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India: Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate from 2004 to 2014 (compared to the previous year)
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The expectations of Indian masses have skyrocketed since the new election results. There is excitement and anticipation in the air from all factions of society and industry. Will it be resurgent India taking giant strides towards a vibrating economy or will there be strategic moves on consolidation and then acceleration? The New Prime Minister has...
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... corporate brilliance with a continu- ous rise of excellent entrepreneurs has always kept India's economy in the news. A decade ago, the country with an Annual growth @ 10% (see Figure 1) was on its course with the attention of the world on its progress. Even during the financial crisis, India did reasonably well albeit slow (Bajaj, 2009) and seemed destined to rival China. ...
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Citations
... Some authors focused on cooperation between Central European countries and India. Svobodová and Fernandes (2014) state that despite limited trade and political contacts in the past, there are mutual interests in enhancing relations and cooperation. Tremendous investment and trade opportunities can be found in research and development, infrastructure, construction, transport, communication, or energy. ...
... As many as 81 commodities were worth less than 0.7, so we see room for expanding trade cooperation between the V4 countries and India in deepening intra-industry trade in commodities, where countries have a similar RCA profile. We agree with Laš (2017) that there is a space for deeper cooperation in terms of trade and mutual interests for improving mutual relations, as stated by Svobodová and Fernandes (2014) and Kugiel and Upadhyay (2017). ...
EU stepped up its efforts to reinforce its presence in the Asian region, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, due to increasing geo-strategic importance for the EU, high mutual interconnectedness, as well as trade and investment engagement. In September 2021, the EU adopted its first Indo-Pacific Strategy. The aim of the paper is to point out the development of the partnership between the EU and the Asian (Indo-Pacific) region based on the evaluation of the analysis of trade and investment cooperation between the EU and India with a focus on mutual trade and investment relations between the Visegrad Group countries and India (and point out the comparative advantages that the V4 countries might use to extend mutual trade cooperation). The paper is based on trade analysis, and empirical methods of RCA and Grubel Lloyd indices were used. There is room for expanding cooperation between the V4 countries and India in deepening intra-industry trade in commodities, where countries have a similar RCA profile. Moreover, the cooperation could complement bilateral relations between both regions. Implications for Central European audience: The paper evaluates V4 competitiveness and assesses V4’s export potential (RCA index) with India and potential trade prospects with India (RCA1) to confirm that there is room for expanding trade cooperation between regions. We consider the V4 countries to be one of the regions that could deepen its mutual relations with India and intensify political dialogue and, therefore, take mutual cooperation and relations to the next level as well as deepen cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.
... Despite the VoC's detractors (e.g. Ebenau, 2012;Herrigel & Zeitlin, 2010;Streeck, 2011Streeck, , 2016 capitalist institutions within both the DME and SME models offer a snapshot of the potential trajectory of Hungarian economic development and subsequently the remaining DME cases, should investments increase in size and importance from the SME cases; a trend with potential given increases in Chinese capital flows into the V4 (Matura, 2017;McCaleb & Szunomár, 2017) and India (Svobodová & Fernandes, 2014)both SME casesas well as Russia (Weiner & Deák, 2018), a partner within the EO grouping. Further, stemming from this potential convergence, this research posits that should the Hungarian political economy and those of the remaining three DME cases indeed be altered due to domestic developments, e.g. the continued subsumption of domestic business through a prebendal network, to more closely resemble the SME cases, then the potential for an 'alternative to the liberal economic order' (Nölke et al., 2015, p. 540) may assume new dimensions and accelerate, though this is by no means guaranteed. ...
The Hungarian coalition government (Fidesz-KDNP), dwarfed by the much larger Fidesz party, has not only dominated the domestic political landscape since 2010 but also embarked on a widespread organised project of corrupt practice for the purposes of self-reproduction. These factors combine to make Hungary a highly unique politico-economic case amongst its post-socialist European peers. This article investigates a critical aspect of this phenomenon, namely, how far Fidesz has subsumed domestic business through an enlarging state–business relationship, described here by the Weberian term ‘prebendalism’. Using insights from data captured from elite interviews conducted in Budapest in 2017, this research discusses the origins of Fidesz longevity and the successes of the prebendal network in determining current and potential paths of capitalist development. Subsequently, it is argued that institutionalist approaches to capitalist development can maintain efficacy but must acknowledge the critical importance of political agency in determining such outcomes. Consequently, scope is provided for future research to investigate continued corrupt practice, prospects for changes to the external dimensions of the national political economy and regime strategies in Hungary and cognate ‘illiberal’ regimes, advancing nascent studies of comparative capitalism that have moved beyond focus on Eurozone and/or so-called advanced economies, to encompass developing markets.
... This will adhere to the authors' original call to acknowledge politics more widely (N€ olke and Vlieganthart 2009) and may appease well-known critics of the wider VoC tradition (e.g. Baccaro and Pontusson 2016;Streeck 2011Streeck , 2016 who have typically lamented what they perceive as a dearth in political analysis within the approach. ...
Since 2010, Hungarian political agency has become more dominant in determining economic outcomes, rendering the increase in Chinese FDI into Hungary more politically-induced, rather than market-driven making Sino-Hungarian economic relations more important than before Fidesz returned to government. Approaches to understanding Hungarian capitalism have been overly firm-focused and therefore cannot account for (a) politically-motivated decisions on FDI or (b) increasingly significant transnational capital flows from China, both of which have the potential to affect the trajectory of Hungarian economic development. This article investigates the Belgrade-Budapest railway upgrade, the largest infrastructure project funded by Chinese FDI.
After a brief historical review of economic relations between India and Central Europe (Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), this chapter examines the legal framework for current cooperation and assesses the salient features of economic and trade relations over the past decade. The authors argue that the lack of a more coherent Indian strategy enables China to surpass India in the region. In conclusion, the chapter seeks to identify potential areas for enhanced cooperation and evaluates the challenges to fostering enhanced trade.
