Conference PaperPDF Available

A New Security Framework for HIPAA-Compliant Health Information Systems.

Authors:

Abstract and Figures

Security in health care information systems is among the highest priority research topics. Introduction of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) increased the pressure on health care organizations for implementing security. Two existing frameworks, which affect the proposed security standards, are introduced. It is important to understand the development of standards and how they can be useful, in order to successfully implement them. In this paper, we propose a techno-managerial framework that
Content may be subject to copyright.
2003 — Ninth Americas Conference on Information Systems 929
A NEW SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR HIPAA-
COMPLIANT HEALTH INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Bengisu Tulu
Network Convergence Laboratory
Claremont Graduate University
bengisu.tulu@cgu.edu
Samir Chatterjee
Network Convergence Laboratory
Claremont Graduate University
samir.chatterjee@cgu.edu
Abstract
Security in health care information systems is among the highest priority research topics. Introduction of the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) increased the pressure on health care
organizations for implementing security. Two existing frameworks, which affect the proposed security
standards, are introduced. It is important to understand the development of standards and how they can be
useful, in order to successfully implement them. In this paper, we propose a techno-managerial framework that
can aid planners of security systems as deployed within health care environment. Having a security framework
will enable organizations to implement security standards more easily and quickly. As a result, we–the
patients–will start seeing an increasing number of new health care services supported by the information
technologies.
Keywords: Security framework, HIPAA, health information systems
Introduction
It has become impossible to practice modern medicine without seeking the help of information technologies and communication
networks. Today’s health care professionals spend a significant portion of their time managing information – for example
obtaining and recording information about patients, consulting colleagues, planning diagnostic procedures, devising strategies
for patient care, interpreting results of laboratory and radiological studies or conducting case based or population-based research.
Only computers can manage the vast amount of information generated during clinical encounters and other health care
transactions. One of the biggest challenges involves balancing two competing values – free access to information and protection
of patients’ privacy and confidentiality. Information should be readily available to health care professionals so as to provide the
best possible care. Yet, making this information readily available creates opportunities for access by unwelcome individuals. Such
undesired access could be by curious clinicians or even more worrisome to people who may wish to harm the patient physically,
emotionally or financially (Shortliffe and Perrault, 2001).
Recent research (Brender, et al., 2000) was conducted to identify what is needed to implement information society in health care
and the related research topics that should be given higher priority to achieve the desired evolution. The results indicated that
security is among the highest priority research topics according to international experts involved in this research. It was indicated
in this study that the problem regarding security in health care information systems is not the technology itself but the practices.
How to implement the existing security technologies within the health care boundaries is a question that still needs to be answered.
In this paper, we develop a techno-managerial framework that can aid planners of security systems as deployed within health care
environment. In Section 2, we first briefly discuss the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and
then present a general security model for health care systems. In Section 3, we further develop both technical as well as non-
technical security issues as pertaining to HIPAA compliance. Section 4 discusses two existing frameworks for security in health
care information systems. In Section 5, we present our techno-managerial framework and finally conclude this paper by discussing
its applicability.
Information Technology in Health Care
930 2003 — Ninth Americas Conference on Information Systems
HIPAA and the General Security Model
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) was signed into law on August 21, 1996. HIPAA
requires that the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) adopt standards for the electronic transmission of specific
administrative transactions. Table 1 shows some of the requirements for HIPAA.
Table 1. Sample Requirements for HIPAA (1996)
1. The Secretary must adopt standards for transactions and data elements for such transactions, to enable health information
to be exchanged electronically that are appropriate for financial and administrative transactions consistent with the goals
of improving the operation of the health care system and reducing costs including:
a. Health Claims or equivalent encounter information
b. Health Claims attachments
c. Enrollment and Disenrollment in a Health Plan
d. Eligibility for a Health Plan
e. Health Care payment and Remittance Advice
f. First Report of Injury
g. Health Claim Status
h. Referral Certification and Authorization
i. Coordination of Benefits
2. The Secretary shall adopt standards providing for a unique health identifier for each individual, employer, health plan, and
health care provider for use in the health care system
3. The Secretary shall adopt standards for code sets for appropriate data elements for financial and administrative
transactions.
4. The Secretary shall adopt security standards that …specify procedures for the electronic transmission and authentication
of signatures.
Before we take a look at the general security model, it is important to further explore the foundations of health privacy and
confidentiality. These two terms are not synonymous. Privacy generally applies to people, including their desire not to be a victim
of eavesdropping, whereas confidentiality is best applied to information. We imply privacy when someone spots us in a place
where we do not want to be seen while confidentiality is broken when someone can look into our medical record in some location
(Shortliffe and Perrault, 2001).
The General Security Model (Figure 1) proposes that the security of information systems has to be analyzed under two main
topics, which are application security and communication security [3, 6]. Application security assures that the application under
use cannot be interrupted or damaged by intruders. Application security threats can be grouped under two fundamental categories,
people attacking software and software attacking software like virus programs (http://www.cloakware.com/pdfs/
FSAwardpressrelease-1Oct2002.pdf, 2002). Communication security deals with assuring a secure communication between
principals (Blobel, 2000), which may be a user and an application, two applications, etc. It ensures that while data is being
transferred between various parties, it cannot be intruded upon or sniffed by other parties. Some of the threats related to
communication security are loss of privacy, loss of data integrity, and identity spoofing. Since communication security is
concerned about interactions and has serious threats, it must always be included (Blobel, 2000). The General Security Model has
been used to identify the security needs of the health care environment in a generic way. In fact, if we take a closer look at the
HIPAA security rules we will see the reflections of general security model in technical rules.
Tulu & Chatterjee/Security for HIPAA-Compliant Health Information Systems
2003 — Ninth Americas Conference on Information Systems 931
Figure 1. General Security Model (Brender, et al., 2000)
HIPAA Security Model
HIPAA mandates rules to maintain the privacy of protected health information, to establish security requirements to protect that
information, and to develop standard identifiers. Based on the HIPAA security rules (HIPAA.org, 2003), if a system or the
communication between two systems was implemented using technology(s) meeting standards in a general security framework
(Identification and Authentication; Authorization and Access Control; Accountability; Integrity and Availability; Security of
Communication; and Security Administration.) then that system would be essentially secure. However, there is no single standards
development organization (SDO) that is addressing all aspects of health care information security and confidentiality. As a result,
HIPAA defines the security standard as a set of requirements with implementation features that providers, plans, and
clearinghouses must include in their operations to assure that electronic health information pertaining to an individual remains
secure. The standard does not reference or advocate specific technology in order to allow the security standard to be stable, yet
it is flexible enough to take advantage of state-of-the-art technology. HIPAA security standards can be summarized under four
main topics:
1. Administr ative proc edures to gu ard data in tegrity, c onfidentia lity, and av ailability: Defines the mandatory documented,
formal practices to manage the selection and execution of security measures to protect data, and to manage the conduct of
personnel in relation to the protection of data.
2. Physical safeguards to guard data integrity, confidentiality, and availability: Defines the mandatory practices to protect
physical computer systems and related buildings and equipment from fire and other natural hazards, as well as from intrusion.
3. Technical security services to guard data integrity, confidentiality, and availability: Defines the processes that are put
in place to protect information and to control individual access to information.
4. Technical security mechanisms: Defines the processes that are put in place to guard against unauthorized access to data
that is transmitted over a communications network.
Information Technology in Health Care
932 2003 — Ninth Americas Conference on Information Systems
Technical Aspects
It is clear that the information security needs are not restricted to the technical aspects of the health care environment only. These
four main categories identify the information security needs of a health care environment by taking various aspects of it into
account. In this section, the technical rules will be explained in detail. Figure 2 and Figure 3 provide the details for these two rules,
3 and 4.
Figure 2, Technical Security Services, is the security rule 3 in HIPAA, which was defined by Blobel (Blobel, 2000) after
modifying the CORBA Specifications. The general security model provides the main thinking for these two rules. Rule 3 deals
with the application security. However, as mentioned above, communication security has to be included all the time since we are
talking about applications that were developed to interact with other principals. Figure 3, Technical Security Mechanisms, deals
with the communication security itself, which is described in the general security model. In the general security model, data and
entity authentication should also be considered under application security. One reason for this modification is that entity
authentication cannot be separated from authorization. The applications should have control over the entity authentication in order
to make better authorization decisions. This does not imply that all applications should have authentication capability. Rather they
should be able to identify the authentication mechanisms that an entity can use in their environment and be able to assess the
authentication information, which can be provided by the entity itself or by a separate authentication application.
Figure 2. HIPAA Proposed Security Rule 3
Tulu & Chatterjee/Security for HIPAA-Compliant Health Information Systems
2003 — Ninth Americas Conference on Information Systems 933
Figure 3. HIPAA Proposed Security Rule 4
Non-technical Aspects of HIPAA Security
“Regarding security with special aspects of the health care domain, ethical, legal, social, organizational, and
technological issues must be handled.” (Blobel, 2000)
Complexity of the health care environment, as summarized by Blobel above, makes it more complex to develop a security
framework that covers all these issues. However, non-technical aspects also require a careful consideration in order to have a
strong security implementation in the health care environment. HIPAA reserved the first two rules of the security section to non-
technical issues that concern about administrative procedures and physical safe guards.
In order to achieve “trustable” security levels, a comprehensive information security policy is necessary (Janczewski and Shi,
2002). These policies should be defined based on the organization’s philosophy and the environment to which it belong. Standards
like HIPAA provide guidelines for defining the policy rules in health care organizations. Security policies will vary based on the
organization structure, culture and much other organization specific attributes. However, an organization should at least cover
the following security baselines in its security policy:
1. A statement of organizational philosophy and goals regarding privacy and security; (Janczewski and Shi, 2002) which
concerns the management of information security and its organization.
2. A classification of information assets by type; (Janczewski and Shi, 2002) which concerns the control of the asset
management, the definition of the ownership of health information assets, and standards for health information classification.
3. Standards for administering, controlling and monitoring information use by type; (Blobel, 2000) which concerns the personnel
security, their training about the information security, and awareness of security policies, as well as the physical and
environmental security.
4. Standards for information system design, implementation and operation; (Janczewski and Shi, 2002) which concerns the
computer and network management, and system development and maintenance.
5. A definition of procedures for detecting and handling abuses; (Janczewski and Shi, 2002) which concerns the system access
controls, user classification, authorization and authentication.
6. Standards for legal and ethical issues; (Blobel and Roger-France, 2001) which concerns the ethical and legal rules that apply
in health care environments.
The first five items that were listed by Janczewski and Shi cover almost all the issues regarding the security. An additional item
on their list should be the legal and ethical standards, which were covered by Blobel et al. (Blobel and Roger-France, 2001)
security framework.
Information Technology in Health Care
934 2003 — Ninth Americas Conference on Information Systems
Survey of Security Frameworks for Health Care Organizations
Based on these technical and non-technical aspects of security, different frameworks were developed by researchers. Blobel et
al. (Blobel and Roger-France, 2001) has developed a framework that purely addresses the technical aspects and it shown in
Figure 4.
Blobel et al. reported that security services and related mechanisms could be managed by following a series of actions. They
provided a list of seven actions and based on these guidelines they came up with nine use case scenarios to develop their
framework. The list of actions is provided below (Blobel and Roger-France, 2001):
1. Identification of the domain;
2. Definition of the security objects;
3. Specification of the use cases and the set of security services needed;
4. Specification of the architecture, which implements the general security model (explained above);
5. Realization of a detailed threat and risk analysis and specification of security requirements considering the use case
specifications;
6. Selection and specification of security mechanisms for providing security services;
7. Consideration of IT-related security mechanisms and implementation of the security environment needed using
appropriate algorithms.
Figure 4. Security Framework by Blobel (Blobel and Roger-France, 2001)
A different framework that addresses more of the organization aspects has been developed by Janzewski and Shi (Blobel and
Roger-France, 2001). They reported in their study that a security framework should include an overall baseline assessment and
risk analysis, specific policy development, measure implementation, and monitoring and reporting action. It also added that a
framework should enable the personnel involved in developing policies and procedures to understand the ultimate goal of their
Tulu & Chatterjee/Security for HIPAA-Compliant Health Information Systems
2003 — Ninth Americas Conference on Information Systems 935
efforts, as well as how these efforts complement parallel efforts elsewhere within the organization. The security baselines, listed
in the previous section, were used to introduce this framework.
The coverage of these two frameworks is not exactly the same. The Blobel et al. framework is covering in detail the technical
aspects of the security compared to Janzewski and Shi framework. On the other hand, the latter framework covers in detail the
managerial and organizational aspects of the environment.
A Hybrid Framework for Security
The two frameworks described above were selected since they affect the security standards that are being proposed. It is important
to understand the development of standards and how they can be useful, in order to successfully implement them. Although these
frameworks mentioned are very comprehensive, a combined version of these two frameworks will provide better results. HIPAA
forces us to realize that it is very important to cover both technical and managerial aspects in detail to have successful security
implementations. We present such a hybrid security framework in Figure 5. This framework is a simple eight-stage framework
that should help the management team to decide how to make their organization HIPAA compliant. Each of these stages is
described in detail below.
Stage 1: Infrastructure Evaluation
The infrastructure evaluation stage serves as the foundation where the ensuing seven stages will draw upon. Analyzing the existing
components and current status of the infrastructure will provide management a clear vision and understanding of the security
issues that the organization is challenged with. The analysis component of the assessment is intended to provide a diagnostic
regarding the current state of the infrastructure. The result of the diagnostics will provide a list of areas that requires
implementation of new security mechanisms and/or a list of secured areas that needs to be improved. For each item in the list,
there should be opportunities and challenges listed as well. The diagnostics list is the first step for managers to identify the most
suitable security mechanism for their organization. Some critical components of the infrastructure that should be considered are
provided in Table 2.
Table 2. Some Critical Components of the Infrastructure
System Hardware
Software
Applications
Structure Work Processes (Medical and Administrative)
Organizational Structure
Roles and Responsibilities
Geographic Spread
Policy Security Policy of the enterprise and its impacts on business
strategy
Upper management support policy
Government Policy on security
Strategy Core competencies
Environment Competitors
Regulations
Information Technology in Health Care
936 2003 — Ninth Americas Conference on Information Systems
Figure 5. A New Security Framework Addressing Technical and Organizational Issues
Stage 2: Set Goals and Objectives
After understanding the infrastructure of the organization in detail, it is important for the organization to restate its organizational
vision, mission, and goals. These statements will help the organization to define what return is expected from implementing
security mechanisms. Even though HIPAA rules are mandatory, managers should identify the possible effects of necessary
changes on the organization.
Stage 3: Functional Abstraction
Information System reliability requirement is a critical domain where functional abstraction from processes, procedures, interfaces
and people, among others, are derived to attain a high-level verification of how effective or germane a specific security system
can be used optimize an enterprise’s reliability requirement. In Stage 3, we recommend an appraisal of how each of these
requirements (Data Integrity, Availability, Confidentiality, Privacy, Access Control, Authorization, and Authentication) rate in
importance and substance in the operations of the enterprise.
Stage 4: Identification of Key Sources of Security Value
A needs assessment provides an opportunity to consult with a variety of people in the organization as well as the patients. The
information collected, ideas generated, and the conversations that take place when people discuss their work lives lend enthusiasm
Tulu & Chatterjee/Security for HIPAA-Compliant Health Information Systems
2003 — Ninth Americas Conference on Information Systems 937
to the process. Functional requirements are subsequently developed from the needs assessment effort. The data collected -
whether obtained through interviews, observations, focus groups, performance data, questionnaires or tests - can clarify issues
and provide a focus on the following key sources of security value: Patient Satisfaction, Individual/Workgroup productivity, Inter-
Enterprise and External Business Relationship Enhancement, Decision Quality improvement.
There are several steps to consider when developing a plan to conduct a needs assessment. These steps include: (1) Selecting the
method for gathering information, (2) Selecting the sources of information, (3) Assigning responsibilities for activities of the needs
assessment, (4) Conducting the information gathering, (5) Analyzing and reporting the information. The lesson learned from past
IT projects is that a technology needs assessment is more effective when the analysis is based on the enterprise’s strategic goals
and analysis of the current state of infrastructure resources.
Stage 5: Impact Analysis
It is important to identify the impact of implementing HIPAA in order to predict the possible outcomes of the project. The impact
can be analyzed under four main topics: Work Processes, Stakeholders, Legacy Systems and Applications, Legal and Policy
Considerations. After identifying the impact of implementing HIPAA on the business processes one can determine the processes
requiring enhanced security how strategic these are for the organization. This also helps to prioritize the applications and
determine the sequence of migration. The success of implementation is directly related with the stakeholders of the organization.
Therefore, it is important to identifying decision criteria for internal and external users, and to assess the requirement for technical
support and administration.
Stage 6: Solutions Analysis
Once the justification of the implementation is made, requirements are identified, and the impacts are predicted, the organizations
should consider the alternative solutions for implementing HIPAA. An assessment of the alternatives that can fulfill the
requirements of the organization is the next step. This assessment should be based on cost, time to implement, interoperability,
acquisition type (outsource vs. in-house), and state of standards.
At the end of this stage, the organization should be able to make a decision in order to implement HIPAA. If there are still doubts
about the implementation then the stages where doubts can be cleared (Stage 1,2,3,4,5) should be reconsidered.
Stage 7: Implementation
Project implementation begins with identifying initiatives or activities needed to carry out the best solution. The broad categories
for delineating the HIPAA implementation plan are: Risk Management; Communications Management; Cost and Procurement
Management; Integration and Change Management; Time, Testing, and Quality Management; and Training. Each of these should
be carefully planned in order to achieve success.
Stage 8: Evaluation
An assessment exercise can be performed during or after implementation to identify the success of the project. Different
techniques, individually or in combination, can be used to evaluate the implementation. Measuring results against goals, standards,
and stated objectives will help managers to evaluate the performance of the project.
Conclusions
It is clear that health care organizations have a tremendous challenge ahead as they become HIPAA compliant and at the same
time plan strategies to deploy security within their organizations. While the technical issues are clearly needed, the intricate
relationship between various stakeholders in the health care arena makes it even more necessary to incorporate the organizational
and managerial issues into a framework. Our proposed framework is aimed at that.
Information Technology in Health Care
938 2003 — Ninth Americas Conference on Information Systems
Another important issue in implementing security is gaining knowledge about the existing technologies that can provide necessary
tools to satisfy the requirements of security standards. A guideline should be developed for the existing security technologies and
should be expanded as new ones are added. This guideline can be provided as an addition to the global security framework. Such
a guideline should not only include all the existing technologies that can provide the technical and managerial services required,
but should also mention the weaknesses and strengths of each technology.
Having a security framework will enable organizations to implement security standards more easily and quickly. It also ensures
that the implementers and planners are aware of all the important information regarding the security needs and technologies, which
they need to consider. As the number of health care organizations that implement security framework and standards increase, we -
the patients - will start seeing an increasing number of new health care services supported by the information technologies.
References
Blobel, B. “Advanced tool kits for EPR security,” International Journal of Medical Informatics (60), 2000, pp. 169-175.
Blobel, B., and Roger-France, F. “A systematic approach for analysis and design of secure health information systems,”
International Journal of Medical Informatics (62), 2001, pp. 51-78.
Brender, J., Nohr, C., and McNair, P. “Research needs and priorities in health informatics,” International Journal of Medical
Informatics (58-59), 2000, pp. 257-289.
HIPAA.org “HIPAA Security Rules,” (2003:May 30), 2003, http://www.cloakware.com/pdfs/FSAwardpressrelease-
1Oct2002.pdf, loakware Wins Frost & Sullivan Award for Technology Innovation,” (2003:May 30), 2002,
Janczewski, L., and Shi, F.X. “Development of Information Security Baselines for Health care Information Systems in New
Zealand,” Computers & Security (21:2), 2002, pp. 172-192.
Shortliffe, E.H., and Perrault, L.E. Medical Informatics: Computer Applications in Health Care and Biomedicine, Springer-
Verlag, New York, 2001.
... Despite high hopes, however, telemedicine has been slow to come into routine use. Numerous studies document the diverse problems related to telemedicine technology diffusion in general (Barrett and Brecht, 1998;Brady, 2005;Kuan and Chau, 2001;Tulu et al., 2005); these studies often point to scarcity of resources (Janczewski and Shi, 2002;Tulu and Chatterjee, 2003;Wootton, 2003), poor telecommunication infrastructures such as bandwidth (Adam, 1996(Adam, , 2001Bashshur, 2005), and the impact of the Internet (Avgerou, 2000;Mbarika et al., 2005). Other frequently mentioned factors in the literature are non-technological issues such as organizational (AaS, 2001;Hu et al., 2000), human elements (Chau and Hu, 2002a;Crote and Viera, 2002;Kifle et al., 2005b), policy (Anderson, 2000;Gilbert, 1997;Kumekawa et al., 1997aKumekawa et al., , 1997bVarghese and Scott, 2004), socio-economic (Bashshur et al., 1997;Jennett et al., 2003aJennett et al., , 2003bJennett et al., , 2004Kamel , 1995;Madon , 2000;Odedra-Straub, 1996;Scott et al., 1999Scott et al., , 2005 and cultural issues (Bagchi et al., 2003;Banai, 1992;Checchi et al., 2001Checchi et al., , 2002Choe, 2004;Ford, 2003;Hill et al., 1998;Hofstede and Franke, 1991;Kaplan, 2000;Leidner and Kayworth, 2006;McCoy, 2002;Myers and Tan, 2002;Okoli, 2003;Straub et al., 2002) as primary barriers to telemedicine becoming a routine part of a healthcare system. ...
... Telemedicine has been chosen as the topic for this research because, although it is still in its early stage, it is gaining considerable interest due to the use of many new telemedicine applications as its services expand. Much of the previous research in the area referred to situations in which the potential of telemedicine is undermined by such concerns as policies (Anderson, 2000;Courtright, 2004;Darkins and Cary, 2000;Fidler, 2001;Fujimoto et al., 2000;Scott et al., 2002), security and privacy (Blobel and Roger-Frace, 2001;Gilbert, 1997;Kumekawa et al., 1997a;Magennis and Mitchell, 1996;Sandberg, 1995;Stanberry, 2006;Tulu and Chatterjee, 2003), standards (Kumekawa et al., 1997b;Loane and Wootton 2002;Wachter, 2000;Williams and Singh, 1996), ICT infrastructure (Carbajal and Honea, 1999;Collen, 1999;, lack of interest or resistance of physicians (Chau and Hu 2001, 2002a, 2002bCroteau and Vieru, 2002;Kifle et al., 2005b;Friedma, 1997), reimbursement (Brady, 2005;Doolittle et al., 2004;Johnston et al., 2004;Whitten, 2002;Whitten et al., 2000a), organization and environment (Aas, 2001;Hu et al., 2000;Iacovou, 1995;Rogers, 1983;Whitten and Allen, 1995) and cultural situations (Hofstede, 2000;Leidner and Kayworth, 2006;McCoy et al., 2003a;Straub et al., 2002 ). ...
... Based on this division and standards that are addressing all aspects of healthcare information security and confidentiality, researchers have developed different frameworks which are classified as technical security service (access control, audit control, authorization control, data authentication and entry authentication) (Blobel and Roger-France, 2001;HIPAA, 2003), and non-technical (administrative procedures and physical safe guards) (Janczewski and Shi, 2002) aspects of security. However, it is very important to incorporate both security infrastructure as well as security policy aspect of healthcare information security and confidentiality system, which are to be considered to enhance telemedicine implementations (Tulu and Chatterjee , 2003). ...
... The current signature process utilises the manual collection of signatures. A security framework previously proposed (Tulu and Chatterjee, 2003) was utilised to guide the implementation of the digital signature solution. This security framework consists of eight sequential stages. ...
... Keeping these drawbacks of PKI deployment in mind, a framework was selected to guide the PKI implementation process. A slightly modified version of the security framework (Tulu and Chatterjee, 2003), which was proposed to help management decide how to make their organisation compliant with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), was utilised to investigate the possible PKI implementation at this company. The framework, illustrated inFigure 3, consists of nine sequential stages and allows implementers to revert to a previous stage any time during the implementation. ...
Article
Full-text available
This paper presents a conceptual security framework and a case study of a digital signature solution implementation for a healthcare organisation that provides disability evaluation services for various government agencies and private companies. One service the company provides for its clients is online disability report generation and electronic report submission. When generating these disability reports, the signature of the examining physician is required for submission. The current process used by the company involves the manual collection of signatures. To streamline this process, and to meet legal and client requirements, the company investigated a digital signature solution. A security framework previously proposed was utilised to guide the implementation of the digital signature solution. This security framework consists of eight sequential stages. An in-depth analysis of the first seven stages for this case is provided, including guidelines for choosing digital signature solutions, vendor analyses and implementation issues.
... The company was seeking a digital signature solution that would meet legal and client requirements and would streamline the current signature process. A security framework previously proposed (Tulu and Chatterjee, 2003) was utilized to guide the implementation of the digital signature solution. This security framework consists of eight sequential stages. ...
... Keeping these drawbacks of PKI deployment in mind, a framework was selected to guide the PKI implementation process. A security framework (Tulu and Chatterjee, 2003), which was proposed to help management decide how to make their organization compliant with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), was utilized to decide on how to implement the PKI at this company. The framework, illustrated inFigure 2, consists of eight sequential stages and allows implementers to revert to a previous stage any time during the implementation. ...
Conference Paper
Full-text available
This paper presents a case study of a digital signature solution implementation for a healthcare organization that provides disability evaluation services for various government agencies and private companies. One service the company provides for its clients is online disability report generation and electronic report submission. When generating these disability reports, the signature of the examining physician is required for submission. The current process used by the company involves the manual collection of signatures. To streamline this process, and to meet legal and client requirements, the company was seeking a digital signature solution. A security framework previously proposed was utilized to guide the implementation of the digital signature solution. This security framework consists of eight sequential stages. An in-depth description of the first six stages for this case, including guidelines for choosing digital signature solutions, vendor analyses, and implementation issues, are provided.
... Blobel et al developed a framework focused on the technical dimensions of health applications (Blobel & Roger-France, 2001), while others have developed frameworks focused on organizational and policy dimensions (Janczewski & Shi, 2002). Tulu et al present an integrated security framework for HIPAA compliant health information systems that addresses both technical and managerial aspects of HIPAA (Tulu & Chatterjee, 2003). Working with privacy and security consultants, we utilized these frameworks in the design of the artifact described herein. ...
... In the literature, there are several studies that focus on the issues of information security and ICTs security in general. Most of them focus on security models within the application and communication, technological and organizational aspects of security, where the security services required to secure the communications were identification, authentication, access control, integrity, confidentiality, and availability (Smith, 2005;Blobel & Roger-France, 2001;Tulu & Chatterjee, 2003;Marković (2006) ;Doupi, et al. 2005;Gupta & Gupta, 2001;Bobadilla et al., 2007;Sulaiman et al., 2008). This paper focuses on physical security aspects, where the e-health solutions implemented in rural areas are in jeopardy of being vandalised or stolen. ...
Article
Full-text available
The implementation of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in the healthcare industry has witnessed a tremendous growth in the recent past. These ICTs are often viewed as vehicles that can bridge the digital divide between rural and urban healthcare centres. They hold the promise of bringing resolution to the shortages facing the rural healthcare sector by introducing e-health solutions such as electronic health records, telemedicine and e-education. Furthermore, e-health solutions promise to improve efficiencies, reduce costs, and improve the quality of health service delivery. Therefore, ICTs have proved to be increasingly fundamental to the socio-economic development of nations. However, these e-health solutions are currently under-realised in developing countries, especially in rural areas due to various challenges. Developing countries face barriers to reach significant levels of e-health adoption. Existing research, in identifying these barriers, has grouped a variety of contributing factors into several categories. This study, in viewing these categories, highlights an overlooked factor which impacts e-health development and other ICT4D activities in the rural areas of South Africa. Community awareness and involvement, at an appropriate level, is presented as an important control that may reduce or even eliminate the prevalence of e-health solutions vandalism and theft in rural areas. The literature case reviews and main author experiences are mainly based in the rural areas of the Eastern Cape Province in South Africa.
... One of the authors and the ISO met to discuss the best practices and other literature dealing with the implementation of two-factor authentication using PKI (See Appendix 2: Need for a New Training Approach). We found that the case studies offered very little guidance for WCSU's situation because they didn't provide any information on the training method or techniques used during implementation (Tulu & Chattergee, 2003; Guida et al., 2004; Linden et al., 2002). There are, however, two studies reported that developed a framework on the training techniques used to train service members on the use of the common access card using PKI at the Department of Defense (DoD) (Ziemba, 2001; Athanasopoulos, 2004). ...
Article
Identification and access management I/AM is among the top security issues facing institutions of higher education. Most institutions of higher education require end users to provide usernames and passwords to gain access to personally identifiable information PII. This leaves universities vulnerable to unauthorized access and unauthorized disclosure of PII as, according to recent literature, usernames and passwords alone are insufficient for proper authentication of users into information and information systems. This study examines a critical element in the successful implementation of any information security initiative, end user training. Specifically, this study advances research in the area of end user security training by using canonical action research CAR to develop and refine an IT security training framework that can guide institutions of higher education in the implementation of USB security tokens for two-factor authentication using public key infrastructure PKI.
... , 2004 ; Scott et al . , 2002 ; Vargneses and Scotte , 2004 ; WHO , 2000 ) ; and ( 3 ) data security policies ( the government ' s awareness and support of setup standards and procedures for telemedicine communication improvement ) ( Blobel , 2000 ; Gilbert , 1997 ; Janczewski and Shi , 2002 ; Kumekawa , 1997 ; Sandberg , 1995 ; Stanberry , 2000 ; Tulu , 2003 ; Wachter , 2000 ) . ICT infrastructure , a telecommunication infrastructure with Internet connections ( bandwidth ) , impacts telemedicine outcomes unidimensionally according to availability , security and affordability ( Datta and Mbarika , 2004 ; Iakovidis , 2000 ; Mbarika et al . ...
Conference Paper
Full-text available
Given the documented benefits of telemedicine, especially in resource-constrained health-care contexts, we empirically examine the factors they contribute to successful transfer of telemedicine to Sub-Saharan Africa. The results indicate that policies specific to the advancement of ICT influence the country's advancement in ICT infrastructure and telemedicine capabilities. Likewise, the level of ICT infrastructure and the nature of the country's health services sector impact the telemedicine capabilities of that country. Additionally, telemedicine seems to be more valued in regions where resources for health-services provision are scarce, and its value tends to diminish as the resources become abundant. However, telemedicine seems unable to thrive where ICT infrastructure is scarce. This is an indication that the value of telemedicine to SSA is leveraged by leveraging ICT infrastructure in general and ICT for telemedicine, in particular.
... Furthermore, as some schemes (e.g., [9]- [11]) deliver data in clear text, the patients' records may be intercepted and tampered by malicious attackers in the transmission channel. Nowadays, it is increasingly important for patient privacy be protected in the telemedicine systems by being compliant with Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [16]. ...
Article
Full-text available
Teleophthalmology (TeleOph) is an electronic counterpart of today's face-to-face, patient-to-specialist ophthalmology system. It enables one or more ophthalmologists to remotely examine a patient's condition via a confidential and authentic communication channel. Specifically, TeleOph allows a trained nonspecialist in a primary clinic to screen the patients with digital instruments (e.g., camera, ophthalmoscope). The acquired medical data are delivered to the hospital where an ophthalmologist will review the data collected and, if required, provide further consultation for the patient through a real-time secure channel established over a public Internet network. If necessary, the ophthalmologist is able to further sample the images/video of the patient's eyes remotely. In order to increase the productivity of the ophthalmologist in terms of number of patients reviewed, and to increase the efficiency of network resource, we manage the network bandwidth based on a Poisson model to estimate patient arrival at the clinics, and the rate of ophthalmologist consultation service for better overall system efficiency. The main objective of TeleOph is therefore to provide the remote patients with a cost-effective access to specialist's eye checkups at primary healthcare clinics, and at the same time, minimize unnecessary face-to-face consultation at the hospital specialist's center.
Conference Paper
Ehealth provides integrated services to the different users of health care which are broadly accessible by internet technology. It is subjected to the same threats as other online services. The paper highlights the sensitivity of communication involved in the health domain. The interaction has been divided into different stratum according to the Indian ehealth system. The layers portray the different level of confidentiality which further give rise to different requirement of protection. The different well known cryptography algorithms according to the different layers have been suggested to optimize the health system in terms of network bandwidth, CPU power and time.
Conference Paper
This paper aims at proposing a guideline for the health care industry covered under Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act (HEPAA). In this paper Key Compliance Attributes (KCA) for email system are defined. At the next level architecture for Email Handler and Spam Filter (EHSF) is devised. Two soft computing models named "user behaviour prediction model" and "genetic algorithm compliance model" are proposed. The healthcare industry can implement it to guard against unauthorized access to the Electronic Protected Health Information (E-PHI). Protected Health Information (PHI) refers to any health information that could be expected to reveal the identity of an individual. It includes the explicitly linked data and also that which could be used to determine the identity of an individual. To secure E-PHI according to HTPAA rules employs secure transmission systems and/or encryption when e-mailing or transmitting patient data. This paper also proposes the best email encryption standard for Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act compliance to secure PHI.
Article
In 1996 New Zealand had introduced security standard AS/NZCS 4444 based on the British Standard BS 7799, which has recently been accepted as an international standard ISO 17799. This standard is very often referred to as the ‘baseline lane approach’ to the issue of managing information security. On the other hand the health information systems (HIS) are undergoing rapid development both in the number of installed systems as in the law and regulations governing HIS developments and deployment. The project was aimed at reviewing the AS/NZCS 4444 standard from the HIS requirements point of view. In this paper, we began with an overview of healthcare information systems (HIS) infrastructure in New Zealand and associated security issues around privacy and confidentiality, followed by a general review of the security baseline approach. We analyzed each clause of the AS/NZS 4444 with the information collected about technical and non-technical approaches to protecting HIS, consisting of a series of multi-case studies of healthcare organizations that collect, process, store and transmit electronic medical records. Finally, we proposed a new set of information security baselines based on the research to build an information security model for healthcare organizations.
Article
A Delphi study was accomplished on the topic "what is needed to implement the information society within healthcare? and which research topics should be given higher priority than other topics to achieve the desired evolution?", involving 29 international experts. The study comprised of four phases, (I) a brainstorming phase based on a open question; (II) an evaluation phase for mutual commenting; (III) a feedback phase allowing corrections/extensions; and (IV) a phase collecting the ratings of individual issues within a questionnaire synthesised from the previous phases. A total of 110 research items and 58 supplementary barriers were raised, divided into 14 topics grouped according to homogeneity. The emphasised research topics are business process re-engineering, the electronic patient record and connected inter-operating systems, (support for) evidence-based medicine and clinical guidelines, and education. Issues inherent to the healthcare domain often are the kernel of the research recommended. Similarly, methods and 'people'-issues are strongly emphasised among the research issues in general and among those for which the experts' joint opinion was rated as statistically significant. In contrast, only a minority of the research issues emphasised was related to technical issues.
Article
Responding to the challenge for efficient and high quality health care, the shared care paradigm must be established in health. In that context, information systems such as electronic patient records (EPR) have to meet this paradigm supporting communication and interoperation between the health care establishments (HCE) and health professionals (HP) involved. Due to the sensitivity of personal medical information, this co-operation must be provided in a trustworthy way. To enable different views of HCE and HP ranging from management, doctors, nurses up to systems administrators and IT professionals, a set of models for analysis, design and implementation of secure distributed EPR has been developed and introduced. The approach is based on the popular UML methodology and the component paradigm for open, interoperable systems. Easy to use tool kits deal with both application security services and communication security services but also with the security infrastructure needed. Regarding the requirements for distributed multi-user EPRs, modelling and implementation of policy agreements, authorisation and access control are especially considered. Current developments for a security infrastructure in health care based on cryptographic algorithms as health professional cards (HPC), security services employing digital signatures, and health-related TTP services are discussed. CEN and ISO initiatives for health informatics standards in the context of secure and communicable EPR are especially mentioned.
Article
A toolset using object-oriented techniques including the nowadays popular unified modelling language (UML) approach has been developed to facilitate the different users' views for security analysis and design of health care information systems. Paradigm and concepts used are based on the component architecture of information systems and on a general layered security model. The toolset was developed in 1996/1997 within the ISHTAR project funded by the European Commission as well as through international standardisation activities. Analysing and systematising real health care scenarios, only six and nine use case types could be found in the health and the security-related view, respectively. By combining these use case types, the analysis and design of any thinkable system architecture can be simplified significantly. Based on generic schemes, the environment needed for both communication and application security can be established by appropriate sets of security services and mechanisms. Because of the importance and the basic character of electronic health care record (EHCR) systems, the understanding of the approach is facilitated by (incomplete) examples for this application.
HIPAA Security Rulespdf, loakware Wins Frost & Sullivan Award for Technology Innovation
  • Hipaa Org
HIPAA.org " HIPAA Security Rules, " (2003:May 30), 2003, http://www.cloakware.com/pdfs/FSAwardpressrelease- 1Oct2002.pdf, loakware Wins Frost & Sullivan Award for Technology Innovation, " (2003:May 30), 2002,
  • E H Shortliffe
  • L E Perrault
Shortliffe, E.H., and Perrault, L.E. Medical Informatics: Computer Applications in Health Care and Biomedicine, Springer-Verlag, New York, 2001.