The Distribution of Identity and the Future of International Order: China's Hegemonic Prospects

Abstract

Existing theories predict that the rise of China will trigger a hegemonic transition and the current debate centers on whether or not the transition will be violent or peaceful. This debate largely sidesteps two questions that are central to understanding the future of international order: how strong is the current Western hegemonic order and what is the likelihood that China can or will lead a successful counterhegemonic challenge? We argue that the future of international order is shaped not only by material power but also by the distribution of identity across the great powers. We develop a constructivist account of hegemonic transition and stability that theorizes the role of the distribution of identity in international order. In our account, hegemonic orders depend on a legitimating ideology that must be consistent with the distribution of identity at the level of both elites and masses. We map the distribution of identity across nine great powers and assess how this distribution supports the current Western neoliberal democratic hegemony. We conclude that China is unlikely to become the hegemon in the near term.

Full text

The Distribution of Identity and the Future of
International Order: China’s Hegemonic
Prospects
Bentley B. Allan, Srdjan Vucetic, and Ted Hopf
Abstract Existing theories predict that the rise of China will trigger a hegemonic
transition and the current debate centers on whether or not the transition will be
violent or peaceful. This debate largely sidesteps two questions that are central to under-
standing the future of international order: how strong is the current Western hegemonic
order and what is the likelihood that China can or will lead a successful counterhe-
gemonic challenge? We argue that the future of international order is shaped not only
by material power but also by the distribution of identity across the great powers. We
develop a constructivist account of hegemonic transition and stability that theorizes
the role of the distribution of identity in international order. In our account, hegemonic
orders depend on a legitimating ideology that must be consistent with the distribution of
identity at the level of both elites and masses. We map the distribution of identity across
nine great powers and assess how this distribution supports the current Western neolib-
eral democratic hegemony. We conclude that China is unlikely to become the hegemon
in the near term.
The rise of China has generated renewed interest in theories of hegem-onic stability
and transition. However, existing studies do not adequately address the central ques-
tions at the heart of the contemporary debate about the future of hegemony: how
strong is the US-led Western hegemonic order and what is the likelihood that
China can or will lead a successful counterhegemonic challenge? Existing work
focuses either on military-economic power or the beliefs of policymaking elites.
Taken together, these studies offer a thin conception of hegemony that reduces heg-
emonic transition to material variables conditioned by elite perceptions of threat or
calculation of interest. A thin conception of hegemony overstates the likelihood of
a Chinese hegemony because it ignores a set of structural, ideational obstacles.
That is, the strength and stability of hegemonic orders also depends on the distribu-
tion of ideas and identities among the great powers. In order to assess the prospects of
We thank the editors of International Organization and two anonymous reviewers for comments that
improved the paper. The paper benefited from presentations at Columbia University, Dalhousie
University, European University in St. Petersburg, Lehigh University, the London School of Economics,
Princeton University, Queen’s University, Università degli Studi di Trento, and the University of British
Columbia. We also thank all of the analysts who worked on the data used in the piece: Liang Ce,
Benjamin Chan, Jian Ming, Marina Duque, Nanaho Hanada, Jarrod Hayes, Lim Kai Heng, Ki Hoon
Michael Hur, Shivaji Kumar, Rebecca Oh, and Rachel Zeng Rui.
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hegemony, we must look at the support for the reigning hegemonic ideology in the
domestic discourses of other great-power states.
Thirty years ago, Robert Cox introduced a thick conception of hegemony as eco-
nomic, military, and political dominance backed by an ideology that secures a
“measure of consent”from other states and publics.
1
But Cox, like other theorists
of hegemony, gave ideas little autonomy to constrain or shape hegemonic stability
and transition. Moreover, he did not develop the Gramscian idea that hegemony
depends not just on elite beliefs but on mass common sense.
2
We build on Cox’s
insights to build a constructivist theory of hegemonic stability and transition. Our
theory contends that the distribution of identity among the great powers constrains
and shapes the dynamics of hegemonic stability and transition. When the reigning
hegemonic ideology is supported by the distribution of identity, then the hegemonic
order is likely to remain stable even if the leading state is declining. A hegemonic
order is stronger to the extent that its ideology appeals to both elite and mass under-
standings of national identity among great powers. Conversely, when there is a dis-
juncture between the hegemonic ideology and the distribution of identity, then a
hegemonic transition is more likely. However, a counterhegemonic coalition is
likely to be successful only if it can draw ideological strength from the distribution
of identity itself. Otherwise, other states will not find the alternative order appealing
or desirable and the challenger will be unable to build support for it.
Our empirical analysis is based on an original mapping of the distribution of iden-
tity across nine great powers in the year 2010—Brazil, China, France, Germany,
India, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
3
The data are
drawn from the project Making Identity Count: A National Identity Database,
which is in development.
4
The data are built on discourse analyses by analysts we
trained and supervised, all of whom had prior linguistic competence in the relevant
national languages. Each analyst studied a standardized sample of texts including
political speeches, newspapers, high-school history textbooks, novels, and movies.
They used simple, inductive coding rules to recover the categories used to define
and understand national identity in each country.
5
The analysts then produced
reports that included both quantitative counts of the central identity categories and
interpretivist accounts of their contextual meanings. This mapping helps reveal the
elite beliefs and mass common-sense understandings that underlie the Western heg-
emonic order.
1. Cox 1987,7.
2. See Hopf 2013.
3. There are a variety of ways to define “great power.”We aimed to account for both military-economic
and institutional factors. The nine powers we included are all in the top ten states ranked in terms of the
Correlates of War composite index of national capability score (CINC) for the most recent year available,
2007. The Republic of Korea is ranked eighth (0.23), ahead of the UK (0.21) and France (0.18), but the
latter have permanent seats on the Security Council, justifying their inclusion (NMC v. 4.0, Singer,
Bremer, and Stuckey 1972).
4. For an explanation of the project, see Hopf and Allan 2016.
5. On discourses of national identity, see Allan 2016; Hopf 2002.
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Our main finding is that the distribution of identity presents a system-level barrier
to a Chinese hegemonic succession. First, we find strong support for the democratic
and neoliberal hegemonic ideology among elites and masses across the great powers.
Notably, there is strong ideational support for the order outside the core states of the
Western alliance. As a result, the US-led order might remain stable in the face of a
Chinese challenge or American decline.
6
Second, the democratic and neoliberal
hegemonic ideology effectively excludes China with its authoritarian national iden-
tity from full membership in the present order. Thus, it is unlikely to join and trans-
form the order from within. Third, we contend that China is unlikely to be able to
attract powerful followers into a counterhegemonic coalition. Its national identity dis-
course is insular and propagandistic and so is unlikely to form the basis of an ideology
or vision that could find support in the distribution of identity. While China may seek
to cultivate a favorable distribution of identity among other great powers, this process
is likely to take decades and proceed with difficulty. In short, for the foreseeable
future, the distribution of identity will serve as a powerful constraint on China’s heg-
emonic prospects. Our data show that there is mass-level discontent with neoliberal
markets that could be harnessed to a social democratic, populist, and democratic
counterhegemonic coalition in a number of countries. However, there is no alterna-
tive ideology to support and legitimate a hegemonic order based on those premises.
In the absence of a coherent alternative, the rise of anti-neoliberal populism is more
likely to lead to the dissolution of hegemonic order than a transition or succession.
Hegemony and Change in International Order
According to the conventional view, hegemonic transition is the transfer of leadership
from one dominant military-economic power to the next and the central question is
whether the transfer will be violent or peaceful.
7
This implies that the rise of China
or any other behemoth should trigger a hegemonic transition on military-economic
grounds alone. Elite perceptions and beliefs may alter how violent the transition is,
when it occurs, or what rules will emerge, but transition itself is thought to be a func-
tion of material power dynamics alone. While some theorists recognize the import-
ance of ideas in theory, in practice ideas are reduced to functional or secondary roles.
8
Cox, for example, intended to avoid the materialist determinism of classical
Marxism by affording an important role to the institutional and ideational structures
6. Here our argument revives and supports hegemonic stability theory. See Keohane 1984; Ruggie 1982;
Snidal 1985.
7. See Allison 2016; Cox 1987; Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1987; Kugler and Lemke 1996; Organski and
Kugler 1980; and Saull 2012.
8. This point was made over twenty years ago by Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 288–89. For examples
see Gilpin 1981, 34; Keohane 1984, 45; Organski and Kugler 1980,39–40.
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of world order.
9
However, Cox’s empirical studies do not demonstrate how ideas
affect hegemonic stability or transition. Cox’s explanations for the stability of the
liberal order between 1848 and 1873 and the subsequent transition to the welfare-
nationalist order that dominated from 1870s through 1945 are primarily economic.
He explains stability as a function of states’ability to moderate class conflict and
change by “an innovation of capital.”
10
Ideas emerge later in the story as a justifica-
tion for the social order of production. As such, they serve as a functional response to
changes in capital and neither shape the content of orders nor constrain the dynamics
of hegemony.
Other approaches allow ideas to have some autonomous influence, but they focus
only on elite perceptions and beliefs. Organski and Kugler argue that “the outbreak of
major war is a result both of changes in the power structure of the international system
and of the willingness of elites to fight …wars occur only when a dissatisfied great
power catches up with the dominant nation.”
11
Here, ideas can shape willingness and
satisfaction, but they are conceptualized narrowly as “elite perceptions.”
12
Similarly,
Keohane recognizes the importance of ideas but reduces them to elite beliefs about
whether or not support for the hegemon is in their interest: “hegemony rests on the
subjective awareness by elites in secondary states that they are benefiting.”
13
Ikenberry and Kupchan broaden the understanding of ideas to include norms,
values, interests, and preferences, but still focus on when and why “foreign elites
buy into the hegemon’s vision of international order.”
14
The literature on the rise of China tends also to focus on elite Chinese beliefs
and political calculations.
15
Schweller and Pu contend that to mount a true revisionist
challenge to US hegemony, China will have to challenge the reigning ideology.
16
This
is an important point, but their empirical analysis looks only at Chinese beliefs and it
cannot speak to the likelihood that Chinese delegitimation will succeed at the system
level. After all, the prospects of delegitimation or counterhegemonic mobilization
depend on the extent to which discourses in other great-power states reflect and
accept the beliefs and purposes embedded in the reigning hegemonic ideology.
Similarly, while Ikenberry seeks to give ideas a prominent role, he nonetheless
understates their importance. Ikenberry analyzes the ideational character of the
liberal order to assess the likelihood that China will join the present order or challenge
it.
17
He concludes that since the liberal order is “open”and loosely based on “fair”
9. Cox 1987, 159.
10. Ibid., 147, 161.
11. Organski and Kugler 1980, 39.
12. Ibid., 40.
13. Keohane 1984, 45, 137.
14. Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 285.
15. Breslin 2013; Callahan 2008; Foot 2006; Legro 2007; Schweller and Pu 2011. For material-power-
centric treatments of the rise of China, see Christensen 2006; Friedberg 2011; Mearsheimer 2010. For
exceptions complementary to this approach, see Tsai and Liu 2017; F. Zhang 2015; Y. Zhang 2015.
16. Schweller and Pu 2011.
17. Ikenberry 2011, 343–44.
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rules, it has the capacity to accommodate China and other rising powers.
18
The future
of international order, he concludes, “hinges”on Chinese decisions.
19
This reduces
the role of ideas in hegemonic transition to determining whether or not Chinese
elites choose to join the order or not. But the deeper problem is that Ikenberry’s
thin conception of hegemony leads him to miss the possibility that the ideological
element of order can serve as a constraint on the process of transition.
If hegemony is simply leadership of a rule-based order conditioned by elite beliefs,
then in the abstract it can incorporate any rising power. But if hegemony is a thick
phenomenon encompassing elite and mass beliefs, then the substantive ideational
content of the order, rather than its abstract form, is crucial. From this vantage
point, Ikenberry’s analysis fails to account for a major ideational barrier to China’s
entry into the US-led order: the democratic core of Western ideology delegitimizes
China’s authoritarian government. China cannot be expected to integrate into an
order that challenges the ideological foundations of its own domestic rule. Even if
the liberal states wanted to change this ideological requirement, it is not clear they
could, given mass support for democratic ideals in most liberal states. The actions
of both China and members of the US-led hegemonic coalition are constrained by
the reigning ideology and its deep roots in mass domestic discourses.
Kupchan argues that “understanding and managing international change requires
examining not just shifts in material power, but also the associated contest among
competing norms of order.”
20
For him, the process of hegemonic transition begins
when a rising power “seeks to push outward to its expanding sphere of influence a
set of ordering norms unique to its own cultural, socioeconomic, and political orien-
tations.”
21
This brings the rising power into normative conflict with the hegemon.
22
Kupchan is right that theories of hegemony need to account for both the economic-
military and normative or ideational elements of order. However, he does not specify
when we would expect economic and military power to translate into the develop-
ment of a successful normative order. After all, there is no guarantee that just
because a state possesses economic and military power other states will find the
vision of order it offers compelling. In short, the success of China’s efforts to cultivate
ideological support for its hegemonic project depends on the distribution of ideas
among the other great powers.
Moreover, Kupchan does not provide a systematic analysis of either Chinese
beliefs or the beliefs of other powers.
23
To understand if or how conflict over
18. Ibid., 345–46.
19. Ibid., 343.
20. Kupchan 2014, 220.
21. Ibid., 226.
22. Ibid., 252.
23. Kupchan draws on the secondary literature to argue that China is likely to operate only within a
“Sinicized sphere of influence.”This claim would be strengthened by a more systematic analysis of
elite and mass beliefs in China. See ibid., 253–55.
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normative orders is going to play out, we need to know the distribution of ideas. How
broadly shared and deeply held are the core normative elements of the order? Is there
a constituency among other elites and publics for the rising power’s vision? These are
central questions if we want to understand the stability of the current order and the
prospects for the creation of an alternative order led by the rising state. After all,
Kupchan merely stipulates that the rising great powers will come into conflict with
US order.
24
However, this is an empirical question that depends on who and what
will be deemed a threat, which in turn depends on the distribution of ideas.
In sum, while many theories recognize the role of ideas, accounts of hegemonic
stability and transition tend to restrict ideas to elite beliefs in the leading countries.
These approaches underestimate the power of mass beliefs and the importance of
ideas in the other great powers. What these studies miss is that hegemony is a struc-
tural phenomenon that rests on the distribution of power and the distribution of ideas
at elite and mass levels. The result is that the dynamics of hegemonic stability and
transition are poorly understood and the prospects for American or Chinese hegem-
ony cannot be adequately assessed.
Identity, Ideology, and the Constitution of Hegemonic Order
In contrast to the thin conceptions of hegemony common in the literature on the rise
of China, our account builds on the thick understanding of hegemony advanced by
Cox, Ruggie, and others.
25
Cox defines hegemony as “dominance of a particular
kind where the dominant state creates an order based ideologically on a broad
measure of consent.”
26
For him, a hegemonic order is a worldwide system of produc-
tion supported by “the mutual interests and ideological perspectives of social classes
in different countries.”
27
As such, orders depend on a set of general ideological prin-
ciples that convince “the less powerful”that their interests are aligned with leading
states and social classes.
28
Thus, hegemonic orders have three elements: a dominant
state (or coalition of states), a legitimizing ideology, and a network of institutions that
act as transmission belts and socialization mechanisms to disseminate the ideology
globally. These interlocking elements unite the social classes of diverse countries
in a coherent system of production that underwrites what Cox called a “world order.”
Cox’s conception of hegemony, as in the Marxist literature more generally, is cen-
tered on the construction of a single mode of production.
29
So Cox distinguishes
24. Ibid., 252.
25. Cox 1987; Ruggie 1982. See also Clark 2011; Finnemore 2009; Nexon and Neumann 2017; Worth
2011; and Y. Zhang 2015.
26. Cox 1987,7.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Recent Gramscian variants distinguish between varieties of capitalism within order. See Rupert
2006; Saull 2012.
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hegemonic order from non-order by investigating whether or not transnational social
forces generate convergence on a politico-economic system. For the purposes of this
analysis, we follow the current literature in focusing more broadly on “international
order.”An international order is a regular, lasting pattern of state behaviors (foreign
policies and transaction flows).
30
An order might rest on a worldwide mode of pro-
duction, but need not. International orders are constituted by an underlying structure
of institutions, rules, norms, and discourses that structure and shape state practices.
31
That underlying structure is carried and reproduced by all associations (states, organ-
izations, civil-society groups, corporations) whose actions shape state behaviors. The
patterns of behavior can pertain to the conduct of war and diplomacy, financial
systems, trade regimes, development strategies, humanitarian action, and so on. So
an order is a configuration of different practices across domains. In coherent, lasting
orders, practices across domains are tied together by overlapping values and
norms, such as the prominent role of liberal norms in international orders since the
1860s. But values and norms themselves do not constitute an order. Instead, we
know there is an international order when the patterns of behavior and practice
across domains are stable or regular over an extended period of time.
A hegemonic order is a particular kind of international order in which a leading
state or coalition can establish and impose rules on other great and secondary
powers. With Cox, we maintain that a hegemon cannot impose rules without securing
a broad measure of consent through the production and reproduction of a legitimating
ideology. The legitimating ideology serves to promote and protect the taken-for-
granted rules and ideas that structure international order.
32
The principal difference
between hegemony and empire or pure domination is that hegemons rule without
using coercion at every turn.
33
Instead, other great-power states accept the hegemon’s
leadership because they can see a place for themselves in the order. Moreover, a
hegemon backed by a legitimate ideology will also face less resistance when its inter-
ventions violate domestic preferences or commonly held standards of behavior.
When the supporting ideology lacks legitimacy, the hegemon will find it difficult
to lead and attract followers.
However, Cox, like others before him, privileged conscious, elite beliefs and in so
doing ignored a powerful source of legitimacy: the taken-for-granted and common-
sense beliefs of the masses. This is surprising because Cox himself argued that hegem-
ony rests on the consent of “the less powerful”in societies, who nonetheless have to
participate in the worldwide system of production. Given this, consent must rest
on the beliefs that structure understandings of what is good and desirable in everyday
30. See, for example, Bull 1977,7–8. Some thinkers define order according to the institutions or rules
that constitute it. Ikenberry 2001, 23. See Schweller 2001 on why a behavioral definition is preferred.
31. See Allan 2018,31–46.
32. Bially Mattern 2005; Bull 1977,24–27; Finnemore 2009, 62; Goh 2013,8–9; Wendt 1999, 206, 310;
and Y. Zhang 2015, 322.
33. Cox 1987; Finnemore 2009, 62; Goh 2013,4–6.
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political and social life at both the elite and mass levels. This was one of Gramsci’s
most important insights but one that Cox did not incorporate into his own Gramscian
theory of international hegemony. A conception of hegemony that includes both elite
and mass beliefs implies a unique theory of hegemonic transition in which these
common-sense ideas play a central role.
34
Ideology, Common Sense, and Institutions
For Gramsci, ruling elites fashion a hegemonic ideology to depict their own self-
interest as a universal interest of the masses. In that sense it is a collection of ideas delib-
erately assembled to advance the interests of those in power. It is designed to both attract
other members of the ruling elites and co-opt subordinate classes. Gramsci argued that it
is impossible to establish ideological hegemony without taking into account the senso
comune, or common sense, of the masses.
35
Gramsci defined common sense as “‘the phi-
losophy of non-philosophers,’the conceptualization of the world that is uncritically
absorbed.”
36
It is a collection of ideas about how to go on in the world in a good and
just way. It is a folk philosophy, necessarily incoherent and multifarious.
Common sense is the very opposite of a deliberately organized coherent ideology
designed to appeal to an audience. But no ideological hegemony can be established
among the masses unless it resonates with their lived daily common sense. For
example, a peasant’s sense that her labor should result in physical security for her
family is not part of any ideology. But if one seeks to construct a capitalist ideology,
one must find a way to integrate and accommodate such expectations. One must go
from “knowing, to understanding, to feeling”this common sense if one is to take it
into account as well as shape it, or render it more coherent, so it can become an
integral part of the hegemonic project.
37
Of course, over the long run, the state appa-
ratus can shape common sense. Power and common sense exist in a dialectical,
pedagogical relationship. Nonetheless, common sense cannot be easily or completely
manipulated. Thus, Gramsci argued that both hegemonic and counterhegemonic
movements need to begin with an ideology that “already enjoys, or could enjoy, a
certain diffusion, because it is connected to, and implicit in, practical life, and elab-
orating it so that it becomes a renewed senso comune possessing the coherence and
sinew of individual philosophies.”
38
The more deeply an elite ideology connects with
mass common sense, the stronger and more robust it will be.
Our theory of hegemonic stability and transition begins with the basic Gramscian
insight that an ideology must be made hegemonic among the masses. That is, an inter-
national order must be supported by an ideology that appeals to the common sense of
34. Hopf 2013.
35. Gramsci 1971, 425
36. Ibid., 419, 198–99.
37. Ibid., 418.
38. Ibid., 330.
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the masses throughout the great-power states. We posit that the present order is sup-
ported by an ideology that valorizes democracy and neoliberalism. This ideology rep-
resents the interest of the American hegemon in a world full of democracies enacting
neoliberal policies. Certainly there is more to the dominant ideology than that.
However, for the purposes of this study, we follow the literature in focusing on
these two aspects.
39
The more deeply the hegemonic ideology of neoliberal democracy penetrates
beyond elites into civil society and the masses, the stronger that hegemony will be.
At the international level, a thin ideological hegemony would be one that appeals
to elites in other great powers. A thick, and so more enduring and comprehensive,
ideological hegemony would be accepted as commonsensical by mass publics as
well. To the extent masses in great-power countries understand democracy as the
commonsensical way to go about organizing one’s political system and markets as
the taken-for-granted way to run an economy, we can say that Western neoliberal
democratic ideology is hegemonic.
Gramsci did not devote much attention to explaining how common sense could be
known, understood, and felt, or what institutions would be necessary to produce and
reproduce it. According to Althusser, one of the most important Marxist interpreters
of Gramsci’s writings, it was Gramsci alone who “had the ‘remarkable’idea that the
State could not be reduced to the (Repressive) State Apparatus, but included, as he put
it, a certain number of institutions from ‘civil society’: the Church, the Schools, the
trade unions, etc.”
40
For Gramsci it was the “complexes of associations in civil
society”that served as the “trenches and permanent fortifications”in the war of ideo-
logical position.
41
Unfortunately, Althusser lamented, “Gramsci did not systematize
his intuitions.”
42
Yet, the key to understanding the strength of hegemonic ideology is
understanding the institutional sites where common sense and ideology meet.
Robert Cox, in his application of Gramsci to International Relations (IR), theor-
ized the role of international institutions in the production and reproduction of ideo-
logical hegemony in only the Pax Britannica and Americana.
43
Cox concentrated on
only those elite institutions used by the UK and the US to manage the world capitalist
economy: the city of London, the International Monetary Fund, General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization, and the World Bank. He did not try
to analyze a broader set of institutions that would reveal the relationship between ideol-
ogy and Gramscian common sense. Thus, if we want to know how strong or robust a
hegemonic ideology is, the question remains—how can we operationalize and
measure common sense?
39. Acharya 2014; Ikenberry 2011; Rupert 2006; Saull 2012.
40. Althusser 1971, 142.
41. Gramsci 1971, 243.
42. Althusser 1971, 142.
43. Cox 1987.
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National Identity and Hegemonic Order
There are a variety of ways to operationalize and measure common sense at the inter-
national level. We argue that common sense plays a necessary role in constituting dis-
courses of national identity. We define national identity as a constellation of social
categories about what constitutes the national self or what it means to be a
member of a nation.
44
By this definition, there is no single national identity in a
country. Rather, there is a discourse of national identity categories and concepts
that actors draw upon to constitute action, construct meanings, and make claims in
social and political life. In our view, understandings of the national self are embedded
in the taken-for-granted desires and understandings in elite and mass common
sense.
45
They both draw on and reproduce these understandings in everyday life.
Thus, national identity categories can be found in “everything that is said or
written in a given state of society, everything that is printed or talked about and rep-
resented today through electronic media.”
46
It follows that we can examine common
sense by analyzing the identity categories that circulate in modern states. Moreover,
recovering national identity discourses allows us to assess the degree to which hegem-
onic ideology is supported or rejected in the everyday common sense of a country.
In short, we contend that a hegemonic ideology is robust when it resonates with dis-
courses of national identity.
How do national identity discourses in great-power states affect the strength and
content of hegemonic orders? Our account highlights two mechanisms that link
domestic identity discourses and support for the hegemonic order. First, a large
body of scholarship shows that identity discourses shape foreign policy decision
making at the domestic level.
47
Identity discourses, as part of domestic common
sense, contain heuristic categories and concepts that constitute foreign policy dispo-
sitions.
48
That is, identity discourses help shape what policies are taken for granted or
acceptable for both elites and masses. They help determine which countries are likely
to be deemed threats and which are likely to be considered friends or allies.
49
At the
elite level, foreign policy decision makers are citizens and thus are likely to deploy
common-sense identity in constructing their own beliefs about international
politics.
50
At the mass level, widely shared domestic identities constrain and
enable policymakers by making some policies more natural or easier to justify in
public than others.
51
Decision makers cannot consistently make decisions that
make no sense or cannot be justified to members of the political community as a
44. On definitions of identity in general, see Abdelal et al. 2009, 19.
45. See Hopf 2002.
46. Angenot 2004, 200. See also Sarup 1996, 25.
47. For a recent literature review, see Vucetic 2017.
48. Hopf 2002; Neumann and Pouliot 2011.
49. Wendt 1999, 106. Also see Herman 1996; Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995; Telhami and Barnett
2002.
50. Herman 1996; Hopf 2002; Vucetic 2011.
51. Hayes 2013; Hopf 2002,2013; Vucetic 2011.
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whole. While the institutional mechanisms for holding elites accountable are stronger
in democratic states, these constraints apply in authoritarian regimes as well.
Nondemocratic leaders are still socialized at home and they are unlikely to adopt pol-
icies that do not appeal to their selectorates and publics. As Gries argues, Chinese
nationalism among the masses constrains the elite because mass nationalism is
held by more individuals and is therefore likely to be more stable than elite views.
52
This general relationship between national identity and foreign policy decision
making implies that national identities influence the extent to which a state will
support or contest a hegemonic order. Policymakers will find it easier to marshal
domestic support for international order when that order’s ideological vision is con-
sistent with domestic identity. Conversely, if the hegemonic ideology is inconsistent
with a country’s identity discourse, foreign policy elites will have to struggle to artic-
ulate and defend policies that support the international order. For example, in the
early twentieth century, the US public was more likely to reject the ideology of inter-
national order rooted in balance-of-power doctrine because they associated it with
Europe and the Old World powers.
53
Wilson marshaled American nationalism to
articulate an exceptionalist, evangelical foreign policy befitting of a New World
power.
54
Second, hegemonic ideologies may operate as a structural factor at the inter-
national level that includes or excludes certain states from full membership or partic-
ipation in the order. In such cases, hegemonic ideologies draw on collective identities
rooted in self—other distinctions that delegitimize certain practices and
identities.
55
If the rules and ideologies of an order reject a state’s identity (e.g., as
“communist”or “theocratic”), then that state will be under pressure to contest the
hegemonic ideology and the associated order. Leaders from outsider states will
find it hard to ask their publics to make sacrifices for hegemonic orders that do not
accept the country or offer it full recognition within an order. Likewise, insider
states will find it easier to support an order that rejects and delegitimizes its perceived
enemies. In addition, this mechanism entails that rising powers with identity profiles
that conflict with the distribution of identity will find it difficult to fashion a hegem-
onic ideology that appeals to both its publics and the publics of the other great
powers.
Importantly, domestic identity discourses and mass-level constraints are unlikely
to change in the short run because they are rooted in the categories of everyday
life. The discursive structures of everyday life change slowly, if at all, over time.
They exist in complex relationships to daily practices and local cultural traditions.
Because they are distributed across so many individuals, mass discourses are also
52. Gries 2004. Researchers who view Chinese nationalism as state-directed agree that nationalism con-
strains foreign policy. Weiss 2014; Zhao 2004.
53. Ambrosius 1990, 9, 212.
54. Ibid., 10, 53–54.
55. Wendt 1999, 224–30.
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fragmented. Thus, any changes to the discursive structures of everyday life will be
difficult and gradual.
The connections between domestic identity, ideology, and foreign policy mean that
the legitimacy of an international order depends on the relationship between its sup-
porting ideology and the distribution of identities across states.
56
When we say that
the distribution of identity is consistent or resonant with the hegemonic ideology, we
mean only that these mechanisms—foreign policy constitution and ideological inclu-
sion or exclusion—are likely to operate in one direction or another. In short, a legit-
imating ideology is likely to succeed in unifying and supporting an international order
to the extent that it makes sense to and is accepted by both elites and masses in other
great-power states. In this way, the strongest, most robust hegemony would be con-
sistent with elite and mass identities across the great powers. In Gramscian terms, this
would reflect the grounding of hegemony in the everyday common sense of domestic
societies. Conversely, we would say that a legitimating ideology is likely to fail when
policymakers in many states will struggle to marshal domestic support for the order or
when the ideology excludes too many key states from full participation.
Figure 1 summarizes the theoretical framework. Discourses of national identity in
great-power states constitute the distribution of identity. The distribution of identity
Discourses of
National Identity
Discourses of
National Identity
Discourses of
National Identity
International Order
Hegemonic Ideology
Distribution of Identity
Ideational support and influenceIdeational constitution
FIGURE 1. Identity, hegemony, and international order
56. On the distribution of identity see Wendt 1999, 224–33.
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contains identity categories that are shared by multiple states (e.g., Western states’
self-understanding as democratic), as well as some categories that are idiosyncratic
(e.g., China’s self-understanding as socialist). The distribution of identity supports
and shapes the hegemonic ideology which in turn legitimates the hegemon’s leader-
ship as well as the institutions and rules that influence international order.
The history of hegemony since 1800 demonstrates that the mechanisms linking
identity and hegemony have had a powerful influence on international politics.
Over the course of the nineteenth century, Britain built a global hegemonic order sup-
ported by liberal institutions and ideology in Europe and mercantilist colonial imper-
ialism in the global south.
57
This order drew sustenance from the increasingly liberal
self-understandings of European states and the construction of a common European
civilizational standard.
58
However, as the case of Russia demonstrates, the liberal and
civilizational ideology excluded states perceived as illiberal or backwards. While
Russia had the material power to serve an important role in the European balance
of power, and so was part of the European international political system, it never
became a member of European great-power society.
59
Thus, it was unthinkable
that Russia could become the hegemon of a Eurasian or world order because its iden-
tity was inconsistent with the distribution of power.
Neumann has shown that Russia was marginalized as a European power in part
because the Europeans perceived Russia as foreign, illiberal, and backward.
60
Historian Hans Bagger writes that the 1721 Treaty of Nystad marked Russia’s
entry into European great-power politics only because “the courts of Europe could
no longer ignore Russia as a semibarbarian state.”
61
Russia’s continued identity as
a despotic power clashed with the growing liberal forms of governance that increas-
ingly characterized other European great powers.
62
By 1875, Russia was the only
great power still ruled by an absolute monarchy.
63
Russia was an “abnormal”great
power at odds with the identities and ideologies of the European great powers.
European resistance toward Russia grew over the course of the nineteenth century:
“by 1856, the political ideologies of the West stood in unflinching hostile array
against …the precepts and institutions of autocracy that Alexander II was sworn
to defend …Europeans …saw in Russian autocracy the personification of that
tyranny they had fought to destroy in the revolutions of 1789, 1830, and 1848.”
64
As a result, many Europeans were strengthened in their opposition to “Russia’s
claims for recognition as a European power.”
65
While West European middle
57. Bartlett 1969; Gamble 2002; Kupchan 2010; and Vucetic 2011.
58. Bowden 2009, 142–50; Watson 1969, 120–25.
59. Around 1870, Russia had the largest military force in the world and the second largest economy.
Ikenberry 2011, 42.
60. Neumann 2008a,2008b; Neumann and Pouliot 2011.
61. Bagger 1993, 36.
62. Neumann 2008b, 26.
63. Watson 1969, 120.
64. Lincoln 1982 quoted in Neumann and Pouliot 2011, 129.
65. Ibid.
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classes in the nineteenth century were challenging absolutism, Russian absolutism
was only getting stronger. So despite being a major material power in the nineteenth
century, Britain never faced a serious hegemonic challenge from Russia.
Similarly, despite the rapid rise of the US, the British never had to fight back an
American counterhegemonic project. Instead, the peaceful rise and integration of
the US into the British order suggests that identity discourses shape the dynamics
of hegemonic stability and transition.
66
Britain and the US oscillated between
rivalry and outright enmity from the American Wars of Independence (1793–1814)
until the 1870s. After the final outstanding issues from the American Civil War
were settled in 1872, London and Washington found fewer and fewer reasons to
fight. After the 1859 publication of Darwin’sOrigin of Species, existing racial atti-
tudes were bolstered and Anglo-Saxonism rose in prominence.
67
Anglo-Saxonism
was a racialized identity discourse that held Britain and the US were “kinsmen”
with common sentiments, customs, and values.
68
The rise of Anglo-Saxonism and
the improvement of diplomatic relations displaced the American anglophobia that
had dominated both elite and mass views since the revolution.
69
While an alliance was not formally considered, relations improved through the
1890s into the new century. During the main colonial wars in the period—the
Spanish-American War and the Boer War—the two countries acted as each other’s
cheerleaders. Instead of taking the opportunity to weaken their rival, Britain and
the US supported one another through what they called “benevolent neutrality.”
This fellow feeling and support was offered at both elite and mass levels. When
the Spanish-American war began, “all London burst out into the rainbow hues of
the American national colours.”
70
While reciprocal displays would not be forthcom-
ing for some time, American public opinion slowly shifted in Britain’s favor. This paved
the way for further cooperation and collaboration that forged the “special relationship.”
Alternative explanations for the peaceful transition that focus on democracy and
transnational capitalism alone are incomplete. In the absence of a shared Anglo-
Saxon identity, democracy and profit would have had different meanings and thus
different implications for foreign policy.
71
The hand-off was made possible by “cul-
tural and ideological affinities”that compelled British elites to embrace the United
States as Britain’s“natural successor to the leading role in the world system.”
72
Kupchan concludes that “the sense of solidarity arising from compatible identities
in turn helped Americans and Britons embrace the notion that war between them
was unthinkable.”
73
Moreover, the US was ready and able to take up leadership of
66. Allison 2016 codes this as the only peaceful transition before the advent of nuclear weapons.
67. Perkins 1968,8.
68. Ibid., 59; Kupchan 2010, 110–12; Vucetic 2011,25–28.
69. Perkins 1968,8–10, 23; Vucetic 2011, 35, 133–39.
70. Henry Thurston Peck quoted in Perkins 1968, 42.
71. Kupchan 2010,73–111; Vucetic 2011,22–49.
72. Gamble 2002, 128.
73. Kupchan 2010, 111.
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a hegemonic order built largely upon the same liberal principles that British liberal
ideology had mobilized. In short, the British did not challenge the rise of the US
in part because the US was not seen as a threat to Britain or the British order. The
US was able to ascend to a position of leadership because its identity profile was con-
sistent with liberal publics in core great-power states and arrayed against the illiberal
enemies in Germany and Russia.
74
These cases demonstrate the importance of identity relations to hegemonic dynam-
ics throughout European history. While each hegemonic transition has its own
characteristics, we can expect that the distribution of identity will play an important
role in the prospects for hegemonic stability or transition. Thus, if we want to assess
the likelihood of a Chinese hegemonic transition we need to compare China’s own
identity profile to the overall distribution of identity across the great powers.
The Distribution of Identity and the Dynamics of Hegemonic Orders
In this final theoretical section we outline the implications of our framework for a
theory of hegemonic prospects. Our theory builds on Ruggie’s seminal argument
about hegemonic stability: “as long as purpose is held constant, there is no reason
to suppose that the normative framework of regimes must change as well.”
75
For
Ruggie, as for Keohane and Snidal, the decline of the hegemon or the rise of other
states is not a sufficient condition for change in the rules and institutions of
international order.
76
As Snidal puts it, the provision of public goods can be main-
tained so long as the rising powers form a “k-group”of states interested in maintain-
ing the order. Certainly, shifts in the distribution of economic and military power
generate pressures for change.
77
However, our theory of hegemony expects
hegemonic transition only when specific conditions obtain between the distribution
of identities, the reigning hegemonic ideology, and challenger ideologies.
First, returning to Ruggie, if there is strong support for the hegemonic ideology
among the great powers, then the hegemonic order is likely to be stable even if the
relative economic and military power of the hegemon declines. If, in turn, the distri-
bution of identity supports the existing hegemonic ideology, then hegemonic leadership
is likely to be bolstered by the foreign policies of other great powers and there will be
ample ideological resources to resist challenges. The hegemon may have to accommo-
date allied rising powers, but the basic character of economic, military, political, and
74. This also likely shaped the alliance patterns of World War II. We would hypothesize that the Soviet
Union was an unavailable ally to Britain and France because of the identity relations that prevailed among
them.
75. Ruggie 1982, 384.
76. Keohane 1984; Snidal 1985.
77. Cox 1987; Gilpin 1981.
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social arrangements are likely to remain constant. Thus, when the distribution of iden-
tity and the hegemonic ideology are consistent or resonant with one another, hege-
mony is likely to be stable.
Second, the ability to adapt a hegemonic order is constrained by the distribution of
identities because not all ideologies will be able to draw support from underlying
common sense. As we saw earlier, power transition theory argues that conflict
between the hegemon and the rising state is likely only if the rising state is dissatis-
fied.
78
The distribution of identity influences when a state is likely to be satisfied or
dissatisfied. We argue that conflict between the hegemon and the rising state is likely
if the hegemonic ideology and the underlying identities excludes or delegitimizes the
rising power’s role in the international order. If the hegemonic ideology and distribu-
tion of identity includes a place for the rising power, then the rising power can be
accommodated and satisfied easily. Moreover, if the order is premised upon an ide-
ology that the rising power cannot accept, the hegemon may find itself unable, for
both domestic and international reasons, to accommodate the rising power. If an ide-
ology is consensually shared among elites and masses across the great powers, it will
not be easily altered. To the extent that accommodating the rising power requires
alterations in the ideology, the hegemon risks reducing both domestic and interna-
tional support for international order. Thus, when the identity of the rising state is
consistent or resonant with the ideologies and identities underlying the order,
hegemony is likely to be stable. When there is a clash between the identity of the
rising state and the distribution of identities, the hegemon faces high costs of ideolog-
ical accommodation. As a result, conflict between the hegemon and the rising state is
more likely. However, this may or may not lead to war, depending on other factors.
79
Third, hegemonic transition is likely only when the rising state is able to form a
counterhegemonic coalition of revisionist great powers. The formation of a counter-
hegemonic coalition depends on both the delegitimation of the existing ideology and
the formation of a new ideology that can attract followers. In Gramscian terms, a war
of position precedes any hegemonic change. The processes of both delegitimation
and ideological construction are shaped by the distribution of identity. First, attempts
to delegitimate the existing hegemonic order are likely to be successful only if there is
a disjuncture between the dominant ideology and the distribution of identities. That
is, arguments against the present order need to find support in discourses across the
great powers. Second, the construction of a challenger ideology is likely only if the
ideology offered by the rising state can find support in the distribution of identities
among the other great powers. The distribution of identities can then provide the ideo-
logical basis for the rising state to attract followers willing to obey and contribute to
an alternative set of institutions. However, if the rising state’s own domestic identity
discourse is in conflict with the distribution of identities, other states are unlikely to
support its ideology. Moreover, the rising state may find it difficult to fashion an
78. Organski and Kugler 1980,39–40.
79. For realist accounts see Levy 1987; Schweller 1999.
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ideology that will be simultaneously acceptable to its own public and the masses in
the other great powers. Since domestic common sense changes only slowly over time,
there are strong limits on any efforts to obviate this constraint by engineering discur-
sive change at home or abroad. Thus, if the rising state has a national identity dis-
course that is idiosyncratic to or discordant with the prevailing distribution of
identities, it is unlikely to be able to construct a successful counterhegemonic bloc
or an alternate international order. Hegemonic transitions are likely only when
the rising state can build on ideological resources in the distribution of identities.
Mapping the Distribution of Great-Power Identity
Constructivists have yet to test theories about the distribution of identity in part
because data collection and analysis at the system level presents considerable barri-
ers. Recovering the national identity of a single country is an onerous undertaking,
let alone recovering the distribution of identities among the great powers. The chal-
lenge of mapping the distribution of identity is compounded by the fact that to oper-
ationalize our conception of hegemony we need to recover identity categories at both
elite and mass levels. On the one hand, we need a method that will capture the mean-
ings that constitute discourses of national identity. This requires an interpretivist
method that can recover meanings inductively from a variety of everyday contexts
and institutional centers. On the other hand, the method must be general and replic-
able enough to produce comparable results in all the great-power countries. Balancing
these requirements, our data are produced using a method of discourse analysis that
combines the inductive ethos of interpretivism with a positivist emphasis on transpar-
ency and reliability.
80
While rooted in the recovery of intersubjective webs of
meaning, our method is built on transparent principles of text sampling, quantitative
counting procedures, and the standardized presentation of evidence. We trained ana-
lysts with requisite language abilities to apply this method to a sample of texts in each
of the great-power countries for the year 2010.
The core of the method is the inductive coding of a range of texts to recover the
central identity categories used to understand the “national self”in each country.
An identity category is any concept that a text uses to explain what it means to be
a member of the nation or what embodies the nation. That is, a category is a descriptor
that serves to tell us “what does it mean to be American?”or “what is America?”We
instructed analysts to proceed inductively, set aside their preconceived notions, and
record only those categories that appeared in the texts.
80. For more information on our methodology see Allan 2016. We chose discourse analysis rather than
content analysis because we wanted a method that would be both inductive and able to recover not just a list
of categories but the meanings attached to those categories.
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Each analyst coded a standardized sample of texts guided by four principles. First,
we aimed to sample texts that would be read by the largest number of people and so
focused on best-selling or popular texts. Second, we chose texts from a variety of
genres and media to capture both elite and mass everyday, common-sense beliefs.
Finally, the sample needed to be comparable across states, so we chose genres that
would be popular and available in all states.
81
In short, our goal was to sample
texts from the “innumerable centres of culture, ideological state apparatus and prac-
tices: parents, family, schools, the workplace, the media, the political parties, the
state.”
82
Following these principles, we constructed a standardized text sample
drawn from five genres:
Leadership speeches: Two leadership speeches by the head of government or
ruling party on significant occasions. These might be the national holiday
address or a programmatic or budgetary speech.
Newspapers: The two newspapers with the highest national circulation. From
these, all opinion-editorials and letters to the editor for the fifteenth day of
each month were coded.
History textbooks: Two widely read high-school history textbooks on the coun-
try’s national history. Analysis began with the chapters on the twentieth century.
Novels: The top two best-selling novels in the country, by the country’s authors,
in an official language.
Movies: The top two most-attended movies in the country, by the country’s
directors/producers, in an official language.
The sample aims to capture documents that are widely read and that reflect both elite
and mass discourse. A text is more reflective of “elite”discourse if it is produced and
consumed by political and social elites that dominate powerful institutions of a
society. A text is more reflective of “mass”discourse if it is produced for and con-
sumed by a large, multiclass, multi-ethnic, etc. collection of people in the country.
As a rule of thumb, we considered speeches and newspaper editorials to represent
elite political discourse, while letters to the editor, novels, and movies captured
mass discourse. History textbooks occupied an intermediary position since they are
likely to reflect elites’self-understanding of the country, but are also taught to
every person receiving secondary education.
We trained analysts to recover identity categories and their associated meanings by
applying simple coding rules to the texts: what does it mean to be country X or a
81. We also had to forgo some potentially useful genres, such as television and social media sites, that
could not be easily or reliably sampled.
82. Sarup 1996, 25.
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citizen of country X? Analysts were instructed to both recover meanings and provide
a count of how many times a given category appeared in the text. Coders were explic-
itly asked to distinguish between “themes”and identity categories. Themes are just
recurring ideas in the discourse, such as “it is good to be hard working.”Identity cat-
egories must be explicitly linked to the nation or what it means to be a member of the
nation. It counts as an identity category only if hard working is mentioned as an attri-
bute of the Japanese people.
Identity categories were to be coded according to valence (positive +, negative -,
neutral /, or ambiguous ∼). Analysts were also asked to attend to whether the identity
is one that the country aspires to or is trying to avoid (aspirational or aversive) or if it
serves as a significant other with which the country compares itself. Consider this
example drawn from a speech by the French President to la Francophonie:“To our com-
patriots overseas, I want to convey my determination to that which the Republic holds to,
with regards to their promises of equality and dignity that was not sufficiently held in to in
the past.”This was coded as: EQUALITY+, DIGNITY+, HISTORICAL OTHER-. The
quote explicitly hails the French nation as “the Republic”and defines what it means to be
French as striving to achieve equality and dignity. The negative historical coding notes
that France has not always succeeded in maintaining the dignity and equality of people.
This marks present France as distinct from that past other. When coding was completed,
analysts prepared summary tables and wrote up their findings in standardized reports.
After their inductive analysis was completed, we asked each analyst to summarize
whether the predominant identity discourses in their countries supported Western
democratic neoliberal hegemonic ideology.
83
Identities were deemed consistent
with the democratic elements of ideology if they accepted and valorized electoral
government, the rule of law, and human rights. They were considered supportive
of neoliberalism if they identified with market-based policies and a restricted role
for state intervention in the economy.
China and the Distribution of Identity
The main findings appear in Table 1. There is strong, but not unanimous, elite support
for both the democratic and neoliberal elements of Western hegemony. With
83. These are highly contested terms. Here are the definitions we gave the analysts: “In the context of
Western hegemony, democracy refers to political system in which: (i) the people rule via elections; (ii)
a parliamentary or other elected legislative body of representatives makes the laws; (iii) there are institu-
tional checks and balances (rule of law; functioning courts). Neoliberalism is an economic doctrine that
promotes: (i) faith in markets to solve problems; (ii) a negative view of state intervention in the
economy; (iii) a positive attitude toward liberal economic policies and liberalizing reforms (free trade,
deregulation, privatization, openness). Cultural theorists have extended the concept to include corollary
beliefs that support and bolster those economic doctrines: (iv) strong individualism (Thatcher’s“there is
no such thing as society”), as expressed in values like individual self-help or individual responsibility;
and (v) competitiveness mentioned as a positive value.”On support for democracy and neoliberalism in
the US national identity discourse, see Hur 2016.
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exceptions, there is a mass-elite consensus that being democratic is a positive aspect
of one’s identity. Elites also understand some aspects of neoliberalism to be a positive
part of their country’s national identity. Notably, elites in Japan, India, Brazil, and
China identify positively with both liberalizing policies (openness and free trade)
and statist or socialist identities. These countries do not share the neoliberal view
that the state is an ineffective or illegitimate economic actor, but they still identify
with economic liberalism. While the mass texts exhibit strong support for democratic
identities, they display largely negative or ambivalent attitudes toward neoliberal
ones. This might provide the basis for a counterhegemonic ideology, but there is
no coherent alternative economic identity to rival neoliberalism in the discourse.
Thus, there is strong support for the democratic elements of Western hegemony,
and only ambivalent support for the neoliberal elements.
Support for democratic, neoliberal hegemony is especially strong in the core states
of the Western alliance.
84
In the United Kingdom there is an elite and mass consensus
on the understanding that “modern Britain”is democratic, lawful, and free.
85
British
texts ranging from political speeches to letters to the editor identify being British with
enjoying or defending individual freedoms and basic rights.
86
The prevalence of these
themes in British identity discourses means that Britain’s support for the democratic
elements of Western hegemony is taken for granted and uncontested. The economic
side is more complex.
On the one hand, the importance of freedom in British discourse supports a neo-
liberal “globalist”identity that represents the nation as an economically open
TABLE 1. Democracy and neoliberalism in national identity discourses, 2010
Democracy Neoliberalism
Country Elites Mass Elites Mass
Brazil +−++−
China −++−−+
France + + +−−+
Germany + + −++−
India (E) + + +−−+
India (H) + + +−+−
Japan −+−
Russia + + + −
UK ++++−
US + + −+−+
Notes: Symbols represent valence: (+) refers to a positive evaluation, (−) to a negative one, and (+−) to a mixed eval-
uation, with the more prominent valence appearing first. India-H and India-E refers to findings of the Hindi and English
language reports, respectively.
84. For data on the national identity discourse of the American hegemon, see Hur 2016.
85. Vucetic 2016, 174.
86. Ibid.
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country that benefits from trade, the pursuit of prosperity, and competitive individu-
alism.
87
But globalism is not uncontested. In one editorial in The Times on the
whether or not the government should prevent Kraft from buying British chocolatier
Cadbury, globalism confronts an economic-cultural nationalist challenge:
Saving this one company from a foreign predator is not worth setting a prece-
dent: one that allows a business secretary to interfere in the business of take-
overs, based on a whim; one that overturns all notions of free trade; one that
could damage our international reputation as a place that values fair business
practices and minimum state intervention. These are more important British
principles, alas, than a decent bar of chocolate.
88
For The Times editorial board, at least, liberalism is a more important component of
British identity than historical cultural artifacts. Elsewhere in the British texts, a wel-
farist and nationalist understanding of Britain is counterposed to this liberal identity.
The welfarist understanding lauds the achievements of the postwar Labour party such
as the National Health Service and rejects the self-help values of neoliberal
discourse.
89
So while support for neoliberalism is not taken for granted, elements
of British discourse and society do bolster the neoliberal elements of Western
hegemony.
French national identity discourse depicts the country as a “republican”nation built
on the values of liberty, fraternity, equality, secularism, the rule of law, and democ-
racy. As one letter writer puts it, children are “raised in the admiration of France, its
Republican values, of its democracy that respects diversity without harming the
unitary whole.”
90
In the textbooks, novels, and movies France is defined as a
social democracy that rejects laissez-faire capitalism and values its historical strug-
gles for political and economic rights.
91
Work and competition are derided as exploit-
ative and socially corrosive.
92
Profit is portrayed as vulgar.
93
In the novels and
movies, these themes come together in the figure of the neurotic, overworked urbanite
who can only be saved by the pastoral, bucolic experiences of the properly French
countryside.
94
But there is no sense that France is or should be socialist or commu-
nist. So, in France there is mass resistance to the neoliberal elements of Western hege-
mony but strong support for the democratic aspects.
German national identity discourse defines Germany as a free, democratic, and
liberal country that has a responsibility to defend its values internationally.
95
The
87. Ibid.
88. Quoted in ibid.
89. Vucetic 2016, 176–77.
90. Chan, Ming, and Oh 2016, 85.
91. Ibid., 94.
92. Ibid., 73.
93. Ibid., 73.
94. Ibid., 88–89.
95. Heng 2016, 100.
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commitment to Western ideals is consensual, spanning elite and mass texts.
Thematically, Germany’s identity as a democratic, liberal state is structured by a
strong rejection of its fascist and communist past.
96
The rejection of the communist
past carries over into a rejection of China. In textbooks and opinion letters China is
depicted negatively because it is not liberal or democratic.
97
On the economic side,
Germany’s identity as a social democracy tempers its commitment to neoliberal prin-
ciples. While capitalism is mentioned mostly positively in speeches and textbooks,
neoliberalism is criticized in letters to the editor.
98
This divide may reflect some dif-
ferences between elite and mass views, but both groups agree that the government is
socially and economically responsible for its people and so they reject neoliberalism
in that sense. Nonetheless, Germany identifies strongly with Western values and
depicts China as a negative external Other.
Japan’s place in the Western alliance is more ambivalent, but Japanese identity dis-
course still supports Western hegemony and rejects Chinese influence. There is an
elite-mass consensus that Japan is an economically strong, capitalist country that
prizes familial orientation and communal values.
99
As in France and Germany, neo-
liberal policies are criticized and citizens identify with the welfare state. Politically,
Japan itself is not represented as a democracy and there is no strong identification
with liberal values.
100
Nonetheless, elite texts depict the United States as a close
and important ally.
101
Thus, Japan does not strongly support Western hegemony,
but nor are its values in tension with or likely to challenge Western hegemony.
Outside the core states of the Western alliance, rising powers Brazil and India iden-
tify with key elements of the reigning hegemonic order. Both countries identify as
democracies and aspire to be full members of the American-led order. India’s identity
as the “world’s largest democracy”anchors the dominant discourse. Identification
with democracy is evident in speeches, newspapers, textbooks, and novels in both
English and Hindi.
102
For example, Indian Prime Minister Singh touts India’s
status as the “world’s largest democracy”and makes it an “example for many
other countries to emulate.”
103
India’s democratic identity is part of a broader
“modern”orientation that aspires to be a country with capitalist growth, economic
competition, and western political ideals. Many elite and mass texts express strong
support for the rule of law and legal rights even while worrying that endemic
96. Ibid., 105.
97. Ibid., 106.
98. Ibid., 104.
99. Hanada 2016, 151–55.
100. We might hypothesize here that the Japanese texts are silent because it is already a taken-for-granted
aspect of Japanese national identity. One way to test this would be to assess Japanese discourses of national
identity beginning in 1950 to see if democratic identity was explicitly present before it dropped out. This
would imply it has been internalized as so commonsensical as not to bear mention. If, however, democracy
was never a significant category, we would conclude it just is not part of Japanese self-understanding.
101. Hanada 2016, 160.
102. Ibid. 118; Kumar 2016, 135.
103. Quoted in Hayes 2016, 121.
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corruption threatens these values.
104
Indian texts express ambivalence toward neolib-
eralism. On the one hand, free trade and business competition are credited with pro-
ducing India’s economic successes.
105
On the other hand, many texts still see India as
a socialist country that should strive for equitable growth and directly alleviate
poverty.
106
Nonetheless, India’s democratic identity and modernist aspirations
align it strongly with the American order.
Brazilian national identity discourse also represents itself as a democracy under
threat by corruption and incompetence.
107
One novel notes that journalists “were mis-
taken to believe that the slum belonged to the nation …[or] was regulated by the
Federal Constitution and the democratic rule of law.”
108
But mass and elite texts
alike represent democracy as an aspirational identity. So while Brazil sees itself as
a“limited democracy”it nevertheless aspires to great-power status as a regional
leader within the Western order.
109
The United States is portrayed in textbooks as
the model for Brazilian democracy and European-American influences are on
balance characterized positively.
110
However, the United States is also criticized as
consumerist, militarist, and neoliberal.
111
Thus, while Brazil rejects certain elements
of American leadership, its dominant identity categories position it as an aspirational
power within the existing order.
Russian national identity discourse presents a more complex picture. On the one
hand, there is elite support for neoliberal democratic hegemony. Medvedev and
Putin’s speeches articulate support for neoliberal policies and even use the language
of democratic governance. On the other hand, mass texts reject democratic neoliber-
alism or are at least ambivalent. While there are no negative understandings of
democracy, Russian mass ambivalence toward democracy is directed precisely at
Western conceptualizations of democracy. So while there is little support for
Western ideology, there is no elite rejection of it and certainly no ideological alterna-
tive proffered in political speeches or newspapers.
China’s identity discourses are markedly different from those of the other great
powers. The key themes are insular, nationalist, and propagandistic. Communist
Party phrases such as “socialism with Chinese characteristics,”“bureaucracy-
oriented consciousness,”“the Chinese dream,”and “reciprocal courtesy”play a
central role in defining what it means to be Chinese.
112
These phrases serve important
ideological functions domestically but they are inward looking and particularistic.
For example, “the Chinese dream”is not a universalizable vision of economic
104. Hayes 2016, 117–119; Kumar 2016, 134–37.
105. Hayes 2016, 117; Kumar 2016, 138.
106. Hayes 2016, 117.
107. Duque 2016, 48.
108. Quoted in Duque 2016, 42.
109. Duque 2016, 55.
110. Ibid., 54.
111. Ibid., 54.
112. Ce and Zeng Rui 2016,68–71.
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prosperity but a nationalist call for the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
113
The economic doctrine of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”is linked to a spe-
cific story about how Chinese society has and will develop.
114
These dominant ele-
ments of Chinese identity are unlikely to form the basis of a compelling alternative
international vision or hegemonic order that will appeal to other great powers.
Assessing Hegemonic Prospects
What are the prospects for the Western hegemonic order in the face of China’s rise?
Broadly speaking, there are three possibilities. The order could remain stable under
the leadership of either the US or a coalition of great powers. The order could dissolve
without being replaced. Or, China could lead a hegemonic transition, either by
joining and transforming the current order or by constructing an alternative order
from the outside. To assess which of these is most likely, we return to the three theor-
etical expectations about the dynamics of hegemonic order we outlined earlier. We
conclude that the first two possibilities are more likely than a Chinese-led transition,
given the distribution of identity.
First, does the distribution of identity bolster Western hegemony? The evidence
shows that while some aspects of Western democratic neoliberal hegemony are con-
tested, the distribution of identity among the great powers provides strong support for
Western hegemony. Masses and elites in the United Kingdom, France, Germany,
Japan, Brazil, and India clearly identify with democracy. While the masses in
some of these countries reject neoliberalism, elites identify with liberal policies.
This suggests that the hegemonic order is likely to remain stable even in the face
of a relative decline in American power. Other states would likely be willing to
support the order and either bolster American leadership or form a coalition akin
to Snidal’sk-group that could maintain most existing rules without a hegemon.
Second, what does the distribution of identity imply for China’s ability to join and
transform the existing order? Among the great powers, Chinese elites are alone in
openly opposing the democratic element of Western hegemony. This poses an import-
ant obstacle to any Chinese global hegemonic project because Chinese elites would
have to abandon a fundamental aspect of their own self-understanding to become full
members of the current order. There is unlikely to be an American-Chinese hand-off
similar to the shift from British to American hegemony because China is not likely to
join the existing order as a junior partner. Thus, China is unlikely to lead a transition
within the dominant norms of the existing order.
Third, what is the likelihood that China will be able to form an alternative counter-
hegemonic bloc that would challenge or displace the current order? Again, since all the
other great powers save Russia identify as democracies, it is unlikely China can build
an ideology that would simultaneously satisfy its domestic needs and appeal to others.
113. Ibid., 69.
114. Ibid., 68.
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So elites and masses in the other great powers would have to reject their democratic
identities in favor of a Chinese alternative. This seems unlikely given the strong
support for democracy in India and Brazil. To make a nondemocratic hegemony pos-
sible, China would have to delegitimate or displace the democratic elements that
dominate identity discourses in the other great powers. While this is a possibility,
the mass-level support for democracy means any effort to cultivate an alternative, non-
democratic distribution of identity is likely to take a long time. Moreover, China is por-
trayed negatively in other great-power discourses on this point. In Germany, Chinese
authoritarian socialism is linked to a rejected Nazi and Soviet past.
115
Some Indian
texts worry that India’s democratic identity will bring it into conflict with a Chinese
power hostile to democracy.
116
Elsewhere, China is viewed ambivalently as an eco-
nomic marvel or competitor, but is never represented positively as a leader or model.
China’s identity discourse contains little else that could be extrapolated into a com-
pelling vision or ideology in support of an alternative international order. Because its
national identity discourse is insular, it is hard to imagine how Chinese identity cat-
egories could be universalized so they would appeal to others. Given that the masses
in all countries except for the UK have ambivalent or negative attitudes toward
capitalism, markets, and neoliberalism, one possibility is that China could lead an
anti-neoliberal, nationalist, counterhegemonic coalition. There is a latent alternative
“historic bloc,”to borrow Gramsci’s terminology, in search of an ideology backed
by sufficient global material power to make it hegemonic. But it is difficult to see
how China would offer a compelling alternative to neoliberalism. Europeans and
others seem ready for social democracy, but China is unlikely to offer that alternative.
If anything, the resurgence of populism in the US, Britain, and elsewhere suggests
that dissatisfaction with neoliberalism could be mobilized in a coalition aimed against
unfettered markets, but in favor of democratic governance.
117
As Nigel Farage put it,
“voters across the Western world want nation state democracy.”
118
A global populist
counterhegemonic ideology would contest the neoliberal content of the reigning
ideology, while embracing an ethno-nationalist understanding of the democratic
self. The election of President Donald Trump raises the possibility that the US
could lead an antiglobalist movement. However, Trump’s foreign policy seems
more likely to dismantle the Western hegemonic order from within.
119
This would
constitute not a counterhegemonic coalition, but a transformation and perhaps disso-
lution of American order led by its author and guarantor. From there, it will be diffi-
cult for emerging powers to exploit Trump’s shock to the international system to seize
power in the present system.
120
That said, it is conceivable that some powers, emerg-
ing and established alike, could withdraw support. This would move international
115. Heng 2016, 110–11.
116. Hayes 2016, 122.
117. See Inglehart and Norris 2016.
118. Quoted in Witte, Rauhala, and Phillips 2016.
119. See Nexon 2017.
120. Acharya 2017.
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order in the direction laid out in Gilpin’s model of a fragmented order fashioned
around a handful of neomercantilist centers or Acharya’s“multiplex”of crosscutting
and overlapping orders.
121
Here, the system would enter an age without hegemonic
leadership marked by confusion and vigorous contestation over the rules of the order.
The robust support for elements of Western hegemony outside the US raises
another possibility: hegemonic stability underwritten by Europe, China, India, and
Brazil. At the 2017 G20 summit, states demonstrated their willingness to forge
ahead on climate change and further economic integration without American partici-
pation.
122
Indeed, judging from Chinese President Xi Jinping’s defense of free trade
and liberalization at the 2017 World Economic Forum, China is willing to uphold the
liberal elements of the order amid growing populism and protectionist rhetoric.
123
Continuous support from other great powers could facilitate a partial transition in
which leadership would shift to a coalition, but the rules of the order would
remain more or less intact. In the absence of US leadership, one could imagine a
shift from democratic neoliberalism to democratic nationalism or democratic social-
ism, given that there is far less support for the economic side of the order than the
political side in the distribution of identity. This would be a shift akin to the shift
from embedded liberalism to democratic neoliberalism in the 1970s and 1980s.
Conclusion
This study contributes to the constructivist research program on how national identi-
ties affect international relations by theorizing three effects of the distribution of iden-
tities on hegemonic ideology. First, if the distribution of identity supports the
hegemonic ideology, the order is likely to be stable. Second, if the identities of
rising states and the hegemonic ideology are inconsistent, rising states are unlikely
to enter the order as full members. Third, if there is a disjuncture between the identity
of a challenging state and the distribution of identity among the other great powers,
they are unlikely to be able form a counterhegemonic bloc. Our main empirical claim
is that China’s rise is unlikely to spur a hegemonic transition because the distribution
of identities largely supports Western democratic neoliberalism. Moreover, China has
not yet begun the difficult work of constructing an alternative ideology that might res-
onate with Brazil, India, and others.
124
In outlining and theorizing hegemonic stability underwritten by the distribution of
identity, our argument raises the question of when we would expect a hegemonic
transition.
125
To count as a transition, an aspiring hegemon would have to obtain
121. Gilpin 1975. In Gilpin’s classic argument, multipolar systems are symbiotic with economic nation-
alism and protectionism. See also Acharya 2014, especially chapter 5; Laïdi 2014.
122. Herszenhorn 2017.
123. Xi 2017.
124. On the importance of an alternative vision, see Breslin 2013; Callahan 2008; and Kupchan 2014.
125. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing this line of inquiry.
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control over the rules and institutions that structure the predominant patterns of state
behavior among the great powers. In our theory, there are two pathways to hegem-
ony. First, an aspiring hegemon who has an identity profile that is already consistent
with established great powers would be in a good position to yoke together a hege-
monic order. Such a rising power would still need to delegitimize the existing ideol-
ogy and articulate an alternative in order to mobilize a counterhegemonic bloc. We
have argued that this pathway would be difficult for China. Second, an aspiring
hegemon might cultivate a coalition of great-power states with aligned identity dis-
courses in one of two ways. It could lead a group of rising great powers with
aligned identities into the rank of great powers, building an alternative order
around their cooperative endeavors along the way. Or it might coerce and cajole
elites and masses in other countries into changing their identities so that they can
adopt the new ideology. This second pathway still requires that the aspiring hegemon
is able to produce an appealing ideology. But as we have argued, even if China is mili-
tarily, economically, and culturally capable of cultivating favorable change in the distri-
bution of identity, it is not clear what universalizable elements of its identity could gain a
foothold. Nonetheless, China could try to propagate an authoritarian capitalist hegem-
onic ideology. However, as Gramsci argues, this would have to take the form of a
“war of attrition, trench warfare”against democratic common sense in other states.
This is likely to take decades and require considerable economic and cultural resources.
This all raises important questions for future research. What are the mechanisms
and processes by which an aspiring hegemon might yoke together established
powers into a counterhegemonic bloc? How might an aspiring hegemon cultivate a
favorable distribution of identity? How long do these processes take? These questions
are important to understanding the degree to which the distribution of identity serves
as an exogenous, structural constraint on the dynamics of hegemonic orders. But they
are fundamentally empirical questions that require a more careful examination of the
history of hegemony than we are able to offer here.
The data used in this paper are drawn from a broader project that aims to build a
great-power national identity database including qualitative and quantitative data on
national identity from 1810 to the present.
126
Such a database could be used to
improve our understanding of the dynamics of hegemony, alliance formation, insti-
tutional legitimacy, treaty ratification, and so on. In particular, by mapping change
in national identity discourses we will be able to empirically assess how resistant
national identities are to internal and external efforts to manipulate them. These his-
torical data will also allow for a more fine-grained analysis of the role of the distri-
bution of identity in the last hegemonic transition from Pax Britannica to Pax
Americana. This will allow us to refine the theory introduced here and more carefully
specify the mechanisms linking hegemony and identity. We actually know very little
about the dynamics and processes of hegemonic stability and transition. In part, this
follows from the fact that since the construction of a truly worldwide international
126. See Hopf and Allan 2016.
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order in the mid-nineteenth century there has only been one hegemonic transition. But
being able to think through these dynamics in historical context is precisely what we
will need in the coming century. Rather than referring only to abstract, generalizable
laws that privilege economic and military factors, we need accounts of hegemony that
can also map its institutional and ideological complexity in real time.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary material for this article is available at <https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0020818318000267>.
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