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Cognition and Emotion
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Reappraising reappraisal: an expanded view
Andero Uusberg, Brett Ford, Helen Uusberg & James J. Gross
To cite this article: Andero Uusberg, Brett Ford, Helen Uusberg & James J. Gross
(2023): Reappraising reappraisal: an expanded view, Cognition and Emotion, DOI:
10.1080/02699931.2023.2208340
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2023.2208340
Published online: 10 May 2023.
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THEORY SECTION
Reappraising reappraisal: an expanded view
Andero Uusberg
a
, Brett Ford
b
, Helen Uusberg
a
and James J. Gross
c
a
Institute of Psychology, University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia;
b
Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada;
c
Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, USA
ABSTRACT
Reappraisal is a frequently used and often successful emotion regulation strategy.
However, its underlying cognitive mechanisms are not well understood. In this
paper, we seek to clarify these mechanisms by expanding upon our recently
proposed reAppraisal framework. According to this framework, reappraisal consists
of appraisal shifts that arise from changes to the mental construal of a situation
(reconstrual) or from changes to the goals that are used to evaluate the construal
(repurposing). Here we propose that reappraisal can target both object-level
construals and goals representing states in the environment as well as meta-level
construals and goals about different states in the mind. We also propose that
reappraisal can operate by facilitating decommitment from a dominant construal
or goal as well as by facilitating commitment to alternative construals or goals. We
demonstrate that the 2 × 2 × 2 matrix formed by crossing the three distinctions
between reconstrual and repurposing, between object-level and meta-level
representations, and between decommitment and commitment operations forms a
useful map of different reappraisal tactics. We draw examples of each of the 8
reappraisal tactics from basic and clinical research. We conclude by considering
future research inspired by the expanded reAppraisal framework.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 13 April 2023
Accepted 22 April 2023
KEYWORDS
Reappraisal; appraisal theory;
reconstrual and repurposing;
object-level and meta-level
representations;
decommitting from and
committing to
representations
Reappraisal is a common and effective form of
emotion regulation that has the power to change
how we respond emotionally to situations. For
instance, when feeling frustrated by missing a train,
it’s helpful to change one’s interpretation of what
just happened from “This is a prime example of my
constant failures”to “Stuffhappens, it’s actually nice
to relax until the next train”. Even though reappraisal
has been thoroughly studied, we know surprisingly
little about the specific cognitive mechanisms that
underlie it (McRae, 2016; Uusberg et al., 2019). In
this paper, we hope to help address this challenge.
To this end, we build upon our recently proposed
reAppraisal framework that, as its name suggests,
uses appraisal theory to model component processes
of reappraisal (Uusberg et al., 2019). According to this
framework, reappraisal works by altering either the
mental representations of states of the world (i.e. con-
struals), in a strategy we call reconstrual or the mental
representations of desired states of the world (i.e.
goals), in a strategy we call repurposing. Here, we sup-
plement the distinction between reconstrual and
repurposing with two further distinctions drawn
from cognitive psychology. The first is the distinction
between object-level representations that denote
states in the environment (e.g. “I failed to catch a
train”) and meta-level representations that denote
states in the mind (e.g. “I notice I’m upset about
failing to catch the train”). The second is the distinc-
tion between decommitting from currently dominant
representations (e.g. “On second thought, missing
the train doesn’t actually ruin my day”) and commit-
ting to alternative representations (e.g. “Missing the
train opens up new possibilities”).
Combining these distinctions leads to an
expanded reAppraisal framework that we introduce
in this paper. We first spell out in more detail how
we define reappraisal and then review the core
© 2023 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
CONTACT Andero Uusberg andero.uusberg@ut.ee Institute of Psychology, University of Tartu, Näituse 2, 50409 Tartu, Estonia
COGNITION AND EMOTION
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2023.2208340
reAppraisal framework. Next, we expand the core fra-
mework by incorporating the distinction between
object-level and meta-level representations as well
as the distinction between decommitment and com-
mitment operations. We illustrate each cell of the
resulting 2 × 2 × 2 matrix with examples drawn from
basic as well as clinical research. We conclude by con-
sidering how the expanded reAppraisal framework
can guide future research of reappraisal.
Reappraisal and its consequences
Reappraisal may be defined as the process of inten-
tionally changing the motivational meaning of a situ-
ation in order to change the emotional reaction to
that situation (Gross, 2015). This definition assumes
that emotions consist of loosely-coupled changes in
physiological, expressive and subjective components
that are typically orchestrated by changes in apprai-
sals (Mulligan & Scherer, 2012; Scherer & Moors,
2019). This definition also assumes that the processes
that change the motivational meaning of a situation
can be elicited intentionally, in service of a goal to
respond emotionally in some way (Tamir, 2015).
Such goals about emotions often include hedonic
desires to reduce negative emotions and increase
positive emotions. Goals about emotions can also be
counter-hedonic, for instance, when people wish to
avoid inappropriate flippancy at a serious event or
wish to become angry in order to perform better in
a sport. Goals about emotions may or may not be con-
scious, as is true for the reappraisal processes they
initiate (Braunstein et al., 2017). The scope of reapprai-
sal thus extends from fast and unconscious goal-
directed corrections of initial appraisals to deliberate
efforts to change appraisals such as those practiced
in psychotherapeutic contexts.
Rigorous scientific work on the age-old idea that
emotions can be changed by thinking differently
about situations began largely with the work of
Richard Lazarus (Smith & Kirby, 2011). For instance,
he demonstrated experimentally that emotional
responses, including in physiological components of
emotions, depend on manipulations of the motiva-
tional meaning of otherwise identical situations
(Lazarus & Alfert, 1964). He also identified how
coping with stressful situations depends on the way
people intentionally change how they appraise
these situations (Lazarus, 1966). These studies
helped establish the ideas that emotions depend on
appraisals and that these appraisals can change as a
result of, among other mechanisms, intentional
emotion regulation.
In recent decades, reappraisal research has flour-
ished within the broader field of emotion regulation
research (Gross, 2015). Much of this work has estab-
lished that reappraisal is not only a correlate (Aldao
et al., 2010) but also a cause of mental health and
wellbeing. Laboratory manipulations of reappraisal
can bring about robust changes to most com-
ponents of emotions (Webb et al., 2012). Instructed
reappraisal can also improve emotional experiences
in real-life settings (Wang et al., 2021)andproduce
sustained improvements in well-being (Denny &
Ochsner, 2014). Reappraisal is not a panacea
against all challenges to wellbeing as there are
known boundary conditions on its effectiveness
(Ford & Troy, 2019). Nevertheless, we now know
that reappraisal is a broadly helpful emotion regu-
lation strategy.
As we learn about the effects of reappraisal, it is
also important to learn about the mechanisms under-
lying these effects at different levels of analysis. In this
regard, we know more about the neural correlates of
reappraisal than about the cognitive computations
these correlates reflect. Engaging in reappraisal
tends to correlate with increased activity in the pre-
frontal and parietal cortices coupled with decreased
activity in subcortical regions such as amygdala and
ventral striatum (Buhle et al., 2013; Morawetz et al.,
2017). This neural pattern is consistent with the idea
that reappraisal hinges upon cognitive processes
that shape affective responding, but it does not on
its own reveal the cognitive operations performed
by the brain during reappraisal.
At first sight, explaining the cognitive mechanisms
of reappraisal may seem simple: reappraisal is, by
definition, the intentional changing of appraisals.
However, understanding what this means requires
further elaboration of what it means to change
appraisals. What are the cognitive structures involved
in appraisal? What processes govern their formation
and change? In the present paper, we seek to make
progress in answering these questions.
A clearer model of the cognitive mechanisms
underlying reappraisal would be useful beyond the
inherent value of improved understanding. Not every-
one benefits from reappraisal as much as they could
and it’s not clear why (Suri et al., 2015,2018). A
model of reappraisal could be used to pinpoint
where these limitations arise from and how to
remedy them. For instance, it could indicate how to
2A. UUSBERG ET AL.
tailor psychoeducational tools to different levels of
ability to generate reappraisals (Weber et al., 2014).
A clearer account of reappraisal mechanisms may
also aid efforts to taxonomically organise the
specific ways people use reappraisal i.e. reappraisal
tactics. Several partially overlapping lists of reapprai-
sal tactics have been documented in experimental
studies (McRae et al., 2012) and self-report instru-
ments (Carver et al., 1989; Garnefski & Kraaij, 2007;
Haynes et al., 2009). For instance, the Cognitive
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ) includes
factors for self-blame, other-blame, acceptance, rumi-
nation, positive refocusing, positive reappraisal,
refocus on planning, putting things into perspective,
and catastrophizing (Garnefski & Kraaij, 2007).
Although very useful, these largely atheoretical taxo-
nomies make it difficult to know the extent to which
they cover the full range of existing reappraisal
tactics. A related question is whether strategies such
as distancing and acceptance that are sometimes
seen as alternatives to reappraisal can in fact be con-
sidered at least in part as forms of reappraisal. We
believe that the reAppraisal framework we present
and expand on in the next sections can generate prin-
cipled hypothesis about different reappraisal tactics
that are possible and build a theoretical space to
draw together different research programmes.
The reappraisal framework
To begin, we first review the core tenets of the reAp-
praisal framework (see Figure 1; Uusberg et al., 2019).
Assuming that reappraisal indeed involves appraisal
change, the framework leverages the conceptual
tools developed for understanding appraisal to
better understand reappraisal. Appraisal may be
defined as a representation of the motivational
meaning of a situation that shapes an emotional
response (Moors et al., 2013; Scherer et al., 2001).
For instance, not being able to attend a party can
elicit sadness when the situation is taken to mean
being deprived of valuable experiences. Even
though appraisals are tethered to situations, they
often vary considerably from one instance of a
similar situation to the next as well as from one
person to the next. For instance, the motivational
meaning of missing a party can also be seen as only
an inconsequential setback and an opportunity to
rest. The possibility to appraise the same situation in
more than one way is what allows people to inten-
tionally replace one appraisal with another, that is to
engage in reappraisal. Taking a closer look at the
appraisal process should thus help uncover the mech-
anisms of reappraisal.
Appraisal shift profiles as a description of
reappraisal
Viewing reappraisal through the lens of appraisal first
suggests that an instance of reappraisal can be
described using the idea of appraisal dimensions.
Appraisal dimensions refer to abstract characteristics
that collectively represent the motivational meanings
of situations, similar to how the red, green and blue
dimensions collectively represent colours in the RGB
system. Most efforts to specify appraisal dimensions
include some version of the following five dimensions
(Moors et al., 2013): (a) Goal relevance reflects how
much a situation matters to various goals. (b) Goal
congruence reflects the extent to which a situation is
helpful rather than harmful for achieving these
goals. (c) Certainty reflects the confidence a person
has about what a situation entails. (d) Accountability
reflects the distribution of responsibility for the situ-
ation between oneself and others. (e) Finally, control
reflects the amount of power a person perceives to
have to change the situation.
According to the reAppraisal framework, each
instance of reappraisal can be described in terms of
how a situation is appraised on different appraisal
dimensions before and after reappraisal (i.e. as a
profile of shifts along appraisal dimensions). For
instance, goal relevance would be reduced when a
person trying to feel less bad about missing a party
tells themselves that attending this party is not that
important. Goal congruence would improve when
the person realises they can watch a TV show they
would have missed if they went to the party. Certainty
would be reduced when the person thought that
there is no guarantee that the party will be fun.
Accountability would shift when they emphasised
that they miss the party due to no fault of their
own. And control would increase when they remind
themselves that if they really wanted to, they could
still go to the party.
Supporting the idea that appraisal shift profiles are
useful for describing reappraisal, we have found that
such profiles statistically mediate emotion changes
accompanying reappraisal (Uusberg et al., 2023). Par-
ticipants used reappraisal to successfully reduce nega-
tive feelings elicited by reactivation of a recent
distressing event. They also reported how they
COGNITION AND EMOTION 3
appraised these events and responded emotionally to
them before as well as after using reappraisal. Analys-
ing these data, we found that from a fifth to half of
reappraisal-related changes to emotions were statisti-
cally mediated by shifts along different appraisal
dimensions. In a conceptual replication using experi-
ence sampling data, we also found that appraisal
shifts explained a similar proportion of the changes
in how people felt about an event within an hour vs
in the evening of the same day, but only if they had
used reappraisal in the interim. These initial findings
demonstrate the potential of using appraisal shift
profiles to efficiently measure instances of reappraisal.
Construal and goal change as an explanation
of reappraisal
Beyond describing reappraisal using appraisal shift
profiles, we also need a way to explain how these
shifts arise. After all, merely declaring to oneself that
a situation is not relevant, not that bad, or not one’s
fault without deeper cognitive changes tends to
have only limited impact on emotion. The reAppraisal
framework thus argues that impactful appraisal shifts
arise further upstream among the cognitive processes
involved in producing appraisals. Specifically, it
focuses on the processes of mentally representing
the emotion-eliciting situation that produce a con-
strual of the situation and on the processes of men-
tally representing the motives that the situation is
relevant for yielding a set of active goals.
The focus on construals and goals arises from
viewing appraisals as constructive representations
that are formed by integrating these two types of rep-
resentations (Frijda, 2007; Moors et al., 2017). The
term construal is used here to cover different kinds
of mental representations such as concepts, beliefs,
schemas and narratives that are involved in represent-
ing the state of the emotion-eliciting situation on
different levels of abstraction (Gilead et al., 2020; Lie-
berman, 2022). The term goal is used here to cover
different kinds of representations such as motives,
Figure 1. The expanded reAppraisal framework. An emotional response is shaped by a profile of values on abstract appraisal dimensions that
reflect what a mental construal of a situation means in light of salient goals. When people seek to alter the emotional response using reap-
praisal, they can produce appraisal shifts by using reconstrual to change some of the ways in which a situation is construed or repurposing to
change some of the goals that are used to evaluate the construal. Reconstrual can target object-level construals that denote states in the
environment as well as meta-level construals that denote states in the mind such as emotions. Likewise, repurposing can target object-level
goals that denote desired states of the environment as well as meta-level goals that denote desired mental states. Reconstrual can begin
either with decommitting from the current construal or with committing to an alternative construal. Likewise, repurposing can begin either
with decommitting from the currently pursued goals or with committing to alternative goals.
4A. UUSBERG ET AL.
norms, values and identity that are involved in repre-
senting the states that the person seeks to approach
or avoid (Elliot & Fryer, 2008; Heylighen, 2022). We
refer to a set of goals because the same situation
can be relevant to several goals at once.
Viewing appraisal as a constructive process that
involves construals and goals implies that there are
two main pathways to bring about appraisal shifts:
one could either reconstrue the situation by altering
the situational construal or repurpose the situation
by altering the set of goals that are used to evaluate
the construal. For instance, the person missing a
party could reconstrue the situation by thinking that
the party is probably going to be less fun than it
initially might have seemed it would be. This
thought would impact the construal of the situation
of not being at a party without necessarily changing
goals i.e. any of the reasons why the person wished
to be there. Alternatively, the person missing a party
could repurpose the situation by realising how
staying home allows them to get some long
overdue rest. This thought would activate previously
disregarded goals that happen to be congruent with
the situation without necessarily changing how the
situation is construed.
Both forms of reappraisal have been shown to be
effective in regulating negative emotions (Wang
et al., 2021). Participants from 87 countries and
regions (n= 21,644) viewed images depicting
different distressing aspects of the COVID-19 pan-
demic. They were randomised to receive either one
of two control instructions or one of two instructions
guiding them to use reconstrual or repurposing while
viewing the images. On average –as well as in the vast
majority of countries –both strategies reduced nega-
tive emotions and increased positive emotions not
only in relation to the images but also in relation to
the pandemic more broadly. We hope that this
impressive demonstration of the effectiveness of
both reconstrual and repurposing spurs further
research into the antecedents and consequences of
these strategies.
Expanding the reappraisal framework
The distinction between reconstrual and repurposing
opens the door for further specifying the types of
mental representations these processes target as
well as the mental operations that these processes
consist of. Specifically, in this section, we first consider
how both reconstrual and repurposing can target
object-level and meta-level representations. Next,
we consider how both reconstrual and repurposing
involve the operations of decommitting from a cur-
rently dominant representation and committing to
an alternative representation.
Object-level versus meta-level representations
as reappraisal targets
Representations can denote states of the environ-
ment (i.e. object-level representations), or states of
the mind (i.e. meta-level representations; Flavell,
1979). Object-level representations include any form
of mental representation that signifies things and
events within the external or internal environment
outside of the mind. Meta-level representations, by
contrast, are representations about things and
events in the mind such as thoughts, memories and
feelings. Examples of meta-level representations
include “I can’t stop thinking about it”,“I keep
having flashbacks about it”and “I don’t like the way
it makes me feel”. Although meta-level represen-
tations are more reliably conscious than object-level
representations, both levels can in principle enter
awareness or stay outside of it.
We propose that there are object-level and meta-
level versions of both construals and goals with inter-
esting implications for reconstrual and repurposing.
When mentally construing complex situations,
people often use both object-level and meta-level
representations. For instance, the mental construal
of an impending end of a good party probably
includes an object-level construal denoting being
alone as well as a meta-level construal denoting the
state of the mind that accompanies being alone
such as feeling sad. Likewise, the goals that are used
to evaluate these construals during the appraisal
process can be both object-level and meta-level rep-
resentations of desired states. For instance, the
object-level construal of being alone may be incon-
gruent with the object-level goal of being in a good
company, leading to negative emotions such as
sadness. Meanwhile, the meta-level construal of
feeling sad about being alone may be incongruent
with the meta-level goal of being an independent
person, leading to negative emotions such as shame.
The distinction between object-level and meta-
level representations can thus be applied to the con-
struals and goals envisioned within the core reApprai-
sal framework (see symbols with solid and dashed
outlines in Figure 1). Extending the reAppraisal
COGNITION AND EMOTION 5
framework in this manner suggests that there can be
four different targets for reappraisal in any given situ-
ation. First, the person could attempt two versions of
reconstrual. To feel less sad about being alone, they
could use object-level reconstrual to change the
object-level construal of being alone, e.g. by remind-
ing themselves that they can continue socialising via
text messages even after the party has ended. To
feel less ashamed about feeling sad, they could use
meta-level reconstrual to change the meta-level con-
strual of their emotional reaction, e.g. by attributing
their unpleasant feelings to being tired and intoxi-
cated rather than being alone. In addition to reconstr-
ual, the person could also attempt two versions of
repurposing. To feel less sad about being alone,
they could use object-level repurposing to change
the object-level goals that are incongruent with
being alone, e.g. by prioritising the desire to get
some sleep over the desire to socialise. To feeling
less ashamed about feeling sad, they could use
meta-level repurposing to change the meta-level
goals that are incongruent with being sad, e.g. consid-
ering sadness not as a sign of weakness but as a
natural reaction worth observing.
Decommitment and commitment as
reappraisal operations
We have now identified four types of target represen-
tations that reappraisal seeks to alter. In addition to
different targets, we argue that instances of reappraisal
can also be differentiated based on the mental oper-
ations they rely upon to initiate changes in the targeted
representations (see arrows in Figure 1). Specifically,
changes in construals as well as goals can be initiated
in one or both of two ways: decommitting from a cur-
rently selected construal or goal or committing to an
alternative construal or goal. Decommitment reappraisal
works by undermining initial construals or goals without
intentionally amplifying specificalternatives.Commit-
ment reappraisal works by amplifying alternative con-
struals or goals without intentionally undermining the
initial ones. Both operations can in principle operate
on both object-level and meta-level representations.
For instance, consider again the person who is
trying to use reconstrual to feel less sad about losing
enjoyable social contacts when a party ends. They
could use decommitment reconstrual and actively
undermine their present construal of the situation
without necessarily knowing what will take its place.
For instance, they may question whether the party
will really end at the designated time. Alternatively,
they could use commitment reconstrual and actively
promote an alternative construal of the situation
without necessarily questioning the initial construal.
For instance, they may think about who they might
converse with via text message once the party ends.
Similarly, goal changes can be brought about by
decommitment and commitment versions of repur-
posing. To use decommitment repurposing, the
person at the party may actively devalue the goal of
continued interaction without necessarily knowing
which alternative goals would take its place. For
instance, they may tell themselves that they don’t
really enjoy socialising with increasingly intoxicated
people. Alternatively, to use commitment repurpos-
ing, the person may actively value an alternative
goal without necessarily devaluing the original goal.
For instance, they may think about the benefits of
getting some sleep after the party has ended even
while they miss their friends.
The notion of decommitment and commitment
operations relies on the parsimonious assumption
that the mind does not have separate purpose-built
systems for changing construals and goals. Instead,
construals and goals change as emotion regulation
processes bias the general mechanisms that give
rise to construals and goals.
Construals arise from inferential processes that con-
struct a coherent experience out of less coherent
sensory and contextual information (Lieberman, 2022).
As demonstrated by bistable stimuli such as the
Necker cube, we usually perceive a single version of
reality at a time even if the available information is con-
sistent with several versions (Brascamp & Shevell, 2021).
Construals are thus selected through competitive pro-
cesses that can turn a slight advantage of one construal
over alternatives into a temporary dominance of per-
ceptual experience (Lieberman, 2022). We suggest
that reconstrual operates by biasing these competitive
processes. In broad strokes, it can do so either by under-
mining the competitive advantage of the currently
dominant construal, corresponding to decommitment
reconstrual, or by amplifying an alternative construal,
corresponding to commitment reconstrual.
Goals are selected by similarly competitive pro-
cesses that determine which goals people commit
to pursuing. Goal commitment is largely a function
of expected subjective value or the extent to which
attaining a goal would serve salient motives weighted
by the probability of its attainment (Klein et al., 1999).
Instead of pursuing all valuable goals afforded by a
6A. UUSBERG ET AL.
situation, people usually commit to pursuing only one
or a few at a time. Thus, goal selection also relies on
competitive mechanisms that can amplify slight
advantages in value of one goal over alternatives
into temporary goal commitment. We suggest that
repurposing operates by biasing these goal selection
processes. It can do so either by undermining the
value of the currently committed goal, corresponding
to decommitment repurposing, or by amplifying the
apparent value of alternative goals, corresponding
to commitment repurposing.
Mapping reappraisal tactics
The preceding section expanded the initial 2-way dis-
tinction between reconstrual and repurposing offered
by the core reAppraisal framework into a 2 × 2 × 2
matrix of three distinctions yielding eight unique com-
binations (see Figure 2). In this section, we argue
that the cells in this matrix can be used
to taxonomically organize different reappraisal
tactics. Each cell identifies a core mechanism that
allows an instance of reappraisal to succeed. Some
reappraisal tactics rely upon a single mechanism
whereas others rely upon more than one mechanism.
To illustrate the value of this taxonomy, we will offer
a selective review of basic and clinical literature to
demonstrate that the eight types of reappraisal
envisioned by the expanded framework have been at
least partially documented, although under different
labels and within different contexts.
Some emotion regulation strategies discussed
below such as distancing and acceptance have not
always been considered forms of reappraisal. A major
reason we view them as at least in part forms of reap-
praisal is the importance of meta-level construals and
goals for human emotions. Strong emotions can arise
from object-level appraisals about events in the
environment such as missing a party as well as from
meta-level appraisals about events in the mind such
as being sad about missing a party. Cognitive strategies
designed to alleviate the distress associated with
emotions about events in the mind (e.g. shame
about sadness) often differ from strategies designed
to alleviate the distress associated with emotions
about events in the environment (e.g. fear of
heights). However, insofar as both types of strategies
rely on altering the appraisal process, they may fall
within the scope of reappraisal.
Object-level decommitment and commitment
reconstrual
Someone using object-level reconstrual seeks to alter
some aspect of how they perceive or understand
what is going on in the situation, including how it
came about and how it might evolve in the future.
When they do so relying on the decommitment oper-
ation they seek to undermine their initial construal of
the situation, for instance, by thinking “Are things
really that bad?”(Figure 2, box A). When they do so
relying on the commitment operation they seek to
promote an alternative construal, by thinking for
instance that “I can fix this”(Figure 2, box B).
In the context of basic research, object-level
reconstrual is often used by participants of emotion
Figure 2. A taxonomy of reappraisal tactics with example thoughts. The letters A to H are used to refer to this figure in the text.
COGNITION AND EMOTION 7
regulation experiments instructed to find alternative
interpretations of emotional stimuli such as images
or videos (McRae et al., 2012). For instance, viewing
an image of a physical injury, a participant may tell
themselves that the injury is not as bad as it looks.
This participant would engage in object-level decom-
mitment reconstrual as they question the evidence in
favour of their initial construal without necessarily
committing to an alternative construal. Alternatively,
another participant may tell themselves that the
depicted person will make a full recovery or will soon
receive help. That participant would engage in object-
level commitment reconstrual as they embrace an
alternative construal to replace the initial one without
necessarily making direct efforts to undermine it.
Object-level reconstrual is also captured in ques-
tionnaires designed to measure individual differences
in cognitive emotion regulation. One relatively
extreme example of object-level decommitment
reconstrual is “denial”which is assessed with items
such as “I pretend that it hasn’t really happened”
(COPE; Carver et al., 1989). Examples of object-level
commitment reconstrual can be found in the CERQ
(Garnefski & Kraaij, 2007) that assesses the ways
people think when they are experiencing unpleasant
events, some of which fall under the definition of
reappraisal. Among other factors, this instrument
assesses “other blame”using items such as “I feel
that others are to blame for it”and “refocusing on
planning”using items such as “I think about how I
can best cope with the situation”. These factors rep-
resent object-level commitment reconstrual as shift-
ing blame from oneself to others and considering
ways to cope with the situation constitute alternatives
to a presumed original construal.
In the context of clinical research, targeting of
object-level representations is a hallmark of the
“second wave”of behavioural therapies such as cogni-
tive behavioural therapy (CBT; Beck, 1976). A typical
therapeutic goal of CBT is to challenge automatic
thoughts (Longmore & Worrell, 2007), which can be
facilitated with techniques that fall under both
decommitment and commitment reconstrual. An
example object-level decommitment reconstrual tech-
nique is “checking the facts”(Neacsiu et al., 2014)
that involves asking the patient to elicit additional
facts in relation to a maladaptive automatic construal
under the assumption that these will help undermine
the construal. An example object-level commitment
reconstrual technique, by contrast, is “attributional
retraining”(Försterling, 1985) wherein the patient is
instructed to revisit and challenge their initial attribu-
tions for successes and failures. For instance, a person
attributing failures to lack of ability is instructed to
consider the role of external factors, of temporary
states, and ways to control their performance in the
future.
Meta-level decommitment and commitment
reconstrual
Someone engaging in meta-level reconstrual seeks to
change some aspect of how they perceive or under-
stand their own mental reactions to a situation,
including sensations, memories, thoughts and feel-
ings. When they do so relying on the decommitment
operation, they seek to undermine their initial con-
strual of their reactions, for instance, by thinking “Is
feeling this way really that bad?”(Figure 2, box C).
When they do so relying on the commitment oper-
ation, they seek to promote an alternative construal
of their reactions, for instance by thinking that “I can
change how I feel about it”(Figure 2, box D).
An example of a meta-level decommitment reconstr-
ual from the basic research literature is increased meta-
phorical distance between a reaction and the self
(Kross & Ayduk, 2011). Psychological distance is often
revealed in linguistic features that represent third vs
first person perspective, and temporal, spatial, as well
as social distance (Moran & Eyal, 2022). Demonstrating
the efficacy of self-distancing as a reappraisal tactic,
instructing people to adopt these features when
expressing themselves can reduce the intensity of
their emotions (Nook et al., 2017). We suggest that
the key ingredient in self-distancing is decommitting
from an initial construal of one’s reactions as being
integral and highly relevant to the self.
A basic research example of meta-level commit-
ment reconstrual is altering construals about
emotions. Construing emotions as more vs less con-
trollable is associated with higher wellbeing (Ford &
Gross, 2019). There is also preliminary evidence that
changing this construal can be an effective reapprai-
sal tactic. For instance, when a small sample of
people were told that a drug they had taken improves
the controllability of their emotions, they were more
successful in regulating their emotions (Bigman
et al., 2016). We suggest that the main active ingredi-
ent in reconstruing one’s emotions as more controlla-
ble is commitment to a different construal.
In the context of clinical research, targeting the
meta-level is a hallmark of the “third wave”of
8A. UUSBERG ET AL.
behavioural therapy that includes approaches such as
Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; Segal
et al., 2013) and Acceptance and Commitment
Therapy (ACT; Hayes et al., 1999). Whereas the
“second wave”exemplified by CBT is said to focus on
the content of cognitions as a source of distress and
thus a target of intervention, the “third wave”focuses
on the context of cognitions (Flaxman et al., 2010). In
terms of this paper, the distinction between content
and context overlaps with the distinction between
object-level and meta-level representations.
A clinical research example of meta-level decom-
mitment reconstrual is the broad construct of decen-
tring, which involves construing one’s thoughts and
feelings as temporary events in the mind rather
than true reflections of the self, such as switching
from “I am anxious”to “I feel anxiety”(Bernstein
et al., 2015). Decentring overlaps with distancing but
is a more comprehensive construct that commensu-
rately is developed through more comprehensive
practices. Improvements in the ability to adopt a
decentred perspective mediates the effectiveness of
several therapies including CBT, MBSR and ACT
(Bennett et al., 2021). We suggest that an instance
of adopting a decentred perspective is an example
of meta-level decommitment reconstrual as its focus
is on dislodging the automatically generated con-
strual of emotions as true reflections of the self.
Clinical research examples of meta-level commitment
reconstrual can be found among the broad range of
psychoeducational techniques that help patients
acquire new knowledge and skills in service of
different therapeutic goals (Lukens & McFarlane,
2004). Often, the knowledge obtained includes novel
or more elaborate ways to think about bodily sen-
sations or emotions. For instance, patients with health
anxiety or panic disorder may learn how excessive
attention can generate sensations that may seem like
symptoms of imminent health problems (Wright
et al., 2000). We suggest that such instances of psychoe-
ducation involve meta-level commitment reconstrual
as they teach people specific construals they can
commit to with the goal of dethroning initial and less
helpful meta-level construals.
Object-level decommitment and commitment
repurposing
Someone using object-level repurposing seeks to
alter the nature or importance of the goals they use
to evaluate what the emotional situation means to
them. When they do so relying on the decommitment
operation, they seek to devalue the goals that domi-
nated their initial evaluations, for instance, by thinking
“I didn’t really want this anyway”(Figure 2, box E).
When they do so relying on the commitment oper-
ation, they seek to promote an alternative goal that
happens to align with the situation, for instance by
thinking that “This is bad, but I can learn from it”
(Figure 2, box F).
The basic research literature offers several
examples of object-level decommitment repurposing.
For instance, self-conscious emotions such as guilt
and shame can be down-regulated by lowering the
commitment to the goal of being positively regarded
by particular people (Leary & Gohar, 2014). Some
people have also been found to engage in defensive
pessimism whereby they intentionally lower their per-
formance expectations with the aim of pre-emptively
reducing anxiety (Norem, 2001). Related examples are
a pair of factors within a questionnaire assessing
coping with ailments in older age (Haynes et al.,
2009). The factors labelled “downgrading expec-
tations”(e.g. “Tell yourself that you mustn’t set your
goals too high”) and “downgrading importance”
(e.g. “Tell yourself the task is not necessary”) capture
instances of reappraisal wherein negative emotions
are reduced by reducing the ambitiousness or the
value of the goals that cast a situation in an unfavour-
able light.
Basic research examples of object-level commitment
repurposing can be found among the thoughts
reported by participants in experimental reappraisal
studies such as thinking of a lesson being learned
from a bad experience or a deceased person being
in a better place (McRae et al., 2012). A similar
mental operation is captured by the “positive reapprai-
sal”factor of CERQ (e.g. “I think I can learn something
from the situation”), “Positive reinterpretation &
growth”factor in COPE (e.g. “I try to grow as a
person as a result of the experience”) and “positive
reappraisal" factor in the coping with aging scale
(“Tell yourself that good things often come from
hard times”). In these instances, participants activate
novel desirable states that match the depicted
situation.
A clinical research example of object-level decom-
mitment repurposing is the “big picture”technique
used in CBT for perfectionistic thinking (Egan et al.,
2016). Individuals with perfectionistic tendencies set
overly high and inflexible standards that incentivize
unreasonable efforts and can generate negative
COGNITION AND EMOTION 9
affect when the standards are not met. The “big
picture”technique encourages the individual to ask
questions such as “Will this still matter tomorrow,
next week, next year?”. We suggest this technique is
an example of object-level decommitment repurpos-
ing as it involves lowering the value of an initial goal
by suggesting it will be much less relevant in the
future without necessarily increasing the value of an
alternative goal.
Clinical research examples of object-level commit-
ment repurposing can be found among CBT tech-
niques that deal with social comparisons. One such
technique is recommended to patients who
compare themselves unfavourably to others and
includes guiding them to identify alternative compari-
son targets, such as oneself in the past (Beck, 2021).
We suggest this technique involves commitment
repurposing as it activates a specific alternative com-
parison standard to gradually dethrone the initial less
adaptive standard.
Meta-level decommitment and commitment
repurposing
Someone using meta-level repurposing seeks to alter
the goals they use to evaluate their thoughts, feelings
and other reactions to a situation. When they do so
relying on the decommitment operation, they seek
to devalue the goals that dominated their initial
evaluations, for instance, by thinking “It’sfine not to
be happy all the time”(Figure 2, box G). When they
do so relying on the commitment operation, they
seek to promote an alternative goal that happens to
align with the situation, for instance by thinking that
“I feel bad, but it shows that I care”(Figure 2, box H).
A basic research example of meta-level decommit-
ment repurposing can be found in studies of accepting
emotions without judging or regulating them, i.e.
emotional acceptance. Acceptance can be assessed
with self-report questionnaires using items such as “I
tell myself I shouldn’t be feeling the way that I’m
feeling”(reverse coded; Baer et al., 2006) as well as
manipulated in experiments using similar instructions.
People higher on dispositional emotional acceptance
as well as people instructed to respond in an accept-
ing manner tend to experience less intense negative
emotions and enjoy better mental health (Ford
et al., 2018). We suggest that using emotional accep-
tance as an emotion regulation strategy constitutes
meta-level decommitment repurposing as it devalues
the otherwise spontaneously activated goals about
emotions such as the desire to avoid negative
emotions and experience positive emotions.
A basic research example of meta-level commit-
ment repurposing is arousal reappraisal that involves
teaching people that stress can be beneficial for per-
formance (Jamieson et al., 2017). A key ingredient of
this intervention is linking of a performance goal to
the construal of an arousal experience. For some
people, this may be a new goal that starts to
compete with the initially activated hedonic goal to
avoid unpleasant experiences such as stress. For
others, the performance goal might have been part
of the goal set but seemed incongruent with the
stressful experience. We suggest that in either case,
the effect of arousal reappraisal relies in part on com-
mitment repurposing as it activates or promotes a
specific goal.
A clinical research example of meta-level decom-
mitment repurposing is mindful acceptance cultivated
across several third wave therapies such as the
MBCT and ACT, usually in conjunction with mindful
attention. Mindful acceptance includes emotional
acceptance but is a broader and more multifaceted
construct that involves observing all mental event
without judging or trying to guide them (Lindsay &
Creswell, 2017). We suggest that mindful acceptance
operates in part through meta-level decommitment
repurposing because a key outcome of this strategy
is reduction in the motivation to avoid unpleasant
experiences, i.e. experiential avoidance (Flaxman
et al., 2010). Without acceptance, many impulses,
cravings, and other emotional reactions would
compare unfavourably to goals about emotions
leading to meta-level negative emotions that motiv-
ate often unnecessary efforts to avoid, change, or sup-
press the initial emotional reactions. Practicing
mindful acceptance can devalue these goals about
emotions and thus prevent the emotional and behav-
ioural avoidance cascade from following. Even though
other mechanisms can be involved in mindful accep-
tance, we suggest that one of them is decommitment
repurposing.
A clinical research example of meta-level commit-
ment repurposing is the practice of self-compassion
(Neff,2011) often associated with Compassion
Focused Therapy. Among the goals of this
approach is a shift from judgement to compassion
in relation to the largely meta-level concept of self
(Dixon & Gross, 2021; McAdams, 2013). This shift can
facilitate various subjective, bodily and cortical indi-
cators of mental health and well-being (Gilbert,
10 A. UUSBERG ET AL.
2010). The change cultivated in compassion-based
interventions is in large part motivational –a shift
from pursuing survival or achievement goals to pursu-
ing affiliation goals. We therefore suggest that enga-
ging in self-compassion is a form of commitment
repurposing as it activates a set of alternative meta-
level goals.
Future directions
In the expanded reAppraisal framework, we have inte-
grated the reconstrual versus repurposing distinction
with a pair of additional distinctions, one concerning
the cognitive structures involved in appraisal (object-
level and meta-level representations), and the other
concerning the cognitive processes involved in apprai-
sal (decommitment and commitment operations). We
have also demonstrated the usefulness of this
expanded framework for mapping different forms of
reappraisal, irrespective of whether they have been
labelled as such in previous literature. We would like
to end by exploring other ways in which the proposed
framework could spur future research.
First, key predictions could be empirically tested to
further support the reAppraisal framework. For
instance, the framework predicts that people should
engage in reconstrual when the construals are easier
to change than goals and in repurposing when the
goals are easier to change than construals. This idea
could be tested experimentally by systematically
varying the malleability of construals (e.g. by provid-
ing multiple performances evaluations that are more
vs less consistent) and the malleability of goals (e.g.
by highlighting one or more criteria in the perform-
ance evaluations). The framework also predicts that
meta-cognitive ability (Rouault et al., 2018) should
correlate with preferences for and benefitting from
meta-level reappraisal. Finally, experiments could be
designed to test the prediction that engaging in
decommitment reconstrual decreases the perceptual
confidence associated with the dominant construal
and increases it for alternative construals whereas
commitment reconstrual has the opposite effects. To
address these and other hypothesis in field studies,
novel questionnaires could be developed to assess
constructs identified in the reAppraisal framework
(cf. Olderbak et al., 2022).
The expanded reAppraisal framework may also
help explain why some forms of reappraisal are
more effective than others. There appears to be thera-
peutic value in shifting self-relevant thoughts from
object-level to the meta-level (Fisher & Wells, 2009).
This suggests that reappraisals that tap into meta-
level representations may have an advantage over
reappraisals that operate exclusively on the object
level. Another hypothesis is that reappraisal tactics
that fall into more than one cell in our 2 × 2 × 2
matrix are generally more effective. For instance,
even though we associated decentring with meta-
level decommitment reconstrual and acceptance
with meta-level decommitment repurposing, these
broad and powerful techniques probably also activate
other mechanisms within our taxonomy.
The representations and operations we have high-
lighted can also be seen as candidate mechanisms that
prevent people with certain traits from attempting and
benefitting from certain forms of reappraisal. For
instance, people high on perfectionism may find it
easier to use reconstrual than repurposing. Perfection-
ists set high goals and find it difficult to not meet them
(Egan et al., 2016). This suggests that they may also find
it difficult to use repurposing, especially with the
decommitment operation. Likewise, people with low
tolerance for cognitive uncertainty (Rosen et al.,
2014)mayfind it difficult to use decommitment reap-
praisal because they are motivated to find a construal
to commit to and stay committed to.
These are just a few of many possible predictions
that could be derived from the expanded reAppraisal
framework we have offered here. We hope readers
will find it useful for cataloguing and understanding
the diverse ways people change thinking with the
aim of changing emotions. We also hope that it will
inspire researchers and practitioners to craft new,
individually tailored reappraisal interventions for
those in need.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Funding
This research was supported by the Estonian Research Foun-
dation grant PSG525 awarded to Andero Uusberg.
ORCID
Andero Uusberg http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7327-9503
Brett Ford http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7943-4447
Helen Uusberg http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8832-7195
COGNITION AND EMOTION 11
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