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Models of Emotional Intelligence
Aljoscha C. Neubauer
H. Harald Freudenthaler
Institute of Psychology
University of Graz, Austria
Summary
Stimulated by Daniel Goleman's bestsellet the concept of Emotional Tn-
telligence (EI) has become enormously popular in recent years. Origi-
nally formulated by Peter Salovey and John Mayer 1n 1990, three major
components of EI were postulated: appraisal and expression of emotion,
regulation of emotions, and utilization of emotions (with further subdivi-
sions of each of these branches). Seven years later these authors presented
a modified version of EI and the first performance test (i.e., Multifactor
Emotional Intelligence Scale, MEIS). Models and measures provided by
Mayer and colleagues are hitherto the only published ability models of EI.
In the present review of EI models these are contrasted with more recently
developed mixed models of EI (like Bar-On's) and the trait EI concept (de-
veloped by Petrides and Furnham). The term mixed describes the fact
that EI is viewed as a collection of (partially already well-known) abilities
and non-ability traits. In addition to elaborating conceptual differences
between EI models, fundamental differences regarding measurement ap-
proaches are demonstrated. Finally, critical issues regarding the status of
ability and mixed models are discussed.
32 Models of EI
2.1 INTRODUCTION
SALOVEY AND MAYER'S (1990) ORTGTNAL MODEL OF EI 33
broaden the analysis of the conceptual underpinnings of EI. Notably, other
EI models, such as those mentioned above (e.g., Goleman, Cooper & Sawal
and Weisinger) have evoked little commentary in the scientific literature. Con-
sequently, these models shall be dealt with only in passing, though the reader
interested in exploring them further may consult the previously cited sources
(see also Table 9.3 on Page 1961. in Chapter 9by Pêrez, Petrides, & Furnham).
2.2 SALOVEY AND MAYER'S (1-990) ORIGINAL MODEL OF
EMOTIONAL INTELTIGENCE
The question of the relationship between intelligence and emotion is a long-
lasting and controversial topic at the societal as well as the scientific level (see
Mayer, 2002; Mayer et al., 2000a) . In 1990 , Peter Salovey and John Mayer drew
together the existing psychological literature on general contributions of emo-
tion and emotionality to personality and suggested a new concept of how to
synthesize the two psychological concepts of intelligence and emotion. They
proposed the first published, formal concept of EI as a guiding framework for
the integration of an exciting but scattered body of research on individual dif-
ferences in the capacity to process, and to ødøpt fo, emotional information.
According to this framework, the main details of which are represented in
Figure 2.L,EIcomprises three conceptually related mental processes involving
emotional information. These processes are: (a) the appraisal and expression
of emotion, (b) the regulation or control of emotion, and (c) the utilization of
emotion in adaptive ways. As can be ascertained from Figure 2.1,, two branches
are further subdivided into self and other. Thus, Salovey and Mayer distin-
guish between the two perspectives of perceiving and regulating one's own
emotions or the emotions of another person. In the lower branch (appraisal
and expression) the self and other perspective are further subdivided accord-
ing to a content factor, that is, a verbal versus a nonverbal domain. The model
seeks to incorporate a number of well-established constructs from emotions
research. The appraisal of others'emotions in the verbal domain, for example,
is equated with the well-known construct of empathy.
Figure 2.1, also shows that the upper left branch comprises four sub-factors,
which assume high EI persons to be more flexible in their utilization of emo-
tions due to flexible planning, more creative thinking, the ability to (re-)direct
attention, and a propensity to motivate themselves and others. Furthermore,
this model assumes that emotionally intelligent individuals should be espe-
cially adept in certain domains. These include (a) perceiving and appraising
their own emotions accurately, (b) expressing and communicating them accu-
rately to others when appropriate, (c) recognizing the emotions in others accu-
rately and responding to them with socially adaptive behaviors, (d) regulating
emotions in themselves and others effectively in order to meet particular goals
(e.g., to enhance their own and others mood), and (e) using their own emo-
tions in order to solve problems by motivating adaptive behaviors (cf. Mayer
& Salovey, 1993).
Human intelligence is among the most frequently studied.constructs in the
field of indivià'ual differenceã. The sound tñeoretical foundation and empir-
i*Uy a"-onstrated usefulness of cognitive ability tests are well documented
1".g., S"n-lat & Hunter, 1998). How"-v"r, some researchers argue that the IQ is
a rather narrow concept. From this perspective it is suggestedthat while cogni-
tive intelligence is a pttent predictõr of educational and professional success,
it is nonetñeless an imperfeãt predictor of successful functioning in everyday
life (Brody, 1992). According tô this viewpoint, this functioning relies not sim-
¡it;" "rä"itivá intelltg"r-,"Ë brrt rath_er on the relatively new (and emerging)
ãonstruct of emotional intelligence (EI).
Historically, at least part of this suggestion ma¡z b9 tracedto Daniel Goleman
who, in l995,'publisheð.Emotionat tnlltligence: Why it Can Møtter More Than IQ'
This book becäme a bestseller in many countries. It also generated enormous
popular interest, typified by a plethorá of popular bogks,.mlSazine and news-
þuþ", articles, "o*i. stripå, und "rrun the oicasional talk show program. In
ilol"rnun,, rather simplisiic view, EI is much more important than cognitive
intelligence. Since claJsical IQ scores explain only about 2g%ofsuccess in life,
Golenian argues that a significant propórtion of ihe rest should be determined
by Ef. Although Golemaî's claimi aie based on a priori assumptions rather
tlian empiri"uidutu, it nonetheless seems plausible that El.might have incre-
mental validity beyond cognitive intelligence and personality- Although the
,,raw" science ín Góleman's"book is sparðe, it served to spark increased scien-
tific study of EI. Recently, numerous- studies on the conceptualization, oper-
ationatzátion, validity, ut a ,-rtitity of EI have emerged in the peer-reviewed
scientific literature ur,ä in u ,utrg"bf academic and quasi-academic books'
However, rather than a consensus of opinion on what EI is, several alter-
native models of EI have been proposed (e'g', Bar-On, 1997; Coo'per & Sawa^f'
1997; Goleman, !995; Mayei &-Salovey, 1997; Salov.ey- &. Mayet' 1990;
weisinger, 1998). These modeh canbe classified into two fairly distinct groups,
that isTabitity models and mixed models (see Mayer, -S1lo.vey, & Caruso' 2000a'
2000b; cf. aló Freudenthaler & Neubauer,200l). with the gxceptionof Mayer
ãr-ra Satorrey's ability model, existing conceptuali?lig"t of EI are mixed' and
so expand ih" -"unir,g of this conãtruct by explicitly incorporating a- wide
,àr,g"'of personality chãracteristics. Howevä., ubility rr"rsus mixed models of
EI ñot orrly rrury considerably regarding the (scope of) conceptualizations but
also with respect to the propósed"instruäents used to measurè EI. Thus, mixed
models rely tn setf-report measures of EI, while the ability model centers on
performante-based measures of emotional abilities'
In this chapter, Salovey and Mayer's (1990) original Tg{Î1of emotional in-
telligence (reierred to as Utlg¡, Mäyer and Salove''s (1-9!7) modified ability
model of emotional intelligence (refärred to asEI97), and Bar-On's (1997) non-
cognitive mixed model oi emotìor,ut (and social) intelligence are reviewed'
Moreover, two approaches within the organizali_o1al coirtext (i.e., Boyatzts'
Goleman, & Rhee, 2000; Dulewicz & Hi"ggs, 2000) are briefly described to
ln otlìe¡
Motivâtion In self
Creative
thinking Redirectcd
attention
Flexible
planning
Regulation oI
emotion
Utilization of
emotion
Emotional
Intelligence
Appraisal ând
expression of
emotion
OtheÌ
Self
Empathy
Non-verbal
perception
Verbal
34 Models of EI
Figure 2.1 salovey and Mayer's 1990 model of emotional intelligence.
MAYER AND SALOVEy',S (1997) REVISED ABILITY MODEL OF EI 3s
2.2.2 Criticism and Response
The status of two branches of EI90 (appraisal and expression, regulation) with-
in the domain of emotion ability related constructs remains largely undis-
puted. However, the third branch has been criticized, in part, for the vague-
ness of concepts employed. For example, what does "flexible planning","ledi-
rected attention", and the like mean? Equally, it appears that the upper left
branch in Figure 2.1 introduces "fuzziness" to well-known psychological con-
structs, like attention and motivation, that might otherwise clarify the role of
EI. Moreover, liberally borrowing established constructs has prompted ques-
tions of whether EI is a new form of intelligence at all (cf. Neubauer & Freuden-
thaler, 2002;'Neber & Westmeyer, 2001).
Despite these problems, Mayer and Salovey argue that EI clearly represents
a meaningful new type of intelligence because the series of emotion-related
abilities they posit does fit well within the boundaries of widely acknowledged
conceptual definitions of intelligence. Consider, for example, correspondence
with Wechsler's (1958) definition of intelligence as "the aggregate or global ca-
pacity of the individual to act purposefully, to think rationally, and to deal
effectively with his environment" (p.7). Although EI shows important con-
vergence with other ability concepts like socisl intelligence, Mayer and Salovey
(1993) argue that EI is not a mere re-description of social intelligence. Instead,
because EI primarily focuses on the emotional problems embedded in personal
and social problems, it is argued to be a narrower descriptor than social intel-
ligence. Thus, EI should display better discriminant validity with respect to
cognitive intelligence (cf. Mayer & Salovey, 1997).Indeed, EI is broader, as it
also covers the perception of, and reasoning about, internal emotions (Mayer,
Caruso, & Salovey, 1999).
Finally, Mayer and Salovey (1993) argue that EI represents unique mecha-
nisms that might underlie the processing of affective information. In so doing,
they also contend that EI should not be considered as a collection of socially de-
sired personality traits and talents, but rather as an intelligence that enhances
the processing of certain types of information. In some ways, this account thus
represents the first demarcation of the domain, in turn leaving the research
community to decide between ability-based and mixed models of EI.
2.3 MAYER AND SALOVEY'S (19971REVISED ABILITY
MODEL OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE
InI997, Mayer and Salovey presented a revised and refined conceptualization
of EI (here referred to as EI97) that strictly constrains EI to a mental ability
concept and separates it from classical social-emotional personality traits like
the Eysenckian PEN factors, the Big Five personality traits, and many others.
The revised model omits the ,rpper left branch of the 1990 model (UIOO¡ ln
Figure 2.1, and includes u new, þerformance-related domain, referred to as
thinking about emotions (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). InEI97, ttre authors define
2.2.1 Operationalization and Conceptual Validation
In order to assess the components of EI that they identified, Salovey and Mayer
(1990) proposed several approaches that can be divided into self-report versus
àuilityïuärures (cf. Neubãuer & Freudenthaler, 200L). Notably Salovey and
ivtayer had demonstrated how aspects of EI might be measured as an ability
1e.g., Muyet, DiPaolo, & Salovey, 1990; see also Mayer & Geher, 1996), even at
ìnii "urff point in tirne. Howevér, in this initial work, they also-considered self-
report -"är.rr"r of related constructs (e.g., empathy, emotional expressivity, or
mãod regulation) as ancillary measures of emotion-related abilities.
At the time of writing, only one self-report measure (and no performance-
based measure) had beãn "*pti.itty designed to measure EI as originally con-
ceptualized by Salovey and Mayei (1990) This measure is the Schutte et al'
(1Ö98) trait méasure of ämotionuíittt"ìtg"t-,ce (SEI; see also the- Trait Meta Mood
òcule'proposed by Salovey, Mayer, Golãman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995, for a te-
lated,^bui conceptually -or" réstricted, questionnaire). Factor analyses.that
have been employed ón data provided Uy tfre SEI, by different authors (e.g',
Ciarrochi, Deane, & Anderson, 2002;Petrídes & FurnÍrarn,2000, Schutte et al',
1998) have so far yielded different factor solutions. Moreover, these findings
demonstrate neither the structure of emotion-related mental abilities proposed
by salovey and Mayer (1990) nor the existence of a coherent domain of emo-
tional intelligence.
36 Models of EI MAYER AND SALOVEv',S (1.997) REVISED ABILITY MODEL OF EI 37
EI as a collection of emotional abilities that can be divided into four classes,
facets, or (in their terminology) branches. These four classes of emotion-related
abilities ui" urrur-rg"d from more basic to higher-level skills_(see also Mayer et
a|.,1999,2000b). táitt'tit-t eachbranch, four rçresentative abilities are described
which differ in their developmental antecedents (see Figute 2'2)'
Branch I (Perception, Apprnisnl ønd Ëxpression of Emotion) involves the receiv-
ing and recognizing of ómotional information and comprises the most basic
eriotion-reluiô¿ rt iltr. These components range from the ability to identify
emotions in one's self to the ability to discriminate between emotions, for ex-
ample, honest versus dishonest expression of feelings (cf. Figure 2'2). These
basic input processes are necessary preconditions for the further processing of
emotional information in order tosõlve problems (Mayer, salovey, Caruso, &
Sitarenios, 2001).
Branch II (Emotiorutt Facilitation of Thinking) describes the use of emotions to
enhance reasoning and proposes vãrious emotional events that assist in intel-
lectual processingl tnclúdeã under this branch are emotions that direct atten-
tion to important"information and different kind of moods that may facilitate
different färms of reasoning (e.g., deductive vs. inductive reasoning).
Branch III (IJnderstønding and Analyzíng Emotions) involves cognitive
processing of eàotions and ãomprises four representative.abilities involving
àbstract rinderstanding and reasoning about emotions' These components
range from the abilitlito label emodõns,and recognize relations among the
*oä, and the emotiôns themselves, to the ability to recognize likely transi-
tions among emotions.
Branch IY (Reftectiae Regulation of Emotions) refers to the ability to Tanag.e
emotions in oneself, and ìi others, in order to enhance emotional and intel-
lectual growth. This ability comprises the most advanced skills, ranging from
the abiñty to stay open to feelings-both pleasant and unpleasant ones-to
the ability to manage emotions iñ oneself ánd others by enhancing pleasant
emotions and modeiating negative ones. This highest branch represents an in-
terface of many factors iicluáing motivational, emotional, and cognitive fac-
tors that must -be recognized uttà'bulur,."d in order to manage and cope with
feelings successfully (Mayer, 2001; Mayer et al., 2001)'
2.g.1, convergence of EI with standard Criteria for an Intelligence
Mayer and colleagues claim, in a series of recent papers (e.g., Mayer & salovey,
ßíz;xlayer et aLI,I9g9,2000a,2001), that their revised conceptualization now
^""i, irnportant criteria that moves EI firmly into the domain of intelligence
constructs. The criteria they cite ure "onc"piual, correlational, and develop-
mental. In the passages thatfollow we briefly exposit these criteria.
Conceptuøl criterion, The authors argue that EI is composed of a series of
concepiually related mental abilities, réferring to various aspects of reason-
ing aËout emotions that can be clearly distin[uishe{_from personality- traits
anä talents. Moreover, their proposed branches of EI involve those mentat
Perception, Appraisal, and Expression of Emotion
Emotional Facilitation of Thinking
Understanding and Analyzing Emotions; Employing Emotional Knowledge
Reflective Regulation of Emotions to Promote Emotional and Intellectual Growth
Figure 2.2 Mayer and Salovey's 1997 model of emotional intelligence
Ability to identify
emotions in other
people, designs, art-
work, etc., through
language, sound,
appearance, and be-
havior.
Ability to express
emotions accurately,
and to express needs
related to those feel-
ings.
Ability to discrimi-
nate between accurate
and inaccurate, or
honest versus dishon-
est expressions of
feeling.
Ability io identify
emotion in one's
physical states, feel-
ings, and thoughts.
Emotions prioritise
thinking by directing
attention to impor-
tant information.
Emotions are
sufficiently vivid and
available that they
can be generated as
aids to judgment and
memory concerning
feelings.
Emotional mood
swings change the in-
dividual's perspective
from optimistic to
pessimistic, encoura-
ging consideration of
multiple points of
view.
Emotional states
differentially encou-
rage specific problem
approaches such as
when happiness faci-
litates inductive
reasoning and creati-
vity.
In
Emotional
Ability to label emo-
tions and recognize
relations among the
words and the emo-
tions themselves,
such as the relation
between liking and
loving.
such as that sadness
often accompanies a
loss.
garding
Ability to interpret
the meanings that
emotions convey re-
Ability to understand
complex feelings:
simultaneous feelings
of love ancl hate, or
blends such as awe as
a combination of fear
and surprise.
Ability to recognize
likely transitions
among emotions,
such as the transition
from anger to satis-
factiory or from anger
to shame.
Ability to stay open
to feelings, both
those that are
pleasant and those
that are unpleasant.
Ability to reflectively
engage or detach
from an emotion
depending upon its
judged informative-
ness or utility.
Ability to reflectively
monitor emotions in
relation to oneself
and others, such as
recognizing how
clear, typical, influ-
ential, or reasonable
they are.
Ability to manage
emotion in oneself
and others by mode-
rating negative emo-
tions and enhancing
pleasant ones, with-
out repressing or ex-
aggerating informa-
on
processes that are widely u"lqlewledged as central parts of an intelligence
äyrt"*. These include aústract underJtanding or reasoning. as a core feature
o? a system that is assisted by several adjunct functions of input processing,
knowíedge processing, and meta-pro.essing (Mayer et al., 2000a, 2001). Thus,
accordinftó Mayer uñd Sulotr"y, EI cat be operationalized as a set of emotion-
related ubilities that have clearly defined performance components.
coneløtionøl criterion. Mayer et al. propose that EI describes a set of mental
uUifity components that are ruth"r closôly ielated to each other and moderately
correíated with other intelligences. Moderate correlations suggest that the new
intelligence belongs to the ãomain of intelligen"g: uttg that it is distinct from
those äheudy ldeñtified and measured. The finding is important since if the
correlations áre too high it would raise the possibility that the new intelligences
are not sufficiently diJtinct from traditional intelligence conceptions.
Deaelopmentøl criterion If EI follows the model of traditional intelligences,
it shouíd vary with age and experience. To this end, Mayer and Salovey's
El-model pr"ái"t, thatän indiviåual's level of EI should rise with age and ex-
perience. 'Muy". and salovey assume, then, that EI reflects a set of acquired
äkiils wnich áerrelop througir experience and social interaction (cf. Davies,
stankov, & Roberts, 1998; sihaie, zoot) rather than reflecting innate or static
skills. Moreover, the third branch (understanding of emotions) mainly reflects
th" pro.urring of emotions through reference to án acquired emotional knowl-
edgà base (seã Mayer et al., 2001)l On the basis of these assertions, one would
exiect EI to be paiticularly related to crystallized intelligence.
2.3.2 Operationalization and Conceptual Validation
Mayer and salovey (1gg7) claim that only psychometric performance tests of
the proposed emoiion-related abilities, enabling discrimination between cor-
rectänd incorrect responses, can demonstrate and Prove the existence of EI' To
fill the measurement void surrounding this claim, Mayer et al' (1999) devel-
oped the Multifactor Emotional lntelligence Scale (MEIS), which consists of 12
pärformance tasks designed to measure the four branches o1EI97:
38 Models of EI
1. Branch I consists of four tests that measure the ability to identify emo-
tions in faces, music, designs, and stories'
2. Branch II comprises two tasks designed to measure the ability to assimi-
late emotions into perceptual and cognitive processes'
3. Branch III consists of four tasks assessing the ability to reason about and
understand emotions.
4. For Branch IV two tasks measure the participants' abilities to manage
their own emotions and the emotions of others'
unlike the domain of cognitive intelligence, where the correctness of re-
,porrr", can usually be deteimined fairly"easily on logical grounds, this has
MAYER AND SALOVEY',S (1997) REVTSED ABILITY MODEL OF EI 39
proven difficult in the case of emotions (see Zeidner, Matthews, & Roberts,
2001., for a discussion). Currently, three approaches are followed:
L. Group consensus: Each response is scored according to the proportion of
participants who gave the same answer.
2. Expert scoring: The correct answer is determined by asking experts in the
field what the best/correct answer is (for the MEIS the first two authors
served as experts).
3. Target criterion: The correct response is determined by correspondence
with a target person experiencing the emotion. For the subtests percep-
tion of emotions in music, designs, nnd stories of the MEIS, the composers/
designers/authors identified the best response alternatives.
To validate the MEIS empirically (thereby validating the underlying EI mo-
del), Mayer et al. (1999) employed an exploratory factor analysis that yielded
a three-factor solution: emotion perception, assimilation and understanding
of emotions, and managing of emotions). As the correlations of these factors
were substantial (from r : .33 to r : .49), the authors conducted a hierarchical
factor analysis. Here a single second-order generøl EI factor was extracted, with
salient loadings from each of the primary factors.
An exploratory factor analysis of consensus subscale scores conducted by
Roberts, Zeidner, and Matthews (2001) also yielded three interpretable fac-
tors (perception, understanding, management). However, contrary to Mayer
et al.'s findings, the two assimilation subscales loaded about equally on the
three extracted factors. Thus, the utilization of emotion to facilitate thought
and action seems to represent a (factorially) complex domain encompassing or
requiring emotion-related abilities of all other three branches. Nevertheless,
confirmatory factor analyses conducted by Roberts et al. (2001), on both con-
sensus and expert scores, identified the proposed four-factor structure to be
the most plausible model tested.
A further evaluation was conducted by Ciarrochi, Chan, and Caputi (2000).
Consistent with Mayer et aI. (1999), they found that all measures of the MEIS
loaded on the first principal component, which provides further evidence for
an emotional g. However, below the g-factor they could only extract two fac-
tors labeled Emotional Perception andEmotion Reguløtion/Manngement. The tasks
designed to measure emotional assimilation and understanding loaded sub-
stantially on both the perception and the regulation factors.
Generally, these findings provide support for the assumption of a general
factor of EI and for the conceptual validity of at least Branches I and IV (per-
ception and management/regulation of emotions). Flowever, the conceptual
validity remains rather equivocal for Branches II and III. Moreover, Roberts et
al.'s (2001) comprehensivè evaluation of the MEIS also reveals various prob-
lems related to measurement issues and scoring. Some of the ability measures
are problematic because of low reliabilities (Ciarrochi et al., 2000). The cross-
correlations between consensus- and expert-scored subscales are much too low
to demonstrate satisfactory convergencè between these two scoring-methods.
40 Models of EI BAR-ON'S MIXED MODEL OF EI 41,
highly relevant since it answers the question "Why are some individuals more
able to succeed in life than others?".
Bar-On reviewed personality characteristics supposed to determine life-
success beyond cognitive intelligence, and identified five broad dimensions.
He regards these dimensions, which are further subdivided into 15 subscales,
as key factors of EI. They are:
1. Intrapersonal skills, comprising
e self-regard (being aware of, und.erstanding and accepting oneself),
o emotional self-awareness (being aware of and understanding one's
emotions),
o assertiveness (expressing one's emotions, ideas, needs, and desires),
o self-actualization (realizing one's potential capacities),
o independence (being self-directed, self-controlled and free of emo-
tional dependency);
2. Interpersonal skills, comprising
o empathy (being aware of and understanding others' emotions),
o social responsibility (demonstrating oneself as a constructive mem-
ber of one's social group),
o interpersonal relationships (forming and maintaining intimate rela-
tionships);
3. Adaptability, comprising
o problem solving (solving personal and social problems construc-
tively),
o reality testing (validating one's thinking and feelings),
o flexibility (adjusting one's feelings, thoughts, and behavior to chang-
ing conditions);
4. Stress management, comprising
o stress tolerance (actively and positively coping with stress),
o impulse control (resisting or delaying an impulse or drive, and con-
trolling one's emotions); as well as
5. General mood, comprising
o happiness (feeling satisfied with one's life),
o optimism (maintaining positive attitudes).
In 2000, Bar-On presented a revised conceptualizationof this EI model. This
modified conceptualization, which these authors labeled "a model of emo-
tional and social intelligence", comprises L0 components from the original
Moreover, consensus- and expert-scored EI measures show different relation-
ships to other criterion varia6les. Thus, it seems rather questionable whether
thJsame personal qualities are assessed by these two scoring procedures.
To resolve some of these problems, as well as to improve the psychomet-
ric q-ualities of the MEIS, Mayer and collea8ues developed the Mayer-Salovey-
Caruso Emotional Inteiligence Test (MSCEIT; Mayer et al., 2000b; see also
ùuy"r, Salovey, Caruso, ë Sitarenios, 2003). Two scoring procedures are used
for ihe MSCE|T: (a) a general consensus criterion which is based on the an-
swers of more than 2,0î0 participants, and (b) an expert-consensus criterion
which is based on the urr"rr-"nit of 21, members of the International society
of Research in Emotion (see Mayer et al., 2003). In this latter instance, each
,"rpor,ru is scored u""ording to ihe proportion of experts who-gave the same
answer. In a recent analysistf the cõrrelation of the two sets of scores, Mayel
et al. (2003) report a surprisingly high correlation coefficient or r : .91, as well
as improved tèhabilities (relative to the MEIS)'
However, as Zeidner et al' (2001) point out, it is up to Mayer and, col-
leagues to sirow that this new measu." hut conceptual overlap (i.e., correlates
nig"Ny) with its predecessor MEIS (as it is has been done with most other well-
"riu¡íirn"¿ psyähological tests, like the Wechsler, Kaufmann, and Stanford-
Binet scalesj. 'Witnoüt such a demonstration/ as Zeidner et al. claim, "itis
entirely porrlbl" that what is being assessed each time is something entirely
dissimiür, rendering it impossible*to compile a corpus_of knowledge around
which a cåncept hk;EI migtrt coalesce" (Zeidner et al',200L, p' 268)'
In concluding this section, it should be acknowledged that the research
gïoup around. Hñuyut represents the first, and hitherto also the only published,
efforts towards the development of EI performance tests. Nevertheless, the
MEIS seems problematic in several respects and the actual empirical status of
the MSCEITiequires the emergen.e o? a body of independent research sup-
porting its psychometric properties and construct validity'
2.4 BAR.ON'S MIXED MODEL OF EMOTIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
In contrast to Mayer and Salovey's ability conceptuali'dlql-d-!1, mixed mod-
els (e.g., Bar_On, iOOr;Coop.r & sawaf, 1gg7;Goleman,1995,1998; Weisinger,
rqgàl äå not exclusively refer EI to emotion or intelligence. Instead, they claim
that'EI is often used as a label for a diverse group of personality characteris-
tics that might predict success in professional and everyday domains. Because
among the äix;d models Bar-OJs OggT)broad conceptualization of EI has re-
ceived most attention in the scientific literature, and is the only one for which
empirical findings have been reported, it is the main model discussed here.
In contrast to Salovey and Máyer, who argue that EI is ability-based, Bar-On
(IggT) defines EI as "aí urruy oí.o.cognitive capabilities, competencies, and
skills that influence one's abíhty to succeed in coþing with environmental de-
mands and pressur"s." (p. 14). hor Bar-On, a clinical psychologist, EI becomes
42 Models of EI CONCEPTUALAPPROACF{ESTOEI 43
construct carìnot be emotional. Other components do not label an ability but
rather traits that refer to peoples' preferred way of behaving (e.g., social re-
sponsibility), likewise the construct cannot be an intelligence. Although there
is strong agreement among intelligence researchers that other traits beyond in-
telligence can predict success, most of them strongly object to classifying these
characteristics as intelligence components. The critique on the fuzziness of the
(original) EI concept by Salovey and Mayer (e.g., Weber & Westmeyer, 200L)
applies even much more strongly to Bar-On's model. If abilities and traits and
emotional ns well as non-emotionøl constructs can be labeled emotional intelli-
gence, where are the (necessary) borders of such a psychological construct? Is
then the whole domain of personality psychology simply a domain of emo-
tional intelligence?
2.5 CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES TO EMOTIONAL
INTELLIGENCE WITHIN AN ORGANIZATIONAL
CONTEXT
Boyatzis et al. (2000) proposed an EI conceptualization encompassing four
competence clusters (i.e., self-awareness, self-management, social awareness,
and social skills) which differ from each other with respect to two dimensions,
namely (a) self versus other, and (b) recognition versus regulation or manage-
ment (see also Goleman, 1998,2001). Similar to Bar-On's mixed model, the
four competence cluster involve various components that are not exclusively
restricted to emotion-related competencies (e.g., emotional self-awareness) but
are rather related to broader social skills (e.g., leadership, conflict manage-
ment, developing others) or to personality and motivational constructs (e.g.,
self-confidence, service orientation, initiative, achievement orientation). How-
ever, empirical analyses of the proposed conceptualization of EI by means of
the so-called Emotional Competence Inventory (designed to assess the pro-
posed competence components from an organizational perspective; see also
Chapter 9byPérez et al.), have yielded inconsistent findings and failed to con-
firm the proposed structure of competencies (see also Matthews, Zeidner, &
Roberts,2002).
Regarding the impact of EI on success and performance in the organiza-
tional context, Dulewicz and Higgs (2000) presented another relatively broad
conceptual approach. For several years, Dulewicz and Herbert (e.g., Dulewicz,
1998; Dulewicz & Herbert,1999) have been working on the identification of
competencies that are related to success in organizational life and developed a
job competencies survey (JCS). For each of thè 40 competencies, a singleicore
was calculated by aggregating the performance-ratings of the evaluated man-
ager and his/her boss. In a recent study, Dulewicz and Higgs (2000) subdi-
vided these competencies by means of content analyses intõ three different
groups/ that is emotional (EQ), intellectual (IQ), and managerial (MQ) compe-
tencies. Sixteen of the 40 competencies (supposed to be relaied to various com-
ponents of existing, mixed models of EI) have been classified into six clusters
model. These components are self-regard, emotional self-awareness, assertive-
ness, empathy, intôrpersonal relatiottãhlp, stress tolerance, impulse control, re-
ality tesiing, îexibiùty, and problem-solving. The other five subcomponents
"i íf.r" original modeí (i.e., setf-actualization, independence, social responsi-
¡ill y, opti'mism, and hàppiness) are now consid eted as facilitators rather than
consiituent components of emotional and social intelligence.
2.4.1 Operationalization and Conceptual Validation
Like Mayer and salovey's model, Bar-on's model required a new assessment
tool. To ârr"", ;¡is 1997 rnixed model of EI, he developed the Emotional Quo-
tient Inventory (EQ-i; 1gg7), which consists of 133 items' By means of factor
analyses, the proposed model was more or less empirically confirmed (see Bar-
Ot,'Bro*r1, firtcatay, & Thomé, 2000; Petrides & Furnham' 2001)' Bar-On
portrrtut"a that the tótal item score rePresents an indicator of an individual's
overall (i.e., general) EI'
For the criterion-related validity, Bar-on (7997) reported correlations of up
to r :.52 between EQ-i factors and self-report measules of job performance
and work satisfaction.ìn response to this study, Petrides and Furnham (2001)
examined the relationships of the EQ-i scales to measures of well-known per-
sonality traits in two of tireir own studies. Their findings, which are based on
factor ánalyses of several additional personality measures, yielded the isola-
tion of an EI factor in Eysenckian facior space (study 1) as wel] as within the
Five-Factor-Model (Stuáy 2). Howeve., othe. authors reported a high multi-
colli.eurlty among ìn" EQ-i factors and personality traits. Dawda and Hart
(2000) obsárved mäderate to high correlations of EQ-i scores with neuroticism,
àxtraíersion, agreeablen"ss, a.1ã conscientiousness, as well as negative corfe-
lations of the pþ-l witfr depression, somatic symptomatology, and increased
e*periertc" of somatic ,y-pto-t under stress' Similarly, Newsome' Day' and
catuno (2000) obtained a very high correlation of r : -.77 between the EQ-i
,.or" urrà the anxiety factor oi tnJf Opp. In contrast, they found_no correlations
between the EQ-i and cognitive abilities or with academic achievement (but
academic achievement wa"s significantly correlated with cognitive abilities, ex-
traversion, and self-control). ön the baóis of these findings, especially the high
correlation with anxiety, Newsome et al. concluded that the EQ-i can largely
be regarded as a measure of (lack of) neuroticism'
2.4.2 Limitations and Critical Issues
Bar-On's conceptuali zalionincludes not only emotiorr-related.mental abilities'
but also broader social skills (e.g., assertiveness) and non-ability traits that re-
fer to personality traits (e.g.,'iñpulse control) and chronic mood (happiness,
opti-L*¡. Therefore, to sãm", th" upploptiateness of the term emotional in-
lãli/"n""'seems t"th";-q""rtionablJ icf. 'Neubauer & Freudenthaler, 2002)'
Indeed, some of the comionents suggested by Bar-On at best indirectly relate
to emotional pro."rr", 1ã.!., problerri"solving tr reality testing), therefore, the
44 Models of EI
of EQ-competencies (i.e., sensitivity vs. achievement, resilience, influence and
uaufruUitiiy, decisiveness and. assértiveness, energy vs. integrity, leadership)'
similar to other existing mixed models of EI, the selected EQ-competencies
;ããt;5 a relatively bro"ad combination of individual traits, values, and (so-
cial) behaviors. Hówever, in order to test the predictive/incremental validity
of the three different types of competencies, ãggregate scores-of the EQ, IQ,
and Me competence-r*1", as weli us composiie measures ?f fQ -F /Q and
EQ + IQ + MQcompetencies have been corielated with long-term managerial
advancement. Using multiple regression analyses, the authors report-that all
three types of compãtencies GQ,IQ, MQ considered separately as well as two
.ãÁpJrit" scales IÈC + IQ, EQ + Iq + MQI contribute significantly to man-
ug"Ë, rate of udrrunã"meti -itfti" tñeir organization ov.er aperiod of seven
yËur, lprrrportedly accounting fo171, p"r."i-tt of the total variance on the de-
i;;J"ìit våriable). Accordingig ?"hîY and Higgs, these findings provide
evidence for the incremental"validity of EI as well as the proposed usefulness
of combining different types of comþetencies with respect to the prediction of
success.
GENERAL DISCUSSION 45
mance tests. Therefore, ability EI should primarily be related to cognitive
intelligence components.
2. Although there are fundamental differences between ability and mixed
(or trait) EI, regarding conceptualization and operationalization, these
two approaches are not mutually exclusive but rather tend to be com-
plementary with respect to emotion-related components (see Ciarrochi
et a1.,2000; Petrides & Furnham,2001). Almost all existing concepts and
measures of EI cover at least four emotion-related areas that result from
the factorial combination of the two dimensions of self versus other and
recognition/awareness versus regulation/management: (a) recognition
or awareness of one's own emotions, (b) recognition or awareness of the
emotions of others, (c) regulation or management of one's own emotions,
(d) regulation or managemenf of the emotions of others. Although self-
report measures of emotion-related competencies might be influenced
by personality traits, some authors (e.g., Mayer et al., 2000b; Neubauer &
Freudenthaler, 2001) think they have their own merits and should not be
completely disregarded. They (a) can provide relevant information about
internal processes and experiences that can hardly be assessed by perfor-
mance tests, (b) might be used to assess the validity of performance tests,
and (c) might contribute either directly or indirectly to the prediction of
life-success.
3. Currently, there is debate about the appropriateness of using the term
EI for mixed or trait EI models. Proponents of ability models, as well as
most researchers from the domain of cognitive intelligence, hold the view
that the term intelligence should be reserved for strictly performance
related psychological constructs (some theorists even argue that intelli-
gence should stay a reserved term for the classical cognitive intelligence
concept). Proponents of mixed or trait models allow for EI as a new um-
brella term for various (old and new) personality traits. Nevertheless,
Petrides and Furnham (2001) also emphasize the importance of using
different terms for the verbal description of ability- versus trait-related
constructs via the following alternative labels: cognitive-emotional abil-
ity for the former and emotional self-efÍicacy for the latter.
4. Also in the realm of ability concepts, some progress has been achieved
concerning the subfactors that should be included in the domain of EI.
The literature on model development and recent empirical data suggests
that compon ents like emotion p erception and emotion management /re gulation
can be operationalized via performance tests and show up clearly in fac-
tor analyses. The usefulness of other components suggested by Mayer
and Salovey (1997), namely Emotional Facilitøtion of Thinking and Under-
standing and Annlyzing Emotions, has been undermined by several studies;
the current status of these factors (or at least their operationalizations via
the MEIS), is largely equivocal.
5. Clearly, many questions about EI have been raised in the last two deca-
des. Many of these are highlighted in a special issue of Emotion, that
examined EI. Some of the more intriguing points made there are:
2.6 GENERAL DISCUSSION
Thirteen years after the first mention of a concept of EI by Salovey and Mayer,
we are fiíally seeing some small, albeit important, steps towards the devel-
ooment of a coherent model of EI. Golemàn's popular assertions about EI,
irir"ãrt "", ãmpirically proven themselves, sputied scientific inquiry into the
const-ruct. Recent work on EI follows two paths:
1-. As is highlighted throughout this book, the importance of distinguish-
ing twoTunãamentally ãifferent types of models is apparent. These two
tyies of models have been assignéd different labels, for examp-1e, abil-
iíy ,rersus mixed EI models (MaJter et aI',1999)' Whereas models of the
fiíst type refer to EI strictly as än_ ability construct, models of the sec-
ond tþe alow for u *r."h broader combination of diverse (p_artially
older and well-established) personality traits under the umbrella term
EI. with regard to the different *"u*i"*"nt approaches to EI, Petrides
and Furnham (2001) emphasize a conceptual differentiation betweentrait
ËI and abitity/informaüoh processing EI. The authors Propose that the trait
approach piu."ä EI in thé domain of personality, encompassing various
bäÀarrioruî dispositions and self-assessed abilities that ""ql1.to b" i:";
suredbyself-reporttests'Takingintoaccountthatintelligenceano
p"rror,uíity ,"prår".t independeni.constructs, trait EI should be exclu-
äirrety relaied to personality dimensions and not to cognitive intelligence'
petrides ur-r¿ f,rir"rt"rum suggest their formal concept õf trøit E/ as a guid-
irrg fru*"*ork for the intãfation and systematizátion of research on the
different facets of EI encoñrpassed by existing mixed models. By c9l-
frast, nbility El is viewed as å cognitiíe-emotional ability within an abll'
ity f*me#ork that ought to be measured by means of maximum perfor-
46 Models of EI CONCLUSIONS 47
available measurements of tLre EI97 model, really represent competency or if
they rather reflect knowledge cumulated over varying learning opportunities
(Zeidner et a1.,2001). Current measures of EI are mainly of a crystallized kind;
the question remains open if more fluid tests of EI, ihat is, for emotional rea-
soning might be devised in the future. Again, we can observe here the strong
interdependence between theorizing and measurement; in this case, the mea-
surement tools (MEIS and MSCEIT) strongly moved EI in one direction with-
out having a priori resolved whether EI should more resemble Gf or Gc forms
of ability. This also has important implications for the issue of cultural rela-
tivity and cultural fairness. Thus, Zeidner et al. (2001) point to the fact that
crysiallized tests/conceptions of EI (like MEIS/MSCEIT) might be extremely
cultural dependent. Many Western cultural beliefs might not apply to Eastern
cultures, while changes over time are easily conceivable (in times of totalitarian
regimes probably different social-emotional behavior can be considered emo-
tionally intelligent than in more democratic times and so forth). As Zeidner et
al. (2001) have stated: "The weakness of EI and similar adaptive constlucts is
that emotional situations or . . . interpersonal situations may be too broad and
ill-defined to constitute a coherent ad4ptive challenge" (p.273) and"atpresent
it is unclear what is meant exactly by the term EI" (p.273).
2.7 CONCLUSIONS
Currently, we face several conceptual approaches to modeling EI, which-
roughly classified-belong either to the ability or the trait/mixed model do-
main. However, with the possible exception of the integrative approach by
Petrides and Furnham (2001), EI conceptions and models seem rather self-
contained in that their development is mainly psychometrically driven (i.e',
strongly connected to the instruments designed to measure them). Since re-
search on cognitive intelligence started in similar fashion, this approach cannot
be considered wrong in and of itself. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Matthews
et al. (2002) the models presented so far are lacking from integrating theories
and results from related fields like the psychology of emotions and biological
approaches. Research on cognitive intelligence took this path. Starting from
the psychometric perspective many decades of IQ research have seen a strong
emphasis on structural aspects, with research on developmental aspects, on
biological, psychological, and sociological correlates showing up later. For ex-
ample, for biopsychological correlates it was not before the 1-970s before se-
rious efforts were taken to explain IQ biologically (Neubauer & Fink, 2005).
Viewed from this perspective, there is a long way for EI to travel: On the in-
put side (the causes) the construct must be better connected to, or grounded
1n,_the psychology of emotions; biological correlates should be established; the
utfluence of nature and nurture assessed through behavior genetic research;
and so forth. Regarding the output side (the effects) researchers must inquire
mto psychological as well as sociological correlates of EI. As pointed out by
Matthews et a1. IZOOZ) such research'should help also in ansr¡¿ering what ar-e
(a) Maybe the most important issue regarding the new concept of EI is
the question of corvergent and discriminant validity: Where does
EI fif in the space of t]re plethora of already existing psychological
constructs? Fot "ot rr"rgènt validity some correlations with (com-
ponents of) cognitive ability as well as with some personality traits
-have been derionstrated. But with respect to discriminant valid-
ity the question must be raised: How does EI relate to other con-
struct liie for instance wisdom, social intelligence, ego resiliency
and so forth? As schaie (2001) says, we are awaiting proof that the
MEIS and MSCEIT "are not simply performance measures of well-
established personality traits" (p. zaQ.
From the viewpoint of lzard, a luminary in the field of emotion re-
search, *" *.tãt question if EI does not overlap largely with well-
established concepts from emotions research. Concepts suchas emo-
tionalknowledge (iisefi composed of emotion perception and emotion
labelling) anl emotional alaptiaeness, have actually been extensively
studied, albeit predominantly in children.
(b) Directly related to the question of convergent versus- discriminant
validity is the question of incremental validity, which may be_the
pivotai issue irrEl studies. Roberts et al. (200L) noted that while
Muy"t and colleagues have so far reported a number of meaning-
ful iorrelates of EI, we are still awaiting a demonstration that EI can
predict real life criteria after statistically controlling for "rival pre-
äictors" (Izarð,, 2001), namely intellectual ability and personality'
(c) As already noted by Mayer and colleagues, the postulation of a new
construct-also requires developmental evidence, that is, the onto-
genetic developmènt of EI must be demonstrated. some evidence
ón this issue wãs reported by Mayer et al. (1999), but Schaie (2001)
points to deficienciès in this study. Further, Schaie (2001) argues
ihat the development of the interrelationships between EI subcom-
ponents must be studied, that is, "how does their structure unfold
or in late life converge once again" (p.2afl.If similar to the domain
of general intelligerrce maybè we còuld also observe a process of
differentiatiotr anã dedifferentiation of EI abilities (schaie, 2001).
(d) with respect especially to concerns raised about Branches II and III
of the figZ-moãel, Zeidnet et aI' (2001) note that, in fact, much
of emotional and social knowledge can be implicit and procedural.
They argue that humans have acquired emotional and social skills
(especiaþ nonverbal ones) that are often difficult to verbalize. An
individuát might have excellent academic knowledge about emo-
tions without behaving with emotional intelligence in social inter-
actions. If this is the case, current assessments may be missing an
important array of implicit components of EI.
A compounding problem in the field is the lack of psychometrically sound
-"urrr."ri It has yðt to be determined whether the MEÍS ând MSCEI! the only
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probably the most important questions: "Is EI an underlying competence? Is
ÈI an outcome of more basic psychological factots?" (p. 531).
These questions refer to possibly the most fundamental issue: In view of the
"nor-orrs variety of existiñg psychological constructs and their fundamental
theories, the quéstion remainã open if EI really describes a new meaningful
psychologicalìharacteristic of human beings, or if it is only a_new label for
äxisting õnstructs. In a similar vein, the study of EI could also be viewed
us un utt"mpt towards reanimation of the related, but historically rather un-
successful, concept of social intelligence. Once the relation between these two
concepts have been clarified and integrative attempts have both demarcated
the bóundaries of EI and its subcomponents, all efforts should head towards
the development of reliable and valid performance measures of EI. If these can
be shownio have incremental validity beyond established constructs, ffom
both the ability and the trait domains, the concept of EI will have served its
purPose.
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The Emotion Systems and the Development
of Emotional Intelligence
David Schultz
University of Maryland-Baltimore County, USA
Carroll E.Izard
University of Delaware, USA
]o Ann A. Abe
Southern Connecticut State University, USA
Summary
The starting point for considering the development of emotional intel-
ligence is this: Emotions themselves are intelligent. Much of what some
callemotional intelligence (EI) reflects direct functioning of the emotion sys-
tems. Other aspects of EI are shaped over time by a person's emotion ex-
periences. In the present chapter we examine this last hypothesis by con-
sidering children's abilities to recognize how others' feel. We believe that
those aspects of EI that influence children's social and behavioral adjust-
ment most strongly will be aspects most closely associated with emotion
systems functioning.
