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Group Identification Moderates Emotional Responses to Perceived Prejudice

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Two studies tested the prediction that group identification (importance of the group in the self-concept) moderates the impact of perceived discrimination on self-evaluative emotions (depression and self-esteem). In Study 1, women low in gender identification experienced less depressed emotion and higher self-esteem if a negative evaluation was due to sexism than when it was not. The self-evaluative emotions of women high in gender identification were not buffered by attributions to sexism. In Study 2, ethnic identification and depressed emotions were positively related when Latino-Americans read about pervasive prejudice against the ingroup but were negatively related when they read about prejudice against an outgroup. Both studies demonstrated that for highly group identified individuals, prejudice against the ingroup is a threat against the self. Thus, the self-protective strategy of attributing negative feedback to discrimination may be primarily effective for individuals who do not consider the group a central aspect of self.
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10.1177/0146167203253466 ARTICLEPERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETINMcCoy, Major / GROUP IDENTIFICATION AND PREJUDICE
Group Identification Moderates Emotional
Responses to Perceived Prejudice
Shannon K. McCoy
University of California, San Francisco
Brenda Major
University of California, Santa Barbara
Two studies tested the prediction that group identification
(importance of the group in the self-concept) moderates the
impact of perceived discrimination on self-evaluative emotions
(depression and self-esteem). In Study 1, women low in gender
identification experienced less depressed emotion and higher self-
esteem if a negative evaluation was due to sexism than when it
was not. The self-evaluative emotions of women high in gender
identification were not buffered by attributions to sexism. In
Study 2, ethnic identification and depressed emotions were posi-
tively related when Latino-Americans read about pervasive prej-
udice against the ingroup but were negatively related when they
read about prejudice against an outgroup. Both studies demon-
strated that for highly group identified individuals, prejudice
against the ingroup is a threat against the self. Thus, the self-pro-
tective strategy of attributing negative feedback to discrimina
-
tion may be primarily effective for individuals who do not con
-
sider the group a central aspect of self.
Keywords: group identification; social identity; discrimination
Throughout the past 10 years, research on prejudice
and discrimination has increasingly moved from focus
-
ing on “who is prejudiced and why” to examining how
targets of prejudice cope with evidence that they and
their group are devalued by society. Evidence of devalua
-
tion may come in the form of barriers to obtaining hous
-
ing, education, employment, and even proper health
care (Braddock & McPartland, 1987; Cash, Gillen, &
Burns, 1977; Neckerman & Kirschenman, 1991;
Treiman & Hartmann, 1981; Yinger, 1994), as well as
interpersonal mistreatment, such as insults, belittle
-
ment, exclusion, or exposure to racist or sexist jokes.
Although there is substantial agreement among psychol
-
ogists that being a target of prejudice is associated with
negative psychological and physical consequences, there
is less agreement about the psychological consequences
of perceiving prejudice, especially with regard to per
-
sonal self-esteem. Some scholars assert that perceiving
that oneself or one’s group is a victim of prejudice can
-
not help but have negative consequences for self-esteem
(Allport, 1954/1979; Cartwright, 1950; Schmitt &
Branscombe, 2002b). Other scholars, in contrast, argue
that the perception of prejudice against one’s group
does not inevitably lead to lower self-esteem and may
actually protect self-relevant emotions and personal self-
esteem under some circumstances (Crocker & Major,
1989).
We report two experiments testing the hypothesis that
the consequences of perceived prejudice for emotion
and personal self-esteem are moderated by how strongly
the individual identifies with the group that is the target
of discrimination. Specifically, we predicted that perceiv
-
ing prejudice against the ingroup has negative effects on
the self-evaluative emotions (depression, self-esteem) of
individuals who are highly identified with the ingroup
but does not have negative effects on the self-evaluative
emotions of people who are not highly identified with
the ingroup. Indeed, for these latter individuals, perceiv
-
ing prejudice against the ingroup may buffer self-
1005
Authors’ Note: This research was supported by National Science Foun
-
dation Grant BCS-9983888 to Brenda Major. We gratefully acknowl
-
edge the assistance of Margaret Samotyj and Jesslyn Maron in data
collection. We thank Cheryl Kaiser, Faye Crosby, Fred Rhodewalt, and
an anonymous reviewer for providing valuable feedback on earlier ver
-
sions of this article. Correspondence concerning this article should be
addressed to Shannon McCoy, Health Psychology Program, University
of California, San Francisco, 3333 California Street, Suite 465, San
Francisco, CA 94143-0848; e-mail: skmccoy@itsa.ucsf.edu.
PSPB, Vol. 29 No. 8, August 2003 1005-1017
DOI: 10.1177/0146167203253466
© 2003 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.
evaluative emotions when the individual self is
threatened.
Perceptions of Prejudice and Self-Esteem
Many scholars assume that prejudice and discrimina
-
tion directed against a group will inevitably result in neg
-
ative psychological consequences for individuals who
are members of that group (e.g., Allport, 1954/1979;
Cartwright, 1950). Dorwin Cartwright (1950), for exam
-
ple, argued, “To a considerable extent, personal feelings
of worth depend on the social evaluation of the group
with which a person is identified. Self-hatred and feel
-
ings of worthlessness tend to arise from membership in
underprivileged or outcast groups” (p. 440). Drawing on
social identity theory, Schmitt and Branscombe (2002a)
recently arrived at a similar conclusion. They argue that
perceiving oneself as a victim of discrimination is harm
-
ful to the self-esteem of the stigmatized because this per
-
ception requires recognizing that an important aspect of
the self—one’s social identity—is devalued by powerful
members of society. Furthermore, because social iden
-
tity is a central component of self, threats to one’s social
identity (such as prejudice against one’s ingroup) are
experienced as threats to the self. In addition, they note
that members of chronically disadvantaged groups are
likely to perceive discrimination as global, stable, and
pervasive, exacerbating its negative implications for self-
esteem.
Consistent with the view that perceiving prejudice has
negative implications for emotional well-being and self-
esteem, perceiving one’s group as a victim of discrimina-
tion has been shown to be negatively related to self-
esteem and emotional well-being among various stigma
-
tized groups, including women, immigrant groups, gay
men, and ethnic minorities (e.g., Branscombe, Schmitt,
& Harvey, 1999; see Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002, for
a review). Experimental evidence that perceiving dis
-
crimination causes lowered self-esteem and more nega
-
tive self-directed emotions, however, is rare. An excep
-
tion is a study in which women were asked to imagine
being rejected from a course by a sexist professor (who
rejected only women) or a jerk (who rejected everyone)
(Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002a). Rejection by a sexist
professor led to more negative affect (outwardly
directed hostility and self-directed depression com
-
bined) and also was seen as more internally caused (“due
to something about me”) than rejection by a jerk, which
was seen as purely external caused.
Other research contradicts the view that perceiving
prejudice against one’s group will inevitably lead to
lower self-esteem. For example, many groups that are
targets of prejudice do not have lower self-esteem, and
some groups that are chronic targets of prejudice (e.g.,
African Americans) have higher self-esteem than groups
that are typically not targets of prejudice (Crocker &
Major, 1989; Porter & Washington, 1979; Twenge &
Crocker, 2002). In an effort to explain this paradox,
Crocker and Major (1989; see also Dion, 1975) ventured
the hypothesis that perceiving prejudice against one’s
group may actually help to buffer the self-esteem of the
stigmatized. In particular, they argued that individuals
who are aware that they are vulnerable to being targets of
prejudice might protect their self-esteem from negative
outcomes by attributing those outcomes to discrimina
-
tion against their group rather than to internal, stable
aspects of themselves. They assumed that attributing out
-
comes to another’s prejudice against one’s group is an
external attribution and that attributing negative events
to external causes protects self-esteem relative to attrib
-
uting negative events to internal, stable causes (such as a
lack of ability) (Weiner, 1985). It is important to point
out that their hypothesis was specific to self-esteem and
related self-evaluative emotions, such as depression.
They did not predict, nor would one expect, that attrib
-
uting outcomes to discrimination protects individuals
against feeling anger or hostility (e.g., Crocker, Voelkl,
Testa, & Major, 1991; Major, Kaiser, & McCoy, 2003).
Consistent with their self-esteem protection hypothe-
sis, women who were evaluated negatively by a man who
endorsed sexist attitudes experienced significantly less
depressed affect (but not less hostility) and marginally
higher self-esteem than women evaluated negatively by a
man with nonsexist attitudes (Crocker et al., 1991). In a
second study, women who received negative perfor-
mance feedback in the presence of blatant prejudice
cues (i.e., a confederate, the presence of blatant preju
-
dice cues, i.e., a confederate commented that she heard
the evaluator was sexist) subsequently had higher self
esteem than women who received the same feedback in
the presence of no prejudice cues or ambiguous preju
-
dice cues (i.e., a confederate commented that she heard
the evaluator graded men and women differently)
(Major, Quinton, & Schmader, 2003). In another study,
women who imagined being rejected from a course by a
sexist professor reported significantly less depressed
affect (but not less hostile affect) than women who imag
-
ined being rejected from a course because of a stable
aspect of self (lack of intelligence) (Major et al., 2003).
Collectively, these studies indicate that the presence of
group-based prejudice as a possible cause of a negative,
self-relevant event can protect an individual against
experiencing self-evaluative emotions such as depres
-
sion and lowered self-esteem.
In sum, two differing perspectives have emerged
regarding the consequences of perceiving prejudice
against one’s group for self-evaluative emotions (depres
-
sion and self-esteem). One perspective suggests that per
-
ceiving prejudice against one’s group increases depres
-
1006 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
sion and lowers self-esteem, whereas another
perspective suggests that perceiving prejudice may,
under some circumstances, protect against depression
and lowered self-esteem. In our opinion, neither of these
perspectives is sufficient to capture the complexity of the
relationship between perceived discrimination and self-
evaluative emotions. We believe that the emotional con
-
sequences of perceiving prejudice against one’s group
are moderated by how strongly the individual identifies
with the group.
Group Identification As a Moderator
of Responses to Discrimination
According to Branscombe and Schmitt (Branscombe
et al., 1999; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002b),
discrimination is psychologically painful because it
implicates a core aspect of the self—one’s social identity.
Implicit in their view is the assumption that threats to
social identity and threats to individual identity are
experienced as one and the same and, hence, will have
similar effects on self-evaluative emotions. Implicit in
Crocker and Major’s (1989) perspective, in contrast, is
the assumption that threats to the group and threats to
the individual self have different emotional
implications. From their perspective, perceptions of bias
against the collective self may be used to buffer the
individual self from threat.
Neither of the above perspectives takes into account
that individuals differ in the extent to which they incor-
porate a group into the personal self-concept. There is
substantial evidence that individual differences in group
identification are an important predictor of cognition,
affect, and behavior in intergroup situations (see
Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002, for a review; Mackie &
Smith, 2002). Relative to highly identified group mem
-
bers, individuals low in group identification are (a) less
concerned with relative intergroup treatment (Petta &
Walker, 1992), (b) less likely to perceive group-based
injustice (Branscombe et al., 1999; Crosby, Pufall,
Snyder, O’Connell, & Whalen, 1989), (c) less likely to
attribute a negative outcome to discrimination when
cues to prejudice are ambiguous (Major et al., 2003;
Operario & Fiske, 2001, Study 2), and (d) more likely to
distance from the group and protect the personal self
when the group is threatened (see Ellemers et al., 2002,
for a review). Thus, individual differences in group iden
-
tification are likely to be an important determinant of
how individuals will respond when faced with a threat to
their collective self (e.g., prejudice against their group).
We define group identification as the importance, or
centrality, of the group in the self-concept. This follows
in the tradition of other researchers who define group
identification as inclusion of the group in the self-con
-
cept (Smith & Henry, 1996; Tropp & Wright, 2001), as
the importance of the group to the self (Luhtanen &
Crocker, 1992), or the importance of the group to self-
definition (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell,
1987). However, our approach is in contrast to research
-
ers who have defined group identification as attachment
to, liking for, or pride in the group (Smith, Murphy, &
Coats, 1999; Smith & Tyler, 1992). Tajfel’s (1981) defini
-
tion of group identification included not only a cogni
-
tive component (similar to our definition) but also an
affective component. He defined group identification as
“that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives
from his knowledge of his membership in a social group
(or groups) together with the value and emotional sig
-
nificance attached to that group membership” (Tajfel,
1981, p. 255). Research increasingly illustrates, however,
that the cognitive (importance of the group) and affec
-
tive (liking for the group) aspects of group identification
are conceptually as well as empirically distinct. Further
-
more, they predict different aspects of intergroup behav
-
ior (e.g., Deaux, 1996; Ellemers, Kortekaas, &
Ouwerkerk, 1999; Jackson & Smith, 1999; Tropp &
Wright, 2001). We believe that using one term (group
identification) to describe two different constructs (cen-
trality of the group to identity, liking for the group) con-
tributes to difficulties in interpreting and comparing
empirical results of research on group identification.
Accordingly, here we use the term “collective self-
esteem” to refer to the affective component of one’s rela-
tionship to the group (liking for the group) and the term
“group identification” to refer to the cognitive compo-
nent (importance of the group in the self-concept).
We propose that group identification—the extent to
which the self overlaps with the group—moderates the
emotional consequences of perceiving prejudice against
one’s group. Specifically, the more central the group is
to the self-concept, the more perceiving discrimination
against the group should have negative consequences
for self-esteem and depressed emotion. In contrast, the
less central the group is to the self, the less perceiving dis
-
crimination against the group should have negative con
-
sequences for self-esteem and depressed emotion. Fur
-
thermore, drawing on Crocker and Major’s perspective,
among those who are not highly identified with their
ingroup, perceiving discrimination against the group
may protect depressed emotions and personal self-
esteem from threat.
STUDY 1
Our first study addressed the implications of ingroup
identification for self-evaluative emotions (depression
and self-esteem) of individuals who could or could not
attribute personal rejection to prejudice against their
ingroup. We predicted that being able to attribute a per
-
sonal rejection to prejudice would lead to less negative
McCoy, Major / GROUP IDENTIFICATION AND PREJUDICE 1007
self-evaluative emotions primarily among individuals
low in group identification. In contrast, we predicted
that for individuals highly identified with their group,
learning that another is prejudiced against their collec
-
tive identity is unlikely to protect their self-evaluative
emotions because a threat to their collective identity is
also a threat to their individual identity. Indeed, Schmitt
and Branscombe’s (2002b) perspective predicts that
learning that others are prejudiced against one’s group
poses an additional threat to self.
We tested these predictions in an experiment in
which women, all of whom had previously completed
measures of gender identification and gender-specific
collective self-esteem, received negative personal feed
-
back from a male evaluator. Half subsequently learned
that the male evaluator held sexist attitudes toward
women, whereas the remainder learned that the male
evaluator held nonsexist attitudes. Attributions for the
negative feedback, emotion (depression and hostility),
self-esteem, and postmeasures of gender identification
and gender-specific collective self-esteem were then
assessed. Among women rejected by a sexist evaluator,
we predicted that gender identification would be nega-
tively related to self-esteem and positively related to
depressed emotion. We did not expect gender identifica-
tion to moderate self-esteem and depressed emotion
among women not exposed to a sexist evaluator. We also
examined whether collective self-esteem (liking for
women as a group) would moderate affect and self-
esteem in response to prejudice in the same manner as
would group identification.
Finally, although not a primary goal of this experi-
ment, our design allowed us to test experimentally the
prediction that exposure to prejudice against the
ingroup increases identification with the ingroup (e.g.,
Tajfel & Turner, 1986) as well as the prediction that ini
-
tial levels of group identification moderate changes in
group identification following exposure to prejudice
(Ellemers, Wilke, & Van Knippenburg, 1993; Ethier &
Deaux, 1994).
Method
PARTICIPANTS AND PRETESTING SESSION
European American women (N = 54) ranging in age
from 18 to 20 (M = 18.33, SD = .61) participated in the
experiment for credit toward an introductory psychol
-
ogy course. In a pretesting session, all participants com
-
pleted measures of group identification and collective
self-esteem. Gender identification was assessed with the
four-item Importance to Identity subscale of Luhtanen
and Crocker’s (1992) Collective Self-Esteem Scale (CSS)
(e.g., “Being a woman is an important reflection of who I
am”; “In general being a woman is an important part of
my self-image”; “Being a woman is unimportant to my
sense of what kind of person I am,” reverse-scored;
“Overall, being a woman has very little to do with how I
feel about myself,” reverse-scored; α = .68). Collective
self-esteem was assessed with the four-item Private
Regard subscale of the CSS (e.g., “I feel good about
being a woman”; “In general, I am glad to be a woman”;
“I often regret that I am a woman,” reverse-scored;
“Overall, I often feel that being a woman is not worth
-
while,” reverse-scored; α = .92). Responses to the Private
Regard scale (collective self-esteem) and the Impor
-
tance to Identity scale (group identification) were not
strongly correlated (r = .11, p > .40), reinforcing our view
that these are distinct constructs.
EXPERIMENTAL SESSION
Modeled after a paradigm utilized by Crocker et al.
(1991), women participated in a study on “first impres
-
sions” and believed that they would be forming an
impression of another student based on limited informa
-
tion. Participants were led to believe that they would
either be assigned to a “performer” or “evaluator” role in
a social interaction and were assured that they would
never meet their interaction partner face to face. In actu-
ality, there was only one female participant per session.
The participant completed a brief attitude topics ques-
tionnaire, ostensibly to facilitate the first speech interac-
tion. The questionnaire addressed four attitude topics:
recycling, the Equal Rights Amendment, the electoral
college, and future goals and plans.
Based on a bogus card selection, all participants were
assigned the “performer” role, whereas the fictitious
other student was assigned the “evaluator” role. The par
-
ticipant was given 1 min to prepare a 2-min speech that
focused on the topic of Future Goals and Plans. The par
-
ticipant then delivered the speech over an intercom,
ostensibly to the interaction partner in an adjacent cubi
-
cle. All participants then heard a negative evaluation of
their speech delivered by a prerecorded male voice. The
evaluator stated,
Well . . . I really didn’t think I would be able to tell very
much about a person just from a little speech like that,
but I do think I have a sense of what she’s like. Umm ...I
thought the speech was...Iguess . . . well . . . OK. She
could have expressed her ideas more clearly though.
Maybe then she would have sounded like a more inter
-
esting person to me. Her goals . . . they seem a little unre
-
alistic and naive. It sounds . . . just like...shemaynot
have the right qualities to get what she wants out of life.
Honestly, my gut feeling is that she’s just one of those sort
of people who will be dependent on others and will
just . . . just get by in life. That’s it.
1008 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
Prior to being asked to form an impression of the male
evaluator, participants exchanged attitude question
-
naires with the evaluator to further facilitate impression
formation. For women assigned to the sexist condition,
the evaluator’s responses indicated he held very sexist at
-
titudes toward women. In particular, he strongly en
-
dorsed items stating, “Women should not earn the same
amount of money in certain fields because they do not
have the same abilities as men”; “I think a man should be
hired over a woman because men often have families to
support”; “I could not work for a female boss because
women can be overly emotional”; and “In my opinion, it
is a good thing that the Equal Rights Amendment never
passed.” In the nonsexist condition, the evaluator
strongly disagreed with these statements. In both condi
-
tions, the evaluator’s attitudes about the electoral col
-
lege, recycling, and future goals and plans were matched
to the participant’s attitudes. Participants subsequently
completed the dependent measures and then were fully
and sensitively debriefed.
DEPENDENT MEASURES
Emotion. Participants completed five items assessing
depressed emotion (sad, failure, confident [reverse-
scored], pleased [reverse-scored], satisfied [reverse-
scored]; α = .82) and three items assessing hostile emo-
tion (angry, agitated, irritated; α = .95). The response
scale for all dependent measures was 0 (not at all)to6
(very much).
State self-esteem. Participants completed a brief five-
item measure of state self-esteem adapted from the
social and performance subscales of Heatherton and
Polivy’s (1991) scale (“I feel confident about my abili
-
ties”; “I am worried about what other people think of
me”; “I feel frustrated or rattled by my performance”; “I
feel that I having trouble understanding things I read”;
“I feel concerned about the impression I am making”).
Appropriate items were reverse-scored such that high
scores indicated high state self-esteem. These items were
specifically selected because they are most relevant to
state self esteem in the current experimental context.
This shortened measure provided a reliable assessment
of state self esteem in the present study (α = .81).
Postfeedback group identification and collective self-esteem.
Participants completed the same four-item measures of
group identification (α = .62) and collective self-esteem
(α =.90) they had completed in pretesting.
Manipulation checks. Participants indicated the extent
to which the rejection was due to an internal factor (the
quality of her speech) and due to sexist discrimination
(the sexism of the evaluator). In addition, each partici
-
pant indicated the sex of her interaction partner, the
extent to which her evaluator was sexist, and the extent
to which the evaluator’s attitudes toward women in the
workplace differed from her own on a scale from 1 (less
in favor of equal rights for women)to5(more in favor of equal
rights for women).
Results
MANIPULATION CHECKS AND ATTRIBUTIONS
All participants correctly reported the sex of the eval
-
uator. The perceived sexism manipulation was success
-
ful. As expected, women in the sexist condition reported
that the evaluator was more sexist (M = 5.22, SD = 1.07)
than did women in the nonsexist condition (M = 1.22, SD
= 1.37), t(52) = 11.90, p < .001. In addition, participants
in the sexist condition reported that the evaluator held
more sexist attitudes toward women than their own (M =
1.04, SD = .19), whereas women in the nonsexist condi
-
tion reported that the evaluator held attitudes toward
women that were equivalent to their own (M = 3.06, SD =
.52), t(52) = –18.76, p < .001. As well, women in the sexist
condition were significantly more likely to attribute the
negative evaluation to sexism (M = 4.85, SD = 1.48) than
were women in the nonsexist condition (M = 1.37, SD =
1.50), t(52) = 8.57, p < .001. Finally, women in the sexist
condition tended to blame the rejection on the quality of
their speech less (M = 3.96, SD = 1.50) than women in the
nonsexist condition (M = 4.56, SD = 1.12), t(52) = –1.64,
p = .10. Four participants reported suspicion regarding
the presence of another student and/or the validity of
the negative feedback and were dropped from all
remaining analyses. Of importance, women in both con-
ditions had equivalent pretesting levels of group identifi-
cation, t(50) = –1.24, p > .20, and collective self-esteem,
t(50) = .85, p > .30.
ANALYSIS PLAN
We conducted hierarchical linear regression analyses
on each dependent variable to test our hypotheses. On
Step 1, we entered the group identification main effect
(continuous) and the sexist condition main effect
(dummy coded: 0 = sexist, 1 = nonsexist). On Step 2, we
entered the interaction of group identification and sex
-
ist condition.
We then performed these analyses again, substituting
collective self-esteem (positive regard for the group) for
group identification in the analyses. This enabled us to
investigate whether group identification and collective
self-esteem function similarly as moderators. Because
our hypotheses concern the moderating effect of group
identification, we present these results first.
DOES GROUP IDENTIFICATION MODERATE EMOTION
AND SELF-ESTEEM IN RESPONSE TO PREJUDICE?
Depressed emotion. Women evaluated by a sexist evalua
-
tor tended to report less depressed emotion (M = 2.10,
McCoy, Major / GROUP IDENTIFICATION AND PREJUDICE 1009
SE = .23) than women evaluated by a nonsexist evaluator
(M = 2.73, SE = .23), (β= .26, p = .06). In addition, the less
identified with women a participant was, the less
depressed emotion she tended to report following the
negative evaluation (β = .26, p = .06; Step 1: R
2
= .12, p <
.05). Both of these effects were qualified by the predicted
interaction between group identification and sexist con
-
dition (β= –1.54, p < .05; R
2
= .08, p < .05). As predicted,
group identification was positively related to depressed
emotion in the sexist condition (β = .59) and unrelated
to depressed emotion in the nonsexist condition (β =
.03) (see top panel, Figure 1). Among women evaluated
negatively by a sexist evaluator, the less important being
a woman was to their identity, the more protected they
were from experiencing depressed emotion.
State self-esteem. Neither sexist condition (β = –.20, p >
.15) nor group identification (β= .02, p > .80; Step 1: R
2
=
.04, p > .30) predicted state self-esteem. The predicted
Group Identification × Sexist Condition interaction was
significant (β = 1.52, p = .05; R
2
= .07, p = .05). Among
women evaluated negatively by a sexist evaluator, the less
important being a woman was to their identity, the
higher their self-esteem (β = –.31). In contrast, among
women in the nonsexist condition, group identification
and state self-esteem were positively related (β= .25) (see
bottom panel, Figure 1).
Hostile emotion. Overall, women reported feeling levels
of hostility at around the midpoint of the scale following
the negative evaluation (M = 3.07, SD = 2.03). No effect
of sexist condition, group identification, or the interac-
tion was found (ps > .50). Consistent with prior research
(Crocker et al., 1991; Major et al., 2003), women evalu
-
ated negatively by a sexist man were just as angry as
women evaluated negatively by a nonsexist man.
DOES PREJUDICE INCREASE OR DECREASE
GROUP IDENTIFICATION?
Postrejection group identification. Not surprisingly, group
identification assessed at prescreening was a significant
predictor of postrejection group identification (β= .47, p
< .001). Although not significant, women evaluated by a
man with sexist attitudes tended to be more identified
with their gender group (M = 4.35, SE = .16) than women
evaluated by a nonsexist evaluator (M = 3.97, SE = .17; β=
–.19, p = .12; Step 1: R
2
= .28, p < .001). The interaction
was not significant (β = .70, p > .30; Step 2: R
2
= .02, p >
.30).
DOES PREJUDICE AFFECT COLLECTIVE SELF-ESTEEM?
Postrejection collective self-esteem. To assess changes in
collective self-esteem, we first controlled for pretesting
levels of collective self-esteem by entering this variable
on Step 1 of the analysis. On Step 2, we entered the main
effects of group identification and sexist condition. On
Step 3, we entered the interaction. As expected, collec
-
tive self-esteem prior to participation significantly
predicted collective self-esteem postrejection (β = .78, p
< .05; Step 1: R
2
= .58, p < .001). No effects were found for
sexist condition, group identification, or the interaction
(ps > .30).
DOES COLLECTIVE SELF-ESTEEM
MODERATE RESPONSES TO PREJUDICE?
We performed all of the above analyses again using
collective self-esteem rather than group identification as
the individual difference variable in the analyses. No sig
-
nificant main effects of collective self-esteem, or modera
-
tion of the effect of the sexism of the evaluator on affect
(depressed affect, ps > .50; hostile affect, ps > .40) or state
self-esteem (ps > .30) were observed. Not surprisingly,
initial levels of collective self-esteem significantly pre
-
dicted postrejection collective self-esteem (β = .77, p <
.001). However, collective self-esteem did not predict
1010 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Non Sexist
Sexist
β = .59**
β = .03
Low
Group Identification
High
Group Identification
D
E
P
R
E
S
S
E
D
M
O
O
D
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Non Sexist
Sexist
Low
Group Identification
High
Group Identification
S
T
A
T
E
S
E
L
F
E
S
T
E
E
M
β = .25
β = -.31
Figure 1 Top panel: Depressed affect as a function of group identifi-
cation and sexism of the evaluator. Bottom panel: Self-es-
teem as a function of group identification and sexism of the
evaluator.
NOTE: Slopes are graphed at 1 standard deviation above (high) and
below (low) the mean of group identification.
**p < .01. †p = .10.
postrejection levels of group identification (p > .16) or
interact with sexist condition to predict either
postrejection group identification or postrejection col
-
lective self-esteem (ps > .80).
1
Discussion
Study 1 attempted to reconcile two seemingly dispa
-
rate perspectives on the emotional consequences of per
-
ceiving discrimination against one’s group. Crocker and
Major (1989) hypothesized that being able to blame neg
-
ative personal outcomes on prejudice against one’s
group can protect personal self-esteem to the extent that
it allows one to discount the role of internal, stable
aspects of self in producing those outcomes. Schmitt and
Branscombe (2002b) hypothesized that being able to
blame negative outcomes on prejudice against one’s
group will be harmful to personal self-esteem because
prejudice is a threat to a core aspect of self—one’s social
identity. We found some support for both perspectives.
Women who were low in gender identification showed
responses consistent with predictions of Crocker and
Major (1989). Among women rejected by a man they
perceived as sexist, the less they identified with being a
woman, the less depressed mood, and the higher self-
esteem they reported feeling. Furthermore, the pattern
of the interaction shown in Figure 1 suggests that among
low-gender-identified women, those who could attribute
negative feedback to sexism experienced less negative
self-evaluative emotions (depression and self-esteem)
than those who could not make this attribution. Thus,
Crocker and Major’s self-protective attributional strat-
egy may be primarily effective for members of stigma
-
tized groups for whom the group is not a core aspect of
self.
High-gender-identified women, in contrast, showed
responses more consistent with predictions of Schmitt
and Branscombe (2002a). For women high in group
identification, knowing that the negative evaluator was
sexist did not buffer self-esteem or depressed emotion.
Among women high in group identification, those who
could attribute their rejection to sexism felt just as bad as
those who could not make this attribution (see Figure 1).
These results suggest that for highly identified group
members, an attack on the group is experienced as a
threat to the self. Thus, a threat to the collective self (sex
-
ism) cannot be used to protect the personal self. Conse
-
quently, the hypothesis that attributions to discrimina
-
tion are detrimental may be primarily true when the
group membership is a core aspect of self.
Although results of this first study are provocative,
there are several limitations. First, it could be argued
that the effects observed here are limited to situations in
which a person is exposed to a single prejudiced person
(a sexist evaluator) and may not apply when people per
-
ceive that discrimination against their group is global
and pervasive. There is substantial evidence that perceiv
-
ing oneself or one’s group as a victim of pervasive dis
-
crimination is negatively associated with self-esteem and
well-being (see Major et al., 2002, for a review). It is possi
-
ble that regardless of individual differences in group
identification, all members of a group will experience
more negative self-evaluative emotions and lower self-
esteem when their social identity is perceived as under
pervasive threat. In short, group identification may have
different emotional implications in the presence of per
-
vasive prejudice against one’s group than it has when
one experiences an isolated instance of prejudice from a
single person.
Second, it could be argued that the effects observed
here are limited to situations in which an individual has
experienced a personal threat that they are trying to
defend against. That is, without the presence of personal
threat (e.g., personal rejection), identification with the
group may be irrelevant as a moderator of emotional
responses to perceived group discrimination. In the
absence of personal threat, perceptions of discrimina-
tion against the ingroup may lead to negative self-
evaluative emotions among all ingroup members.
Third, the majority of experimental research investi-
gating the emotional implications of attributions to prej-
udice has examined emotions and self-esteem of women
in response to sexism. Gender identification is likely to
differ from ethnic group identification in important
ways, such as the extent to which the group identity is
accompanied by ideologies about discrimination and
oppression. Accordingly, it is important to examine
whether group identification moderates emotional
responses to perceived discrimination among groups
other than women.
Finally, it is important to examine the process by
which group identification affects emotional responses
to perceived discrimination. We speculated that for indi
-
viduals who are highly identified with their ingroup, a
threat against the group is experienced as a threat
against the self. Consequently, we expected highly group
identified individuals to report more feelings of per
-
sonal threat in response to perceiving discrimination
against the ingroup than low group identified individu
-
als. Furthermore, we expected perceptions of personal
threat to mediate the effect of group identification on
self-evaluative emotions. We conducted a second study
to address the above limitations and issues.
STUDY 2
In Study 2, Latino-American participants, all of whom
had previously completed a measure of group identifica
-
tion, were randomly assigned to read an article describ
-
ing the existence of severe and pervasive prejudice
McCoy, Major / GROUP IDENTIFICATION AND PREJUDICE 1011
against Latinos/Latinas in the United States or against
an unfamiliar outgroup (the Inuit) in Canada. Self-
evaluative emotions (depression and self-esteem), hos
-
tile emotions, appraisals of personal threat, group iden
-
tification, and collective self-esteem were then assessed.
We hypothesized that perceiving prejudice against the
ingroup would be more painful for highly identified
group members than for those low in group identifica
-
tion. Thus, we expected ethnic identification to be posi
-
tively related to depressed emotions and negatively
related to self-esteem among Latino-Americans in the
ingroup prejudice condition. We did not expect to
observe these relationships in the outgroup prejudice
condition.
Method
PARTICIPANTS
Latino-American participants (N = 36, men = 12,
women = 24) ranging in age from 18 to 24 (M = 18.53,
SD = 1.21) participated in the experiment for credit
toward an introductory psychology course. In a
prescreening session, all participants completed the
same four-item measure of collective self-esteem (α =.
84) used in Study 1 and a six-item measure of group iden-
tification, both phrased specific to ethnicity. The mea-
sure of group identification included the four items used
in Study 1 in addition to two new items reflecting overlap
of the self and the group (“My ethnic group’s successes
are my successes”; “When someone criticizes my group it
feels like a personal insult”; Silver, 2002). The addition of
these items increased scale reliability (α = .71). As in
Study 1, group identification and collective self-esteem
were not strongly correlated (r = .25, p > .14), reinforcing
that these are distinct constructs.
EXPERIMENTAL SESSION
Participants were run in groups of 5 to 10 and
believed the purpose of the experiment was to investi
-
gate college students’ reactions to newspaper articles.
The experiment was conducted in conjunction with a
related survey study. Thus, there were at least five Euro
-
pean American students present at every session. In this
intergroup setting, participants were randomly assigned
to read either an article that reported that prejudice and
discrimination against Latino-American students in Cali
-
fornia was severe and pervasive or an identical article
reporting that prejudice and discrimination against the
Inuit in Canada was severe and pervasive. Participants
then completed the dependent measures listed below
and were fully debriefed.
DEPENDENT MEASURES
Depressed emotion. Participants completed a five-item
measure of depressed emotion (sad, depressed,
confident [reverse-scored]; happy [reverse scored]; sat
-
isfied [reverse scored]; α = .72). The response scale for
all dependent measures was 0 (not at all)to6(very much).
State self-esteem. The participants completed the same
five-item measure of state self-esteem used in Study 1 (α
= .84).
Hostile emotion. Hostile emotion was assessed with a
five-item measure (angry, agitated, irritated, hostile,
mad; α = .91).
Group identification and collective self-esteem. The partici
-
pants completed the same measures of group identifica
-
tion (α = .74) and collective self-esteem (α = .76),
phrased specific to ethnicity, used in Study 1.
2
Appraisals of personal threat. We assessed the extent to
which participants felt personally threatened by racism
with a nine-item scale (e.g., “Racism will affect many
areas of my life,”, “Racism is personally threatening to
me”; α = .80).
Manipulation checks. Participants were asked how cred
-
ible the news article was on a 0 (not at all)to6(very much)
scale. In addition, participants completed four items
assessing the extent to which Latinos as a group face per-
vasive racism (e.g., “Members of my group face a good
deal of racism”; “My racial group will likely be a target of
racism in the next year”; α = .76).
Results
MANIPULATION CHECKS
Three participants reported suspicion regarding the
validity of the article (two participants in the outgroup
[Inuit] prejudice condition, one in the ingroup [Latino]
prejudice condition) and were dropped from the analy
-
ses. Remaining participants rated the articles as equiva
-
lently credible (Inuit: M = 4.47, SD = 1.12; Latino: M =
4.16, SD = .90), t(31) = .93, p > .36. Participants who read
about prejudice against Latinos were significantly more
likely to report that Latinos as a group faced pervasive
racism (M = 4.01, SD = .97) than participants who read
about prejudice against the Inuit (M = 3.23, SD = 1.20),
t(31) = –2.15, p < .05. Of importance, pretesting levels of
group identification did not moderate this effect (p >
.60). Thus, our manipulation of perceptions of pervasive
prejudice was successful. There were no significant dif
-
ferences by condition in pretesting levels of either group
identification, t(31) = –.21, p > .80, or collective self-
esteem, t(31) = .77, p > .40.
ANALYSIS PLAN
As in Study 1, we conducted hierarchical linear
regression analyses on each dependent variable. On
Step 1, we entered the group identification main effect
(continuous) and the prejudice condition main effect
1012 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
(dummy coded: 0 = ingroup prejudice [Latino], 1 =
outgroup prejudice [Inuit]). On Step 2, we entered the
interaction of group identification and prejudice
condition.
DOES GROUP IDENTIFICATION MODERATE
EMOTIONAL RESPONSES TO PREJUDICE?
Depressed emotion. Group identification was unrelated
to depressed emotions (β= .12, p > .40). Participants who
read about prejudice against the ingroup reported sig
-
nificantly more depressed affect (M = 2.65, SE = .23) than
those who read about prejudice against an outgroup (M
= 1.91, SE = .25; β = .35, p < .05; Step 1: R
2
= .15, p = .08).
However, the effect of prejudice condition was qualified
by the predicted Group Identification × Prejudice Con
-
dition interaction (β = .43, p < .05; Step 2: R
2
= .10, p =
.05). The simple slopes for this interaction are shown in
the top panel of Figure 2. Consistent with predictions,
group identification was positively associated with
depressed emotion when participants read about preju
-
dice against the ingroup (β = .40) but was negatively
associated with depressed emotion when participants
read about prejudice toward an outgroup (β = –.25).
State self-esteem. No significant effects were found for
the analysis predicting state self-esteem (ps > .16). How-
ever, in line with predictions, group identification
tended to be negatively associated with state self-esteem
in the ingroup prejudice condition (β = –.13) and posi
-
tively associated with state self-esteem in the outgroup
prejudice condition (β = .32).
Hostile emotion. Participants were significantly angrier
in the ingroup prejudice condition (M = 2.34, SE = .31)
than in the outgroup prejudice condition (M = .95, SE =
.33; β = .46, p < .01). Neither the main effect of group
identification (β= .22, p = .15; Step 1: R
2
= .28, p < .01) nor
the interaction (β = .21, p > .25; Step 2: R
2
= .02, p > .25)
was significant.
Appraisals of personal threat. We next examined
whether group identification and prejudice condition
moderated the extent to which Latinos appraised racism
as personally threatening. No significant main effects of
prejudice condition (β= .22, p > .20) or group identifica-
tion were found (β= .10, p > .50; Step 1: R
2
= .06, p > .30).
The predicted interaction, however, was significant (β =
.43, p = .05; Step 2: R
2
= .11, p = .05). As expected, group
identification was positively associated with threat
appraisals in the ingroup prejudice condition (β = .41)
and negatively associated with threat appraisals in the
outgroup prejudice condition (β = –.23) (see bottom
panel, Figure 2).
DO THREAT APPRAISALS MEDIATE
DEPRESSED EMOTION EFFECTS?
We tested whether threat appraisals mediated the
effect of the interaction on depressed emotion using
procedures specified by Baron and Kenney (1986). As
reported previously, the interaction of group identifica
-
tion and prejudice condition significantly predicted
both depressed emotion (β = .43, p < .05) and appraisals
of threat (β = .43, p = .05). In the final step of the
mediational analysis, we included threat appraisals and
the interaction in the model predicting depressed emo
-
tion. As hypothesized, threat appraisals mediated the
relationship between the interaction and depressed
emotion. Threat appraisals were significantly and posi
-
tively related to depressed affect (β = .50, p < .05). In
addition, in the presence of threat appraisals, the inter
-
action no longer significantly predicted depressed affect
(β = .19, p > .30).
DOES PREJUDICE INCREASE OR DECREASE
GROUP IDENTIFICATION?
Not surprisingly, group identification assessed at pre
-
testing significantly predicted group identification
assessed in the experiment (β = .52, p < .01). No main
McCoy, Major / GROUP IDENTIFICATION AND PREJUDICE 1013
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Outgroup Prejudice
Ingroup Prejudice
D
E
P
R
E
S
S
E
D
A
F
F
E
C
T
β = -.25
β = .40
Low
Group Identification
High
Group Identification
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Outgroup Prejudice
Ingroup Prejudice
P
E
R
C
E
I
V
E
D
T
H
R
E
A
T
β = -.23
β = .41
Low
Group Identification
High
Group Identification
Figure 2 Top panel: Depressed affect as a function of group identifi-
cation and prejudice condition. Bottom panel: Threat ap-
praisals as a function of group identification and prejudice
condition.
NOTE: Slopes are graphed at 1 standard deviation above (high) and
below (low) the mean of group identification.
p = .08.
effect of prejudice condition on group identification was
found (β= –.18, p > .20; Step 1: R
2
= .29, p < .01). However,
the Group Identification ×Prejudice interaction was sig
-
nificant (β = .50, p < .01; Step 2: R
2
= .15, p < .01). The
simple slopes for this interaction are shown in Figure 3.
When Latino-American participants read about preju
-
dice against their ingroup, those low in identification
identified even less with Latinos, whereas those high in
group identification identified even more strongly with
Latinos, relative to their pretest levels of ethnic group
identification (β = .70, p < .001).
3
The change in group
identification in the control condition was much less
strong (β = .30, p > .20).
DOES COLLECTIVE SELF-ESTEEM
CHANGE IN RESPONSE TO PREJUDICE?
As expected, both collective self-esteem (β = .35, p <
.05) and group identification (β= .36, p < .05) assessed at
pretesting significantly predicted collective self-esteem
in the experiment. However, neither the effect of preju
-
dice condition (β = .03, p > .80) nor the interaction was
significant (β = .26, p > .20).
DOES COLLECTIVE SELF-ESTEEM
MODERATE RESPONSES TO PREJUDICE?
As in Study 1, we performed all of the above analyses
again, using collective self-esteem rather than group
identification as the moderator in the analyses. There
was a marginally significant interaction predicting state
self-esteem (β = –.61, p = .08; R
2
= .15, R
2
= .09, p = .08).
Collective self-esteem was positively associated with state
self-esteem in the outgroup prejudice condition (β =
.64) and unassociated with state self-esteem in the
ingroup prejudice condition (β = –.06). In the remain
-
ing analyses, only the main effect of initial levels of col
-
lective self-esteem predicting experimental collective
self-esteem was significant (β = .36, p < .05; all other ps>
.13). Thus, as in Study 1, collective self-esteem did not
moderate emotional responses to prejudice.
Discussion
Consistent with predictions, the results of Study 2
illustrate that group identification moderates self-
evaluative emotional responses to perceptions of perva
-
sive prejudice against one’s ethnic group. Latino-Ameri
-
cans who read about pervasive prejudice against Latinos
reported significantly more depressed emotion the
more strongly they identified with the group. Latino-
Americans who read about prejudice against an
outgroup, in contrast, tended to report less depressed
emotion the more strongly they identified with their
group. Consequently, exposure to pervasive prejudice
against the ingroup led to more negative self-evaluative
emotions than exposure to prejudice against an
outgroup for participants who identified highly with
their group, but not for those who were low in ethnic
group identification. Thus, the effects observed in Study
1 are not unique to women, to situations involving a spe-
cific personal threat, or to situations involving a single
prejudiced person.
In addition, Study 2 provides initial evidence for the
process by which group identification influences
depressed emotion in the face of prejudice. As we pre-
dicted, when Latinos were faced with pervasive prejudice
against the ingroup, they were more personally threat-
ened by racism the more they identified with the group.
Intriguingly, there was no main effect of prejudice condi
-
tion on appraisals of threat. It was not the case that
Latino-Americans appraised racism as more personally
threatening in the ingroup prejudice condition than in
the outgroup prejudice condition. Nor was it the case
that individuals high in group identification appraised
racism as more personally threatening than those low in
group identification. It was only when pervasive preju
-
dice against the ingroup was salient that group identifi
-
cation and appraisals of threat were positively related.
This suggests that for those high in group identification,
a threat against the group is appraised as a threat to the
self. Our mediational analysis illustrated that it is this
heightened appraisal of personal threat that is responsi
-
ble for the observed effect of group identification on
depressed emotion.
Consistent with Study 1, our findings were specific to
depressed emotions and did not apply to hostile emo
-
tions. In addition, depressed emotions proved to be a
more sensitive measure of state psychological well-being
than was state self-esteem. Expanded and more precise
measures of emotions (e.g., shame, pride, guilt) are
1014 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Outgroup Prejudice
Ingroup Prejudice
P
O
S
T
G
R
O
U
P
I
D
E
N
T
β = .30
β = .70**
Low
Group Identification
High
Group Identification
Figure 3 Postgroup identification as a function of pretesting group
identification and prejudice condition.
NOTE: Slopes are graphed at 1 standard deviation above (high) and
below (low) the mean of group identification.
**p < .01.
likely to yield a fuller understanding of the emotional
consequences of being a target of prejudice than mea
-
sures of self-esteem. Furthermore, because personal self-
esteem is not equivalently valued in all cultures, empiri
-
cal results regarding the emotional consequences of per
-
ceived prejudice may be more easily compared cross-cul
-
turally than self-esteem results.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current research helps to reconcile differing the
-
oretical predictions concerning the consequences of
perceived prejudice for self-evaluative emotions
(depression and personal self-esteem). One perspective
suggests that perceiving prejudice against one’s group is
negatively associated with self-evaluative emotions (e.g.,
Branscombe et al., 1999). Another perspective suggests
that perceiving prejudice against one’s group may,
under some circumstances, protect personal self-esteem
(e.g., Crocker & Major, 1989). In the present research,
we found support for both perspectives. Overall, our
research illustrates that whether perceiving prejudice is
negatively associated with self-evaluative emotions or not
depends in part on the extent to which an individual
identifies with the group. Perceiving prejudice against
one’s group is psychologically painful for individuals
who are highly identified with their group. In Study 1,
women exposed to a negative outcome due to sexism
reported more negative self-evaluative emotions the
more important the group was to their identity. Latino-
Americans in Study 2, who read about pervasive racism
against Latinos, reported more depressed emotions and
were more personally threatened by racism the more
strongly they identified with the group. Of importance,
however, we also showed that perceiving sexism pro
-
tected the self-evaluative emotions of low-group-identi
-
fied women who experienced a personal rejection.
Only group identification (defined as importance to
the self-concept) and not collective self-esteem (defined
as liking for the group) moderated women’s depressed
emotion and self-esteem following the sexist rejection
and Latino-Americans’ depressed emotion following
reading about pervasive prejudice. Our results join those
of other researchers in stressing the importance of dis
-
tinguishing between these important but distinct aspects
of one’s relationship to the group (Deaux, 1996;
Ellemers et al., 1999; Ethier & Deaux, 1994; Jackson &
Smith, 1999; Tropp & Wright, 2001). However, our defi
-
nition of group identification as “importance of the
group to the self-concept” may prove too limiting to
those who suggest that group identification may contain
different components depending on the group in ques
-
tion (e.g., Sellars, Rowley, Chavous, Shelton, & Smith,
1997) and those who suggest that one construct (inclu
-
sion of the ingroup in the self) may underlie both our
conceptualization of group identification and our con
-
ceptualization of collective self-esteem (e.g., Tropp &
Wright, 2001). Nevertheless, we believe that distinguish
-
ing these aspects of one’s relationship to the group into
the separate constructs of group identification and col
-
lective self-esteem will facilitate interstudy comparison
as well as clarify the relationships among group identifi
-
cation, collective self-esteem, self-evaluative emotions,
and the experience of discrimination.
It could be argued that one limitation of the present
research is that we measured rather than manipulated
our moderating variable (group identification).
Although several studies indicate that the salience of
group identities can be manipulated in the laboratory
(e.g., Smith & Henry, 1996), evidence that identification
with important social categories can be likewise manipu
-
lated is scarce. We concur with Ellemers and colleagues’
(Ellemers et al., 2002) observation that it is difficult to
experimentally manipulate the importance of a natu
-
rally occurring group identity to the self-concept during
the time-span of a typical experiment.
Nonetheless, the fact that our moderating variable
was measured rather than manipulated leaves open an
alternative explanation for our data. There is substantial
evidence that group identification is positively corre-
lated with perceptions of personal and group discrimi-
nation (see Major et al., 2002, for a review). This rela-
tionship suggests the possibility that the important
moderating variable underlying the present findings is
perceptions of being a frequent target of discrimination
rather than group identification. Pretest data on partici-
pants in the current studies indicated that perceptions of
discrimination (e.g., “I experience discrimination
because of my gender/race”; My gender/racial group is
discriminated against”; four items, α = .82) were signifi
-
cantly and positively correlated with group identifica
-
tion both in Study 1, r = .44, p < .05, and Study 2, r = .43, p <
.05. However, when we controlled for individual differ
-
ences in perceptions of discrimination (and/or the
interaction of perceptions of discrimination and preju
-
dice condition) in regression analyses predicting self-
evaluative emotions, results of the current research were
unchanged. In fact, the effects of group identification on
self-evaluative emotions became stronger in Study 1 and
were unchanged in Study 2. Thus, the effects demon
-
strated in the present research cannot be explained by
the “third variable problem” of perceiving oneself as a
target of discrimination.
One conclusion that might be drawn from our data is
that identifying with a group makes one emotionally vul
-
nerable if that group is a target of prejudice. Although
this is an accurate characterization of our data, we do not
believe that this would be a correct inference to draw.
The relationship between group identification and psy
-
McCoy, Major / GROUP IDENTIFICATION AND PREJUDICE 1015
chological well-being among minority groups is com
-
plex. We think it is likely that high group identification
produces an initial, temporary increase in emotional vul
-
nerability in response to group threat but that identify
-
ing with the group also provides a source of emotional
and tangible support and, hence, emotional resilience as
time goes on. A number of studies have shown a positive
relationship between group identification and various
aspects of psychological well-being among members of
stigmatized groups (e.g., Branscombe et al., 1999;
Crosby et al., 1989). Such findings suggest that group
identification is an important source of resilience
among members of stigmatized groups. Group identifi
-
cation is positively associated with feeling a sense of com
-
fort when interacting with ingroup members (Tropp &
Wright, 2001) and with feeling close to fellow ingroup
members (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995), consistent
with the idea that ingroup members are a source of social
and emotional support for highly identified individuals.
If identification with the ingroup is a source of self-
protection in response to threats to the group, we might
expect that ingroup identification would increase as a
function of exposure to prejudice against the ingroup
(Allport, 1954/1979). We found mixed support for this
hypothesis. In Study 1, women who were rejected by a
sexist man tended to report higher group identification
than women who were rejected by a nonsexist man,
although this difference was not significant. In Study 2,
Latinos who were initially high in ethnic identification
identified even more strongly with being Latino if they
read about pervasive prejudice against their ingroup as
compared to an outgroup. In contrast, Latinos who were
initially low in ethnic identification disidentified even
more strongly if they read about pervasive prejudice
against their group. These patterns are consistent with
those observed by Ellemers (Ellemers et al., 1993) and
Ethier and Deaux (1994). These results suggest that
even though highly identified group members are more
vulnerable to group threats, they also identify more
strongly with the group after threat. Further research is
needed on the psychological implications of ingroup
identification among members of devalued groups.
In closing, we note that unless individuals identify
with their group, it is unlikely that social change targeted
at reducing discrimination will occur. Members of stig
-
matized groups who are highly identified with their
group are most likely to perceive group-based injustice
(Crosby et al., 1989; Major et al., in press; Operario &
Fiske, 2001) and pursue collective action (see Wright &
Tropp, 2002, for a review). Hence, members of stigma
-
tized groups who are low in group identification may be
exchanging a short-term personal benefit for a long-
term group cost.
NOTES
1. Details of the analyses using collective self-esteem as an alterna
-
tive moderator of the effect of the sexism of the evaluator (Study 1) or
prejudice condition (Study 2) on the dependent variables are available
from the first author.
2. The two new group identification items were inadvertently omit
-
ted from the dependent measures.
3. These conclusions are further supported by a 2 (group identifica
-
tion median split: high, low) ×2 (condition: ingroup or outgroup prej
-
udice) ANOVA conducted on group identification assessed in the
experiment. The interaction was significant, F(1, 35) = 11.35, p < .01.
Latino participants low in group identification reported significantly
lower group identification in the ingroup prejudice condition (M =
2.31) than in the outgroup prejudice condition (M = 3.71, p < .05). In
contrast, participants high in group identification tended to report sig
-
nificantly higher group identification in the ingroup prejudice condition
(M = 4.65) than in the outgroup prejudice condition (M = 4.0, p = .10).
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Revision accepted February 13, 2003
McCoy, Major / GROUP IDENTIFICATION AND PREJUDICE 1017
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