Content uploaded by Ahmed Shafiqul Huque
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Ahmed Shafiqul Huque on May 07, 2015
Content may be subject to copyright.
International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management
Accountability and governance: strengthening extra-bureaucratic mechanisms in
Bangladesh
Ahmed Shafiqul Huque
Article information:
To cite this document:
Ahmed Shafiqul Huque, (2011),"Accountability and governance: strengthening extra-bureaucratic
mechanisms in Bangladesh", International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management, Vol. 60
Iss 1 pp. 59 - 74
Permanent link to this document:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/17410401111094312
Downloaded on: 07 May 2015, At: 09:41 (PT)
References: this document contains references to 49 other documents.
To copy this document: permissions@emeraldinsight.com
The fulltext of this document has been downloaded 1576 times since 2011*
Users who downloaded this article also downloaded:
Abu Elias Sarker, (2006),"New public management in developing countries: An analysis of success and
failure with particular reference to Singapore and Bangladesh", International Journal of Public Sector
Management, Vol. 19 Iss 2 pp. 180-203 http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09513550610650437
Anis Chowdhury, (2002),"Politics, society and financial sector reform in Bangladesh", International Journal
of Social Economics, Vol. 29 Iss 12 pp. 963-988 http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03068290210447003
Habib Zafarullah, Redwanur Rahman, (2008),"The impaired state: assessing state capacity and
governance in Bangladesh", International Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol. 21 Iss 7 pp. 739-752
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09513550810904541
Access to this document was granted through an Emerald subscription provided by 191455 []
For Authors
If you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please use our Emerald for
Authors service information about how to choose which publication to write for and submission guidelines
are available for all. Please visit www.emeraldinsight.com/authors for more information.
About Emerald www.emeraldinsight.com
Emerald is a global publisher linking research and practice to the benefit of society. The company
manages a portfolio of more than 290 journals and over 2,350 books and book series volumes, as well as
providing an extensive range of online products and additional customer resources and services.
Emerald is both COUNTER 4 and TRANSFER compliant. The organization is a partner of the Committee
on Publication Ethics (COPE) and also works with Portico and the LOCKSS initiative for digital archive
preservation.
*Related content and download information correct at time of download.
Downloaded by McMaster University At 09:41 07 May 2015 (PT)
Accountability and governance:
strengthening extra-bureaucratic
mechanisms in Bangladesh
Ahmed Shafiqul Huque
Department of Political Science, McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada
Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to examine accountability arrangements in Bangladesh and to identify
strengths and weaknesses, as well as potentials for improvement.
Design/methodology/approach – The study is based on review and analysis of published
documents and data and information obtained on field visits to Bangladesh.
Findings – The administrative system in Bangladesh is driven by complex rules and procedures
with weak institutional support. Internal mechanisms of accountability in administrative
organizations have become ineffective due to existing political, economic and social conditions.
Therefore, the external mechanisms of accountability must be strengthened to ensure good
governance in Bangladesh.
Social implications – A weak system of accountability renders the task of public management
difficult and the establishment of good governance unattainable. Improvements in social conditions
can be expected with the strengthening of accountability mechanisms.
Originality/value – The value of this paper lies in the identification of factors such as institutional
disharmony, politicization and corruption as the most formidable barriers to accountability and good
governance in Bangladesh. It presents a fresh analysis of the factors and points to the potentials for
improvement.
Keywords Bureaucracy, Parliament, Governance, Bangladesh
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
Accountability is identified as an essential element in achieving good governance. New
states that do not have a long tradition of functioning under an operational system of
accountability face the challenge of establishing a system of governance that ensures a
responsive, equitable and effective government. Since achieving independence in 1971,
Bangladesh has suffered from numerous problems. Military intervention, political
instability, natural disasters, overpopulation, corruption and a number of other factors
have impeded the progress of the country. Post-colonial legacy of the British and
Pakistani rules has been a strong obstacle, and efforts to ensure good governance have
been futile, as an intriguing set of features and circumstances contribute to the
problem[1].
Judging by reports, speeches and rhetoric coming out of Bangladesh, political
leadership, administrative officials and citizens consider good governance to be the
solution to the numerous problems confronting the country[2]. Poverty,
administrative incapacity, political instability and a number of other maladies
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/1741-0401.htm
The author wishes to acknowledge valuable comments and suggestions from two anonymous
referees and Professor Arie Halachmi.
Accountability
and governance
59
International Journal of Productivity
and Performance Management
Vol. 60 No. 1, 2011
pp. 59-74
qEmerald Group Publishing Limited
1741-0401
DOI 10.1108/17410401111094312
Downloaded by McMaster University At 09:41 07 May 2015 (PT)
make life extremely difficult for the citizens. Political leaders become overwhelmed
at the magnitude of problems and administrative officials appear to be captives of
the system that does not allow them to perform effectively. Most of these
problems can be traced to the absence of an effective system of accountability in
Bangladesh. Lack of accountability has resulted in administrative failure, poor
political decisions and high incidence of corruption. Therefore, a sound system of
accountability could be the first step in alleviating most of the weaknesses in the
administrative system of Bangladesh. In fact, good governance as an overarching
principle can be realized through a number of building blocks such as
accountability and other mechanisms.
This article reviews the concept of accountability to establish a framework for
examining the existing circumstances in Bangladesh. An examination of the
constitutional arrangements for accountability will help understand the context in
which the concept is to be operationalized. At the same time, the political aspects of the
issue need to be recognized. In addition to the internal arrangements found in
government agencies and organizations, it is useful to consider the role of the
Parliament and its committees, media, political parties, think tanks and the civil society
because all have a role to play in the process. Further constraints emerge due to the
disharmony between the executive, legislature and judiciary. In addition, corruption
and adversarial relationships between the two major political parties pose obstacles in
the way of an effective system of accountability. The ultimate objective is to argue that
established internal arrangements for accountability in the public services of
Bangladesh are neutralized by bureaucratic and political interests, and
extra-bureaucratic means and mechanisms need to be strengthened to facilitate
accountability.
Accountability as a tool of governance
The linkages between governance and accountability are obvious. Rhodes correctly
pointed out that governance takes on a number of meanings and described it as a “new
process of governing”, and refers to “self-organizing, interorganizational networks
characterized by interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game and significant
autonomy from the state” (Rhodes, 1997, p. 15). Peters (2000, p. 31) suggests that
governance implies changes in the public sector that minimize the role of formal
governmental actors. The World Bank (1989) views governance as “the exercise of
political power to manage a nation’s affairs”, and the Asian Development Bank (1997)
describes it as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is
exercised for the common good”. Kooiman (1993, p. 258) goes on to describe the
phenomenon as “the pattern or structure that emerges in a socio-political system as a
common result or outcome of the interacting intervention efforts of all involved actors”.
Almost all analysis of governance places accountability as a critical element in the
framework. Brinkerhoff (2006, p. 270) lists transparency, responsiveness and
accountability as its core components.
There are good reasons for actors involved in decision-making in government, the
private sector and civil society organizations to be accountable to the public, as well as
to institutional stakeholders. Accountability acquired increased importance as modern
governments seek to enhance the degree of freedom and empower managers to manage
IJPPM
60,1
60
Downloaded by McMaster University At 09:41 07 May 2015 (PT)
in order to achieve targets. It provides the critical check and balance in the more
liberated environment of public administration.
Accountability refers to the extent to which one must answer to higher authority –
legal or organizational – for one’s action in society at large or within one’s particular
organizational position (Shafritz and Russell, 1997, p. 376). It is grounded in
arrangements to call public officials, private employers or service providers to account
requiring that they be answerable for their policies, actions and use of public money.
This has emerged as a major issue in Bangladesh because corruption, or the abuse of
public office for private gain, has affected the quality of administrative decisions, and
the consequences have been very bad for the poor sections of society. This group does
not have direct access to officials and are the least likely to be able to obtain public
services.
Day and Klein (1987) identified five types of accountability – political, financial,
professional, managerial and legal. They highlight the need for public officials to be
accountable for responding to the needs of citizens, using taxpayers’ money
judiciously, remaining dedicated to their professions, properly using authority
delegated to them for specified tasks, and upholding the rule of law. This paper focuses
on three types of accountability mechanisms: political, administrative and public or
social. Political accountability is related to the performance of governments formed by
political parties. The right to govern by representatives of the citizens in the legislature
is ensured through democratic elections. Administrative accountability of government
agencies is attained through internal mechanisms, both vertically within and
horizontally across organizations in the public sector. Public/social accountability
mechanisms help to hold government officials and agencies accountable to citizens.
This is important because, in developing countries, there is frequent interaction
between administrative and political actors. Such arrangements have the potential to
reinforce political and administrative accountability mechanisms.
Romzek and Dubnik (1991) categorized accountability on the basis of source of
control (internal or external) and the degree of control (tight or loose). DeLeon argued
that “different accountability mechanisms are appropriate in different circumstances”,
and added that it depends “on the type of problems it is designed to handle” (DeLeon,
1998, p. 553). For countries like Bangladesh, a number of tools and strategies may be
considered to ensure greater accountability to citizens for public actions and outcomes.
Access to information by citizens builds pressure for improving accountability,
whether in setting priorities for national expenditure, providing access to quality
schools, ensuring that roads once finalized get built, or seeing to it that medicines are
actually delivered and available in health centres. Access to laws and impartial justice
is also critical to protect the rights of poor people and pro-poor coalitions to enable
them to demand accountability, whether from their governments or from private sector
institutions.
Following the lead of western democratic countries, many developing countries
have adopted similar frameworks for ensuring accountability. They include:
.external-formal mechanisms: legislative committees and parliamentary
questions; control of political executives over public agencies; administrative
courts and ombudsman;
Accountability
and governance
61
Downloaded by McMaster University At 09:41 07 May 2015 (PT)
.external-informal mechanisms: public hearings, interest groups; opinion polls;
media;
.internal-formal mechanisms: rules; codes of conduct; hierarchies; performance
reviews; and
.internal-informal mechanisms: organizational culture; professional ethics; peer
pressure (Haque, 2001, p. 606). Several of these mechanisms appear to be
ineffective in Bangladesh.
“Central to good governance, and a special aspect of the rule of law, is the efficient and
accountable management of public finances” (World Bank, 2002, p. xi). At the
community level, it is also important to give poor groups choice as well as the
resources to purchase technical assistance from any provider rather than accepting it
from the government. Fiscal discipline can be imposed by setting limits and reducing
subsidies over time. Contractor accountability is ensured when poor people decide
whether the service was delivered as contracted and whether the contractor should be
paid. When poor people can hold providers of public service accountable, it will be
possible to shift the location of control and power in their favour.
In simple terms, accountability means answerability for the discharge of duties or
conduct. It calls for satisfactory reasons for the conduct of officials as well as
acknowledgement of responsibility for their actions. An effective system of
accountability serves as a check on power and authority, and is applicable to both
politicians and administrators. In this sense, accountability is both a mechanism and a
process, by which the political leadership of a country discharges its routine duties
through ministers and civil servants, and these officials are required to account for
their actions or inactions on matters related to administration. Public administrators
are bureaucratically accountable to elected officials and political officials are politically
accountable to the voters (Hughes, 1998). This arrangement helps to free the
government from encountering challenges to authority, avoid potential mistakes by its
officials, and protect public interests.
Accountability in various aspects of public affairs presents a formidable challenge
in Bangladesh. It is essential for establishing the legitimacy of governing elites, as well
as ensuring just and equitable treatment of the citizens. At the same time, an effective
system of accountability can contribute to improvements in the production, delivery
and distribution of pubic services. The following section reviews the state of
bureaucratic accountability in Bangladesh and the inadequacies that affect the process.
The situation reflects the classic tension between “moral” and “political” responsibility
highlighted by Friedrich and Finer. While Friedrich (1940) favoured ethical values and
professional standards to guide the behavior of public officials, Finer (1941) argued for
the establishment of external measures for keeping them in check[3]. Bangladesh
provides an interesting milieu for testing these ideas.
Bureaucratic accountability in Bangladesh
The administrative agencies in Bangladesh are organized in a hierarchical structure,
with the central Secretariat in the capital as the nerve centre. The system is based on a
legal-rational framework and has been in effect since the British colonial period and
later (1947-1971) when Bangladesh formed part of the state of Pakistan. Statistics are
IJPPM
60,1
62
Downloaded by McMaster University At 09:41 07 May 2015 (PT)
not regularly published, and it is difficult to obtain accurate numbers for the purpose of
analysis. Zafarullah (1998, pp. 88-90) categorized ministries and departments into
executive, regulatory, service-oriented/welfare, developmental, promotional, advisory,
research, and international to demonstrate the extent of their breadth and coverage.
Therefore, public officials are engaged in performing a wide variety of tasks and a
framework of accountability is needed to guide their behavior.
There is vertical and horizontal differentiation in the structure of public
administration in Bangladesh. Ministries are generally organized along functional
lines with a rigid hierarchy of levels. The bureaucracy used to attract the best available
talent in the country to its ranks and this institution acquired influence as the political
system crumbled and military intervention shifted power to an alliance of the army
and bureaucracy (Huque and Rahman, 2003). The slide in public accountability can be
attributed to the political instability and problems of legitimacy faced by successive
governments in Bangladesh.
The structure of government in Bangladesh has undergone changes frequently in
the early years. Immediately after independence, Bangladesh adopted a system of
multi-party parliamentary democracy in which the legislature, the cabinet of ministers
and the opposition in the parliament had a major role to play in ensuring accountability
(see Constitution, Part V). In 1975, an amendment of the constitution resulted in the
establishment of a single-party presidential form of government, and the balance of
power shifted to the executive (Hakim and Huque, 1995). Soon after wards, the military
captured power and, in the process of civilianization, opted for a multi-party
executive-led system. The government was dominated by military leaders who did not
appear to be accountable for their decisions and actions (Huque and Akhter, 1989), and
power was concentrated in the office of the President.
As in all bureaucracies, the first and foremost mechanism for accountability in
Bangladesh is the administrative hierarchy. The bureaucracy at the central secretariat
is organized into Sections, Branches, Wings, Divisions and Ministries. In each unit,
there are arrangements for supervisors to ensure accountability of the officials under
their charge. Senior Assistant Secretaries are in charge of sections and Deputy
Secretaries, of branches. Wings are headed by Joint Secretaries, and Divisions by
Secretaries or Additional Secretaries. The Ministries are headed by ministers and the
hierarchical setting helps ensure accountability of officials at the lower levels. For the
purpose of field administration, Bangladesh is divided into divisions, districts, and
upazilas (sub-districts). Divisional Commissioners supervise the work of District
Commissioners who, in turn, supervise Upazila Nirbahi Officers. In turn, the
supervisors at the highest level of Secretariat/Ministry and field administration are
accountable to the respective ministers (Mollah, 2008, pp. 92-93).
The supervisory-subordinate relationships contribute to the process of
accountability in a number of ways. Annual confidential reports (ACRs) are
prepared by the supervisors on the performance of officials. The ACRs constitute an
integral component of the assessment for career advancement, and can result in denial
of promotion, increment or other rewards. Although the heavy reliance on ACRs is
often viewed as unfair due to the lack of objectivity on the part of those preparing
them, they continue to be in use (Ali, 2004). The ACR is supplemented by supervision,
Accountability
and governance
63
Downloaded by McMaster University At 09:41 07 May 2015 (PT)
inspection, audits, and written reports on the performance of the agency as well as
officials.
The Rules of Business are designed to guide the functions of officials and have
served as another mechanism for ensuring accountability. They govern the activities in
public organizations in Bangladesh, and are used as the basis for making decisions.
The Rules of Business remained unchanged since 1975 and hence may cause confusion
among public officials. Military rule led to the establishment of strong presidential
systems, and permanent secretaries of the ministries emerged as executive heads and
principal accounting officers of their respective ministries. The ministers had hardly
any power, and needed full and direct support of the President to function. “Before
1996, the permanent secretaries and civil administrative officials (but not the ministers,
though they were elected members of the Parliament) were Executive Heads and
Principal Accounting Officers of the Ministries” (Mollah, 2008, p. 93). Thus, the lines of
accountability have remained fuzzy over the years.
In addition, bureaucratic agencies have other arrangements to ensure
accountability. Failure to perform or complaints of maladministration can trigger
departmental investigations culminating in sanctions. Elements of a code of conduct
for public servants are incorporated in the Government Servants Conduct Rules 1979
(Government of Bangladesh, 1979), and the Government Servants (Discipline and
Appeal) Rules 1985 (Government of Bangladesh, 1985), but there is no integrated code
of conduct that contributes to accountability in public administration in Bangladesh.
To make things worse, intense politicization often frustrates efforts of senior officials
to enforce these rules.
In the past, problems of accountability and a number of related issues had deep
impact on the state of public administration in Bangladesh. Political changes
contributed to the centralization of authority and subsequent politicization of the
bureaucracy had adverse effects on the recruitment process. The consequences
included bureaucratic domination over policy decisions, factionalism and
micro-bureaucracies, and bureaucratic intemperance and intransigence (Zafarullah,
1987). The problems are not exclusively limited to the bureaucracy and reflect a much
wider concern. Kochanek (2000, p. 531) found that “a combination of weak institutions,
patrimonial politics, personalized political parties, patron-client relationships, and the
absence of political consensus have resulted in a partial democracy dominated by
perverse corruption, a lack of transparency, normless behavior, an absence of public
accountability, and political instability”.
To sum up, post-independence bureaucracy in Bangladesh operated on centralized
authority while the hierarchical relations became more flexible in spite of strict central
control. There was an increase of input from below, but the application of rules became
irrational and elitism remained dominant. Superiors were compelled to share power
with subordinates, and the level of trust was low (Huque, 2010). The relationship
between politicians and bureaucrats was interdependent in nature, and the level of
competence varied, as the quality of performance was contingent on the political
affiliation of the official. A high degree of politicization had contributed to all these
changes. The bureaucracy took advantage of weak political and national institutions,
and senior bureaucrats gradually shifted from a position of domination to alliance with
powerful stakeholders in the system (Huque and Rahman, 2003).
IJPPM
60,1
64
Downloaded by McMaster University At 09:41 07 May 2015 (PT)
A number of reforms were attempted with various objectives. They were initiated
by the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh to ensure continuity of
government (1971), control bureaucracy (1972), win public support (1972, 1976, 1984,
1986, 1098, 2004, 2008), strengthen bureaucratic elite (1976), review organization and
personnel (1982), decentralize administration (1982), and make civil service effective
and efficient (1997). In addition, the International Development Association (in
collaboration with the government), World Bank and the United Nations development
Program also undertook studies to identify problems and recommend measures for
improvement. Accountability has featured in almost all the studies as a critical
requirement, but there has been little progress in this area mainly because most of the
reports from reform bodies (except the National pay Commissions) were either ignored
or partially implemented.
Therefore, the internal and bureaucratic mechanisms for accountability remained
ineffective and recommendations for reforms to improve the system were not fully
implemented. This points to the need for exploring the extra-bureaucratic mechanisms
for accountability and assess their potential for making public administration more
accountable in Bangladesh. In addition to the legislature and judiciary, the media and
civil society are demonstrating increasing concern over this issue. Besides, since
Bangladesh is heavily dependent on external aid, the donors (World Bank,
International Monetary Fund, International Development Association, the United
Nations and a number of industrially and economically developed countries) take a
keen interest in enhancing accountability in the country. Finally, the private sector is
also participating in the debate as their operation and productivity is often jeopardized
due to lack of accountability in government.
Problem areas
An overview of the institutional arrangements and relationships as well as
bureaucratic behavior points to a number of factors that act as impediments to
accountability in Bangladesh. They are institutional disharmony, political
partisanship and politicization of the bureaucracy, and high incidence of corruption.
Each of these factors has impacted the effectiveness of the internal mechanisms for
accountability and a combination of these constitutes a major challenge.
Institutional disharmony
The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh (Bangladesh Government,
2004) stipulates the role of the key national institutions and the nature of their
interaction. Unfortunately, frequent political changes in the country did not allow the
constitutional practices to take root, and the institutions have regularly been
manipulated to protect the interests of the ruling groups. The constitution was
amended several times, often for trivial reasons (see Hakim and Huque, 1995). The
Constitution of Bangladesh was adopted in 1972 and it provided for a multi-party
parliamentary democratic form of government. Powers were vested in the legislature
and the President was a titular head of state. In 1975, the constitution was amended to
revert to a single-party presidential system. The country remained under Martial Law
for four years (1975-1979), and the military rulers further curtailed the authority of the
national institutions. A multi-party Presidential system continued until the next
Accountability
and governance
65
Downloaded by McMaster University At 09:41 07 May 2015 (PT)
military takeover in 1982. Bangladesh returned to a multi-party parliamentary
democratic system in 1991.
The inter-institutional harmony was further disturbed by the adoption of an interim,
non-partisan caretaker government since 1996. Owing to complete lack of trust in the
government in power, an arrangement was made to form a caretaker government that is
composed of politically neutral advisors under the leadership of a Chief Advisor. The
mandate of the caretaker government is to hold elections within 90 days and hand over
power to the new elected government. Even this arrangement for ensuring neutrality did
not succeed in establishing trust among competing political parties. On occasions, the
defeated parties have placed the blame on caretaker governments, alleging that they
helped their rivals. Hoque and Ahmed (2004, p. 130) observed that the political leaders
who were instrumental in influencing the introduction of the caretaker government
“have paradoxically become its worst critics”.
Frequent tinkering with the constitution thwarted the prospect of establishing
conventions and practices to guide the behavior of the actors involved in ensuring
accountability in the public services. The bureaucracy has been a dominant partner in
governing Bangladesh for various reasons. Political leaders with scant experience in
governing relied excessively on non-elected members of the bureaucracy to make
policy decisions and implement them. The expertise and experience of the bureaucracy
was recognized by the leaders of Bangladesh, both in civilian and military
governments. This further undermined the sovereignty of the Parliament and the
executive continued to dominate the legislature even after military rule was
terminated. For similar reasons, the judiciary was unable to perform its expected role.
It can be said that the lack of harmony among the national institutions has not allowed
the principle and practice of accountability to work in Bangladesh.
Political partisanship
Bangladesh has a history of experiencing political change through violence as two
Presidents were assassinated and the military took over power several times. The two
principal political parties (Bangladesh Awami League or BAL and Bangladesh
Nationalist Party or BNP) have never been able to work together effectively as the
government and the party in opposition in the political system. These political parties
have demonstrated absolute intolerance of one another, and the party in opposition
refuses to attend sessions of the Parliament. Such strong political division has
permeated all the other institutions. Each party seeks to identify and support its
supporters in the bureaucracy and military while they are in power. With a change of
government, there is a turnaround, and supporters of the other party are appointed to
key positions where they can continue to promote the interest of the governing group.
Political partisanship has resulted in politicization of the bureaucracy at all levels.
There is a tendency among bureaucrats to demonstrate their loyalty to the ruling
political party, in exchange for promotion, prize postings and even the prospect of a
political career after retirement from public service. It was reported that health sector
jobs were “grossly politicized” as only the doctors affiliated with the ruling BAL “are
being given lucrative posts while skilled doctors are being removed from responsible
posts or transferred to remote regions because of their affiliation with other political
parties” (Zannat, 2009).
IJPPM
60,1
66
Downloaded by McMaster University At 09:41 07 May 2015 (PT)
The ruling parties make special efforts to accommodate the expectations of their
supporters. Every change in government is followed by reassignments, dismissals,
promotions and handing out penalties in the form of designating officials as Officer on
Special Duty (OSD). The OSDs receive pay and benefits, but are not assigned to
perform any task. At present, 81 officers are designated as OSDs (The Daily Star,
2009b). Not only does this arrangement result in huge wastage of public resources, it
also encourages political partisanship, because a change of government can reinstate
them in important positions. The requirements of accountability are relaxed for
supporters of the ruling political party, and their actions reflect much more power than
they are officially accorded.
Corruption
For several years, Bangladesh was listed among the most corrupt nations in the
Corruption Perception Index compiled by Transparency International (see www.
transparency.org. various years). Corruption takes many forms in the public sector,
and has rendered the framework of accountability weak. The incidence of corruption
has progressively intensified since the independence of the country. Various
newspapers reports identified some of the key agencies of government such as police,
customs, taxation and the central secretariat as extremely corrupt. A study by Knox
(2009, p. 129) noted the prevalence of petty corruption as well as the fact that key
politicians of Bangladesh (including the two leaders who have served as Prime
Minister and leader of the opposition for the past 18 years) have been charged with
committing corruption[4]. This observation provides a picture of the severe incidence
of corruption in Bangladesh.
Zafarullah and Siddiquee (2001, pp. 469-471) listed pilferage and larceny,
responsibility lapses, bureaucratic intemperance, and patronage as various forms of
corruption. The award of contracts and tenders for procurement and infrastructure
construction without following due procedure is common. It is interesting that political
parties in power initiate cases of corruption against those in opposition. Although it is
claimed that the higher courts have taken a tough stand by delivering verdicts against
powerful political leaders including former Presidents and Ministers (Zafarullah and
Siddiquee, 2001, p. 480), most of these verdicts are overturned as soon as they return to
power. The allegations of corruption are generally perceived to be accurate by the
public, although they do not bear much impact as political pressure is exerted to
dismiss them. Article 66 of the Constitution of Bangladesh stipulates that “A person
shall be disqualified for election as, or for being, a member of Parliament, who has been
convicted for a criminal offence involving moral turpitude, or sentenced to
imprisonment for a term of not less than two years, unless a period of five years
has elapsed since his release”. These ideas appear to be based on unreasonable
assumptions and might encourage corrupt personalities to run for membership of the
legislature (Chowdhury, 2008).
Corruption and its consequences neutralize the official authority that helps to hold
the officials accountable. Ministers and public officials become partners in corrupt
deals, and avoid practices that make administrative systems transparent. Therefore
decisions are made by people in authority without consulting stakeholders, and the
network of corruption protects its members from being exposed or prosecuted.
Accountability
and governance
67
Downloaded by McMaster University At 09:41 07 May 2015 (PT)
Consequently, accountability suffers as the existing channels and frameworks are
never put to use.
Extra-bureaucratic mechanisms
Numerous obstacles exist in the way of ensuring accountability through internal
mechanisms, and it is pertinent to consider the extra-bureaucratic options. Haque
(2001, p. 606) describes the existence of certain basic mechanisms of accountability
such as legislative committees, parliamentary debates, public hearings, ministerial
control, ombudsman, and media scrutiny as some of the most crucial features of the
liberal-democratic framework. Frequent disruptions in the political system of
Bangladesh have not allowed most of these mechanisms to function effectively.
The Jatiya Sangshad (Parliament) is the highest lawmaking body in Bangladesh.
According to Mondal (2009), lawmaking is the main function of the legislature, but it
also investigates or inquires “into the activities or the administration of the ministries
through standing committees”. However, Ahmed and Khan (1995, p. 573) described the
parliament of Bangladesh as “not primarily a lawmaking body but one whose main
function is to exercise oversight over the executive”. The task of oversight is performed
through a number of ways.
Parliamentary questions provide an opportunity for members to bring to the fore
cases of administrative actions and ask for an account from the Ministers concerned
who, in turn, can require the officials in his ministry and department to comply. In the
course of regular parliamentary procedures, issues of accountability and
administrative problems can be brought up by members and assist with oversight.
Ahmed and Ahmed (1996, p. 92) examined the performance of the parliament in
Bangladesh and concluded that they “were generally not successful in ensuring
responsible behaviour”.
Parliamentary committees are expected to serve as a more effective tool in this task.
According to Article 76 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh
(Bangladesh Government, 2004), the Parliament shall appoint a public accounts
committee, committee on privileges and “such other standing committees as the rules
of procedure of Parliament require”. The current parliament appointed from among its
members, standing committees on Public Accounts, Government Assurances, Private
Member’s Bills and Resolutions, Estimates, Rules and Procedures, Public
Undertakings, and Petitions. In addition the Business Advisory Committee, House
Committee, and Library Committee are also standing committees. Additionally, the
largest group of Committees is related to the Ministries and their departments. These
committees examine draft bills and legislative proposals, review the performance of the
ministries, and look into any irregularities in their operation. The committees in the
current parliament were formed within a short time, and they have been holding
regular meetings. A positive sign is that legislators from the opposition political parties
have demonstrated their willingness to contribute, although their parties are
boycotting sessions of the parliament. However, disharmony among institutions and
loopholes in the existing framework of governing has allowed avoidance of
responsibility in many cases[5]:
The parliamentary standing committee on the law, justice and parliamentary affairs ministry
has put forward a legislative proposal aimed at compelling individuals summoned by it or
IJPPM
60,1
68
Downloaded by McMaster University At 09:41 07 May 2015 (PT)
any other such committee to appear before it. The proposal also stipulates that the
committees must be provided with any documents they ask for at any time (The Daily Star,
2009c).
This is expected to strengthen the extent of oversight by the committees of the
Parliament.
In addition, a number of independent commissions have a role to play in ensuring
accountability. The Election Commission, Anti-Corruption Commission and Public
Service Commission are statutory bodies that have the mandate to operate
independently. In the past, the commissions have been criticized for being biased
because appointments to these bodies were made by the President on the advice of the
Prime Minister. Most of the appointments were made to reward supporters of ruling
political parties, and they worked to protect the interest of their appointers. The
members were generally drawn from retired personnel of the judiciary, bureaucracy
and armed forces. At present, all the three Commissions are headed by retired
bureaucrats, and there is dissatisfaction among political and civil society leaders over
their performance. These appointments were made by the caretaker government that
governed Bangladesh for almost two years, in contravention of the stipulation to hold
elections within ninety days of taking charge. Consequently, the caretaker government
which was adopted to strengthen democracy, “has become a threat to it” (Hoque and
Ahmed, 2004).
Civil society organizations in the form of non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
indigenous community groups, mass organizations, cooperatives, religious societies,
professional bodies, trade unions, think tanks, and interest groups have flourished in
Bangladesh since the early days. Immediately after achieving independence in 1971, a
number of NGOs participated in relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction tasks, and
over the years, has established their position as useful participants in the process of
governing. The state “failed to assist the poor or reduce poverty”, and NGOs stepped in
to fill this gap (Ahmad, 2001). These organizations are involved in social and economic
programs of poverty alleviation, literacy, human rights, health care, micro-finance,
environmental protection, as well as awareness of social and political rights. Their
efforts have raised the level of awareness among the citizens – both in urban and rural
areas – and the impact is gradually becoming visible. Citizen awareness is a
significant element in ensuring accountability and the progress in this area has been
impressive.
Although each civil society organization may be driven by its own agenda, they
contribute to the accountability of the government by facilitating and disseminating
public opinion. For example, NGOs and other representatives from civil society “are
increasingly putting pressure on the government to improve its administration in order
to meet the growing social needs” (SIDCA, 2001, p. 31). The Centre for Policy Dialogue,
a prominent think tank summed up the role of the civil society in the following words:
Areas of involvement of the civil society in the context of Bangladesh are policy advocacy,
mobilization of public opinion, demand creation, active participation in policy formulation
process, bridging the gap between citizens and government pressurizing the government
with the help of the media, supporting the popular movement in favour of a given policy
issue, lobbying with the donor groups/development partners, playing the role of
mediator/arbitrator between citizens and government, and policy analysis (CPD, 2001, p. 9).
Accountability
and governance
69
Downloaded by McMaster University At 09:41 07 May 2015 (PT)
Bangladesh has a thriving network of media in a variety of forms. Noticeable progress
has been made in terrestrial and satellite television broadcasts, and internet versions of
newspapers are read by Bangladeshis from all over the world. Although some sections
of the media are dedicated to support certain political parties, they serve as the first
mechanism to detect problems and disseminate information to a worldwide audience.
In recent years, the electronic media has proliferated, and the citizens have access to
overseas channels through satellite links. The government controls only one television
channel while there are a number of privately owned channels. The private channels
report regularly on maladministration, irregularities and administrative lapses and the
government has become more sensitive to adverse reports in the media due to its
ability to reach huge number of people both at home and abroad. Round table
discussions sponsored by think tanks and newspapers and chat shows on television
are increasingly attracting the attention of more citizens and ideas and strategies for
progress are discussed. Blair (2001, p. 185) found that civil society supports and
strengthens democracy through increasing accountability by widening participation.
While the level of effectiveness of bureaucratic mechanisms for accountability
appears to be low, the extra-bureaucratic means hold better prospect. The central
legislature provides a forum for raising questions on issues of significance, and
registering concern at the highest level of government. The independent commissions
are making efforts to become established as useful paraphernalia in strengthening
accountability, and civil society organizations are contributing to the process through
programs to include the disadvantaged groups as well as the urban e
´lite in public
affairs. The media performs a critical role in informing the citizens and this has the
potential to promote accountability in the public service. Committees of the legislature,
debates in the parliament and public hearings, and constant vigilance by the media
have the potentials to promote accountability in Bangladesh.
Conclusions and recommendations
Although this paper suggests the strengthening of extra-bureaucratic means and
mechanisms of accountability in Bangladesh, several constraints remain. The same
factors that impede internal bureaucratic mechanisms for accountability inhibit the
extra-bureaucratic agencies to a certain extent. The Parliament has never been fully
effective in the sense that there has never been an effective opposition in the legislature.
It has either been dominated by an overwhelming majority, or boycotted by the
opposition who did not participate in the proceedings. These factors point to the need
for the promotion and inculcation of a democratic culture in which the level of trust
among political parties will be higher. There is a need for tolerance of diverse views
and opinions and the ability to incorporate input from all stakeholders, including the
members of the opposition, to decisions on public affairs. It is imperative to restore all
authority to the national institutions in accordance with constitutional provisions.
Civil society organizations have proliferated and have a presence in all geographical
regions of the country, yet their contribution remains limited. Their activities are
generally based on specific issues, and they will be more effective if the public space
could be opened up so that these organizations could participate in the governing
process. They will be able to provide diverse perspectives based on their experience at
the grassroots level. Additionally, a vibrant network of print and electronic media has
IJPPM
60,1
70
Downloaded by McMaster University At 09:41 07 May 2015 (PT)
successfully highlighted problems with accountability and the need to deal with it. The
civil society and political leadership could work together to overcome problems
resulting from institutional disharmony by initiating major changes in the political
culture. The incidence of corruption could be minimized through the introduction of a
system of rewards and incentives and taking a strong stand with the full force of
political will. Politicization can be facilitated by establishing a fair and equitable
system in which all citizens will have the opportunity to achieve their potentials.
Finally, accountability in the political and administrative activities will enhance the
legitimacy of governments.
Accountability can be fully effective only after implementing qualitative changes in
the management of public affairs. This involves widespread political, electoral and
administrative reforms. While some progress has been made in the area of public
service reform, they have not had much impact due to the bottlenecks inherent in the
political and electoral arrangements. The approach to governing needs to be shifted
from the traditional, rigid, hierarchical and rule-based form to a flexible and role
oriented nature. Most importantly, Bangladesh needs a democratic political culture and
a restoration of trust in the electoral system to develop a culture that will be conducive
to the integration of accountability in all the critical areas. Ackerman (2004, p. 447)
developed a model of “co-governance” for accountability that would allow social actors
“to participate in the core activities of the state”. Given the proliferation and perceived
effectiveness of extra-bureaucratic mechanisms of accountability in Bangladesh, the
model of co-governance could be appropriate.
The notion of accountability is intimately linked with the concept of open and
democratic governmental structure and processes. While the internal bureaucratic
mechanisms are relatively less complicated and appear amenable to all organizations
regardless of the dominant culture and approach to governance, extra-bureaucratic
mechanisms depend on the support from numerous stakeholders in the society.
Therefore, values associated with democracy such as rule of law, inclusiveness, human
rights, free and fair elections, and a competitive political party system need to be
strengthened in order to develop an effective system of accountability in Bangladesh.
Notes
1. For details on the independence of Bangladesh and subsequent political and administrative
developments, see Lifschultz (1979), Maniruzzaman (1980), Zafarullah (1987), Ahamed
(1988), Huque and Akhter (1989), Huque (1997), and Zafarullah and Siddiquee (2001).
2. The idea of “good governance” as the remedy to most political and administrative problems
in Bangladesh appear to be the conclusion of most seminars, workshops, television talk
shows and media reports in the country. In recent times, the idea resonates in the speeches of
political leaders.
3. For an interesting analysis, see Jackson (2009).
4. It was not surprising to see that soon after assuming power, both leaders have had cases
against them (and their party leaders) thrown out of court on the excuse that all the cases
were politically motivated.
5. For example, parliamentary committees have summoned the former Speaker, Deputy
Speaker and Chief Whip of the Parliament and the former Chair of the Anti-Corruption
Commission to appear and testify. None of them appeared (The Daily Star, 2009a)
Accountability
and governance
71
Downloaded by McMaster University At 09:41 07 May 2015 (PT)
References
Ackerman, J. (2004), “Co-governance for accountability: beyond ‘exit’ and ‘voice’”, World
Development, Vol. 32, pp. 447-63.
Ahamed, E. (1988), Military Rule and the Myth of Democracy, University Press Limited, Dhaka.
Ahmad, M.M. (2001), “The State, laws and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in
Bangladesh”, The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law, Vol. 3, available at: www.
icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol3iss3/art_1.htm
Ahmed, N. and Ahmed, A. (1996), “The quest for accountability: parliament and public
administration in Bangladesh”, Asian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 18, pp. 70-95.
Ahmed, N. and Khan, S. (1995), “The development of parliamentary oversight in Bangladesh:
a research note”, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 20, pp. 573-83.
Ali, A.M.M.S. (2004), Bangladesh Civil Service: A Political-Administrative Perspective, University
Press Limited, Dhaka.
Asian Development Bank (1997), Governance: Promoting Sound Development Management,
Asian Development Bank, Manila.
Blair, H.W. (2001), “Civil society, democratic development and international donors”, in Jahan, R.
(Ed.), Bangladesh: Promise and Performance, Zed Books, London, pp. 181-217.
Brinkerhoff, D.W. (2006), “Accountability and good governance: concepts and issues”,
in Huque, A.S. and Zafarullah, H. (Eds), International Development Governance, Taylor
& Francis, New York, NY, pp. 269-87.
Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) (2001), “Policy brief on ‘Administrative reform and local
government’”, available at: www.cpd.org.bd/html/PolicyBrief/subfolders/PB01/task_
force_reports/Admin.pdf
Chowdhury, A. (2008), “The constitution, democracy and corruption in Bangladesh”, The Daily
Star, 15 January.
Bangladesh Government (2004), The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh (as
amended up to 17 May 2004), Bangladesh Government Press, Dhaka.
(The) Daily Star (2009a), “Probe body summons Sircar, Akhtar, Delwar: asks them to appear on
June 10 to explain graft allegations”, (The) Daily Star, Dhaka, 15 May.
(The) Daily Star (2009b), “OSD pool includes 10 secys (Secretaries)”, (The) Daily Star, Dhaka,
7 September.
(The) Daily Star (2009c), “Editorial: seeking more power for JS committees”, (The) Daily Star,
Dhaka, 25 November.
Day, P. and Klein, R. (1987), Accountability: Five Public Services, Tavistock, London.
DeLeon, L. (1998), “Accountability in a ‘reinvented’ government”, Public Administration, Vol. 76,
pp. 539-58.
Finer, H. (1941), “Administrative responsibility in democratic government”, Public
Administration Review, Vol. 1, pp. 335-50.
Friedrich, C.J. (1940), “Public policy and the nature of administrative responsibility”,
in Friedrich, C.J. and Mason, E. (Eds), Public Policy: A Yearbook of the Graduate School
of Public Administration, Vol. 1, Harvard University Press, Boston, MA.
Government of Bangladesh (1979), The Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1979.
Government of Bangladesh (1985), The Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules,
1985.
IJPPM
60,1
72
Downloaded by McMaster University At 09:41 07 May 2015 (PT)
Hakim, M.A. and Huque, A.S. (1995), “Governmental change and constitutional amendments in
Bangladesh”, South Asian Survey, Vol. 2, pp. 255-70.
Haque, M.S. (2001), “Significance of accountability under the new approach to public
governance”, International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 66, pp. 599-617.
Hoque, A. and Ahmed, K. (2004), “How effective can a caretaker government be?”, The Daily Star,
5 December.
Hughes, O. (1998), Public Management and Administration: An Introduction, 2nd ed., Macmillan,
London.
Huque, A.S. (1997), “The impact of colonialism: thoughts on politics and governance in
Bangladesh”, Asian Affairs, Vol. 84, pp. 15-27.
Huque, A.S. (2010), “Traditions and bureaucracy in Bangladesh”, in Painter, M. and Peters, B.G.
(Eds), Tradition and Public Administration, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 57-68.
Huque, A.S. and Akhter, M.Y. (1989), “Militarisation and opposition in Bangladesh:
parliamentary approval and public reaction”, The Journal of Commonwealth and
Comparative Politics, Vol. 27, pp. 172-84.
Huque, A.S. and Rahman, M.T. (2003), “From domination to alliance: shifting strategies and
accumulation of power by the bureaucracy in Bangladesh”, Public Organization Review,
Vol. 3, pp. 403-18.
Jackson, M. (2009), “Responsibility versus accountability in the Friedrich-Finer debate”, Journal
of Management History, Vol. 15, pp. 66-77.
Knox, C. (2009), “Dealing with sectoral corruption in Bangladesh: developing citizen
involvement”, Public Administration and Development, Vol. 29, pp. 117-32.
Kochanek, S. (2000), “Governance, patronage politics and democratic transition in Bangladesh”,
Asian Survey, Vol. 40, pp. 530-50.
Kooiman, J. (1993), “Findings, speculations and recommendations”, in Kooiman, J. (Ed.), Modern
Governance: New Government-Society Interactions, Sage, London, pp. 249-62.
Lifschultz, L. (1979), Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution, Zed Books, London.
Maniruzzaman, T. (1980), Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath, Bangladesh Books
International, Dhaka.
Mollah, M.A.H. (2008), “Bureaucracy and accountability: the case of Bangladesh”, International
Journal on Governmental Financial Management, pp. 87-100.
Mondal, A.L. (2009), “300 lawmakers, or administrators?”, The Daily Star, 18 August.
Peters, B.G. (2000), “Public service reform: comparative perspective”, in Lindquist, E. (Ed.),
Government Restructuring and Career Public Service, Institute of Public Administration of
Canada, Toronto, pp. 27-39.
Rhodes, R. (1997), Understanding Governance, Open University Press, Buckingham.
Romzek, B. and Dubnik, M. (1991), “Accountability, professionalism and leadership:
the Los Angeles Police Department and the Rodney King beating”, paper presented at
the National Public Management Conference, The Maxwell School, Syracuse University,
Syracuse, New York, NY.
Shafritz, J.M. and Russell, E.W. (1997), Public Administration, Addison-Wesley, New York, NY.
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDCA) (2001), Country Analysis,
Bangladesh, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, January.
World Bank (1989), Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, The World Bank,
Washington, DC.
Accountability
and governance
73
Downloaded by McMaster University At 09:41 07 May 2015 (PT)
World Bank (2002), Taming Leviathan: Reforming Governance in Bangladesh. An Institutional
Review, The World Bank, Washington DC.
Zafarullah, H. (1987), “Public administration in the first decade of Bangladesh: some observations
on developments and trends”, Asian Survey, Vol. 27, pp. 459-76.
Zafarullah, H. (1998), “National administration in Bangladesh: an analysis of organisational
arrangements and operating methods”, Asian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 20,
pp. 79-112.
Zafarullah, H. and Siddiquee, N.A. (2001), “Dissecting public sector corruption in Bangladesh:
issues and problems of control”, Public Organization Review, Vol. 1, pp. 465-86.
Zannat, M. (2009), “Health sector jobs grossly politicized”, The Daily Star, 8 June.
Further reading
World Bank (1996), Bangladesh: Government that Works: Reforming the Public Sector, The
World Bank, Washington DC.
About the author
Ahmed Shafiqul Huque is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at
McMaster University, Canada. He has taught and researched in universities in Canada, Hong
Kong, the UK, New Zealand and Bangladesh and provided consulting service to a number of
national and international agencies. He is the author of ten books and numerous articles in
peer-reviewed journals. Ahmed Shafiqul Huque can be contacted at: huqueas@mcmaster.ca
IJPPM
60,1
74
To purchase reprints of this article please e-mail: reprints@emeraldinsight.com
Or visit our web site for further details: www.emeraldinsight.com/reprints
Downloaded by McMaster University At 09:41 07 May 2015 (PT)
This article has been cited by:
1. Dhruba Kumar Gautam. 2015. Strategic integration of HRM for organizational performance: Nepalese
reality. South Asian Journal of Global Business Research 4:1, 110-128. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
2. Patrick Mapulanga. 2015. Public procurement legislation and the acquisition of library materials in
academic libraries in Malawi. Library Review 64:1/2, 101-117. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
3. Ahmed K. Rashid. 2014. The role of the bureaucracy in policymaking in Bangladesh. Asia Pacific Journal
of Public Administration 36, 150-161. [CrossRef]
4. Moitswadi Mofokeng, Rose Luke. 2014. An investigation into the effectiveness of public entities’
procurement practices. Journal of Transport and Supply Chain Management 8. . [CrossRef]
5. Habib Zafarullah. 2013. Bureaucratic Culture and the Social-Political Connection: The Bangladesh
Example. International Journal of Public Administration 36, 932-939. [CrossRef]
6. Ahmed K. Rashid. 2013. Efficacy of Think Tanks in Influencing Public Policies: The Case of Bangladesh.
Asian Journal of Political Science 21, 62-79. [CrossRef]
7. Nurul Absar, Balasundaram Nimalathasan, Monowar Mahmood. 2012. HRM‐market performance
relationship: evidence from Bangladeshi organizations. South Asian Journal of Global Business Research 1:2,
238-255. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
8. Shamsud D. Chowdhury, Monowar H. Mahmood. 2012. Societal institutions and HRM practices: an
analysis of four European multinational subsidiaries in Bangladesh. The International Journal of Human
Resource Management 23, 1808-1831. [CrossRef]
9. Shahjahan H. Bhuiyan. 2011. Trajectories of E-Government Implementation for Public Sector Service
Delivery in Kazakhstan. International Journal of Public Administration 34, 604-615. [CrossRef]
Downloaded by McMaster University At 09:41 07 May 2015 (PT)
