Content uploaded by Alessandro Colletta
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Alessandro Colletta on Jun 16, 2024
Content may be subject to copyright.
1
Institut européen
European Institute
Joint Master in Global Economic
Governance and Public Affairs
Professor Ugljesa Ugi Zvekic
2024
Alessandro Colletta
Drug Trafficking in the EU and Its
Challenges. Is Cannabis legalization
The Way Forward?
1
ANTI-PLAGIARISM AND FRAUD STATEMENT
I certify that this thesis is my own work, based on my personal study and/or research
and that I have acknowledged all material and sources as well as AI tools used in its
preparation. I further certify that I have not copied or used any ideas or formulations
from any book, article or thesis, in printed or electronic form, or from AI tools without
specifically mentioning their origin, and that complete citations are indicated in
quotation marks.
I also certify that this assignment/report has not previously been submitted for
assessment in any other unit, except where specific permission has been granted from
all unit coordinators involved, and that I have not copied in part or in full or otherwise
plagiarized the work of other students and/or persons.
In accordance with the law, failure to comply with these regulations makes me liable
to prosecution by the disciplinary commission and the courts of the Republic of France
for university plagiarism.
Name: Alessandro Colletta
Date: 15th June 2024
X
Aless and ro Co llet ta
2
Introduction
Drugs have been used for many centuries, both for recreational and medical use. By the
time passing and with the development of sciences like pharmacy and chemistry, drugs
became not only natural but also synthetic. This work is not dedicated to an historical
analysis of the drug trends throughout the years, nor is dedicated to a chemical and
pharmaceutical analysis of such. My thesis is dedicated to the analysis of drug trafficking in
Europe and the analysis of the European Market for drugs, with a special focus dedicated
to law-enforcement measures dedicated to the fight of this phenomenon, this is also going to
be accompanied by an analysis of the legalization and decriminalization measures in
European countries. Before getting into the analysis of what are the most common type of
drugs that circulate in such European illicit market we shall make three considerations. The
first consideration which is important to make is that when we speak about “the European
drug market” we mean an illicit market where the illicit goods respond to the law of supply
and demand, i.e. price and quantity can change over time. In relation to this premise, it is
important to consider an important microeconomic consideration, the demand for illegal
drugs is inelastic (Bergman,2018), This means that the demand for this good is slightly
altered by an increase in price.
The second premise is that the supply of such goods depends on multiple networks of
Organized Criminal Group (OCG) that trade such product from the outside of Europe into it:
cocaine, hashish and heroin are three examples of imported drugs, while MDMA falls into
a different type of analysis because it is often produced inside the European Union while
its chemical producers are produced outside. The third premise to make is that the drug trade
is not random, but it follows precise routes and OCGs are able to regenerate and adapt
whenever there is a disruption caused by police or operations or, as it will be explained, by
exceptional events like Covid-19 pandemic. This aspect will be further analysed in chapter
2, section b.
3
DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND
ITS CHALLENGES. IS CANNABIS LEGALIZATION
THE WAY FORWARD?
Table of content:
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY
1. Introduction
2. Methodology
3. Limitations
CHAPTER 1: Literature review:
1. What are the most common trafficked drugs in Europe?
a) Cannabis.
b) Cocaine.
c) Heroin.
d) MDMA.
CHAPTER 2: Case study: Criminal organizations involved and routes of drug
trafficking.
a) OCGs involved in drug trafficking:
i. ‘Ndrangheta.
ii. Neapolitan Camorra.
iii. OCGs in the Balkans and Eastern Europe
iv. Turkish Organized Crime
CHAPTER 3: Discussion: is Cannabis legalization the way forward?
a) Dismantling prohibitionism
i. The dangerous effects of prohibition
ii. How to proceed?
iii. Possible regulation for cannabis inside the EU: different options
iv. The German legalization model: the best solution
v. Is the German legalization model in compliance with European
and International Law?
vi. Criticisms
CONCLUSION
4
INTRODUCTION AND METHODDOLOGY
1. Introduction
Drug trafficking is a transnational crime which affects the Americas, Asia, Africa, and
Europe. This type of criminal business is the most profitable illegal trade in the world
(Davis, 2011). According to the 2014 data from Global Financial Integrity think tank, the
global drug trafficking market is worth US$426 billion to 650 billion (Global Financial
Integrity, 2014), the revenues from this activity amount for 1/3 of the total revenues from
all the criminal activities in the world. The minimum estimated value of the drug market
in the EU is €31 billion per year and the economic impact on the healthcare, economics
and governance of member states has several consequences in the mid- and long-term
(Eurojust, 2021).
2. Methodology
However, the intermediate aim of this thesis is to start from the premises above to analyse
the European drug market by analysing not only EMCDDA data, but also sources coming
from UNODC, Europol, and Interpol. By doing so, my analysis will ultimately consider
the effectiveness of drug regulation projects and policies as a future approach to be used
against drug trafficking and reduce the negative impact of drug and criminality on the
well-being of society in the EU. This research paper does not aim at advocating for a full
liberalization of drugs, it will critically analyse the data to address the effectiveness of the
current strategies adopted by law enforcement. By using quantitative analysis through
descriptive statistics and qualitative analysis, this thesis seeks to address the following
questions:
i. What are the most common drugs in Europe?
ii. What are the main OCGs involved and why some countries are important
trafficking points?
iii. Why drug trafficking is a security and social threat?
iv. What are the implications of legalization policies?
v. Can the legalization of cannabis at EU level improve law enforcement
efforts against more dangerous drugs?
5
3. Possible limitations
Possible limitations of this study arise from the fact that data regarding dug trafficked are
often limited and imprecise because they solely depend on estimations and seizures, the
latter aspect imply the fact that the quantity of drugs which enters in the EU every year is
higher than what we think because part of the drug trafficked is not detected. Further
limitations concern the analysis of OCGs, what we know about how criminal
organizations work comes from information leaked by confession of former members or
disruption of criminal networks by law enforcement operations. Nonetheless, I will try to
conduct my analysis at its best by considering the aforementioned limitation to my study.
A possible limitation is provided by the fact that all the data coming from the EMCDDA
are taken from their yearly report and the most recent is the 2023 EMCDDA report and.
At the time of the production of this thesis the 2024 EMCDDA is currently unavailable.
Nonetheless, I am going to use a mixed approach between quantitative and quality to
ensure that the data showed during my work have an actual meaning because they
represent criminal phenomena.
A further limitation is provided by the impact of the German model of cannabis
legalization. It is a very ambitious project that presents regulatory complexities, especially
in regards of the creation of a comprehensive regulatory framework for cannabis
cultivation, distribution and sale across federal states. Other important aspects that should
be carefully analysed are the enforcement of regulations such quality control and age
restrictions. The impact on the licit economy and on organized crime itself, the social
acceptance and the public health impact are aspects that are going to be analysed after
years from the entering into force of the legislation, this would be possible through impact
evaluation (Afsahi et al.).
6
substances
TOTAL
26033 2
746435 18
7085 5311
0140 92657
8
5
CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW
1. WHAT ARE THE MOST COMMON DRUGS IN EUROPE?
Globalization is an important facilitator of high drug availability in Europe: various
countries from South America, West and South Asia and North Africa are sources of most
drugs consumed in Europe while cannabis and synthetic drugs remain still produced in
Europe (EMCDDA, 2023).
Drug
Possession/use Supply
TOTAL Fi
Figure 1
Figure 2
Cannabis
566089 99547
665636
Heroin
23439 9882
33321
Cocaine
65856 30571
96427
Amphetamines
55830 8602
64432
MDMA
9188 4453
13641
Other
Drug
incidence
possession/us
e
incidence
supply
incidence of type of drug
detected on total drug
related offences
Cannabis
75,84%
55,26%
71,84%
Heroin
3,14%
5,49%
3,60%
Cocaine
8,82%
16,97%
10,41%
Amphetamines
7,48%
4,78%
6,95%
MDMA
1,23%
2,47%
1,47%
Other substances
3,49%
15,04%
5,73%
TOTAL
100%
100%
100,00%
(Figure 1,2) Tables created on Excel with EMCDDA 2023 data (EMCDDA 2023). The green table shows the amount
and the type of drug related offences for each type of drug.
As you can see in figure 1 and 2 (EMCDDA, 2023, in 2020, almost 1 million of drug
related offences were registered in the EU. Most drug related offences fall in the category
of possession/use of any sort of illicit drug. More precisely, 746435 offences about
possession/use versus “only” 180140, in percentage terms the incidence of possession/use
offences is 80.55% against 19.44%, which is the incidence of supply offences (in other
words production and trafficking) in relation to the total amount of drug related offences
(EMCDDA, 2023).
7
The orange table can display the incidence of the type of drug detected on the total amount
of drug related offences. Almost 72% of the total amount of offences are related to
cannabis (EMCDDA, 2023), this is a prove of the fact that cannabis is the most common
drug trafficked in EU but, at the same time, it also rise the important research question
that is going to be analysed in my work: is legalization the way forward to tackle drug
trafficking and reduce the impact of OCGs in the EU? To answer to this question, it is
important to analyse the most common drugs trafficked in Europe.
According to EMCDDA, 83.4 million people in the EU between are estimated to have
ever used an illicit drug at least once, this number corresponds to 29% of 15-64 years old
population in the EU (EMCDDA 2022). As will be analysed further in this work, the
European drug Market is constantly able of innovating itself by increasing the supply and
the potency or purity of the substance. One of the causes of this ability is globalization,
which is a driving force that can make drug trafficking a transnational issue. Secondly,
criminal diversification, which is the illicit equivalent of economic diversification, allows
OCG to maximize their profits by diversifying the type of criminal business that they are
involved in Many small criminal groups become firstly involved with drug trafficking
because it is a type of business that allow an easy and secure profit, then they begin to
being involved in other types of more violent crimes such robbery and extorsion because
violence became an integral part in the business of OCG (Garzon, 2008)
There are other crucial driving forces with a prominent role in favouring the creation and
the development of drug trafficking networks. Illicit drug markets are determined by
demand, supply, and price of the product; therefore, the size of a market can be reduced
by decreasing the demand for illicit drugs (Petcu, 2017). Indeed, as will be analysed
further in the last chapter, one of the goals of the EU is the reduction of the demand for
drugs along with the reduction of harm by its users.
The structure and the operational ability of illicit drug industry can be defined in terms of
the so-called narcotic international division of labour, NIDL (Wallerstein, 1984). There
are structural reasons, like geographical position and wealth, that explains why some
countries are drug industry’s primary producers; other countries find their dimension in
the role of transit centres while others have primarily a role of consumers (Bartilow and
8
Eom, 2009). Trade openness, which is an aspect of globalization, has a different impact
on each category. In drug-producing countries it enhances state’s interdiction capabilities
while in drug-consuming countries it weakens state’s interdiction capabilities. In drug-
transit countries instead, it has a limited effect (Bartilow and Eom, 2009). The actual
analysis of the criminal actors involved, and the drug trafficking routes will be completed
in chapter 2, respectively in section and b.
It must be admitted that the traditional approach towards drug trafficking, the so-called
war on drugs, have failed for several reasons. The strategy of “decapitating” the head of
drug cartels had a limited affect in the outflow of cocaine from Centre and South-
America. Attacking the supply of drugs causes an increase in the gross and retail price,
the consequence of this is that the drug market become then more attractive, and more
actors will be willing to enter in this market (Williams, 1998). This is a demonstration of
the organizational superiority of drug-trafficking networks if compared to law
enforcement organizations, this superiority relies in the flexible network that they have
created.
A network differs from a hierarchical structure: they are a series of connected nodes which
form a structure that can be large or small, global, or local, unidirectional or
multidirectional (Williams, 1998). Drug-trafficking networks have a core and a periphery,
the core is characterized by dense connections based on trust and cohesion while the
periphery is characterized by weak relationships that allow the network to operate with
greater impact (Granovetter, 1973). Criminal networks seem to fit perfectly in a
globalized world, their structure allows them to flow through legal or geographical
boundaries. They are also able to cross from the illicit to the licit sector without many
difficulties due to actors in legal sectors that can help them to invest their money, this
phenomenon is known as money laundering (Williams 1998).
9
a) Cannabis: Herbal and Resin
Taking into consideration the population
between 15-64 years old. In 2022, 22
million people (7.7% of the population)
have used cannabis or its derivatives
(EMCDDA 2022, figure 3). Over the last
decade prices in EU have remained stable
both at retail and wholesale level: resin is
between 6 and 10 EUR/g at retail while
herbal cannabis is between 9 and 12
EUR/g; at wholesale level resin is
between 3100 and 4000 EUR/kg while
herbal is between 2200 and 4900 EUR/kg
(figure 5,6, EMCDDA, 2023).
Figure 3
As already stated above, with a population
of consumers of 22.6 million aged 15 to 64,
cannabis is the most consumed drug in
Europe. According to the data, 3.7 million
people are daily consumers, and this group
is the most likely to have problems related
to this type of drug (EMCDDA 2022).
2021 was a record year for the quantities
of herbal and resin cannabis seized: figure
4 and 7 (figure 4,7, EMCDDA, 2023)
shows respectively that there were
202000 resin seizures, which accounted
for a total of 816 tonnes seized, and
240000 herbal cannabis seizure, which
accounted for 256 tonnes seized.
Figure 5
Figure 4
10
Figure 6 Figure 7
The data from Figure 8 (figure 8,
EMCDDA, 2023b) shows the quantity of
herbal cannabis seized inside the EU in
2021:
Spain reported 130 tonnes seized,
51% of the total amount seized.
Italy reported 47 tonnes.
France reported 39.5 tonnes.
Figure 8
From the 2021 data coming from figure 9 (EMCDDA, 2023b) it is clearly observable
that, in the case of resin:
1. Spain reported 672.5 tonnes seized, 82% of the total amount of seizures in 2021.
2. France reported 72.5 tonnes seized.
3. Türkiye reported 33 tonnes seized.
4. Italy reported 20 tonnes seized.
The small number of countries which account for a large portion is evidence of the fact
that Spain, France, Turkey, and Italy are in strategic locations on major cannabis routes.
These countries are also the ones that have the largest share of cannabis consumers at EU
level. Their large market caused by a greater amount of cannabis consumers is a plausible
explanation of the large amounts of seizures accomplished (figure 8,9 EMCDDA, 2023b).
11
Figure 9
Each year, EU illicit market for herbal
cannabis generates around €12 billion in
revenues (EMCDDA, 2022). Most of the
herbal cannabis consumed in EU have been
produced inside EU borders, the Western
Balkan region remain a significant source of
herbal cannabis. Before 2018, Albania was
considered the main source for “EU-made
“herbal cannabis (figure 9, EMCDDA and
Europol, 2019). This evidence arises also from the fact that neighbouring countries of
Albania reported a decrease in the seizure of Albanian-origin cannabis (UNODC, 2020).
Furthermore, many criminal networks in Western Balkan are often associated with the
wholesale trafficking of cocaine to Europe (EMCDDA, 2022d; Europol, 2021b).
Following the reports about drug trafficking in the Balkans, herbal cannabis is mainly
transported by land, but it is also transported towards Italy, Greece, and Türkiye by sea,
see figure 10 (figure 10, EMCDDA 2023).
Since the 1990s there was a dramatic transformation in the European Cannabis Supply
(Weinberger et al., 2019). The economist Adrian Jansen defined back in the 2000s, the
upcoming “green avalanche”, a.k.a. the increase in domestic cannabis supply and the
increase in THC content. The first countries affected by this new trend are Netherlands
and the UK. After the first responses coming from law enforcement, cannabis production
resettled to Northern France and the Flemish Region of Belgium, were in 2016 an amount
of 416000 plants were seized (EMCDDA, 2019).
One theory regarding the origins of EU-
made cannabis explains that Dutch OCGs
promoted their expertise with the aim of
drawing interest from local farmers
located in Czech Republic, Spain, and
Morocco (Chouvy and Macfarlane,
2018). Diversifying the location of
production can guarantee a major safety
against law enforcement’s efforts. On the
Figure 10
12
contrary, concentrating the production in a single region can make the illicit production
of cannabis easily detectable. This is the criminal rationale behind the theory of foreign
resettlement and counselling. This strategy has been facilitated by the selling of materials
and goods necessary or the cultivation operated and the spread of grow shops in most
European Countries. In 2016, Dutch online grow shops became the main source of
cannabis seeds, 36,2 % of the total (Boulat et. al, 2016).
Today there is an ongoing policy debate in the EU around the cannabis market. The policy
options range from cannabis regulation to cannabis control. In the absence of evidence of
the consequences of these approaches it is important to increase investments in
monitoring and evaluating the impact on health and public safety. Nonetheless, the
situation from a policy point of view will be analysed in depth in chapter 3.
b) Cocaine: powder and “crack”
Cocaine is the most used stimulant drug in
Europe. According to data, 14 million adults
aged between 15 and 64 years old have tried
cocaine during their entire lives. While it is
estimated that 2.3 million of young people
(15-34 years old) used cocaine in the last year
(figure 11, EMCDDA, 2022).
It is produced from the coca plant, which is a
plant that grows in South America. Enormous
quantities of cocaine reach Europe’s seaports
through commercial shipping containers,
according to the data 303 tonnes of cocaine was seized by EU member through 68000
seizures operations (EMCDDA, 2023). In economic terms, the value of the second most
popular drug in the EU, indeed cocaine, is estimated to be worth EUR 11.6 billion
(EMCDDA, 2023).
Figure 11
13
In terms of number of users, the EU accounts
for roughly 21% of the estimated global
users (UNODC, 2022). 2016 and 2017 are
both considered crucial years for the
expansion of the cocaine market in Europe,
indicators at supply and retail level suggest
that the supply channels which enabled this
market expansion to have developed around
2012 (Figure 12, EMCDDA, 2022). This
expansion was guaranteed by the diversified
criminal network of OCG in Europe, which
can guarantee a constant flow of cocaine from the regions of production to the retailers.
Another evidence which instead arises
from figure 13(figure 13, UNODC,
2022) is that covid caused an arrest in
the growth of quantity of cocaine seized.
The cause of this, as highlighted by the
EMCDDA report on the effect of Covid-
19 on drug trafficking in the EU, suggest
that the quantity of seizures decreased
for multiple reasons. First, the pandemic
contributed to a major development in
the use of darknet markets and surface
web, this guaranteed less face-to-face dealing, so it was more difficult for the police to be
able to track possible trafficking of cocaine since much of the criminal interaction was
occurring in the on-line realm. Secondly, cocaine is a drug often used in clubs and festival,
the social restrictions caused by the pandemic closed the music venues so there was also
a reduction in the trafficking because of this fact. Thirdly, the increasing use of
cryptocurrencies and the less reliance on physical cash guaranteed a safe mean of payment
which is less detectable by common police operation (EMCDDA, 2020). It is important
to remember that Europe is not always the final destination of cocaine shipments coming
from South America. Over the years Europe became a crucial trans-shipment point for
Figure 12
Figure 13
14
cocaine towards the Middle East and Asia (Al Jazeera, 2022). The routes of cocaine
trafficking will be analysed in depth in chapter 3.
c) Heroin and opioids
Heroin remains a critical concern inside the European Union (EU), affecting open
wellbeing, social welfare, and law authorization endeavours over the locale. The
circumstance encompassing heroin within the EU is multifaceted, affected by different
components counting supply courses, utilization designs, and arrangement reactions.
Heroin consumption still accounts for a large share of drug-related health and social costs
in Europe (EMCDDA, 2015). For example, forty experts from across the EU recently
judged heroin to be the most harmful illicit psychoactive substance in Europe, as well as
the second most harmful overall with respect to sixteen harm criteria (van Amsterdam,
Nutt, Phillips, & van den Brink, 2015). Agreeing to the EMCDDA, heroin remains one
of the foremost commonly utilized opioids in Europe, with an assessed 1 million high-
risk opioid clients within the EU and Norway in 2021 and according to the data the
European market itself is able to generate EUR 5.2 billion euros every year. (EMCDDA,
2021). The dramatic data coming from EMCDDA report 2022, shows that 74% of fatal
overdoses is to e attributed to heroin and other opioids. The Data here below illustrates
the data about heroin consumption (figure 14, EMCDDA 2023)
Figure 14
The accessibility of heroin inside the EU is impacted by the elements of worldwide
medicate markets, geopolitical variables, and law authorization endeavours to disturb
trafficking systems. According to the study on the determinants of heroin flows in Europe
(Berlusconi, Anzani et al., 2017), the geographical and social proximity are two factors
that increase the likelihood of observing heroin exchanges between countries. Another
important contribution is given by the levels of corruption since the latter is often linked
with the presence of illicit traffics. Three years before this publication, in 2014, Peter
15
Reuter was able of creating three models
that try to explain how smugglers choose
drug routes for heroin. The first model is
based on the costs imposed by law
enforcement, indeed loss of shipments
and confiscation, which are the main
costs for drug traffickers (Reuter, 2014).
The second model is based on
geographical proximity, as travelling long
distances increases transportation costs as
well as the risk of interception. This is
explained by taking into consideration the fact that Mexico is the main point for heroin
into the US, while the Balkan countries are the main point for heroin into Europe (Reuter,
Figure 15
2014). The third model is based on the social ties between two countries, a major
contribution is given by migration patterns, with regards to the drug trade in Western
Europe, it has been discovered that Turkish and Albanian OCGs have control of the
import and retail distribution of heroin (Paoli and Reuter, 2014). This is confirmed by the
data coming from the EMCDDA 2023 report, which confirms that 22.202 tonnes of heroin
were seized in Turkey while 1.554 in Belgium in 2021. The comparison with 2020 is clear,
the pandemic temporary reduced the quantity of heroin seized, even though a higher
quantity of heroin was seized in 2021 compared to 2019 (Figure 15, EMCDDA 2023). It
is also important to mention a 40% reduction in the number of seizures between 2011 and
2021 due to a change in the strategy of law enforcement. Another important element to
consider is that law enforcement priorities shifted from retail-level interceptions to
wholesale level interceptions, the rationales behind it are two:
1. Retail-level seizures are easier to execute but they have a higher cost compared to
the actual quantity and retail price of the heroin seized (approximately between
25 and 45 EUR/g. EMCDDA, 2023)
2. Wholesale-level seizures can reduce the quantity of heroin sold in the streets.
Interceptions and seizures are completed in areas, cities and ports that are crucial
for the heroin route, which will be analysed in the next chapter. Nonetheless, the
price for heroin at wholesale level in the EU is estimated to be between 20000 and
16
Figure 16
31000 EUR/kg (figure 16.
EMCDDA,2023). In addition,
the utilization designs and
socioeconomics of heroin
clients in the EU are
advancing, posturing extra
challenges for open wellbeing
intercessions. Whereas heroin
utilizes verifiably influenced
more seasoned, marginalized
population, there's prove of a move towards more youthful clients and different
modes of utilization, such as infusing and non-injecting shapes (EMCDDA,
2021).
Endeavours to combat heroin trafficking and utilize within the EU are multi-dimensional,
including facilitated activity at the national, territorial, and worldwide levels. This
incorporates activities centred on supply diminishment, such as law requirement
operations focusing on trafficking systems, as well as demand lessening efforts pointed
at anticipation, treatment, and hurt lessening administrations (European Commission,
2020). Be that as it may, tending to the root causes of heroin utilize and trafficking
requires an all-encompassing approach that addresses financial disparities,
marginalization, and get to healthcare and back administrations. In conclusion, heroin
proceeds to posture critical challenges for the EU, influencing people, communities, and
society. The economic burden of heroin use on EU countries includes costs associated
with healthcare, law enforcement and social services. Furthermore, the indirect costs
associated with this drug are loss of productivity and the economic impact related to
heroin addiction.
Nonetheless, it should be taken under the lenses of analysis that almost all heroin
consumed in Europe comes from Afghanistan. UNODC data for 2023 show a 95% decline
in opium production (UNODC, 2023). At present the effects of this ban are not visible
yet and the EMCDDA estimated at the beginning of 2024 that a sustained ban on opium
production could have a dramatic impact on heroin trafficking by provoking a heroin
shortage in the EU (EMCDDA, 2024).
17
Understanding the complex dynamics of heroin utilize and trafficking is crucial for
creating viable approaches and intercessions to decrease hurt and move forward open
wellbeing results. By drawing upon solid sources and evidence-based approaches,
policymakers, specialists, and partners can work towards a more secure and more
advantageous future for all citizens of the European Union.
Figure 18
Here below, the illustration shows the global picture of the main routes used to smuggle
heroin into Europe (Figure 18, UNODC, 2015)
Balkan route: heroin gets to Europe through four main routes. Most of the heroin
produced in the world come from the so-called Golden Crescent, a region
stretched between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran full of opium poppy crops, then
the heroin arrives in Europe via what is known as the Balkan route. The main hub
used to arrange heroin transports is in Istanbul due to the presence of Turkish
facilitators (EMCDDA, 2015). From Turkey there are different possibilities:
The southern branch (Greece, Albania, and Italy) using ferries.
The northern branch running through Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland
using overland transportation.
The northern branch running from Bulgaria and Romania to central and
western Europe mainly overland.
18
Furthermore, the existence of a “reverse Balkan route” has been detected. Chemical
compounds necessary for heroin production are traded on this route in exchange for
heroin (EMDDA, 2015; Europol,2015).
The Southern route: in
recent years there have been
large heroin shipments from
ports located in Iran and
Pakistan, this phenomenon
has attracted international
attention (figure 19, UNODC
2022). Europe is not the main
recipient of these shipments
Figure 19
because this route has been widely used to traffic heroin to Africa. Seizure data
(EMCDDA 2015; Europol, 2015) shows that the weight of each individual heroin
shipment is between 20 kg and 500 kg. Furthermore, the same route is used to
smuggle cannabis resin and methamphetamine for non-European destinations but
mainly big cities in the Arabian Peninsula and Africa, this is evidence of the
existence of a growing drug market even outside Europe (UNODC, 2014a).
The Northern route:
the heroin exits northern
border of Afghanistan,
and the main final
destinations are large
consumer markets in
Central Asia, Russia,
Ukraine, Belarus and
Central Europe through
Poland and Baltic countries (UNODC,2014a). Northern Afghanistan is
dramatically registering an increasing amount of opium poppy crops, they
increase from 14,200 ha in 2016 to 51,300 in 2017 (figure 20, UNODC, 2017).
Figure 20
19
Figure 21
d) MDMA
3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine,
commonly known with the street name
of ecstasy is a potent stimulant with
psychedelic properties.
MDMA is a synthetic drug chemically
related to the amphetamines, but it
differs from the latter because of its
effect. It is the third-most common drug
trafficked and, in the EU, 2.6 million
people consume MDMA every year (EMCDDA, 2023). In Europe this drug is widely
associated nightlife and entertainment, evidence of this arise from the strong temporary
decline registered during the Covid-19 lockdown (EMCDDA, 2021; 2022; 2023).
A substantial difference with the other
drugs from trafficking and production
perspective is that is a “made in EU” illicit
drug. It is mainly produced in the
Netherlands and Belgium, evidence from
this arise from the EMCDDA 2023 graphs
showing the prevalence of MDMA among
young adults (15-34 years old) and
MDMA residues detected in wastewater
(figure 21,22. EMCDDA 2023). Coming
back at wastewater analysis, this system of
analysis tells us something more about the production of MDMA inside the EU. Some
cities in the Netherlands reported abnormally high values for MDMA in the wastewater.
Figure 22
20
Figure 23
This can be explained by the attempts or directly releasing MDMA into the sewer system
to avoid law enforcement controls (EMCDDA, 2015b). MDMA was synthetized for the
first time in 1960 the psycho-pharmacologist Alexander Schulgin began to explore the
medical use of the drug only in 1970s. Its recreational use began in the 1980s-1990s due
to the development and popularity of the techno-rave scene (EMCDDA, 2016). If LSD
and mushrooms were the predominant drugs in the 1967 Summer of Love, this second
summer of love was predominantly characterized by the use of MDMA and ecstasy tablets
(Collin, 2010). Major evidence of the correlation between the club scene and the use of
MDMA comes from EMCDDA survey analysing MDMA use among young adults from
general population surveys and global drug survey, clubbers, and non-clubbers (figure 23.
EMCDDA, 2015). A major concern for public safety derives from the fact that ecstasy
pills are less pure than MDMA. A lower purity does not mean that it is less dangerous, on
the contrary there is a higher chance of contamination from other additives and drugs used
to cut the pill. Such substances are ketamine, caffeine amphetamines, PCP, 2-CB and
more lately, fentanyl. Nonetheless, a 300 mg of pure MDMA can be lethal (Behrman,
2008). Tablets became also strong in the last few years. The resurgence of the drug began
in 2010, probably thanks to the development of alternative and synthetic pre-precursors
that proved to be more available and reliable than safrole or PMK. The main two pre-
precursors used (EMCDDA, 2016). Other factors that may be influential in this
resurgence are the decentralisation and the increase in sophistication of production
processes and supply. The darknet began to have a role years before Covid 19 pandemic
but the restrictions adopted as measures of protection of public health forced OCGs to
adapt their criminal business to a market with new exogenous conditions.
21
CHAPTER 3: case study
a) OCGs involved in drug trafficking in the EU.
The EU is not only the home of traditional organized crime. Italian mafia indeed. Many
gangs, cartels and more in general criminal groups began to perceive Europe as a gold
mine for illicit traffics and even money laundering (Allum and Sands, 2004). It must be
added that the crime landscape in Europe has two peculiar characteristics. First, illegal
markets are not evenly distributed neither across the continent nor across individual
countries and, secondly, certain criminal activities link countries and entire regions within
Europe and with other parts of the world, this is indeed part of the nature of transnational
crime (von Lampe, 2008; Bartilow and Eom, 2009; Wallerstein, 1984).
Again, about the structure, Von Lampe argued about the existence of five models of
organized crime that can be distinguished (von Lampe, 2004). The first type is
characterized by criminal networks with no social support structure within their country
of operation, like burglary gangs in Eastern Europe. The lack of social support makes
these organizations predatory in their nature and military-like in their structure (Weenink
et al., 2004). The second type refers to crime networks that are rooted in marginalised
subcultures. In this case there is the presence of a social support structure which
guarantees advantages in terms of infrastructure and isolation as a shield from detection.
An example that will be further analysed in this chapter is the Turkish Organized Crime
and its drug smuggling business. For example, smuggling, storage, and distribution of
heroin are typically organized through familial ties (Pearson and Hobbs, 2001). The third
type includes networks that are rooted in mainstream society, they are typically involved
in organized business crimes like for example fraud and their advantage comes from the
fact that they have natural interaction with office holders, and this reduces the risk of law
enforcement interference (Van Duyne, 1997). The fourth type is characterized by criminal
networks consisting of members of the power elites, the actors involved have direct access
to socially relevant decision-making processes (von Lampe, 2004). The fifth is the type
that will be taken into consideration in my analysis. OCGs falling into this category are
mafia-like organizations and it is essential for them to establish an alliance between the
political elites and the criminal underworld.
22
i. ‘Ndrangheta and the cocaine drug flows from Southern America
The historical origins of the ‘Ndrangheta are to be found at the beginning of 19th century.
It is composed of several different families called ‘ndrine, many ‘ndrine together form a
locale, which controls a specific territory (Calderoni, 2012). The strength of these
subgroups is enhanced through the presence of specific rituals and affiliation ceremonies,
this can guarantee exceptional solidity compared to the Sicilian Mafia or the Neapolitan
Camorra, which are often engaged in internal power conflicts.
Without diving deeper into the structure and the history of ‘Ndrangheta, I would like to
explain its role in the trafficking of cocaine. First, ‘Ndrangheta as a privileged and
cooperative relationship with Southern American cocaine suppliers (Paoli, 1994), several
official reports indicated the ‘Ndrangheta as a bridge for cocaine flows towards Europe
but at the same time other reports have disregarded this theory since many scholars
described drug markets as examples of disorganized crime rather than organized (Eck and
Gersh, 2000). This does not absolutely mean that ‘Ndrangheta does not have any role in
the cocaine trafficking but, on the contrary, it takes part to small, flexible, and mutable
networks with a limited number of criminal entrepreneurs (Reuter and Haaga, 1989).
A very common stereotype is that mafia or mafia-like businesses are often characterized
by a certain degree of violence, but it is not always the case. The capacity to use violence
and terror is an important asset for drug trafficking group but the actual use of violence
can cause problems to the ordinary business activity because it increases the risk of
deception (Calderoni, 2012). Furthermore, violence in illicit markets is often a sign of
growing competition, this can also explain why most drug-related violence episodes are
reported in cocaine and cannabis markets (Europol, 2021). Goin back to the network
structure of ‘Ndrangheta, several studies made with the use of SNA (social network
analysis) and with content analysis of judicial sources highlighted again flexible and
mutable groups with low level of organization. This type of decentralized organizational
approach guarantees resilience to law enforcement disruption (Bouchard, 2007)
Two big police operations, named respectively Chalonero and Stupor Mundi conducted
by the Italian police between 2002 and 2007 confirmed the existence of a cocaine route
between South America and Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands. Although the two networks
were distinct, their operational structures were similar and comparable. What has been
23
discovered by the study made by Calderoni is that in the criminal communications there
were never references to formal ranks and positions of the ‘Ndrangheta. Furthermore, the
removal of central nodes of the two networks would have caused only temporary
disruption because the so-called central nodes rarely match with the actual leaders, the
central nodes of ‘Ndrangheta networks are likely to be identified with actual narco-
brokers that manage the later stages of cocaine supply chain (Calderoni, 2012). What
emerges is the lack of hierarchy, which however does not deny the existence of
coordination. Only the ‘ndrine are organized in a hierarchical way but what was
discovered in the trial documents of Rinascita-Scott in 2021 ( a maxi-trial where 4000
individuals were arrested by the District Antimafia Directorate, DDA) is that the different
‘ndrine and province are strictly aligned to ‘Ndrangheta rules and rituals and that the two
main sources of revenues remain international drug trafficking and local extorsion (Sergi
and Lavorgna, 2018; 2023). To resume, the ‘Ndrangheta is a fragmented archipelagos of
clans that has a complex criminal network which is able of connecting a broad range of
sectors, regardless of their belongingness to the criminal underworld or the business and
financial upperworld. It is able of infiltrating everywhere due to the structural fluidity and
mutability of its criminal networks. Without considering other source of profit,
‘Ndrangheta is earning $70 billions.
‘Ndrangheta never needed to have affiliated members in South America to have narco-
brokers. The story of Roberto Pannunzi is a great example of this. He has always orbited
around “foreign branches” of Cosa Nostra clans since he was young, his criminal
experience made him one of the most reliable independent narco-brokers. During the peak
of his criminal career, he was able of moving two tonnes of cocaine per month, its ability
derives from the fact that he was able of accumulating money even if he was working for
rival clans and criminal groups (Gratteri on Corriere, 2013). Then one question about
‘Ndrangheta remains, how can their network with southern-American cartels be
explained? The factors that contributed to a change in the cocaine market are multiple:
Increased law enforcement pressure in the US because of the “war on drugs”
strategy: this made more difficult and riskier for traffickers to operate in the
American market. As a response to these pressures traffickers had to find an
alternative and profitable market for cocaine (Sergi, 2023).
24
Europe’s strategic geographic location: the presence of major ports in multiple
and spread locations contributed to an easier potential accessibility. This
infrastructural characteristic, combined with poor law enforcement coordination
in Europe during the 1980s and 1990s, made Europe the best market to flood with
an increasing amount of cocaine every year (Sergi, 2023)
Increased Disposable income and glamorization of cocaine: people became able
to afford recreational drugs, this improvement of economic condition became
crucial when combined with the normalization of cocaine within the entertainment
sectors. Furthermore, cocaine
has always been presented as a
party drug with fewer immediate
health risks.
Factor of higher profitability:
even if data on seizures and
consumption suggests that the
US market is slightly larger than
European one, but the latter is,
pre profitable. According to UNODC, the wholesale price of cocaine in Europe in
2017 was $41 731 per kilogram, compared to $US 28 000 in the US (UNODC,
2018)
Supply dynamics: ‘Ndrangheta became able of creating a criminal network to
exercise control over several main seaports in Europe like Antwerp, Rotterdam,
and Gioia Tauro. Such control, combined with the extensive use of corruption,
made the shipment and the entrance of large quantities of cocaine possible (figure
24, GI-TOC 2021).
The anti-mafia special commission of the Italian parliament discovered through a 2008
investigation that ‘Ndrangheta was in control of 80% of the cocaine shipments to Europe,
this alarming data has been confirmed four years later by the European Commission
(Forgione, 2008; European Commission, 2012). After the decline in the number of legal
(and illegal) shipments in Gioia Tauro, the ‘Ndrangheta decided to partner with other
smaller OCGs like Dutch and Belgian Criminal Organization to control. This became
Figure 24
25
possible with the presence of ‘Ndrangheta in Belgium with the Aquino’s family (Sorgi,
2023).
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, there emerged a pivotal nexus between the
'Ndrangheta, recognized as Italy's predominant mafia organization, and Colombian
paramilitaries (figure 25, GI-TOC 2021), a connection that has persisted to the present
day. At the forefront of this partnership there was Salvatore Mancuso, who assumed
leadership within the United
Self-Defence Forces of
Colombia (Autodefensas
Unidas de Colombia –
AUC), exerting control over
extensive territories engaged
in coca cultivation across
Colombia. The AUC found
itself in need of reliable
buyers for their cocaine
output and strategic partners
to legitimize and manage their increasing financial assets (Sergi, 2023). Figure 25
In 2005 Mancuso became one of the first AUC leaders to turn himself in. This was a
consequence of the peace agreements between paramilitary forces and the central
government. However, the connection between ‘Ndrangheta and paramilitary forces
continued after the demobilization of the AUC. What emerges, according to Professor
Anna Sergi, is that there is no such thing as a singular mind of the ‘Ndrangheta, this can
guarantee the aforementioned continuity of criminal businesses (Sergi, 2023).
Organizational decentralization guarantees a high degree of adaptability in case of arrest
or death of the leadership, outsiders can only contact one person from the ‘Ndrangheta
network to close the drug deal, this strategy is used to avoid unnecessary exposition. The
‘Ndrangheta criminal structure and network is one of the most complexes among many
other OCGs, but it is one of the most efficient, this is highlighted from the fact that the
number of ‘Ndrangheta clans active in the transnational cocaine trade increased from 10
in the 1990s to between 35 and 50 clans in the 2000s (figure 26, Den Held, 2022). This
growth is what is behind the ‘Ndrnagheta’s oligopoly in the cocaine market, such
26
oligopoly is currently facing growing competition from other European criminal
organizations. Albanian OCGs, for example, learned how to conduct businesses from the
‘Ndrangheta model and they are currently entering in the market through the presence of
independent brokers (Mistler Ferguson 2022).
The model on the right (figure
26, UNODC-SIMCI, 2022)
explains the evolution in the
dynamics of criminal actors
responsible for cocaine
production in South America.
After the demobilization of
FARC and AUC, new
guerrilleros emerges because of
the discontent inside paramilitary groups for the peace agreements with the Colombian
government. The Ejército de Liberaciòn Nacional (ELN) increased its military power and
was able to restore cocaine production in the areas left by the FARC after the
demobilization process (UNODC-SIMCI, 2021).
According to sources, since 2010 Mexican OCGs sent their emisarios (representatives)
to Colombia not only to oversee coca paste and cocaine production, but also to oversee
shipments of cocaine in Cartagena’s port. The presence of Mexican cartels in Colombia
has a precise target, improving the efficiency of the different stages of the supply chain
to increase the volumes of cocaine not only to Europe, but also towards the Caribbean
Region and North America (UNODC-SIMCI, 2021).
Another emerging cocaine route
towards Europe is the so-called
African route (figure 28, GI-
TOC 2021), which is connected
to South America through the
Brazil-West Africa cocaine
trade. The Primeiro Comando da
Capital was founded as a
Figure 26
Figure 28
27
reaction to police violence against Brazilian prisoners, this criminal organization became
able of gaining importance in the southern American criminal environment. Even though
it is not one of the main OCGs in the area PCC manage to seize control in the port of
Santos in 2014, offering an alternative route for shipments towards Africa and Europe in
case of increasing in controls and interceptions on the main routes (UNODC, 2019).
According to sources, ‘Ndrangheta is cooperating with the PCC by providing expertise
and networks necessary to traffic cocaine from Santos to main ports in West Africa
(Feltran et al., 2023). Most of the cocaine trafficked from Santos to West Africa is
concealed inside containers of legal goods, an alternative option is called hoisting, and it
consists of small boats approaching the “mother ship” to unload the drug before the ship
reaches destination, this strategy is used to avoid interception (Africa Intelligence, 2021).
A response from law enforcement to the emerging African cocaine route arrived in 2022,
when the Brazilian Customs Office required inspection towards all cargo leaving report,
regardless of destination (Brazilian Customs Office, 2019;2022)
ii. Neapolitan Camorra and its close connection with the territory
Neapolitan camorra history began during the first twenty years of the 19th century.
According to historians with expertise of the development of Southern Italy, Camorra is
a product of the absence of local administration and progressive distancing of central
institutions. Other scholars consider the violence caused by poverty as a crucial factor in
the development of this criminal organization (Cesoni, 1991). For the reason mentioned
above, Camorra flourished fast into the working-class neighbourhoods because this
organization was proposing to present themselves as the representatives of the popular
classes. By getting the support from the popular class Camorra achieved several scopes
(Ceci, 2018):
Control of the territory: it is one of the main conservative functions of
OCGs. Where the state cannot come, mafia arrives. Mafia began to pursue
their interests in agriculture, then they adapted to the industrial
development as soon as the economic opportunities began to grow.
Monopoly of violence and offensive capability: this strategy is often used
to solve internal disputes or affirm a power that it has already been
established through the creation of fear.
28
Propensity for mediation: Camorra can use its position of territorial
superiority and control to get a larger size of the pie with corrupted
authorities. Negotiation is often required to adapt and guarantee the
conservation of criminal activities.
The wish for expanding in order to search for “dirty” ways of doing business began in the
1970s when Raffaele Cutolo, one of the most controversial bosses of the history of Italian
organized crime, decided to create its own clan named NCO(Nuova Camorra
Organizzata) in order to impose its hegemony over the rival families who decided to
create a criminal alliance called Nuova Famiglia (NF) (Ceci, 2018). The idea of Cutolo
was even quite ideological, he thought that the Camorra should have been reformed to
make it more like secret-societies-inspired criminal organizations like the Sicilian Cosa
Nostra and the Calabrian ‘‘Ndrangheta. The structure of the NCO was the following: a
solid hierarchical division with a vertical structure, with Raffaele Cutolo at its peak and
the different bosses subjected to his will (Cautiero, 2023)
An economic explanation behind Raffaele’s Cutolo decision is that his list for power
coincides with the development of the cocaine market in Italy and more in general in the
Mediterranean area. In 1970s Camorra was in control of the port of Naples and it had a
main role in smuggling of cigarettes from the US thanks to the Italian American clans.
The criminal evolution of Camorra continued in 1971 when Cosa Nostra and the
Marseilles were at war with each other. Camorra families were allies of both and they
decided to increase their influence and power in illicit activities such as contraband and
drug smuggling. The criminal partnership between the two organizations came to an end
in 1979, when Cosa Nostra allowed the Camorra to have their own narcotraffic business.
The war between the NCO and NF ended in 1983, after the death of 1500 people
(Barbagallo, 2010). Despite Cutolo’s imprisonment between 1963 and 2021, the year of
his death, he became able of building of building an empire behind bars. His unlimited
power pushed the Italian State to adopt the Rognoni- La Torre Law (Art.416 bis of the
Italian criminal code), which not only recognized the existence of Camorra and Cosa
Nostra but introduced the mafia-type association offence and the consequent seizure of
asset (Ministero della Giustizia, 1930). Italian author and expert about Camorra, Roberto
Saviano, and other important anti-mafia activists began to describe Camorra as “the
29
system” (Saviano, 2006). “The system” is characterized by a blurred line of demarcation
between the criminal world and civil society, the foundation of the system is a dynamic
network of collusive relationships which allows Camorra to penetrate civil society in
order to pursue their criminal interests (Roberti, 2009). Cutolo’s attempt at the end was
not only an attempt of imposing his cult of personality inside the organization but it was
also the first attempt of unifying the camorra fabric into a federation-type model (Di Fiore,
2006).
According to Europol and according to the U.S strategy to combat transnational organized
crime made by US Department of Justice and Home Affairs, Camorra is one of the four
most threatening OCGs (Europol, 2013, Department of Justice, and Home Affairs, 2011).
As well as in Italy, the Camorra is very active in South America, the US, Spain, France,
the Netherlands, and Germany. Camorra’s clans have repeatedly tried to put their hands
on the drug supply flowing through Southern Europe thanks to the good relationships that
many clans have with OCGs coming from Albania, Morocco, Tunisia, and Spain
(Direzione Nazionale Antimafia e Terrorismo, 2012). Camorra is also extremely active in
reinvesting part of their capital into the legal economy. There are multiple reasons behind
this modus operandi (Veltri, Laudati, 2019; Fantò, 1999):
Money-laundering: investing dirty money into the legal economy can generate a
flow of clean money for the clans (Europol, 2013). Measures aimed at preventing
money-loundering are necessary to avoid facilitating this phenomenon. Moreover,
the presence of assets of a licit company like logistics can be used to carry out
illicit activities like drug trafficking, even without the licit companies being aware
of it.
Profit: profits generated by investments are needed to deal with the costs bore by
Camorra’s families like wages, weapons, logistic costs. Furthermore, factors like
irregular job conditions, fiscal evasion, and corruptions between the public and
the private sector allow Camorra to operate in the grey area. Relations with the
grey area are necessary to extend control on the territory (UNICRI, 2016).
Social approval and control of territory. This feature lies in one of the main axioms
about organized crime, when the state cannot come, the mafia arrives. People have
30
often supported the philanthropic activity of the clans due to the lack of presence
by the State.
There have been several studies about the ideal type of enterprise that is mostly like to be
a target of Camorra’s infiltration to conduct either trafficking of drugs or other illicit
traffics, or activities connected with money-laundering (Lavezzi, 2013). The ideal
enterprise would be small and belonging to a traditional sector with a lower level of
regulation (i.e. the agricultural sector). The Camorra also makes its moves based on the
following assumption: the greater is the presence of the state, the greater is the potential
for corruption in the public sector (Del Monte; Papagni, 2004). This type of assumption
may appear in contrast with the one made by Ceci, the fact is that Camorra needs a certain
degree of absence and at the same time presence of the State to move in the right direction
for conducting its criminal businesses.
Evidence from the involvement of Camorra into the drug trafficking arise from the rising
number of arrests and seizures operated by law enforcement at national and European
level. In April 2024 Bosnian police arrested 22 people, included high-ranking police
officers. Suspected of being linked to the drug cartel led by Edin Gačanin and Raffaele
Imperiale, a notorious figure of the Camorra specialized in smuggling cocaine from
Southern America to Europe (Ljubas; OCCP, 2024). Camorra is a type of OCG whit a
deep relation with the territory that they control, such control is often enforced with the
use of violence and intimidation, evidence of arise from the first and second feuds of
Scampia and Secondigliano in the first 15 years of the 21st century. ‘‘Ndrangheta families
and members have often a delegation in many areas of the world while the Camorra tends
to be present at local level by providing logistics and corruption networks (UNICRI, 2016)
31
iii. OCGs in the Balkans and Eastern Europe
Figure 29
Camorra, during the 1980s, years of its first appearance in the drug market, decided to do
business with Western Balkan OCGs from Montenegro, Albania, and Serbia. This
criminal relationship has been catalysed by the massive waves of refugees who arrived in
Italy because of the Yugoslav War. As already explained at the beginning of this chapter,
through the lens of analysis of Paoli and Reuter, one of the models that can partially
explain the formation of drug routes in peculiar regions show that migration patterns are
positively correlated with drug trafficking. This does not imply that migrants and refugees
are to blame for this but, on the contrary, it is evidence of the fact that OCGs foster and
exploit humanitarian crisis for their criminal purposes (Kemp; GI-TOC, 2020). However,
the Western Balkans diaspora has been a clear opportunity for building criminal networks
in western Europe. In the 2000s Albanians efficiently took control of London’s cocaine
market, by 2015 they clearly became major players not only in the capital but also in other
communities around the country (Townsend, 2019).
It is not the first time that displacement and diaspora are connected to drug trafficking or
any other criminal activity from OCGs. An example from the past is the Italian diaspora
in the US, the Netherlands and Germany. If there is a given proportion of a population
consisting of criminals then, the greater the migration of individuals from that population,
32
the larger the number of criminals that will reach a new territory (Varese, 2011). The
failure in governance as a consequence of the serious situations that Western Balkans
went through can be seen especially in the field of security. Countries of this region often
lacked adequate capacities to fight organized crime. The Balkan route is one of the East-
to-West drug trafficking routes, various types of drugs are smuggled through this route
such as heroin, cocaine, and cannabis. Again, there is a positive correlation between drug
trafficking and human trafficking due to the existence of important migration routes
passing through Turkey, the Balkans, and Eastern Europe (Shelley, 2012). Trafficking of
narcotics can provide different benefits to Western Balkans OCGs. They are able of
securing a large economic profit from it and reintroducing it then into normal economic
flow through money laundering, which is made possible also with the auxilium of
Camorra and ‘‘Ndrangheta (UNODC, 2015).
The Balkan route (figure 29 GI-TOC 2020), continued to be dominated the trafficking of
opiates and heroin to Western Europe. The heroin is mainly transported by road, exception
made for drug shipments from Albania directed to Italy (UNODC, 2018; UNODC, 2020).
Drug trafficking represents the main source
of profit for OCGs in the Western Balkan.
By analysing the number of convictions for
drug production or trafficking in the
Western Balkan region between 2013 and
2017, it can be noticed that only 5% of these
convictions are linked to organize criminal
groups. Despite this, such 5% constitutes
the great majority in term of quantities.
(figure 30, UNODC 2018). Figure 30
33
Some of the drug traffickers interviewed during the MACRO project (figure 31, UNODC,
2020) revealed what is likely to be the functioning of the drug business in Western
Balkans. Most drug trafficking groups described by prisoners served only local or regional
markets not linked to Western European markets. What emerges is a decentralized chain-
like structure of organized drug trafficking groups, some of them are specialized in
wholesale and other groups in retail. Other major results of the MACRO project are that
there are not defined roles or command channels like Camorra and ‘Ndrangheta and that
retail-level clusters’ members have much in common with each other, they often share
residence, age, and education (Benson and Decker, 2010; Bruinsma and Bernasco, 2004).
Western Balkan OCGs have a modus operandi that guarantee a low-profile (MACRO
project UNODC, 2020):
Retail-level clusters tend to limit social relationships with the wholesale cluster,
such relations are merely instrumental, and they are established with a contact
person to reduce the risk of exposure. The loose association between low-level
and higher-level drug trafficking operators may explain the small percentage of
drug trafficking convictions related to Organized Crime (See picture 31, UNODC,
2020; Reuter 2014).
Procurement, transport/supply, and retail trade are separated procedures because
they involve different types of risks and contacts:
o Procurement is decided by the leader of the group without a precedent
group discussion.
Figure 31
34
o Transport and supply depend on security and practicality. The main
method to transfer drugs used by OCGs operating in the Western Balkans
is road transport, either car, taxi, or bus. (Reuter, 2014).
o At retail level, traffickers often rent an apartment where they conduct their
business. They often abstain from engaging in random contacts, they
prefer to interact with costumers that are already known.
Profits from drug trafficking are managed by group leaders. The objective is to
laundry and invest the money in legal businesses such as construction or
import/export firms. Most of the investments do not occur at local level but rather
in Western Europe.
Again, the Balkan diaspora contributed to spread the criminal network explained above
also at European level. Evidence of this is Europol operation, in cooperation with the
police forces of Germany, the Netherlands and Italy (Europol, 2023). Some members of
this network were specialized in money laundering, they used restaurants, bars, and real
estate agencies to launder the illicit profits generated by drug trafficking. The presence of
Albanian clans in other European states increase the efficiency of the routes mentioned
above, smuggling drugs in a chain-like system of small criminal groups decrease the risk
of detection (Tabaku, 2004).
Today, as stated by Paoli and Reuter, reading the list of transnational criminal
organizations is like reading an inventory of ethnic minorities. They highlighted the fact
that organized crime took the opportunities coming from globalization and its consequent
increase in people’s mobility (Paoli and Reuter, 2008). The choice of exploiting pre-
existing migration routes and patterns is merely strategic as it functions as an opportunity
to expand both businesses and criminal networks (Arsovska, 2014). Other
criminology scholars like Varese, Hobbs and Gambetta do not attribute the decision of
exporting the organized crime to OCG’s will. They rather argue that there are
circumstances like economic fragilities or crisis of any kind, which are byproducts of
globalization, that may push OCG’s to conduct or expand their businesses elsewhere
(Varese, 2011; Hobbs, 1998; Chu, 2000).
35
To conclude this section with my opinion, I find myself to agree more with the second
point of view. I believe that socioeconomic factors like wars, crisis and poverty are factors
that certainly negatively affect the business of OCGs. On the other hand, I believe that
criminal organizations autonomously decide where to move, they act as rational or semi-
rational economic actors in the illicit market and the desire of business expansion exists
because they want to maximize their economic utility.
iv. Turkish Organized crime
The Turkish mafia has evolved over time, it became a significant player in global
organized crime, with a history that is intertwined with the socio-political fabric of
Turkey. Historically, Turkey is a geographical bridge between Europe and Asia, and this
has always been an opportunity for smuggling activities (Keser and Ozel, 2008). The
weakening of state institutions during periods of political turmoil further have contributed to the
development of organized crime networks based on familial ties and business. The structure of
Turkish OCGs is often hierarchical, leadership typically belongs to powerful families and
individuals who exert control through violence, corruption and strategic alliances.
Membership is often drawn from individuals with similar ethnic or regional backgrounds,
with recruitment relying heavily on familial connections and loyalty within the criminal
underworld.
Turkey may be becoming the next key cocaine transit hub, the amount of cocaine seized
in the country rose from 393 kg to three tonnes in 2021 (UNODC, 2021). Other alarming
data from the Turkish national Police have registered a 44% increase in cocaine seizures
between 2021 and 2022, the same data did not show a parallel increase in domestic
consumption levels, this serves as evidence of the fact that Turkey is likely to serve as a
drug corridor (Turkish National Police, 2022).
Turkish criminal groups are involved in many of the region’s illicit flows, including
weapons, antiquities, and drugs. About the latter, the existence of small regional/local
Turkish criminal groups with a similar structure and a similar modus operandi to the of
Balkan OCG it is what makes Turkey a key transit country not only for heroin smuggling
through the Balkan Route but also for cocaine smuggling due to the high degree of
cooperation between Turkish and Balkan OCGs and Mexican Cartels (Fares and Adal,
36
2023). It is no longer easy to separate crime and politics in Turkey, state representatives
accuse the PKK of being involved into the heroin trade while the PKK accuse several
state officials of being involved into criminal activities that undermine the constitutional
state itself. The truth is in between the two positions, corruption in Turkey has always
been a systemic problem and corruption is able to increase the chances of flourishment of
smuggling activities.
Figure 32
As shown by the picture above (figure 32, EGM-KOM, 2005), Turkey is affected by the
smuggling of chemicals from Western Europe and Russia towards the MENA regions,
which are slowly increase their production capacity of synthetic drugs like amphetamine
and captagon (Turkish national Police, 2022). Turkish OCGs are not drug producers but
rather a bridge of transit between East and West that began to build their reputation by
smuggling the Afghan heroin in the 1970s (Philips, 2016). As it occurred for Balkan
OCGs, the creation of criminal networks for smuggling and money laundering has been
facilitated by the mass migration of Turkish nationals towards Europe, especially
Germany.
The drug trade operated by Turkish OCGs is able of generating multiple threats to the
state and society. Drug trade is often associated with the use of violence and other crimes
like human trafficking, the latter is often used to smuggle smaller quantities of drug
between Turkey and the Middle East but also between Turkey and Europe. Turkish OCGs
37
are nowadays often considered to be interlocutors for the global organized crime networks
involved as well into human trafficking, sex trafficking and cigarette smuggling (KOM,
2014). Turkish law enforcement authorities believe that PKK’s position into the drug
trafficking networks is growing, between 1984 and 2013 they discovered 377 cases of
PKK-related drug trafficking (KOM, 2014).
Behsat Ekici, a scholar belonging to the General Directorate of Security in the Department
of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime in Turkey elaborated a model based on five
pillars. This model shows five threats posed by drug trafficking; such threats are not to be
considered as such only in Turkey on in other specific regions. Drug trafficking is a
transnational issue and the threats caused by this phenomenon are transnational as well
(figure 33, Ekici, 2014).
Figure 33
38
CHAPTER 3. DISCUSSION: is cannabis the way forward?
a) Dismantling prohibitionism.
This discussion will primarily focus on the hypothesis of an EU project of cannabis
legalization and regulation to combat organized crime and reduce the threats posed by
more dangerous drugs. The main argument that I will try to bring forward for the sake of
this analysis assumes that most law enforcement efforts are focused on cannabis rather
than drugs with a higher impact on society, security, and public health. This assumption
is based on EMCDDA data coming from figure 1 and figure 2 (EMCDDA, 2023).
However, before diving into discussion, it is important to remind to the readers that the
following discussion does not promote the use of cannabis or any other type of drugs. The
argument stem from the undeniable fact that the prohibitionist approaches and the war on
drugs itself have failed.
10 years ago, a study conducted in UK by Adda argued that decriminalize marijuana
allows the police to reallocate efforts aways from drug-related crimes (Adda et al., 2014).
Furthermore, according to Walter E. Block and Meaghan Cussen, when addictive drugs
are made legal, crime will decrease substantially for four main reasons (Cussen and
Block, 2000):
The lower price of narcotics will eliminate the theft and murder associated
with their high price and their trafficking. How will this happen? Legalization
of drugs push businesspeople to invest in the sector, so there will be more
people in the market. This increase in supply will lead to a price drop of
narcotics and again, this stabilization will ultimately lead to a fall in these types
of drug-related crimes (Goldstein, 1985). Some other scholars argued that a
regulation of cannabis can lead to the creation of a substitute and complement
for violence-inducing substances such alcohol, cocaine, and amphetamines
(Dragon, 2017)
Violent substance-related disputes like gang wars will not occur.
Hypothetically the actors involved in the drug business will solve their
39
disputes in front of the court, of course this is going to be possible only with a
strong institutional support of the legalization and regulation processes.
Opening the market without a gradual and controlled approach guaranteed by
a strong cooperation with scientists and academia will only allow OCGS to
enter the market. Again, the purpose of legalization is not to take the OCGs
out of the shadow economy, but it is rather a possibility to reduce the harms
related to drug abuse and drug trafficking.
Drug-trafficking related profits are one of the main economic sources for
OCGs, such money is often used to buy weapons and support terrorist
organizations around the globe. Based on the hypothesis of the benefits
coming from a free market of drugs (Cussen and Block, 2000). The profits that
are now in the hands of few OCGs will be equally distribute by free-market
forces, reducing the amount of drug-trafficking revenues for criminal groups.
What are be considered as formerly illegal activities related to drug-
trafficking, indeed transportation, sale and possession will then become
society-approved business transactions, and this will foster societal stability?
i. The dangerous effects of prohibitionism
The end of prohibitionism
can put an end to the
dangerous potency effect. As
already seen in the section
related to cannabis, the
potency of cannabis
(measured by analysing the
concentration of THC)
increased from 3-4 % in
1980s to 20-25% in 2010s.
Figure 34
The higher the potency, the higher the price will be because people will be more willing
to pay for a stronger product because cannabis quality is often incorrectly associated to
its potency. Fifty years after the end of prohibitionism, the average per capita consumption
of alcohol fallen to its lowest level ever, people then began to switch to weaker alcohol
40
alternatives instead of continuing drinking spirits. Because of the legalization of alcohol
reversed the potency effect, the legalization of drugs will do the same (figure 34, Hamid,
1993).
ii. How to proceed?
To achieve the best possible outcome from drug legalization we must directly involve
political leaders, national and local institutions, academia, the scientific community, and
citizens (Rochette et al., 2023). One of the complexities and even possible limitations of
building a public dialogue on drug legalization is to use and interpret scientific evidence
and its connection to values and morality. More in the specific, different stakeholders tend
to see their own view as morally neutral, and so evidence based, while others’ views are
seen as morally driven because of beliefs and political goals (Zampini, 2018). Another
limitation of this idea is that views on drugs and toward specific drugs are shaped by
socially constructed understandings of drugs, this can lead to a debate that overestimate
or underestimate the actual risks that drugs can pose (Nutt et al., 2007).
Such differences in values and opinion among different stakeholders, as highlighted by
Rochette in the study to measure the impact on cannabis legalization in Canada, offers an
important reflection on what role should medical expert play in fostering a democratic,
inclusive, and evidence-based debate around drug policy (Rochette et al., 2023). This idea
is even supported by Foucault, who said that healthcare professionals have a great
influence on public policy (Foucault, 1994), this was seen this with the impact that
medical experts had during COVID-19. The Canadian Medical Association, for example,
strongly supported the legalization of cannabis and, at the same time, advised the
government to prioritize a public health approach to address the harms associated with
psychoactive drugs (Canadian Medical Association, 2018).
I acknowledge the fact that a project of drug legalization at EU level is difficult to achieve
because of the long and complicated legislative procedure in the European Union. The
best option on the table is that states should consider experimenting with an incremental
regulation of lower-potency drugs like cannabis. Each country must identify and follow
pathways of regulation that are suited to their institutional, social, and cultural
frameworks. States with fragile institutions can benefit from drug regulation because, as
you can see from the picture before the beginning of this chapter, drug trade is able of
41
Figure 35
generating multiple threats (Ekici, 2014;
Global Commission on Drug Policy,
2018). There is a remarkable consensus
that prohibitionism has empowered and
enriched organized crime (Rolles et al.,
2016). The theory behind supply-side
enforcement is to restrict production and
supply through crop eradication and
interdiction, this approach would reduce
availability and so it will consequently
lead to an increase in price. As a result,
the increase in prices is an incentive for new producers to enter the market, leading to the
creation of a new point of equilibrium. Furthermore, enforcement pressure on one
production area or transit route will simply displace illegal activities to other places, an
example is given by coca production shifting between countries in Latin America and
transit routes shifting from the Caribbean to West Africa and Mexico (figure 35, UNODC,
2011). Using the same logic but in an opposite direction implies that ending prohibition
will disempower it, yet there is no agreement on how to confront the problem. There are
two main arguments against the call for regulation:
The first one argues that failures of law enforcement in combating drug
trafficking are due not to flaw in the “zero-tolerance” paradigm against
psychoactive substances, but rather to a lack of resources, coordination, and
enforcement. According to this view, the war on drugs can be won only if with
better coordination and sufficient strength. This view is completely fallacious
in my view because of the existence of extensive evidence that shows that
enforcing prohibition can only temporarily disrupt drug production and
trafficking. The only achievements obtained by prohibitionism is an increasing
in criminalization incarceration and stigmatization of vulnerable and already
marginalized communities (Rolles et. al, 2016)
The second argument is that any attempt of regulation will just simply push
OCGs out of the drug market into other forms of illegal activity. A transitional
regulation can instead progressively reduce the scale and the impact of illegal
42
drug markets, with a following reduction in the harm caused by the substances
(Global Commission on Drug Policy, 2018). Of course, OCGs are going to
adapt to the changes generated by a regulation of drugs, states must be able to
anticipate these changes by redeploying resources to strength the rule of law
and build institutional capacity. The question that should stimulate a reflection
among scientists, academia and
policy makers are the following:
what is more harmful? Having a
controlled substance regulated
or having a potentially harmful
substance in the hand of
organized crime? Controlling
the substance can guarantee
policymakers to plan action
aimed at reducing harm caused
by substance abuse.
Future legal businesses involved in a hypothetical cannabis market at EU level are legal
entities that can be held accountable before the law if the balance between public health
interests and maximization of sales and profits is violated. OCGs cannot be held
accountable for the same reasons because they operate in the shadow area of the economy
(Drug Policy Alliance, 2018). In figure 37, it is possible to see what the ideal balance
between harms and different policies of regulation is. With a full prohibitionist system,
we have a fully unregulated criminal market where OCGs have a complete monopoly on
drug production where social and health harms are maximized. Demand for drugs can
increase faster than the budget allocated for law enforcement against drugs, this offers to
OCGs a constant opportunity of increasing profit margins (figure 37, Global Commission
on Drug Policy, 2018). On the other hand of the graph, the achievement of regulated
access to drugs would lead to an unregulated legal market where consumer’s health is not
protected, and social and health harms are maximized. The ideal degree of policies
concerning drug regulation ranges from decriminalisation to law regulation. The
UNGASS, the UN General Assembly Special Session convened together in 2016 to
discuss the global drug problem demonstrated the fracturing of the consensus behind a
Figure 37
43
Figure 38
prohibitionist paradigm. The outcome of this special session showed an increasing focus
towards health, human rights violation and development related to drug trafficking and
drug abuse (International Drug Policy Consortium, 2016).
iii. Possible regulation inside the EU: different options
Going back to the specific case of the European Union, the drug market is expected to be
worth at least €31 billion (Eurojust, 2021), the illicit EU cannabis market is expected to
be worth around €12 billion alone and the direct law enforcement costs are approximately
€7 billion per year, such costs include policing, customs, prosecution, and incarceration
(EMCDDA, 2019). On average, by looking at government expenditure in 30 European
countries (EU27 + 2) the spending on law enforcement and public safety outpaces
spending on health. Belgium for example spend 62% of its drug budget on law
enforcement but less than 1% in harm reduction services, Sweden spend less than 1% as
well while Austria, Poland and Romania do not even report figures on their national drug
strategies (Wolfe and Csete, 2012). Since 2012, multiple jurisdictions around the world
have changed their cannabis
policies. The possible options of
alternatives to status quo
cannabis supply prohibition
ranges from prohibit with
increasing sanctions to repeal
prohibitionist provisions with
absence of regulation, see figure
38 (Caulkins et al., 2015.) States
in the US used several types of approaches, this offers multiple insights for EU member
states. The standard commercial model has been adopted by Colorado, Washington state
and California. DC and Vermont initially opted for a non-commercial access in 2014,
allowing adults to privately grow and give up away an ounce (28 g) of cannabis without
remuneration. Vermont then decided to regulate cannabis sales in 2020 and state licensed
cannabis dispensaries and retailers began selling to adults in 2022 (EMCDDA, 2020). In
2013, Uruguay became the first country to legalize recreational cannabis. This approach
requires adult citizens to register to state regulatory authority to access cannabis through
one of the three legal supply channels, the purchasing limit is set to be 480 g and the three
44
channels available are home cultivation with a limit of 6 plants, membership through a
cannabis social club or purchase through licensed pharmacies (EMCDDA, 2020).
In Canada, instead, the federal system removed most prohibitions on cannabis by
regulating cultivation, distribution, and possession of cannabis up to 30g of herbal
cannabis or its equivalent in weight in other forms such as hashish and concentrates. Even
though the federal government lifted prohibition, Canadian provinces had power in
designing rules governing distribution, taxation, and age limits for cannabis purchase. The
difference between Canada and US about cannabis legislation matters is that the former
relied on federal government to repeal prohibition while the latter relied on single states
willingness to lift prohibition albeit keeping different criminal laws between different
states (EMCDDA, 2020).
iv. The German legalization model: the best solution
The different examples above can function as model for cannabis legalization projects in
the European Union. Canada and the US function also as example of public health
commitment and education campaigns aimed at reducing drug abuse and underage use.
In July 2022, ministers from Germany, Luxembourg and Malta met for a first high-level
multilateral consultation on cannabis policy and they declared that the status quo is no
longer acceptable (Government of Luxembourg, 2022).
This statement is the beginning of an innovative approach at EU level, but it is well known
that everything depends on political equilibrium both at EU and single member states
level (Afsahi et al.., 2024). On 26th October 2022, the German government composed of
a coalition of social-democrats, liberals and greens adopted key principles for the
controlled sale of cannabis to adults for recreational purposes
(Bundesgesundheitsministerium, 2022). The legal rationale behind Germany’s decision
is that if decriminalization is in line with international conventions like 1961 UN Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the
1988 UN Anti-trafficking Convention, since they do not contain any unconditional
obligation for the parties to impose criminal sanctions on all forms of drug possession and
use, then depenalization is possible. One of the main reasons behind German
government’s decision of cannabis legalization was that a regulated framework for
cannabis could have guaranteed control on quality, distribution, protection of minors and
45
the eventual presence of contaminating substances. Furthermore, the legalization plan of
the Cannabis Reform Act provides that an evaluation is going to be made after 4 years
from its entry into force, to adapt drug checking models and harm reduction measures
(Koalitionsvertrag, 2021). Furthermore, the German proposal of cannabis legalization
provided detailed provisions for large-scale cultivation, licenses, retail, labelling and a
separate cannabis taxation law (Hofmann, 2023).
German drug policy is strongly influenced by a health approach combined with strict
enforcement policies (Anderson, 2012). German law enforcement is strictly bound by a
strict understanding of the rule of law, called Rechtsstaat, which implies that German law
is profoundly serious about its obligation and that German law enforcement cannot make
exception or closing an eye in front of law infringements (Hofmann, 2021). Hower, their
approach towards cannabis is more flexible because of its widespread use, 47% of
German adults between 18- and 25-years hold had consumed cannabis at least once in
their lifetime (EMCDDA 2020).
Considering again figures 1 and 2, the 2020 data coming from German law enforcement
are in line with the ones presented by the tables. Out of 365.000 drug related offences,
more than 220.000 were in connection with cannabis and, by considering only cannabis-
related offences, more than 85% (188.000) were offences related to possession of lesser
amounts of the drug. Furthermore, public prosecutor’s offices dropped almost 40% of
these cases due to the small quantities (Bunderskriminalamt, 2020). This inefficient
mechanism causes increasing costs for German law enforcement and the cannabis
legalization proposal has been encouraged because effectiveness and efficiency of the law
system are two required principles that must be in line with the principle of legal certainty
established by Article 20 of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz. Basic Law for the
Federal Republic of Germany, 1949).
46
v. Is the German legalization model in compliance with European and
International Law?
The German project of legalization raised question of compliance with European and
International law aim at preventing narcotic production and trafficking. Scholars like Van
Kempen and Fedorova, however, both agrees that state implementing a high regulated
licensing system that is based on the rationale of prevention and treatment for addiction
is in compliance with the Schengen Implementation Agreement, the legal rationale is the
principle referred to Article 71(2) of the same legal source, which declares that
contracting parties can depart from the prevention of sales and exports established by
Article 71(1) with a national policy aimed at prevention and treatment of addiction to
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances (Van Kempen and Fedorova, 2023).
However, besides the Schengen agreement, the most important EU legislation related to
cannabis and drug policies more in general is the framework decision 2004/757 from
2004, which is not only related to the threat and fight against illicit drug trafficking but
also to a coordinated and harmonized law enforcement approach among member states.
However, member states’ law enforcement strategies towards drugs drifted apart from
each other: Sweden is widely known for its zero-tolerance policy towards all drugs while
the Netherlands has a very relaxed approach towards cannabis, synthetic drugs, and new
psychoactive substances. (Chatwin, 2003: Tops et al., 2018). If we analyse Article 2(2),
the cultivation of cannabis and other drugs is not prohibited if it is committed exclusively
for own personal consumption as defined by national law. The actual room for
legalization proposals is instead provided by Article 2 lit b of the same legal framework
which prohibits intentional trafficking and cultivation carried out without right and
neither the Council and the European Parliament were able of providing a homogeneous
definition of what is the right that would allow an exception to this law (Van Kempen and
Fedorova, 2014). According to Klip, a prestigious scholar of European Criminal Law, the
exception of this legal framework is the production and trade for medical and scientific
use (Klip, 2021). German legislators, however, decided to interpret the terms “without
right” differently, they decided to interpret it as a decisive loophole to enable total
legalization of cannabis under a high-regulated framework (Hofmann, 2023). This
revolutionary interpretation of the “without right clause”, contained in Article 32 lit b, by
Van Kempen and Fedorova, it is based on two further arguments:
47
The authorization under a high-regulated system can qualify as a “right” for the
cultivator, distributor, or retail seller to perform the activity.
Cannabis regulation ensures a more effective protection of human rights due to
the interconnection between human trafficking and drug trafficking, and due to
the violence and criminalization caused by prohibitionism. These higher standards
of protection justify deviation from obligations to criminalize cannabis for
recreational use while at the same time respecting Framework Decision 2004/757
(Van Kempen and Federova 2014)
The goals of health, youth protection and combating drug-related crimes, set by the
international drug control treaties, have been interpreted in a way of achieving them
through a legalization regulatory framework. Furthermore, EU drugs strategy and action
plan 2021-2025 does not require EU Member States to criminalize drug use (Council of
the European Union, 2021), this decision is in line with Council conclusions on March
2018 where it has been declared the willingness to promote the use of alternatives
coercive sanctions for drug using offenders (Khan and Landwehr, 2023))
Despite the possible compliance with European law, the German Cannabis Reform Act
must follow international obligations coming from the aforementioned 1961 UN Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances and
the 1988 UN Anti-trafficking Convention.
The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (UN, 1961) classifies cannabis as
a schedule I substance, indicating that it is subject to control measures. Article
4(c) of his Convention impose on member states to limit the production,
distribution, and cannabis only to medical and scientific use. Legalizing cannabis
for recreational purposes would then violate this convention. Framing cannabis
legalization as a matter of public health and human rights concern can help
Germany to deviate from its international obligations. More precisely, controlling
the substances through a system of stringent control and regulation allow
Germany to comply with its international obligation towards this convention.
The 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances (UN, 1971) imposes control on
psychotropic substance with the prime aim to fight drug abuse. Again, framing
48
cannabis legalization as matter of public health and protection of human rights is
a nuanced approach to legalize production, use and distribution of cannabis and
simultaneously protect citizens from drug abuse (Van Kempen and Fedorova,
2014). The Cannabis Reform Act impose a limit of 25g per person, this focus on
limiting quantity is a strategy to have continuity towards the compliance of
Germany’s international obligations.
The 1988 United Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances (UN, 1988) has two aims: fighting drug trafficking and
criminalizing production, distribution, possession, and personal consumption of
the drugs listed into the 1961 and 1971 convention (Art. 3(2)).
One of the scopes of the German project of cannabis legalization is to fight OCGs,
such principle is in accordance with one of the main aims of 1988 convention.
Furthermore, cannabis legalization reduces the influence and revenue of
organized groups by also stopping the criminalization towards marginalized
communities.
Canada and Uruguay never obtained any sanction for their projects of cannabis
legalization. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), which monitors
governments' compliance with international drug control treaties, didn't take any action
in response to legalization, but it only expressed concerns when both countries decided to
ignore the Convention's provisions and regulated recreational cannabis (Sabaghi, 2022).
For this reason, Germany can just ignore a strict interpretation of its international
obligations toward 1961,1971 and 1988 UN conventions by providing a regulatory
framework which from a theoretical point of view looks stricter than more “liberal”
models of legalization adopted in Uruguay, US or models of depenalization adopted by
Portugal or The Netherlands. What Germany propose is not a full violation but an
alternative paradigm to prohibitionism since the latter has been proven of being inefficient
in complying with international obligations coming from the conventions.
49
vi. Criticisms
It is important to recognize that there can be criticisms and issues that must be addressed
to continue to achieve the goals established by drug-control treaties. First, what is a
possible solution to prevent drug tourism? The Dutch regulatory framework on cannabis
has been modified to prevent drug tourism, the current framework provides a limitation
of cannabis sale only to Dutch residents and the European Court of Justice (ECJ)ruled
that it was not a discriminatory measure on the base of residency because cannabis is
prohibited under Dutch and EU Law so there cannot be a right for EU nationals to acquire
it (Hofmann, 2023). German legislators instead want to exclude cannabis from the list of
forbidden substances regulated by German narcotics law, this will make cannabis a fully
legal and regulated product within the German jurisdiction as it will be considered an
agricultural product. Following ECJ jurisprudence on the Dutch case, called Joseman-
Judgement, once that the product is erased from the list of forbidden substances it will not
be possible to apply any restrictions based on nationality and residency as they will be
considered a discrimination under EU law.
Another problem is the free market conundrum (Hofmann, 2023), which is a problem on
the production side of recreational cannabis. Germany will hypothetically become a “legal
island” surrounded by states without any regulation regarding the production side, for this
reason the German government planned to restrict cannabis production to domestic level.
Another important reason behind the import prohibition is that Germany can guarantee
more efficient scrutiny and control of cannabis production if the market is kept closed and
domestic. This protectionist might appear in violation with article 34 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) because all trading rules that are capable of
hindering, directly or indirectly or potentially, intra- community trade are prohibited
(CJEU, 1974). On the other hand, art.36 TFEU provides the possibility of exception on
the ground of public security or protection of human life and health. The German decision
of creating a closed domestic market falls under the scope of art.36 TFEU. A free
European market for cannabis is only possible if states are going to adopt the German
model, which appears to guarantee extremely ambitious standards of protection of security
and human life, but in a more realistic perspective this is difficult to achieve in a short
amount of time.
50
Other criticisms which are related to the closed domestic cannabis market in Germany
comes from environmental concerns. German climate is not ideal for large-scale cannabis
cultivation and most of it should have been produced through indoor cultivation. UN’s
environmental concern comes from the fact that the carbon footprint of indoor-produced
cannabis is 100 times greater than that of outdoor-produced cannabis, due to the extensive
use of energy and fertilizers (UNODC, 2022).
CONCLUSION
The aim of this thesis was, in the first chapter, to inform the reader about what are the
main drugs used and trafficked inside the European Union. In the second chapter instead,
I provided a very detailed outlook of the main OCGs operating not only at EU level but
also at global level due to the transnational nature of crime and mor in the specific of drug
trafficking, which nowadays it is one of the main sources of revenues for OCGs. The third
chapter has been dedicated to an extensive discussion on policies of legalization and
regulation by provided different specific examples, the German model captured my
attention not only because it was the most recent but also because from my own
perspective it looked like the more advanced and the one with higher standards for
consumers protection and security.
The regulation and legalization of cannabis should achieve also with the purpose of
fighting drug trafficking and organized crime, as established by the aforementioned 1961
UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic
Substances and the 1988 UN Anti-trafficking. Global drug prohibition is fuelled by the
fear of a domino effect, if a state decides to legalize cannabis than other states will follow
to avoid being left out of a new economic possibility guaranteed by a hypothetical high-
regulated framework on cannabis sale and production, this will ultimately be resulting in
a collapse of the entire prohibitive system (Jelsma, 2011).
Prohibitionism, as highlighted by its historical and ongoing implementation, has failed to
fight drug use and it ended in contributing the proliferation of organized crime, criminal
networks, and new drug routes. OCGs exploits the illegal market to generate increasing
profits from the trafficking of cannabis and other drugs. Prohibitionist policies contribute
to worsen these issues, redirecting economic resources from law enforcement and judicial
systems that could be better used in harm reduction and public health initiatives.
51
Legalizing cannabis across the EU can be considered a first step towards putting an end
towards prohibitionism and its collateral effects since it will create a regulated market
where product safety and therefore consumer protection can be guaranteed. Furthermore,
it will reduce profits for OCGs that heavily rely on drug trade as a source of revenue,
states will be also able to get revenues from a “cannabis tax” that can be used to fund
education, prevention programs and fight the marginalization caused by the war on drugs.
To recapitulate and conclude my work, the legalization of cannabis in the EU is a critical
step toward protecting citizens from the harms posed by prohibitionism, illegal markets
and organized crime. It is imperative that EU Member States collectively join a war on
prohibitionism by using the German regulatory framework to promote a safer, healthier,
and more just society.
52
Bibliography
Africa Intelligence. (2021). Repeated cocaine seizures worry sugar traders as
drug found in Sucden and LDC cargoes. Retrieved from
https://www.africaintelligence.com/west-africa/2021/08/19/repeated-cocaine-
seizures-worry-sugar-traders-as-drug-found-in-sucden-and-ldc-
cargoes,109685939-art
Afsahi, K., Giraudon, I., & Mounteney, J. (2024). Cannabis potency monitoring:
Challenges for public health and safety. The Lancet Regional Health - Europe,
28, Article 100096. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lanepe.2024.100096
Al Jazeera (2002), Europe a global cocaine hub as multi-billion market
grows.https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/6/europe-a-global-cocaine-hub-
as-multi-billion-market-grows-report
Allum, F., & Sands, J. (2004). Explaining organized crime in Europe: Are
economists always right? *Crime, Law and Social Change, 41*(2), 133-
160.https://doi.org/10.1023/B:CRIS.0000016223.49968.17
Anderson, S. (2012). European drug policy: The cases of Portugal, Germany,
and the Netherlands. The Eastern Illinois University Political Science Review,
1(1), Article 2, 9. Available at: http://thekeep.eiu.edu/eiupsr/vol1/iss1/2
Appel, L. (2013). La guerre du cannabis entre dans les jardins (1). Criminalités,
4, February.
Arsovska, J. (2014). The “G-local” dimension of Albanian organized crime:
Mafias, strategic migration and state repression. *European Journal on Criminal
Policy and Research*, 20, 205–223. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-014-9236-8
Barbagallo, F (2010). Storia Della Camorra. Laterza: Roma-Bari.
Bartilow, H. A., & Eom, K. (2009). Free Traders and Drug Smugglers: The
Effects of Trade Openness on States’ Ability to Combat Drug Trafficking. Latin
American Politics and Society, 51(2), 117–145.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20622728
Behrman, A. (2008). Behrman Article: Luck of the Draw: Common Adulterants
Found in Illicit Drugs. Journal of Emergency NursingVol. 36, Issue 2.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jen.2007.10.001
Benson, J. S., & Decker, S. H. (2010). The organizational structure of
international drug smuggling. Journal of Criminal Justice,38(2), 130-138.
53
Bergman, M. (2018). Criminal Diversification and Corruption in the Drug
Business. In: Illegal Drugs, Drug Trafficking and Violence in Latin America.
Springer, Cham.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73153-7_5
Berlusconi, G., Aziani, A., & Giommoni, L. (2017). The determinants of heroin
flows in Europe: A latent space approach. Social Networks, 51, 104-117.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2017.03.012
Bouchard, M. (2007). On the Resilience of Illegal Drug Markets. Global Crime,
8(4), 325–344.https://doi.org/10.1080/17440570701739702
Boulat T., Cadet-Taïrou A., Gandilhon M., Néfau T., Lahaie E., 2016. Auto-
culture d'herbe de cannabis en France : cultivateurs et production à travers
l'enquête SINTES cannabis 2013. Le Courrier des Addictions, vol. 18, n° 4, p.
16-19.
Brazil Customs Office. (2019). Ordinance ALF/STS no. 241. Retrieved
fromhttp://normas.receita.fazenda.gov.br/sijut2consulta/link.action?idAto=1052
31
Brazil Customs Office. (2022). Ordinance ALF/STS no. 119. Retrieved
fromhttp://normas.receita.fazenda.gov.br/sijut2consulta/link.action?idAto=1265
04
Bruinsma, G., & Bernasco, W. (2004). Criminal groups and transnational illegal
markets.Crime, Law and Social Change, 41(1), 79-94.
Bundesgesundheitsministerium (2021), “Eckpunktepapier der Bundesregierung
zur Einführung einer kontrollierten Abgabe von Cannabis an Erwachsene zu
Genusszwecken“. See press
release:<https://www.bundesgesundheitsministerium.de/ministerium/meldungen
/kontrollierte-abgabe-von-cannabis-eckpunktepapier-der-bundesregierung-liegt-
vor.html
Bundeskriminalamt (2020): Rauschgiftkriminalität Bundeslagebild. 14.
Calderoni, F. (2012). The structure of drug trafficking mafias: The ‘Ndrangheta
and cocaine. Crime, Law and Social Change, 58(3), 321–349.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-012-9387-9
Canadian Medical Association. (2018). Health Canada Consultation on
Canadian Drugs and Substances Strategy. CMA policy base, available from:
www.cma.ca/cannabis
Cautiero F. (2023). Brief History of Camorra Organizations, part of The Devil
Among Us. Retrieved from Medium at: https://medium.com/the-devil-among-
us-stories-and-articles-about/brief-history-of-the-camorra-mafia-organization-
part-two-13bd7d050e1d
Ceci, E. (2018). *The relationship between organized crime and political
corruption in Italy*.Crimen, 3(3), 207-223. Retrieved from
http://crimenjournal.ius.bg.ac.rs/articles/crimen_003-
2018/Pages%20from%20Crimen%202018-03-3.pdf
54
Chatwin, C. (2003). Drug policy developments within the European Union: The
destabilizing effects of Dutch and Swedish drug policies. The British Journal of
Criminology, 43(3), 567-582.
Chouvy P.-A., Mac Farlane J., (2018). Agricultural innovations in Morocco’s
cannabis industry. International Journal of Drug Policy, vol. 58, p. 85-91. DOI :
10.1016/j.drugpo.2018.04.013
Chu, Y. K. (2000). The triads as a business. London: Routledge.
Collin, M. (2010). Altered state: The story of ecstasy culture and acid house.
Profile Books.
Corriere della Sera (2013). Arrestato in Colombia il boss Pannunzi, il «narco-
broker» della 'ndrangheta. URL consultato il 6 luglio 2013.
https://www.corriere.it/cronache/13_luglio_06/boss-ndrangheta-arrestato-
colombia_d0075986-e5c9-11e2-8d17-dd9f75fbf0e3.shtml
Court of Justice of the European Union. (1974). Dassonville, Case 8/74,
Procureur du Roi v. Benoît and Gustave Dassonville. ECLI:EU:C:1974:82.
Retrieved fromhttps://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-8/74
Cussen, M., & Block, W. (2000). Legalize Drugs Now!: An Analysis of the
Benefits of Legalized Drugs. The American Journal of Economics and
Sociology, 59(3), 525–536.http://www.jstor.org/stable/3487894
Davis, J. A. (2011). Threats from Non-Traditional Actors: Expanding and
Transforming Intelligence to Address Transnational Issues. American
Intelligence Journal, 29(1), 47–52.http://www.jstor.org/stable/26201919
Del Monte A., Papagni E. (2004), “The Determinants of Corruption in Italy:
Regional Panel Data Analysis”, p.7, available
at:http://www.economiaindustriale.unina.it/papers/Corr2004.pdf
Di Fiore, G. (2006). *La Camorra E Le Sue Storie. La Criminalità Organizzata a
Napoli Dalle Origini Alle Ultime «Guerre»*. UTET.
DNAA,(2012), Annual Report, p. 351, available at:
http://www.stampoantimafioso.it/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/DNA_Dicembre-
20121.pdf
Dragone, D., Prarolo, G., Vanin, P., & Zanella, G. (2017). Crime and the
legalization of recreational marijuana. IZA Discussion Papers (No. 10522).
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn. https://hdl.handle.net/10419/161145
Drug Policy Alliance (2018). From Prohibition to Progress: A Status Report on
Marijuana Legalization. [online] New York: DPA. Available at:
http://www.drugpolicy.org/legalizationstatus-report
Eck, J. E., & Gersh, J. S. (2000). Drug trafficking as a cottage industry. In M.
Natarajan & M. Hough (Eds.), Illegal drug markets: From research to prevention
policy. Crime prevention studies 11 (pp. 241–271). Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers.
55
Ekici B. (2014), International Drug Trafficking and National Security of Turkey,
Journal of Politics and Law; Vol. 7, No. 2; 2014, Canadian Centre of Science
and Education.http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v7n2p113
EMCCDA (2023), EU drug market: Cannabis- In depth
analysis.https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/eu-drug-
markets/cannabis_en
EMCDDA (2015). Opioid trafficking routes from Asia to Europe. Part of
Perspective on Drugs. Publications Office of zthe European Union.
Luxembourg.
EMCDDA (2015b), ‘Wastewater analysis and drugs: A European multi-city
study’, EMCDDA, Lisbon (www.emcdda.europa.eu/topics/pods/waste-water-
analysis).
EMCDDA (2016). Recent changes in MDMA/ecstasy market. Publications
Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.DOI::10.2810/817237
http://europa.eu/
EMCDDA (2020) Statistical Bulletin 2020 – prevalence of drug use.
https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/data/stats2020/gps#.
EMCDDA (2022d), Drug-related health and security threats in the Western
Balkans, regional report, Publications Office of the European Union,
Luxembourg.
EMCDDA (2024), Report on Heroin and Other Opioids, 24/01/2024,
Lisbon.https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/news/2024/1/new-report-heroin-and-
other-opioids-pose-substantial-threat-health-and-security-europe_en
EMCDDA(2020), Impact of COVID-19 on patterns of drug use and drug-related
harms in Europe, Publications Office of the European Union,
Luxembourg. DOI: 10.2810/19284
EMCDDA(2020), Monitoring and evaluating changes in cannabis policies:
insights from the Americas, Technical report, Publications Office of the
European Union, Luxembourg.
EMCDDA, Europol (2019), EU drug markets report 2019, Publications Office
of the European Union, Luxembourg.
EMCDDA, Europol (2023), European Drug Report 2023: Trends and
Developments, https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/european-drug-
report/2023_en
EMCDDA. (2015). Developments in the European cannabis market.
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. DOI:
0.2810/084165http://bookshop.europa.eu/uri?target=EUB:NOTICE:TDAT15002
:EN:HTML
EMCDDA. (2019). Developments in the European cannabis market.
Publications Office of the European Union,
Luxembourg.https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/emcdda-
56
papers/developments-in-the-european-cannabis-market_en DOI:
10.2810/769499
Eurojust (2021). Eurojust Report on Drug Trafficking. Published 19 April 2021.
https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/publication/eurojust-report-drug-trafficking
DOI: 10.2812/204889
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, Europol (2022),
European Drug Report 2022: Trends and Developments. Publications Office of
the European Union,
Luxembourg.https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/edr/trends-
developments/2022_en DOI: 10.2810/75644
Europol (2013), “SOCTA: EU Serious and Organized Crime Threat
Assessment” Link:
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/.../socta2013.pdf
Europol (2021), The use of violence by organized crime groups, Europol
Spotlight Report series, Publications Office of the European Union,
Luxembourg. doi:10.2813/950157
Europol (2021b), ‘Over 60 charged in crackdown on Balkan cartel behind
cocaine pipeline to Europe’, Europol, 7 September
Europol (2023), Strike against an Albanian drug trafficking networks in
Germany, italy and the Netherlands. Link:
https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/strike-against-
albanian-drug-trafficking-network-in-germany-italy-and-netherlands
Fantò E. (1999), “L’impresa a partecipazione mafiosa: economia legale ed
economia criminale”,Edizioni Dedalo, Bari.
Fares S., Adal L. (2023). Cocaine trafficking in Western Asia and Turkey: An
emerging route. Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.
https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/cocaine-western-asia-turkey-turkiye/
Feltran, G. S., Pinho, I. V., & Bird Ruiz-Benitez de Lugo, L. (2023). *Atlantic
connections: The PCC and the Brazil-West Africa cocaine trade*. Global
Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. Retrieved from
https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/brazil-west-africa-cocaine-trade/
Forgione F. (2008), *Documenti parlamentari - Indagine conoscitiva sulle
nuove prospettive di politica criminale e la riforma della giustizia*, Camera dei
Deputati. Retrieved from
https://documenti.camera.it/_dati/leg15/lavori/documentiparlamentari/indiceetes
ti/023/005/INTERO.pdf
Foucault, M. (1994). La naissance de la médecine sociale. Dits et Écrits. Paris:
Gallimard, pp. 207–228.
Garzn, J. C. (2008). Mafia & co. la red criminal en Mxico, Brasil y Colombia.
Editorial Planeta Colombiana : Fundaci n Seguridad Democracia.
57
Giommoni, L., Aziani, A., & Berlusconi, G. (2017). How Do Illicit Drugs Move
Across Countries? A Network Analysis of the Heroin Supply to Europe. Journal
of Drug Issues, 47(2), 217-240.https://doi.org/10.1177/0022042616682426
Global Commission on Drug Policy. (2018). Regulation: The Responsible
Control of Drugs. Retrieved from
https://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ENG-
2018_Regulation_Report_WEB-FINAL.pdf
Global Financial Integrity (2017), Transnational Crime and the Developing
World.https://gfintegrity.org
Goldstein, Paul J (1985). The drugs/violence nexus: A tripartite conceptual
framework. Journal of Drug Issues 15(4), 493-506.
Government of Luxembourg. (2022, July 15). Joint statement: High-level
consultation on cannabis. https://gouvernement.lu/dam-
assets/documents/actualites/2022/07-juillet/15-lenert-tanson-canabis/joint-
statement-high-level-consultation-on-cannabis-150722.pdf
Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The Strength of Weak Ties. American Journal of
Sociology, 78(6), 1360–1380. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2776392
Grundgesetz (1949), Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.
Hamid, Ansley. (1993). "To the Editor of the Commentary." In Drugs in
America: The Reference Shelf (New York: FI.Vl,'. Wilson) 65 (4): 181-184.
Hobbs, D. (1998). Going down the glocal: the local context of organised crime.
Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, 37, 407–422.
Hofmann, R. (2021). Formalism versus pragmatism – A comparative legal and
empirical analysis of the German and Dutch criminal justice systems with regard
to effectiveness and efficiency. Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative
Law, 28(4), 464
Hofmann, R. (2023). The ‘Total-Legalization’ of Cannabis in Germany: Legal
Challenges and the EU Free Market Conundrum. European Journal of Crime,
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 31(2), 173-196.
https://doi.org/10.1163/15718174-bja10044
Kemp, W. (2020). Transnational Tentacles – Global hotspots of Western Balkan
Organized Crime. Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.
Retrieved from: https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/transnational-tentacles-wb6/
Keser, H., & Özel, N. (2008). Geo-political position and importance of Turkey
in the crime trafficking between the continents Asia, Europe and Africa.
*International Journal of Environmental & Science Education*, 3(2), 75-81.
Retrieved from https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ894848.pdf
o Klip, European Criminal Law – An integrative Approach. Intersentia, 4th
edition (2021), 281.
Koalitionsvertrag (2021). See page 87 of the coalition agreement which can be
found
58
herehttps://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Koalitionsvertrag/Koalitionsvertr
ag_2021-2025.pdf
KOM Daire Başkanlığı. (2013). Turkish Report of Anti-Smuggling and
Organized Crime (p.4).
Lavezzi M. (2013), “Analysis of the Organized Crime Economy”, elaborated in
the framework of the Master in Organized Crime held at the University of Pisa.
Link:http://www1.unipa.it/~mario.Lavezzi/didatticaMat/slides/slide_master_PI_
2013_01.pdf
Ljubas. Z. (2024), Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting
Project:https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/18674-bosnia-cracks-down-on-
international-drug-cartel-police-officials-among-suspects
M. Jelsma, ‘Lifting the ban on coca chewing. Bolivia’s proposal to amend the
1961 Single Convention’. Series of Legislative Reform of Drug Policies, Nr.11.
(2011) 5
Ministero della Giustizia. (1930). Codice Penale [Italian Penal Code], Articolo
416 bis: Associazione di tipo mafioso. Retrieved [Month Day, Year], from
http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legislativo:1930-10-
19;1398!vig=
Mistler-Ferguson, S. (2022). Albanian drug traffickers jockey for position in
Ecuador. InSight Crime. Retrieved from https://insightcrime.org/news/albanian-
drug-traffickers-jockey-for-position-in-ecuador/
Nutt, D., King, L. A., Saulsbury, W. and Blakemore, C.(2007). Development of a
Rational Scale to Assess the Harm of Drugs of Potential Misuse. Lancet,
369,1047–1053.
Paoli, L. (1994). An Underestimated Criminal Phenomenon: The Calabrian
'Ndrangheta. European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice,
2(3), 212-238.https://doi.org/10.1163/157181794X00151
Paoli, L., & Reuter, P. H. (2008). Drug Trafficking and Ethnic Minorities in
Western Europe. European Journal of Criminology, 5(1), 13–37. DOI:
10.1177/1477370807084223
Pearson, Geoffrey and Hobbs, D.. 2001. Middle Market Drug Distribution:
Home Office Research Study. Home Office. ISBN 1840827629
Reuter, P. (2014). Drug Markets and Organized Crime. In L. Paoli (Ed.), The
Oxford Handbook of Organized Crime (pp. 359-381). New York: Oxford
University Press.
Reuter, P. H. (2014). The Mobility of Drug Trafficking. In J. Collins (Ed.),
Ending the Drug Wars (pp. 33-40). London: The London School of Economics
and Political Science.
Reuter, P., & Haaga, J. (1989). *The organization of high-level drug markets: An
exploratory study*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/N2830.html
59
Roberti, F (2009). “Analisi E Proposte Di Un Magistrato.” In Dire Camorra
Oggi. Forme E Metamorfosi Della Criminalità Organizzata, a cura di G. Di
Gennaro and D. Pizzuti, 29–33. Napoli: Guida.
Robins, P. (2016). *Middle East drugs bazaar: Production, prevention and
consumption*. Oxford University Press.
Rochette, M., Valiquette, M., Barned, C., & Racine, E. (2023). Drug
legalization, democracy and public health: Canadian stakeholders’ opinions and
values with respect to the legalization of cannabis. Public Health Ethics, 16(2),
175-190. https://doi.org/10.1093/phe/phad016
Rolles, S. et al. (2016). The Alternative World Drugs Report. Count the Costs.
[pdf] Bristol:Transform Drug Policy Foundation. Available
at:http://www.countthecosts.org/alternativeworld-drug-report
Saviano, R. Gomorra. Milano: Mondadori, 2006
Sergi, A. (2023). Cocaine Brokers: The Flexible Backbone of the ’Ndrangheta
Trafficking Empire. InSight Crime. https://insightcrime.org/news/cocaine-
brokers-flexible-backbone-ndrangheta-trafficking-empire/
Sergi, A. (2023). To become ‘ndrangheta in Calabria: Organisational narrative
criminology and the constitution of mafia organizations. *Trends in Organized
Crime*. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-023-09489-y
Sergi, A. (2023, May 30). Cocaine Brokers: The Flexible Backbone of the
’Ndrangheta Trafficking Empire. InSight Crime.
https://insightcrime.org/news/cocaine-brokers-flexible-backbone-ndrangheta-
trafficking-empire/
Sergi, A. and Lavorgna, A. (2016) 'Ndrangheta. The Glocal Dimension of the
most powerful Italian mafia. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1-122. ISBN 978-3-319-
32584-2. Official URL: https://www.palgrave.com/gb/book/9783319325842
Shelley, L. (2012). The relationship of drug and human trafficking: A global
perspective. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 18(3), 241-
253. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-012-9175-1
Sorgi, G. (2023). The Godfather of Maasmechelen, how Italy’s ‘ndrangheta
Mafia went global https://www.politico.eu/article/lucio-aquino-ndrangheta-
mafia-godfather-of-maasmechelen-belgium-italy/
Tabaku, A. (2004). Organized crime in Albania: A detrimental force to its social
and economic development. *SEER - South-East Europe Review for Labour and
Social Affairs*, 4, 123-131. Retrieved from
https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=15182
Tops, P., van Valkenhoef, A., van der Torre, E., & de Jong, D. (2018). The
Netherlands and synthetic drugs: An inconvenient truth. Eleven International
Publishing.
Townsend, M. (2019). Kings of cocaine: How the Albanian mafia seized control
of the UK drugs trade. *The Guardian*.
60
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/13/kings-of-cocaine-albanian-
mafia-uk-drugs-crime
Turkish National Police. (2022). *Türkiye National Drug Report 2022*. Turkish
National Police.
https://www.narkotik.pol.tr/kurumlar/narkotik.pol.tr/TUB%C4%B0M/Ulusal%2
0Yay%C4%B1nlar/Turkiye-National-Drug-Report-2022.pdf
UNICRI(2016). Organized Crime and the Legal Economy - The Italian Case.
Recuperato da UNICRI website. https://unicri.it/organized-crime-and-legal-
economy-italian-case
UNODC (2014a), World Drug Report 2014, UNODC, Vienna (www.unodc.org/
documents/wdr2014/World_Drug_Report_2014_web.pdf)
UNODC (2015), World Drug Report 2015 . Retrieved from
https://www.unodc.org/documents/ungass2016/Contributions/Civil/Count-the-
Costs-Initiative/AWDR-exec-summary.pdf
UNODC (2015). Drug Money the illicit proceeds of opiates trafficked on the
Balkan route, 82. Available
at:https://www.unodc.org/documents/dataandanalysis/Studies/IFF_report_2015_
final_web.pdf
UNODC (2017), Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017, Vienna.
UNODC (2017), Heroin and cocaine prices in Europe and USA,
https://dataunodc.un.org/drugs/heroin_and_cocaine_prices_in_eu_and_usa-2017
UNODC (2018). World Drug Report 2018. United Nations
publication. https://www.unodc.org/wdr2018/
UNODC (2020), Measuring organized crime in the Western Balkans, United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna
UNODC (2023), Afghanistan Opium Survey, available at:
https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-
monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_opium_survey_2023.pdf
UNODC(2022), World Drug Report 2022, available
at:https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/world-drug-report-
2022.html
UNODC. (2022). *World drug report 2022* (p. 44).
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/world-drug-report-2022.html
UNODC-SIMCI (2021). Monitoring of Coca, Poppy, and Marijuana Crops in
Colombia 2021'. Monitoring of the territories used for illicit cultivation. Bogota
Van Duyne, P. C. (1997). “Organized Crime, Corruption and Power.” Crime,
Law and Social Change 26(3): 201–238.
Van Kempen, P., & Fedorova, M. (2014). Internationaal recht en cannabis: Een
beoordeling op basis van VN-drugsverdragen en EU-drugsregelgeving van
gemeentelijke en buitenlandse opvattingen pro regulering van cannabisteelt voor
61
recreatief gebruik. Kluwer. Available at
https://repository.wodc.nl/handle/20.500.12832/2100
Van Kempen, P., & Fedorova, M. (2023). Cannabis regulation through the
“without right” clause in Article 2(1) of EU Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA
on illicit drug trafficking. European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and
Criminal Justice. Advanced online publication.
https://doi.org/10.1163/15718174-bja10039
Varese, F. (2011). Mafias on the move: How organized crime conquers new
territories. Princeton University Press.
Veltri E., Laudati A. (2009), “Mafia Pulita”, Longanesi, Milano.
von Lampe, K. (2008). Organized crime in Europe: Conceptions and realities.
Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 2(1), 7-17.
https://doi.org/10.1093/police/pan015
Wallerstein, I. M. (1984). The politics of the world economy: The states, the
movements, and the civilizations. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] : Cambridge
University Press.
Weinberger, D., Gandilhon, M., Shah, J., & Lalam, N. (2019). Illegal cannabis
cultivation in Europe: new developments. EchoGéo, 48. DOI:
10.4000/echogeo.17704
Williams, P. (1998). The Nature of Drug-Trafficking Networks. Current History,
97(618), 154–159. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45319654
Wolfe, D., & Csete, J. (2012). On Drug Policy, Europe Shows Us the Money—
and It’s Ugly. Open Society Foundations. Retrieved from:
https://opensocietyfoundations.org
Zampini, G. F. (2018). Evidence and Morality in HarmReduction Debates: Can
We Use Value-Neutral Arguments to Achieve Value-Driven Goals? Palgrave
Communications, 4, 1–10.
Zuccato, E., Chiabrando, C., Castiglioni, S., Bagnati, R. and Fanelli, R. (2008),
‘Estimating community drug abuse by wastewater analysis', Environmental
Health Perspectives 116(8), pp. 1027–1032
