depth the nature of critical discourse analysis, breaking down the
components of the term. Fairclough understands discourse to mean the
“complex relations which constitute social life: meaning, and making
meaning” (2010, p.3). Fairclough then moves on to define the research
method in greater depth, establishing that it is “part of some form of
systematic transdisciplinary analysis of relations between discourse and other
elements of the social process”, as a “systematic analysis of texts” and as
discussing “social wrongs in their discursive aspects and possible ways of
185
righting or mitigating them” (2010, pp. 10-11). It is with this definition that
critical discourse analysis shall take place within the context of the case study.
As Bryman and Bell argue, qualitative research has received criticism for
being “less scientific than the quantitative kind, and ethics committees may
prefer the epistemology of the latter, with its derived hypotheses and specific
plans” (Bryman and Bell 2022, p. 52). However, as Bryman and Bell say, it is
also valuable to obtain an-depth understanding of the themes being studied
(ibid., p. 327) which deploy “a predominantly inductive approach to the
relationship between theory and research, in which the generation of theories
and interpretations is the main goal” (Bryman and Bell, p. 16). Owing to the
nature of the case study, this approach seems most germane to the topics
being discussed, as news media language and public responses are
necessary in understanding interpretation of themes, and allowing space to
identify the social, political and affective influences on public mood
thereupon. There have been criticisms of qualitative research, however. With
it being “sometimes criticized for the anecdotal nature of its data, which
leaves the reader with no way of assessing their generalizability” (Bryman and
Bell 2022, p. 332). However, alongside this direct, more apparent meaning, it is
clear that one must also look at the underlying, less obvious meaning, as
outlined by (2010) in the book “Researching Beneath the Surface:
186
Psycho-social Research Methods in Practice”, in which Manley (2009 p97)
asserts that
“By accessing affect through imagery, we are able to understand some of the
hidden motivations in the way people think and act. This is one of the ways
we can “research below the surface” and reach fuller and more mature
understandings of how society functions”
As a result, this research shall utilise this interpretative approach to better
understand the nature of public mood. This approach enables one to unpack
the affective dynamics of the content as discussed by Klein (1935-1960) in
connection to the psychodynamics of the paranoid schizoid and depressive
position. Bryman and Bell argue that qualitative research “embodies a view of
social reality as a constantly shifting and emergent property of individuals’
creations” (Bryman and Bell 2022, p. 332). The latter sits well with the study of
fluidity of affect and its relationship to discourses identified in this study.
The data utilised for this research was collected via the gathering of tweets
and responses throughout the time period of May 22nd 2020 to May 27th
2020. These tweets and responses were collected by aligning the release of
stories in the Dominic Cummings Durham scandal, and tweets posted by the
Twitter accounts of the news media outlets, in direct regards to those stories.
187
This week of news reporting was selected due to the high intensity at which
the story spread, and the strong response it received throughout the nation.
After this intense period, disinterest crept in, and other news stories captured
the public attention. Stories such as the death of George Floyd. Primarily, the
main focus of this research shall be the interpretation of the language of both
the news headline reporting, as well as comments and tweets, identifying
paranoid-schizoid and manic defensive themes via critical discourse analysis.
By focusing on that week of intense news coverage and social media activity,
the aim here is to capture the socio-cultural, political and affective mood of
that period.
The main benefit of critical discourse analysis is that it “brings issues such as
power hierarchies, structural inequalities, and historical political struggles to
bear on the analyses of texts” (Bryman and Bell 2022, p. 404), and as such, is
the most appropriate for this case study. This research method also relates to
one of the primary reasons behind the cultural significance of Cummings’
trip; it represents structural inequality in its most basic form; if a member of
the UK government is able to break rules that the UK government has put in
place, there is a clear inequality within that structural system that needs to be
addressed. Owing to the structural inequality, it is clear that this style of social
research pertains most directly and relevantly with the nature of the research
that must be conducted. It shall provide the most straight-forward way to
188
discuss themes and traits within both news reporting and within public
discourse surrounding these news reports, bearing specific relation to
paranoid-schizoid and manic defensive themes. Within the context of this
study, there is a clear distinction in which discourse analysis can take place,
with other research into the notion of cultural mood taking place (see
Jorgensen 2019), there has been little taking a psychodynamic approach that
could see significant results.
In the identification of themes, one can look at specific paranoid-schizoid
concepts, as well as the notions of “unfairness” and “dismissal”. News stories
were identified from a range of different political biases, and the tweets
identified were those that aligned with the release of these stories. As a result
of this, the research conducted will be in a largely unstructured manner in
order to best capture language patterns, themes and rhetoric within the
content shared. The news articles from both right-leaning tabloid The Daily
Mail and broadsheet The Daily Telegraph and left-leaning tabloid The Daily
Mirror and broadsheet The Guardian were assessed in relation to Twitter
responses in the hours that followed, with care being taken to align this with
the research aims.
In the identification of themes, one can look at specific paranoid-schizoid and
manic defensive concepts, as well as the notions of “unfairness” and
189
“dismissal” (see Appendix 1). News stories were identified from a range of
different political biases, and the tweets identified were those that aligned
with the release of these stories. As a result of this, the research conducted
will be in a largely unstructured manner in order to best capture language
patterns, themes and rhetoric within the content shared. These articles were
then assessed in relation to either comments on the news site reporting the
events, or on Twitter in the hours that followed in alignment with the research
aims. These responses have been placed in a coding sheet, attached in
Appendix 1.
Having conducted an ethics checklist (See Appendix 2), there are several
elements that require clarification before progression. In regards to the
analysis of tweets, it is vital to keep the names of users and their handles
anonymous. Due to the nature of critical discourse analysis, utilising tweets is
theoretically acceptable, due to the public nature of Twitter, however direct,
express permission has not been gained. This is in-keeping with Bryman and
Bell’s notions of conduct (2022, p. 59), who write that “where such permission
has not been obtained, it is absolutely crucial to maintain the anonymity of
the people observed”. With this in mind, anonymisation shall take place. Each
Twitter user shall be anonymised as User A, User B, User C and so on, and
gender shall be anonymised when quoting tweets (see Appendix 1).
190
It is also vital to note that the concepts of the paranoid-schizoid position,
splitting, denial, idealisation and manic-defence must be treated as positions,
and not as fixed specific regressions. Throughout one’s life, these concepts
can be picked up by the ego and utilised as defence mechanisms, before
being worked through. Mitroff and Kilmann (2021, p.2) write that “in times of
extreme stress or threat, we shouldn’t be surprised to find people regressing
to the Paranoid Schizoid Position. This is exactly what has happened because
of the Coronavirus. Aided by the internet”. One must avoid acting in a way
that treats these comments, responses and replies in a way that would
replicate this paranoid-schizoid position; in that it must acknowledge that
these respondents are not “all-good” and “all-bad” and shouldn’t be
pathologised that way. Instead, it is important to remember that it is the
language utilised by these users as opposed to an assessment of the user
themself that is being analysed.
The Dominic Cummings Case Study
As established, the primary objective of this case study is to explore and
understand paranoid-schizoid and manic defensive language and themes via
analysis of Dominic Cummings’ trip to Durham during the COVID-19
pandemic. This analysis shall be used to explore the nature of individual
191
thought in order to gain direct knowledge of contemporary public mood in
the United Kingdom through a Kleinian lens, before discussing potential
further research that can be conducted in this regard.
The first aim in this research is to understand whether or not the UK exists
within a paranoid-schizoid, manic-defensive public mood. This notion shall be
answered in the analysis of responses to the news articles. The second aim is
to understand whether or not news media portray the news from a
paranoid-schizoid viewpoint. This shall be explored when looking at news
media outlets and their reporting of events as they unfolded in a
chronological manner, ensuring the most in-depth research takes place in
relation to the research questions. Each date is broken down into headings,
with specific news headlines from right-leaning newspapers The Daily Mail
and The Daily Telegraph and left-leaning newspapers The Daily Mirror and
The Guardian identified and analysed in accordance with the research aims,
with the same analysis being applied to the tweets responding to the articles.
May 22nd 2020
On May 22nd 2020, The Guardian and The Mirror broke the news of British
political advisor Dominic Cummings breach of lockdown guidelines. As
someone who spearheaded the Brexit campaign, Cummings acted to
support a campaign that these newspapers expressed vocal opposition to. As
such, one can hypothesise that these newspapers would potentially treat
192
Cummings quite harshly. The Guardian reported the event with the headline
“Pressure on Dominic Cummings to quit over lockdown breach” (Weaver
2020) and the Daily Mirror with “Dominic Cummings investigated by police
after breaking coronavirus lockdown rules” (Crerar and Armstrong 2020). One
can view this as the start of the news media narrative, establishing Cummings
in a negative light, with both news sites being accompanied by a
picture/video of him rushing out of Downing Street looking distressed. This
draws up the image of him “scurrying” away. This image, coupled with the
headlines can build up the idea of Cummings running away from
responsibility, or running from blame. This contributes to the idea of building
him up negatively in the schema of those reading. Interestingly, one can
immediately recognise subtle elements of paranoid-schizoid language within
the report of this event. The author of the Guardian article has opted to build
up the idea of Cummings completely resigning, quitting his job, in a very
all-or-nothing, split manner. As such, one can suggest that paranoid-schizoid
language has been utilised within the initial reports of this event, however it is
interesting to note that this language was utilised by the broadsheet
newspaper, as opposed to the tabloid newspaper. Convention dictates the
roles would be reversed, however it appears this is not so in this instance.
193
The reaction to this on Twitter was immediate. The themes of “unfairness”
and comparisons to one’s own personal experiences with bereaved loved
ones were shared. The language of a tweet from User A exemplifies this,
“If #DominicCummings could travel hundreds of miles during lockdown
whilst symptomatic, does that mean I could have travelled, without
symptoms, to attend my Papa’s funeral after he died of Covid-19?
It’s brutally unfair that it’s one rule for us and another for them. #resign”
(2020)
Within this, when viewed with a Kleinian lens, one can see manic defensive
traits begin to surface. The author recognises the unfair nature of the event,
and compares it to their own predicament. The language used indicates an
experience of lockdown that caused them to be plagued by high-persecutory
anxiety. When analysed alongside Cummings’ dismissive actions, one could
potentially be led to denial of psychic reality and belief that the pandemic
isn’t important as a result. Within this case, the contradictory and unfair
nature of this has been acknowledged in the language; “It’s brutally unfair
that it’s one rule for us and another for them”, but denial hasn’t taken place.
However, interestingly, this event did trigger the denial of psychic reality
within the language of others.
194
Within the reporting of this story by the Guardian and the Mirror, there were
two separate means in which denial of psychic reality took place. There was
language used that suggested a denial of the legitimacy of the story and
language that suggested a denial of the pandemic in its entirety. In regards to
the first instance, User B claims it to be “Sly Fake News and the remoaners still
bitter abour Cummings” (2020). This stance, with a Kleinian perspective, is
one that enables the mind to protect itself by denying the story and instead
attributing it to a plot by those who voted to remain in the European Union.
The manic defensive rhetoric perceives the reality of this as being too
uncomfortable and thus rejects it completely, in allowing this to take place,
the mind placates itself. One could read this as still being caught up in
concern for the object, and appearing as if it understands the reality of the
story in its entirety; targeting anger and contempt towards “remoaners”, as a
way of gaining omnipotent control. One can surmise perhaps that if the
possibility of truth is considered, reality would have to be accepted, as is the
case for User A. Effectively, that paves the way for a split mindset to emerge.
One that the perceives the sacrifices made in regards to COVID-19, have
essentially been for nothing.
In the second instance, the rhetoric of total denial of the pandemic surfaced,
with User C claiming such as “why one rule for one and another rule for
another plandemic” (2020). In this case, one can observe paranoid-schizoid
195
binary oppositions. The theme of “unfairness” is recognised. However, it
proves only to substantiate already existing ideas that COVID-19 itself isn’t real
and leans into more conspiratorial reasoning. In the case of conspiracy theory,
one can observe the language of strict, binary denial of the entirety of
high-persecutory anxiety, idealising the self, and allowing for the total denial
of that which it is threatened by. This notion of conspiracy theory is backed up
by Klein, who documents that without “temporary denial of psychic reality the
ego cannot bear the disaster by which it feels itself threatened” (1940, p141).
Allen then relates this to conspiracy theory, stating that “the more powerless,
insecure, and disenfranchised a community feels, the more likely it would be
to harbor persecutory anxieties, to feel itself constantly under attack from
shadowy, nefarious, powerful forces” (2021, p194), with Johanssen confirming
this notion stating that conspiracy theories “thus bring a sense of relief to
those who (unconsciously) desire clarity, direction and clear knowledge”
(2020, p637), a position the paranoid-schizoid position craves.
23rd & 24th May 2020
Within the next two days, the amount of articles about the trip
increased from 2 to 93, with the notion of Cummings’ resignation from office
taking the forefront. Within the language of the news articles, one can
observe clearly the notions of idealisation, denial, as well as manic defensive
demand for his resignation. The Daily Telegraph reported on the story by
attempting to shift blame from Cummings and target it at those who voted
196
to remain in the European Union, writing that “In defence of Dominic
Cummings: Don't join the blowhard Remainers calling for his head” (O’Flynn
2020) whilst the Daily Mail leaned towards language that reflected manic
defensive significance-repudiation, writing that “Boris tries to save Dominic
Cummings' job by declaring 'it's not like he was visiting a lover' as maverick
ally is accused of breaking lockdown rules” (Cole 2020). The Daily Mirror wrote
that “Dominic Cummings breaks cover to say he "doesn't care" how lockdown
travel looks” (Boyd 2020), and the Guardian utilised language that reflected
binary “us” vs “them” oppositions, stating that there is “one law for Dominic
Cummings, another for the rest of us” (The Guardian 2020). The language
used in these headlines shall now be analysed in accordance with Kleinian
theory.
The Daily Mail & The Daily Mirror
Both the Daily Mail and the Daily Mirror invited a dismissive outlook on the
story, in two different ways. The Daily Mail’s approach was to present
Cummings as an interesting, fun figure in order to dismiss the validity of the
story, whilst the Mirror’s approach was to present Cummings as a coward who
treats the pandemic dismissively. The first analyses shall be the Daily Mail.
The Daily Mail
197
Boris tries to save Dominic Cummings' job by declaring 'it's not like he was
visiting a lover' as maverick ally is accused of breaking lockdown rules”
(Cole 2020)
The language utilised within the headline of the Daily Mail draws up the
notion that the Prime Minister himself has treated the story as nothing
special, and allows room for those reading to deny psychic reality in a similar
way. If an authority figure suggests these events are of no real significance,
then it could easily lead to manic defensive thinking in those who read this
statement. Additionally, in referring to the Prime Minister as simply “Boris”
and Cummings as a “maverick ally”, it further lessens the severity of the event
and instead suggests something a bit more fun and relaxed. The central
theme of this headline can be seen as “dismissal”, and owing to this, it is
understandable that themes of denial and dismissal arose primarily in
response to this story. The top reply from User D states
“Fake news.” (2020)
This comment utilises a similar dismissive tone as the article, with the
language utilised by the user indicating complete dismissal of the entire
news story. It demonstrates a rejection of nuanced, critical thinking, leaning
more towards the denial that is the progenitor of the paranoid-schizoid
198
position. Klein’s notions of denial of psychic reality play a role in this instance.
If one were to accept the nature of the pandemic, one would have to accept
the high-persecutory anxiety that surrounds life during the pandemic.
Instead, denial of this reality protects the ego and acts as a form of placation.
The Daily Mirror
“Dominic Cummings breaks cover to say he "doesn't care" how lockdown
travel looks” (Boyd 2020)
The language utilised within this headline paints a very different image, yet
one that still enforces Kleinian theory. In essence, Cummings is seen as a man
in hiding, scared of the press, trying not to be seen, until he has finally broken
cover. However, in breaking cover, he has not apologised or admitted any
wrongdoing, rather he has dismissed the story further and admitted he
“doesn’t care” about how it looks. Naturally, this story will exacerbate
paranoid-schizoid tendencies, by stoking anger and anxiety. The central
theme of this headline can be seen as unfairness and dismissal, with this
rhetoric being exhibited in the tweets that followed in direct response. Twitter
user E directs this anger directly at Cummings, stating
“Hung up by his toes over a fire would look good but that wouldn't be right
either.” (2020)
199
This criticism pertains directly to the story - the language indicates that the
user is angry, that they are frustrated with Cummings and they claim to want
to attack him. When viewing this through a Kleinian lens, one can understand
a recognition of the ego’s desire to rid itself of the bad object (Klein 1935). If
the statement ended there, one could surmise that the user was thinking
along paranoid-schizoid terms, however, it progresses further with the line
“but that wouldn’t be right either”. This language indicates a lean towards
manic defensive thinking, in that there is a desire to act out, to do something
and to “make things right”, but the user acknowledges that they are
powerless to actually hang Dominic Cummings up by his toes over a fire. The
recognition of this within the language of this tweet can be seen in other
instances throughout the pandemic. As mentioned previously, the desire to
make bread, grow tomatoes or host virtual parties allowed the ego to feel it
was doing something, sometimes into hyperactivity. As such, the ego was
able to stave away the thoughts of the high persecutory anxiety that
surrounded it with the sense that it was doing something; one can see this
manic defensive activity replicated within the language of the user. One
could also point to the rhetoric of killing Dominic Cummings as existing as a
form of omnipotent control; the ego works to triumph over Cummings in
order to reject this high-persecutory anxiety (Segal 1979).
200
Another example of manic defences in regards to this situation came
from User F who stated that,
“i am not angry at him, but angry at the media and labour etc for boring the
fxxx out of me all day with this non story” (2020)
This language demonstrates a further lean towards denial of psychic reality,
with frustrations and anger being directed at “the media and labour”. The
rhetoric of this tweet implies that, while the event may have happened, it has
been blown way out of proportion by the news media and by the Labour
party. This position could allow for the ego to treat the situation with both a
sense of dismissal, as well as with a sense of contempt, allowing omnipotent
control over it. It is clear then, that from these examples, one can observe
denial, manic defence and elements of the paranoid-schizoid position.
The language within these first two headlines draws up the idea that not just
Cummings, but the government itself believe that the pandemic is no longer
of significance, suggesting that the sacrifices of the British public have all
been for nothing. This concept relates directly to the provocation of manic
defensive thinking. Effectively, if the ego starts to think along the lines that
“all the sacrifices I have made have been for nothing”, it can lead to anxiety
201
and fear as to what to do next, with potential thought processes being that “if
obeying the rules doesn’t matter anymore, what do I do?”. This can lead to
hyperactive activities, such as flouting of the rules, demonstrations, and
erratic thinking (Klein 1940).
The Guardian and the Daily Telegraph
In the case of the broadsheet newspapers, one would expect to observe a
sense of less sensationalistic, less provocative headlines, with less use of
paranoid-schizoid and manic defensive language. However, there are
subtleties to the news reporting that could potentially indicate these traits
within the writing.
The Guardian
“One law for Dominic Cummings, another for the rest of us”
(The Guardian 2020)
Within the Guardian’s headline, one can observe both the continued use of
split thinking; it persists in furthering the distance between what it perceives
to be the public and Dominic Cummings. This contributes to the theme of
unfairness and this use of language can potentially cause further rhetoric of
this nature to persist through the discussion of the story. If this language
becomes the norm, the entire discussion will take place through that lens. In
202
the analysis of responses to this, it becomes clear that this split thinking is
already forming in those discussing the topic. User G commented that
“Really the child who had been in contact with their mother with
COVID-19 talk about spreading the virus !!!!! Please, one rule for us one rule for
them.” (2020)
The language of this user quite succinctly demonstrates the notion that the
Guardians reporting of Cummings’ trip to Durham has stimulated split, binary
“us” vs “them” oppositions within political discourse. With this user in fact,
repeating the language used by the Guardian, with the term “one rule for us
one rule for them”. It appears as if this user has accepted this framework as
being par for the course when it comes to the discussion of the topic,
acknowledging the themes of unfairness within this context. It would be
interesting to note whether, in controlled conditions, this user continued to
utilise this narrative framework, or whether it ceased to be of significance
once the narrative had shifted, or the terminology changed. Further research
conducted could examine the lasting effects of paranoid-schizoid culture in
relation to individuals.
203
User H takes a disavowing stance, relinquishing the ideas of personal
responsibility and denying the significance of the pandemic as a result of this.
They state that
“It’s a green light for everyone to break the lockdown rules.” (2020)
With the user’s disavowal of the lockdown rules, it would make controlling the
virus more difficult, and potentially lead one down the route of conspiracy
theory. From a Kleinian perspective, this disavowal is an example of
introjection; Cummings, perceived as an authority figure, has committed an
act that has changed the narrative of the pandemic. As such, it allows space
for the potential of a change in public mood. When these notions of dismissal,
insignificance and disregard come to the fore within political discourse, it can
be introjected by the individual and they can exhibit traits that pertain to that
which has been introjected (Klein 1946, p.24).
The Daily Telegraph
“In defence of Dominic Cummings: Don't join the blowhard Remainers calling
for his head” (O’Flynn 2020)
The Daily Telegraph’s article is perhaps the most interesting to examine. The
language used focuses on rivalries on a brexit-based, neoliberal line
potentially to create split mindsets to curry favour for Cummings. It focuses
on the black-and-white of Leave voters vs Remain voters, implying that to be
204
outraged with Cummings is to be acting as a Remainer would; painting those
who voted to stay in the European Union in a negative light, focusing on the
idealisation of the Leave voter. This attitude was not condoned at all by those
online and was rejected entirely. User I stated that
“Why should anyone obey the lockdown at all? When the architect of policy
clearly doesn't give a shit. The route to anarchy my friends.” (2020)
The intended function of the headline didn't have its desired effect, and it
appears to have reinforced the notion of disavowal and disobedience within
its respondents. The rejection of the pandemic’s significance once again
comes to the fore within this statement, with the user highlighting
Cummings authority as a means in which to justify dismissal of the
pandemic, treating him in a contemptuous manner as they do so. This
justification of morally ambiguous actions via the utilisation of politically
authoritative figures is a commonality of a lot of the statements in regards to
this story. The notion of following authority to justify disobeyal can be related
directly to the fundamentals of Kleinian theory. Cummings, in his actions, can
almost be observed to be an idealised figure, that the ego takes pleasure in
demonising, and using it as a means in which to justify manic defensive traits.
Allen (2021 p119) documents this, quoting Klein (1937), stating that,
205
“this separation of love from hate in both our intimate and our broader social
relationships “affords relief, both because the ‘good’ person is spared and
because there is satisfaction in hating someone who is thought to be worthy
of it.”
Developing on this, one could posit that the respondents, and the authors of
the tweets are those deemed to be Klein’s “good” person, sparing their own
guilt and responsibility by hating Cummings.
It is clear that on the 23rd and 24th of May 2020, elements of both
paranoid-schizoid and manic defensive positions are taking place both within
news media and within online discussions, almost creating a feedback loop,
with language being repeated and opinions being formed directly on the
basis of that which has been read. It is interesting to note the themes of
unfairness, dismissal and deferred responsibility that have surfaced as a result
of this analysis, especially when one considers the research aims and the
psychodynamic context of the literature review.
25th May 2020
Moving forward to 25th May 2020, Dominic Cummings hosted a press
briefing, in which he discussed the events that transpired, and members of
the British public went to beaches during the sun. Within the reporting of this
story, there were various elements of paranoid-schizoid thinking, as
206
exemplified in the headlines listed. The Daily Mail wrote “'Ever get the feeling
you've been cheated?” (May 2020), The Daily Mirror wrote that “Brits flock to
beaches to enjoy Bank Holiday sun amid fears lockdown could collapse”
(Murphy 2020), the Guardian stated that “Dominic Cummings refuses to
resign or apologise for lockdown breach” (Mason 2020), with the Telegraph
writing that “Beach-goers cite Dominic Cummings lockdown breaches as
reason for packed resort” (Horton 2020). In accordance with the central
research aims, these headlines, and their subsequent responses shall be
analysed in conjunction with the central themes of unfairness and dismissal.
The Daily Mail & The Daily Mirror
Both of these headlines, whilst not specifically being written in a
paranoid-schizoid way, can provoke those feelings within readers schema. The
Daily Mail’s approach thus far has been to highlight the dismissive nature of
Cummings attitude towards his trip, in a manic defensive position of
significance-repudiation. This is continued with the headline “Ever get the
feeling you’ve been cheated?”. Whereas the Daily Mirror opted to start
observing the implications of Dominic Cummings trip, highlighting the
notion that lockdown could collapse, and the ramifications of the manic
defences outlined by reporting that has preceded it.
The Daily Mail
207
'Ever get the feeling you've been cheated?” (May 2020)
In the first instance, “Ever get the feeling you’ve been cheated?” can be read
as something that invokes a split mindset and an idealisation of the self. It
promotes the idea that the reader is free of all bad elements, being a victim to
Cummings’ actions and being expected to deal with the outcome. It
highlights the unfair nature of the event by alluding to the idea that “you are
being lied to and all your sacrifices have been for nothing”. The idea of being
cheated in this context is represented by the idea that Cummings has placed
himself above the reader, leading to the notion that the reader could have
done what they wanted all this time. The Twitter responses to this were fairly
divisive, with a multitude of the comments treading on the toes of conspiracy
theory. User J states,
“CAN YOU ALL NOT SEE WHAT IS HAPPENING HERE ? THIS MAN IS WHOME
MADE BREXIT HAPPEN AND IT IS VERY CLEAR HE IS BEING TARGETED BY
MAINSTREAM MEDIA BECAUSE OF THIS. THE MSM DONT GIVE A HOOT
ABOUT YOU ALL GETTING COVID AS THEY PROVED WHEN THEY WAS ALL
HUDDLED TOGETHER AT HIS HOUSE !” (2020)
208
Within this, there is a host of information to be broken down. Firstly, within
the language of the user, one can detect anger. Klein wrote that when in a
state of anger, the ego can slip into the paranoid-schizoid position and
illogical thinking (1957). In this case, the assertion that “HE IS BEING
TARGETED BY MAINSTREAM MEDIA'' because of his ties to Britain leaving the
European Union during the Brexit campaign doesn’t consider the fact that
the Daily Mail endorsed this Brexit campaign fervently in the run up to Brexit
and within contemporary publishing, and so acts as an illogical contradiction.
This is also an example of the idealisation of the self; the language seems to
express that the user views their opinion as 100% accurate, with little to no
need for research. Within this state, one can reject nuance and, in a political
sense, fail to perform even the most cursory of research. In this sense then,
the language displayed by User J demonstrates a belief of omnipotent control
in demonising the media from an self-idealisatory perspective. Additionally,
the validity of the story is denied here. From a manic-defensive stance, this
can be perceived as significance-repudiation, as the focus was taken away
from the story and directed instead on the nature of the reporting itself.
The Daily Mirror
“Brits flock to beaches to enjoy Bank Holiday sun amid fears lockdown could
collapse” (Murphy 2020)
209
The focus of the Daily Mirror’s headline differed from the rest of the reporting,
in that it was the first to assess the implications of Cummings’ visit to Durham
on the public mood. The article focused on members of the public going to
Bournemouth beach on a hot bank holiday, in contravention of official
COVID-19 guidelines, and posits the question that it could be as a result of
Cummings’ behaviour. This article can lead to division between those who are
obeying the guidelines and those who aren’t; extending the issue from a
position of solidarity against Cummings, to a divisive issue amongst readers.
As such, those reading who oppose the actions of these individuals can
potentially be perceived to be anxious about Cummings, can be anxious
about the notion that lockdown could collapse, anxious at the people who are
not following guidelines, and anxious about the fact that this could provoke
further spread of the disease. This notion of unfairness is exemplified in the
responses that were made to it. User K wrote that,
“Same people I bet who are saying its too dangerous to send my child to
school or go back to work. Morons.” (2020)
As can be observed, there is a shift in frustration and anger from Dominic
Cummings that is redirected to the general public, branding them “morons”.
The theme of unfairness is brought up in an unjustified way within this
example. Whilst one should be careful not to condone the actions of those
210
who went to the beaches, the User states that these are the “same people I
bet who are saying its too dangerous to send my child to school or go back to
work”. This cannot be proven, however, within Kleinian language, one can
assess this to be a form of denial. It creates a phantasy within the ego that
allows justification for its frustration and anger, allowing itself to feel a greater
sense of comfort in demonising its perceived threat, allowing room to deny
the sense of control it has lost, Ogden (1984, p.142) writes that “lost objects are
not mourned for, they are (in phantasy) magically repaired or re-created”.
The Guardian and the Daily Telegraph
The Guardian
“Dominic Cummings refuses to resign or apologise for lockdown breach”
(Mason 2020)
Within the Guardians commentary, the provocation of this rage is more
subtle. Effectively, in the use of the term “refused”, a defiant, angry image of
Cummings is drawn up as someone who believes they are above the law,
arrogant and entitled. It highlights Cummings as the enemy of the reader, as
he “refuses” to apologise to the reader, who he has wronged. This headline
reinforced the divisive, binary oppositions of the paranoid-schizoid position in
211
a subtle, yet direct manner. One can observe the implications of this by
examining the direct tweet responses to it. User L stated in response to this,
"All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others."
(2020)
This user invokes imagery of Orwell’s Animal Farm. Implying that the nature
of political hierarchy allows for those in power to take liberties in a way that
those without power cannot. The unfair nature of Cummings trip is thus
highlighted within this statement. This mindset represents a more calm
attitude towards the events that have taken place, in that one can read the
nature of this response to correlate with a more depressive position (Klein
1935). This language accepts Cummings’ trip, and recognises that due to the
state of contemporary British political culture, little will likely change, due to
the power imbalances that exist. One can view acceptance of these power
imbalances as indicative of the depressive position due to the necessity of
nuance within this position - in understanding both the unfair nature of this
situation, as well as recognising that the British media and British
government existing in its current position will not allow for this imbalance to
be rectified, this nuance is established, and yet the unfair nature of the
situation is addressed with the quote.
212
The Daily Telegraph
“Beach-goers cite Dominic Cummings lockdown breaches as reason for
packed resort” (Horton 2020)
The Daily Telegraph’s headline indicates the possibility that the British public
are looking at Cummings’ actions to justify their own breach of lockdown
guidelines. This notion can be seen in two ways. These beach-goers can be
perceived to be dismissive of the significance of the pandemic, or they can be
seen as part of the same ilk as Cummings; uncaring about the ramifications
of their actions. One can hypothesise that this headline appears to reiterate
both the themes of unfairness and dismissal, and can lead to
paranoid-schizoid “us” vs “them” thinking in regards to those who have
attended the beach. This supports the theme of dismissal that has been
prevalent throughout this narrative, as well as that of unfairness. In response
to this article, User M writes,
“You mean that people will find an excuse anywhere” (2020)
This User’s language reiterates the same sentiments that are clear from other
statements; one of frustration and an acknowledgement of unfairness. This
unfairness comes not from Cummings, but from the British public. The notion
of “finding an excuse” lends itself to further division within the British public.
213
The notion of “people” in this instance acts as a means in which to Other
certain groups, allowing for assumptions to be made about the intentions of
those that which the User disagrees with. If observed with a manic defensive
lens, this Othering leads to feelings of contempt and triumph within the ego.
This allows for the ego to feel a sense of placation in its triumph over the
Othered “people”. However, it should be noted, this can add to guilt within
the ego. In this instance, guilt pertains to the notion of “the people”. In
distancing itself from the concept of “people”, the ego rejects the guilt that
emerges as a result of their being part of it. Segal states that “as a defence
against the pain of loss, unconscious contempt and triumph can be
mobilized. This, in turn, increases the guilt, making it harder to restore in one's
mind the lost person as a good internal object, and it adds to the pain and
length of the work of mourning” (1979 p.82).
It is possible from this example that splitting and manic defensive
significance-repudiation have taken place, with blame expanding outwards;
from the isolated event itself to those who have attended the beaches during
the May bank holiday. The shift of blame from simply Cummings’ actions to
the actions of the British public enable a further split mindset to emerge;
within which, one can observe “us” vs “them” binary oppositions being
established within the language of the commenters, allowing for further
polarisation. The narrative marks an end to the solidarity that surrounds
214
Cummings, with the public dividing into those who believe the rules of the
pandemic should now be lifted and those who believe the opposite. Whilst
one cannot justify the actions of the beach-goers, one can perceive these
actions to be manic defensive. With the unconscious attempt to pursue
mastery and omnipotent control of all of the ego’s objects. As Klein writes “by
mastering his objects the manic person imagines he will prevent them not
only from injuring himself but from being a danger to one another” (1935,
p.162). This manic defence provides a means in which to respond to the
high-persecutory anxiety that surrounds the ego via mastery of the object. In
replicating Cummings actions, a sense of fullness can be restored within the
ego and reparation can take place. That which has been “taken away” by
Cummings can be reacquired; in this case, a sense of control.
27th May 2020
On the 27th May 2020, the Daily Mail shifted its narrative to blame the
BBC for being responsible for spreading misinformation, writing that “BBC is
blasted for 'bare-faced bias' after Emily Maitlis states as fact that Dominic
Cummings 'broke the rules'” (Dual & Ridler 2020). The Daily Mirror stated that
“PM's spokesperson insists Dominic Cummings acted 'legally and with
integrity'” (Wilkes 2020), the Guardian wrote that “Lockdown violators using
Cummings as excuse, say police” (Murphy and Bowcott 2020) and the Daily
215
Telegraph stated that “Tory MPs revolt as voters turn on Dominic Cummings”
(Raynor 2020). These headlines shall be assessed in relation to the themes of
the research, as well as in relation to the notions of paranoid-schizoid and
manic-defensive thinking.
The Daily Mail & The Daily Mirror
Within the tabloid reporting of the event, the Daily Mail and the Daily
Mirror took different approaches. The Daily Mail focussed blame on
newsnight presenter Emily Maitlis, indicating a shift in division within the
language of the news; encapsulating more characters within the narrative to
be blamed and targeted in a manner similar to binary opposition. While the
Daily Mirror focused on Cummings and the scandal itself, continuing with the
themes of unfairness and dismissal.
The Daily Mail
BBC is blasted for 'bare-faced bias' after Emily Maitlis states as fact that
Dominic Cummings 'broke the rules'” (Dual & Ridler 2020)
In response to the Daily Mail’s article, Twitter user N stated that “When are
these BROADHATERS going to be sacked for ABUSING their positions.What
LAW did D.C. BREAK? NONE.Therefore they are BANG out of order.The Public
216
PAY their Licence fee to have UNBIASED NEWS.Public deserve a REFUND
from the BBC ASAP…”. The language used within this highlights denial and
idealisation of the event. The user interprets the story as a means in which
injustice has been committed by the BBC. One could argue that their
language “What LAW did D.C BREAK? NONE…” reframes the argument in
order to gain control. Instead of focusing on the disobeyal of COVID-19
guidelines, the user instead shifts the statement to be about the law instead,
asserting that no law was broken. One could read this tweet as an example of
the complex nature of the idealisation of the self. There is a narrative
established that denies reality, and opts to support it, based on the fact that it
would make the ego feel protected. This can only take place with the
idealisation of the self; with total belief that the self is right, outright denial of
that which surrounds it can take place. Within this narrative, The ego then
establishes an Other. In this case, the user moves to demonise the BBC for
being “BANG out of order.The Public PAY their Licence fee to have UNBIASED
NEWS”. This Othering is necessary in order to project fears, insecurities and
worries onto, that can then be attacked. The language utilised within the
tweet certainly implies this, when analysed through this Kleinian lens,
however, it should be noted that, at this stage it is unknown what
“BROADHATERS” are.
The Daily Mirror
217
“PM's spokesperson insists Dominic Cummings acted 'legally and with
integrity'” (Wilkes 2020)
In regards to this article, Twitter user O stated that,
“We insist the he's a liar and a hypocrite” (2020).
The language within this statement is something to be noted. In the initial
instance, one can observe split, binary oppositionary language taking place,
with the idea of Cummings being “a liar and a hypocrite” exemplifying this.
Additionally, this language indicates split, binary thinking. If the bad object is
attacked, the phantasy can be restored. In Kleinian terms, the bad breast can
be shunned, and the good breast embraced (1946). As such, the language of
this tweet can indicate a desire to rid the self of the anxiety-provoking object,
allowing it to triumph over the bad object and return to a state of perceived
happiness. This rhetoric of “we insist'' indicates the idealisation of the self,
presenting one’s own stance as entirely correct while dismissing the
possibility of nuance. This stance maintains a more paranoid-schizoid position
than a manic defensive one, however one could argue that in this response,
significance-repudiation takes place; rejecting the importance of the story.
The Guardian & the Daily Telegraph
218
Within the language of the Guardian and the Daily Telegraph, there is
further division in reporting. The Guardian opts to focus on the beachgoers
and the relevance of Cummings trip to their flouting of the rules, focusing a
portion of blame onto the British public, whereas the Daily Telegraph opts to
defend Cummings’ actions, writing that the country requires him, despite his
rule-breaking.
The Guardian
“Lockdown violators using Cummings as excuse, say police” (Murphy and
Bowcott 2020).
This headline provoked further paranoid-schizoid language, with Twitter
User P stating,
“Left-wing police talking to a left-wing rag.” (2020)
Effectively, within this, one can observe significance-repudiation, “us” vs
“them” thinking, and Othering. In the first instance, the User dismisses the
significance of the police reports by indicating that their belief that the police
are “left-wing” invalidates their statements. User P progresses to express that
if the police reports are in fact accurate, they don’t matter as they have been
reported to a “left-wing rag”. In so-doing, the user is able to find a
manic-defensive comfort in its denial of the importance of the story, treating
it with contempt in order to continue existing, unaffected by the anxiety it
provokes. Additionally, within this statement, one can recognise a split
219
mindset and Othering of the Left. In the belief that the Left has no credibility,
the User demonises left-wing thinking without further consideration. One can
postulate that if the user were to admit that the Left could be taken seriously,
they would subsequently admit that their belief in “left-wing police” could still
be of relevance, and the “left-wing rag” could be reporting the truth.
The Daily Telegraph
“Tory MPs revolt as voters turn on Dominic Cummings” (Raynor 2020)
This headline documents the break-down of political ties with Conservative
Party MP’s and Dominic Cummings, further highlighting Cummings as an
“us” vs “them” split figure. Within this statement, the notion of Cummings
being revolted against demonstrates the idea of him being an authoritative
figure that should be challenged and that the MPs who have “revolted” have
joined the side of the people. This headline was challenged by User Q, who
stated that the MPs were
“35 remainders who we can do without.” (2020)
In terms of this statement, there are ties to conspiracy theory, as well as
denial. In accusing “35 remainders” (a typo of “remainers”), the User leans into
conspiracy theory, asserting that these MPs are those who voted to remain in
220
the European Union, and as such, should be ignored. The User engages in
significance-repudiation by denying the relevance of the opinions of
Remain-voting MPs. This can be viewed as conspiratorial reasoning, due to
the fact that these Conservative MPs weren’t all Remain-voting. For example,
a prominent figure was one Steve Baker, who self-identifies as
“brexit-hardman Steve Baker” (Baker 2016).
One can view this language as being indicative of aforementioned denial, as
supported by Klein, who states that “without partial and temporary denial of
psychic reality the ego cannot bear the disaster by which it feels itself
threatened” (1940, p141). It demonstrates the idea that, within conspiracy
theory, idealisation represents the presence of absolute power. If one
perceives something to have absolute power, one can control its own psychic
reality and have omnipotent control over it. In addition, the concept of
“remainers” (in this instance, one can hypothesise that “remainers” represents
unwanted governmental forces) creates a phantasy of the ‘other’ to emerge.
This other can then have any negative, angry and high-persecutory anxieties
projected onto it, and then can be criticised and attacked accordingly. This is
the nature of a considerable amount of conspiracy theories and is an area of
research that can be examined with a Kleinian lens even further. Additionally,
in analysis of this statement, one can observe also the denial of the
importance of the event, as is characterised by the nature of manic defence.
221
This demonstrates that there is not entire investment in the belief that the
story itself isn’t real, rather manic attempts at denying it and placating the
ego.
As this story progressed, similar attitudes were shown. However, the
first five days of this story showed to be the most intriguing, past this point,
answers tended to lean more towards frustration that the story was still being
written about. These five days establish the divisive and polarising means in
which both the story of Cummings’ trip was reported, the various other
elements of society that were also blamed, and the increase of divisory, split
and manic-defensive mindsets within those consuming the articles. There are
also elements of conspiracy theory that take place within the case study that
can be researched further, with the “Remainer” plot being something that
appears within the last example, as well as within a number of other
examples.
One can potentially observe the nature of paranoid-schizoid language within
the events surrounding the Cummings’ affair and the direct implications of
this on public mood during the COVID-19 pandemic. This is made apparent
by observing the language used by the public in the direct aftermath of it. It
can read that Dominic Cummings’ trip to Durham county led to a denial of
psychic reality, creating a public mood that says “if he’s broken rules, the
222
pandemic is obviously not that bad”. This could potentially explain the
swathes of people heading to beaches during the summer, as well as an
exacerbation of conspiracy theories, although these notions would have to be
tested in more rigorous studies. However, it is clear that manic defences
exhibited during lockdowns led to the aforementioned denial of psychic
reality, as there was the belief that the pandemic was clearly of little
significance, dismissing the importance of high-persecutory anxiety. In
addition, it led to feelings of either control, contempt or triumph. In the first
instance, it became clear that the notion of control and contempt were
prevalent, with the accusations of it being a “remoaner” plot, and the denial of
the existence of the pandemic altogether.
This was one of the more key themes that arose during the analysis. With
Users C, J and Q demonstrating language that pertains to conspiracy theory.
This language seems to deny psychic reality and high-persecutory anxiety
and instead seeks placation in paranoid-schizoid, self-idealisatory notions.
These notions allow the ego to deny that which confronts it, projecting these
anxieties onto an Other and feel an omnipotent sense of control and triumph
over it. One can note that Klein’s understanding of the paranoid-schizoid
position closely mirrors that of conspiracy theory, with the former being
defined by Douglas (2021, p271) as prospering “in times of crisis as people look
for ways to cope with difficult and uncertain circumstances”. In further
223
research then, one could conduct analysis of conspiracy theory in relation to
high-persecutory anxiety within times of stress, with perhaps specific focus
on conspiracy theory during the COVID-19 pandemic.
An interesting element to note is the existence of the depressive position at
play within the context of Cummings’ trip, in that within a great deal of the
comments made and arguments being presented, there is a sense that one
could potentially damage one’s internal objects, as is the case with User M,
and as such, provides a link that this instance affected the public on both a
paranoid-schizoid level, as well as affecting those within depressive positions.
As such, further research conducted could focus on the relationship between
conspiracy theory and high-persecutory anxiety, with focus on how, in times
of this anxiety, the ego can shift into paranoid-schizoid thinking, idealisation
and significance-repudiation.
This case-study has demonstrated that not only is Kleinian psychodynamics
relevant to contemporary politics, but perhaps is one of the best ways to
explain the situation in Western democracy as a whole. This research could be
conducted again in relation to the ongoing investigation into the UK
Conservative governments hosting of illegal parties during nationwide
lockdowns and the direct effects on the British public, as there is clear
evidence that media consumption influences the attitudes presented by
224
ordinary members of the public, and leads to the question of nuance within
reporting. If news articles focused more on representing the nature of
political events in a balanced, nuanced way - would there be a direct
influence on the recipient? As such, in further research, a mixed-methods
approach could be taken, presenting candidates with news reporting; one
with a paranoid-schizoid slant and one with a depressive slant, and observing
their direct responses to this. Additionally, in understanding the impact of this
trip, it may perhaps be worth identifying those who decided to take the
pandemic less seriously after the event. Although, in practice it could be
potentially problematic to locate such specific groups. This Kleinian lens can
also be useful to explain the nature of conspiracy theory via qualitative,
interview/critical discourse analysis. Alternatively, in pursuing McAfee (2019)
and Allen’s (2021) notions of communication and sharing of ideas within
modern political agoras, one could initially conduct questionnaires based
around the idea to understand if this concept would gain popularity, and to
understand whether or not the public can perceive the reality that
paranoid-schizoid thinking is taking place.
Another element of this study that became more apparent as the study
progressed was the subtlety of broadsheet news media reporting in relation
to the paranoid-schizoid and manic defensive positions. There are definite
tendencies utilised within the language, such as the Guardian’s “Pressure on
225
Dominic Cummings to quit over lockdown breach” (Weaver 2020), or perhaps
the use of “Dominic Cummings refuses to resign or apologise for lockdown
breach” (Mason 2020) as mentioned previously. Whilst this language isn’t as
overt as the more right-wing tabloid press, it is a clear indicator that despite
the reputation of broadsheets as being more reliable, elements of divisive
language exist within that realm of news media publishing as well. Owing to
this, it would perhaps be important to conduct the study again, utilising
specifically broadsheet press instead of broadsheet and tabloid press. This
would aid in understanding the level of paranoid-schizoid and manic
defensive thinking within their writing.
It is clear, then, that creating spaces in which healthy conversation can take
place would be beneficial to move on from paranoid-schizoid,
manic-defensive thinking within society, as McAfee (2019) and Allen (2021)
both pointed out. These spaces would enable people to interact with one
another without the influence of news media, social media and prejudice. In
this regard, groups would be able to interact, share commonalities and work
together to understand the means in which society can progress, effectively
breaking down the divisions that have been created. However, the problems
that this notion faces are perhaps insurmountable. In regards to the
contemporary state of political discourse, one can trace this back to the
neoliberal political framework, and its encouragement of selfish, entitled
226
thinking, as well as ultra-competitive profit-making news media and social
media corporations. One can recognise the necessity as a society to progress
from this stance, however, existing under capitalist measures means this is
not in the interests of financial institutions, right-wing, populist and neoliberal
governments. If discussion groups were implemented, it would potentially
pose a direct challenge to those institutions. Additionally, one can trace
apathy in politics to be of significance. As mentioned in the introduction,
Blair’s shift from representation of the working class to embracing
neoliberalism within the Labour party, left huge swathes of the working class
disenfranchised with politics, governments and political institutions resulting
in apathy. As such, even with the existence of these groups and other
deliberate attempts to work through this division, there is little chance the
public would consider them to be worthy of their time or effort, instead
resigning to the hopelessness that has been so embedded in British political
culture. Essentially, the only means in which this change can occur, is with an
overhaul of the British political system. One can speculate however, perhaps
cynically, that this overhaul will be met with derision and extreme criticism or
complete ignorance from news media outlets and politicians that rely on the
current hegemony, with apathetic stances from the public. As such, one
could surmise that this change will not come without committed research,
study and, above all, empathy.
227
Reference List
Allen, A., 2021. Critique on the Couch : Why Critical Theory Needs
Psychoanalysis. 1st ed. New York: Columbia University Press.
228
Baker, S., 2016. Brexit Hardman Steve Baker [online]. www.youtube.com.
Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=65WAyD-AxO8 [Accessed
18 Apr 2022].
Bollas, C., 1979. The Transformational Object. International Journal of
Psychoanalysis, 60 (1), 97–107.
Bollas, C., 2018. Meaning and melancholia : life in the age of bewilderment. 1st
ed. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, Ny: Routledge.
Boulding, C., Mullenax, S. and Schauer, K., 2021. Crime, Violence, and Political
Participation. International Journal Of Public Opinion Research, 34 (1).
Boyd, M., 2020. Dominic Cummings breaks cover to say he doesn’t care how
lockdown travel looks [online]. The Mirror. Available from:
https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/breaking-dominic-cummings-breaks-c
over-22074482 [Accessed 22 Mar 2022].
Bryman, A. and Bell, E., 2022. Social Research Methods. 6th ed. S.L.: Oxford
Univ Press.
Bursztyn, L., Rao, A., Roth, C. and Yanagizawa-Drott, D., 2020. Opinions as
Facts. SSRN Electronic Journal [online], 1 (1), 1. Available from:
https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/BFI_WP_202044.pdf [Accessed
29 Apr 2020].
Cole, H., 2020. Boris: It’s not like Cummings was visiting a lover’ [online]. Mail
Online. Available from:
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8350755/Ministers-squirm-insist-Do
229
minic-Cummings-did-NOT-break-rules.html#comments [Accessed 29 Mar
2022].
Crerar, P. and Armstrong, J., 2020. Dominic Cummings investigated by police
after breaking Covid-19 lockdown rules [online]. The Mirror. Available from:
https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/dominic-cummings-investigated-polic
e-after-22072579 [Accessed 29 Mar 2022].
Douglas, K. M., 2021. COVID-19 conspiracy theories. Group Processes &
Intergroup Relations, 24 (2), 271.
Duell, M. and Ridler, F., 2020. Emily Maitlis DID breach BBC’s impartiality rules,
admits broadcaster [online]. Mail Online. Available from:
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8360695/Emily-Maitlis-states-fact-Do
minic-Cummings-broke-rules.html#comments [Accessed 28 Mar 2022].
Edelman Trust, 2021. 21st Annual Edelman Trust Barometer [online]. Edelman
Trust. New York City: Edelman Trust. Available from:
https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2021-03/2021%20Edelma
n%20Trust%20Barometer.pdf [Accessed 18 Feb 2022].
Fairclough, N., 2010. CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS : the critical study of
language. S.L.: Routledge.
Horton, H., 2020. Beach-goers cite Dominic Cummings lockdown breaches as
reason for packed resort. The Telegraph [online], 25 May 2020. Available from:
https://t.co/QTP9q21G6b [Accessed 18 Apr 2022].
230
Johanssen, J., 2020. Social Media and Coronavirus: Paranoid-Schizoid
Technology and Pandemic? Human Arenas, 4, 637.
Klein, M., 1935. A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive
States. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 1 (16), 147, 161, 162.
Klein, M., 1940. Mourning and Its Relation to Manic Depressive States” (1940).
International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 21 (1), 141, 150.
Klein, M., 1946. Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms. Melanie Klein. Int. J. Psa.,
XXVII, 1946, pp. 99–110. The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 18 (1), 101, 109 110, 113.
Klein, M., 1948. On The Theory of Anxiety and Guilt. Developments in
Psychoanalysis, 1 (1), 30.
Klein, M., 1952. Some Theoretical Conclusions Regarding the Emotional Life of
the Infant. In: Envy and Gratitude & Other Works. London: Vintage, 65, 73.
Klein, M., 1957. A Study of Envy and Gratitude. In: Geneva International
Congress of Psycho-Analysis. Presented at the Geneva International Congress
of Psycho-Analysis, Geneva, 1–60.
Klein, M., 1960. A Note on Depression in the Schizophrenic. International
Journal of Psychoanalysis, 41 (1).
Lilleker, D. G. and Aslan Ozgul, B., 2022. The Psychology of Democracy. 1st ed.
Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, Ny: Routledge.
MacAfee, N., 2019. Fear of Breakdown. 1st ed. New York: Columbia University
Press.
231
Manley, J., 2009. Researching beneath the surface : psycho-social research
methods in practice. London: Karnac.
Mason, R., 2020. Dominic Cummings refuses to resign or apologise for
lockdown breach. The Guardian [online], 25 May 2020. Available from:
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/may/25/dominic-cummings-refus
es-to-resign-or-apologise-for-lockdown-breach [Accessed 28 Mar 2022].
May, L., 2020. British Press is divided over response to Dominic Cummings
scandal [online]. Mail Online. Available from:
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8353977/British-Press-divided-respon
se-Dominic-Cummings-scandal.html [Accessed 28 Mar 2022].
McGrath, C., 2022. EU plots to PUNISH Britain: Bloc happy to see UK
disintegrate as they ‘don’t give a stuff’ [online]. Express.co.uk. Available from:
https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/1568356/brexit-news-eu-northern-irel
and-protocol-sammy-wilson-dup-boris-johnson-vat [Accessed 21 Feb 2022].
Mitroff, I. I. and Kilmann, R. H., 2021. The psychodynamics of enlightened
leadership : coping with chaos. 1st ed. Cham: Springer.
Murphy, N., 2020. Brits flock to beaches for Bank Holiday sun amid fears
lockdown could collapse [online]. The Mirror. Available from:
https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/brits-flock-beaches-enjoy-bank-22082
730 [Accessed 31 Mar 2022].
Murphy, S. and Bowcott, O., 2020. Lockdown violators using Cummings as
excuse, say police [online]. the Guardian. Available from:
232
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/may/27/lockdown-violators-usin
g-cummings-as-excuse-say-police?utm_term=Autofeed&CMP=twt_gu&utm_
medium&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1590600919 [Accessed 18 Apr 2022].
O’Brien, J., 2018. ‘This is about as fertile ground as it’s possible to get for a
fascist’: James O’Brien on Britain in 2018 [online]. Shortlist. Available from:
https://www.shortlist.com/news/james-o-brien-britain-in-2018-interview-brexit
[Accessed 15 Mar 2022].
O’Flynn, P., 2020. In defence of Dominic Cummings: Don’t join the blowhard
Remainers calling for his head. The Telegraph [online], 23 May 2020. Available
from:
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2020/05/23/defence-dominic-cummings-
dont-join-blowhard-remainers-calling/?utm_content=telegraph&utm_mediu
m=Social&utm_campaign=Echobox&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=15902320
97 [Accessed 30 Mar 2022].
Ogden, T., 1984a. Subjects Of Analysis. 7th ed. Routledge.
Ogden, T., 2019. Primitive Edge Of Experience. 10th ed. Jason Aronson Inc.
Ogden, T. H., 1984b. Instinct, Phantasy, and Psychological Deep Structure.
Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 20 (4), 512.
Quiggin, J., 2022. The Evolution of Neoliberalism. Sustainability and the New
Economics, NA (NA), 89–106.
Rayner, G., Johnson, S. and Yorke, H., 2020. Tory MPs revolt as voters turn on
Dominic Cummings. The Telegraph [online], 26 May 2020. Available from:
233
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2020/05/26/tory-revolt-grows-mps-break-
ranks-calling-dominic-cummings-resign/ [Accessed 18 Apr 2022].
Ringmar, E., 2017. What are public moods? European Journal of Social Theory,
21 (4), 453.
Rogers, J., 2020. Piers Morgan brands Boris Johnson a ‘f***king disgrace’ for
refusing to sack Dominic Cummings after he bro... [online]. The Sun. Available
from:
https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/11699839/piers-morgan-disgrace-boris-johnso
n-dominic-cummings-twitter/ [Accessed 23 Mar 2022].
Rudan, D., Jakovljevic, M. and Marcinko, D., 2016. Manic Defences in
Contemporary Society. Psychiatria Danubina, 28 (4), 335, 339, 340.
Segal, H., 1979. Klein. 1st ed. London: Routledge.
Segal, H., 1988. Introduction to the work of Melanie Klain. 1st ed. London:
Karnac.
Sigmund Freud and Daniel Paul Schreber, 1911. The Schreber case. New York:
Penguin Books.
Sky News, 2016, Sky.
Statista Research Department, 2021. Topic: Social media use during
coronavirus (COVID-19) worldwide [online]. Statista. Available from:
https://www.statista.com/topics/7863/social-media-use-during-coronavirus-co
vid-19-worldwide/#dossierKeyfigures [Accessed 2 Apr 2022].
234
The Guardian, 2020. One law for Dominic Cummings, another for the rest of
us | Letters [online]. The Guardian. Available from:
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/may/24/one-law-for-dominic-cum
mings-another-for-the-rest-of-us [Accessed 23 Mar 2022].
Wahl-Jorgensen, K., 2019. Emotions, media and politics. Cambridge ; Medford
Polity Press.
Weaver, M., 2020. Pressure on Dominic Cummings to quit over lockdown
breach. The Guardian [online], 23 May 2020. Available from:
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/may/22/dominic-cummings-durh
am-trip-coronavirus-lockdown [Accessed 17 Mar 2022].
Wilkes, J., 2020. Coronavirus - all you need to know as government u-turns on
masks in school [online]. The Daily Mirror. Available from:
https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/coronavirus-live-updates-uk-lockdow
n-22567788 [Accessed 18 Apr 2022].
Wyatt, T., 2020. Anger as ‘disgraceful’ Dominic Cummings accused of
breaking lockdown rules [online]. The Independent. Available from:
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/dominic-cummings-coronavi
rus-lockdown-durham-twitter-a9529606.html [Accessed 23 Mar 2022].
235
236